Memory, Phantasia, and the Perception of Time: a Commentary on Aristotle's De Memoria Et Reminiscentia
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Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fall 1-1-2016 Memory, Phantasia, and the Perception of Time: A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Memoria Et Reminiscentia Evan Strevell Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Strevell, E. (2016). Memory, Phantasia, and the Perception of Time: A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Memoria Et Reminiscentia (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/31 This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MEMORY, PHANTASIA, AND THE PERCEPTION OF TIME: A COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Evan Robert Strevell December 2016 Copyright by Evan Robert Strevell 2016 MEMORY, PHANTASIA, AND THE PERCEPTION OF TIME: A COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA By Evan Robert Strevell Approved September, 15, 2016 ________________________________ ________________________________ Ronald Polansky Patrick Lee Miller Professor of Philosophy Associate Professor of Philosophy (Committee Chair) (Committee Member) ________________________________ Lanei M. Rodemeyer Associate Professor of Philosophy (Committee Member) ________________________________ ________________________________ James Swindal Thérèse Bonin Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate Acting Chair, Department of Philosophy School of Liberal Arts Associate Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy iii ABSTRACT MEMORY, PHANTASIA, AND THE PERCEPTION OF TIME: A COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA By Evan Robert Strevell December 2016 Dissertation supervised by Dr. Ronald Polansky My dissertation is a commentary on Aristotle’s treatment of memory and remembering in Aristotle’s De memoria that concentrates on four central issues. First, what is the proper object of memory? There is a general consensus that Aristotle restricts memory to the past, but there is disagreement over what this means. I argue that the proper object of memory is the remembering subject’s own past activity on the grounds that unless what is remembered is perceived as connected to the subject’s prior cognition, what is remembered will not be conceived as having happened before. By rejecting as memorable in a governing sense any object that does not include the remembering subject’s past activity, Aristotle is able to allow for lesser ways of speaking about memory, thereby allowing for a comprehensive account. Second, because memory is of the absent past, Aristotle is committed to the position that a present affection must serve iv as a proxy. I explain how the etiology of the present proxy gives the proxy the causal power to represent the remembering subject’s absent past anew. Because the remembering subject is aware of a present proxy, I argue that Aristotle is committed to a form of indirect perception in the case of memory, but one that preserves realism (that what is remembered is precisely one’s past activity) in virtue of the causal powers of the proxy. The third central issue concerns how remembering is possible. Because remembering is by means of a present proxy, an impasse arises. How by attending to a present proxy does one remember the absent past? Even if the present proxy is a copy of the absent past, it is unclear why the remembering subject should perceive the present proxy as a copy. Heretofore, commentary has universally suggested that because the present proxy is a likeness to the absent past, the remembering subject is able to perceive the proxy as being a copy. Such an interpretation fails to solve the impasse, for it does not explain why the remembering subject should become aware of the proxy as a copy. I argue that Aristotle models remembering on sense perception. The sense power of the remembering subject is assimilated to the activity of the memory proxy, thereby becoming aware of the proxy as a copy. Finally, there has been confusion over what memory is. Aristotle defines memory as a hexis, but what this means has been under appreciated. I argue that hexis is ambiguous between a disposition (first actuality) and an activity (second actuality) which captures memory in both its applications as retention and remembering. The categorization of memory as a hexis has been under appreciated insofar as a hexis indicates not only retention and remembering, but a disposition in virtue of which a remembering subject is disposed well or poorly toward its past. The categorization of memory as a hexis nicely allows for idiosyncrasy pertaining to memory. v DEDICATION For Dad, who always urged of me: fingas dum vincas. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am thankful for the direction and support of my director, Ronald Polansky. Our conversations, your encouragement, advice and comments were tremendously helpful in the course of my writing. Thanks also to Lanei Rodemeyer and Patrick Miller for reading the dissertation with such care and providing such valuable criticism. Many thanks to George Shea, whose dissertation misery was the best company I could possibly have had. I am grateful for the support and encouragement I have received from the Department of Philosophy at Xavier University, in particular from Tim Quinn, Richard Polt, Timothy Brownlee, James Wood, but especially from Gabriel Gottlieb whose advice and comments helped shape the dissertation on many points. Many thanks also to Kristen Renzi for her constant encouragement and help. Finally, thank you to Stephanie Findlay. For your love, for your sacrifice, and for your refusal to let me fail, I can never be grateful enough. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv Dedication .......................................................................................................................... vi Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... vii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. viii Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter synopses ............................................................................................................ 5 Chapter One: The place of De memoria within the Parva Naturalia and Aristotle’s philosophy. ........................................................................................................................ 13 Chapter Two: The initial characterization of the objects of memory, the act of remembrance, and memory. .............................................................................................. 28 449b6-9 That memory and recollection are different. ................................................. 30 449b9-23 Nature of the memorable object. ................................................................. 40 449b18-23 The initial account of remembering........................................................... 65 Recall versus remembrance. ..................................................................................... 66 The initial articulation of remembering according to actuality. .............................. 83 449b24-28 The initial definition of memory. .............................................................. 99 Chapter Three: Memory as retention of phantasmata and remembrance as indirect perception. ....................................................................................................................... 118 450a25-32 The first impasse: how is it possible for memory to concern the past? ... 121 450a32-50b11 The physiological and psychological conditions of retention. .......... 157 Chapter Four: The second impasse confronting the indirect perception model of remembrance and its solution. ........................................................................................ 170 450b11-20 The second impasse: why does the remembering subject perceive the present phantasma to be a proxy for its past cognition? ............................................. 170 viii 450b20-27 Solution to the second impasse part one: the status of the memory phantasma both as by itself and as from another........................................................ 174 450b27-51a2 Solution to the second impasse part two: memory as assimilation to memory phantasmata. ................................................................................................ 184 Stage one: awareness of phantasmata is a kind of perceiving that belongs to the aisthêtikon. .............................................................................................................. 187 Stage two: the sense power assimilates to the activity of its objects. ..................... 204 Stage three: remembrance is an assimilation of the sense power to the activity of the memory phantasma insofar as it is from another. .................................................. 206 451a2-8 A consequence