The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: the Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
University of Southampton Research Repository ePrints Soton Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination http://eprints.soton.ac.uk University of Southampton, 2014 HUMANITIES HISTORY/POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THE EAGLE COMES HOME TO ROOST: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CIA’S LETHAL DRONE PROGRAMME by Christopher J. Fuller Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2014 i The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The historical origins of the CIA’s lethal drone programme ABSTRACT Since 2004, the CIA has been engaged in a covert campaign using remotely-operated drones to conduct targeted killings of suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. The rapid escalation of this programme under the Obama administration has attracted the close attention of the media and of academic experts working in the foreign policy, defence and legal fields. However, while such attention has enhanced our understanding of the scale, effectiveness and legality of drone warfare, there has been little attempt to explain the origins of the programme and place it within wider US counterterrorism practice. This dissertation meets that need, making an original contribution to the study of American counterterrorism by tracing the historical origins of the programme back to a small but influential group of policy makers within the Reagan administration. The thesis reveals how a shared hardline vision of how best to deal with terrorists set in motion legal and technological developments which eventually culminated in the CIA’s drone programme three decades later. By identifying the parallels between the drone campaign and the demands of the hardliners within Reagan’s government, the thesis challenges the commonly held notion that the CIA’s entry into drone warfare marks an unprecedented escalation of US counterterrorism practices resulting from a post-9/11 mind-set. Instead it presents evidence that current US counterterrorism practice is the result of a gradual evolution over the past three decades. Rather than placing the focus upon the drones themselves, this historical review reveals that the CIA’s unmanned aircraft are simply the current tool which enables the United States to pursue the counterterrorism goal it has held for decades – the ability to unilaterally neutralize anti-American terrorists in safe havens around the world. The thesis reveals that the drone campaign should not be regarded as a product of post-9/11 policy, nor the result of the seductive nature of remote control warfare. Instead, the use of drones should be seen as the embodiment of America’s long-term counterterrorism goal. ii Contents Introduction “The true watersheds in human affairs are seldom spotted” 1 - 18 Chapter 1 “The Hamlet of Nations”: the rhetoric and reality of the Reagan administration’s counterterrorism policy, 1980–1985 19 - 64 Chapter 2 “Let’s find a way to get them”: the Fadlallah affair attempt and Achille Lauro hijacking, 1985 67 - 98 Chapter 3 “We have to find a better way to send a message”: the founding of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and the Eagle Programme, 1986–1987 99 - 126 Chapter 4 “Talking about capturing bin Laden”: the Clinton administration and the legal architecture of lethal force in counterterrorism, 1993-2000 127 - 178 Chapter 5 “Ninja guys in black suits”: alternative counterterrorism tools, 1993-2008 181 - 216 Chapter 6 “The only game in town”: the effectiveness of the CIA’s lethal drone campaign, 2009-2012 217 – 242 Conclusion “It sends its bloodhounds everywhere” 243 - 245 References and Bibliography 247 - 299 iii Academic Thesis: Declaration of Authorship I, Christopher J. Fuller declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research. Thesis title: The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The historical origins of the CIA’s lethal drone programme I confirm that: 1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University; 2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated; 3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed; 4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work; 5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help; 6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself; 7. Either none of this work has been published before submission, or parts of this work have been published as: [please list references below]: Signed: Date: iv Acknowledgements I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisor Professor Kendrick Oliver for his timely, clear and detailed constructive criticism which doubtless helped refine the content of this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr Russell Bentley for his input on the political aspects of the thesis and words of encouragement, and his colleague Dr Kamil Zwolski for his guidance on the International Relations aspects of the project. In addition, I am grateful to Dr Mick Jardine for his contributions on the contentious language of counterterrorism. I am also indebted to Dr Helen Spurling for her support and enthusiasm. Furthermore, I would like to thank Richard Kennet and Gail Alani in the University of Southampton Recruitment and Outreach Department for the financial support and flexibility granted through the duration of this project. Finally I would like to thank my mother Joan and father Charles for the pride they have shown in my progress, my sister Jennie for improving my ability to form a concise argument, and my wife Carys for her patience and moral support throughout this PhD. v A note on language This thesis uses a number of terms which hold serious and at times contentious connotations. The use of these terms has been considered carefully, and an explanation of why each is used follows: AfPak – The term “AfPak”, popularised by the Obama administration, is used throughout this dissertation to reflect America’s strategic thinking on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border regions, rather than as an acceptance of the term in a geopolitical sense, inferring that the border regions are a single, homogenous bloc. It is fully acknowledged that the tribal regions which make up the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP) and the border provinces of Afghanistan are all distinct regions with their own unique identity, tribes, culture, social groupings and history. Collateral damage – This military term is used to denote civilian casualties. It is not intended to sanitise the tragic losses it signifies, rather to ensure the language used in official sources is consistent with that of the thesis. Drone - The term “drone” is unpopular with pilots due to connotations of a mindless or autonomous activity. So too are the terms “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” (UAV) and “Unmanned Aerial System” (UAS), as both suggest aircraft which fly without pilots. The preferred term amongst operators is “Remotely Piloted Aircraft” (RPA).1 However due to its common usage in both academia and the media the term “drone” will be used throughout this thesis to cover all variants of RPAs. It is used with a full acknowledgement that at no time is a “drone” flying without a pilot or the support of a sensor operator and ground crew. Neutralization - The term “neutralize” is used in reference to the counterterrorism objectives of the United States. It is drawn from the Reagan administration’s first counterterrorism document, National Security Decision Directive 138 and is used to 1 Matt J. Martin with Charles W. Sasser, Predator: The Remote-Control Air War Over Iraq and Afghanistan: A Pilot’s Story, (Minneapolis MN: Zenith Press, 2010), p.3. vi collectively denote the most proactive counterterrorism interventions such as killing, rendition and imprisonment as opposed to defensive measures or efforts to tackle the root causes of terrorism. Targeted killing – This term is used to denote the killing of a known or suspected terrorist/militant in a drone strike. It is used in place of assassination in acknowledgement of the fact that within its own domestic law the United States government considers itself to be legally at war with al-Qaeda, its affiliates and their Taliban allies. vii Abbreviations and Acronyms AFPAK – Afghanistan/Pakistan border region AIRRA - Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (Pakistan) ANSA - Assistant for National Security Affairs/National Security Advisor ANSF – Afghan National Security Force AUMF – Authorization