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The International Foundation for SocioEconomic and Political Studies (The Gorbachev Foundation) BREAKTHROUGH TO FREEDOM PERESTROIKA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS R.VALENT PUBLISHERS 2009 Compiled by Viktor Kuvaldin, Professor, Doctor of History Executive Editor: Aleksandr Veber, CONTENTS Doctor of History Translation: Tatiana Belyak, Konstantin Petrenko To the Reader . .5 Page makeup: Viktoriya Kolesnichenko Art design: R.Valent Publishers PART I. Seven Years that Changed the Country and the World Publisher’s Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Mr. Mikhail Selivanov, Vadim Medvedev. Perestroika’s Chance of Success . .8 who helped make this book possible. Stephen F. Cohen. Was the Soviet System Reformable? . .22 ISBN 9785934392629 Archie Brown. Perestroika and the Five Transformations . .40 Aleksandr Galkin. The Place of Perestroika in the History of Russia . .58 Viktor Kuvaldin. Three Forks in the Road of Gorbachev’s Perestroika . .73 Breakthrough to Freedom. Perestroika: A Critical Analysis. Aleksandr Veber. Perestroika and International Social Democracy . .95 M., R.Valent Publishers, 2009, — 304 pages. Boris Slavin. Perestroika in the Mirror of Modern Interpretations . .111 Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Perestroika as Viewed from Washington, 19851991 . .126 Copyright © 2009 by the International PART II. Our Times and Ourselves Foundation for SocioEconomic and Political Studies (The Gorbachev Foundation) Aleksandr Nekipelov. Is It Easy to Catch a Black Cat in a Dark Room, Copyright © R.Valent Publishers Even If It Is There? . .144 All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means Oleg Bogomolov. A Turning Point in History: without written permission of the copyright Reflections of an EyeWitness . .152 holders. Nikolay Shmelev. Bloodshed Is Not Inevitable . .161 Anatoly Adamishin. ...Those Best Three Years . .172 Printed in the Russian Federation Rodric Braithwaite. Gorbachev and Perestroika: 2009 Foresight and Hindsight . .184 3 Vadim Zagladin. To Be Continued . .194 Anatoly Chernyayev. New Thinking: Yesterday and for the Future . .203 Pavel Palazhchenko. Ending the Cold War . .210 Andrey Grachev. To End the Argument with History . .219 Georgy Ostroumov. New Beginning of a Seemingly Impossible Venture (Subjective Notes on Perestroika in Russia) . .226 Vadim Mezhuev. Perestroika as Seen Today . .243 Dmitry Furman. Perestroika as Seen by a Moscow Humanitarian . .249 TO THE READER Aleksandr Tsipko. Stop Reviling Perestroika! . .264 Liliya Shevtsova. Twenty Years Later... .274 Olga Zdravomyslova. Perestroika: From Opinions to Understanding . .281 Mikhail Gorbachev. Historical Significance of Perestroika . .292 t has been twenty years since the beginning of the dramatic stage in Ithe history of our country, which got the name of "Perestroika". Two decades on, people still keep asking themselves questions like, "Was Perestroika really needed?", "Was it conditioned by the objective demands of social development?", "Were the fatal events that resulted in its abrupt termination and the disintegration of the Soviet Union really inevitable?", and "What did it give to society and the world and what is its legacy?" All these questions are taking on a new urgency in the light of the specific nature of the social and political situation existing in Russia today. They arise in the minds of generations of young people who started out in life in the postPerestroika period. And once again these questions make one try to understand and assess the events of 1985–1991, when the foundations of democratization of our society and transition to market economy were laid down in the atmosphere of a breakthrough to freedom that swept through the country. The research foundation, of which I am head, invited a number of Russian and foreign scientists and public figures who were active participants or witnesses to the events of those times to analyze or comment on them from today’s perspective. Many of them responded favorably to our invitation, which made this book possible. It contains articles by more than twenty authors, who are economists, political scientists, social scientists, historians with the Russian Academy of Sciences, diplomats who held important positions in the years of 4 5 Perestroika, former senior officials with the CPSU Central Committee, and associates with the Gorbachev Foundation. The authors include, among others, Aleksandr Nekipelov, Academician and VicePresident of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN); Oleg Bogomolov, Academician; Nikolay Shmelev, Academician and Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAN; Vadim Medvedev, Corresponding Member of the RAN; prominent PART I. foreign Slavic studies scholars Stephen F. Cohen (USA) and Archie Brown (Great Britain); Anatoly Adamishin, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., former Ambassador Seven Years of the United States to Moscow; Roderick Braithwaite, former Ambassador of Great Britain to Moscow; Anatoly Chernyayev, Aide that Changed the Country and the World to General Secretary of the CSPU Central Committee and later to the President of the USSR; prominent Russian scientists and political writers Vadim Mezhuyev, Liliya Shevtsova, Dmitry Furman, and others. The readers will, certainly, notice not only the variety of genres of the essays included in this book, but also the wide range of opinions Vadim Medvedev. Perestroika’s Chance of Success and assessments presented here. I see it as the book’s great virtue, since it does not impose on readers a preset viewpoint, but provokes Stephen F. Cohen. Was the Soviet System Reformable? thought, reflection and comparison of assessments and facts. Archie Brown. Perestroika and the Five Transformations I hope this book will contribute to better understanding of the ideas and actions of the initiators of Perestroika and to further studies Aleksandr Galkin. The Place of Perestroika in the History of Russia of this most major event in Russia’s and world history of the th 20 Century. Viktor Kuvaldin. Three Forks in the Road of Gorbachev’s Perestroika Mikhail Gorbachev Aleksandr Veber. Perestroika and International Social Democracy Boris Slavin. Perestroika in the Mirror of Modern Interpretations Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Perestroika as Viewed from Washington, 19851991 6 7 Vadim Medvedev • Perestroika's Chance of Success The sharp divergence of opinion on Perestroika was also reflected in PERESTROIKA’S CHANCE OF SUCCESS the vast flow of literature published in the past decade. My views and judgments on all these complex issues were given in four of my books,1 in a great number of brochures, articles, and reports published in those by Vadim Medvedev years. In this article I would not want to repeat what I have already said; however, I think it is important to give my judgments on some of the Vadim Medvedev is Corresponding stereotypes that formed in the interpretation of a number of important Member of the Russian Academy of problems of Perestroika, without claiming them complete or indisputable. Sciences (RAN), Doctor of Science oday hardly anyone (Economics), Professor, Adviser with On the causes of the defeat of Perestroika disagrees that Perestroika the Gorbachev Foundation, Project was one of the most Leader; in 1985, Head of the CPSU Perestroika started in spring of 1985 and had several stages. The first T Central Committee's Department for stage (or, rather, preparation for Perestroika) covered the period from important events in contemporary Science and Educational Institutions; history of this country and the in 19861990, Secretary of the CPSU spring 1985 through the end of 1986. The second stage (the actual start of whole world. However, divergence Central Committee; and in 1988, Perestroika processes) covered the period from the early 1987 to the of opinion on this phenomenon is Member of the Presidential Council middle of 1988. The third one, the culminating stage, lasted from mid1988 great, ranging from positive, even and Senior Adviser to the President of (the time of the 19th Party Conference) until the middle of 1990 (the time the USSR. enthusiastic, views to critical and of the 28th Congress of the CPSU). Finally, the fourth period, the crisis and extremely negative. The former prevail in the world public opinion. The defeat of Perestroika, continued from mid1990 until the end of 1991. The latter are characteristic mostly of the Russian writers and the Russian end of Perestroika was marked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, mass consciousness. Gorbachev’s resignation and the shift to catastrophic economic reforms. This paradox is easy to explain. The world is right to associate There exist different opinions of the reasons for the defeat of Perestroika with new political thinking, the end of the Cold War, real Perestroika. reduction of armaments and freeing of humanity from the threat of a According to one of them, that is rather exotic in nature, Perestroika global thermonuclear disaster. It is also associated with the unification of as a process of democratic reformation was doomed to failure, because Germany, termination of the reckless war in Afghanistan, and a number of Soviet society was essentially unreformable and the old system was other local conflicts, and, of course, shifting of the country’s development ossified and had to be simply scrapped. Allegedly, Russia passed its point onto the path of modern democratic processes. Naturally, the world of historical apogee, the highest point of its development, and was doomed community did and does welcome
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