/ ARl'BftLY *fl^ ) \rf 13 ,1984 MARCH, >I98S Kos. 1-4 ' : iSH 0^ -'X'^' lf?S> "msftJt'- -^y^ - Jr* ^ AMBODHI ARTERLY ) APRIL 1984 MARCH 1985 13 Nos. 1-4 |>RS iUKH MALVANIA ; BETAI SSHASTRI L: D. INSTITUTE OF INDOtOGY, AHMBDABAD-9 : Editors : . Pt, D. D. Malvania Dr. R. S Betai Dr. Y. S. Shastri Board of Experts Pt. D. D. Malvania Dr. H. C. Bhayani Dr. E. A. Solomon Dr. M. A. Dhaky Dr. R. N. Mehta Dr. K. R. Chandra Dr. J. C. Sikdar Dr. R. S. Betai Dr. Y. S. Shastri Contents Refutatiou of Advaita Vedanta in Major Jain Works 1-13 Yajneshwar S. Shastri Unpublished Inscription of Rang Sariga 15 Raghvcndra Manohar Ksvyabandha or Vakyavinyssa 17-23 R. S. Betai Conception of Maya (illusion) In Asanga's Vijnanavada Buddhism 25-34 Y. S, Shastri Bhatti as Quoted in the Durghatavrtti 35-56 Nilanjana S. Shah 'Kasirsja' of Bhasa An Appraisal 57-72 Sudarshan Kumar Sharma Buddhism Vs. Manusmrti 73-78 Jaya R. Betai & Ramesh S. Betai - Avidyg Its Agraya and Visaya 79-99 E. A. Solomon - Vardhaaltna S'uri's Apabhra-m^a Metres 101-109 H. G, Bhayani and Origin Development of Jaina Sangha 111-119 /. C. Sikdar Rasa and its Pleasurable Nature 121-134 V. M. Kulkarni '-HRl M'x-MV >H'4H MM-U Review 63-80 REFUTATION OF ADVAITA VEDANTA IN MAJOR JAINA WORKS* Yajneshwar S. Shastri of Indian History philosophy tells us that all the systems of Indian Philosophy developed in the atmosphere of freedom of thought. There was a tradition in Indian Philosophical platform to present opponent's-, view first known as the Purvapaksa (prior view) and then establishment of one/s own view by refuting opponent's star.d point known as the Uttarapaksa or Siddhanta (conclusion). This kind of method inspired the Indian thinkers to 'study thoroughly, views of all others prior to the establishment of thejr own of system philosophy and gave thoroughness, perfection and cathojjc to their spirit system. Jaina philosophers also following the same brpd- , minded tradition, presented views of all the of Indian systems thought,,,' with considerable care and established (heir own principles . refuting.,oppg- nent's view with logical rigour. But it is very interesting to note, ilia,t as thinkers of just great other schools of thought such as Bhartrhari,i Kumariia.bhatta,? Prabhakara,3Jayantabhaa4 and Udayana,Swho treated only Advaita as real Vedanta system, similarly eminent philosophical per- sonalities of Jainism presented and refuted only Advaita system of Vedanta in their writings. Even later writers who flourished after Rsms- nuja and Madhva mention neither Ftt/rfsdvaita nor Dvalta system of Vedanta. Criticism of Upanisadic Atmadvaila or Brahmndvaita is found in early'" Jamagamas such as and ; Sutrakrtangao Vise3avasyakabhsya.7 Th e line of presentation and refutation of Advaita is more or less 'similar in all the major works of Jainism. Certain common features are found in both Jainism and Advaita Vedanta such as liberation as the highest goal of ' life, ignorance of as the Reality cause of our bondage Laiv of Karma, Jivanmukti etc., still in certain other matters both the systems are diametrically, to each opposed other. Absolutism of Advaita Vedtinta claims thai, Reality is one without a second,' this world is mere' and ' appearance ultimately there is no difference between supreme Reality and mdivKlual a soul, Jainism is a system of realism, dualism and pluralism/ 2 Y. S. Shastri It is a realism, because it recognises the reality of the external wor is a kind of dualism, because it advocates two fundamental realities cj Jzvfl (Soul) and the Ajiva (Matter) which are obviously controdic each and a on related to other; pluralism account of belief in plnra 10 of substance. Advaita Vedanta believes in absolute non-dua advocates non-absolutism or while Jainism manysided theory of Re It both the extreme view of (Anekantavada). rejects absolute eternality as It is a as absolute non-existence. system of unity in difference, of one 1 many and of identity-in-change. "* According to Jainism Advaita Vedat which one-sided theory rejects particularities and emphasises only one of Reality. It gives only partial knowledge of Reality and falls under 2 sangrahanaya.* Logical Jiants of Jainism such as Samantabhadra, * 3 Akalarikj 1 5 16 Prabhacandra :< 8 Vidyananda, 5 Hemacandra,nVadidevasuri, Mallise and 'others have severely criticised the Advaitic theory of non-< doctrine of and of Brahman, Maya oneness individual Souls. (Ekajivava Criticism of Advaitic conceptions are scatered in different Jaina wo has been A humble attempt made here to size them in to unity in a ^ condensed form. Jaina thinkers argue that Advaitic doctrine of non-duality of Brahn of and theory Maya (i.e. illusory nature of the world) cannot be pro by any accredited means of knowledge. If it is provable by any means then there is of aa knowledge duality Pramana and Prameya. Frist of ; existence of non-dual Brahman is contradicted by our perceptital expe ence. Perception reveals only the world of plurality. Daily experiences or duality plurality of phenomena cannot be repudiated as false app< ranee or illusory, because this difference is clearly seen and felt. Th< is no proof against this duality or plurality which is cognised in c normal is experience. Where contradiction in saying that potter fashio a pot with his sticks and eats his food with his own hand. The differen as (such potter and his actions) between agent and action is even know by the ordinary If Advaitic view of people." non-dual Brahman is acce] the ted, then, difference observed between the agent and the action cai not be 2 a possible. The standpoint of the Advaitin's that one absolu transforms into many such as agent and action etc., also indicates dtialit This is because one absolute never transforms itself into many \vithoi the assistance of others, which means acceptance of duality between th assistant and assisted. 2 3 fhe well-known example of shell and silver give Refutation of Advaita Ved&nta in Major Jaina Works 3 the Advaita by Vedantms to prove the ultimate falsity of the phenomenal world and oneness of Brahman, itself proves the existence of the shell and the silver as two different entities. In the same way, the statement of Advaitins that Brahman is one without a second and the world is just appearauce24 proves the duality of Brahman and the phenomenal world which is different 25 from Brahman. It is also not tenable to argue that one self-identical unitory Brahman appears as the plurality of phenomena as in a just dream plurality of facts is experienced though it is one Cons- ciousness that only exists and is felt and thus existence of one absolute Brahman is not contradicted by perceptual experience. This is because even in dream as in wakeful experience, the consciousness of action is different from that of the agent because dreamcontents are produced by different memory impressions. 8 * The viewpoint that the indeterminate (nirvikalpa) cognition which cognises existence of Brahman cannot be accepted as source of our experi- ence, because we never perceive what is not determined by space, time and what is not other than the Self. knowing On opening our eyes we per- ceive specific existence determined by space, time, otherness and the like.* ' Granting that indeterminate cognition is a kind of valid source of know- ledge, it must be accepted that, it will not only take note of what Brahman is, but, will also take note of what Brahman is not and thus it leads to dualism of Brahman and non-Brahman." Even the argument that perception has no power to deny the Reality, it only affirms is baseless because affirmation always implies negation, a thing cannot' be affirmed to be yellow without denying that it is black. Thus, affirmation and negation which are presented together are the positive and negative aspects of a single Reality. Our perceptual experience instead of proving one Brahman, proves difference lobe as to integral Reality as identity If perception only affirms i.e. Reality Brahman, then why not to state that it affirms this plurality of phenomenal world also. If it affirms both, then there is a dualism of Brahman and the world. Thus argu- ment of the V&dnntins that perception affirms only positive Reality" is not justified by our experience If Brahman is only real and this world is false, then Brahman could have been in known the first case of our normal experience and not this pluralistic phenomenal world. a >'. Even the of Brahman cannot Non-duality be proved on the basis of pure also. When Vedsntins logic argue that Xtman is un-born, uu-bound and always freed and in there is thus, reality, neither bondage nor Jibe- ration, this is etc., purely fabrication of mind and to prove such kind of Ataiau by inference will be completely imaginary. The Consequence of 4 r. S. Shastri '-his is attainment of an 3 imaginary liberation. Bondage and liben are facts and both cannot be regarded as illusory. Denial of distiuc between them in definance of experience is nothing but embracing Scepticism or Universal nihilism. 5 3 If non-duality of Brahman 'is proved with the help o? valid infer which involves the proban (hetu) and the probandum (sadhya), then t is clear admission of duality between the proban and probandum a tact is that both cannot be identical becai.se, inference will be ini unless both are admitted as two distinct facts. ain it Ag will not.be c We to p construct a syllogism which demands different members In one infere proves the probandum by means of known proban, preceding to .he tin-known' which means inevitable dualism of U: '"**< uuvi m ua COv/ tin 1 Jinn nt H I-fTa,.