74

Chapter III

The Philosophy of Advaita as expounded by Sarvajnatman

Backgroiind: Thoiigh the Advaita Philosophy was first visualised and preached by the seers of the Upanifads, by the Lord Himself in his Bhagavad-Glta, by , the great redactor of the Brahmasutras and by the renowned expositors like > still, it was brought home clearly to all the world, on the basis of a systematic interpretation of all these Scriptures by ^ri ^ankaracarya; and therefore the prcxnulgation and consolidation of this philosophy came to be mainly associated with the name of ^rl Sankaricarya, who was thus given the honour of being the founder of that system. He established the doctrine firmly by refuting all the extant systems of philosophy with his versatile and subtle genius. Within the short span of thirty-two years of his life, it was not possible for him to deal with the various bones of contention in their entirety e.g. the substratum of , the nature of the Individual Soul and its relation with etc. It might be said that he did not consider all this minute discussion as quite necessary for the establishment of his doctrine. But his later successors in the field differed in their view-point and tried to develop the system by elaborating some untouched problems in their great treatises which dealt with all the salient features of the system. Sarvajnatman was one of such expositors. He composed his Sanksepa-sariraka - a manual of , in order to remove the obstacles in the acquirement a of the fruit of the knowledge.

Nature of the Highest Reality: The Advaita philosophy of damkaracarya conceives the Pure Brahman as the only Reality, vrtiich is understood from the Upanigads as being of the nature of Being, Bliss, Consciousness etc., which can be attained by the true understanding of the Scriptures alone and which is the basis of the superimposition of the phenomenal paraphernalia of the impure nescience. Sarvajnatmamuni, following the footsteps of his revered preceptors, points out at the very outset that the highest Reality is the only sentinent, infinite and read entity, which is free from all the defects of the world, viz. falsehood, inertia, misery, impurity, bondage etc. which is devoid of all delusions, whose greatness is stigmatised by the various unreal distinctions as to the world, God, the Individual Soul etc., which is cognisable by Intuition alone, which is really of the nature of Being, Bliss and Consciousness. He declares that the Bliss of Brahman is directly experienced in the state of deep sleep, for, the Bliss that is enjoyed at that time cannot be due to the knov/ledge of the objects as the state is devoid of all knowledge . He further establishes this ’Bliss’ of Brahman with the help of inference d. as he says in 1.57. See also 1.10 7G

9 and also the Scriptures. Brahman is also described as eternal (permanent), pure, self-luminous, free from all bondages, true, subtle, existent, omnipresent, the one unity which is the 10 reservoir of all happiness, the highest Knowledge, which is identical with unsurpassed Bliss. The same Brahman is identified with the highest Pada of Vi?iju, (gTTT: the goal of all endeavour.

The Definition of Brahman: Brahman, which is described above as the One highest Pure Reality is regarded by Sarvajnatman to be the material cause of the world, which is laid down by the second aphorism of the Brahmasutras viz. - Janmadyasya yatah - as being responsible for the production, preservation and the destruc­ tion of the world. He points out that one sentient cause should be admitted behind all this distinct paraphernalia, because the Scripture itself declares this idea firmly by using the singular number in the ablative case (yatah) with regard to the cause of the world. 12 This characteristic mark

9. 11.22

10. I 1 . 173 11 . q w f i T «fTPfewT rniTTFT i gc=aw^»?rc»t>Hq ^ ^HS||Ld<^; il X See also III.291 which says that "f^fSPhr; 12. The topic is discussed from 1.496 onwards 7 7 of the causality of the world in the case of the highest Brahman, should be regarded as a subsidiary characteristic mark (upalak§ana), because otherwise it would contradict the power of the principal word in the sentence viz. Brahman. He further points out that the characteristic marks are really prescribed to state that the particular thing to be denoted is quite different from the other things of its class. The Scripture does not lay down this characteristic mark of being the producer of the TJniverse^in the case of Brahman,either - (i) to accomplish the relationship of the denoter and the thing to be denoted or (ii) to describe the real natural form of the highest Reality . But it is laid down here in order to account for the difference of Brahman from all other things that are not Brahman. In the various systems of philosophy that attribute causality to such entities as Time, Nature, Atoms, the Individual Soul, the , the Principles, the Knowledge or the Void, limited­ ness is to be pocketed everywhere. This second is laid down to deny such limitedness in case of the highest Cause. A real upalakgana is described as that characteristic mark, which is not responsible for the production of the idea of the special characteristic with regard to the thing to be denoted and which, even though is not a natural description of that thing, still becomes ultimately the true describer of the thing. Therefore, this '^-*1 fVnIcfc^ should be really treated as an upalaksana - a subsidiary characteristic. This upalak§ana should be regarded as merely a sign. It is not to be 7S looked upon as an inference or a means to know Brahman. The Vedanta-sentence itself with the help of the power of the words in it, is inclined to establish the highest Reality, whose form is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss and which is the cause of the production, preservation and dissolution of the universe, in a particular manner. No other proof like inference etc. can establish this fact in that manner. Though causality in the real sense of the term, which is imagined in the case of the highest Reality is itself a contradiction, because, it is generally seen in the case of the insentient things, still, it can be pointed out that causality is discernible in the sentient beings as e.g. the causality of the individual Soul in the production of the varied substances of the dream etc. Therefore ultimately this very characteristic mark should be regarded as a mere sign only in the case of Brahman. The Scripture is self-proved and the various infer­ ences which are based on the argument of the cause-effect relation, are eternally subservient to the Scriptural declara­ tion. For the fear of the disturbance to the real nature of Brahman, of infiniteness and etemality, this is regarded as a cTHTWcSfT.

Thus Sarvajnitman regards the Pure Brahman only as the material cause of the world. The first aphorism - athato Brahmajijnasa enunciates the desire of knowing that Brahman from which the creation, preservation and dissolution of the 7 l i world proceed. This definition therefore applies to that Brahman, which is put forth in the first Sutra as an object of enquiry. He does not admit like Vacaspati that the avidyopadhika Brahman is prescribed in the first Sutra.

The author lays much stress upon the sole causality of Brahman. But the unchanging Brahman cannot be an independent cause, is therefore supposed to be an intermediate cause - an instrument - a dvarakaraija - through which the one Brahman appears as many. That which is not the cause but is simply a conveying factor of the chief cause is found often to inhere in the effect. This is said to be the interaediate cause which acts between the actual cause and the real effect. The view of Sarvajnatman is concerned only with emphasizing the reality of Brahman as the only and does not give miya or avidya the same degree of co-operation in the production of the world. Maya is also frequently designated as the cause of the world in the .The author of the Muktavali admits Maya only as the material cause of the world and remarks that the usage that Brahman is the cause of the world, is secondary as Brahman is the substratum of Maya, which is the real cause of the world. The author of the Padarthatattvanirnaya assumes that both Brahman and Maya are the material cause of the world - Miyi being the parinamakaraija

13» Different opinions in this connection are noted in the “ / * Siddhantalesasamgraha pp.4^-6$. 8 0 and Brahman being the Vivartakarana. According to Vacaspati, even the itmautable and the attributeless Brahman is the material cause of the appearance of the world i.e. ’Vivartamanataya upadinam*, Maya being only the assistant in as much as it obstructs the real knowledge of Brahman. Sarvajnatman followed the footsteps of his preceptor - Suresvaracarya in admitting the Pure Brahman as the real ground cause and ajnana only as the instrument through which It becomes the cause of all appearances. According to him, Brahman can be understood only by the testimony of the Scriptures and the Upanisads declare the highest Brahman only as the real cause of the world.

The view of Sarvajnatman is represented by Appayya Dikfita in his Siddhantalesasamgraha as follows:

m wcm^qirMrirr|TTr ^ 3firwiicFrftr

An interesting view as regards the interpretation of Sarvajnitman*s view on this point is given further in the Siddhantalesasamgraha.^^ It is pointed out there that

frmFTwrPignf ^ 1-^rqrc;i hh,! ^ gw^zrnrn^ f^r^': i 81

Sarwajnitman does not object to the theory that the Qualified Brahman is the material cause of the creation, that the author wants to say that Brahman accompanied by Maya is not the material cause, but Brahman, which is free from nescience and yet rules over it, is the cause. The fact that he has inter­ preted the word ’That’ in the great sentence 'That thou art' as the material cause of all, implies that he regards God as represented by ’That' to be the cause of the universe and not the pure Brahman. But as regards this view-point, it can be clearly pointed out that there is no reason to doubt Sarvajnat- man's opinion on this point, for, he has declared in clear-cut terms that the Qualified Brahman should not be regarded as the cause of the world. He says — ^ I See also his clear utterance:

Thus, it is beyond doubt that he regards the pure Brahman only as the real cause of the world and that he dis­ agrees with the Vivaranakara who prescribes the Qualified Brahman as the material cause of the world. His clear opinion on this point can be summarised in the words of Prof. Ram Pratap Singh, who says in his 'A Metaphysics of Value’ that — ”The only thesis to which the Advaitism of dankaracirya is

15 . Samk§epa-sariraka 1.329. 16. " 1 .334. 8 2 committed is that Brahman, the Highest Value is also the Supreme Creativity and this position has found its true representative in Sarvajnatmamuni, who, in his Samk^epa- sarlraka, had held the view that the suddha or the Pure Parabrahman is the source and origin of the Universe, It is the constitutive stuff of the world as well as the directive power behind it.” The author’s treatment of the problem is quite consistent with his preceptor’s view-point, who is only concerned with emphasizing the reality of Brahman as the only truth.

Superimposition: The notion of the causality of the world in the case of Brahman or the world, which is produced from Brahman, gives rise to the concept of adhyasa or superimposition, for, all the things except Brahman are regarded in the Advaita philosophy as wrongly superimposed on the Reality. Sarvajiiatman deals with this problem in the following manner:- It is pointed out that the nature of the highest Reality is indicated to be that of eternal blissfulness and the absence of all miseries. But the limited form of this Reality is superimposed on it wrongly. The mutual superimposition of the identities and the character­ istics of the self and the object of self, brings all the woe in the world. The cause of this superimposition is the nescience, which conceals the real nature of the Reality and projects It in the various forms as the God, the individual soul, the world etc. Ignorance only should be regarded as the 8 ^ i real cause of the superimposition and not the notion of resemblance etc. Just as in the cognition in the direct perception, the appearance of the illusion takes place because of delusion and is not caused by the faults either in the subject or in the object, similarly in case of the superimposi- tion on the highest Reality, nescience or the notion of duality, caused by it, should be regarded as the only cause. With the help of the illusion in the everyday parlance of the silver on the conch-shell, the superimposition of and the can be proved. Ignorance, which is the substance-stuff of the false appearance, hides the determinate qualities of the 'this' i.e. the underlying conch-shell and so long as the specific ignorance of those qualities remains, the illusory perception of the silver is continued, and it is destroyed as soon as the knowledge of the adhis^hana is gained. Similar is the case of the superimposition of Atman and the anatman. The superimposed thing only appears in illusion, nothing else is cognised at that time.

Two main objections against this concept of adhyasa are raised and answered. The first objection is that the world would become all void if such a mutual superimposition is admitted. The answer given is that — the adhis-^hana and the adhara i.e. the substratum and the locus of the superimposition are admitted to be distinct from each other. And the adhi§^hana being real, no voidness would arise. With the disappearance of the illusion by the perception of the underlying reality, 5 the adhis^hina, lying concealed so far, shines forth in its full glory. Hence, no question of voidness comes forth.

The second objection is that illusion is possible in the case of the objects, which fall under the ken of direct perception; in other words, it is possible in the case of the objects which are similar, which are distinct and which consist of parts. These characteristics cannot be shown in the case of Atman, who is beyond perception. So superimposition can never be spoken of in the case of Atman. The objection is answered by arguing that it is possible to prove all these in the case • _ of Atman, at the time of superimposition. Moreover, Sankaracarya himself states in his introductory Adhyasabhisya, that Atman is not an absolutely non-object, for the sake of the vyavahara in this samsara, all these things can be admitted in the case of Atman. Though from the ultimate point of view, Atman should be admitted as partless and not the object of any concept (not even the object of the concept of the ego or 'IM still, through the beginningless nescience, Atman attains the state of and appears as if limited, as if possessed of parts, and as if an object of the concept *1’. So partly apprehension and partly non-apprehension, which is necessary for adhyasa, is possible, in this way, in the case of Atman. It has been further pointed out that just like the objects of the sense- perception, the contact of the object with the sense-organs is not necessary in the case of the objects, which are experienced directly, but, the superimposition of wrong attributes is 85 discernible in the case of such objects* The sky, for example, is an object of direct perception, still, the various colours like blue, dark, white etc. are attributed wrongly to it. Atman is experienced directly in the dream-state, but various illusory forms are superimposed on It due to the impressions of the . So the objection for the invalidity of the superimposition is wrongly taken.

Now, this limited form, which is superimposed on Atman, serves as a bondage to that Atman, the cause of which is the ignorance. This ignorance is not natural to Its state, other­ wise, it would contradict Its real nature described in the drutis viz. that of sentiency, changelessness and non-duality. It is not real from the ultimate point of view. This ignorance further, is beginningless, so the fault of interdependence or atmasrayatvadosa cannot be logically put forth. It is argued that the visayatva of Atman depends on the adhyasa and the adhyasa depends on Its being an object. But this adhyasa is admitted to be beginningless, so the above fault does not accrue. This ignorance, though it is beginningless, is not endless. It has certainly got an end, for, with the knowledge of the real nature of the reality, the illusion disappears. This beginningless nescience is the root-cause of all the edifice of the universe. This nescience establishes itself and all other things connected with it. The superimposition of the Atman and the anitman is the root-cause of all other superimpositions. Even the Scriptures and all other valid means of proof have 8 G scope only when this superimposltion takes place; because, only then, Xtman turns into the individual soul and becomes the cogniser, doer etc. Before that, Stman is not the pramata and hence no or valid means of proof would have any reference to Atman. If this superimposltion is not proved by perception, logical reasoning and inference, there would arise the contingency of the nullification of this very triad. Moreover, it is seen in this world that though the entitles are fully recognised, the knowledge of their stability and their distinction from other things dawns later only. Therefore though the highest Reality shines in Its real form, this superimposition of Its limited form seems to be proper. Thus, all this appearance or the limited fom, is contacted with the highest Consciousness with the help of the intermediate nescienc® only, which is the cause of the ignorance about Its own real nature. Therefore, this illusion becomes liable to be nullified by the true knowledge of Its real nature.

The concept of adhyasa is the basis of the whole Advaita Philosophy. It is dealt with in the adhyasabhasya, which is wrongly supposed to be an utsutrabhasya or a commentary not connected with the . But it is not like this. Sarvajnat- man has pointed out that the introductory adhyisabhasya is quite in consonance with the views of the Sutrakara, by showing the necessity of that bha§ya. The author says that the Sutrakara speaks of the desire of the knowledge of Brahman in the first aphorism. He speaks of this knowledge as capable of 5 7 removing the root-cause of the bondage. In order to justify the enquiry of Atman, it is quite necessary to show that there does exist doubt as to the exact nature of Atman and that there is some purpose of the correct knowledge of Atman. In order to prove the necessity of the enquiry of the Brahman-knowledge, the treatment of superimposition was quite essential. So all this is suggested by the Sutrakara by speaking of the knowledge of Brahman, implying thereby that the discussion is necessary, for the removal of ignorance, for the true knowledge of the real nature of the reality and for the attainment of Salvation by destruction of the bondage. Therefore, understanding the implication of the Sutrakara, the Bhasyakara deals with this problem in detail. Thus, the introductory adhyasabhasya is quite essential for the explanation of the implication in the mind of the Sutrakara and so it is illogical to remark that the adhyasabhasya is an utsutrabha§ya. In fact, this very treatise is ccwaposed in order to remove the incapability of the knowledge to reach its real fruit viz. the destruction of the plurality and the understauiding of the real nature of Brahman.

Avidya :

The concept of the superimposition of the world on Brahman and vice versa gives rise to the concept of Avidya. This avidya is regarded as the root-cause of all misery in this world. The avidya functions first by vieling or suppressing the true nature of the Reality of blissfulness etc. and then projecting the unreal forms like the world etc. Sarvajnatman 8 0

gives much emphasis upon the vieling aspect of the ignorance. He describes it as - ajadabodhatiraskriyatma - consisting of the concealment of the Pure Consciousness. He calls it as the jadya - the insentiency prevalent in this world, as also - pumgatam• • maudhyam • - ignorance or the dull apprehension of the individual person- It is designated as the darkness enveloping

• ^ mm the highest Reality - timiram or tamah. This ajnana is not real and is not natural to the state of consciousness. It conceals the fundamental Reality with the predominance of tamas in it, with the help of , it creates the show of the conditional existence. It establishes itself and also the finite samsara. Sarvajnatman points out that just as Atman establishes Itself and Its objects, similarly ajnina also proves itself and its objects. This ajnina is positive in nature. Because of its vieling power, which is described by the Lord himself in his Gita, its nature cannot be admitted to be of a negative character. Had it been mere negation of knowledge, it would not have been capable of concealing the self-luminous Cit and projecting the show of finite existence. Its positive nature is vouchsafed also by the common experience of the deep-sleep-state. Though it is of a positive nature, it is almost essenceless when weighed against the Cit and so it is at once removable by the knowledge of the time nature of the Reality.

This ajnana is equated with Maya, which is regarded as the power of the Lord - Achyutasakti, responsible for the 8 0 creation of all show. There is difference of opinion among the interpreters of the Advaita Vedanta as regards the relation between Maya and Avidyi. According to Sarvajnatman, these two entities, Maya and Avidyi are not different from each other, they are used as synonymns. 17 Maya - - is the ignorance of the persons, who see the juglory. It is fiindamentally identical with the non-understanding of the actual facts on the part of 1S the spectators. So, it is quite justifiable to accept the same meaning of the tera Maya in the Scriptures and the Sutras. Maya and ajnana, both are identical with each other, because 19 - - both are removed by knowledge. Maya can be equated with the ajiiina, because of its being an object of cognition, because of its subsistance on the ultimate Reality and because of its dependent nature. 20 These two entities are not different, there is only one ajnana, which creates the divisions of the individual soul, God, world etc. It is designated as avidya with reference to the individual soul and as Maya with reference to the God, the creator. Though ajnana is equal to Maya, it is certainly different from the pragabhava of knowledge, because, the distruction of the prigabhava is not possible by knowledge,

17. See 11.127 - ^ m TTHTr m :

fiflTWTWf tterfti r ia. III.101. 19. II.10S-9 3 R l T = m ^ arrsrW W HTTTTI and ^

20. See 11.169. 1*0 as, only after the destruction of the former, the latter is to be produced.

The main point of Sarvajnitman in regard to this problem of avidyi is his admission of the highest Consciousness - Brahman as the substratum - - of avidya. He differs from Mandanamisra, who accepts the individual soul as the asraya of avidyi. Sarvajnitman has very strongly refuted the Jivasritividyivida. The Jivasritividyividins regard the individual soul to be the substratum of nescience, in order to save Brahman from impurity.They argue that if Brahman is regarded as the substratum of nescience, it would be polluted by the impure nature of darkness etc. of the nescience, so it is not proper to regard Brahman as the substratum of nescience, as Brahman is of the form of or knowledge. Brahman can become the object of this avidya but the individual sotil only should be regarded as the only possible adjunct of avidyi.

The following points are raised by Sarvajnitman while refuting this Jivasritividyivida. (i) The existence as well as the anergence of the Jiva is fundamentally dependent on avidya. Thus tht Jiv* b«com«a the effect of avidyi. So to argue that the effect is the substratum of the cause is to accept the illologicity of the first order.

21. i *11 : II - p.258. 22. See 1.319

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(il) After the mahapralaya, the ajnana evolves in the fora of the finite universe. All the enlivening power, required for this work, cannot come from the individual self, who is yet to be evolved.

(iii) Atmasrayadosa is involved in accepting the Jiva as the substratum of ajnana, because the Jiva becomes the substratum of ajnana and ajnana becomes the cause of the Jivahood of the eternal being. To save Brahman from impurity, the Jivasritavidyavadins accept the individual soul to be the substratum. But it is pointed out that if the faultless pure character of the eternal Reality is not affected by its assuming the garb of Jivahood, there is no reason why the case should be different when the same Brahman is proposed as the substratum of nescience.

(iv) If the Jiva, the product of avidya is regarded as the substratum of nescience, there will be no salvation as such, because, the true knowledge of the oneness or the identity with the highest reality, which is necessary for the salvation, cannot dawn upon the individual soul.

(v) The Scriptural passages speak of Brahman as

• ^ asamsarin. So to become the individual soul on the part of Brahman is just the condition of Brahman, brought by ignorance. Thus, the individual soul cannot be said to be ignorant, because, the supreme Reality is characterised as ajnanasraya by the scriptures themselves. If the individual soul is to be so designated, there would be two nesciences or regressus ad infinitun »/ .

Therefore this view should not be resorted to by wise persons.

(vi) The Jivahood of Brahman is not real* So the srutis which seem to advocate the Jivasritavidyavada are to be interpreted like this that ajnana, because of its subsisting in the limitless Git, subsists in the individual soul. It subsists elsewhere from the view-point of nonsentiencey in the case of the Jiva, it exists from the view-point of the 23 vanguishability at the hands of the opposite knowledge. So, the stand adopted by the protagonists of the Jlvasrita- vidya view, led by Mandana has not got any foundation in the revered texts and therefore, it should be rejected by a real Advaitin.

It has been pointed out that the bandhamok§avyavastha is not properly explained if the individual soul is regarded as the substratum of nescience. While dealing with this problem, Sarvajnitman discusses and refutes some other views as regards the asVaya and visaya of ajnana.

The first theory^^ points out that though ajnana resides in the individual soul it has Brahman as its object. It states that just as a generality, which is one, is common

23. 1 1 .165. 24. 3r?TFt

grrq =TT Ht>ARuifMfclI li Samk?epa 11.132. 93 to all particular individuals, it subsists in them, it leaves a particiilar individual when he is destroyed but still it continues to subsist in other individuals, so also this ajnana, which is one and is common to all the individual souls, subsists in them, leaves a particular individual soul when he becomes enlightened, yet it continues to subsist in the rest of the individual souls.

The theory is regarded as illogical because the very conception of the individual soul being the locus of ajnana is logically untenable. Existence of Brahman cannot be proved by right knowledge or by the wrong cognition. Brahman as an object of ajnana cannot also be self-manifest, because there is no such experience. Therefore this theory is untenable.

25 The second theory speaks of the different ajnanas of the different innumerable . It points out that these innumerable ajnanas are not the motivating force behind the world but there is a divine power Maya, which is different from these ajnanas, which has Isvara as its locus and is eternal. But this view also is not acceptable because, Brahman like Maya, would have an imaginary validity. Also if Brahman associated with Maya be self-manifest then there would be two

IyfHbHmy: u n.133 Hi self-manifest entities, which goes against experience. A further objection has been taken against this plurality of the souls. It is asked whether Brahman knows the difference between Itself and the individual souls and the difference between the individual souls themselves. If the first alter­ native is accepted, then the souls being different from Brahman become unreal and the second makes Brahman ascrvajna. The mutual distinction between the individual souls cannot appear as self-manifest, because, then it would be an unconditional validity, secondly if it is not self-manifest, it becomes an object of cognition, which means that the Individual souls, by becoming the objects of cognition, become ultimately non- sentient. The understanding of the plurality of the souls from the view-point of a particular individual cannot be proved by right cognition^wrong cognition,or self-illumination. Therefore considering all these points, this view also is unacceptable.

The third theory^^ regards Brahman as the substratiim and the object of nescience but it explains the bandhamok§a- vyavastha by admitting the presence and absence of one and the same thing like Brahman by proving the presence and absence of one bird in the sky. But it is pointed out against this theory

26. w w agrqrgiiTfk 9 5 that the phenomenon of the presence and absence of one thing at the same time is impossible without the admission of any limiting adjunct.

The fourth theory ' speaks of the impure ajnana creat­ ing an infinite nximber of antahkaranas, which operate for the individual souls. It is through the media of these belonging to the particular individual souls that the ajiiana continues to exist in Brahman. In the case of the liberated soul, this medium vanishes due to the rise of knowledge. It is pointed out against this theory that if the antahkarana is accepted as a neutral medium for the entry of pure Brahman, the impure ajnana also would enter and would spread far beyond its limits, as, there is nothing to prevent it from doing so. Thus, Brahman being always obscured, the liberated soul also would be again engulfed in the snares of samsira, which is contrary to the scriptural declaration ^na sa punarivartate.

The fifth theory^^ says that Brahman, influenced by Ajn^a, gets reflected in many intellects and thereby takes

27. ^ TR:

ciw r II n.135 2a. m r f ^ ^ m : ^ ^ ajgrf^^srxrf^ gwnFzr^

■^4 gdfsngwr MiHginiW II H.136 ft Sly the forms of the st^atic and the mobile objects in the world. The individual s o v d m becomes free through proper realisation somewhere. The AjSi^a, remaining in part and vanishing in part produces the Mvyavahara. The faults accrued by the nanajivavada, are Balso embraced by this theory. So it goes without saying tha^j this view is unacceptable.

The sixth thSfcory^^ asserts that there is the Maya of God, which is the c a S ^ e of the sentient and non-sentient objects in this world. T|Pue to the will of God, It spreads Itself upon the Jivas l i ® e the net of the fisherman, while, through His desire, it cor ^tracts itself in some Jivas. It may be real or unreal but the expanse and the contraction depend upon his will* Th theory is regarded as illogical, because, this Maya> as qu ite different from the ajnana of the Jivas, as well as the hig ciest Reality possessing any such power, cannot be proved e ither by right knowledge or by wrong knowledge. Maya and Brah nan - both can never be accepted as svaprakasa. So this theo^T also is untenable.

29. ^ I 1 1 ■RT3IT

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W f l H I 11.137 ' • r-* ^ /

The seventh view^^ states that every Jiva has his own avidya, which is beginningless. The samsara is due to the continuation of the foraer samskaras. The highest Atman is the object of avidya, but its resort is admitted to be the Jiva. With the help of jnana and , some devotees exert for salvation, while, some prefer to be entangled in the snares of this worldly existence. It is pointed out against this theory that the individual soul as the resort of avidyi, can never be admitted by any logical proof, also the achievement of salvation by the mixture of both jnana and karma is un­ acceptable to the Advaitins. So, this view sdso is inadmissible.

Thus, declaring all theories to be unacceptable from the logical point of view, he gives vent to his own theory viz. there is only one ajnana, which possesses two powers - veiling and projecting, with which it effects the work of concealing the true nature of the highest Reality and creating all this great edifice of the universe, the individual soul, God etc., which has got the highest impartite consciousness - Brahman as its substratum and object, which is positive in nature, which is of the form of darkness, which is the intermediate cause through which the highest Brahman effects all its work, which is the Maya of IsVara, which is the cause of all superimpositions

30. 5 T f W tvr=fr

c T T g f ^ ’Eisd ?f^^F=Tr: =rr ^ ii 1 1 .13d 9 S

and which being imaginary in nature is ultimately removable by the real knowledge of the exact nature of the highest Reality. When such a view is adopted, the bandhamoksavyavastha is easily explained, because, the distinction like bondage and freedom appears to be real until the rise of the true knowledge. But when the knowledge of the Identity of the soul with Brahman is gained, there is no necessity of any such classification. Avidya must be located in the highest Brahman and the usage as regards the individual soul, Isvara etc. is just due to the absence of the correct knowledge of Brahman. Sarvajnatman has made it clear that even though Brahman alone being the object and the substratum of nescience is ultimately real, the preceptor and the other things necessary for the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, are possible due to one’s own nescience. They are fabricated by nescience but their exist­ ence Is necessary only for the acquirement of real knowledge. All the things appear to be valid during the waking state but when both the waking and the dream states are considered from the ultimate point of view, both of them are found to be imaginary, being the effects of nescience. Thus, this avidya projects the whole show, having the highest Brahman only as its substratum and object.

Following the footsteps of his revered preceptor, Sarvajnatman regards Avidya as synonymous with Maya,^^ but

^scTTwnrfiTf^ 1 ^ ; iI

— Tterirn

Oneness of Avidya is proclaimed by Sarvajnatman. But Avidya is regarded as two-fold by Mandanamisra — cTFTR^I^- ^ These two viz. the agrahana and the viparyayagrahana are rather two powers of Avidyi. Vacaspati also proclaims avidyadvitaya but his interpretation is different from Mandanamisra’s. Avidya is two-fold - one being beginningless and positive and the other being in the form of the impressions of the previous illusions.

Though the Bhasyakara has not dealt with this problem of Avidya in detail, the later followers tried to discuss it

32. ^ l The ^ruti says ill i The Sutrakara also points out this fact when he says ^ etc. wrfw RnrrsfWfcren" HnrnrfrFrftf^ m m "P^rr^i ziWpFm ^rfWr HTTrrj?iTf^TcgTfrc^rT^i ^9WFrf^Err n n r r l^a r r i R ^ 1 . in full detail — its nature, its substratum etc. Though Sarvajnitman followed his preceptor in his treatment of Avidya, still he handled the problem along new lines and drew the conclusions which were bold and logically correct.

Jivaikatva Theory: The problem consequent upon the acceptance of the problem of Avidya is the problem of the unity or plurality of the individual souls. The highest Reality, Brahman, when it assximes the garb of entering the body, due to the Avidya or the ignorance of its true nature, is designated as the individual soul. Thus, the Jiva is, really speaking, none else than Brahman, according to all Advaitins and Brahman is one. Hence, if the consideration is made on a higher level and from the ultimate point of view, there cannot be found any contro­ versy as regards the problem of the unity or the plurality of the individual souls. But from the empirical point of view i.e. having assumed scxae sort of difference between the individual soul and the Supreme S0ul, it is discussed whether the individual soul is one or many. As pointed out by Sarvajnatman in his development of his pet doctrine of Drsti-traya, the sadhaka in the middle stage of the ladder of the three views or Drs-^is - the aropadrsti, the vyamisradrsti and the apavadakadrsti, can only discuss such a problem. When the sadhaka attains the highest stage of the cessation of all duality, all the problems are of no value to 1 1:1 him, for, he has attained the true knowledge of the Reality. It is further pointed out^^ that there are two types of sadhakas in the middle stage -- those who accept the plurality of souls and those who propound the unity of souls.

The admission of the principle of Avidya as being one, gives rise to the Jivaikatva theory. Sarvajnatman regards this Avidya as being one and as having for its locus and object the same eternal Consciousness - Brahman only. It follows then that he should propound the Jivaikatva or the O I unity of all souls. According to this Jivaikatva theory there exists only one Jiva as the product of one avidya and all other different individual souls - etc. seen in this uni­ verse, are the fabrications, wrongly imagined by nescience. Just as a person sees in his dreams in the sleep-state, crores of lives and years coming and going away in a very short space of time, similarly, in the waking state also, a person can have a similar experience of some persons leaving for ever this mundane existence and some coming back again to this phenomenal existence. Just like the of Gauda- pidicarya, Sarvajnatman propounds that all this universe is only the fabrication of one’s ignorance about the true nature of the Reality.

An objection is taken against the Jivaikatva theory that

33. See II.83- 31f. 11.12 a ...... 131. I ( i 2 the bandhamok^avyavasthi is not properly explained in this theory. It is pointed out that if there is only one avidya, which is common to all the various individual souls that are the effects of that avidya, then the supreme enlightenment on the part of one individual soul, which means in other words the total destruction of his avidya, would result in the complete cessation of the avidya of all the souls and the consequent liberation for all persons. This contingency of ’ekamuktau sarvamuktih', leads ultimately to the denial of the doctrine of J^vanmukti. Thus, the instances of the Jivan- muktas like duka and , which are very highly praised and openly declared by the authoritative Upanisads, would appear as false. Therefore this doctrine of Jivaikatva or unity of souls cannot be admitted as logical and reasonable. The objection is answered on the ground that there is no necessity of justifying the post-liberational existence or the continua­ tion of the universe after the enlightenment of a particular individual. The problem is solved by taking the illustration of the dream; for, the world, as perceived in the dream-state is fundamentally similar to that cognised in the waking-state, because, both have got only a conditional validity. Just as the scheme and the order of the world as perceived in the dream-state are true only so long as the dream continues and are dissolved at the very moment of the cessation of the dream, similarly, all this scheme of the empirical universe appears to be true as long as the true knowledge of the Reality does not dawn upon the seeker; but, as soon as this l e a enlightenment Ig nnHghtnnmnrm Is gained, all the diversity and the complex show of his avidya cornea to an end and with this annihilation of his ignorance, he becomes liberated. Thus, the various other individual souls, being fabricated by their

» _ own nescience, appear to be valid during the samsaravastha, and so until the rise of the enlightenment, the seeker is concerned with the liberated and the unliberated souls. But, when he gains the true knowledge of the Reality, he knows that the descriptions of the Jivanmuktas like i^uka and Vamadeva are mere arthavada, laid down for the inclination of other people for the attainment of knowledge. Therefore, these Scriptures have scope as long as the true knowledge is not gained. After the enlightenment, even the preceptor etc., which are the necessary helpmates for the rise of true knowledge, are found to be mere fabrications of one’s nescience, for the seeker now sees advaita or non-duality everywhere. Thus, this classifica­ tion of bondage and freedom can be accoxmted for, by accepting Jivaikatva.

However logical this theory may be, the explanation of Individual bondage and freedom, which is furnished by this theory, is very difficult to understand for an ordinary man, as it goes against the common experience. Hence, the general tendency of the majority of the Advaitins, is, to propound the plurality of souls, based upon the multiplicity of avidya, mind etc., which are the limiting conditions of the Jivas. As, it has been discussed in the last topic of avidya, this theory 10 i of Jivananatva, which is propounded by most of the Jivasrita- vidyavadins, receives a harsh and severe criticism in the hands of Sarvajnatman. It can be further pointed out against this nanajivavada that though these people offer an explanation of the individual bondage and freedom, which appears to be satisfactory to an ordinary man, their view does not stand the tests of the ultimate philosophical stand-point of the Advaita doctrine. If the ultimate results, to which this doctrine of the plurality of souls leads, are taken into consideration, the doctrine turns out to be improper. Thus, for example, if it is admitted that there are different avidyas belonging to the different individual souls, it results in the admission of the different innumerable universes, that arise out of these different avidyas. The continuation of the universe from the stand-point of other individual souls, even though a particular individual becomes liberated, can be well accounted for in this theory; but if avidya is admitted to be different for different individuals, there is nothing common to account for the similarity found in this universe, though there are innumerable universes arising out of the different avidyas. There is another fault in the admission of the Jivananatva. The JivisVitavidyavadins regard the individual soul to be the locus of avidya, as well as its effect. It follows then that consequent on the destruction of the cause, the effect also should vanish, for, the effect cannot stay without the cause. When the avidya of a particular individual is destroyed at the time of his enlightenment, the individual soul also, which is its effect and locus should necessarily be admitted as destroyed at the very moment of the destruction of avidya. Thus, the same contingency of the denial of the doctrine of Jivanmukti, also exists in this Jivananatva theory; for, the destruction of the individual soul means the negation of any opportunity for the soul to live here and impart guidance to others. Therefore, the Jivananatva theory makes the doctrine of Jivanmukti impossible for admission. In this way, many objections can be raised against this Jivananatva theory. Though both the theories are subjected to criticism and objected to on logical grounds, the Jivananatva-theory is more popular among the Advaita circles. It seems that Sarvajnatman was compelled to accept this Jivaikatva theory because of his admission of the principle of avidya as being one and having Brahman as its locus and object. It should also be remembered here that it was not incumbent on Sarvajnatman to give such a harsh and severe treatment to the Jivananatva theory. The JivisVitavidyivadins have pro­ claimed the Jivananatva theory, not for the sake of a theory as such but they have accepted it as the only possible expla­ nation that can be offered for explaining the ordinary experience, which may not be true from the ultimate point of view but which certainly requires some sorb of justification at least. The Jivasritavidyavadins considered the problem on a lower plane by offering a greater degree of validity and IftiJ

reality to this empirical world, while Sarvajnitman and other Brahmasritavidyivadins were not prepared to give that much validity to the common experience, they considered the problem on the highest Advaita plane and offered an explanation of the common parlance, that would not appeal to the ordinary mind at the outset.

An interesting point to be noted in this admission of the Jivaikatva theory by Sarvajnitman is that the plurality •f the souls is ascribed to Sarvajnatman by Mm. Vasudeosastri Abhyamkar, in his Advaitimoda, a wellknown work written for the special purpose of refuting the objections raised by against the Advaita. He says — STTf^^TTPfT +['iPh ^ . 35 Really speak­ ing, there should be no ambiguity or doubt as regards the Jivaikatva theory, being shared by Sarvajnitman, because, he has very strongly refuted the Jivaninitva theory by raising various objections against it and showing it to be illogical and very difficult for being accepted. It is quite ununder- standable how the view of Sarvajnatman came to be misrepresented.

Dr. Radhakrishnan has stated in his 'History of *that ^ankaracirya does not support the view that the Jiva, limited by avidya is one as avidya is one. He further points out that the ekajivavada conflicts with the

35* See Advaitimoda, p.10, 36. p. 6>10 10 ?

Brahmasutras II*i*22 and II.i.33* It should be noted in this connection that these three above-mentioned sutras may at the most speak of the difference between the highest Self and the Individual Self. They do not in any way refer to the difference between the individual souls themselves, which is necessary for the propagation of the nanajlvavada. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that these sutras conflict with the ekaj^vavada. It should also be remembered that both the Sutrakira and the Bhasyakara did not intend to promulgate any theory as such, ^ankaracarya has often stated^^ that the difference between Brahman and the individual soul is only wrongly fabricated by one’s nescience and when there arises the knowledge of the identity between these two souls, there results the cessation of all phenomenal activities, even the idea of bondage and freedom, of the liberated and the un­ liberated souls - comes to an end. He has also declared — 3^ avldya as ekarupa. So it cannot be argued that the Sutrakira and the Bhasyakara are opposed to the idea of

37. ^ S m T R T fyPH: q f t t ^ S W W T T f t T ^ T TT =T tjTf

Pudicj Wcl^i See also ^ ^ 3 [ f ^ anrot >1^ ^ ^tarfr^i

38. ^ ^rrf^W(r 3P l e s ekajlvavada.

Jivanmuktl: A connected problem with the problem of the Jivaikatva theory that is to be next discussed is the problem of Jlvan- mukti. It is clear from the former discussion that the Jivaikatvavadins do not care to admit Jivanmukti, as, from the point of view of the liberated soul, there is no nece­ ssity of justifying the post-liberational existence, for, all the distinctions like liberated and unliberated souls etc. are like dream experiences. So the scriptures, which speak of Jivanmukti are to be interpreted as mere arthavada, laid down for the inclination of other people for the attainment of knowledge.

It seems that being an ekajlvavadin, Sarvajnatman has declared in clear-cut terms that the knowledge destroys the nescience completely and so Jivanmukti, for which the Avidya- lesa is necessary is not possible. He has stated frankly that the scripture, which speaks of Jivanmukti, is nothing 39 but the arthavada, having no purport in establishing the salvation before death. The author of the Vrttiprabhakara,

39. 5404-4 ^rmRTcf

aiq-^i T'ii4circqi li

40. See Chap. VIII, Ifilj taking his stand on the above statement, points out that Sarvajnitman has admitted Videharaukti at the very moment of the rise of knowledge, for, the scriptures advocating Jivan- mukti are regarded as the mere arthavada of the injunctory statements about sVavana etc. Dr. Radhakrishnan has remarked^^ that Sarvajnatmatnuni does not accept mukti while on ealrth, though almost all other Advaitins support the conception of

Jivanmukti. Appaya Dixita also states that^^ —

■Tcfc^cn-

But curiously enough, it is found that in the same chapter,after declaring the ’sadyomukti’ as an appropriate doctrine, the author tries to justify also Jivanmukti, by admitting the trace of avidya, which continues to remain even after the knowledge is produced. That trace is to be removed by itself or by the continuation of knowledge. The main proof for accepting the Jivanmukti is the experience of the liberated souls Isvanubhutih pramanam). It is further pointed out that the difference between two states (pre-knowledge and post­ knowledge) is that in the first state, there is the hindrance of ignorance, while in the latter, it is not. In the case of the Jivanmukta, there is no possibility of having the next birth, as the scriptures declare emphatically to that effect.

41* History of Indian Philosophy, p* lf2. Siddhantalesasaragraha, p. 4-'b'b 43* See Sanksepasariraka, Chap.IV.V.40. 11 0

Considering these statements of Sarvajnatman, some people argue that Jivanmukti is admitted by Sarvajnatman, because, judging from the maxim that the author gives his own opinion in detail and does not mention it as a mere casual reference, it seems that Sarvajnatman has dealt with this view of Jivanmukti in detail and so that view only should be regarded as the real opinion propounded by Sarvajnatman. It is also pointed out by these people that though the scriptures speaking of Jivanmukti are regarded as mere arthavada, they should be treated as self-authoritative because they are not contradicted by any other means of proof. Even though avidya is destroyed at the moment of the rise of knowledge, there remains some trace of avidya and so till the dissolution of the prarabdha- karma, the seeker has to live on this earth. The commentator Svayamprakasa says in his commentry^^ on the Advaita Makaranda of Laksmidhara that -- and quotes these two verses from the Samkgepa-airlraka

1^5PTTT3Err=tr ti

Thus, there is diversity of opinion on the point of the admission of Jivanmukti by Sarvajnatman. As regards his exact opinion on this problem, it can be stated that as an

44* See the comment on V.27 of the Advaita-Makaranda. 11 ekajivavadin, Sarvajnatman does not care to admit Jivanmukti, as, no necessity is felt by these people for accepting Jivan­ mukti- But he has not declared his opinion as a theory or doctrine, for, he is not so keen on this point. As other Advaitins - even the Sutrakira and the Bhasyakara - have accepted the Jivanmukti, he also gives that as another opinion and has tried to justify it. So it cannot be stated as a firm argument that Sarvajnatman is opposed to the idea of Jivanmukti.

Reflection Theory;

The problem that is to be next discussed is the problem of the nature of the individual soul. As regards the nature of the individual soul and its relation with Brahman, scholars of the damkara Vedanta have propounded different theories. A wellknovm and widely circulated stanza —

HTUT' ^ I y Pd a has recorded sane of the theories and their propounders. This stanza, although it has been regarded to be authoritative,does not include all the sub-theories. The following are the theories, which are held by different scholars in connection with the nature of God and the individual soul — (i) Avaccheda- vada, (ii) , (iii) , (iv) Bimba- pratibimbavada, and (v) a theory which uses both the Avaccheda- vada and the Pratibimbavada.

Of these, the first is said to have been set forth by 112

Vicaspatiraisra, the second by Suresvaracarya, the third by Sarvajnitman, the fourth can be said to have been advocated by the author of the Vivarana, while an attempt has been made by in his PancadasI, to form a theory of his own, by using both the Avacchedavada and the Pratibimbavada.

According to the Avacchedavada, the individual soul is the Highest Consciousness Itself, limited by the adjuncts like mind, gross and subtle bodies, inner sense-organ, which are imagined by the indescribable and beginningless nescience. According to the remainiag theories, the individual soul is the reflection of the Highest in the inner sense-organ. This reflection, according to the Abhasavadins, is unreal in as much as the image is seen to be quite different from the original. They argue that the inner sense organ has the capa­ city of fabricating a new thing in the form of reflection, just like the original. So this new thing has no existence in reality. According to the Pratibimbavadins and the Bimba- pratibimbavadins, this reflection is real in the sense that it has no separate existence from the original. In the reflection, the original itself is seen as being characterised by the qualities viz. that of being different from its own nature and that of having entered into the adjunct. And as it is the original itself, it cannot be unreal.In this way, apparently there is no vital difference between these theories.

45* See the Siddhantabinduvyakhya by Mm. Vasudeva dastri Abhyankara, p.25* 113

But if it is observed minutely, it can be found that there are some points of technical difference. For instance, according to the Abhasavadins, the individual soul is unreal and hence liberation is not going to be attained by him. So, the case- co-ordination in the sentences like ’That thou art* is to be resorted to, by suppressing altogether one of the two words (i.e. what is technically called ^TETTWiTFTrf^FRTRT) . While according to the Pratibimbavadins, the individual soul is real and does exist at the time of liberation which is to be attained by him and the case-co-ordination in the sentences like 'I am Brahman’ is possible by the identity between the two .

Between the Pratibimbavadins and the Bimbapratibimba- vidins, there is no difference in regard to the nature of the individual soul; as regards the nature of God only they hold different views. The Pratibimbavada of Sarvajnatman maintains that both God and the individual soul are the reflections. While, according to the Bimbapratibimba theory of the Vivarana school, God is type, while the individual sovil is the proto­ type.^^

46. anrr^rqt^ 1 f^f«i

1

— Siddhantabindu, p.46. 1 1 4

Vidyaranya in the Citradipa chapter of his Pancadasi, admits Ku^astha as limited Consciousness, Brahman as unlimited Consciousness and both God and the individual soul as reflections of Consciousness. Thus, although he has made use of the Avaccheda theory, he is of the opinion that both God and the individual soul are the reflections of the highest Consciousness.

In this way, in connection with the nature of the indi­ vidual soul, only two theories stand prominently. And for the same reason, it seems that Appaya Dixita, in his Kalpataru- parimala^^ refers only to the Avaccheda and the Pratibimba theories, while discussing the theory intended by the Acarya - the author of the Kalpataru.

Now, it is intended here to observe minutely what exactly the Pratibimbavada means and in what way it is adumberated in the Sank§epa-sarlraka. The conception of the

* Pratibimba or the reflection of the highest Consciousness is like the conception of the reflection of the Sun in water, where, the image, though it has the same brilliance as the Sun, yet undergoes the defect of the impurity and movements of the water. The Sun remains ever the same in its purity, untouched by the impurities from which the image of the Sun suffers. The Sun may be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of water and yield different kinds of images,

47. Pancadasi - 6.18. 4a. pp.155-159. 1 i ; i

possessing different characteristics and changes, which, though unreal, yet have all the appearance of reality phenomenally. Sarvajnatman has given this illustration o-: the reflection of the Sun in the water and has pointed out that just as the Sun remains pure outside in the sky, shining in its full highest brilliance, similarly, the highest Consciousness, Brahman,remains ever pure, uncontaminated by the various defects, which defile Its image. He further points out that the reflection of the Git in the avidya is called as IsVara, while, Its reflection in the antahkarana, a product of avidya is called as Jiva- Avidya is considered by him to be the upadhi - the adjunct for the reflection. When the Cit appears as a reflection in the beginningless avidya in its total aspect as cause, It is styled as IsVara. The indi­ vidual soul is the highest Consciousness that has entered the antahkarana. The only true Reality - the pure Bimba - Brahman remains outside these reflections, free from the entanglement of ajnina.

Both the Jiva and the Isvara are regarded as the

reflections of Brahman. It is necessary to take into considera­ tion the development of the nature of Isvara by Sarvajnatman. Usually, the highest Atman is accepted as the eternal witness on the basis of the druti like - but

49. Samksepasariraka, III. 280. 1 j f i according to Sarvajnatman, the highest Git - Brahman - cannot be the witness, as, it presupposes association with the object of witness. The term Saksin, being relative, cannot refer to the Reality which is beyond all associations and relations- Due to the adjunct of maya, the One becomes Tsvara; hence, this Tsvarahood is not real. It resembles the redness of the crystal due to the proximity of the jasamine flower.As, the highest Bliss, when reflected in the worldly objects and associated with the sense-organs, is spoken of as produced etc., likewise, the One Eternal Bliss, when reflected in miya, is styled as Isvara. According to some, Godhood should also be considered as a constituent of the highest Atman. But, this is not correct as druti never refers to it. On the contrary, in the passages like '"ifcl -ifd etc.* God-hood is denied and what remains as the ultimate Reality is only faultless pure Git.^^ Hence, the term Isvara with reference to the Atman is only metaphorical conveying independence.^^ Sarvajnatman argues further that the generality cannot stand

50. ^nrter ^

^ ^ trnrqrt^ it

Sanksepasarlraka III.190 51. ^ I ^1 : ii 111.148 52. ^

ii III. 162 1 1 ?

independently in the absence of a particular thing and the

latter without the former, hence, it follows then that this dual is relative and what is relative is made up of raayi like the dream; and therefore Godhood etc. should be accepted as imaginary as a logical consequence.^^ Generality and the individual go together, similarly witness goes with the object and same is the case with God-hood. For, a Lord requires things to rule. These are thus relative and not independent by themselves. Hence, they cannot be included in Reality, which is bereft of any duality. This inter­ pretation of Brahman, void of even saksitva, Isvaratva and other qualities,is a new innovation in the interpretation of the Pratibimbavada as given by Prakasatman, who opines that isVara is nothing else but only Brahman, associated with maya. Thus, even the IsVara is regarded as a mere reflection of Brahman.

T - / • 55 Appaya Dixita, in his Siddhantalesasamgraha, explains the Pratibimbavada as — ^ T W - qrfWr^; 3TfWziT : I - - _ _ Madhusudana Sarasvatl represents this vada in his Siddhanta- bindu as — PdT^PMci I HsjP^ci I

54. Hr=TT=2f =T cTWf§=TT cT=r ^ W c F ? ^ gCTgcrr ^

^=zrRi^; II III.193- 55. P-6<^-70 IIS

There is difference of opinion, even among the Prati- bimbavadins themselves, on the point of the exact process of the reflection of the highest Consciousness. Sarvajnatman regards both Isvara and Jiva to be the reflections of Brahman. The Vivaranakara does not accept the view of Sarvajnatman. He regards the Jiva alone as the reflection of Isvara, who is admitted to be the type. The Pure Brahman is acknowledged to be the original source. The threefold distinction between the original, the type and the prototype reflection, seems to have been necessitated by the consideration that since ajnana is one, there cannot be two separate reflections such as Jiva and IsVara, but it is better to admit that the Jjva is the image of TsVara. This Bimbapratibimbavada is quite in conso­ nance with his admission of the Qualified Brahman as the cause of the origin of the universe. Some followers of Vivarana regard Isvara to be the reflection of Brahman in Maya and Jiva to be the reflection in avidya, a part of Maya. The Tattvaviveka prescribes that the reflection of Brahman in the sattva aspect of the Mulaprakrti is termed as IsVara and the reflection in other aspect is styled as Jiva.

It would not be out of place, here, to consider the objections raised by the Avacchedavidins against the Prati- bimbavada. It is argued by the Avacchedavidins that a formless thing like Brahman - pure Consciousness as it is, cannot be 1 1 9 reflected. The objection is answered by the Pratibimbavadins by pointing out that even the formless things like (rupa), number () etc. are seen to be reflected, when their asraya or substratum is reflected. Or, a thing like ether, which is formless, is seen to be reflected in water. This reflection of ether must be accepted as otherwise the appre­ hension of depth even in little water cannot be justified. Thus, on the strength of these analogus instances, the image of pure Consciousness in the inner - sense-organ can be accepted. These illustrations, which are cited by the Prati­ bimbavadins may be refuted by the Avacchedavadins by declaring that it is only a misapprehension that form, number, ether and other formless things are seen as being reflected. But this is mere quibbling on the words and the Avacchedavadins have no weighty argument to deny that even a formless thing can have its image and the reflection can be apprehended as real phenomenally.

The main point raised by the adherents of the Prati- bimbavada against the Avacchedavida is that according to the theory of delimitation, the consciousness limited by the antahkarana or the inner sense-organ in this world would be quite different from the consciousness limited by the antah- karana in the next world. 56 That is to say, the individual soul in this world and in the next one, would not be one and the same. Thus, there would be the contingency that the doer

56. Siddhanta-iesa-Samgraha, p.97. 12 i) would be different from the enjoyer. The fallacies are technically called 'krtahani’ and ’akrtabhyagama'; ’krtahani’ when the doer is not the enjoyer i.e. what is krta or achieved by him in the foi'mer birth, does not yield any fruit and hence lost and 'akrtibhyagama' when the enjoyer is not the doer i.e. some fruit is allowed without any action in the previous life. The advocates of the Avaccheda theory cannot show this fault against the Pratibimba theory, because, the reflection of the Consciousness does not change with the change in the outside

_ ^ adjunct. Therefore, the question of 'krtahsiSii' and ’akrtibhyagama’ does not arise at all.

The second objection raised by the Pratibimbavadins against the Avaccheda theory is that the druti-passage, 57 wherein Isvara is said to be the antaryamin i.e. residing in each and every object (of course including the individual souls) will not be intelligible, if the individual soul be regarded to be the limited Consciousness, and Is'vara to be unlimited Consciousness, as the unlimited Consciousness cannot reside in the limited Consciousness.

The Pratibimbavada is, absolutely not a new innovation of these later Advaita teachers. For, its antiquity can be seen in the ^ruti itself. e.g.

57. Antaryami , Brhadaranyakopanisad III.? ' 1 2 1

m r f>n f

artrr a trrfeR T 1 W r

The Smrti^^ gives the illnstratlon of the reflection of the

Moon in water - ^ ^ gcTTcRT ’Jet >5& 8=Wft»Wt| ten* ajgErr ^ ii

The Pratibirnbavada is catagorically propounded in the

Rasapancaka of ^^rimad-Bhagavata, with the words -

I i.e. the Lord's relationship with the

Cosmos is compared to a boy’s playing v/ith his own reflections-

Of course, nowhere i t is represented as a theory and only the analogy of the reflection of the Sun or the Moon in the water is found to have been used v/ith a view to pointing out the relation between and the nature of the individual soul and the .

As pointed out by the commentator Govindananda in his

Ratnaprabha, it can be admitted that the Sutrakara favoured more the Pratibimba theory than the Avaccheda theory, for, the latter proclaims that the analogy of the reflection of the

Sun in the water is more useful in understanding the relation between the Paramatman and the Jivatm an, by using the

5^. Brahmabindu 92- 122 evakara*^^ Besides the Brahmasutrabha^ya, dankaracarya has suggested this reflection theory in the commentaries on the Chandogya and the Brhadaranyakopanisad. He states that the

Jiva is a reflection of the Highest Brahman - * i l H t59crnrr m i » arr^ 5rf^»

In the commentary on the Brhadaranyakopanisad, he says that the Jiva is like a reflection of the Sun and the Moon in the water, which takes its rise due to the upadhi and which vanishes at the moment of the removal of that adjunct, leaving back ultimately the original pure Bimba only. m r f M n jwrr ^ w ftw i

...... w -ftRsiaillr, WmBr agcg^HVHlMdHtmf

Following the footsteps of his revered Master,

59. sfhaiWnRef

JFrtrrast^iTOTxfti v i jrftrjtrr

Also see the other sutra - ^ ^TtPTT

60. Chandogya Upa.VI.3*2. 61. See the corny, on the Brhadira^yaka II.4«12. 12:i

Sarvajnatman also develops the problem on the same lines. While giving the explanation of the identity between the highest Self and the individual Soul, Sarvajnatman analyses the idea behind the terms ’ta t ’ and 'tvam*. According to him, four things are imderstood in the terms ’ta t ’ and 'tvam*. The adjunct or the upadhi, the appearance of the Cit on the upidhi, the reflection of the Cit and the Cit itself - these are the four constituents, implied in each entity. In the case of ’ta t ’,^ ^ the adjunct is the beginningless cosmic ignorance, the aupadhika i.e. the appearance of the Cit, the Consciousness entangled by the condition is the God-hood, the reflection of the Consciousness is the ’Is v a r a ’ and the original is the pure Cit itself. With respect to ’th o u ’,^ ^ ths adjunct consists of the intellect, the product of the ignorance, the appearance of the Cit is the individuality or , the Consciousness inside it is the reflection - the individual Soul and the original is the pure Cit Itself. Out of these four constituents, the first three are unreal, while the last * 6/t one - the original Bimba, Brahman, is only absolutely real. The first three things are not ultimately real, because, the

64. ftfrftnr qrv<^t/! - tfi -fti«3rri 12 i condition the upadhi is unreal, fabricated by the nescience. The upadhi is only a matter, which receives the reflection of the pure Consciousness and is therefore present to it but does not belong to the reflection (i.e. the Jiva and the Isvara) as its essential nature. Therefore, upto Brahman, everything is unreal, though it serves the purpose of worldly activity.

It seems from Sarvajnatman's treatment of the problem that he never intended to propagate any theory like the

^ Pratibimbavada.• His inclination towards the reflection theory is certainly discernible but he cannot be said to be the originator of the reflection theojry. His usual style of developing the pet doctrine is not discerned in dealing with this problem about the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. He has not made any attempt to establish firmly his own view after considering the problem in all its phases and refuting all the opponent's objections. He has not refuted the Avaccheda theory at any place. On the other hand, he has given the illustration of the gha^akasa, the pet drstanta of the Avacchedavadins, in his Pancaprakriya.- 65 Therefore he cannot be called as the propagator of the reflection theory. In that case, dankaracarya also would have to be referred to as the propounder of the Pratibimba theory. After all, both the Avaccheda and the Pratibimba• are not ultimately real and the justification for both, from the ultimate point of view, is utterly impossible. The reflection theory in regard to the individual soul has been more popularly utilised in the later Advaitic literature. The reason for this is that it is easier to understand the relation between Brahman and the individual soul, with the help of the reflection theory. The controversy between these two theories is only suggestive of the pedantic scholarship of the later writers, who spent much of their energy in fighting among themselves. These two apparently contradictory theories can be reconciled, if an attempt is made in that direction. When a thing is reflected, it can be very well said to be conditioned or limited - may be with some minor differences. And even according to the limitation theory, there should be no objection to admit that the Consciousness, when it is delimited by the mind, is seen as if reflected in it. Sadananda, in the commentary of his own Pratyaktattvacintamani, has explained the Pratibimba theory, without any intention of making a reconcilliation between the two theories, in the following manner -

That is, he speaks of the reflection as being limited or avacchinna. Hence, it can be held without any logical

66. Commentary on the Pratyaktattvacintamani, pp.272-3. I2i; discrepancy that these two theories need not be taken to be so contradictory, especially when both the reflection and the delimitation are not real, from the ultimate point of view. The theory, which has been referred to as being propounded by Vidyaranya in his Pancadasi, also sxiggests that both the Avaccheda and the Pratibimba can be accepted at one and the same time and there is no real contradiction between them. The main tenet of the Advaita that the individual soul is, in reality, not at all different from the highest Soul, is, by all these theories stabilised to a great extent, as, all these theories have their purport in proclaiming the ultimate identity between the individual soul and the highest one.

^abdaparok§atvavada:

According to the Advaita Philosophy, moksa or emancipa­ tion is the state of the annihilation of nescience. This annihilation of nescience results from the direct perceptual knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. There is difference of opinion among the Advaitins as regards the point whether such a direct knowledge can be acquired by the word (i.e. from the Upanisadic statements). The majority of the Advaitins, including Sureivara, Sarvajnatman, accepts the theory of the dabdaparoksatva i.e. the theory which admits the production of the direct knowledge from the word. The Bhamati school on the other hauid, is against it. According to this Bhamati tradition, the mind accompanied by meditation, is alone 127 capable of giving rise to the direct knowledge, which has got sufficient power to dispel the delusion of the world. It would not be out of place, here, to examine the arguments advanced by both the schools.

The doctrine of ^abdaparoksatva, which is subscribed by Suresvara^Sarvajnatman declares that the direct perception of Brahman can be accrued only from the Scriptures i.e. by the l^abdaprama4a. The directness and the indirectness of knowledge is not determined by the nature of the means of knowledge but it entirely depends on the object which is cognised. Knowledge is direct when the consciousness condi­ tioned by the object of knowledge (Visayavacchinna-caitanya) becomes one with the consciousness determined by the internal organ (antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya). Direct perception would take place if the object is capable of being perceived and if the above identification is effected. Thus, the means of knowledge has got a secondary importance in determin­ ing the directness of knowledge. Therefore, in the case of the direct perception of Brahman, the Scriptures should only be accepted as the direct cause. Of course, it is not possible for them not to admit meditation and internal organ as being helpful to Atmasaksatkara. The only question then arises as to how much importance is to be given to them. Mind, accord­ ing to this school, cannot be designated as the asadharana or the peculiar cause of Atmasakfitkara, as, it is necessary for every type of knowledge and not for Atmasaksatkara only. Thus, it is helpful but not the principal cause of the direct perception of Brahman. Meditation is also useful to make the person qualified for the knowledge of the Supreme being, by purifying his mind but it cannot be accepted as the direct cause of the knowledge of Brahman.

Sarvajnatman, while answering the objection raised by the objector as regards this point of the acquisition of the direct knowledge from the Scriptures ( PelP- w p h ) , points out that the object of knowledge viz. Brahman being itself direct, it is possible to gain this knowledge from the Upanisadic statements only^in the following stanzas.

ci^HI <^dl i. c ^*rd r*i l li

w r T W f z n n F F ^ I -p'VlTd i 1 c*M I do 3-^ ^ cTHT^

He clearly declares his opinion that the Scriptures alone are the cause of the direct knowledge of Brahman and no help is sought by them in their task:

W r s ^ T R l K p f c r f ^ I <5l [ '^c:^ I \ H ‘id H r < W f fw d !

^Fzrrr9=rr mrpr it ^

=r qr^fw ^ tf: II

67. Samkfepasariraka - 1.341, 342. 6a. Ibid, 111.29$. 12 9

Thus, Sarvajnatraan, like the majority of other Advaitins, accepts the dabdiparokfatva.

The main argument put forth by the followers of the Bhamati school is that knowledge is direct because of its being generated by the sense-organ. That is to say, knowledge is direct only when it is produced by the sense-organ and it is indirect when it is produced by something other than the sense-organ. It is pointed out that both directness and indirectness are possible even in regard to one and the same knowledge, e.g. a man of an effective sense-organ can acquire the direct knowledge of a subtle thing, while, an old man of ineffective sense-organ cannot have the direct knowledge, although the object is one and the same. So, for the knowledge of Brahman also, in order that it should be direct, a sense- organ, - that of course mind, as its generator, should nece­ ssarily be resorted to. The objection against that view that even the inferential knowledge would be perception as it is also produced by the aid of the internal organ, is answered by pointing out that the inference etc. are not produced by the sense-organ alone, while perception has got only the sense- organ as its cause. Thus it is argued that knowledge, which is produced by the sense-organ only is perception. Therefore, in the case of the Atmasaksatkara, the mind, assisted by meditation should be accepted as giving rise to the direct knowledge. Citsukhacarya, the author of the Tattvapradlpika, however, denies the assistance of the mind in generating self- realisation. He argues that mind is nowhere admitted to be the cause of Sakjjatkara, because, happiness etc. are appre­ hended by the Sak§ in or witness and Atman is self-illuminating. Even the realisation which is not prama, is of the nature of witness. Thus, mind is never the cause of any Saksatkara.- - - 69

It should be noted that both the schools are in a position to quote authoritative passages from scriptures and from the Bhasya of are the passages to which the followers of the Bhimati school take resort, while ’zp r R ’ETT ^ 7 ^ '■?T5^T15£f etc. are the favourable authorita­ tive quotations cited by Suresvara and the Vivarana tradition. Bach school is prepared to interpret the passages seemingly favourable to the other school, in the light of its own theory e.g. the advocates of the Bhamatl school interpret the passage ’zp t p r o r =T etc. to mean that Brahman cannot be V 9

69. Tattvapradipiki, p.344* 70. Brhadaranyakopanisad, 4.4.19. 7 1 . Mundaka, 3*1«9. 72. Gltabha^ya of 11.21, p.55 (Anandasrama Edition) 73* Kenca 3* 74. Brhadaranyaka, 3*9.26. 75. Chandogya, 6.7 .6. 1 3 ! known by an un-ciiltivated (asaniskrta)• mind. The passages, which directly proclaim the Brahman - realisation from the are taken by this school in the sense that this knowledge is paroksa or indirect, and to make it aparoksa or direct, constant meditation is to be resorted to. Thus, this school has to modify the sense of the passages favourable to the other school. On the other hand, according to the dabdaparoksa theoiy i.e. the theory, which admits of direct perception from the word or valid testimony, the passages like - 1* ’ - etc. only suggest that the concentration of the mind is quite necessary for the realisation of Brahman. The famous illustra­ tion on which this school takes its stand is wherein the sentence i.e. dabdapramana gives rise to the aparoksa or the direct knowledge. 76

Taking into consideration the arguments put forth by both the schools, it can be remarked that meditation, internal organ and the mahavakyas - these three things are to be inevitably accepted by every school as being helpful for

76. It is amusing to note here that even this knowledge is not accepted to be direct. The Kalpataru says - ^

5mr?iiFrrt^: 1 .. rPM :, pp.55-56. But this is a matter of difference in regard to the experience as such, and no argument would be useful. .132

Atmasak^atkara. Controversy is only about the importance to be given to one of these as an efficient cause. Mind, as the material cause of perception is accepted by all. And when following SuresVaracarya, the word is accepted as having power to produce direct knowledge, no necessity should be felt to take any resort to meditation to turn indirect knowledge into direct one. As has been already noticed, internal organ need not be admitted as the peculiar cause of the direct realisa­ tion of Brahman, as its presence is necessary for each and every knowledge i.e. it is the Sadharana cause and not the asadharana one. Hence, it is better to assign the prominent place to the mahavakyas in the production of the direct realisa­ tion of Atman. As it has been pointed out by Sarvajnatman that - aparoksavastuvisayakam jnanam aparoksam* i.e. the knowledge of a thing which is direct, is necessarily aparok§a when there is no obstruction like the incapability of the mind etc., it can be asserted that when the above maxim is admitted, there would be nothing in the world, which can prevent the directness of Brahman-realisation, when it is generated by the word or the valid testimony and when there is no incapability of the internal organ as Brahman, the object of knowledge is Itself aparoksa. The point raised by the followers of the Bhamati school, under the influence of the Naiyayika concept of the means of knowledge, that both directness and indirectness would have to be accepted in regard to one and the same knowledge, can be answered by is.i declaring that a person of the ineffective sense-organ, has no contact with the object and hence there is no direct perception, although the object remains the same. For the same reason, there would be nothing illogical if somebody- acquired direct knowledge of Brahman from the Mahavakyas while the other one does not.

Sarvajnatman is very emphatic about this sabdaparoksatva. He points out again and again that the scriptural sentence is able to point out the established Reality i.e. Brahman, it is able to speak of the absence of any action, it has got the power to bestow the fruit of liberation. This scriptural knowledge only, which is not tinged with the errors, consequent on manhood, reveals the highest Reality in its t m e real form and uproots completely the darkness, veiling that Reality and thus gives liberation, without seeking for any help from out- side quarters. 77

Refutation of the Rival Systems of Philosophy;

The second chapter of the Brahmasutras, called as the avirodhadhyaya, deals with the refutation of the rival systems of philosophy. The various doctrines of the rival schools are considered on a logical plane in the first two padas of the second chapter and are shown to be untenable. Sarvajnatmamuni,

77. ^ dH^il

■BT^^TcOTftT ^ Hfi-; ii following his revered preceptors, discusses the objections raised by the opponents, as well as points out the faults inherent in their systems. The Vaisesika, Samkhya and the Buddhist systems are dealt with in the second and the third chapters of the Samksepasariraka. It is intended here to point out the exact views of Sarvajnatman about these theories.

For the understanding of the refutation of the Vaisesika system, it is quite necessary to know their doctrines - about cosmology and other problems. The Vaisesika school is famous for the atomic cosmology, the concept of samavaya, and the asatkaryavada. The Vaise§ikas have posited the Atoms as the cause of the world. It is argued here that whatever consists of parts must always originate from certain specific substances, which operate by the help of conjunction and which inhere in the resulting avayavin itself. Therefore, the Vaisesikas hold that where this process of division and sub-division of a given padartha, into smaller and smaller parts comes to an end, that is the atom, the utmost limit of subdivision. The atoms are thus the cause of the world. When the creation of the world starts through the desire of God, there originates a motion in the atoms of the element of wind, depending upon the principle of Adrsta. That motion causes the atom in which it inheres to dash against another atom and in the sequence of the binaries etc. the various elements are generated and from them the whole world-creation is effected. Two atoms make one dvyanuka, two dvyanukas make one caturanuka, three dvyanukas 135 make one tryanuka, the smallest particle of matter that is visible. The atoms have got the parimandalya dimension, the binaries (dvyanukas) have a different and new dimension vi25. anutva - minuteness and haasvatva - smallness. The caturanuka has got mahattva - greatness and dirgahatva - length. The tryanuka possesses mahattva and dirghatva, which is due not to the dimension of its causes - the dvyanukas, nor due to the dimension of the paramanus, but to a third cause viz. the quality of number, belonging to the three dvyanukas that have originated it. It can be seen that each of the above combina­ tions is marked by the effect dropping off some one characteris­ tic of the cause and taking on a new one, entirely unknown to the cause. Another important doctrine of the school is the asatkaryavada. According to this theory of causation, the pragabhava of the effect terminates the very same moment that the effect comes into being. This means that the effect is a new thing brought into existence by the causal apparatus working upon the causes, which remains thereafter in the intimate relation of inherence with the effect. The same is true of the qualities also. The doctrine of samavaya is akin to this doctrine of the asatkaryavada. Samavaya is a ’nitya* connection between two distinct padarthas, which exists between the five ayutasiddha pairs.

The Vaisesika opponent charges the Brahmavadin of violating the rule of like producing like. He points out that the qualities inherent in the cause-substance, originate in 130 the effect-substance, other qualities of the same nature. Therefore, if the sentient Brahman is to be assumed as the cause of the world, the quality of sentiency ought to be inherent in the world. But this is not found in the world and so it is not reasonable to believe that the sentient Brahman should be the cause of the world.

The answer to the objection consists in pointing out the inconsistency that is inherent in the Vaisesika view of causation."^^ It is argued that the tryanuka, which is produced from the hrasva binaries is not regarded as hrasva. The hrasvatva and the anutva of the binaries are not the reproduction of the parimandalya dimension. The mahattva and the dirghatva, belonging to the tryanuka, are ass\imed to be due to the quality of number - the bahutva. So it is seen that in the production of the dimension of the dvyanuka and the tryanuka, the dimension of the cause is not responsible. The rule of like producing like is thus violated and therefore, the Vaisefika opponent cannot blame the Brahmavadin for the assumption of the production of the non-sentient world fr«n the sentient Brahman.

While refuting the asatkaryavada, it is pointed out that the effect cannot be taken to be non-existent. The non­ existent things, like the son of a barren woman, are not

gta i t n .70 137 famous as a means for some undertaking. No creation is possi­ ble of a non-existent thing. Even the expression like »the effect was non-existent formerly’ is contradictory, because, whatever is non-existent cannot be qualified by any term like prak. Creation means the connection of the material cause with the effect, and connection is possible between two existent things only. Therefore, creation of a non-existent thing is impossible. The doctrine of samavaya, which is admitted in order to relate the karana with the karya, which is regarded as non-existent prior to its origination and both of which are taken to be distinct from each other, is shown as impossible. The untenability of the doctrine is proved by pointing out the inconsistency of calling samavaya, a connection between two distinct things and regarding it at the same time as of a

t totally different kind from samyoga, which also exists between two distinct things.

^ « The refutation of the Samkhya system consists in point­ ing out the defects inherent in the doctrine of cosmology and the doctrine of satkiryavada. The original standpoint of the Samkhya system is dualistic, for, it has admitted the sentient Purusa and the insentient Pradhana as the two original principles. The insentient Pradhina is held as the root-cause of all creation, the Purusa being an inactive, unconcerned seer only. Sarvajnatman points out that this xxx view about creation is rejected by the Sutrakara on the basis of the argument that the design and the arrangement of this huge world remain 1 3 8 unexplained if only a non-sentient world-cause, like the Pradhana, unsupervised by any sentient entity, be accepted. 79 It is impossible to admit that a non-sentient first principle would exibit the highly intelligent, complicated and purposive activity that is presupposed in the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world. The Pradhana is incapable of putting forth such an activity, because, being non-sentient, it has not the sufficient power, and the Purusa is incapable of doing it because, being merely the unconcerned witness he has got no will for it. Thus some sentient supervisor must necessarily be admitted for all the transformations of the insentient Prakriti.

The , which maintains that the effect is produced from an existent thing, is refuted very strongly by Sarvajnatman. He points out that the existent thing cannot be the object of creation, because, in that case, the operation of the cause will become futile. If the operation of the causal agencies would be said to be fruitful in that it helps to remove the non-manifestation of the effect, it can be shown that this 'non-manifestation of the effect’ must be admitted to be already existing. If, again, this operation

79. M i IWI cPTT I =T *f^ W il 11.76. 80. : I

w r q ii 1 1 .2 1 1 . 139 would be accepted to have motif enough in that thereby the cause is made to assume the form of the effect, it can be said that this 'form of the effect' is of one essence with the cause. Thus, in the opinion that the existent thing is created, the effect and the operation of the cause always exist. Hence, there will be always creation and dissolution and the sleep etc. would not be justified. It is further pointed out that these objections cannot be raised against the Vedanta philosophy, because, therein, the v/hole transforma­ tion is accepted due to maya. The effect is really speaking samvyavaharamatra - merely for the sake of usage. Real cause- effect relation cannot be proved either between two altogether different things or between two non-different things also. From the ultimate point of view, the reality of causation should be denied, because, all this samsara is a wrong siipposi- tion on the true nature of Brahman, the highest Reality.

In the refutation of the satkaryavada of the , Sarvajnatman has followed the doctrine of ajativada of Gauda- padacarya. On the basis of the argument that it is not a i possible for a thing to change its nature, he has refuted both the satkaryavada of the Samkhyas and the asatkaryavada of the Vaisesikas. lift

t The third characteristic of the Simkhya system viz. the parinamavada,^^ the transiormationistic view, which speaks of the reality of perception is discussed thoroughly and it is pointed out that it serves as a background to the

Vivartavada.

While refuting the Buddhist opponent, Sarvajnatman has answered the charge levelled against the Vedantins that the

Advaita philosophy is not different from the Buddhist philo­

sophy, when it admits the unreality of the outward object and the unreality of the outward object and the unreality of the waking state.Sarvajnatman has pointed out that the Advaitins, by all means, accept the four-fold division viz. the knower, the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge 84 and the knowledge itself, as real for all practical purposes, while the Buddhists do not recognise any such division. The momentariness of the objects is also not admitted by the Advaitins. On the contrary because of recognition, their permanency is accepted as long as the knowledge of the Highest is not attained. The Saksin, who witnesses the whole world

82. This view is dealt with in the next topic of 'The doctrine of Drstitraya'.

83. 9 ^ B w r f W =1 9 ^ I

II 1 1 .25.26.

g it.2 7 . 1 4 i merely by His existence, is a permanent entity in the Advaita system. Moreover, in no system other than the Advaita, the distinction between the real and the unreal can be made. Both the waking and the dream states are not real from the ultimate point of view, they are only relatively real, but the Bauddhas do not give any reality to the things in the waking state also.

The VijnanavadI Bauddhas deny the outer world and give nothing instead but the transient flux of ideas, so also the dunyavadi Bauddhas deny the whole world and give instead ’void’ only, but the Vedantins admit the external world episteraologically real and when they deny it, it is only to affirm its existence in and through the absolute Brahman. The dream-state is sublated like the snake imagined on the rope, in the matter of time, space and person. But the waking-state does not meet with any such sublation anywhere, as the experience - the 8 S pratyaya - is not of that type. Because of that, the waking-state is regarded as real, until the real nature of the highest Brahman is understood by the seeker. With the rise of the highest true knowledge, there takes place the sublation of both the waking and the dream states. Therefore, the Advaita system is not the prototype of Buddhist system and the Vedantin can never be charged of being a Buddha in disguise.

5ir*iT» cFTTfW =T ii 1 4 2

Another objection from the Buddhist standpoint is taken against the doctrine of superimposition. Tt is pointed out by the opponent that the world would become all void if the mutual superimposition of the Atman and the anatman is admitted. Sarvajnatman has answered the objection by arguing that the adhisthana and the adhara i.e. the resort and the locus of the superimposition are admitted to be distinct from each

other, and, the adhisthana being real, no voidness would arise.

With the disappearance of the illusion by the perception of the underlying reality, the adhisthana lying concealed so far,

shines forth in its full glory. Hence, no question of voidness

comes forth, and no nihilism would have to be pocketted in the admission of the mutual superimposition of the Atman and the anitman.

Sarvajnatman has also refuted the theory of cosmology

of the Buddhists. The Sarvastitvavadins among the Buddhists, have divided the whole Reality into two classes - the external and the internal. The elements, the senses and the qualities constitute the external side. The internal side is comprised by the five - rupa, vedana, samjna, samskara and vijnana. This doctrine about cosmology is attacked on the ground that both the physical and the psychical aggregates are not possible in the absence of some sentient cause of aggregation.The Buddhists do not admit any pennanent

i t II ij.69 1 4 3 sentient entity, which is endowed with the power of bringing about the samghata - the aggregation of the various elements.

No sensible inducing cause for the samghata be reasonably postulated. Therefore, on account of the absence of any

* • ^ samhantr - the permanent, sentient controller for the samghata, this doctrine of the aggregates, which is put forth to explain the lokayatra, is declared as untenable and misleading.

Various Theories about Creation and the famous Doctrine of Drstitraya:- Sarvajnatman has discussed various theories about creation, which are put forth by the Vaisesika, Bauddha, Samkhya and the Vedanta systems of philosophy. The iirambha- vada of the Vaisesikas and the Samghatavada of the Bauddhas are discarded by proving their unreasonableness and untenability.

It is intended here to study the two remaining theories - the Parinamavada of the Siinkhyas and the of the Vedantins as they are dealt by Sarvajnatman.

Sarvajnatman defines Parinama as the presentation in 87 another real form of the same thing possessing parts, e.g. Earth is changed into crops. There is no change as such in the thing in itself but its condition or the external form is gy. arirf^: ^ i EfhT» trfi»rrw ^ i ii 14 i changed once for all. Milk is transfonned into curds, which cannot again be changed into milk but the two are not altogether independent entities. Thus real transformation of the cause, assuming a new, varied form of the effect is admitted by this raodification-view of the Simkhyas.

Vivarta is explained by Sarvajnatman as the appearance in many unreal forms, without any change in the thing e.g. the moon appearing in many drops of water. The moon appears to be many when reflected in many ponds but in reality she is one, so also one thing vdthout change wrongly appears to be something else. The rope is many a time mistaken for a serpent. Without undergoing any real transformation, Brahman appears to be many. This process of wrong appearance is styled as 'vivarta'.

The doctrine of adhyasa, which has been discussed before, necessarily gives rise to the concept of Vivarta. Brahman, which is absolutely differenceless, changiess, attributeless, which may be called as the self-luminous pure Consciousness is the only real thing. There is no other thing equally real like or unlike it, whether within or outside Itself. The world, as it is experienced by us, cannot be said to be identical with Brahman, because of its possessing

88. i 14., impurity, limitedness, non-sentiency and destnictibility - the qualities, which are contradictory to the nature of Brahman.

Inference and the scriptures point out the world as being produced from Brahman, the only highest Reality. The Parinama- vada of the Simkhyas cannot be accepted in the case of the creation from Brahman, firstly because it is immutable - not liable to any kind of change, and real transformation is well-nigh impossible, without absolutely disturbing the nature of the cause. Secondly, Brahman is all-pervasive and hence no action will have any scope in Its case. Brahman is declared by the Scriptures to be both the material and the efficient cause of the world. But when the effect is a real transforma­ tion of the cause, there must be some sort of change and modification in the material cause and action in the efficient cause. And as these are not possible in the case of Brahman, the cause of the world, the necessary conclusion is that real transformation from Brahman is not possible. Therefore, the effect viz. the world, should be understood as being wrongly superimposed upon Brahman. a 11 this creation, which shotild be described as ahirvacaniya or mithya - neither real nor unreal, becomes, thus, a vivarta - a wrong appearance, of the ultimate cause - Brahman.

The problem about this causality in the case of Brahman is that the Scripture has given all these different theories and following the ^ru.ti, the Sutrakara also speaks of both the 14G

Parinaraa• and the Vivarta theories. Thus, the* ^niti first presents the parinamavada, in the passages like In the Sutra Sutrakara speaks of the parinamavada as being useful for explaining the dealings of the people. In the comment on this sutra, ^ankaracarya has also given the illustrations of the transformation-theory and has explained the lokavyavahara with the help of these illustrations. But in the next sutra the Sutrakara has pointed out that though the ^ruti first speaks of the parinamavada, it accepts at the end the vivartavada by declaring the unreality of the effects - All the modified forms of the cause, the various effects, are spoken of as the mere fabrications of the word, a name only, having no reality of any essence; the reality belongs to the cause only.

Therefore, the entire mass of the world-creation should be understood as having no existence apart from Brahman, Brahman being declared as the only true Reality. Thus, though the parinamavada is sometimes resorted to in the ^ruti and is accepted first by the Sutrakara, it should be only admitted as serving the background to the vivartavida, which is a logical corollary of the former.

The exact use of the parinamavada is pointed out by

89. Ghandogya VT.ii.3- 1 ^h i

90 _ - Sarvajnatman. He states that the parinamavada should be

■understood as the lovjer step of the ladder by which thought has to rise to the highest metaphysical peak represented by the absolute Brahman, the next step being the vivartavada.

It is easier to understand the vivartavada, when the parinama­ vada is comprehended first, by the seeker of truth. Just as,

in the everyday parlance, people use some means to gain a particular object, which is wishfully aimed at and which is resting at the highest peak, similarly, the ^ruti and the Sutrakara accept the parinamavada for explaining the vivarta- 91 vada. On the basis of this background of the transforma­ tion theory, the Vedanta-system puts forth the vivartavada as the next step for understanding the causality from Brahman-

The next step from the vivartavada is the ajativada of

Gaudapadacarya, which denies even the phenomenal reality of all creation. When the vivartavada is fully comprehended in all its aspects, it is easier to understand the ajativada, which dismisses the apparent universe as essenceless as hallucination. Thus, Sarvajnatman points out that the earlier Advaitins repfctfiiated the heterodox doctrines like collectivism - the samghatavada of the Bauddhas and the creationistic view of the Vaisesikas, through the adoption of the orthodox principles

90. trfWtRTS: I »II 11.61 91. I II 11.62. 1 4 c like the parinama-vada. They then proceeded further and criticised the latter from the higher level of vivarta-vada.

Even this vivartavada is abandoned as not unconditionally real and therefore the final culmination is found in the ajativada, which declares that creation, in the real sense of the term, is difficult to be admitted in the case of Brahman, as it is not possible for a thing to change its nature on any account, in any way- Thus, the fuhdamental reality of being can be viewed from three different angles, each succeeding one, marking a higher level of approach.

Sarvajnatman has classified the sadhakas under three grades, each grade following one of the approaches to the problem of causality- The first grade, which is called as the iropadrsti, is meant for the ordinary people, who believe in the reality of the v;orld, who explain the empirical reality as the real transformation of the highest Reality, through the adoption of the doctrine of parinima. Higher than this grade is the vyamisVadrsti, which forms a sort of an interaediary stage between the first and the last stages, which explains the empirical reality as the conditionally real appearance of the unconditional highest tmxth viz. Brahman, through the adoption of the doctrine of vivarta. Highest among the three is the apavadakadrsti, which firmly upholds the acosmic view of the transcendental reality, through the adoption of the doctrine of ajati or cessation of all duality. The first is meant for the ordinary person who is called by Sarvajnatraan as a krpanadhi, the second belongs to one, whose mind has just become free from all impurities, and the third is meant for the person, who has rea.lised the truth and who is a sthiramati. The Vivartavada stands midway between the aropadrsti and the apavadakadrsti, because though it possesses the relation of an apavada to the parinama theory of the aropadrsti, still, as regards the highest apavadaka drsti, it should be called as the aropa for that drsti. Sarvajnatman further points out

that the opinion of the Sutrakara and the Bhasyakara seems to

be that these three grades are possible to be experienced by

one and the same person, because these three views are the three steps of the ladder, which are to be successively climbed for reaching the highest peak of the realisation of the true

nature of the Absolute.

This ladder theory put forth by Sarvajnatman, reveals

his compromising attitude. It may be said to be one of the highest type of accommodative spirit in the Advaita, to view the parinamavada of the vSimkhyas as the background to the vivartavada, which is put forth as a logical corollary of the former. Sarvajnatman’s position marks the higher stratum of the middle stage, which has got a closer affinity with the ajativada of Gaudapadacarya. He is chiefly concerned with the elucidation of the transcendental reality and so he does not care so much to give a detailed explanation of the empirical 150 reality. This doctrine of drstitraya or the ladder theory about causality, is quite in consonance with his other doctrines of the eka-jiva-vada and the eka-cidasVita-ekajnanavada, for, everjrwhere he has laid the greatest emphasis on the sole reality of the highest Brahman. This doctrine of drstitraya, can be said to be clearly marking the beginning of the synthetical tendencies in the Advaita school of thought, and can be acknov/ledged as a great contribution by Sarvajnatman to the philosophical outlook of the advaita system of thought.

V '. mm Another important aspect about the attitude of Sarvajnat­ man is that, he realised strongly the difficulty that many of the sutras of Badarayana seem to give the parinama view of causation. He tried to solve the difficulty by suggesting that the Parinama theory is discussed approvingly in the sutras only because this theory is nearest to the vivarta and by initiating people to the parinama theory, it would be easier to lead them to the vivarta theory. His attitude reveals that he is always ready to justify and support his preceptors whenever any seemingly contradiction is pointed out.

The nature of the injunction in the sentence 'Atma va are drastavyah'

The next problem to be dealt with is, in regard to the nature of the injunction in the scriptural passage - S T T ’RT SfT

92. Brhadaranyaka, II.iv.5. 151 which there is a good deal of controversy among the Advaitins themselves. The meaning of the 'tavya' in drastvyah etc. is the bone of contention. Even from an outward examination, it seems that some sort of injunction is laid down by the affix tavya. This injunction is different according to different authorities.

The author of the Prakatarthavivarana holds that in • • drastavyah - etc., there is the apurvavidhi, as the sVavana is not already knoxm as an invariable means of the direct perception of the Atman and it is only by virtue of the mandate of the Upanisads that one learns for the first time that one OTight to listen to the Vedanta texts. Therefore the injunction laid down in the sentence is of the type. According to Prakisatman the expounder of the Vivarana tradition, the injunction in this scriptural passage is not the apurva, because the oravana is not, for the first time, known from the Scriptures, as the means of the direct perception. It is universally known as the means of the direct perception, when the object of the perception is direct. So, the injunction in sVotavyah etc. is the niyamavidhi, which orders that the knowledge of Atman should be obtained only through the Vedanta- sVavana and no other means, which may present themselves, are to be resorted to. Some of the followers of Suresvaracarya maintain that there is the parisamkhyavidhi in the sentence sVotavyah.... The parisamkhyavidhi, according to them, excludes the possibility of any other activity, which may not 1 5 2 be favourable to the knowledge of the Atman.

There are in all three kinds of injunctions and every one of them is advocated as being present in this sentence.

Now, Sarvajnatraan holds that no injunction, in any sense of the terra, be spoken of in the sentence ’At m a va are drastavyah’. According to him, the sentence only declares the Atman, as the only object, which is proper to be known. From the aphorism of Panini '31^ , it seems that the affixes krd - etc. should be employed when the sense of capability or propriety is implied. So, the tavya affix, which is employed in the sentence, reveals only the capability of the Atman as regards the hearing, sight etc. 93 As it is quite wellknown that the Atman is not understood, the sentence should be interpreted as talking of the capability of the knowledge as restricted to the Atman-reality only. Moreover, like the karmakanda, the Jnanakanda or the Vedanta philosophy does not depend on the actions or the actor of the actions. So, it is not proper to speak of any injunction in this sentence. He further points out that the sentences about sravana, raanana, - etc. are helpful in destroying the obstacles in

93. trrfWmt 133 the acquirement of the realisation of Atman. According to him, ^ravana is nothing but the logical investigation, pertain­ ing to the power of the v;ords in the sentences, which reveal the knowledge of Atman. Similarly nididhyasana is nothing but meditation. So, the force of the sentence lies only in revealing the capability of the Atman as regards hearing, sight etc. and the sentence should be interpreted as only helpful in removing the ignorance and the obstacles by holding the discussions for the clarification of one's intellect to receive properly the true knowledge of Atman. Thus no injunction in any sense of the term can possibly be pointed out in the sentence 'Atma va are drastavyah sVotavyah...'.

Sarvajnatman has got the authority of the Bhasya of damkaricarya, in propounding this view. On the Sutra ’ta t t u samanvayat ’ -^ankaracarya has remarked that the sentences like ’At m a n should be seen, heard etc.’, which are shadows of injunctions, are really meant for the purpose of turning one away from the objects of natural activity. It is also quite clear from the bhasya of ^ankaracarya that he embraced the view that no slightest possible connection of Atman with any sort of injunction, could be shown. He admits that there do occur some imperatives with respect to the Atman, but they become blunt like the edge of a razor applied to a stone. 95 94. B.3. I.i.4. n 95. W H T'U grftr B.S.Bhisya, p.129. 1 0 4

Because, these imperatives have for their content Brahman which can neither be rejected nor accepted. Further, while com.menting on the concluding part of the ubhayalingadhikarana,

^amkaracarya has remarked;- STftf...... wherein, it is certainly implied that there is no vidhi in connection with darsana, ^ravana, and nididhyasana- Moreover, no injunction is possible in regard to the sravana and others, because they are a peculiar kind of knowledge and knowledge is never the object of any injunction. The fact that ^ankaracarya on the sutra ' remarks that the repitition of sVavana, manana etc. is to be performed because of the repeated instruction contained in the passages such as . irrasitT ipgsirr ___ » intimates the repetition of the required mental acts tt- clearly suggests that ^ankari- carya understood sVavana etc. to be of the nature of knovrledge.

So Sarvajnatman is correct when he does not admit any injunc­ tion in regard to the seeing, hearing etc.

96. B.S.Bhasya, pp.713-14* 15;i

Views about the or the valid Means of reasonable knowledge: While answering the objection, which challenges the harmony of the Vedanta sentences in the highest Brahman, Sarvajnatman has declared his opinion about the pramanas like perception. The objector has pointed out that the fact that Brahman alone is understood from the Vedanta to be the highest Reality goes contrary to the other means like perception and inference, as only bheda or distinction is experienced by perception. The direct perception points out to the unhappy nature of the Self, while the ^rutis speak of the Atman as void of nescience, which is the root-cause of all miseries. Moreover, the Karmakanda speaks of the Atman as doer, while the Upanisads declare the Atman as void of all sorts of distinctions. Therefore, the knowledge received from the senses with the help of the means like perception, sublates the idea of the Reality, as revealed by the sacred Upanisads.

Sarvajnatman answers the objection by pointing out that the Upanisadic sentences only are capable of speaking authoritatively on the matters relating to philosophy. The Scriptures only are regarded as authoritative, because, the worldly objects are the objects of perception, while the highest Reality, Brahman, which is beyond the worldly measures is known as the object of the Scriptures only. Hence, there can be no contradiction between the perception and the Scriptures. Although it is admitted that perception comprehends 15i)

the independent existence of the external things, the knowledge gained from the Upanisadic statements is not at all sublated, because, the perception does not satisfy the conditions of a means of right knowledge. The conditions for a valid means are — (i) the object of the proof should be hidden by ignor­ ance, i.e. it should be unknown - ’anadhigata', (ii) it should be incapable of being sublated by any other means of knowledge i.e. it should be an ’abadhya’ object- Now, though the objects of perception fulfil the second condition, their antecedent concealment by ignorance is not there, e.g. the jar - etc. are themselves non-intelligent - jada, and conse­ quently they do not require ignorance for their covering. The thing to be known cannot be said to be comprehended by the means of proof, until and unless it is experienced as not known before. Having seen a white cloth, one, who has not seen a dirty cloth before, cannot state with certainty whether the whiteness is due to washing or it is so naturally. Therefore, unless there is the experience of the anadhigatatva of the object, the object cannot be acknowledged as anadhigata. Perception is not able to understand the anadhigattva of an object. All the worldly means are related to the non-sentient things only. Even the ^rutis have declared that perception etc. cannot have the internal self as its object, because, the 97 openings of the senses are pierced so that they can turn outward.

97. Mil 15 /

Therefore, these worldly means are acknowledged as relating to the jada things only; and as these jada things cannot be spoken of as anadhigata, being themselves covered by ignorance, the so-called valid means like perception cannot be admitted 93 as a reliable proof. The Scriptures only can be declared as the valid means for the knowledge of Brahman, because, its object viz. Brahman is anadhigata, not understood before.

Many objections against the validity of the Scriptures as the only reliable and authoritative proof in the case of Brahman, are answered by Sarvajnatraan. It would not be impertinent here to record these objections and the answers, which help to point out the attitude of the author as regards the highest proof viz. the ^Scriptures. The objector states that the Upanisadic sentences cannot become the proper pramana 99 for the understanding of Brahman. Because, firstly, if these sentences are admitted to be denoting an established entity like Brahman, then they would expect another pramana to prove their object (as it is experienced in the case of the

established entities in the world). In the absence of this manantara, the knowledge of the harmony in the sentence is not possible to be spoken of. Therefore the Vedanta sentences

9a. ^ ^ PPTTSWHSd I 11.21 .

99. The topic is dealt with from 1.101 onwards. 15:,

cannot denote the Brahman. Secondly, in the admission of the validity of these sentences in the case of the siddha Brahman, it would become difficult to speak of the pravrtti and nivrtti for any thing, and without these two things, the aim of existence via. the acquisition of happiness and the

destruction of misery is not possible. As no proyojana can be pointed out, the pramanya of the sentences based on the instruction for sravana, manana etc. becomes futile. Thirdly, a pramana is really admitted to be that which denotes an unknown object. This ajnitata is very difficult to be spoken of the Paramatman, as He is declared in the drutis to be only vijnanaghana. Fourthly, this pramana is admitted to be the remover of the ajnana. But this ajnana, which is to be removed, cannot be said to be either sat, or asat, or of the form of

sadasat (existent and non-existent). Therefore, this Vedic

pramana is not able to destroy the ajnana. Fifthly, a pramana is not admitted to be a karaka. But if this pramana is

admitted to be the remover of the ajnana, then, it becomes a

karaka and it would give up its nature of being a pramana. Sixthly, like the ordinary means, the Vedic means is not able to produce the idea of an object in a direct manner. Seventhly, if the fourfold division of the knower, the object of knowledge, the means of knowledge and the knowledge itself is admitted to be imagined by ignorance, then, Brahman also, would become a kalpita thing, as it is declared as an object to be known. If Brahman is not said to be an object to be known, then, the 1 5 statement that the Vedanta sentences are the proper means to understand Brahman appears to be unreasonable. For all these various reasons, the Scriptures can never be admitted as the reliable means to knov7 Brahman.

Sarvajnatman answers these objections by pointing out that the accomplishedness or establishedness in the case of an entity cannot be declared as the condition for being an object of the means of knowledge. The real requirement for being an object is that the thing should come under the province of the worldly notions. This quality exists in the various actions and the objects in the world, but it cannot be spoken of the highest Brahman. Therefore, the worldly means cannot work in the case of Brahman and the Upanisads should be admitted to be denoting the siddha Brahman. To the second objection that no fruit is accrued in the knowledge of Brahman, like that obtained in the case of the injunctive sentences, the answer is given that when a person attains the highest Bliss by the knowledge of Brahman, there does not remain anything which he can covet for. The said objection for the absence of the pravrtti and the nivrtti is not really a fault, it is considered by the Vedantins as a compliment to them. Because, such a knowledge of the highest Reality, becomes the cause of the ultimate liberation, on account of the destruction of the root-cause of all pravrtti. The third objection is answered on the ground that the ajnatata can be reasonably precluded 16 0 of the highest Consciousness because of its actual experience in the form - I do not know. In this connection, all the nature of ajnana is explained by Sarvajnatman and it is pointed out that Brahman only can be declared as the asraya and visaya of ajnana and therefore the objection is futile. To the fourth objection, the answer is given that the knowledge, received from the Vedanta sentences, removes off the ajnana, which is anirvacaniya or indescribable, by the power only of its real essence, acquired by its production and not with any other help. Thus, the pramana is able to destroy the ajnana* Further, the argument that the Vedic means is not able to produce the idea of the object directly is refuted by proving that the means of knowledge has got a secondary importance in determining the directness of knowledge, because, direct perception of an object can be had if the object is direct and Brahman being a direct object, the Vedic means is able to give the idea of Brahman directly.

The last objection is answered on the ground that unlike the jada things in the v/orld, the highest Reality, Brahman is declared to be svaprakasa. So the nature of the meya being different, the ordinary means cannot work in its case. Though the fourfold division of the knower - etc. is admitted to be ajnanakalpita and therefore unreal from the paramarthika point of view but real until the rise of knowledge, the results, which are produced from this kalpita division are experienced 161 as true and real for all practical purposes. Therefore Brahman can never become a kalpita thing, otherwise the Vedanta sentences describing It would be sublated. Thus, these ^rutis only should be declared as the reliable proof for understanding the highest Reality.

It is further pointed out that there is no real contra­ diction between the perception and the ^ruti. Even though, according to the theory of Vedanta, perception etc. are not authoritative in the case of the ultimate Reality, they do have authority as regards the mundane objects, as, this fact is understood from the very experience. Although, perception and the verbal testimony are similar, as, they are produced by ignorance, the former is not capable of pointing out the

Reality and not the latter. The reason is that - the ignorance, conditioned by the Samvid attains the form of the means of knowledge. There, the ignorance-part dominates at the time of perception, while the samvid-part is predominant at the time of valid testimony. This difference between the two means is understood from their results. Perception conceals the Reality and projects the duality, while, the drutis point out the real nature of the highest Reality. The object of the perception being different from that of the valid testimony.

Sarvajnatman has quoted the authority of to support his view. Jaimini has defined ’pratyaksa' as - 1 6 2

a?g?5Bt P w h i ^ i h s p h irii Sarvajnitman points out that this definition of perception, which speaks of the contact with the existent, aims at establish­

ing the highest Reality. Jaimini has also defined real knowledge as that which makes the unknown thing known to the world. Thus, the view about perception is similar to the view adopted by

the great Mimamsaka-Jaimini.

Sarvajnitman's definition of a real pramana as that, which makes known an anadhigata object, is quite acceptable.

He has proved the validity of the drutis as the only authoriti-

tive proof for the knowledge of Brahman, in a very convincing and logical manner. He has used his usual method of consider­

ing the philosophical problem from the point of view of the

highest Reality.

Appaya Dixita has represented the view of Sarvajnatman

in the following manner -

crccgnr^i^^c^giduiyi crf^tr^T|gwca?Tl^- 1 -fV 5RPf =r ^

I ^ I a H I gi^mTRtWi jripf ^ gWcrf^qzii i

Sarvajnatman has not developed this problem about the

100. - i.i.3. ^ f * 101. Siddhantalesasaragraha, pp.233-34* perceptual knowledge. He has mainly answered the objections ^ ft of the rival schools of philosophy - especially the Mimamsakas, against the validity of the Scriptures as regards the Brahman - knowledge. But the later followers in the field posited a systematic presentation of the perceptual knowledge. The knowledge of the object to be known, is designated as the revelation through the particular vrttis or the mental modes, to the subject or the pramata. The saksin is posited over and above the pramata as the direct but passive witness to all the objects, without any necessity of active behaviour, which is attributed to the knowing agent. It seems that Sarvajnatman did not think it necessary to deal with this practical side of the perceptual knowledge in all its aspects by considering the various pramanas or the means of valid knowledge. He mainly concentrated his attention on refuting the objectors, as, that only was thought by him as the necessary uprerequisite for the understanding of the true knowledge of the Reality as well as for keeping the great regard and trust in the Scriptural statements.

The Use of the Actions, prescribed in the Scriptures:

Another important point of difference among the Advaitins, is, in regard to the use of the actions, prescribed in the Scriptures. The Vedic passage - fqfqMP-ci iflR I ^02 unambiguously declares that the

102. Brhadaranyaka IV.iv.22. 1 6 4 actions like sacrifices are useful to attain the knowledge of Brahman. The only point of difference is in regard to the exact place of the actions in producing this knowledge i.e. whether the sacrifices etc. are directly useful or are only

indirect means to attain the knowledge of Brahman. Sarvajnat- raan strongly holds that actions are useful for the attainment of knowledge, only indirectly. That is to say, actions directly produce the desire to know. And this desire on its part is the direct cause of the knowledge of Brahman. He points out that the sacrifices and the other actions produce the purity in the intellect and therefore they should be regarded as the productive indirect cause. In the above sentence, the sacrifices etc. are to be connected with the desire, which is the meaning of the affix 'sanj and not with the knowledge, which is the meaning of the base ’vid’. He discusses the Panini-sutra - srTcTTf ziTi. which lays down the affix

’sa n ‘ in the sense of 'desire'. He points out that in this aphorism, Panini has not stated that the meaning of the root - the dhatvartha - should be given prominence. On the other hand, the real intention of the sutrakara seems to be that the dhatvartha should be subordinated to the pratyaya, which reveals the desire for that act. Following the general maxim - I » flrrepSRl (i.e. the meaning of the affix is principal to the meaning of the base) the prominence is given to desire, and therefore the sacrifices and other actions 1 6 5 are to be taken as the means of the desire to know and not the means of knowledge. Thus, *rtR (and not aitF? f^f-=d) is the correct meaning of the sentence under discussion.

The interpreting the above scriptural passage in this way, Sarvajnatman has got the authority of the bhasya, which concludes the sarvapeksadhikarana with the remarks -

The Vivarana tradition advocates a different view as regards this problem. According to the follov/ers of this tradition, Vedic actions like sacrifices are the direct means of the knowledge of Brahman. They argue that although it is a general rule that the meaning of the affix is principal to that of the base, there are some instances, which are nece­ ssarily to be regarded as the exception to that rule. The instances, which they point out are - .... »he desires to go on a horse’, ’he desires to kill by a sword’ - wherein the horse and the sword are not construed with the desire, which is the meaning of the affix, but with going and killing which are the meanings of the bases ’gam’and ’han’. In the same way, etc. should be understood as an exception to the general maxim - and thereby it should be

10 3. B.S.Bhasya, p.900. Itiitf admitted that sacrifices - etc. produce knowledge directly and not through desire.

In this case, there is not, in reality, a good deal of difference in these two views. For, even the Vivarana tradi- tion has to admit the samnyasa, which involves the abandoning of the actions, as the means of the knowledge of the Self. So, according to the Vivarana tradition also, actions cannot be said to be the ultimate cause of the knowledge of Brahman.

Parting with actions is inevitably admitted for the knowledge of Brahman, by all the dimkaravedantins. So, that the Vedic actions directly produce the knowledge of Atman, cannot mean that they are to be practised up to the attainment of knowledge. Because, these actions are to be stopped when the mind is purified and the strong desire to know is generated. That is to say, the direct result of these actions is the purification of mind and giving rise to strong desire. Dp to this limit, all the Vedantins hold the same view. The Vivarana tradition, while holding that actions are directly useful for the attain­ ment of the knowledge, suggests, as Appaya Dixita, in his Siddhanta-lesa-samgraha has observed, that actions, though not to be continued after the purification of the mind, find out the proper preceptor for the performer of the actions and they help to practise meditation etc. In this way, actions, according to this view, guarantee the knowledge of Brahman, while the view, according to which these actions serve only the purpose of creating desire, does not assure of the desired 1 6 ? knowledge. But this sort of distinction, does not appear to be justifiable. Because, the followers of Sarvajnatmaa can argue that these actions produce such a strong desire, the sure result of which is the attainment of the desired knowledge.

That is, they also can guarantee the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman.

This will be mere jumbling of words and no theoretical difference as such can be pointed out, as the status of the actions is one and the same in both the views.

Generally, Sarvajnatman’s views are akin to the views of the Vivarana tradition. But in this respect, he has agreed with the Bhamatikara, Vacaspati, in holding that the actions produce only the desire to know. He has proved his view as the only correct logical view, by basing the arguments on the grammatical ground. He firmly holds the opinion that if a

• ^ samnyasin resor*ts to these outer means like the sacrifices etc., and abandons the inner means like the practice of sama, dama etc., he will surely deviate from his path. He further states that the Vedanta sentences only are the direct cause of the knowledge of the Self and the remaining means are helpful in destroying the obstacles in the acquirement of the realisation. Among the remaining causes, the sacrifices etc. remove the sin while the sVavana etc. dispel the ignorance. The fruit of these sacrifices is to be offered to God, it is not to be desired. Otherwise, these actions will give heaven, which is I b S a hindrance to the attainment of knowledge. Thus the actions can only be regarded as the indirect productive cause for the attaiament of the knowledge of Brahman. Sarvajnatman*s usual style of considering a problem from the higher level, from the view-point of the highest Reality, is also revealed here. He does not give any importance to the worldly actions and the various sacrifices, which are so loudly acclaimed by the

Miiiamsakas. In order to give stability to the old sanatana only, he admits the actions as helpful for the production of the desire to attain wisdom.

The View about the Mok^a or Liberation:

The aim of all existence is acknowledged to be the acquisition of happiness and the destruction of all misery. Both these things are summarised in the term ’moksa’ of the Vedantins, for, moksa means the liberation from the clutches of avidya, which can be expressed in other words as the attain­ ment of the Brahmabhava, which is Bliss itself. There is no divergence of opinion among the Advaitins as regards the point that moksa is avidya - nivrtti. A slight difference exists only as regards the nature of the liberated soul. So it is necessary to deal with all the aspects of this moksa as developed by Sarvajnatman, in comparison with the other divergent view. lb'<

The of the moksa -- The following four means are prescribed by Sarvajnatman as the necessary pre-requisites for the attainment of liberation^: (i) Bxtreme non­ attachment or the disgust for life, (ii) Exact knowledge of the terms ’that’ and ’thou’, (iii) Correct knowledge of all the texts, which aim at throwing light on the nature of the attributeless Brahman and the relation to It of the individual soul, (iv) Discrimination between the inner and the outer causes of the highest knowledge viz. sama etc. and the sacrifices etc. respectively. A person, whose mind has become pure by the practice of the means as directed by both the sciences - the pravrttisastra and the nivrttisastra i.e. the purva and the uttara mimamsa sastra, who is ready to observe the sama, dama, and the renunciation from all acts - such a proper samnyasl approaches the preceptor and gains from him the true knowledge of the highest Reality and thereby realises the identity between the highest Self and his own Self and thus gets salvation at the very moment of the realisation of the Advaita, his idea of duality, caused by the avidya, being destroyed at that time. For the attainment of Brahmabhava, the means, prescribed by Sarvajnatman, are extremely necessary.

104. d ccc|qg^|-«faaT

I r| r3» r

II III. 3. 1 7 0

He has written his Samksepasariraka for the parivrajakas, the samnyasins, to help them on the path of liberation. Together with the , the understanding of the tirue purport of the Upanisadic statements, which describe the nirguna Brahman is quite essential, as without that knowledge, the advaita cannot be realised.

The nature of the liberated Soul:

The nature of a liberated soul is a controversial point among the Advaitins. Of course, the well-known scriptural passage, ' veda Brahmaiva bhavati',^^^ one who knows

Brahman becomes Brahman, declares in the clearest possible terms that the nature of a freed soul is nothing but that of Brahman. But the enthusiastic followers of ^ankaracarya have not kept the problem so simple. They discussed whether this liberated soul becomes one with the highest Brahman or the saguna Brahman, which serves the purpose of Isvara or God. According to those, like Sarvajnatman, who are inclined to accept the theory of the ekajivavida, there would naturally result the absence of the world, including God or the so-called saguna Brahman, when that single individual soul becomes free from the bondage of nescience. So, in this view, the problem of mukta's becoming one with the God does not arise at all. The only possibility is his becoming one with the absolute Brahman.

10 5. Mundakopanisad III.2.9. 17

Now, those, who have for the sake of the arrangement of bondage and freedom, posited the theory of the plurality of souls will have to argue that the liberated soul attains the lower Brahman and not the Highest one. Because, although from the point of view of the liberated soul, there is no nescience in connection with Brahman, there is still the existence of nescience as long as there are other individual souls, as unliberated. When all the individual souls would achieve salvation then alone the liberated souls would become one with the pure Brahman.

As it has been pointed out in the topics on the

Jivaninukti and the Jivaikatva theories, Sarvajnatman always considers the problem on a higher level. As an ekajivavadin, he does not care to account for the post-liberational existence, as, from the point of view of the liberated soul, the prapanca has come to an end. At the end of his work, he has described the state of a person, who has realised the truth, from the knowledge of the Upanisads. The sisya tells the preceptor that he has attained the highest form of the attributeless Atman, which consists of infinite Bliss only and that he sees all this dual phenomena like a burnt rope. He looks upon his body as the cast hood of the serpent, which appeares beforehand as real but whose unreality is experienced when the serpent throws it away. The cessation of all duality as well as the attainment 17

of the identity is acknowledged by the pupil. Thus, in the

opinion of Sarvajnatraan, the liberated soul attains the highest

pada of the Lord^.he becomes the nirguna Brahman Itself, as soon as the identity is realised.

Appaya Diksita maintains in his Siddhantalesasamgraha, that the view which admits that the liberated soul attains one­ ness with the lov;er Brahman is only consistent with the scriptures

as well as with the Brahmasutras and the bhasya of ^ankaracarya thereon. But, in reality, the liberated soul need not become one with the saguna Brahman, ^ankaracarya, while using the phrase i iqy fdMiclearly suggests that

Brahman, which is to be attained or rather, as if to be attained, is beyond all the usages, including that of IsVaratva. If the unliberated souls are not given an undue importance, as it is

not quite reasonable to do so, all the Advaitins would agree

in holding that the liberated soul becomes one with the highest Brahman. Sarvajnatman is quite correct when he admits that the mukta attains the state of the nirguna Brahman.

The nature of liberation and the catagorles of moksa :

Moksa is designated as the avidyanivrtti or the removal of nescience. This removal is neither real, nor unreal, nor real and unreal, nor indescribable. It is beyond these four types and is designated by Sarvajnatman as pancamaprakara or of ^ 6

the fifth type, because, it cannot be designated by any of the four above terms. In order to avoid gaurava in accepting this

removal of nescience as pancamaprakara, Sarvajnatman suggests that the removal should be accepted as the conscience itself, marked with the knowledge, produced by the raahavakyas. The

objector takes an objection that the word 'ajnananivrtti',

being negative in character, cannot mean Brahman, which is a

positive entity. This objection is answered on the ground that ajnana and nasa, are the two words, coMbined in the compound, which, with the help of the upadhi - jnanodaya, givef rise to an altogether different sense viz. the conscience.

The Istasiddhikara - Vimuktitman, agrees with Sarvajnatman ^ _ _ 106 in admitting that the avidyanivrtti is pancamaprakara. Sarvajnatman has made an advance over the view of the Istasiddhikara, by suggesting cleverly that avidyanivrtti can be designated as Brahmabhava.

Generally speaking, there are three types of liberation, which are admitted by the Advaitins: (i) sadyomukti tii)

jivanmukti, and (iii) kramamukti. The first is attained by the person, who becomes liberated at the very moment of the rise of the true knowledge of the Reality. Such a person, who

106. ^ y

The person, who has become liberated but who is not able to throw his body instantly and who has to live on this earth in the mukta-state is called a Jxvanmukta. The kramamukti is that in which the sadhaka attains the state of Brahman by stages successively.

Sarvajnatman really approves of the sadyomukti. He holds the view that as soon as a person gains the true knov/ledge of the Reality, there remains no hindrance in his realising advaita and becoming one with the highest Brahman. Some sort of avidyalesa is necessarily to be admitted for the Jivanmukti and the kramamukti. So he is not ready to accept these tv/o other types. But as other Advaitins have give their permission to these types, Sarvajnatman also accepts these two types, which help to stabilise the Advaita philosophy. From the practical point of view, the Jivanmukti is necessarily to be admitted, as, the liberated soul can impart the knowledge of his experience of the realisation of the advaita to other seekers and help them on the path of liberation. Thus, these different catagories of liberation are quite essential if the problem is considered on the lower plane of the phenomenal reality and if some importance is given to the experience of the mukta, who lives here till the destruction of all his prarabdha karma- And as these categories are meant for different sadhakas, there is not n r I

nee. a great degree of diverge^among the Advaitins on this point.

The Doctrine of Apauruseyatva:

According to the first interpretation of the Brahmasutra ' sastrayonitvat', Braiiman is the author of the . This

statement, which pre-supposes that the Vedas are sakartrka, is more or less, a challenge to the Purvamimamsakas, who strongly maintain that the Vedas are akartrka or not created by anybody

- even by God. According to the Mimimsakas, the fact that the

letters are eternal and that the author of the Vedas is not known even when an unbroken tradition of the preceptor and the disciple is still in existence, logically leads to the concept of apauruseyatva and anaditva. The Naiyayikas, on the other hand, hold that the Vedas are originated by God, who is not even slightly contaminated by the human defects. Nov/, the question arises as to what theory exactly is admissible to the

Advaitins, because, it is generally knoim that the Advaitins

maintain that the Vedas are apauruseya while the sastrayonitva-

dhikarana declares that the Vedas are created by Brahman. The

attitude of Sarvajnatman to this problem is as follov/s. He

states that the Vedas should be regarded as self-authoritative.

The Mimamsaka objector raises an objection against this view

of the Advaitins. He points out that if everything is produced

by Brahman - either according to the parinamavada or according to the vivartavida, the Vedas also, being produced would lose i ii their self-authoritativeness, and when they have no self­ authoritativeness, the undual nature of the highest Brahman vfill not be proved satisfactorily. Sarvajnatman answers the objection by pointing out the same difficulty in the view of the objector- Even, according to the Mimamsakas, the words and the letters express the meaning when they are cognised. This cognition is momentary. So, the words, which are conditioned by the cognition, are to be accepted as momentary.

Moreover, the order of the words is also necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the words, and the order not being natural, cannot be said to be eternal. Hence, the words, which are differentiated by the sequence, would also become non-eternal. Thus, there should be no difference of opinion as to the creation of the words and the sentences - both ordinary and scriptural, even though the eternality of the letters is accepted by the Mimamsakas.

The objection raised by the Naiyayikas is that - every word requires the convention of the particular meaning - the convention, which is certainly man-made. Therefore, the Vedic words must presuppose the independence of man's intellect - the fact, which deprives the Vedas of their apauruseyatva and its consequence viz. authoritativeness. Sarvajnatman refutes the Naiyiyika stand by pointing out that the convention is not man-made, it is beginningless. No valid means of knowledge can possibly prove the existence of one, who could have made this 1 7 7

convention. It is altogether impossible for anyone to create the relation of the words with the sense, unless, he does not know a single word beforehand. If at all any person has made this convention, there is no reason for his not being remembered. The inference, with which the Naiyayikas prove the existence of

Isvara, is not of any use, because, it does not prove the

independence of Isvara in creating the world.

The Scriptures unambiguously refute the idea of the

independence in the composition of the Scriptures as well as

the world. The srutis point out that the highest Brahman is

svayambhu and the Vedas are only like the breathings

Thus, God is regarded as the

creator of the Vedas but at the same time He is not independent

in creating them. He has to create them in accordance with the Vedas in the previous age. The only remaining alternative in these circumstances is that the Vedas must be accepted as self- authoritative. Sarvajnatman concludes the topic by calling the Vedavidya as svaprayuktapramanabhavajnana and by pointing out

that the reasoning about the pojirnseyatva of the Vedas is not logical and therefore the Vedas must be regarded as apauruseya.

Before closing this chapter, it is necessary to discuss a point, which deserves some notice from the point of view of the correct presentation of Sarvajnatman’s views. It has been made quite clear that the Mimamsakas hold the view that the 1 7 ‘:

Vedas mainly speak of some action or the other. Sarvajnatman has given different viev/s as regards the exact nature of this

’karya' or ’action’, v/herein lies the purport of the Vedas. The first view given is that, according to some, the ’karya' is that, which being unrelated with the time-element, dispells the inclination towards non-action. That is, in other words, the vidhivyapara, in the fonn of pravartana or instigation, which necessarily gives rise to action is meant by the word ’karya'.

This view, which has been referred to as being held by some - eke - by Sarvajnitman, is wrongly supposed by Agnicit purusottama, a comraentator on the Sanksepasiriraka, as being shared by the Bhattas or the followers of Kumarilabhatta. Madhusudana , on the other hand, rightly attributes this view to some followers of Prabhakara. The second view, expressed in the next line of the same verse, is also attributed to the followers of the Prabhakara school, who have admitted the first view. It is the Prabhakaras who hold that the karya, is the direct cause of instrument of the production of the result, desired by the (prompted) person and which acts as an incentive, because, action is brought about by the exertion of the agent and the causal potency resides in this exertion.

Therefore, this faculty is assumed to exist in the action itself and the kirya is called as an incentive. Thus, Madhusudana 17II

Saraswatl is quite right in attributing both these views to the

Prabhakaras.

In this way, an attempt has been made in this chapter, to put forth a correct presentation of Sarvajnatraan’s views. The important philosophical problems, which have become the bone of contention among the Advaitins and on which various divergent views are expressed by the later savants of the

Advaita tenets, are only dealt with in this chapter. The refutation of the dogmas of the rival schools and of the charges, levelled by the opponent systems is also presented vfith a view to help the understanding of the argumentative power of Sarvajnatman. The estimate of the author's new approach to the old concepts, which are hinted at by the great Master but which are not fully developed by him, is dealt with in the next chapter.