AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

PUTINISM AT HOME AND ABROAD: A CONVERSATION WITH VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA

INTRODUCTION AND MODERATOR:

LEON ARON, AEI

DISCUSSION:

VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA, OPEN RUSSIA

9:30 AM – 11:00 AM FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2015

EVENT PAGE: http://www.aei.org/events/putinism-at-home-and-abroad-a- conversation-with-vladimir-kara-murza/

TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY DC TRANSCRIPTION – WWW.DCTMR.COM

LEON ARON: Welcome. Vladimir’s vita was part of the invitation and you also saw it and I saw some of you picked it up at the registration. So I will not go through it. He’s very well known. Let me mention only that he’s deputy leader of the Party of Russian Freedom, better known by the Russian acronym of PARNAS. He’s the resident coordinator of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Open Russia. He’s a resident because Vladimir actually moved. He lives in Russia now, or rather he’s recuperating and then he will move there, and we’ll get to that in a moment.

He’s also a Cambridge trained historian and author of several monographs, one of which I hope to be able to discuss here. And he is, of course, a prolific and most enjoyable and insightful commentator on Russian domestic and foreign policies with publications in all leading Western and Russian media.

So thank you very much, Volodya, for coming over. We’re honored to have you.

VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA: Thank you very much, Leon. And thank you to the American Enterprise Institute for organizing and hosting our meeting today.

MR. ARON: Volodya, we were all very saddened and disturbed by the news about your mysterious near fatal illness in the last week of May. Then, you were in a coma for quite a while. So what happened exactly?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Well, before I answer your question, I just want to say that today is October the 9th. And today is the birthday of Boris Nemtsov. He would have been 56 and it’s the first birthday without him. And there is – there is a Russian saying, as you know – (speaks Russian) – there are no irreplaceable people. But that saying is not true because Boris was irreplaceable as a political leader, as a human being, and as a friend. And he inspired so many people with his courage, his vision, and his commitment to always do the right thing, regardless of the price. And in the end, he paid the ultimate price in his struggle for a free and democratic Russia. And we shall never forget. And we now have to carry on the work without him and we will carry on, but it will be so much more difficult.

Now, to your question, as you said, it was the last week of May, May 26, I’ve just come back from one of my many trips around Russian regions. I was in a meeting in Moscow and I was suddenly taken ill with an acute intoxication of unidentified origins. I went into a coma. All my major organs started failing, just shutting down one after another, the heart, the lungs, the kidneys, all of them. And in fact, doctors told my wife that I had a 5 percent chance of making out alive. So I’m very grateful to be here today and I’m very grateful for the concern and the support and the prayers of so many people in Russia, in this country, and elsewhere.

And I just want to take this opportunity to thank everybody. It really means a great deal. And we still do not know the cause. The poison, toxin that caused the poisoning was not identified. The tests were inconclusive. So I guess we’ll never know the exact poison. But of course, to state the obvious, I’m certain that this was not an accident. This was not natural. And this was somehow connected with my public activities inside Russia.

MR. ARON: And I should add, of course, that in addition to being the deputy leader of PARNAS, you’re also the resident coordinator of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Open Russia.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Right, the Open Russia movement, exactly.

MR. ARON: Well, Volodya, as I’ve mentioned, among many hats that you wear, perhaps the largest is – well, one of the largest is that of a Russia expert. So let me start with one issue that this town is mostly concerned about these days, Syria. Why do you think Putin decided to go there and what is his objective or objectives?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Well, I think as was all foreign policy adventures of the current regime, the origins are domestic. And everything this Kremlin has been doing in the last several years, especially since 2011-2012, when we saw the biggest pro- democracy on the streets of Moscow, during the whole time of Putin – (inaudible) – especially since then, everything they’ve been doing was dedicated to one chief goal, the preservation of their power. Thank you so much.

And that’s why, I think, for example, that Putin’s aggression against Ukraine was not primarily about geopolitics or spheres of influence. What he disliked the most was the precedent of a corrupt authoritarian ruler fleeing as popular protests were breaking out in the capital city. He didn’t enjoy those pictures of Mr. Yanukovych boarding the helicopter. And what he was afraid the most, and I think rightly, is that a successful democratic Ukraine would be a contagious bad, in his view, example for Russian society. And I think he was right in that. And that’s why he had to do everything he could to try to prevent the success.

And so with this latest adventure in Syria, I think the regime needed, frankly, new ammunition for his propaganda machine, which is the main essential pillar, support pillar for the Putin regime. And now Ukraine’s become a quagmire, the Novorossiya project has clearly failed. The economy is in a free fall. They need something, you know, to oil the propaganda machine. And they chose this. And now, if you look at the Russian state TV news, Ukraine’s almost completely gone. It’s all about Syria, Syria, Syria, you know, how we’re a super power across the other side of the world doing what we want without asking anybody, and so on and so forth.

Of course, an added bonus to this for Mr. Putin is to help a fellow dictator stay in power. As we know the informal international club of dictators is a loyal one. And Mr. Putin does not like to see fellow despots lose their position. He’s seen too many in recent years, you know, from Gaddafi to Yanukovych. And so we are seeing now that the main targets for Russian airstrikes are not in fact ISIS areas, but the anti-Assad opposition. We’ve all seen the maps, you know, Homs and so forth, which is not an ISIS area.

But I think there is a potentially very big problem for the Kremlin here, the problem being that Syria could possibly become for Putin what Afghanistan became for the late Soviet regime. You know, and – a draining and unpopular foreign military adventure that helped hasten the system’s demise in the end. And there’re already warnings being sounded to this effect. And in fact, there was a new poll by the Levada Center yesterday, which showed that despite all the barrage of the bravado and the propaganda that we see today almost half of Russians, almost half respondents are afraid already today that Syria could become what Afghanistan became for the late Soviet Union. So I think, you know, for all the hype that’s being put up today, I think that’s a potentially big problem for the regime.

MR. ARON: Volodya, presidential primaries are starting in this country. You and I talked about that. And unlike Russians, we don’t know who the next president will be. (Laughter.) So with that uncertainty comes, you know, some intellectual work. What would be your advice to the presidential hopefuls of both parties? Let me narrow this a bit. What would you say be three, four, five things they must keep in mind as they shape and project the Russia portion of their foreign policy message?

MR. KARA-MURZA: I think they’re all informed and intelligent people, so I wouldn’t presume to tell them something they don’t know. But I would –

MR. ARON: Don’t presume. (Laughter.)

MR. KARA-MURZA: But I will would say this. I think many political leaders in the West, including in this country, too many, fall into one of the two extremes when it comes to the approach to the current Kremlin regime. Either they want to make friends with it, or the other opposite is they blame the entire Russian nation for the actions of this unelected authoritarian system. And I think it’s the most important thing for policymakers, presidential candidates, is to recognize the situation as it is. And the fact is that Russia today is ruled by an unaccountable, unelected, dictatorial regime. And if history teaches us anything it’s that making friends with such regimes and closing eyes on their abuses is not a sound long-term strategy.

And unfortunately we’ve seen administrations of both parties in this town tried to do this. You know, remember President Bush famously looking into Putin’s eyes and seeing his soul. We remember the reset policy of the current president, Barack Obama. So I think if values, if principles on which this nation was founded still mean something for political leaders, it’s those values that should inform the attitude towards a regime that routinely abuses the rights of its own citizens and now also the borders and sovereignty of other nations. And short-term deals with such regimes at the expense of fundamental values I don’t think are the answer.

I think the answer ultimately lies in democracy and rule of law in Russia itself. And the fact is that Russia deserves better than what we have today. And the fact is that Russia is not destined to remain under this system forever. And I think it’s very important for policymakers to have this understanding and to recognize this above all when they shape the policy.

MR. ARON: Thank you very much. Now, let me broaden this issue a little bit. No matter who the next president will be, one thing I think we can be sure of, and you alluded to it, like all U.S. presidents, from both parties, pretty much since the establishment of the diplomatic relations between the United States and Soviet Union in 1933, she or he would wish two things for Russia: to be prosperous and to be free. What can the United States do to further the emergence of such a Russia?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Well, I think first of all, I’d like to say that it’s our job to bring democratic changes to our country, no one else’s. And I don’t think that can be done from outside. I don’t think it should be done from the outside. It’s for us to do. But if the U.S. wants to show solidarity with those people in Russia who want a future based on democracy and rule of law, I think the main thing you could do is to standby and abide by its own fundamental principles. To speak openly and frankly about the abuses of the Kremlin regime, not to close their eyes on it, not to pretend that the corrupt dictator in the Kremlin is a partner.

At the same time, differentiate and emphasize this differentiation between the Kremlin regime and Russia and maintain lines of communication with the civil society in Russia, with the democratic movement in Russia. And very importantly, keep up the prospect of a future democratic Russia being an equal partner on the world stage. That’s a very important prospect to have and to put out.

But I think most importantly is practice the principles you preach, frankly, and there is – I’ll give one example. There is a law on the books in the United States, the Magnitsky Act, which was passed nearly three years ago, passed with unseen or rarely seen bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress, signed by President Obama, in December 2012. I think one of the most principled and honorable pieces of legislation ever passed in any foreign parliament.

It’s, as you know of course, it’s designed to end the impunity for those who continue to abuse the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens and steal the money of Russian taxpayers by denying them the privilege of traveling to and owing assets in this country, a privilege, I should add, they so greatly enjoy. For all the many similarities we can discuss with the Soviet regime, there is one major difference with this one.

You know, Brezhnev, Suslov, and Andropov did not buy yachts, hold bank accounts, or send their kids to study in the democratic West. This bunch do. And so I think ending this double standard is a very important way for the U.S. to show solidarity with those in Russia who struggle for a democratic future.

Frankly, almost three years after this law has been passed and signed, implementation remains pretty timid. And so far, we’ve seen only low-level abuses targeted. So I think it’s important for the U.S. to step up and be more bold and more forthcoming and target some more prominent and influential people.

And one idea that former Prime Minister Kasyanov and I suggested earlier this year, when we came to this town and met with congressional leaders, was to include the officials from the state propaganda machine for their public incitement against the late Boris Nemtsov before his – in the month leading up to his murder, you know, the incitement that created this atmosphere that made it possible to murder the leader of the opposition 200 yards away from the Kremlin.

And I should add that this law and these personal targeted sanctions on abusers and corrupt officials are very popular with the Russian people. Despite all of its propaganda possibilities, the regime has failed to present this, the Magnitsky process as, quote, “sanctions against Russia.” People understand that, you know, targeting those who abuse their rights and steal their money is not sanctions against Russia. That’s a pro- Russian measure.

And so even despite the situation today, these measures are very popular with the citizens of Russia and I think it’d be really important if the U.S. and hopefully also the European Union afterwards would follow up and be more bold in its implementation.

MR. ARON: Volodya, let’s talk a little bit about a subject you know so well, intimately I would say, the domestic politics and the policies of the regime. Local elections were held last month. Your party, PARNAS, was the only one, the only opposition party – and I’m not counting the ones in the rubber stamp – it was the only party that was allowed to participate, but then only, ultimately, in one region of Russia, Kostroma, one of Russia’s 85 regions.

So on the one hand, I guess congratulations are in order. On the other hand, given that, you know, it was only one region and that your candidate got less than 2 percent of the vote, that seems like another sign of the consolidation of the Putin dictatorship. Now, at the same time, though, your recent interview with Moscovsky Komsomolets was very interesting because, among other things, you said that these restrictions are the regime of – I’m sorry, the evidence of regime’s weakness and fear. Could you explain to us what happened exactly and why do you think the regime is in that position?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Sure, thanks for the question. And I think it’s important to always remember, as you rightly pointed out, that in the vast majority of cases Russian citizens do not get a real choice with the ballot box, do not get a real alternative. In the rare cases when they do, the opposition often scores very significant results, such as when Alexei Navalny got nearly 30 percent of the vote in Moscow, two years ago. Or when Boris Nemtsov was elected as a head of the PARNAS ticket in Yaroslavl also two years ago.

But in most cases, Russian voters are stuck with a pre-selected pool of pro- Kremlin parties, the rubber stamp parties, as you call them. And then these recent local and municipal elections that were held in September, our party, PARNAS, was prevented from running in the Novosibirsk region, in the Kaluga region, the Magadan region for the city Nizhny Novgorod. So this is the usual pattern of behavior for this regime. They bar genuine opposition from the ballot. They harass independent election monitors. They ban or disperse opposition rallies, and generally try to stifle and prevent and block any manifestation of independent civic activity, anything that doesn’t, you know, conform to their goals.

For example, as you mentioned, I’m the coordinator of the Open Russia movement and one of my main tasks is to organize public events around Russia, much as this one. You know, discussions, seminars, lectures. We’re trying to recreate the space for public discussion, for free and unfettered public discussion that’s been so limited by this regime. And almost every time that we hold such events, you know, we get police seizing the building, we get, you know, being announced that the building is bombed. The electricity goes out, all the rest of it. Every time they try to do something to prevent our events from happening. Every time they try to do something to stop us from going ahead.

And in this election, Kostroma, that you mentioned, Open Russia has a big – pretty big vote monitoring operation. We sent a vote-monitoring mission to Kostroma. This was a pilot project for us. We’re going to hopefully expand on this for the next year’s State Duma election, and do it nationwide. But this was kind of the pilot version. And on voting day itself, we had an armed police squad block our headquarters. You know, extensively they were looking for a dead body inside our vote-monitoring mission. Of course, they didn’t find a dead body, but what they did was detaining, questioning our coordinators, our monitors, and basically sabotage the mission.

Now, in my mind, this is not the behavior of a strong, popular, and self-confident government. This is the behavior of people who are afraid of every challenge, any challenge to their position. And I think, frankly, you know, from – especially given the historical lessons, I think they have every right to be afraid. But that’s what – that’s not a behavior of a strong, powerful, and self-confident government, getting off your opponents if you are.

MR. ARON: Speaking of historical lessons, change your hat to that of a Cambridge-trained historian. Let me ask you something that has been on my mind for quite a while. There is a widely shared opinion, a stereotype basically, that Russians long for a strong arm – that their backs are aching for a whip. And with Putin’s popularity ratings such as they are – and I want you to address that issue as well – this cliché is back in force. And yet, when you look at the history, in those rare instances when the Russian people were given a more or less free choice, a more or less imperfect choice, however imperfect, a more or less informed choice, the story’s quite different.

And I would like to bring up this excellent book of yours that I always consult – (speaks Russian) – “Reforms of the Revolution,” by Vladimir, it’s about the elections to the first Russian Duma, the first Russian, more or less, freely elected parliament, in 1906. And as you tracked it, with all kinds of fascinating details, of course, the plurality of deputies, the party with most deputies in the Duma was the openly liberal pro-western party of constitutional democrats, Kadets. And then, of course, we’ve seen this again and again. Over eight decades passed before the Russians could vote again more or less freely. And we saw the results in ’89 in Moscow. We saw the results in 1990, ’91. We saw the referendum of ’93, where people voted to continue the reform against the leftist populist Supreme Soviet. And of course, in December, ’93, again contrary to the Zhirinovsky stereotype, when you count the deputies elected both on the party list and on the single mandate list, it was the, again, sort of the Kadets Party. Ninety years later, it was ’s Russia’s Choice.

So how would the – what should we make out of all of this, especially given what’s happening now?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Well, I think first of all, you know, as far as the, you know, opinion polls and Putin’s so-called high support goes, I think it’s completely meaningless to talk about opinion polls in a system where every single major television channel is controlled by the state propaganda, where we have now dozens of political prisoners, where we have – not mass, but targeted, very acute political repressions, where we don’t have free elections. You know, when you sit at your house and you get a phone call and some person on the other line asks you, do you support Putin, I think most people would just say yes to be on the safe side and put the phone down.

So I think it’s, frankly, meaningless to talk about these so-called 84 percent that, you know, people talk about. But on your deeper question, on the stereotype, yeah, there’s this very popular myth, this urban legend, you know, that Russians are somehow uniquely among other Eastern European nations and it’s certainly not borne out by the facts. You mentioned the 1906 election, when indeed the Kadets won a plurality of seats and supporters of absolute monarchy did not win a single seat in the State Duma, not one.

MR. ARON: Right.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Also, we could mention the 1917 election to the Constituent Assembly, which was held after the Bolsheviks already seized power in the coup d'état, but the people rejected them in favor of the SRs, the pro-democracy center- left party. And of course, ’91, when the democratic opposition candidate beat the official Soviet establishment’s candidate Nikolai Ryzhkov by 57 percent to 17, a whooping landslide.

So the, you know, the simple fact is that we are no better and no worse than other Eastern European nations, including Slavic, including Orthodox Christian nations who once lived under totalitarian dictatorships and now have functioning democracies. And there will come a day when Russia too will have a functioning democracy.

And I think what’s important to note is that this myth that Russians are somehow unsuited for democracy, not ready for democracy, and all the rest of it, it’s being implicitly used by that Kremlin’s propaganda machine to imply that any alternative to Putin would be worse –

MR. ARON: Or after Putin.

MR. KARA-MURZA: – what comes after Putin would be worse, precisely. So I think that it’s crucial that informed and well-meaning people do not fall for this propaganda ruse.

MR. ARON: Well, Volodya, we’re doing so well and your answers are so excellent and concise that we have quite a bit of time to take questions from the floor. Thank you very much for talking with me. Please, questions for Vladimir Kara-Murza. Please. Wait for the microphone and please introduce yourself.

Q: I’m John Gizzi, political correspondent for Newsmax. And it’s such an honor to meet you, sir, having heard so much about you from our friend Elena Servettaz. And glad to be in your presence.

The Magnitsky sanctions have been applied to so many people and as Russia, for example, continues to be a presence in Ukraine and spreads its influence in other countries internationally, people say why not impose sanctions on Putin. The White House, at the regular press briefings have never ruled that out, to sanction him personally. What do you think of that and would that have an effect on him? One member said support sanctions on him enough, so that the Kremlin itself might overthrow him.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Thank you very much for the question, John. Glad to meet you in person, too. And you said that there’d been many people sanctioned under the Magnitsky law. There have been quite a few, but as I mentioned already, they were all low-level operatives. Not a single high-profile influential person in Putin’s circle has been targeted. And I think that was the intention of the law. Again, the double standard at the heart of this regime is that they want to rule, you know, like an oppressive third world dictatorship inside of Russia, but they want to enjoy all the benefits that the free world can offer, including the financial benefits. And that has to stop. And as I alluded to earlier, that this idea is shared by a lot of people in Russia that this has to stop.

There have been some high-profile cases outside of the Magnitsky process. I’ll give you just one example. Last year, Mikhail Lesin, who was then head of Gazprom- Media, which is the largest state propaganda television outlet, owns NTV and other entities, he had an investigation started against him by the FBI under the anti-money laundering and Foreign Corrupt Practices Acts. Because it was found out that he purchased some luxury real estate in California. And the purpose of the investigation is to find out how. You know, he was a state official. And he had to resign two days afterwards. He resigned last December, he’s not in that position anymore. That’s just one example of how effective this process can be if it’s applied properly, if it’s done against the right people.

So I think, yes, it would be very important, I think, symbolically to sanction Putin personally, as well as the head of this regime, but even more effective to do it around – to do it against those people, those state connected oligarchs around him, that all of them have spare air drums, as we’re calling, right, spare bases prepared in Western countries. And I think that would be really effective to go after them.

And again, as soon as the third anniversary of the passage and signing of the Magnitsky law and I really hope that the administration steps up the implementation and also that the European Union follows it. In all our meetings with our counterparts in the EU, members of the European Parliament, and so forth, we always raise this issue that it’s really important to do it. They have started to do some sanctions, targeted sanctions with relation to the aggression on Ukraine. And actually some propagandists have been targeted like Dmitry Kiselyov, probably the most infamous one.

MR. ARON: The one who wanted to turn the United States –

MR. KARA-MURZA: The U.S. into radioactive ash, exactly.

MR. ARON: – in a heap of radioactive ash.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Precisely, right.

MR. ARON: The host of the most popular television show.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Exactly. Well, again, we can talk about popular or not, but it’s basically that no one – when you have one dish in a restaurant, you can say it’s the most popular dish, but – (laughter) – and it would be true technically. But also I think it’s a very important point to make, these shouldn’t be sanctions against Russia, and they shouldn’t be called as such. There should be targeted sanctions against those abusers who engage in both internal repression and external aggression. And sometimes many – too many Western leaders are careless with the language and they do call them sanctions on Russia, another thing that helps because that is used by the propaganda machine to say, oh, look, they’re against, you know, Russian people and all the rest of it.

So I think, as you step up the implementation of it, it’s important to be very careful about the wording and the presentation, frankly, as well.

MR. ARON: Please, think of more questions. Meanwhile, you know, I’ll abuse my host prerogative, ask you one. Let’s delve a little bit deeper, Volodya, again, you know, putting back your expert hat. What’s – I mean, you talked a little bit about Syria. But I mean, it seems that Ukraine – I mean, a frozen conflict, I mean, my formula is that the tie goes to Ukraine. A frozen conflict, I’m not sure this is not Abkhazia, this is not Transnistria, this is – you know, to say that I essentially tried and failed is something that this regime, I don’t think can afford.

(Cross talk.)

MR. KARA-MURZA: – right.

MR. ARON: Yeah, the sense is that it’s not frozen, it’s – or say, it’s frozen, but Putin controls their access to a microwave. He can always pop it back in. so what do you think, what is the end game in Ukraine or it would just go, you know, day by day?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Well, he can pop it back in, but if you look at what’s happening at the moment, they are backing away clearly. I mean, the Novorossiya project has failed a long time ago, but now even, you know, if you look on the state news programs, on Russian state TV, they, for instance, have started again calling them Luhansk and Donetsk regions as opposed to republics. And they’ve canceled those, you know, so-called elections that were supposed to take place in eastern areas this month.

So they are clearly backing away and this picture from Ukraine, it’s not a winning picture for them anymore. It’s become a quagmire. It’s been a year and a half. And they failed to get, you know, all of the eastern part of Ukraine, as was apparently, you know, their original plan. They, I hope, will fail to prevent the success of the democratic institutions in Ukraine, which is – again, was a main motivation.

MR. ARON: Of course is the goal, yeah.

MR. KARA-MURZA: And if you look at state TV again, the Ukraine is being gradually but completely replaced with Syria. All you hear now is Syria, Syria, Syria. Almost don’t hear about Ukraine. Whereas for the last year, if you looked on state TV, you wouldn’t hear anything about Russia, for instance. All you’d hear about is about the Ukrainian fascist junta, you know, in Kiev. And that’s all changed in the last few weeks.

MR. ARON: Just one call for clarification or perhaps maybe projection. I think, Volodya, you were absolutely right to say that, you know, as Mikhail Dmitriev actually told me, you know, a leading Russian political sociologist, long before Crimea, foreign policy is the only thing that’s working for this regime. So – but then, OK, so Ukraine now is being slowly abandoned. Now, there’s Syria. But if this logic is, you know, Dmitriev’s logic and what I understand is your logic, holds, then there will have to be something after Syria. I mean, this patriotic mobilization has to be, I mean, he settled the tiger and the tiger is trotting rather successfully, but you’ve got to feed tiger with meat, the bloodier the better. So what’s the projection there?

MR. KARA-MURZA: I think the thing with those is that at some point it will simply stop working. You know, if you look at our history small victorious wars never ended well for the – you know, for our dictatorships, beginning with, of course, the Russo-Japanese war, the one that term was invented for.

MR. ARON: Where the phrase – yeah – Plehve – right.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Right, – Plehve – exactly. And you know, Afghanistan again that we mentioned that helped hasten the demise of the Soviet regime. And even if we look at the First World War, for instance, you know, the patriotic, the pro-monarchist hype that accompanied the beginning of it, and look what happened just three years later.

So I don’t think we can take it or we should take it for granted that this will continue to work for them they will just go to next target and next target. If Syria becomes for Putin what Afghanistan became for the Soviet Politburo, then, you know, this is the last military adventure he’s entered in, quite possibly one of the last few things, big things his regime has engaged themselves to.

MR. ARON: Anders.

Q: Anders Aslund, the Atlantic Council. Three questions, if I may. First, on the Magnitsky Act, we know that the government – the White House is very happy to sanction people but not according to the Magnitsky Act because the Magnitsky Act means that the Congress has a say over it, and the administration prefers to have it all in its own hands. Shouldn’t you focus on the other sanctions instead, given that the White House is so much more happy to do that than under the Magnitsky Act? Isn’t – shouldn’t the Magnitsky Act, for practical reasons, be put on a backburner because all White Houses have been burned by the Jackson-Vanik act, but they couldn’t get it for 20 years when it was no longer applicable?

Second question, what do you make of the demise of Vladimir Yakunin, the head of the Russian railroads, considered one of the 10 top people around Putin as a good KGB general from Sankt Petersburg, and he just disappears like this? So it would be interesting if you elaborate up on it.

And from what you talked before about, it would be interesting to hear how do you think that this regime can fall? Khodorkovsky has told us very firmly that he thinks that this cannot fall through elections. And how do you see that this regime could fall, alternative scenarios and probabilities. Thank you.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Thank you very much, Anders, it’s great to see you. And I’ll start with your last question, if I may. Of course, it’s not going to change through elections. We don’t have real elections, as you know. And we happen to believe that our country’s had enough revolutions for the last century. And we wouldn’t like to see another one, certainly not another bloody one. But what this regime does, they’re doing really the best they can to make sure that when the power does change, as it inevitably will, nothing is permanent, it will do so not in the constitutional, not in a peaceful way.

You know, they have this new pro-Kremlin movement called Anti-Maidan, right, presumably it’s against revolutions. And they accuse us, the Russian opposition of wanting a Maidan, wanting a revolution. In fact, I think, the biggest supporters and the biggest instigators of a future Russian Maidan are sitting in the Kremlin right now. Because when you shut off every single legal avenue to , to express an alternative opinion, when you have no free elections, you have no independent media on a big scale, certainly on television, when you have no working judicial system, you’re ensuring that when society does or the active part of society does have enough of these people, as again, as it will inevitably, and I think sooner rather than later.

It’s not going to be peaceful. It’s not going to be constitutional. And I’m saying it – I’m not happy about it. I’m saying this, you know, with sorrow. That’s – I don’t think that’s going to be good for anybody, but that’s what they’re – that’s what they’re making sure by everything they do. So yeah, I don’t think – I don’t see how the regime can change through elections since we don’t have free elections now.

On your question about the Magnitsky Act, sure they can – I mean, as you know, the executive here has the authority to sanction anybody anyway. It’s a right of the U.S. to give or not to give somebody a visa. So they can just do it anytime they wish. Of course, the reason the Magnitsky Act was passed was because they do it, that they didn’t use that authority.

And I think it’s also important that the Magnitsky Act provides a concrete motivation. It’s the human rights abuse. It’s the corruption, the graft, it’s – you know, there are – these executive actions, as you know, there is President Obama’s executive order about Ukraine. There are sanctions applied to those involved in aggression against Ukraine, and they are acting on that, too. But I think it’s important to have the human rights motivation because as we know from the founding documents of OSCE, which bound both Russia and the United States, human rights are not an internal affair. Whatever Mr. Putin or Mr. Lavrov continue to say.

The Moscow document of the OSCE clearly states that issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms could not be considered internal affair of a member state. So human rights concerns everybody. And I think that’s why it’s such an important symbolic act. And after all, the majorities were huge and bipartisan, and the president signed it. So I think they should really abide by, you know, a United States federal law. But of course, you’re right, they can do it otherwise as well. And if they, for some reason, decide just to sanction people outside of the law, you know, I wouldn’t see any problem with that, but of course I think it will be more effective if it’s under the process.

And Yakunin, there’s a new version out about Yakunin’s sacking, I’m sure you saw it yesterday, when his son applied for a British passport, and that was considered a sign of un-loyalty, I guess in the Kremlin or something. But a lot of people are saying that this is the beginning of the fight under the carpet already. And these Kremlin clans that are beginning to clash with each other and – and as, you know, as the crisis deepens, the crisis of the regime deepens, I think we’ll see more and more of this. There won’t be any friends left in the – (speaks Russian) – as it were. And I think he may be the first sign of that.

And you’re right, he just went nowhere. First, he was supposed to be given the conciliatory position of a senator, of course, which is a rubber stamp position in Russia, it’s not like a senator here. But even that, he rejected as, you know, he’s probably considered it too modest an offer, frankly. And you’re right. He’s just gone completely nowhere, one of the closest people to Putin. And I think there will be others to follow.

If we remember, again, the big protests in the end of 2011, we saw what many considered what was the beginning of the split of the elites back then, when we saw, you know, Kudrin on Sakharov Avenue. Prokhorov came –

MR. ARON: Even Surkov said something, remember?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Surkov said these are the best people in the country, right. So – and that was, unfortunately, that was too short a time and then the regime regained the initiative and it’s been doing what it’s been doing since, you know, suppressing and oppressing. But once that moment starts again, and I’ve no doubt it will, I think we’ll see some more interesting dynamic at the top there.

MR. ARON: Laura, please. And identify yourself. No, no, no, Jill, right here.

Q: Hi, Vladimir, it’s so nice to see you. I’m from “Le Figaro.” I have a question about Europe. You have described the powerful, you know, influence of the propaganda machine inside Russia. What about the Russian propaganda war in Europe? It is being waged daily as we see and with quite a lot of success actually. We’ve seen, you know, increasing support for Putin throughout Europe, especially countries like France, you know, where you have whole political parties on the extreme right, but also people on the left, and many leaders in the Gaullist Party supporting now some kind of alliance, compromise with Putin. And it’s only going to increase with these migrants crisis. And Putin seems to have made clear to the Europeans that at some point maybe they’re going to have to give up, you know, on sanctions maybe on Ukraine if they want this Syrian, you know, mess to stop. Otherwise, he could actually mess it up even more.

So how do you think this is going to play out? I mean, are you worried about this kind of divide of Europe that Putin seems to be seeking pretty successfully?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Sure, thanks for the question. It’s an important one. And of course, while the Kremlin is, you know, railing against so-called fascists in Ukraine, it’s pretty happy to make friends with the far right in European Union countries, like you mentioned, the Front National, also the Hungarian far right. And there was a recently a big conference of the far right parties from across Europe, in Sankt Petersburg, it was actually held in the same hotel and in the same hall where we, Open Russia, were supposed a forum in December, and it was, of course, broken up by police. But with the fascists, they have no problem, that’s fine.

He’s – you’re right, Putin is – and the Kremlin is aggressive in trying to split the EU, get his support in the EU, ratchet up the propaganda in EU through RT, and you know, other means. I think it’s important, first of all, to recognize it that this is happening because not everybody does. Some people like to close their eyes on it.

It’s happening here as well, but to a lesser extent, much more so in the European Union. So I think it’s important to recognize it and to recognize that it’s not, you know, a good thing to do. And actually, to – again, the origins of everything are domestic and that’s why I think it was such a good proposition by the European Union presidency, which was held by Latvia then last year to create a new Russian language pan-European television channel, which would also be broadcast into Russia itself. I think that’s a really important notion because you have to combat the roots of this propaganda at the heart of it, where it’s originating from.

But of course, also, it’s going to be easier for EU countries to try to combat it on their own territory, so at least I think they should be doing that and not to mix up propaganda with free speech. They’re very different things.

We heard from critics of the idea, for instance, to include the propagandists, Putin’s state propagandists into the targeted sanctions here in this country. You know, what about the First Amendment? Well, you know, free speech and incitement are different things. And when state employees use state resources and state money to hound political opponents of the regime on national TV, you know, things they said about Boris Nemtsov, when he was alive, you know, that he would have welcomed Nazi troops in Moscow, in 1941, that he was in the pay of the Americans, that he was a traitor, all the rest. You should – it’s all – you can see all the quotations. This is not free speech. This is not the first amendment. And I think when these arguments are being voiced from the EU, these are not correct arguments, frankly. I think propaganda should be recognized and confronted.

MR. ARON: Please, yes.

Q: My name’s James Burn, I’m a longtime journalist here. And something I paid a lot of attention to in recent years is the very sad demographic reality that was going on in Russia. Male life expectancy is plummeting. I’ve attended a lot of discussion by Russian demographers of this and I’m wondering what impact will that very bad demographic picture have on the government?

MR. KARA-MURZA: Thanks for the question. Yeah, I think we have one of the biggest gaps in the world between male and female life expectancy. It’s 11 and 12 years. And in fact, that’s been a situation since the Soviet times, since early to mid-1980s, if you take Russia, not the Soviet Union as a whole, Russia. Because of course, there’s, again, another myth about the horrendous, so-called horrendous 1990s is that that’s when the demographic problems began. No, they began under the Soviet system and essentially continue today. The only region which has a surplus, more people born or dying is North Caucasus, the Muslim regions of Southern Russia, which is, you know, a whole other subject for discussion, as well, how is that going to bode for the future.

But I think the bottom line is this regime doesn’t care about long-term national interests of Russia. Be it what happens inside our country or what happens in relation to our foreign affairs. And all the pieces will have to pick up once they’re gone with restoring our position in the world.

So that’s why these problems are continuing and exacerbating and not getting better. All they care about is to preserve their power. And frankly, you know, I don’t think they give even a small thought to the demographic problem that you mention. For instance, they’re very happy about their opponents leaving the country. And these are, you know, we have a massive brain drain, frankly, in the last few years from Russia. People leaving in great numbers, educated people, intellectual people because, you know, they cannot stand the atmosphere anymore. I think it’s a tragedy. I think, you know – of course, it’s not my place, everybody decides for their own life, but I think it’s a tragedy that so many such people are leaving. But they’re happy about it, the regime because, you know, fewer troublemakers, easier to control who’s left.

I still think, I mean, I still think they are doomed. I still think they’re going to fail, but that’s what they’re doing.

MR. ARON: Anna Aslund.

Q: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, for those who don’t know, in front of you are two of people from Russia who are probably some of the most cultured and educated in topics of Russian culture, not just politics and all this stuff that we are all fond of. So – and this is my question to Vladimir. Vladimir, please, after my short comment, prove me wrong. Please, I really want to be proven wrong.

So in 1825, a bunch of young, noble, heroic aristocrats, pretty much looking like Vladimir – (laughter) – I guess some of the answers –

MR. KARA-MURZA: Without the cane, though.

Q: – decided that the regime was awful, unfair, which it was. And they all ended up in Siberia or being hung, right? In 1827, Pushkin wrote a poem, which sounded very much like what we heard from Vladimir. (Speaks Russian.) That the prisons will collapse and the freedom will meet you at the gate, 1827. One hundred and ten years later, we know Stalin’s purges happened, right? And on and on and on, to make it short, some 20 years ago, I would say everything Vladimir said because I was also young. I was – I really wanted to believe that this time is different. And so Vladimir is now saying this. He is in the U.S. Leon, as I said, one of the most cultured people, he’s in the U.S. I’m actually American citizen since 2005. Who’s there? I mean, why would that happen? Please prove me wrong. I think everyone who has potential is even in prison or killed or immigrated.

You travel in regions. When I traveled in regions, 20 something years ago, I was afraid I’ll be murdered and decapitated when they heard that I was Gaidar’s press secretary. And he was on the stage. And I thought, oh, my God, he has bodyguards, I don’t. Because people were fueling with hatred.

So you traveled, do you see these young people may be in the region, somebody who is ready to burn and continue this. Now, I don’t know how much it takes, 100, 200 years.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Thanks for the question. It’s a really deep one and important one. And of course, to your last point, time goes much quicker now and those Decembrists you mentioned, those who were still alive, as you know, were freed and returned in one of the first symbolic acts of Alexander II, in 1855. And they did return to Sankt Petersburg. And they were old, but there was a symbolic move. But time goes faster now, I don’t think it’s going to take another 30 years, or certainly not another 74 years.

And I think made this comment once and I think it’s right to the point that he says, what always surprises me in a good way is that however much repression there is and however strong the dictatorship, you know, however many people leave or are in prison or are killed, there always remain people in Russia who are European minded, who want a normal future based on the rule of law, on democracy, on respect for the dignity of a human being. There are always such people and as I travel around the country and I see them, I see them especially among the young generation. I wouldn’t say it’s the majority of the young generation because the young generation has really been, I think, the main victim of this horrible propaganda campaign that Putin’s regime has been unleashing over the past 10-15 years. But there are many of them. And they are there, and our job, for instance, the main task of the Open Russia movement is try to support and consolidate those people who want a European future for our country.

And Bukovsky is right, always, in every generation there are enough people. And remember, as you alluded to, in ’91, when the putschists had everything. They had the whole state apparatus, they had all the television channels, by the way. They had the Communist Party. They had the KGB, one of the most feared organizations in the history of the world. But when 200,000 came out and stood in front of the tanks and refused to leave, they failed. The putschists, I mean, the coup leaders failed. And I think, frankly, that’s the destiny of all of those who want to drag our country back to the Middle Ages, back to suppressions other different guises and forms.

It may take some time. The price may be high. It’s already really high. We already lost so many people. And we lost, you know, we lost Boris this year. And these last few months have been really, really dark. But there was a, you know, Soviet saying that Soviet dissidents like to say, the night is darkest before the dawn. And I believe that. I still believe that freedom and justice will prevail in the end in Russia.

And you said, I’m in the U.S. You know, I’m recuperating in U.S. after what happened, but once I recover further, I will go back, and I will resume my work as coordinator of Open Russia because as we discussed, this is our job. No one is going to do it for us. And I believe that freedom and justice will prevail and I think we have to do everything we can to bring that day a little bit closer.

MR. ARON: Please, right there, and then you.

Q: Yes, I’m Russell King, retired federal employee. I have a question about Putin’s naval intentions. When Putin took over Sevastopol, I can’t help thinking he must have had naval intentions because that’s where the Black Sea fleet is based. And as I understand it, I believe that Ukraine had a lease that based Russian – there might have been a limit on the number of ships, and once Russia took over, I think, maybe that limit disappears. And the terms of transit going through the Turkish straits are much, much better for Russia than for the United States because I believe it’s governed by the Montreal Convention of the mid-1930s and it gives preferential transit privileges to Black Sea nations, which would including Russia, would include Ukraine. But I don’t believe it accounts for the fact that you might have an act of war of one Black Sea nation against another. And I would think that the Black Sea fleet would supply Syria and I believe the port there might be Tartus.

And then, in the Arctic, the United States and NATO has none of its own icebreakers. I think we’re totally dependent upon Norwegian and Danish icebreakers in the NATO area. But with the Russian northern fleet, they’re very active and the Northern Sea Route I believe is now functioning for local shipping and may in a few years possibly even be an international sea route, in which case I think it would be the shortest distance between Europe, North America, and East Asia. And also due to the warming, there’re some resource grabs in international waters in the Arctic. So I’m wondering, can you tell me a little bit about Russian naval intentions and what the U.S. would – should likely be.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Sure, thanks. It’s an interesting question. I’m not a naval expert, although my father-in-law is a naval officer, so I probably should be. But I would say that we already saw – with this Syria operation going on now, we saw some strikes from the Caspian Sea, two days ago. And there’re actually some questions raised as to whether or not these were medium range missiles that would violate the 1987 treaty between the U.S. and the –

MR. ARON: Russia effectively abrogated that treaty.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Right. And happy to show it. But I think, again, everything that happened with Crimea, for instance, it wasn’t primarily about, you know, gaining the fleet. We had the fleet there anyway, as you say, until 2017 was the current agreement, but it probably would have been prolonged. But again, I think it had domestic mainly propaganda objectives. And it worked for the regime for about a year, I guess. It’s worn off now, the effect, but it worked for about a year, this hype.

So I don’t think – my main point is I don’t think what they do is primarily directed to foreign policy and strategic goals. Again, it’s the preservation of the power inside the country. If they’ll need military interventions and they’ll think that will help them, they will do it, as we saw with Ukraine, as we see with Syria. I’m sure they’d be happy to use naval resources, too.

And of course, you said that the limits on the Black Sea fleet are gone. Well, everything that happens in Crimea now is technically illegal since the annexation, nothing is according to convention and law anymore. So sure, it could be done, anything could be done. But again, I think we have to look for domestic motivations, domestic factors. And the answers to the problem are also domestic.

MR. ARON: Over there, somebody was very patient, thank you very much.

Q: Thank you. My name is Katie Fox. I’m from the National Democratic Institute. It’s also very nice to see you and to see you in good health, I hope. I have a couple of questions about the organized opposition to Putin or what might potentially succeed him. My two questions are how strong is the alternative to Putin on the far right, the sort of nationalist leaders, how likely are they to succeed him? And my other question is can you address another myth about Russia, which is that the more liberal democratic opposition of which you are part, tends to shoot itself in the foot by internal infighting and general elitism and disorganization.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Right, thanks a lot for the questions, Katie. Good to see you. Well, I think it’s an accepted truth that, you know, fascists are generally more organized than liberals. So to your last point, I think it is a problem. And what we at Open Russia try to do – I know Open Russia is not a party, it’s an umbrella movement, it’s an organization trying to consolidate. And when I work with people in the regions is that people from – you know – far – just only from PARNAS people, it’s also people from , from other smaller parties, without any party affiliation is a bit part of the people we work with.

So we’re trying to at least try to remedy that a little bit. And we have seen in recent years some hopeful moves on consolidation. We’ve seen this new democratic coalition, for instance, being created this spring, which was, of course, barred from the ballot in most places it was supposed to run, as I mentioned earlier. But you know, I’m hoping that – I wish this lesson would have been learned sooner. You know, I think 2003 was a decisive year when FSB and Yabloko had been together in one bloc. The whole history of Russia would have been different after that, but we have what we have.

But what I’m trying to learn, I’m, you know, I’m with you on this. I think it doesn’t make any sense that we’re not consolidated. And I personally and my colleagues, I know will do everything we can to try to achieve it. But of course, at critical points, I think we are, like in the protests, in 2011-2012, everybody was on Bolotnaya, everybody was on Sakharov. It was people from Yabloko, from PARNAS, from other parties, from no parties at all. Actually, most people were not from any parties at all. So I think – I still hope we’re going to get there.

And in terms of nationalists, the Kremlin’s done a lot, you know, to nurture and to grow up these nationalists itself. For instance, with what’s been doing in Ukraine, these guys are now coming back, the so-called Novorossiya volunteers. And the Kremlin is going to soon find, I think, that they’re not actually very much supporters of it, as many people originally told them, when they started doing it. But they have been toying with the nationalists abroad. You know, I mentioned this European fascist conference that was held in Sankt Petersburg. Has been toying with the nationalists inside. You know, one of the nationalist firebrands, Rogozin is a member of Putin’s government, was appointed in 2012.

So the Kremlin has been toying and thinks they can control it. Of course, the problem with all these movements is that they often go out of control. And therein, I think, lies a danger, not just for this regime, but for our country as a whole. But I still, I still not just believe, but I know from my experience with, you know, dealing with a lot of people, including outside of Moscow, outside of Sankt Petersburg, that, you know, this far right, they don’t have genuine strong popularity. They do not. And when, for instance, the big protest movement of 2011-2012, it was unified, right? It included everybody, including nationalists. But when the Levada Center did a big survey of Bolotnaya and Sakharov, it found that the nationalists accounted for 6 percent, just 6 percent of the unified protesters.

So I think it’s hyped up to where – to more than it actually is. But I also think there is a danger, but that danger is coming from the top, not from the bottom. So it’s not genuine support that these far right forces have on Russian side. I don’t think they have. But it’s the fact that Kremlin opportunistically toys with them, and that could be a potential source of a problem.

There’s one in the back there, very –

MR. ARON: Oh, yes, somebody in the back, please.

Q: Thank you. Emma Louise Leahy from Dentons. And I have two questions about Russia’s relationships in the Middle East. One is, after the nuclear deal and with Russia and Iran both supporting the Assad regime in Syria, what do you see as the future of the Russian-Iranian relationship. And the other, to what extent is Putin concerned about losing standing in the Sunni world as a result of his support for Assad? Thank you.

MR. ARON: And actually, Volodya, this was one of the questions I could piggyback also, add to this. Your, you know, your second one is extremely important. you know, Foreign Ministry estimates that there are 2,400 fighters from Russia itself in – among ISIS and up to 5,000 of Russian speakers. And that, of course, includes central Asia. We add to this the fact that most recruitment occurs in Moscow and in Russia, rather than Uzbekistan or Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. And the fact that, eventually, one way or another, they’ll – in fact, Putin alluded to that in his speech at the UN, that they tasted blood, they’ll be coming back. This, I think, this could be an issue of enormous importance. So if you could, you know, address that, first about Iran, just to recap, you know, Russia’s goal in the Middle East, and then, finally, this issue of Sunnis that Putin is frankly desperately afraid of because of the Central Asia connection and because those regimes, once Taliban is undermined successfully, which I think is only a matter of time or Afghanistan, Central Asia will begin will begin to fall. And given the fact that there’re about 5 million migrant workers only legally registered in Russia from Central Asia, that could be an enormous problem for the regime.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Absolutely. And I think – thanks for the question. I think that’s a classic case of – the Syria dimension is a classic case of whether the regime is trying to preserve its own power at the expense of long-term interests of our country. This is not only, you know, place they’re doing it, but that’s certainly, I think, one of the most visible ones.

Of course the majority of Russian Muslims are Sunnis. And we’ve already seen Saudi Sunni clerics declaring jihad against Russia earlier this week, as a result of the intervention in Syria. There is talk of, you know, potential consequences, frankly, with regard to terrorism in Russia itself, with regards to events in the North Caucasus, which has been volatile anyway. And none of this bodes well for our country and for our long- term national interests. And again, that’s the – I think that’s one of the most classic cases, where they choose their own self-preservation or short-term, even, as well as that, you know, the propaganda effect that’s going to give them for a few months against – at the expense of the long-term interests of Russia.

In terms of opposition in the Middle East, this regime’s continuing with, you know, essentially what the Soviet Foreign policy was in the Middle East, with the exception that we still have diplomatic relations with Israel. The Soviet Union did not. But, you know, again, usually, we always – we, it’s a bad “we” – the Kremlin regime gives Israel a cold shoulder usually and it’s trying to be friendly with the regime in Tehran. And so, General Soleimani come to Moscow, a few weeks before the beginning of the operation in Syria. I think it’s very possible that they were discussing it as well. And of course now, we’re officially in a coalition with the regime in Tehran, just as we are with – again, we, the Kremlin regime was with the regime of Assad and so on.

So I think this is the model they are continuing with. I don’t think it’s the right one, frankly. I mean, I’m of course, evidently, I’m one of those who believes that our natural alliances lie in the Western world, you know, Russia is a European. Our natural allies are our neighbors in Europe. And if we’re talking about the Middle East, it should be the only genuine democracy in the Middle East, which is Israel. And I think a future Russian government that is democratic will be doing that, just as we began to do it in 1990s for a brief time.

But for now, we have to unfortunately state that that’s the foreign policy and that’s the alliance policy of this regime. Iran, Assad, and this club of dictators that we’re mentioned earlier.

MR. ARON: Volodya, I just wanted to thank you again and I think I speak for everybody in this hall, in this audience that we just, in admiration of your personal heroism and the heroic work you’re doing in Russia. Thank you so much.

MR. KARA-MURZA: Thank you so much. Thank you for the invitation. (Applause.)

(END)