Hijacking of Airliner to Malta - Mutiny by Paramilitary Conscripts - Other Security and Foreign Affairs

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Formation of new government - Economic situation - Hijacking of airliner to Malta - Mutiny by paramilitary conscripts - Other security and foreign affairs

Summary and key dates

Resignation of Ali government and formation of Lutfi Cabinet (Sept. 4–5, 1985). Appointment of Attorney General (Aug. 8). Appointment of Air Force Chief of Staff (Nov. 19). Opposition party developments (late 1985). IMF and World Bank reports, current-account deficit figures (1984–85). Hijacking of Egyptian airliner to Malta (Nov. 23–24, 1985). Arrest of Prof. Rahman in connexion with Islamic fundamentalist activity (July 25). Rioting by central security force conscripts (Feb. 25–28, 1986). Resignation of Interior Minister (Feb. 27). Assassination of Israeli diplomat in Cairo (Aug. 20, 1985). Killings of Israeli tourists in Sinai (Oct. 5). Israeli agreement to accept arbitration as means of settlement of Taba dispute (Jan. 14, 1986). Other foreign contacts (September 1985-March 1986).

Gen. Kamel Hassan Ali, the Prime Minister since mid-1984, announced the resignation of his government on Sept. 4, 1985. Later the same day, President Hosni Mubarak appointed Dr Ali Lutfi Mahmoud Lutfi as Prime Minister.

Gen. Ali, who had become partially crippled as a result of arthritis, was seen as a weak leader who had failed to tackle the nation's economic problems. President Mubarak was reportedly particularly annoyed at the government's failure to apprehend those responsible for the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Cairo, the capital, in mid-August [see below].

Dr Lutfi (63) had served as Finance Minister under President Sadat from October 1978 to May 1980 [see 29998 B] . He was currently chair of the economics committee of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and head of the economics department at Cairo's Ein Shams University. He was apparently appointed with the specific brief of improving the economic situation without resorting to drastic cuts in subsidies on basic consumer items. In his letter of appointment, President Mubarak also stressed the importance of improving public housing, ‘which problem continues to be a prime cause of concern to a large number of our workers’, of improving education and of developing tourism, which was seen as a means of significantly increasing the country's foreign exchange revenues.

Dr Lutfi on Sept. 5 announced the formation of his Cabinet, which was sworn in by the President two days later. [For previous Cabinet listing, see page 33125; see page 33819 for the subsequent resignation of the Economy and Foreign Trade Minister.]

Dr Ali Lutfi Mahmoud Lutfi Prime Minister

Field-Marshal Mohammed Abdel- Deputy Prime Minister, Defence and Military Production Karim Abu Ghazalah Dr Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs, Planning Dr Kamal Ahmed Ganzouri and International Co-operation Dr Yusuf Amin Wali Deputy Prime Minister, Agriculture and Food Sufficiency

Mr Ahmad Rushdi Interior Dr Mohammed Salaheddin Hamid Finance

Dr (Mrs) Amal Abd ar-RahimOsman Social Insurance and Social Affairs

Mr Hasaballah Mohammed al- Reconstruction, New Communities and Land Reclamation Kafrawi

Mr Saad Mohammed Ahmad Manpower and Vocational Training Mr Mamdouh Atteya Justice

Mr Soleiman Metwali Soleiman Transport, Communications and Maritime Transport Mr Mohammed Mahir Osman Abazah Electricity and Energy

Mr Ahmed Abdel Masoud Heikal Culture Mr Sawfat Sharif Information

Mr Helmi Abdel Razak el-Hadidi Health

Gen. Hassan Soliman Abu Basha Local Government Mr Fuad Abdel Latif Sultan Tourism and Civil Aviation

Mr Sultan Abu Ali Economy and Foreign Trade Dr Mohammed Nagi-Shatlah Supply and Internal Trade

Mr Isam Radi Abdul Hamid Radi Irrigation Mr Mohammed Mahmud Faraj Abdul Industry Wahab

Mr Abdul Hadi Mohammed Qandil Petroleum and Mineral Resources

Dr Atif Mohammed Mohammed Cabinet Affairs and Administrative Development Ubayd Mr Mansour Ibrahim Hussein National Education and Training

Mr Mohammed Fatih Mohammed Ali Higher Education and Scientific Research

Mr Abdel Rahman Labib Housing and Utilities Dr Mohammed al-Ahmadi Abu an- Waqfs (Islamic trusts) Nur Ministers of State

Mr Mohammed Abdel Hamid People's Assembly Affairs Radwan

Mr El Sayed Ali - Sayed Shura (Constitutional Council) Affairs Mr William Naguib Seifine Emigration and Egyptians Abroad

Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali Foreign Affairs

Dr Gamal al-Sayed Ibrahim Military Production

*New member of Cabinet.

Dr Wali was in early September appointed to the post of secretary-general of the NDP. Mr Radwan was Culture Minister in the outgoing government. Some observers expressed surprise at the retention of Mr Rusdhi, who was seen as having failed to maintain tight enough control over opposition activity. [For his eventual resignation in the wake of the February 1986 riots, see below.] Mr Abdul Aziz Ibrahim Mustapha al Jundi was appointed Attorney General on Aug. 8.

Shaikh Abdel Latif Khater, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, died on Sept. 16, at the age of 63.

On Nov. 19 Maj. -Gen. Mohammad Ala al Din Barakat was appointed as Air Force Chief of Staff.

Leaders of the main political parties met with President Mubarak at the latter's invitation on Oct. 16 to discuss the Israeli air raid on the Tunis headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise liner and the interception by US fighter aircraft of the Egyptian aircraft carrying the hijackers [see 34074 A]. Certain of the opposition leaders reportedly demanded that President Mubarak should sever diplomatic relations with Israel.

Those present at the meeting included the leaders of the opposition New Wafd , Socialist Labour, National Progressive Unionist, and Liberal Socialist parties.

There was considerable support in Egypt at this time for a revival of Nasserite policies and ideology. Mr Farid Abdel Karim, a former member of President Nasser's Arab Socialist Union (ASU), had recently established the ‘Arab Socialist Nasserite Party’, although this had not received legal recognition as a political party. Another faction led by Mr Kamal Ahmed, a lawyer and former ASU member, was seeking legal sanction for the establishment of a Nasserite party.

Egypt continued to experience economic difficulties through the latter part of 1985. A report by the International Monetary Fund in mid-August identified economic weaknesses as including over-dependence on oil revenue, remittances from workers abroad, and earnings from tourism and from Suez canal tolls, all of which had declined appreciably in the last year. The report called in particular for administrative, pricing and exchange rate reforms. It estimated total external debt as US$31,000 million. IMF officials visited Cairo in late October for discussions on Egypt's request for a $1,500 million standby credit.

The 1985 World Bank report on Egypt noted that the economy was failing to meet the targets set by the 1983–87 five-year plan, [see 32165 A] notably those for growth in gross domestic product, for investment, and for reducing government spending.

President Mubarak on Sept. 18 instructed all government authorities to suspend foreign borrowing except for “productive projects able to compensate for themselves”. Any foreign debt incurred would henceforth be the personal responsibility of the borrower, not the state.

Egypt's current-account deficit for the fiscal year 1984–85 amounted to $1,527 million. While this represented a 7.5 per cent increase compared with the previous year's figure, the trend in the second half of 1984–85 constituted a significant improvement compared with the half-years January-June 1984 and July-December 1984.

An airliner belonging to Egypt Air, carrying approximately 92 passengers and crew, was hijacked on a flight from Athens (Greece) to Cairo on Nov. 23 by five self-styled members of “Egypt's Revolution” (which had earlier claimed the assassination of an Israeli diplomat-see below). In an exchange of fire during the hijack, one of the hijackers was shot dead and an Egyptian security guard was wounded. The hijackers forced the pilot to land the aircraft at Luqa airport in Malta, even though the Maltese authorities refused landing permission, switched off airport lights and blocked the main runway.

In initial negotiations with Dr Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, the Maltese Prime Minister, the hijackers demanded that the aircraft be refuelled. Dr Mifsud Bonnici refused to consider the request until all the passengers had been freed. During the ensuing negotiations, a large number of Maltese government officials and diplomats from other countries were present in the airport control tower, including the Libyan ambassador and PLO representatives.

Using passengers’ passports to determine nationality, the hijackers singled out Israeli, US, Australian, Canadian and Western European citizens. The two Israelis, both women, and at least four Americans were at intervals led out on to the boarding steps and shot at. Only one of these passengers, an American women, was killed; four were wounded and at least one other escaped unhurt.

In the early hours of Nov. 24 approximately 75 Egyptian commando troops arrived at the airport under cover of darkness, accompanied by three US officers.

The presence of the US officers, it was later reported, led to a dispute between Maltese and US officials which may have delayed the Maltese government's approval for the despatch to Luqa of a special US anti-terrorist team, probably composed of members of the “ Delta Force”. In the event, this US team did not land in Malta, the Egyptian assault on the aircraft taking place before it could arrive.

Approximately 25 of the Egyptian commandos attacked the aircraft in the evening of Nov. 24, gaining entry by blowing open the baggage hold whereupon the hijackers exploded grenades. About 60 people died during the ensuing fire and confusion, with some witnesses claiming that the commandos in the aircraft and on the tarmac fired indiscriminately as passengers were attempting to escape.

Maltese officials later claimed that the explosives used on the baggage hold door were too powerful, and that the noxious fumes from this explosion caused a large number of the casualties. Certain unnamed diplomatic sources were subsequently quoted as saying that the hijackers had been behaving in a calmer and more rational manner shortly before the assault commenced. An Egyptian government statement issued on Nov. 25 referred to a “successful” rescue attempt which had been carried out in accordance with a “predesigned plan”. The statement claimed that none of the deaths sustained by the passengers had been caused by bullets fired by the commandos. The Egyptian decision to storm the aircraft was supported by the Israeli, UK and US governments.

Shortly before the assault, the US Secretary of State, Mr George Shultz, had affirmed in a televised interview the belief that the only effective means to confront terrorists was ‘to get after them with a double-barrelled shotgun’. Dr Mifsud Bonnici stated on Nov. 25 that he had authorized the assault in the light of the continued shootings by the hijackers and of a warning which he had received from an unspecified source that the aircraft would be intercepted if it were allowed to refuel and take off. He added that the hijackers had vowed to blow up the aircraft in mid-air should such an interception take place. In view of the large number of Greek passengers on board, however, Dr Mifsud Bonnici was criticized by the Greek government for authorizing the assault without consulting them, and on Nov. 26 the Greek ambassador lodged a formal protest at the Maltese Foreign Ministry.

The five hijackers all carried forged Moroccan passports, similar to those used in the Rome and Vienna airport attacks in December [see 34260A]. The sole survivor, Mr Omar Mohammad Ali Rezzaq, was a Palestinian born in Lebanon in 1963. Repeated Egyptian requests for his extradition were turned down by the Maltese government on the grounds that the killings had taken place on Maltese soil, and that no extradition arrangements existed between the two countries.

The PLO condemned the hijacking, stating that “the terrorists have no connexion, directly or indirectly, with the Palestinian people”. Letters published in several Kuwaiti newspapers on Nov. 25 claimed responsibility on behalf of the “Egyptian Liberation Organization”, a hitherto unknown group.

Egypt and many Western governments condemned Libya from the outset as being behind the hijack, and expressed the belief that the militant Palestinian Abu Nidal group (or “Revolutionary Council of Fatah ”–see page 34261) had carried out the action with active Libyan support.

In an interview in the Moroccan daily L’Opinion of Dec. 5 Mr Khalid al-Hassan, a (mainstream) Fatah central committee member and chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Palestine National Council (the PLO's parliament-in-exile), asserted that Abu Nidal was directly responsible for the hijack.

Egyptian armed forces were placed on alert from the start of the hijacking, while over the ensuing days there was a build-up of Egyptian forces along the border with Libya. On Nov. 26 President Mubarak claimed that the overall commander of the hijack was staying in a specified hotel room in Tripoli, the Libyan capital. From early December, however, tension between the two countries lessened, and on Dec. 3 President Mubarak denied allegations that Egypt was planning to launch a punitive strike against Libya, saying that “Egypt is an Arab and an African country and it is impossible for Egypt to fight an Arab or African brother”.

Against a background of continuing tension between the government and Islamic fundamentalist groups, notably the Gaama al-Islamiya (‘Islamic grouping’), the authorities on July 25, 1985, arrested the blind professor and fundamentalist teacher, Sheikh Omar Ahmed Rahman, on charges of plotting to overthrow the state and reconstitute the Al Jihad (‘Holy War’) organization. Although found innocent by a military court, Prof. Rahman remained in detention under the provision of emergency powers legislation.

Prof. Rahman had been acquitted in February 1984 at the end of the trial of 300 Moslem fundamentalists charged with conspiring to overthrow the regime following the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. At the end of that trial, a Supreme Court report had named Prof. Rahman as among those who had been tortured while under interrogation [see page 33817]

Rioting involving rank-and-file members of the central security forces (sometimes referred to as internal security police) broke out in Cairo on Feb. 25, notably in the Giza area, near the Pyramids, where tourist hotels and nightclubs were set on fire and looted and a large number of cars overturned. The disorder spread to the towns of Ismailia, Sohag and Assyut (the scene of a fundamentalist uprising in 1981-see 31253 A). Large numbers of civilians, particularly fundamentalist youths, joined in the rioting.

The central security forces, which were under the authority of the Interior Ministry, consisted of approximately 282,000 conscripts and a small élite officer corps. The conscripts were traditionally chosen from rural villages, with the least educated undergoing the longest period of service which normally lasted three years. Their principal duties consisted of guarding hotels, embassies and other major institutions, as well as strategic sites such as bridges, water and power installations, etc. Wages and barracks conditions and the treatment of the conscripts by their officers were notoriously poor.

The rioting was apparently in part a response to a rumour that the terms of service were about to be extended by one year. This rumour itself was thought to have been provoked by a directive that any conscript returning late from leave would be compelled to serve an extra year. The conscripts had also recently been informed that they were to suffer a pay cut of about 8 per cent for “austerity reasons”. Various reports suggested that Moslem fundamentalists had played an important role in inciting the riots by encouraging these and other rumours, while the villages from which the conscripts were drawn represented one of the main recruiting grounds for fundamentalism. President Mubarak on Feb. 26 accused “opposition elements” of inciting the rioting. The semi- official newspaper Al Ahram stated on March 3 that police had identified a member of Al Jihad as the leader of a large group of rioters in the Cairo area.

As clashes continued between rioters and troops sent in to restore order, a curfew was imposed on Cairo on Feb. 26. The following day the Interior Ministry announced that 36 people had been killed in the disturbances, all but four of them conscripts, and about 400 wounded, while 3,000 conscripts and 700 civilians had been arrested. Independent observers suggested that the casualty figures were in fact much higher, and there were unconfirmed reports that particularly heavy fighting had taken place in Assyut. Despite government claims that the situation was under control, renewed fighting broke out on Feb. 28 at the Giza barracks, shortly before President Mubarak was due to visit. The barracks was stormed by troops, after which no further incidents were reported.

Mr Rushdi resigned as Interior Minister on Feb. 27 and was replaced by Maj. -Gen. Zaki Badr (60), a career internal security officer who had been appointed as Governor of Assyut after the 1981 uprising. On March 2 President Mubarak demoted four commanders, including Maj. -Gen. Mohammed Tantani, the head of the state security services, who held command responsibility for the central security forces.

On March 5, the Interior Ministry announced the final official casualty figures as 107 dead and 715 wounded, and added that the police and Army were still searching for 8,000 wanted conscripts. Maj. -Gen. Badr said on the same day that 21,000 of the conscripts would be dismissed within a week. The state prosecutor announced on April 3 that 1,236 people were to be charged with offences connected with the riots.

An administrative attache at the Israeli embassy in Cairo was shot dead while driving to work on Aug. 20, 1985. Responsibility was claimed by “Egypt's Revolution”. The assassin escaped detection. On Oct. 5 a member of the central security force [see above] on duty at the Ras Burka checkpoint in Sinai, 40 km south of Taba [see map on page 33820] opened fire on a group of Israeli tourists, killing seven, before firing on other security personnel and shooting dead his commanding officer. According to Israeli sources some of the casualties, who included children, bled to death as a result of a delay in the arrival of medical help. The Egyptian government issued a formal apology to the Israeli authorities on the matter, and promised a full investigation.

During a visit to Israel on Nov. 27 Mr Qandil (the Petroleum Minister) met with the families of the victims. He also transmitted a message from President Mubarak to Mr Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister, calling for “an improvement in bilateral relations in all respects”.

The conscript responsible, Mr Soliman Abdel Hamid Khater (24), came from Bahr al-Bakr village, near Alexandria, where a large number of schoolchildren had been killed in an Israeli air strike in April 1970 [see page 23919] Some reports suggested that he had close contacts with the fundamentalist movement. He went on trial before a military tribunal on Nov. 14, and over the ensuing weeks was increasingly portrayed as a hero by radical anti-Israelis, notably fundamentalist activists, who claimed that he had become enraged at the sight of the tourists openly making love and wandering about naked. One hundred people were arrested at a rally demanding his release on Dec. 28. The court found him guilty on Dec. 29 after deciding that he was sane at the time of the killings, but that he had not known that the tourists were Israelis. On Jan. 7, 1986, he was found dead, hanging in his cell at a prison hospital where he was being treated for bilharzia.

While the government portrayed his death as suicide, opposition activists claimed that he had been murdered, and several noisy demonstrations took place, notably at Zagazig University in Cairo, where he had been undergoing a correspondence course in law. Some tension between Egypt and Israel resulted subsequently from the Egyptian refusal in late January to disclose its report on the killings to the Israeli government.

“Egypt's Revolution” claimed responsibility for a shooting incident at the Cairo international trade fair on March 12 when one Israeli was killed and three others wounded.

Differences emerged within the Israeli coalition Cabinet in mid-1985 over the disputed strip of land at Taba [see page 33820] The right-wing Likud front, led by the Foreign Minister, Mr Itzhak Shamir, resisted Labour Party demands for a rapid settlement of the issue in isolation from other disputes between the two countries. Inconclusive talks, in part hampered by the Israeli differences, were held between officials of both countries in September, October and December 1985.

On Jan. 13, 1986, the Israeli Cabinet agreed to accept arbitration as a means of solving the dispute, commencing with an eight-month “conciliation period”, during which both sides would be permitted to propose compromise solutions. Mr Peres telephoned President Mubarak to communicate the Cabinet decision, which was described as “a positive step” by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry on Jan. 14. Mr Ezer Weizman, the Israeli Minister in the Prime Minister's Office (who had earlier played a key role in bilateral discussions–ibid.), visited Cairo on Jan. 27–28, while further talks between lower-level officials, dealing primarily with the details of the international arbitration, took place in February and March.

Relations with the USA remained generally good during late 1985 and early 1986, in spite of the tension arising from the US interception of an Egyptian aircraft as a result of the Achille Lauro hijacking [see page 34078]. Relations with the Soviet Union continued to improve, and a number of low-level visits were exchanged in the wake of the restoration of full diplomatic relations in 1984 [see page 33126]. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the UK Prime Minister, discussed Middle East peace proposals with President Mubarak during a visit to the region in September 1985 [see page 34076].

In other major foreign contacts, President Mubarak visited Madrid on Sept. 19–21, 1985, for talks with Spanish officials. [See page 34179 for Spain's establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.] Co-operation on ways to defeat terrorism was the principal topic of discussion between President Mubarak and Signor Bettino Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, when the latter visited Cairo on Jan. 14, 1986. President Mubarak visited Bonn for talks with West German leaders on Jan. 31-Feb. 1, and travelled on to Paris for discussions with PresidentMitterrand, who had paid a private visit to Egypt at the end of December. The Chinese President, Mr Li Xiannian, made an official visit to Cairo in mid-March, which concluded with the signature of a cultural co-operation protocol.

Gen. Zia, the Pakistani President, became the first Pakistani leader to visit Egypt in over 20 years when he travelled to Cairo for talks with President Mubarak on Nov. 2–4, 1985.–(International Herald Tribune -Le Monde - Guardian Times - Financial Times - Middle East Economic Digest BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Observer) (Prev. rep. 33817 A)