DOCSLIB.ORG

The Development of Russian Nationalism Under Gorbachev (1985-91)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Development of Russian Nationalism Under Gorbachev (1985-91) The development of Russian nationalism under Gorbachev (1985-91) Timothy Michael Spence V UNIVERSITY ' : :. "f' PhD Thesis V LONDON / • School of Slavonic and East European Studies ProQuest Number: 10011299 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10011299 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract This thesis examines the development of Russian nationalism under Gorbachev, with special reference to new political organisations. Nationalism is defined as a combination of sentiment, political principle and movement. The political principle 'holds that the political and national unit should be congruent'. For Russia, this was not a straightforward matter: some considered the political unit to be a greater (imperial) Russian state; whilst others considered it to be a Russian national state (based on the RSFSR). In addition, the Russian language has two terms to define the national unit:russkii sindrossiiskii narod. Russian nationalism existed to a limited degree in the Soviet Union before 1985. Glasnost and perestroika reduced the limitations on expressions of Russian nationalism and provided an opportunity for opinions to coalesce, resulting in the appearance of organised movements. At first, most Russian nationalists welcomed this change, although some soon started to display elements of caution - they were worried about possible threats to their conceptions of the Russian state. This work aims to show that Russian nationalism under Gorbachev was not a unified movement, but a collage of opinions attempting to define the Russian state and its national values. The thesis examines: the development of new groups connected with Russian nationalism; the relationship between Russian nationalism and the centre; the issues which became Russian nationalist causes; and the tendencies which became apparent in Russian nationalism. The thesis contends that Russian nationalism can be divided into three tendencies: imperialist nationalism, concerned with the maintenance of a greater Russian/Soviet state; isolationist nationalism, which sought to establish a specifically 'Russian' state, untainted by foreign influence and separated from the non-Russian Union republics; and liberal nationalism, which respected other republics' independence, was receptive to foreign influence and, yet, was concerned with the Russian national identity of a new Russian state. C ontents Introduction Chapter 1: The Meaning of Nationalism Nation and Nationality A Russian/Soviet Understanding of 'Nationalism' Chapter 2: A Classification of Russian Nationalism 19th century - Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism Twentieth century - National Bolshevism From Brezhnev to Perestroika Classifications of Russian nationalism under Gorbachev Chapter 3: The Development of Russian Nationalism Part I: The Evolution of Russian Nationalism 1985-1988: Searching for a Cause 1988-1990: Organised Movements Spring 1990 - August 1991: Russian Nationalism Moves to Centre Stage August 1991 - End 1991: Reacting to the Break-up of the U nion Part II: Gorbachev/the Centre and Russian Nationalism Chapter 4: Russian Nationalist Issues Environment The Russian \Tllage The Search for National Identity and the Definition of the Russian Character Demographic Problems Territorial Issues Russian Orthodoxy Xenophobia Russian National Sovereignty and New Russian Institutions Chapter 5: Imperialist Russian Nationalism: Groups and Parties Connected with the Tendency Internationalists Conservative revivalists Populists Unifiers Pamiat' Anti-Communist Fringe Umbrella Organizations and Blocs Chapter 6: Liberal Russian Nationalism: Groups and Parties Connected with the Tendency Democratic Russia Movement Democracy and "enlightened patriotism' Democracy and therossiiskoe state Rossy Chapter 7: Isolationist Russian Nationalism: Groups and Parties Connected with the Tendency Solzhenitsyn Organizations Conclusion Bibliography Introduction The aim of this work is to show how Russian nationalism manifested itself in Russia during the Gorbachev period (1985-91) with particular reference to the groups which adopted it as a political cause. I believe that there are three tendencies within Russian nationalism which were given the opportunity to express themselves clearly under the influence of glasnost and perestroika: imperialist, isolationist and liberal Russian nationalism. One or two texts have referred to the terms 'imperialism', 'isolationism', 'separatism' and 'liberal democracy' in relation to Russian nationalism, but no one has made this exact distinction between the tendencies in Russian nationalism. I start with a discussion of nationalism, which seems to be frequently ignored when Russian (or any) nationalism is discussed. There is no agreement as to what constitutes nationalism, but Gellner's idea that it is a political principle uniting a political and national unit seems to be popular. Examining the various ideas on the subject, I agree with Gellner's definition, but also believe that a definition should mention the sentiment and the movement which pursue the principle. It is upon these three elements that I base my examination of Russian nationalism. The second chapter looks at the work of other scholars on the subject and enumerates some of the terms which they have used. It concludes with the three divisions of Russian nationalism. The third section of the thesis describes the development of Russian nationalism from 1985-1991, with an emphasis on the organisations and parties which arose. It divides the Gorbachev years into four different time periods, representing: the initial intellectual debate and the appearance of Pamiat'; the emergence of new organisations connected with Russian nationalism; the combination of Russian nationalism with both democratic and conservative forces in opposition to the centre; and Russian nationalism in the aftermath of the attempted coup of August 1991. The issues listed in Chapter 4 represent a fairly broad look at the variety of concerns affecting Russian nationalism. The chapter by no means goes 5 into each issue in great depth, for each issue might merit the examination of a thesis. Some issues might be subject to a deeper analysis than others, but the work only wishes to illustrate the variety of ways in which nationalism was expressed. The section on 'national character and identity' may seem to cover many of the other issues in the chapter, but I have tried to avoid repitition. The search for national identity does link many of the issues, but it also presents some new information. I therefore felt it necessary to include it as a separate category in the middle of the chapter. The last three chapters introduce the reader to a number of groups which expressed or used Russian nationalism as a conviction or a political tool. Chapter 5 deals with the organisations which are connected with imperialist Russian nationalism. This tendency represents the largest area of activity in Russian nationalism and encompasses the largest number of groups, some of which were fairly significant in size and some of which were very small. The groups represent a variety of political views, including: support for Marxism-Leninism; réintroduction of the monarchy; increasing the importance of Russian Orthodoxy in Russian life; and extreme right-wing views. However, all the organisations are guided by their desire to maintain or re-institute the greater Russian state/Soviet Union. Chapter 6 examines briefly the organisations which were most closely linked to liberal Russian nationalism. This includes groups which pursued liberal democracy and a civil society, whilst trying to establish specific Russian features within that society. It also includes the umbrella movement. Democratic Russia, and constituent members, which fought for the institution of a Russian [rossiiskii] national identity through the establishment of Russian state structures. Chapter 7 looks at the most marginal tendency, isolationist Russian nationalism. This tendency combined both separatism and isolationism to create the idea of a specific Russian path untainted by foreign influence and the concerns/burdens of the non-Russian(/Slavic) periphery. It gives a summary of Solzhenitsyn's programme for Russian recovery in isolation from the rest of the world and lists three organisations for whom a belief in the innate qualities of the Russian people was paramount. Chapter 1: The Meaning of Nationalism Nation and Nationality It is impossible to discuss nationalism without having a vague idea about what constitutes a 'nation' or a 'nationality'. Many nationalists believe that humanity is naturally divided into nations, whose peculiar characteristics can be readily identified. However, there are problems with this approach: firstly, today's studies of nationalism indicate that the emergence of nations is a relatively recent political phenomenon and discredit the idea that they might be 'natural' or 'preordained'; secondly, it is difficult to distinguish the unique,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Conversation with Vladimir Kara-Murza
    AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE PUTINISM AT HOME AND ABROAD: A CONVERSATION WITH VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA INTRODUCTION AND MODERATOR: LEON ARON, AEI DISCUSSION: VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA, OPEN RUSSIA 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2015 EVENT PAGE: http://www.aei.org/events/putinism-at-home-and-abroad-a- conversation-with-vladimir-kara-murza/ TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY DC TRANSCRIPTION – WWW.DCTMR.COM LEON ARON: Welcome. Vladimir’s vita was part of the invitation and you also saw it and I saw some of you picked it up at the registration. So I will not go through it. He’s very well known. Let me mention only that he’s deputy leader of the Party of Russian Freedom, better known by the Russian acronym of PARNAS. He’s the resident coordinator of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Open Russia. He’s a resident because Vladimir actually moved. He lives in Russia now, or rather he’s recuperating and then he will move there, and we’ll get to that in a moment. He’s also a Cambridge trained historian and author of several monographs, one of which I hope to be able to discuss here. And he is, of course, a prolific and most enjoyable and insightful commentator on Russian domestic and foreign policies with publications in all leading Western and Russian media. So thank you very much, Volodya, for coming over. We’re honored to have you. VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA: Thank you very much, Leon. And thank you to the American Enterprise Institute for organizing and hosting our meeting today. MR. ARON: Volodya, we were all very saddened and disturbed by the news about your mysterious near fatal illness in the last week of May.
    [Show full text]
  • An Overview of Russian Foreign Policy
    02-4498-6 ch1.qxd 3/25/02 2:58 PM Page 7 1 AN OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY Forging a New Foreign Policy Concept for Russia Russia’s entry into the new millennium was accompanied by qualitative changes in both domestic and foreign policy. After the stormy events of the early 1990s, the gradual process of consolidating society around a strengthened democratic gov- ernment took hold as people began to recognize this as a requirement if the ongoing political and socioeconomic transformation of the country was to be successful. The for- mation of a new Duma after the December 1999 parliamen- tary elections, and Vladimir Putin’s election as president of Russia in 2000, laid the groundwork for an extended period of political stability, which has allowed us to undertake the devel- opment of a long-term strategic development plan for the nation. Russia’s foreign policy course is an integral part of this strategic plan. President Putin himself has emphasized that “foreign policy is both an indicator and a determining factor for the condition of internal state affairs. Here we should have no illusions. The competence, skill, and effectiveness with 02-4498-6 ch1.qxd 3/25/02 2:58 PM Page 8 which we use our diplomatic resources determines not only the prestige of our country in the eyes of the world, but also the political and eco- nomic situation inside Russia itself.”1 Until recently, the view prevalent in our academic and mainstream press was that post-Soviet Russia had not yet fully charted its national course for development.
    [Show full text]
  • Colloquium Paper January 12, 1984 STALINISM VERSUS
    Colloquium Paper January 12, 1984 STALINISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM? A Reconsideration by Robert C. Tucker Princeton University with comment by Peter Reddaway London School of Economics and Political Science Fellows Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Draft paper not for publication or quotation without written permission from the authors. STALINISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM? A Reconsideration Although not of ten openly debated~ the issue I propose to address is probably the deepest and most divisive in Soviet studies. There is good ground for Stephen Cohen's characterization of it as a "quintessential his­ torical and interpretive question"! because it transcends most of the others and has to do with the whole of Russia's historical development since the Bolshevik Revolution. He formulates it as the question of the relationship "between Bolshevism and Stalinism.'' Since the very existence of something properly called Stalinism is at issue here, I prefer a somewhat different mode of formulation. There are two (and curiously, only two) basically opposed positions on the course of development that Soviet Russia took starting around 1929 when Stalin, having ousted his opponents on the Left and the Right, achieved primacy, although not yet autocratic primacy, within the Soviet regime. The first position, Which may be seen as the orthodox one, sees that course of development as the fulfillment, under new conditions, of Lenin's Bolshevism. All the main actions taken by the Soviet regime under Stalin's leadership were, in other words, the fulfillment of what had been prefigured in Leninism (as Lenin's Bolshevism came to be called after Lenin died).
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup the Suppressed Transcripts
    Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup The Suppressed Transcripts: Part 3 Hearings "About the Illegal Financia) Activity of the CPSU" Editor 's Introduction At the birth of the independent Russian Federation, the country's most pro-Western reformers looked to the West to help fund economic reforms and social safety nets for those most vulnerable to the change. However, unlike the nomenklatura and party bureaucrats who remained positioned to administer huge aid infusions, these reformers were skeptical about multibillion-dollar Western loans and credits. Instead, they wanted the West to help them with a different source of money: the gold, platinum, diamonds, and billions of dollars in hard currency the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and KGB intelligence service laundered abroad in the last years of perestroika. Paradoxically, Western governments generously supplied the loans and credits, but did next to nothing to support the small band of reformers who sought the return of fortunes-estimated in the tens of billions of dollars- stolen by the Soviet leadership. Meanwhile, as some in the West have chronicled, the nomenklatura and other functionaries who remained in positions of power used the massive infusion of Western aid to enrich themselves-and impoverish the nation-further. In late 1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development concluded that Russian officials had stolen $45 billion in Western aid and deposited the money abroad. Radical reformers in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, the parliament that served until its building was destroyed on President Boris Yeltsin's orders in October 1993, were aware of this mass theft from the beginning and conducted their own investigation as part of the only public probe into the causes and circumstances of the 1991 coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
    [Show full text]
  • Socialism and Current Crisis of Capitalism
    providing benefits for the workers EDITORIAL who are paying into this plan." According to that law Mr. This is the last question to be Obama, it states, very, very asked of Mr. Obama: '7s the directly that: "The primary forced bankruptcy of General responsibility of the pension fund Motors and the elimination of "fiduciaries" is to run this plan tens of thousands of jobs, just solely in the interests of an arranged collection grab for participants and beneficiaries and the favored U.S. financiers that for the exclusive purpose of are calling the shots? PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE BAIL OUT OF US AUTOMKERS This financial robbery of US and Canadian taxpayers hard- earned money is nothing more than the Greatest Auto Theft in history! Besides this unheard of Billions Robbery, it is also dumping 40,000 of the last 60,000 auto trade union jobs into the mass grave dug by Obama's appointee, James Dimon. Mr. Dimon is the CEO of J.P. Morgan and Citibank. While GM trade union workers are losing their jobs and retirement benefits, their life savings, but the GM shareholders are getting rich and most expect to get back a stunning $6 BILLION! Even under the present US Laws this is illegal! Helping Mr. Dimon is also the official Obama's appointee — This cartoon is from the Toronto Daily Star newspaper' showing Steven Rattner, Obama's "Auto the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) leadership that did not stand Czar" - the man who ordered up strongly enough during this financial robbery. Looking on is General Motors to go bankrupt.
    [Show full text]
  • Incommensurate Russia
    perry anderson INCOMMENSURATE RUSSIA t will soon be a quarter of a century since Russia left com­ munism behind. Its present ruler has been in power for fifteen years, and by the end of his current term in office will have all but equalled the tenure of Brezhnev. From early on, Western Iopinion of his regime divided sharply. That under Putin—after a period of widespread misery and dislocation, culminating in near state bankruptcy—the country had returned to economic growth and political stability, was evident by the end of his first term; so too the popularity he enjoyed because of these. But beyond such bare data, there was no consensus. For one camp, increasingly vocal as time went on, the pivots of Putin’s system of power were corruption and repres­ sion: a neo­authoritarian state fund amentally inimical to the West, with a wrapping of legal proprieties around a ramshackle pyramid of klep­ tocracy and thuggery. This view prevailed principally among reporters, though it was not confined to them: a representative sample could be found inEconomist editor Edward Lucas’s The New Cold War (2009), Guardian journalist Luke Harding’s Mafia State (2012), Standpoint contributor Ben Judah’s Fragile Empire (2013), but expressed no less pungently by a jurist like Stephen Holmes. For Lucas, Putin, having seized power with a ‘cynical putsch’, and maintained it with the ‘methods of terrorists and gang­ sters’, had ‘cast a dark shadow over the eastern half of the continent’. For Harding, under Putin’s tutelage, ‘Russia has become bullying, violent, cruel and—above all—inhuman’.
    [Show full text]
  • 2021 Year Ahead
    2021 YEAR AHEAD Claudio Brocado Anthony Brocado January 29, 2021 1 2020 turned out to be quite unusual. What may the year ahead and beyond bring? As the year got started, the consensus was that a strong 2019 for equities would be followed by a positive first half, after which meaningful volatility would kick in due to the US presidential election. In the spirit of our prefer- ence for a contrarian stance, we had expected somewhat the opposite: some profit-taking in the first half of 2020, followed by a rally that would result in a positive balance at year-end. But in the way of the markets – which always tend to catch the largest number of participants off guard – we had what some would argue was one of the strangest years in recent memory. 2 2020 turned out to be a very eventful year. The global virus crisis (GVC) brought about by the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic was something no serious market observer had anticipated as 2020 got started. Volatility had been all but nonexistent early in what we call ‘the new 20s’, which had led us to expect the few remaining volatile asset classes, such as cryptocurrencies, to benefit from the search for more extreme price swings. We had expected volatilities across asset classes to show some convergence. The markets delivered, but not in the direction we had expected. Volatilities surged higher across many assets, with the CBOE volatility index (VIX) reaching some of the highest readings in many years. As it became clear that what was commonly called the novel coronavirus would bring about a pandemic as it spread to the remotest corners of the world at record speeds, the markets feared the worst.
    [Show full text]
  • Ebook Download the Cinema of Russia and the Former Soviet
    THE CINEMA OF RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Birgit Beumers | 288 pages | 30 Apr 2007 | WALLFLOWER PRESS | 9781904764984 | English | London, United Kingdom The Cinema of Russia and the Former Soviet Union PDF Book However, different periods of Soviet cinema have been covered quite unevenly in scholarship. Greenland is not a country. The result is an extraordinary, courageous work of documentary-making, austere yet emotive, which records soup distribution and riots alike with the same steady, unblinking gaze. Username Please enter your Username. Take Elem Klimov. Bill Martin Jr.. Even though it was wrecked by political unrest, the Russian economy continued to grow over the years. It offers an insight into the development of Soviet film, from 'the most important of all arts' as a propaganda tool to a means of entertainment in the Stalin era, from the rise of its 'dissident' art-house cinema in the s through the glasnost era with its broken taboos to recent Russian blockbusters. Votes: 83, Yet they still fail to make a splash outside of their native country. The volume also covers a range of national film industries of the former Soviet Union in chapters on the greatest films and directors of Ukrainian, Kazakh, Georgian and Armenian cinematography. Seven natural wonders. Article Contents. History of film Article Media Additional Info. Olympic hockey team to victory over the seemingly invincible Soviet squad. While Soviet and Russian cinema was rather understudied until the collapse of the USSR, since the early s there has been a rise in publications and scholarship on the topic, reflecting an increase in the popularity of film and cultural studies in general.
    [Show full text]
  • The Historical Legacy for Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy
    CHAPTER 1 The Historical Legacy for Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy o other country in the world is a global power simply by virtue of geogra- N phy.1 The growth of Russia from an isolated, backward East Slavic principal- ity into a continental Eurasian empire meant that Russian foreign policy had to engage with many of the world’s principal centers of power. A Russian official trying to chart the country’s foreign policy in the 18th century, for instance, would have to be concerned simultaneously about the position and actions of the Manchu Empire in China, the Persian and Ottoman Empires (and their respec- tive vassals and subordinate allies), as well as all of the Great Powers in Europe, including Austria, Prussia, France, Britain, Holland, and Sweden. This geographic reality laid the basis for a Russian tradition of a “multivector” foreign policy, with leaders, at different points, emphasizing the importance of rela- tions with different parts of the world. For instance, during the 17th century, fully half of the departments of the Posolskii Prikaz—the Ambassadors’ Office—of the Muscovite state dealt with Russia’s neighbors to the south and east; in the next cen- tury, three out of the four departments of the College of International Affairs (the successor agency in the imperial government) covered different regions of Europe.2 Russian history thus bequeaths to the current government a variety of options in terms of how to frame the country’s international orientation. To some extent, the choices open to Russia today are rooted in the legacies of past decisions.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Introduction Entangled Far Rights A Russian-European Intellectual Romance in the Twentieth Century Marlene Laruelle ince the early 2010s and more visibly since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Russia’s support for the European Far Right—and for conservative and S populist leaders more globally—has become a cornerstone of the West’s perception of Moscow as a “spoiler” on the international scene. Russia is now perceived as a danger to “established democracies”: its support for far- right politics is interpreted as part of a broader strategy that also includes supposed meddling in elections and referendums—the 2016 U.S. presiden- tial elections, Brexit, and the Catalonia referendum, among others. Many observers expected that Russia, if it chose to intervene on the European political scene, would reactivate Soviet soft power toward the European Left. The fact that Russia’s most fervent supporters are now to be found on the right of the ideological spectrum therefore came as a surprise. Two key points explain the present reality. The first is that the Europe- an Left has undergone dramatic changes since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the European Left’s stance on international affairs may share some ideological features with Russia’s position—such as being anti-NATO, cautious toward transatlantic insti- tutions, and reluctant to see a too neoliberal European Union gain more power over nation-states—both are deeply divided on societal issues. Both the “old” Left, which maintains a certain proximity to communism, and the “new” Left, as it has emerged in Greece, Spain, and among many an- 1 © 2018 University of Pittsburgh Press.
    [Show full text]
  • Rainian Uarter
    e rainian uarter A JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Volume LXIV, Numbers 1-2 Spring-Summer 2008 This issue is a commemorative publication on the 75th anniversary of the Stalin-induced famine in Ukraine in the years 1932-1933, known in Ukrainian as the Holodomor. The articles in this issue explore and analyze this tragedy from the perspective of several disciplines: history, historiography, sociology, psychology and literature. In memory ofthe "niwrtlered millions ana ... the graves unknown." diasporiana.org.u a The Ukrainian uarter'7 A JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Since 1944 Spring-Summer 2008 Volume LXIV, No. 1-2 $25.00 BELARUS RUSSIA POLAND ROMANIA Territory of Ukraine: 850000 km2 Population: 48 millions [ Editor: Leonid Rudnytzky Deputy Editor: Sophia Martynec Associate Editor: Bernhardt G. Blumenthal Assistant Editor for Ukraine: Bohdan Oleksyuk Book Review Editor: Nicholas G. Rudnytzky Chronicle ofEvents Editor: Michael Sawkiw, Jr., UNIS Technical Editor: Marie Duplak Chief Administrative Assistant: Tamara Gallo Olexy Administrative Assistant: Liza Szonyi EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: Anders Aslund Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Yaroslav Bilinsky University of Delaware, Newark, DE Viacheslav Brioukhovetsky National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine Jean-Pierre Cap Professor Emeritus, Lafayette College, Easton, PA Peter Golden Rutgers University, Newark, NJ Mark von Hagen Columbia University, NY Ivan Z. Holowinsky Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ Taras Hunczak Rutgers University, Newark, NJ Wsewolod Jsajiw University of Toronto, Canada Anatol F. Karas I. Franko State University of Lviv, Ukraine Stefan Kozak Warsaw University, Poland Taras Kuzio George Washington University, Washington, DC Askold Lozynskyj Ukrainian World Congress, Toronto Andrej N. Lushnycky University of Fribourg, Switzerland John S.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Nationalism and Pamiat
    University of Northern Iowa UNI ScholarWorks Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006) Honors Program 1991 Russian nationalism and Pamiat Brian Granger University of Northern Iowa Let us know how access to this document benefits ouy Copyright ©1991 Brian Granger Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst Part of the Other Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Granger, Brian, "Russian nationalism and Pamiat" (1991). Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006). 73. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst/73 This Open Access Presidential Scholars Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006) by an authorized administrator of UNI ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. l Br.i.an Granqe:r: Preside ntial Scholars Thesis 1991 University of Northern Iowa I?"u.s ~:;.i.an Nat :i.onal:i s m and. Pam:i._ at_' _ More than seventy years after the October Re volution a crisis in the Sov.i.et Union haE:; cnusr:)d its c itiz.1:,•nf., to ffu.:[ f e r a lof;f; of: f::a1 th. This disillusionment s e e mingly stems from the lack of suc cess in economic reform and. the chnos of the democratization policy imple mented since the rise to power of M. S. Gorbache v in March 1985 . The following reaction has not merely c ondemne d. Gorbachev'r.;; "exper.i.mentat:i.on" with the Pand.orn' ~,; box of pereutroi)<<::1 ancl.gl<::isnout.
    [Show full text]