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Home , Agadir Crisis, Algeciras Conference, Dual Alliance (1879), First Moroccan Crisis

Masarykova univerzita, Pedagogická fakulta

Roads to war – historiographical analyses of the origins of the First World War Bc. Vladimír Ovčáček

Brno 2019

Prohlašuji, že jsem závěrečnou práci (diplomovou) vypracoval samostatně, s využitím pouze citovaných pramenů, dalších informací a zdrojů v souladu s Disciplinárním řádem pro studenty Pedagogické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity a se zákonem č. 121/2000 Sb., o právu autorském, o právech souvisejících s právem autorským a o změně některých zákonů (autorský zákon), ve znění pozdějších předpisů.

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Content Introduction ...... 4 1 Theoretical background ...... 8 1.1 Chronology of the events preceding the outbreak of the War...... 8 1.1.1 The Congress of Vienna and creation of The , 1815 ...... 8 1.1.2 Independence of , 1830 ...... 9 1.1.3 Revolutions of 1848 ...... 9 1.1.4 Risorgimento of Italy, 1848-1861 ...... 10 1.1.5 The Crimean War, 1853-1856 ...... 11 1.1.6 Austro-Prussian War, 1866 ...... 11 1.1.7 Franco-Prussian War, 1870 ...... 11 1.1.8 Great Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878 ...... 12 1.1.9 Russo Turkish war, 1877-1878 ...... 12 1.1.10 Forming of the , 1879 ...... 13 1.1.11 Forming of the , 1882 ...... 13 1.1.12 Military convention between Russia and , 1893 ...... 14 1.1.13 The Fashoda affair, 1898 ...... 14 1.1.14 The May Coup in Serbia, 1903 ...... 15 1.1.15 Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 ...... 15 1.1.16 , 1904...... 16 1.2 Events directly preceding the war ...... 17 1.2.1 The , 1905-1906 ...... 17 1.2.2 Anglo-Russian Entente, 1907 ...... 17 1.2.3 The , 1908 ...... 17 1.2.4 The Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911 ...... 18 1.2.5 The Turco-Italian war, 1911-1912 ...... 18 1.2.6 The , 1912-1913 ...... 19 1.2.7 The , 1913 ...... 19 1.2.8 Sarajevo, 1914...... 19 1.2.9 , 1914...... 20 1.3 Summary ...... 22 2 Historians analysing the origins of the ...... 23 2.1 Harry Elmer Barnes ...... 23 2.2 Sidney Bradshaw Fay ...... 24

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2.3 A. J. P. Taylor...... 25 2.4 Fritz Fischer...... 26 2.5 Eric Hobsbawm ...... 28 3 Interpretations of events preceding World War I ...... 29 3.1 The underlying causes ...... 29 3.1.1 from the 1910s to 1971 ...... 29 3.2.1 The Great Eastern Crisis ...... 39 3.1.2 Forming of the Triple Alliance ...... 45 3.1.3 Forming of the Entente ...... 49 3.1.4 Entente Cordiale...... 53 3.1.5 First Moroccan Crisis ...... 56 3.1.6 Anglo-Russian Entente ...... 57 3.1.7 The Second Moroccan Crisis ...... 58 3.1.8 Development in the Near East ...... 60 3.2 Summary ...... 62 4 Discussion ...... 63 4.1 Application in history classes ...... 63 Conclusion ...... 64 Bibliography ...... 66

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Introduction

When contemporary reader studies a book about the War, or when we watch a film from that era, we cannot think of it as of a history lesson. Firstly, it is not, from the point of history as such, very long time ago. Our great-grand parents lived in this society and in many families, stories from these times are still being told. And, secondly, the decades preceding the First World War were in many ways very similar to the times we live today. The world trade expanded into the whole globe, the western population became more and more globalised, entrepreneurs in developed countries thrived, industry and technology made people’s lives easier. New inventions such as steamships, planes, telegraph, and even telephone, kept shortening the distance between people and countries in an unprecedented pace. The whole world was on the move, and the banks made the world go round, as they do today. To a critical reader, a question may come to mind. Even though the times seem to be calm and peaceful, we may notice something troubling about this era. How much similar is the pre-war Europe to the Europe of our time? And to what extent can history repeat itself? The decades of peace and prosperity, not unlike the ones we live in ended in the worst catastrophe the mankind had seen. Many people may ask, if similar devastation of men – how else can we describe what happened to the poor soldiers and civilians who survived the war – could happen to our generation as well. But how could a crisis, which started on 28 June 1914 is Sarajevo by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, unleash such an unprecedented tragedy, which the First World War truly was? This is the question which has troubled historians for more than a hundred years. Much has been written and said about the true nature of reasons why the whole world1 took part in this terrible bloodshed. Yet, as Dr Mombauer claims, “the current [historians’] consensus on why it broke out is ‘that there is no consensus’” (Mombauer). Why is it practically close to impossible to track down the truth behind the origin of WWI and put an end to the centenarian debate? And is there any such ‘truth’? The opinions on this matter have developed throughout a hundred years of research. Concerning several factors which have had effects on certain works and historian schools, this thesis will analyse the main bodies of work significant to each period. Its goal is not to identify the

1 Thirty six countries and 65 000 000 soldiers took part in the war. 8 500 000 of the soldiers died at the war, 21 000 000 were wounded, and 7 750 000 were taken prisoner (encyclopaedia Britannica).

4 true origins of the War (which is beyond its scope and it is perhaps impossible to do, anyway), but to observe the opinions of leading historians of their times and try to grasp the changing attitudes towards answering the critical question – ‘How did the Great War start?’ Even before the outbreak of the First World War, tensions in Europe were high and, by many, the war seemed to be inevitable. The debate in the first period which is analysed in this thesis, that is the time of the war itself, sought to establish the responsibility of the outbreak of WWI. No government wanted to be seen as an aggressor. This was done during and after the war, by both historians, and politicians, whose monographs often overlap into history books as well. After the peace conference in Paris, the victors blamed Germany and its allies of warmongering (most notably in the famous Article 231 of the , which is also referred to as ‘The War Guilt Clause’), and stated, that it was solely Germany who is to blame. Yet, another group of historians emerged in the interwar years, who attempted to revise this assessment and at least reduce the notion of “war guilt” put upon Germany. Clashes between these two groups (who are referred to as ‘proponents of the war guilt’ or ‘traditionalist historians’, and ‘revisionists’ on the other side), together with extensive emission of primary and secondary materials2 giving information in favour and against both Entente and Alliance members, were predominant traits of the debate in the inter-war period. In the 1960s, one of multiple explanations advocated by many, which “identified a failure in the alliance system before 1914” (Mombauer) was challenged by the work of German historian Fritz Fischer. In his monographs Germany’s Aims in the First World War (1961)3, and War of Illusions (1969)4, Fischer claimed that it was nobody but German leaders who held the responsibility for the outbreak of the war and “[F]rom the time of the infamous War Council meeting in December 19125 […] German leaders planned war of aggression” (Mulligan 9). These influential books gained many followers and subsequently the term Fischer school was coined, which is used to refer to the group of historians supporting Fischer’s claims. Yet, many historians criticize Fischer’s work, its methods and both historical and political consequences of his work. No doubt that the Fischer debate did not offer an answer which would bring a conclusion

2 These materials were mostly emitted by governments themselves, in many cases on purpose to defend or accuse one or the oter side. 3 Its original name is Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegziehlpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1918. 4 Its original name is Krieg des Illusionen. 5 The Imperial war council of 8 December 1912 was an informal meeting of Germany’s high military leaders. In that time, the First Balkan War was in progress, Germany had felt more isolated after the Moroccan crises, and the tensions in Europe were high. Many historians, such as Fischer, claim that this council was one of the key steps towards the war.

5 to the debate. On the contrary, many historians “have returned to the arguments of the interwar years, focusing for example on Russia’s and France’s role in the outbreak of war, or asking if Britain’s government really did all it could to try and avert war in 1914” (Mombauer). In the 1970s and 1980s, new directions of approaching the matter of the outbreak of WWI appeared. Numerous social, political, cultural, and military historians offered new perspectives to this issue. After the end of the Cold War, new questions have risen. The globalised world in the 1990s resembled some historians of the interconnected Europe before the outbreak of World War I, therefore examining Europe in 1910s acquired new shape. As Mulligan states, “the credo of globalisation theories in the 1990s suggested that growing economic interdependence and cultural exchange made wars […]” (Mulligan 13). But “interdependence could produce conflict as well as harmony” (13), so the critical scope of some historians in the 1990s was to investigate “the relationship between globalisation and erosion of peace” (Mulligan 11). The one hundredth ‘anniversary’ of the Great War witnessed release of many works which have revisited the war, notably Clark’s Sleepwalkers and Otte’s July Crisis. These publications bring new approach on examination of the outbreak of the war – their critical question is modified from “Why [the European powers came to war]” to “How” (Mulligan 16). The main task of this diploma thesis is to collect and analyse main historians’ monographs, articles, and other works of significance, which have been written to offer an answer to the critical question: “Why and how did the Great War start?” In a hundred years, historians from all around the world have been seeking for the true origins of this conflict, yet no consensus has been found. The aim of this thesis is to find reliable sources which interpret the mechanisms, policies, motivations of individual characters, and another forces which drove the world before the war, analyse them and describe, how the fashion among historians in the interpretation varied through the time, and how the societal and political conditions in which they lived influenced their perception of the events. This thesis should also serve as a source of information for teachers who want to incorporate this topic into their lessons, so that they could see the reasons why the war broke out from different perspectives. To fulfil the aims of this work, monographs “The Genesis of the World War” (1925) by Harry Elmer Barnes, “The Origins of World War, vol. 1” (1930) by Sydney Bradshaw Fay, “The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918” (1954) by A. J. P. Taylor, “Germany’s Aims in the First World War” (1961) by Fritz Fischer, and “The Age of Empire: 1875-1914” (1987) by Eric

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Hobsbawm will be examined. These samples of historical analysis represent major schools of historiography of the First World War, and are also means of expressing each author’s individual perception of the events. There may have been multiple different reasons why certain states and people behaved in certain ways, their motivations and other factors affecting their decision making may be buried in the archives. These, certainly, are worth further examination, which is the aim of this thesis. Even though a large number of historians have studied these primary materials, they often reached very different conclusions. Comparing these, in addition to adding some personal information about the above mentioned historians, may help unravel the stories behind their works and bring some light to the complex questions of how and why the world of the and 1910s marched towards the First World War, and, more importantly, how historians’ perceptions and explanations of certain events can influence popular opinion. In the end of this thesis, a summary of similarities and differences will be made. Then, based on characteristics of each author and/or work, conclusion will be made.

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1 Theoretical background 1.1 Chronology of the events preceding the outbreak of the War

Since Thucydides’ History of Peloponnesian War, as Sidney B. Fay presents in his work The Origins of the World War, two distinct types of causes of war should be taken into consideration. These are "the more remote or underlying” (Fay 1), and “the immediate” ones (1). Or, as Fay wittily continues, “[it] is the distinction between the gradual accumulation of inflammable material which has been heaped up through a long period of years and the final spark which starts the conflagration” (1). In other words, no wars occur without any reason. These reasons may be long-term, such as struggle of two states to conquer certain area or naval routes, or short-term; for example, abduction of a princess.6 This thesis, likewise a considerable number of other works carrying out research on the origins of war, respects this ancient distinction. This chapter provides summative compendium of these events.

1.1.1 The Congress of Vienna and creation of The Concert of Europe, 1815

Even though some historians are able to trace certain traits of European history which lead (directly or indirectly) to crises preceding the war and the war itself as far as back to the ancient Rome, the modern Europe as we know it, as many including Stowell (1915) started in Vienna in 1815. It was after the Napoleonic Wars, during which the whole system before the French revolution of 1789 failed. In Vienna, on the invitation of an Austrian diplomat Klemens Von Metternich, ambassadors of top European states gathered to resolve problems of post-Napoleonic Europe. Here, what is known as The Concert of Europe, or European Concert, originated (Stowell 3). The European Concert consisted of “the principal independent states of Europe” (Stowell 3), namely Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and England. Since this congress, diplomats from above mentioned countries used to meet at any case of possible threatening of peace in Europe, trying to solve it diplomatically, instead of by force. One of the initial accomplishments of the Concert was to divide Europe between the victors. France, together with a new king who was assigned by the Concert7, regained approximately its borders it had had before the French First Republic was founded in 1792. Britain

6 Of which Helen of Troy is a fine example. 7 Louis XVIII (reigned from 1814 to 1824), who was succeeded by his brother Charles X (1824-1830). Charles X was dethroned during the July Revolution of 1830 and departed to England. Thus the period known as The Bourbon , ended.

8 gained Malta, Ionian isles in the Mediterranean, and certain islands in the North Sea. Prussia expanded rapidly and, with territorial gains in Saxony, Pomerania, Rhineland, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw it almost overnight became a great European power. Russia, in addition to securing Finland, gained a part of Poland and part of modern-day Moldova.8 Austria gained Venetian Lombardy and Dalmatia, by which they gained access to the Mediterranean, and also recovered Tyrol.9 Even though this partition of Europe seemed beneficial for most of the big countries, it did not follow borders of smaller nations, which proved especially short-sighted in the case of Belgium. It was decided that Belgian provinces10, even though they had fought for autonomy for decades, were to unite with former Seven United Provinces of and thus create a buffer zone between Prussia and France.

1.1.2 Independence of Belgium, 1830

According to Stowell, the aforementioned decision, however, collided with Belgian public sentiments (Stowell 5) and this Catholic region revolted against Protestant rule of William I of Netherlands. In 1830, following the French who had put an end to the Bourbon king Charles X and had forced him to exile, Belgian revolution broke out. And the same year, the Kingdom of Belgium was established. However, it was recognised no sooner than nine years later by the Treaty of London, which also gave Belgium perpetual neutrality. This meant that no army was to set foot on Belgian soil.11

1.1.3 Revolutions of 1848

The Spring of Nations, as the Europe wide wave of revolutions is also referred to, was a set of national upbringings, opposing old monarchical structures and promoting ideals of national states, freedom, and democracy. Some historians claim that the chain started in Sicily; some, like Pelz, recognise the roots in Paris. Here, the house Orléans12 was dethroned and the French Second Republic was formed. The revolutions of 1848 also lead to resignation of Prince von Metternich.

8 Also known as Bessarabia. 9 Tyrol was shortly divided between Bavaria and Italy, between 1809 and 1815. 10 Also known as Belgium Austriacum. 11 All five major European powers signed this treaty and even during the Austro-Prussian war in 1866, Belgian neutrality was respected by both sides. Breaching this treaty by Germany in 1914 was the casus belli which officially made Britain enter the World War I. 12 After the July Revolution of 1830, the French Parliament offered the crown to Louis Philippe I. During his reign, French economy deteriorated, and in 1848 he was dethroned and the monarchy was abolished. The February Revolution of 1848 in France led to creation of the French Second Republic.

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“That same March of 1848 saw revolutionary crowds gather in Berlin where a startled king verbally accepted demands for elections, a constitution, freedom of the press and the unification of Prussia with other German states” (Pelz 65). In German states, a body often called ‘The Professors‘ parliament’ was set up. Its aim was to create the constitution, but the academics failed to achieve the goal and by the end of the year the parliament was dissolved. The end of 1848 saw the return to the old ways, „the nobles and generals in Berlin, Vienna and elsewhere had regained their nerve and began to reverse all the changes set in motion earlier in the year” (Pelz 66). Also elsewhere in Europe, the rebellions were crushed by the armies and ended in bloodshed.

1.1.4 Risorgimento of Italy, 1848-1861

Initially, there were eight states13 in the Apennine peninsula. Piedmont, or the Kingdom of Sardinia, was among the strongest of them. In 1848, following revolts in Venice and Milan against the Austrian rule, and with support of volunteers from other Italian states, Piedmont declared war on Austria. However, the First Italian War of Independence ended in 1849 by Austrian victory. It is worth mentioning that Italian hero Giuseppe Garibaldi fought in this war and gained a number of minor victories. But the idea of united Italy dates back before the revolution of 1848, when the journalist, politician, and republican activist Giuseppe Mazzini gained influence and became one of the faces of the Risorgimento. But his influence was on decrease in 1850s, and new leading figure emerged in the King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel I. Unlike his predecessors, he was a liberal king, introducing constitution and representative assembly to Piedmont (http://ocw.umb.edu). The economic growth under his reign made Sardinia the most powerful state in Italy, and a model for the united Italy as a monarchy. Piedmont joined the Crimean War (see the next chapter) on the winning side of England and France. This earned this relatively small kingdom participation on the Congress of Paris in 1856. Here, the Prime Minister of Sardinia Count of Cavour initiated talks of the future of Italy, emphasizing especially terrible conditions in Naples, which was under Austrian rule. These conditions were allegedly encouraging revolution, hence the war of 1859, also known as the Second Italian War of Independence. On 17 March 1861, the was proclaimed. This kingdom, however, did not

13 Kingdom of Naples, Kingdom of Sicily, Kingdom of Sardinia, Duchy of Milan (which were under the influence of Habsburg ), Duchy of Savoy, Duchy of Mantua, Duchy of Parma and Piacenza, and The Papal States.

10 unite the whole Apennine peninsula. Venice was part of Austria until the Austro-Prussian war in 1866, and Rome became part of unified Italy in 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war.

1.1.5 The Crimean War, 1853-1856

The Crimean war was a conflict between Russia on one side, and the , France, Britain and in the later phase the Kingdom of Sardinia. It was caused by Russian concern over Eastern Orthodox Catholics in the Ottoman Empire (namely in the Balkan Peninsula), and the Tsar’s demands of placing them under Russian protection. His underlying motive was the expectation of territorial gain from weakening Ottoman Empire (Encyclopaedia Britannica). The initial Russian offensive was halted and the Ottoman Empire gained initiative, landing Russian Crimea and occupying Sevastopol. After Austria threatened to join the allies against Russia, Tsar surrendered and the was signed in 1856. It stipulated that the Black Sea became neutral, Russia lost Bessarabia, and the Danube River was opened to all nations (http://ocw.umb.edu). The war is significant for two more interesting facts. Florence Nightingale, who became the founder of modern nursing, was in charge of training British nurses in this war. And the Battle of Balaklava - a part of the war – was immortalized in a poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade” by Alfred, Lord Tennyson.

1.1.6 Austro-Prussian War, 1866

In 1866, Austro-Prussian war, also known as The Seven Weeks’ war, broke out between Prussia on one side, and Austria on the other, both allied with certain German states. Joined by Italy and with overall military supremacy, Prussia won the war, causing Austria significant power and territorial losses.14 Gaining certain German states supporting Austria, it also connected its territory and thus formed the North German Confederation, of which Prussia was the leader.

1.1.7 Franco-Prussian War, 1870

The Franco-Prussian War started in Spain in 1868. The Spanish Glorious revolution overthrew former queen Isabella II and left her throne free. German chancellor Bismarck supported Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, to the throne. This was perceived with combination of fear and anger in France, because Leopold was cousin of William I, King of Prussia, and France would find

14 Austria ceded Venice to France, which, following secret treaty with Prussia, handed it to Italy.

11 itself enclosed by two Hohenzollern-ruled states. Leopold then retired his candidacy, but the French wanted to revenge the diplomatic insult. The French president Napoleon III further demanded official apology by Leopold, and an assurance that he would never renew his candidacy to the Spanish throne. This was rejected by the Germans, and Bismarck published the story in a way which was intended to intensify the hatred between France and Germany. The German strategy paid off, and on 19 July, France declared war on Prussia. This united southern and northern German states, whose army outnumbered the French and won the war in six months, surrounded Paris, and Prussian king William I was crowned emperor of Germany. During the war, French capital was moved to Tours. Parisians, who defended their city, later revolted and formed the Commune of Paris, thus starting a short civil war. In May 1871, the Treaty of Frankfurt was signed, giving Germany the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and France also had to pay huge compensation to Germany. The annexation of the aforementioned provinces caused deterioration of Franco-German relationship and is referred to as one of the most important events which led to the outbreak of the First World War.

1.1.8 Great Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878

In the early 19th century, the Ottoman Empire struggled to rule the most of the , often rebellious against them. Harsh treatment of Christian peasants by the Ottomans, combined with crop failure (Philips 66) caused rebellion in Herzegovina, which eventually spread into the rest of the Balkan Peninsula, Montenegro and Serbia. By the end of the crisis, Russia joined to fight alongside the Slavic nations, and Britain nearly did so as well (66). The crisis resulted in Serbian, Bulgarian15, and Romanian independence, which was outlined by the and confirmed by the (both in 1878).

1.1.9 Russo Turkish war, 1877-1878

The long and rich history of conflicts (see the Crimean War) between Russia and the Ottoman Empire dates back to the 15th century. Since then, these two powers waged wars over domination of the Black Sea. Russia joined the Slavic nations’ wars of independence, which was supposed to help them regain prestige and power after the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which the

15 “Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary Principality under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. It will have a Christian government and a national militia.“ (The Treaty of Berlin, Article I)

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Ottomans, backed by the French and British, had won. The outcome of this war was autonomy of Bulgaria agreed by the Treaty of San Stefano. However, the western powers saw the rise of Russian influence in Balkans irritating, and it was agreed in Berlin that Bulgaria, which was under Russian influence and its territory was large, therefore the balance of power in Balkan would be disturbed, was to be split into three parts, two of which were given back to the Ottoman Empire. Apart from recognizing Bulgaria as a sovereign state, three new independent states emerged in Balkan – Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro. Bosnia and Herzegovina was decided to be occupied by Austria-Hungary16, though it was still part of the Ottoman Empire. Britain took over Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire, in exchange of promise that Britain would help in defence in case of any further Russian aggression.

1.1.10 Forming of the Dual Alliance, 1879

The negative attitude of western powers to Russian policy in Balkans had an effect on Alexander II, the Russian Tsar. He sent Wilhelm I two letters, in which he expressed his concern that “despite Russia's long-time friendship and devotion to Germany, she had not supported Russia at her time of need, and that now, the Tsar could not guarantee peace between the two nations” (Shafer 70). Bismarck, to William’s regret17, was then forced to seek for partnership with the Dual Monarchy, which resulted in forming secret pact now known as the Dual Alliance. The primary reason of this mutual agreement was their shared fear of possible Russian attack. Also, as Shafer claims, the treaty was agreed to last only for five years, with a possibility of its renewal in the future (Shafer 72).

1.1.11 Forming of the Triple alliance, 1882

In May 1882, Italy joined the Dual alliance of Germany and Austria, thus creating the Triple alliance, or Triplice18. The primary orientation of this system was against France, whose attack on each member should invoke common response. As Conybeare states, “It required aid by the other two members if one of them were attacked by France or became involved in a war with

16 “The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. […]Nevertheless, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political state of affairs, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient vilayet of Bosnia.“ (The Treaty of Berlin, Article XXV) A vilayet is a term used for a province in the Ottoman Empire. 17 Wilhelm and Alexander were cousins and a treaty like this was betrayal in his eyes. But Bismarck insisted on the treaty and even threatened to resign. Since he was crucial for governing Germany, Wilhelm was forced to sign the treaty, willing or not. 18 Stowell, 24

13 two or more other great powers and neutrality if one member initiated war with a nonmember” (Conybeare 1198). With Italian entrance, the Alliance did not gain much stability, and Conybeare’s assessment of Alliance after 1882 bears this in mind: “Italy and Austria had major territorial disputes. Italy and France settled their differences and signed agreements […] obliging Italy to remain neutral in the event of France becoming involved in a war with a third party. An Italo-Russian entente in October 1909, with mutual pledges of support in their respective spheres of influence (North Africa and the Balkans), drove another wedge between Italy and its nominal allies in the Triple Alliance” (Conybeare 1198). It is worth mentioning that Italy practically substituted Russia, who had had bonds especially with Germany. But since 1890, when the Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty19 was terminated, despite Russian calls for its renewal, Russian diplomacy turned its efforts else, namely to France.

1.1.12 Military convention between Russia and France, 1893

Following German refuse to renew the Russo-German of 1887, a military convention between Russia and France was agreed upon in 1893. This convention bound these two countries to support each other in an event of being attacked by a member of the Triple Alliance “as long as Germany was involved either directly or in a supportive role” (Conybeare 1198). This practically meant that France and Russia obliged to have common defence against the .

1.1.13 The Fashoda affair, 1898

Britain and France have been colonial rivals all around the world. One of the most important fields of their expansionist fight for new colonies was Africa, namely modern day Sudan. The French development in this so called went eastwards from modern day Senegal, the British goal was to connect Egypt with south Africa, allowing them build railway from Cairo to Cape Town. The two powers met in Fashoda (modern day Kodok), a town on the White Nile, in today South Sudan. Having control over the Nile Valley was vital for the British. According to Curtis,

19 It was a bilateral treaty which bound both parties to be neutral in case of war, with the exceptions of German attack on France and Russian attack on Austria.

14 the French unit was tiny, consisting of only 120 men, and had been given orders to avoid hostilities and develop friendly relationship with the locals. (Curtis 12-13) On the other hand, British General Kitchener’s army, who outnumbered the French more than ten to one, arrived in five gunboats. The actual meeting was rather friendly, but it sparkled a huge diplomatic crisis between Britain and France, eventually won by the British side. As Curtis concludes, “France was excluded from the whole Nile Valley, but received some territory in western Sudan” (Curtis 87).

1.1.14 The May Coup in Serbia, 1903

The House of Obrenović had ruled Serbia since the mid-19th century, having been traditionally allied with Austrian throne. This stability changed with Aleksander ascending to the throne. His policy was shifting between Russia and Austria, causing also resentment in the army (Markovich 58-59). Hence, one June night20, Serbian king Aleksander and his queen Draga21 were assassinated by a group of army officers, passing the throne to a rival house, which was backed by Russia. This started the reign of Peter I, changing the course of Serbian policy.

1.1.15 Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905

Japan, a newly industrialized country, was becoming a formidable power in the Far East, fully understanding western imperialist mind-sets and making use of technological and scientific knowledge. On the other hand, Russia was a world superpower of its time, even though its autocratic regime and overall lack of industry and development as such anchored it somehow behind its European counterparts. These obstacles, however, did not prevent Russia from expansionist policies on the edges of its vast empire. One of these tendencies was to expand east. As Steinberg explains, “Both Russia and Japan had imperial ambitions over the territories where they fought—Manchuria and Korea. For the Russians, expansion into Manchuria was the continuation of a policy that can be traced back as far as the reign of Ivan the Terrible […]” (Steinberg 19). The war, according to Steinberg, illustrated for the first time in history how important the interconnection between the military and industrial capacities of a country were. Modern weapons, such as rapid-firing artillery and machine guns, together with modern steam-driven ships with

20 The Eastern Orthodox Church uses Julian calendar, which puts these events 13 days behind. 21 According to Markovich, her “dubious background” made her a hated figure, who was seen to be an embarrassment to Serbia.

15 outstanding guns, naval mines, torpedoes, and the use of railway as means of transport of men, weapons and supplies over long distances, foreshadowed how modern warfare would look like. It must not been forgotten to add the financial issues going hand in hand with the use of technologically advanced weapons. In this respect, France had backed Russia and British and American banks loaned the Japanese. Japan, who had begun the conflict22, won the war decisively, yet with great cost on manpower and finance. The loss was even harsher for Russia, whose public sentiment was against the war and Russia underwent a revolution in 1905. Also, the Russians lost Port Arthur23 and had to cease any plans of adding Manchuria. They also had to recognize Japanese control over Korea, which had been also one of Russian spheres of influence.

1.1.16 Entente Cordiale, 1904

In April 1904, the Anglo-French Entente, or Entente Cordiale24, was signed. This document settled territorial disputes in colonies between these two countries, and did not consist of any components of military support or common defensive strategies, as Conybeare claims (Conybeare 1198) . Neither Britain, nor France could boast with numerous allies at that time. The only British ally was Japan, whose aid, due to its remoteness, could not be depended on in case of a European conflict. The same can be said about the only French ally, Russia. By signing the Entente, both France and Britain lost an enemy in Europe, even though these two nations had been fighting each other for centuries. Besides, they bolstered their powers compared to rising Germany. In addition to this, the hereditary enmity between these two states was a key factor for German diplomacy. In fact, the Germans relied on it as on a basic principle of European affairs. After the status quo was refuted, Germany tried the strength of the “agreement” by provoking two Moroccan crises. Yet the first ordeal of the Entente was not caused by Germany; both French ally Russia and British ally Japan had been at war during the signing of this document. However, neither of these countries was pulled into the war, and the Entente overcame its first test.

22 It is fact that the Japanese began the war, sinking Russian ships in Porth Arthur, but this incident was provoked by Russian occupation of Manchuria. 23 A strategic port they had lent from China, because their only large port, Vladivostok, was not operational in winter. 24 Meaning “a friendly agreement” in French.

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1.2 Events directly preceding the war

1.2.1 The First Moroccan Crisis, 1905-1906

One of the effects of reconciliation between Britain and France was the two states’ understanding in Egypt and . While Britain was given a free hand in Egypt, France had the same power over Morocco. This was, however, seen by the Germans as breaching of the of 1880, which was to regulate European territorial gains in Morocco. German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, went to Morocco and gave a speech in which he suggested that Germany would protect the whole Muslim world against the European powers. This ignited diplomatic crisis, eventually leading French minister of foreign affairs Delcassé to resign from his post. This was a minor victory for German diplomacy, since their main goal was to “break the entente and thereby isolate France,” (Zagare 15) having relied on “Great Britain’s unreliability as an ally” (15). In other words, Germany wanted to test the Entente and prove the agreement between Britain and France week, and they failed. Not having met German expectations, Britain unflinchingly supported France, and at the international conference in , Germany capitulated and their diplomacy got even more isolated than before the crisis (15). The First Moroccan crisis showed and tested the bond between Britain and France, which withstood German attempts on breaking it.

1.2.2 Anglo-Russian Entente, 1907

The pre-war system of alliances was completed in 1907 by signing the Anglo-Russian Entente. This agreement, like the Entente Cordiale, did not solve any military issues, but it moderated tensions between these two powers, mainly in Persia. (Conybeare 1198; Stowell 18) Since 1907, European superpowers were divided into two blocks – the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) and the (Britain, France, and Russia).

1.2.3 The Bosnian Crisis, 1908

Following the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Austria occupied the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though it was officially under the Ottoman rule. However, in 1908 the Dual Monarchy, who was German ally, decided to annex the aforementioned domain, thus creating turmoil in the area. Bulgaria capitalized on it and declared its independence. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not cause problems only in Balkans, but in

17 international diplomacy as well. Especially Serbia and its ally Russia were strongly against it. Yet, after Austrian threats to invade Serbia, Russia had to move back and accept the annexation.

1.2.4 The Second Moroccan Crisis, 1911

In March 1911, there was an uprising in Morocco near the town of Fez. French troops were sent to restore order in this area, which was seen in Germany as a possible excuse to take over Morocco. On 1st , German gunboat Panther occurred near the port of Agadir. Hence, another name of this crisis – the . Germany, by sending their boat to the proximity of this port, claimed to protect their interests here. These interests were to establish a port which would allow them to refuel their boats on their commerce sails. In the end, Germany, recognized Morocco a French , in exchange of territory of Ubangi. It was part of , neighbouring with German colony of Kameron. This solution was, however, a great disappointment for both nations – Germans wanted a port in Western Africa which would be a valuable station on commercial routes to both South Africa and South America. In France, on the other hand, emerged strong feelings that they should not have given up their territory simply because Germany was threating with war, and that France did not get anything in return for the land.

1.2.5 The Turco-Italian war, 1911-1912

Italian expansionist policy had one great goal – to cut the Mediterranean in two by securing a line from the Apennine peninsula via Sicily to Tunis, which had belonged to the Ottoman Empire. They set an ultimatum that Istanbul surrenders Tripoli and agrees with Italian occupation of the city. This was met with non-acceptance, so Italy took the city by force, declaring war on the Ottoman Empire. By doing so, Italy put Germany into difficult situation – on one side, Turkey was German protégé, but Italian instability as a member of the Triple Alliance made it close to impossible for Germany to object on Italian attack. After several months, Turkish and Italian delegates met in to negotiate the terms of piece. Having been pushed by the development in the Balkans, Turkey surrendered Tripoli and Cyrenaica25 to Italy in exchange of Aegean islands.

25 Cyrennaica is a province east to Tripoli, and west to the Gulf of Sydra.

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1.2.6 The First Balkan war, 1912-1913

Weakening of the Ottoman empire and its lost war with Italy had another consequence – Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro formed an alliance against the Ottoman government26. In spite of being on their own, without any help from the great powers27, the states beat the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman territory was, as a result of the war, decimated to a small part in Europe near Istanbul. The remaining land was divided among the states, and independent Albania was created. The former outcome met problems in Bulgaria, who wanted more land, the latter caused unrest in Serbia, whose dream of Great Serbia took a great blow. The immediate cause of the First Balkan War was, thence, The Second Balkan War.

1.2.7 The Second Balkan War, 1913

Bulgaria, whose gains from the preceding war were not sufficient for its part, attacked Greece and Serbia, causing an outbreak of another war. Romania, who had had some territorial disputes with Bulgaria, too, joined promptly, and the Ottoman Empire also tried to regain at least some of its losses from the first war. By making so many enemies, Bulgarian capital Sofia was soon surrounded by Romanian troops, forcing Bulgaria to call for an armistice. In Bucharest, a treaty was signed one and half months after the war had started. This treaty meant territorial gains for Romania, Serbia, and Greece in expense of Bulgaria. In Constantinople, another treaty was signed, and the Ottoman Empire regained former Bulgarian spoil of the first war, Edirne.

1.2.8 Sarajevo, 1914

On Sunday, 28th June 1914, the corner of the Appel Quay28 and a street connecting it with the Franz Joseph Street in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, witnessed an unlikely event when a teenage radical Gavrilo Princip shot dead an heir presumptive to the Austrian throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este, and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg. This historical moment happened after an unbelievable chain of accidents. According to Foster, the Black Hand, a Bosnian Serb nationalistic organisation, planned

26 Also referred to as the Sublime Porte or the Porte. 27 All the great powers understood that any changes of the Status quo in the Balkans would pose a threat for the whole Europe, and they sent a collective note that they will not interfere in this conflict, nor support any territorial changes. 28 A narrow street in Sarajevo, on the bank of the Miljacka River.

19 the assassination that day, which involved six anarchists equipped with hand grenades and pistols. The first attempt was unsuccessful, when the hand grenade thrown at Archduke’s car bounced off his cabriolet hood, and exploded under a car behind him. This caused the motorcade to speed up, and make it impossible to act for the rest of the anarchists, including Princip. The event also caused a fatal change of the plan of Austrian delegation. The Archduke insisted on visiting the hospital where the injured from the attack had been taken, instead of a museum, as was the initial plan. Unaware of the change, Archduke’s driver took the wrong turn, and on his attempt to return to the original route, stopped right in front of a delicatessen where one of the assassins, Gavrilo Princip, happened to be at that moment. Princip seized the chance and shot twice from immediate distance. The first shot hit Franz Ferdinand in his throat, the second one, intended to kill the governor Potiorek, dealt a mortal blow to Sophie, Archduchess of Austria. Sophia died in the car which sped to Potiorek’s residence, Ferdinand ceased to be a few moments later.

1.2.9 July Crisis, 1914 The assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne on 28 June accelerated European diplomacy. On 5 July, Austrian envoy travelled to Potsdam and got a ‘blank cheque’, or unconditional support of German Kaiser and Chancellor. On 23 July, Austrian officials issued an ultimatum to Serbia. Serbia was given forty-eight hours to accept it without conditions. The ultimatum was criticised for its harshness, namely by the British. The next day, Russia decides to make military preparations in its cabinet council. On the same day, Britain suggests a quadruple conference, and France recommends immediate bilateral negotiations between Austria and Serbia. Serbia at the same day issues a decree of mobilisation. On 26 July, Serbia accepts most of Austrian conditions. Yet Vienna is not satisfied with Serbian reply. Sir Edward Grey again invites the three powers to London. The next day, British propositions on meditation conference in London are not accepted by Germany. These suggestions reach Austria the next day, when German ambassador forwards them to Vienna. Austria, after difficult consideration29, expresses its view that the Serbian crisis should be solved by force. Russia and France, on the other hand, are in favour of a conference as proposed by the British. Russian Tsar advised the Serbs to look for a peaceful way, and, as the head of allied nation, offered Russian support in case of need.

29 It is worth mentioning that Austrian politicians were not united in their opinion so as the necessity of taking military action against Serbia was essential.

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On 28 July, Austria declares war against Serbia. Russia responds by a partial mobilisation30 scheduled on 29 July, and with a threat that at the moment Austrian troops cross Serbian border, the mobilisation will be full. On the other hand, Sazonov31 is reviving the British proposal for negotiations on 29 July. The very same day, French government assures Russia of their support. Britain still remains neutral. On 30 July, Austria bombards Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. This, in addition to Russian mobilisation, provokes an exchange of telegraphs between the Kaiser and the Tsar, in which Alexander affirms Wilhelm that Russian mobilisation is of defensive manner and they are willing to cease it in case Austria is ready to withdraw its ultimatum. The next day, on 31 July, Germany closes bridges across the border with Luxemburg, causing concern in Belgium and Luxemburg. Belgium is assured that Germany has not changed its attitude to Belgian neutrality. French Minister of Foreign Affairs is, nevertheless, uncertain about the development on German western border, and asks Britain for their prospects. The British, namely their Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, respond “that the British government cannot give any pledge at present time” (Stowell 679) and that “neutrality of Belgium might be […] an important factor in determining their attitude” (679). Grey again proposes negotiations to the Germans and Austrians, suggesting that “if France and Russia rejected any reasonable Austro- German proposal, the British Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences” (Stowel, 680). These efforts are crippled by German attitude to Russian mobilisation, which reportedly handicap their peace efforts in Vienna (680). In fact, on the same day the German army operates along Luxemburg and Belgian border, German diplomacy urges Russia to cease their mobilisation. Italy, seeing the war between Austria and Serbia as an aggression by their Austrian ally, therefore “in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance,” (680) remains at this point neutral. Mobilisations in Austria and Belgium are in progress. On 1 August, a German ambassador in Russia presents declaration of war. On the same day, Sir Edward Grey learns that Austria may be willing to negotiate if Russia stops mobilisation, and this message is also delivered to St Petersburg. German response is that Russian mobilisation is perceived as an act of war and Germany must act accordingly. Therefore, Germany issues orders

30 The success of Russian mobilization was based on its speed. Since Russia is so vast, it was crucial for the Tsar to start at least with partial mobilization of territories near Serbia. A full mobilization was not desirable at this point, because it would imply that Russia wanted to go to war. 31 Russian Foreign minister 1910-1916.

21 for mobilisation, starting on 2 August. When France learns from its ambassador in St Petersburg that Germany prepares for mobilisation, it replies in the same manner. On 2 August, Germany invades Luxemburg and issues ultimatum to Belgium, because of suspicion that France is going to breach the Treaty of London and violate Belgium’s neutrality. Britain responds by assuring France that its fleet will protect French coast in case of German attack. On 3 August, German ambassador in Paris informs that “in view of French violation of Belgian and German territory, the considers itself to be in a state of war with France” (Stowell 684). The next day, on 4 August, German troops enter Belgium, while German diplomats assure Britain that their intention is not to invade Belgium, but to avert French invasion there. Britain presents ultimatum, demanding German respecting Belgian neutrality, and assures Belgium, Norway, and Holland that they will protect their neutrality. German Chancellor gives a speech in Reichstag, in which he recognizes that “Germany’s action was a violation of international law, but to be excused by necessity” (Stowell 685).

1.3 Summary From the above mentioned brief summary of chosen events which had had either direct, or indirect effects on the outbreak of World War One, it is evident that Europe before the War was very complex place. No wonder that this era (beginning by French revolution and ending in 1914) is sometimes referred to as “The long nineteenth century”. The intricacy of interstate affairs, technological and scientific progress, appearance of revolutions of all kinds, development of new classification of society, evolution of warfare, spread of ideas of nationalism, democracy, globalisation, and human rights; these are only some randomly selected traits of (not only) European culture of this time. The complexity of the pre-war period, which is analysed in this thesis, and in which the whole society headed from a thriving one, which capitalized on technological, economic and social developments, to a state of affairs when millions were killed in the trenches of the World War, is uncanny. No doubt that, with a couple of decades separating us from this stage of our European past, views on that population and its mechanisms have differed. Historians throughout the last century have articulated their views on the pre-war society, and these views have influenced contemporary and present-day popular perceptions of pre-war Europe. The following pages present how these

22 fashions have varied, and what possible conclusions consequences they might have had.

2 Historians analysing the origins of the World War I Although hundreds of books on this topic have been published worldwide, the body of this work narrowed to only five of them. This enables the author to focus on the authors themselves, and at least briefly inform the reader on their personal information and academic experience. This information may help understand the authors’ methods, approaches, and findings.

2.1 Harry Elmer Barnes

Harry Elmer Barnes (15 June 1889 – 25 August 1968) was an American historian, whose works also exceeded to “sociology, criminology, religion, economics, current affairs, and social thought.” (Rothbard, 4) As a historian, he was affiliated with the revisionist group. Revisionism is an approach by which a scholar, whose aspiration lays in challenging conventional interpretation of the past, seeks for new evidence or finds unconventional conclusions based on classical works. Historical revisionism of World War I was centred on reconsideration of German ‘war guilt’, and Barnes was one of the paramount advocates of this attitude. Barnes’ alma mater is the University of Columbia, where he got his PhD. He was a student of the founders of so called New History - Robinson, Shotwell, and Shepherd (Encyclopedia.com). New History was an approach of historians such as Robinson to create lively history books, in which not only dates are compiled, but they believed that the study of history “is of importance inly in so far as a knowledge of the past may enable the present to plan more intelligently for a better future.” (Robinson ix) From 1918 to 1929, Barnes acted as a History professor at the University of Columbia. But throughout his career he changed a number of schools where he taught, mainly in sociology departments (ix). Although the start of his academic career was brilliant, he lost his credibility as a historian throughout the 1920s when he firmly called for revision of German “war guilt”, and in 1930s even “efforts were made to prevent his speaking at several institutions” (Doenecke 312). Since the 1940s, he struggled to find publishers for his books, for he was pushing an unpopular thesis that “Roosevelt was ultimately responsible for Pearl Harbor attack,” (Doenecke 313) and since the 1950s his viewpoints went so far that “Germany never pursued a “final solution” towards Europe’s Jews” (313). The latter statements, combined with his amicable approach to Germany itself, earned

23 him later a reputation as a denier of Holocaust. Barnes was indeed a controversial figure. On one hand, he was a member of groups such as Freethinkers of America32 and The World Congress Against War, on the other one he had extreme views, especially on Germany. During the First World War, he resolutely advocated opinions against Germany, yet after the War he reportedly “became as much of a Germanophile as he previously had been Germanophobic” (Mombauer 86). He was in harsh opposition to Roosevelt’s New Deal, which made him, according to Doenecke, many opponents even among his former friends from America First (Doenecke 315). As Novick refers to Barnes in the 1930s: “the indefatigable Harry Elmer Barnes produced a stream of pamphlets denouncing the “historical blackout” by which professional academics conspired to hide the truth about Roosevelt’s perfidy…” (Novick 309). This note also uncovers another treat of Barnes’ personality, his enthusiasm for writing. Barnes was an extremely prolific author, who, according to Doenecke, penned “over thirty books, well over a hundred essays, and 600 book reviews and articles” (Doenecke 311) Among his most notable works belong The New History and the Social Studies (1925) and Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and its Aftermath (1953). His monograph The Genesis of the World War will be examined in this thesis

2.2 Sidney Bradshaw Fay

Sidney Bradshaw Fay (13 April 1876 – 29 August 1967) was an American historian, a member of the revisionist movement. He is best recognised for his two-volume monograph The Origins of the World War, which was published in 1928 and is one of the most cited works on this issue till now. Fay was also an able translator from German. The first volume is part of the body of this research. After graduation at Harvard (1900), Fay studied at Sorbonne and the University of Berlin. There he became familiar with German environment, which he capitalized in his most notable work, The Origins of the World War (1928, revised 1930). In his early career, he taught at Dartmouth (New Hampshire), and Smith (Massachusetts) colleges. But following the success of his magnum opus, he was appointed a professor at Harvard University, and Yale University. Since

32 Freethinkers of America is a society pursuing separation of church and state.

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1946, he was professor emeritus at Harvard (The Times). As a historian, Fay’s main field of interest laid in Europe and especially Germany prior and during the World War I, to which topic he penned tens of articles and book reviews, and five monographs. He also translated several works from German. Fay was “a leading authority on German history” (The Times), having been among the first historians who tried to mitigate the notion of German “war guilt” and rather substitute it with the term “war responsibility” (Fay 2). For his two-volume book The Origins of the World War, Fay was awarded in 1928 the annual George Louis Beer Prize, which goes to chosen authors “in recognition of outstanding historical writing on any phase of European international history” (historians.org).

2.3 A. J. P. Taylor

Alan John Percivale Taylor, FBA (25 March 1906 – 7 September 1990) was a renowned British historian, whose field of interest was European diplomacy of 19th and 20th century. He also was a journalist and a host to numbers of radio and television programmes, which made him famous to the public (Taylor 1). From 1924 to 1927, Taylor studied modern history at Oriel College, Oxford. In the 1930s, he lectured history at the University of Manchester, moving then back to Oxford, where he was a Fellow at the Magdalene College. After his highly controversial book The Origins of Second World War was published, Taylor had to change Oxford for London, teaching at the Institute of Historical Research, University College London, and the Polytechnic of North London. Not only the aforementioned book, but his overall work is influenced by his notorious anti-German views33 (Granieri 28). He sometimes even referred to the World Wars as to “First and Second German Wars,” (Granieri, 29) which is definitely a proof of, what Granieri refers to as “both the centrality of Germany to his view of European history and his generally critical stance” (29). On the other hand, Taylor’s main works were written in the decades after the World War

33 As Granieri examines Taylor’s view on the German nation to more extent, he paraphrases a notion recurring in Taylor’s monograph The Course of German History: “Taylor's most famous analysis of the German character comes from the opening chapter of his controversial The Course of German History. The Germans in this portrait are the people living in the heart of Europe between an advanced West and a more backward East, and offering as a result a Janus-faced image. Facing West, the formerly barbarian tribes try to appear modern, anxious to imitate and to learn. Facing East, however, the Germans are aggressive; 'ostensibly the defenders of civilization, they have defended it as barbarians, employing the technical means of civilization, but not its spirit.'1 Or, as he writes elsewhere about Adolf Hitler's attempt to dominate Europe, 'we can . . . see how little of it was original, how much of it (like most German political activity) a perverse aping of an earlier French achievement.'2 These initial observations on the German character, the half-civilized barbarian using the tools of progress to extend his domination, provide the leitmotiv for his study of Germandom.” (Granieri, 31)

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Two, when the anti-German sentiment was strong in the whole society, and as Granieri explains, “understanding the basic assumptions behind his writing can help readers to understand its historical significance by showing how far the assumptions reflected the concerns of the time.” (Granieri, 30) Yet, the above mentioned concern did not influence Taylor so much so that to prevent him from being indeed a great historian and scholar (30). Apart from scholarly work, Taylor was often a host of television programmes. In fact, he was one of the pioneers of a profession of a radio and subsequently also television historian and lecturer. Between the 1940s and 1970s, he was a prolific broadcaster. Initially he worked for the BBC (radio and television), but he became too controversial and partially moved his attention to independent channels, a step motivated to certain extent by a temporary ban he got from the state media in 1944. Taylor’s political beliefs were of a leftist persuasion. In his youth, he even became a member of the Communist party. Yet, after visiting Russia in 1925 and consequent disillusionment, (Persson, 2) he joined the Labour Party instead. But even though he saw under what state Russia really was, he remained all his life more pro-Russian than pro-German. As far as domestic policy is concerned, he was against British alliance with the , whom he saw as a danger to peace. This explains Taylor’s anti-Korea and anti-Vietnam public utterances. Taylor is best known for two of his monographs. His most influential book, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (1954), which was the first finalised part of The Oxford History of Modern Europe, examines European diplomatic history of the era between the revolutionary year of 1848 and the end of the Great War. This book is also part of the body of this research. The Origins of the Second World War, his most controversial work, offered the reader Taylor’s view on the origins of the conflict. Taylor broke the traditional explanation of its outbreak. Having read the British and German diplomatic documents published at that time, Taylor made, among others, a conclusion that not solely Adolf Hitler and the Nazis were responsible for the War, but the whole German nation took at least part of the responsibility. Later, when the archives opened, many of his claims were refuted and even Taylor admitted that his book was a “period piece of limited value” (Taylor 233).

2.4 Fritz Fischer

Fritz Fischer (5 March 1908 – 1 December 1999) was a German historian, whose 1960s work sparked controversy among historians, which lasts until these days. Fischer studied history,

26 pedagogy, theology, and philosophy at the universities of Berlin and Erlangen. From 1942, he was a professor at the University of Hamburg. In the end of the World War II, he joined the Wehrmacht, and from 1948, when he returned from the POW camp (von Strandmann), he continued his academic career there until his retirement in 1978. He is referred to as “one of the most influential historians of modern Germany” (Berghahn). His scope of interest as a historian changed during his career. Originally, he specialised at 19th century German Protestantism (Berghahn), but since mid-1950s, his scope turned to modern German history, with a particular focus on the person of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (von Strandmann). In early 1960s, having been among the first historians who were allowed to examine both East and West Germanys’ archives, (von Strandmann) his theses and monographs on the causes of the First World War changed German overall perspective to that issue. Most of German historians since the end of the war “had tried to refute the “war guilt lie” and had become revisionists in the historical and political sense” (von Strandmann, Berghahn). The notion of German innocence Fischer’s older colleagues had tried to spread across Europe (von Strandmann, Berghahn) took a blow by these works34, and most of them “fiercely resisted Fischer’s notion of German responsibility for World War I35” (Berghahn). Among his works, Griff nach der Weltmacht: die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland, 1914–18 (translated as Germany's Aims in the First World War) and Krieg der Illusionen: Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 (translated as War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914) are the most notable. The former is further analysed in this thesis. In his later career, Fischer “began to explore continuity aspects between the First and Second World War.” (von Strandmann) But he had to retire due to health issues, and could not finish his thorough analysis of the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany. From 1939 to 1942, Fischer was a member of the Nazi Party. (von Strandmann) This short period of his life has been many times revived to smirch the name of this great historian.

34 To get at least slight idea of how great impact Fischer’s work had on the German public, there is a part of a paragraph of von Strandmann’s obituary: “It is difficult to imagine today how strongly the reaction in the public was against Fischer's challenge of a deeply entrenched national myth. Even at a personal level he was subjected to criticism. He received anonymous telephone calls and threatening letters and was shouted at in public meetings.” (von Strandmann)

35 The Fischer Controversy entered even political layer. According to Berghahn, it went “so far that at one point some of his colleagues persuaded the Bonn government to withdraw promised financial support for a lecture tour by Fischer in the United States. Angry American historians thereupon found the money themselves to pay for the trip. (Berghahn)

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2.5 Eric Hobsbawm

Eric Hobsbawm 9 June 1917 – 1 October 2012 was a British historian, whose works analyse in great focus social and labour history of Europe. Hobsbawm studied the King’s College, Cambridge, receiving there his PhD from history. Since 1937 he taught history at the University of London, Birkbeck College, and from 2002 to 2012 he was its president. He was a fellow in King’s College, Cambridge, from 1949-1955, and in 1971 he became an Honorary Fellow there, which was followed by becoming Honorary Fellow of the British Academy in 1978. He helped found the journal Past and Present (Hanagan and Moazami, 5), he was a leading figure of a 1950s debate on whether English standard of living increased or decreased during the Industrial revolution, claiming the latter. The main focus of Hobsbawm’s early work lays in England of the 17th and 18th centuries, with detail on working people and their revolts (Hanagan & Moazami 6). Hobsbawm was, a “card-carrying member of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPFB) from 1936 until is dissolution in 1991” (Hanagan & Moazami 5). He was a Marxist, (Hanagan and Moazami 7) and even regarded by many as Stalinist (Evans). This label influenced his life – Hobsbawm was not allowed to get the job of broadcaster at BBC, and was not even promoted at Birkbeck, despite his great international reputation (Hanagan & Moazami 5; Evans). He was even investigated by British intelligence MI5 for several decades (Evans). The main body of Hobsbawm’s works consists of a three-volume study of Europe after the French and Industrial Revolutions. The titles of which this study consists are The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848 (1962), The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 (1975), and The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (1987). The three books together depict what Hobsbawm called “the long nineteenth century”, having coined the term which is now widely used. The original trilogy is followed by Hobswam’s outlook on the 20th century: The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914- 1991 (1994). According to Evans, his books were “translated into more than 50 languages and selling millions of copies across the globe”, making him “most probably the world’s best-known historian” (Evans). Hobsbawm’s The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 is another book which is analysed in this thesis.

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3 Interpretations of events preceding World War I 3.1 The underlying causes

The scope of events which have been perceived to be of notable gravity or influence for historians, differs. Primarily, it is due to different methods and approaches they have used in order to examine the issue. Secondarily, it is for the sake of their aims. Hobsbawm’s examination (1987) conducts an analysis of social issues, and as far as the World War I is concerned, it finds significance in 1871. But this year is not significant because the French loss of Alsace and Lorraine to the Germans, but from a very different reason. Since this year, as Hobsbawm stipulates, European expansionism focused, instead of on waging wars in Europe, on underdeveloped states ripe to be reaped as their colonies. This caused an era in which no major war occurred in Europe. Barnes, whose focus is mainly on the immediate causes of the First World War, as he intends to relieve Germany from the notion of war guilt, dates the underlying causes rather vaguely, seeing the primary roots of animosity into the late 1870s and 1880s, when Germany underwent “rapid and extensive” Industrial Revolution and became “a notable contender with Great Britain for the industrial primacy of Europe” (Barnes 46). Taylor’s comprehensive monograph, which is mostly focused on diplomacy, starts in the year of revolutions, 1848, and the reaction to the revolutions across Europe. Fay’s research dates the most important event back in 1871, when the Franco- Prussian War turned economically and politically weak Germany into a formidable power. Fischer’s first chapter: “German imperialism – From policy to world power policy” (Fischer 3) starts with a picture of German lands before the Napoleonic wars and how it changed from the 1800s to the years after 1866, and further to German unification in 1871

3.1.1 Germany from the 1910s to 1971

The following pages analyse Europe between 1815 and 1871, with great focus on German states prior their unification. The critical years are 1815, the year of the Congress of Vienna, 1848 - the year of revolutions called the Spring of Nations, 1866, when the Austro-Prussian War shook the preceding distribution of power over German states, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870- 1871 with the consequent . These years have influenced European diplomacy, and saw the rises of two significant European powers – Germany and Italy. The ‘Holy Roman Empire of the German nation,36’ as Fischer starts, included more than

36 (800/962-1806). There is still a debate whether the beginning should be dated from 800, which was the coronation of Charlemagne, or from

29 three hundred states. However, the conditions changed at the Congress of Vienna, when the German Confederation (Deutches Bund) was created. This association consisted of about thirty states. Yet, as Fischer claims that “this federation never satisfied the German people, who tried in the revolution of 1848 to create 'unity and liberty' from below under the inspiration of west European ideas and on the model of the American federal constitution” (Fischer 3). But these attempts of mostly liberal bourgeoisie were, according to Fischer, subdued, and due to their “dread of red revolution” (3) they allied with the princess37. There were also many challenges of German unification, according to Fischer, such as religion (northern Protestantism versus southern Catholicism), and the struggle for power between Austria, “which sought to defend its position”, and “the rising economic and military power” of Prussia. The struggle, as Fischer states, “was won by Prussia, under Bismarck's guidance, in the war of 1866 against a majority of the German states. Prussia then broke up the federation, excluded Austria from the future Germany, and extended its own power position” (Fischer 4). Thus, the North German Federation was created “from above, but it was accepted by the majority of the liberal bourgeoisie, even though it meant the renunciation of democracy and parliamentary life in the Western sense” (4). “The federal element”, he continues, was only used to attract the southern states, and “counted for little in the decisions which were taken by the German Empire under Prussian leadership with Berlin.” Fischer then very briefly comments on the Franco-Prussian War, after which Bismarck “took advantage of the power position achieved in 1866 to incorporate south Germany in the new Reich, with the king of Prussia as German Emperor” (4). From this interpretation we can see that before the actual unification, there had been a tendency within German states to unite Germany for more than two generations. The tendency came from people, the masses, but it later submitted to Prussian militarism. After the war of 1866, the main force of German struggle for unity was Prussia with Bismarck, who, so to speak, tended to oppose western style democracy and liberalism, and lead the change from above, and not from the masses. That is, Bismarck’s concept of unification was not by a revolution; on the contrary, he preferred to unite Germany under the rule of one dynasty. This approach, as Fischer emphasises, could only lead to creation of an authoritarian state, whose federative base was merely theoretical.

962, when Otto I was crowned. Yet there is no doubt that its dissolution was on 6 August 1806, when it fell to Napoleon Bonaparte. 37 The Hohenzollerns.

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The name “North German Federation” was therefore only a name, with no real consequences on the actual autocratic form of rule. Bismarck’s policy of maintaining the main force of German unification from above, rather than by popular vote, is not left unnoticed in Hobsbawm’s chapter on the right to vote38. In the beginning of his chapter “The Politics of Democracy”, he briefly analyses the development of suffrage across Europe. As far as this issue is concerned, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark were the pioneers of this idea39. The masses longed for change, forcing their governments by strikes and protests to democratize the system. Nonetheless, at the same time, the ruling classes were against extensive broadening of the electorate. They saw passing laws for an increase of popular franchise, as Hobsbawm explains, rather as a compromise to avoid possible leftist radicalisation of people, which could lead to communism; therefore as an adjustment necessary to be done to maintain their power. A representative example Hobsbawm provides is that of Prussia:

Among conservatives there were cynics like Bismarck, who had faith in the traditional loyalty - or, as liberals might have claimed, the ignorance and stupidity - of a mass electorate […] for the mass electorate turned out to be uncontrollable from above. (Hobsbawm 86)

In the manner of unification of German states, we can see a mutual agreement of Hobsbawm’s and Fischer’s view of the attitude of the governing elite towards the masses. Yet, from the very nature of their examinations, it is clear that that their understanding of this matter was not the same. Hobsbawm’s focus was merely to pinpoint what we may call a universal pattern of society – those in power do not want to share it with anybody, especially with the grassroots. Depiction of the same trait in Fischer’s viewpoint gave it a new aspect. In his opinion, Germany had two means of unification – the revolutionary one (cf. Italy), and the diplomatic one (in other words, a change directed from below or from above). Bismarck’s establishment decided to keep the power for themselves, thus preventing German nation from embodying the ideas of liberalism

38 The right to vote is also referred to as the suffrage or franchise. 39 Hobsbawm offers statistics showing development of the suffrage in Europe. Even though it is far from the topic of this thesis, the numbers show an important trait of the society: “In Britain the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1883 almost quadrupled the electorate, which rose from 8 to 29 per cent of men over the age of twenty. Belgium democratized her franchise in 1894, following a general strike for this reform (the increase was from 3.9 to 37.3 per cent of the adult male population), Norway doubled it in 1898 (from 16.6 to 34.8 per cent). In Finland a uniquely extensive democracy (76 per cent of adults) came in with the 1905 revolution; in the electorate was doubled in 1908 to bring it level with Norway; the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire received universal suffrage in 1907, and Italy in 1913.“ (Hobsbawm, 85-86)

31 and Western-style democracy. The means of unification had tremendous influence on these two nations, especially on traditionalist and rigid Germans. Different picture of German states prior 1866 can be seen in Fay. He explains, rather vaguely, the German situation before the Austro-Prussian War as being an economically and politically weak cluster of small states, bullied by France and Austria for almost two hundred years:

After the Thirty Years' War […] Germany remained weak. Economically she had been exhausted by that terrible conflict in which all Europe trampled on her soil. Politically she was weak by her division into an incongruous multitude of states […], and by the increasing rivalry for leadership between the decaying power of the Hapsburgs and the growing vigor of the Hohenzollerns. Consequently she was continually subject to the French policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, which aimed to keep her weak and divided. (Fay 50)

Fay continues his narrative after the Congress of Vienna, when the German Confederation was set, while the “continued jealousy of Austria and Prussia left Germany still comparatively impotent and unimportant as an international power” (50). So, in Fay’s rhetoric, Bismarck had to wage a “fratricidal” war with Austria, in order to “cure German weakness” (50). Fay then dedicates only a few lines to continue with German expansion, how Bismarck won the war of 1866, found how weak and ambitious Napoleon III40 was, and “transformed Germany into a strong unified Empire” (Fay 51) after Prussia defeated France in the war of 1870. Even though these events might seem to be of a significant importance, Fay dedicates them only fifteen lines of his book. Nevertheless what Fay does not forget to pinpoint is, that “Bismarck's unification of Germany was hailed at the time as a desirable, even glorious, accomplishment of the spirit of nationalism” (51). Since 1871, the situation between France and Germany reversed, and now it was France who “was weak and in danger from an attack from across the Rhine” (51). In Fay’s concept, we can see great focus on depiction of rather desperate situation in German states, which were under perpetual threat by the great powers around them. Even the Vienna Congress did not help improve their political misery. It was only the necessary war with Austria, which set German conditions right and turned Germany into the power it deserved to be,

40 Luis-Napoleon Bonaparte was the first French president (1848-1852). Then he took over the state, proclaiming himself the Emperor, and creating the Second French Empire. His rule, and the lasting of the Empire itself, continued till 1870, when France lost the Franco-Prussian War. After the battle of Sedan, when Napoleon surrendered to Germans and fell prisoner, the Second French Empire was dissolved and the Third French Republic was established.

32 a deed indeed desirable and glorious from the point of history. And since the unification of Germany, the vigorous Hohenzollerns could rule their country without fear of being crushed by their neighbours. The underdog overgrew its rival and could thrive to their liking. Taylor’s appraisal of Prussia since the Vienna Conference and during the revolution of 1848 resembles in many ways the Fischer’s one, yet much broader investigation of this era has been made by the former. He describes Prussia as a member of the Holly Alliance (with Russia and Austria), whose collective mechanism of how to maintain both the territorial and political status quo was by adherence to conservatism, viewing liberalism as a “potential threat to international stability” (Taylor 2). This threat, or “radicalism”, came from France, therefore “the armies of the three despotic monarchies41 all looked west against France” (Taylor 3). These “radicals” were, according to Taylor, Polish and Italian nationalists, who, having been supported by France, sought for their countries’ independence. Their goal was to create new European states based on nation; French beliefs were that Paris would gain position similar to Vienna’s after the Congress of 1815 (Taylor 4). The only threat to this plan would be united Germany, which would “destroy this calculation” (4). And their moment came in 1848, when revolutions shook the whole Europe. It started in Sicily and France, but these were only minor episodes. As Taylor explains, “[the] greater revolution of 1848 was against international stability, against the system of the congress of Vienna” (4). Whereas the revolutionaries were well aware of what they were doing, the same could not be said about the rulers. In March 1848, when the French question was being dealt with diplomatically, Taylor describes the diplomatic situation in a nutshell:

Great Britain believed that peace could be preserved by conciliating French feeling; Russia wished to push the two German powers into a defence of conservatism without being committed herself; Austria was willing to be pushed forward if she could have an assurance of Russian support; and Prussia42 clung indecisively to Great Britain and Russia, tempted by a revision of Europe, fearful that it would be executed at her expense. (Taylor 7)

When the revolution spread to Prussia, Frederick William “gave way before the rioters in

41 Prussia, Austria, and Russia, also known as the League of the Three Emperors. 42 Taylor’s comments on Prussian king Frederick William (brother of William I), whose policy was not to outrage both Russia and Britain, suggest that he did not value him for his competence. In fact, some of Taylor’s utterances seem to be taunting, for example Taylor’s comment on his enormous correspondence with Russian and British monarchs: ”[it] is often forgotten that, though Frederick William wrote ceaseless hysterical letters to the tsar, he also wrote ceaseless hysterical letters to Queen Victoria” (Taylor, 6).

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Berlin and agreed to make liberal concessions” (Taylor 7). Yet, it did not take long and the promises were broken (7) However, the central event of the year of revolutions is in Taylor’s view is not the revolution, but the armistice of Malmö. This truce was signed after the First Schleswig War – a local conflict between Prussia and Denmark over control of duchies Schleswig43 and Holstein. In the beginning a small and relatively unimportant episode, later “announced the rise of German nationalism, which was to eclipse all others” (Taylor 4). Though, nationalism was not the main factor why Prussia desired to seize Schleswig. The German population was only a minority of these two provinces, but they together represented a large portion of Danish economy. The access to the North Sea, harbours such as Kiel and its great dockyard, and other industrial facilities seem to have been the main goals of Prussian lust for Schleswig and Holstein. The Truce of Malmö proclaimed the provinces a Danish territory, but Prussian policy towards them was set and later they tied them with their country, showing Austria their dominance over northern states. European diplomats, however, treated [the German question] in a casual manner, without urgency,” (Taylor 17) It was Poland and mainly Italy during and after the First Italian War of Independence (war of Piedmont and Austria over Italian northern states – following revolts in Venice and Milan), the first steps to Risorgimento, or unification, to whom eyes of European diplomats were set (17). It is worth mentioning that Taylor is the only author who includes the First Schleswig War into his narrative, putting Prussian policy in these duchies into broader context of its expansionist policy. The year 1848 showed European rulers for the first time the importance of nationalism and the consequences it may have. The notion of nationalism and the ideas of forming national states became popular in the middle of 19th century, and their greatest tide became a prominent trait of European society since the 1870s. Taylor’s assessment of Prussian position right before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War continues mostly as a study of the sphere of international diplomacy. Bismarck’s concern was not, from Taylor’s perspective, “to bring [the southern states] into a united Germany; that was inevitable in any case” (Taylor 202). “[Bismarck’s] problem was to secure that they should be brought in on the basis of loyalty to the Hohenzollern dynasty and not on that of popular

43 It is interesting to focus on the spelling used in Taylor’s monograph, which clearly reflects the author’s relationship to Germany. As he himself points out: „In the Germanic age of English history-writing which is ending, English historians adopted the German form, Schleswig, and thus admitted the German claim. On the other hand, since there are certainly many German inhabitants, it is not satisfactory to respond to this partiality by writing the Danish form Slesvig. I have therefore revived the anglicized version current before our Germanizing enthusiasm” (Taylor, 4).

34 enthusiasm unification from above, and not from below” (Taylor 202). This means that Bismarck did not want another revolution like in 1848, such mandates would not bring any good in his eyes and the revolutionary way would also empower liberals, whom Bismarck hated. Bismarck, in Taylor’s view, had originally a number of different possibilities how to fulfil his goal to unite Germany. One of them was to increase the dynastic prestige of the House of Hohenzollern, by encouraging Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, to claim the Spanish throne (Taylor 202). The idea was that such highly prestigious family on Prussian throne should subsequently convince leaders of other German states to join Prussia. The French, according to Taylor, learned about the Prussian-Spanish secret plan to appoint Leopold I Spanish king by accident, when a cipher-clerk mistook some information in a telegram from a Spanish delegate to Madrid. In a chaos after this delegate’s return home, when they found out they should recall the Cortes, or Spanish parliament, which was supposed to elect the king. A step like that had to be explained. Thus the French found that a Hohenzollern was about to become the King of Spain (Taylor 203). To this extent, Bismarck’s attempts on increasing the prestige of Prussian royal family turned out to outrage the French and brought out a war. Taylor claims that Bismarck did not intend to unleash the war. On the contrary, his calculations were that “by making the French anxious on their Spanish frontier, it would make them less ready to go to war for the sake of south Germany” (Taylor 202). Bismarck afterwards abandoned the idea after French complaints. But the insult, combined with French false belief that Austria would support them, and thus revenge their lost war of 1866, combined with a change in French government, (Taylor 203) turned history in a different direction and France went to war with Prussia. The French declaration of war did not come unnoticed by Barnes, who capitalized on it in his interpretation of the events. He described the situation before (cf. Fay), during, and after the Franco-Prussian War in this manner: “in 1870 France was a much larger, supposedly more powerful, and more militaristic state than Prussia and the French leaders expected an easy victory” (Barnes 76). This is, however, in direct contrast to Taylor’s assessment. Taylor claims that Prussian forces at that time might have been stronger than those of Austria and Russia combined, and when French hasty preparation for the war (it was an immediate decision) is taken into consideration, their overall underestimation of Prussian strength, and wrong supposing that Austria and Italy

35 would join the war on French side, it is clear that militarily it was Prussia who was the stronger power. (Taylor 204-206) And they proved their superiority since the outbreak of the war, which was crowned by the victory at Sedan. As Taylor accurately expresses: “Sedan marked the end of an epoch in European history; it was the moment when the myth of la grande nation, dominating Europe, was shattered for ever. The Balance of Power was startlingly altered” (Taylor 210). Apart from emphasising French military superiority, Barnes assesses the war in a very critical manner, emphasizing its immorality caused by both combatants. He agrees that Bismarck desired to use “Germanic patriotism” as “means of bringing the unification of the German Empire to completion.” (Barnes 382) Yet he largely blames the French, whose war aims were “to exploit a war in the interest of bolstering up for a time the tottering Bonaparte dynasty. Of the two ambitions that of Bismarck was doubtless the more constructive and laudable” (Barnes 383). The former assessment corresponds to those of Taylor, Fischer, and Fay; the latter is an original idea not being mentioned in other authors’ books. France before the Franco-Prussian War is depicted as a strong state, and even though there were internal problems French government had to deal with, no historian apart from Barnes appraises these such a significant role. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 had, apart from aforementioned unification of Germany, another outcomes. The most significant one is French loss of its two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, to Germany. These provinces are located right on the borderline between France and Germany, with towns Strasbourg and Metz as their capitals. Their position between Germany and France makes them strategic place, but their acquisition by Germany had at least two other consequences. Fischer’s interpretation is that Germans gained rich deposits of iron ore and other materials important in industry development (Fischer 13), but Taylor counters this announcement, claiming that the mineral richness of these regions (especially Lorraine) was “in any case largely unknown” (Taylor 211). He even suggests that the provinces “were not essential to German greatness they were indeed a source of weakness” (211). This interpretation provides the symbolic layer of the annexation, suggesting German intention to humiliate France. A number of historians who have researched the issue of origins of the First World War agree that German annexation of the disputed provinces was a mistake, or a blunder of history. Fay for example explains the French perspective, conveying their lamentations: “The French have always regarded this as a crime—"the brutal dismemberment of a nation," "the tearing of children from their mother." History shows that it was worse than a crime, it was a blunder” (Fay 51).

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However, Barnes comments that “Germany would be foolish not to take advantage of the situation to rectify her frontiers and protect herself against the further aggression of France” (Barnes 76). But later, he admits that “[the] annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany after the war has proved disastrous to both Germany and Europe, but it was only the natural outcome of events” (Barnes 76). The disaster which came from the Franco-Prussian War lays in Barnes’ viewpoint in “the French desire for revenge and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine,” which became “the most powerful and persistent single force in keeping Europe in a continual state of anticipation of, and preparation for, war” (Barnes 74). Fay goes in his advocacy of German claims to the past even further, Bismarck was in his eyes liberating the region which “had been wrested from Germany by Louis XIV at a time when Germany was weak and divided against herself” (Fay 51). However, he suggests that the seventeenth-century annexation was rather different, because then there was no Germany, only a “conglomeration of mutually jealous states” (Fay 52). Barnes’ comment of foolishness of not seizing an opportunity to grab some land after winning a war are disputed by Taylor. He claims that German aims were to gain land and diplomatic power:

Bismarck preached annexation from the outbreak of war. He wanted some concrete achievement on which to focus German enthusiasm; also, in view of the old ties of sympathy between France and the south German states, he may well have welcomed a cause of lasting estrangement between the public opinion of the two countries. (Taylor 211)

Hobsbawm (1987) finds the year 1871 important from a very different perspective. This year, in his interpretation, was for a long time the last one to encounter a major battle on European soil. As he pinpoints, “Since 1871 no European power had ordered its armed men to fire on those of any other such power. The great powers chose their victims from among the weak, and in the non-European world…” (Hobsbawm 303). Hence, we have several interpretations of the state of affairs in and around Germany between 1815 and 1871. Some historians such as Taylor and Fischer see the main importance in German internal affairs, which influenced European diplomacy. Because of German struggle for unification and consequently power in the region, wars were waged and policies of whole nations changed. The pattern of diplomatic animosity between Germany and France is also present in some narratives (Taylor; Fay; Barnes). But the points of view on this antagonism differs. In the works

37 of Barnes and Fay, Germany is the underdog who wants to earn its place on the sun, in Taylor’s (and Fischer’s) narrative Germany is the authoritarian conservative militarist bully who provokes its neighbours, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. Barnes even claims that the force which is mostly responsible for the war of 1870 is French government, putting Germany in a position of a victim, at least partially. Hence, we have several varied interpretations of the significance of 1871. Firstly, we see the economic and political consequences of German victory over the French and transformation of weak Germany into formidable European power; secondly the root of animosity between the two nations and even the reason of whole Europe’s unrest and preparedness for a war; thirdly, on the contrary, we can see that it was the impact of the peace which followed the war that caused social blindness in European society, who have not kept in mind atrocities of wars. From this perspective, the long era of prosperity and relative harmony in Europe accustomed the people and war even became a subject of philosophers44. Study of history of Europe between 1815 and 1871 provides knowledge substantial to understand the roots of the World War I. From different perspectives, the rise of Prussia, development of its autocratic and conservative nature, and the influence of the person of Chancellor Bismarck was examined. Apart from these, ideas such as liberalism, nationalism, and socialism started to emerge in European society in these decades. Franco-German animosity is another trend we can see from the discourse, but its roots are buried even further in history. The above mentioned ideas and trends influenced Europe in later years, and are also considered to be some of the main causes of the outbreak of the First World War. From the events which are by relevant scholars considered to be some of the remote causes of the outbreak of World War I, unification of Germany (and Italy, to a certain degree), the revolutionary year 1848, and the Franco-Prussian War which was followed by France’s loss of Alsace and Lorraine, have been examined. It was shown that historians value different events in diverse ways. Some events seem to disappear from certain historians’ monographs, some are on the other side dealt with in great detail, compared to other works. These differences are not accidental. Every discourse differs so that various readings of history come out of its study.

44 For example, as Hobsbawm quotes, “Nietzsche crazily, but prophetically, hailed the growing militarization of Europe and predicted a war which would 'say yes to the barbarian, even to the wild animal within us'.” (Hobsbawm, 303)

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3.2.1 The Great Eastern Crisis

From the 14th to the early 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was among the most formidable powers in the Mediterranean, controlling vast territories of North Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Asia Minor, and Balkan Peninsula. However, the Balkan nations, following the revolt of Slav Herzegovinians, changed the course of history and fought for their independence. Between 1875 and 1878, their revolts transformed the face of the Balkan part of the Near East45. Yet the fall of “the Sick Man of Europe”, as Fay fittingly refers to the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, (Fay 59) had been indeed felt to be inevitable for a long time. Weakening of the Ottoman Empire, combined with atrocities which the Turkish soldiers committed upon the Christian peasants in their Balkan provinces, “led Russia again46 to consider the possibility of [Turkish] demise” (Fay 59). In other words, as Hobsbawm put it: on the soil of “the long disintegrating Ottoman Empire, war was indeed a permanent possibility as its subject peoples sought to establish or enlarge themselves as independent states and subsequently fought each other, drawing the great powers into their conflicts” (Hobsbawm 303). But this simplified interpretation of events is forerunning this narration. Having started in Herzegovina and rapidly spreading into Bosnia and Serbia, according to Fay’s narrative, it seemed that the Ottomans were unable to manage such a major rebellion. Therefore, “Russia and Austria,” as he states, “were at once brought face to face again in their old rivalry over Balkan interests” (Fay 59). In other words, “[o]nce the Balkan Slavs were astir, the Russian government dared not let them fail; Austria-Hungary dared not let them succeed” (Taylor 229). However, Britain and France did not intend to provoke any change in the Near East, it would bring more harm than good to them. Germany, as the last member of the Concert of Europe, had no interest in Balkan and the Ottoman Empire as such, in the 1870s it was not considered their sphere of influence. Involvement of Russia and especially Austria was, according to Fay, greatly to Bismarck’s discontent; for the German Chancellor, whose policy was to maintain the status quo among the

45 It has been commented by Hobsbawm that the meaning of the term ‘Near East’ has also changed throughout history. In the 1880s the Ottoman Balkan territories “could only be regarded as 'European' by courtesy: in fact, the Balkan Peninsula was still currently referred to as the 'Near East': hence South-west Asia came to be known as the 'Middle East'.” (Hobsbawm, 17) 46 See the chapter 1.1.5.

39 emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia, and who saw the Balkan issues disrupting the overall partnership of the League of the Three Emperors, did not intend to see any “rupture between the two Powers whom he wished to have as friends…” (Fay 60-61). It is vital to mention that both Russia and Austria had vast interests in the region. Russia had long ago pushed towards the Straits, a course of actions it had maintained since Peter the Great acquired Russian access to the Black Sea (Fay 60). Austrian concern, on the other hand, was the rise of Slav nationalism. As Fay explains, “[w]ith the growing spirit of nationalism, [Austrian, and especially Hungarian] Slav subjects were becoming more and more difficult to govern” (Fay 61). Andrássy, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported peaceful way how to solve the Balkan question. He, as Fay pinpoints, proposed an international conference which would suggest that the Ottoman Empire undertook reforms in favour of its Slav subjects. Any form of weakening, or even a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, might in Austrian view cause enormous troubles to the Dual Monarchy as well. The issue of nationalism and its role in Austria’s reaction to the development in Balkan is not unnoticed in Hobsbawm’s book either. Another layer of this conflict is uncovered by Taylor. Instead of the nationalistic layer, he finds the roots of the crisis as a direct cause of the struggle of superpowers to gain and/or maintain influence in the Balkan region, long preceding the uprising in Herzegovina. In his view, the superpowers were following merely their goals and “the subject peoples, Slav, Greek, or Rumanian, counted for nothing in it” (Taylor 228). Russian main goal in the crisis was to gain access to the Straits (cf. Fay), therefore to weaken the Ottoman Empire to whom they had lost in the Crimean War. Austria needed stable Balkan in order to maintain Danube as their main trading route, which adds the economic point of view to the narrative. And it was the economic concerns which drew Britain and France to the scene. As Taylor specifies, “The British still needed the Ottoman empire as a great neutral buffer to secure the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East needed it more than ever since the opening of the Suez canal in 1869. The French were still the principal financiers of Turkey, with the British in the second place” (Taylor, 228). As for the public perception of the crisis, Hobsbawm’s note is taken into regard as well: “the Balkans, for most Europeans who did not live there, belonged to the realm of adventure stories, such as those of the German boys' author Karl May, or of operetta. The image of at the end of the nineteenth century was that of Bernard Shaw's Arms and the Man, which was, characteristically, turned into a musical [in Vienna]” (Hobsbawm 303). Yet not all Europe

40 shared this rather vague awareness of Balkan. Taylor emphasises popular sentiment and its role in the Tsar’s decision making: “Even Nicholas I had been driven on by Russian opinion at the time of the Crimean war; Alexander II, himself a weaker man, was in no position to stand out against Panslav sentiment” (Taylor 229). The idea of Panslavism was so strong that it pushed Russian policy to create, or at least support the idea of doing so, a great Slavic empire under the rule of Russian Tsar (229). This point of view must be taken into consideration, too; since it introduces the popular perception of the events. The “vox populi47” was undoubtedly becoming to be a concern of politicians and statesmen of that time. Hence, we can see a sporadic agreement, at least a partial one, which persists between the historians whose works are analysed in this thesis. The Balkan nations’ struggle for independence from the yoke of their Ottoman tyrant, along with Russian lust for revenge for the war it had lost some twenty years ago, and the emerging of the nationalistic pan-Slavic movement, have been perceived as the crucial factors which took their part in the creation of the crisis. But it was also popular sentiments which started to play important role in governmental policies in the 1870s and 1880s. Nevertheless, the share of importance of these factors considerably differs in each interpretation. For Taylor and Fay, the global perspective, the history of conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and prominence of international diplomacy are the key factors which triggered the crisis, on the other hand Hobsbawm sees its root within the people living in the Ottoman Empire, in nationalism and their struggle for independence. The perspective from which the authors analyse certain events also ranges from the international and governmental point of view to the popular perceptions of these events. The crisis intensified and culminated in a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Russian troops advanced to the outskirts of Constantinople, having forced Turks to sign the Treaty of San Stefano. The Treaty included creation of Bulgarian state, which reached from the Black Sea to present day Serbian-Albanian border. However, the size and potential power of such a large state threatened the balance of power in the region, and Russia was forced to cease from the initial plan. At this point, Taylor offers an interesting course of events preceding the San Stefano talks –

47 Taylor, depicting the Russian situation, claims that: „[T]he sentiment, not the programme, was the important thing about [panslavism]. Though the tsars were despots, they were always sensitive to the limited public opinion within their empire. Constitutional governments can weather unpopularity; autocrats dread it, and this is peculiarly so when they feel at their back the sanction of political assassination.“ Taylor, 252)

41 the Russians were reputedly unprepared for this kind of victory, as they had not defined their aims before they came to the war. They only vaguely knew that they wanted to regain Bessarabia, and perhaps even force the Ottoman Empire to collapse. Therefore, they “had hastily to botch up terms which would both confirm their victory and do something to emancipate the Balkan Christians” (Taylor 246). And the main point of their terms was creation of a new state, Big Bulgaria. On these grounds, a new conference had to be summoned; this time in Berlin. The choice of the venue had its significance. In Taylor’s narrative, “The marked an epoch in where it met, not in what it did” (Taylor 253). Germany, in his view, showed the world that they were a superpower capable of taking action in international diplomacy. However, it was the action, not the place, which counts for Fay. As he claims: “Bismarck at first had no great liking for [the Treaty of San Stefano], but finally consented to act as "Honest Broker"48” (Fay 66-67), and after long and exhausting preliminary negotiations he arranged all the essential points of the treaty. Bismarck is therefore seen as the mediator, the able statesman who served as a diplomatic trouble- shooter. This interpretation, nonetheless, contrasts with Taylor’s view, who, as he often does, offers a bigger picture of the Balkan issues and of German diplomacy as well. Before the Crisis, the ultimate issue of Balkan and the Near East was the Straits. Russia needed them to get access to the Mediterranean, which was opposed by the Turks, supported by Britain. But with the spread of nationalism, the problem of the Straits was subordinated and the British lost interest in Balkan. But for the Dual Monarchy and Russia it remained key factor of their aims. Initially, Germany did not have any reason to be involved in Balkan, but it had to change in order to support Austria. As for German diplomacy, Taylor offers this simplified picture: “In 1854 the problem for Prussian diplomacy was to prevent Austria going to the aid of Great Britain and France; in 1876 and the following years it was to ensure that Great Britain should go to the aid of Austria-Hungary; by the first decade of the twentieth century it was solely a question of time when Germany would have to go to the aid of Austria-Hungary herself” (Taylor 232). This rather incomprehensive summary is further explained by Taylor’s idea of how Bismarck’s possibilities looked like: “If Bismarck brought Russia and Great Britain together, France would be estranged from Russia; alternatively,

48 A “honest broker”, according to oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com, is “a person or country that tries to get other people or countries to reach an agreement or to solve a problem, without getting involved with either side.” (oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com)

42 if the Russians stuck to France, the British would be forced to side with Austria-Hungary. Either alternative would lessen the pressure on Germany; it was this, not the settlement of the , which dominated Bismarck's mind” (Taylor 235). Therefore Fay’s regard of an “honest broker” is completely refuted by Taylor, because Bismarck was (as Taylor suggests) the person whose involvement was the greatest, because much was at stake for Germany itself. As for concrete outcomes, the question of Big Bulgaria was one of the main issues dealt with at the . In Fay’s narrative, the size of this new state produced concern both in Balkan nations (Greece, Serbia, and Romania), as well as among the superpowers (Austria and Britain). The former objected that “this "Greater Bulgaria" was to be so much more powerful than any one of themselves,” (Fay 66), the latter “feared the greatly enlarged Bulgaria would be virtually a vassal state under Russian control” (66). Yet, from Taylor’s perspective, the Russians did not intend to disturb the balance of power in Balkan, they only followed the area in which the Bulgarian nation had lived49. Another crucial point stipulated by the Treaty of Berlin was Austrian involvement in Bosnia. As Fay states, it had been discussed in Vienna and Berlin even during the Crisis that if the Ottoman Empire was to collapse, Austria would annex Bosnia and Herzegovina; thus gaining a “territory which might be regarded as compensation for the loss of Venetia in 1866” (Fay 63). This form of indemnity would be accompanied by Russian regain of Bessarabia and some parts of the Black Sea, and creating many small states in the Balkan. However, the Ottoman Empire withstood the crisis, so the Berlin conference offered only partial execution of the aforementioned talks. This discourse in alternative history has significant place in Fay’s story, emphasising German and Austrian concern about peaceful future of the Balkan. Taylor, however, sees the central point of the Berlin Conference in Russian position, which was unexpectedly weakened by the Ottoman loss. The main outcome of the war is seen in Taylor’s narrative as the opening the Straits to British navy, ultimately weakening Russian position in this region. The year 1878 is important also from a different perspective, the one of nationalism in

49 As far as nations are concerned, Taylor has an interesting remark on artificial creating of nations: “The territory of which Bulgaria was deprived by the congress of Berlin was called 'Macedonia' simply as a matter of administrative convenience. It had no national character of its own, though it developed one in the following half-century. Now there is a Macedonian nationality; historically a Macedonian is simply a Bulgarian who was put back under Turkish rule in 1878.” (Taylor, 246)

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Germany. As Fischer describes, following reforms between 1876 and 1878, liberal Germany set off to the path of strict conservatism and nationalism:

After 1878 the liberal element in the German national movement was overshadowed by the dynastic and military elements. The popular consciousness regarded the foundation of the Empire itself, almost exclusively, as the fruit of three 'victorious wars'. The national festivals, the anniversary of Sedan symbolising victory over France, and the Emperor's birthday [...] were living expressions of this unreserved acceptance of the Empire. (Fischer 7)

From this simplified compendium of events in Balkan in the 1870s, we can see how the Great Eastern Crisis implied the future of Europe. The most prominent motif in this narrative is the enmity between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which had had its roots hundreds of years before these events. Hand in hand with this diplomatic layer, the emergence of nationalism throughout the whole Europe helped to launch the crisis and the subsequent war. Yet some historians such as Taylor deny that the Great Eastern crisis was a mere matter of local Panslav sentiment. The Crisis offered one of multiple opportunities the great powers had to set mutual diplomatic ties and create antagonism between the other. And it was these shifts in the balance of power which helped create the bipartite system of alliances, one of the most condemned traits of pre-war European diplomacy. The Congres of Berlin, which was called to end the Crisis, had a number of far-reaching outcomes. Apart from settling affairs in Balkan, it meant an unlikely milestone in European history – it prevented Europe from any war for decades. Or, as Taylor ends his chapter on the Crisis:

None of the statesmen at Berlin expected the settlement to last long, and they would have been astonished to learn that the congress would be followed by thirty-six years of European peace. But they would have been still more astonished if they could have foreseen that the next great European assembly, forty years later, would meet at Paris and that none of 'the three Northern Courts' would be represented. (Taylor 254)

However, Taylor does not attribute the success of the Congress of Berlin to any politicians or diplomats, but he sees the sole cause of the long peace in economy. As he claims, “Men were too busy growing rich to have time for war” (Taylor 255). The last, perhaps not very evident, motive which is significant to this thesis is the difference

44 between how Taylor and Fay see the Berlin Conference. Although Fay sees it as great Bismarck’s victory, Taylor is more likely to attribute to this treaty Russian loss of power.

3.1.2 Forming of the Triple Alliance

According to Fay, the tendency to form a pact between Germany and Austria started to show after the Berlin Conference: “[i]n the commissions established for executing the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, the German delegates sided regularly with Austria against Russia” (Fay 68). This led to growing animosity between Russia and Germany, which escalated in Russian “vigorous increase in armaments,” (68) and Russian pushing their “troops westward into Poland toward the German frontier” (68). Following the military, Russian Tsar wrote a letter to his cousin in Germany, suggesting that this direction of Bismarck’s policy may be followed by “disastrous consequences” (68). This interpretation is partially in contrast with Taylor’s point of view. Taylor, on the one hand, sees certain significance both in the way the commissions worked, and in Russian threats to Germany; on the other hand, his interpretation of the background of these events is rather conflicting to Fay’s findings. As he claims, it was Britain who had been Europe’s leading diplomatic power in Europe, leaving the other countries behind. British diplomats were heads of the commissions formed to oversee fulfilling of application of the terms of the Treaty. Among others, it was withdrawal of Russian troops from the Ottoman Empire. They even had ambitions of turning the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as an unsustainable realm, into a “system of veiled : Austria- Hungary, through her occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, should make herself responsible for the western Balkans; Great Britain should reform and guard Asia Minor” (Taylor 257). This plan could be taken into action by an alliance between Britain and Austria-Hungary. However, it would be a threat to Russia, who as a response sought for help. They tried Italy, but with no success. They could not ally with Austria and France, who supported Britain, at least as far as the Balkan question was concerned. So the only chance Russia had was to seek its fortune in Berlin. However, there was a miscalculation in their approach. As Taylor claims: “The Russians still thought of Germany as a grateful dependent; and they supposed that they could force her into alliance by a display of bad temper” (Taylor, 258). As he continues, he assesses Russian diplomatic skills in following words: “[menacing] was indeed the only method they knew” (258). But this menacing was merely an act of desperation, and the threats were not meant as seriously as Fay

45 depicts them. Fay, however, agrees that the development in Russia forced the German Chancellor to act quickly and “seek at once a defensive alliance with Austria while Andrássy was still in office” (Fay 68). Bismarck had been on friendly terms with Andrássy, and the news had come to Bismarck that his Hungarian friend was soon to resign from his post of Austrian Foreign Minister. This was seen by Bismarck as an unfortunate course of events, because the personal bonds helped him to maintain great relationship between their countries. As a response to this personnel change in Austrian office, Bismarck urged Austria to sign the secret treaty as quickly as possible. Nonetheless, Bismarck’s decision of forming an alliance with Austria, in Taylor’s eyes, was mainly influenced by two factors. Firstly, it was due to maintaining the balance of power and conservativism in Europe, therefore a matter of diplomacy; secondly, which is more important, it was due to his home policy. In accordance with Fischer’s note on German political situation in and after 187850, when Bismarck turned completely from the liberals to the conservatives, Taylor explains Bismarck’s turn to Austria as “a sop to the liberals whom he was deserting in home affairs” (Taylor 259). By forming the alliance, “he gave them a union of the two German powers, based on national sentiment” (259). Yet, as the domestic politics are concerned, another major Bismarck’s problem was William I, the German emperor. He, in his old age, as Taylor claims, “was devoted to family union with the Russian court” (259). Therefore, two most powerful men of the empire had divergent views on German course of diplomatic efforts. Here, as Taylor continues, Bismarck’s experience and coarseness applied. Bismarck advanced his proposal to form an alliance with Austria, thus creating the Dual alliance. Bismarck’s initial aim, as Fay claims, was to create an alliance whose members would protect each other in case of an attack from Russia, France, or Italy. But, as Fay claims, “Austria was unwilling to expose her eastern frontier to a Russian attack by promising unconditionally to assist Germany in the West in case the French should undertake a war of revenge” (Fay 68). Therefore, a more complicated treaty was created, stating that in case of attack from Russia, both Germany and Russia would help each other with their full strength. In case of one country were attacked by France or Italy (or any other great power), the other would remain neutral. However, if the attacker was supported by Russia, “then the other Contracting Party would come to the

50 See the previous chapter.

46 assistance of her ally with her whole strength” (Fay 70). The alliance was also to be secret and last for five years, after which it could be renewable. Taylor, on the other hand, finds the biggest threat of Bismarck’s policy in “Austro- Hungarian restlessness, not [in] Russian aggression” (Taylor 259). Bismarck could not keep the Austrians calm until the treaty was signed. Therefore, Bismarck, as far as Taylor is concerned, persuaded the German emperor that “Germany was in imminent danger of attack from Russia” (259). It is necessary to add, as Taylor explained William’s and Bismarck’s perception of the affairs, that the act of persuasion was not a difficult one: “Only a very old and very simple-minded ruler could have believed that Germany was threatened by war or even by encirclement; but Bismarck had never had a high opinion of his master's ability and used crude arguments to influence him. After all, it had been just as easy to convince him in 1866 that he was threatened by Austria” (Taylor 260). Thus the eastern border of Germany and Austria-Hungary was protected from possible attacks from both sides. Hence, we can see two original opinions on forming of the Dual alliance. Both find the very origin of this treaty in events immediately following the Berlin Conference. Yet Taylor sees Russian threat to Germany as an act of desperation and wrong assessment of German power, Fay’s explanation puts Russia merely into position of jealous outsider who wanted to threaten its western neighbour. The haste the treaty was signed in is attributed to home affairs in Taylor’s and Fischer’s narrative, nonetheless Fay sees the main factor which accelerated Bismarck’s endeavour in Austria, where his friend Andrássy was to resign from the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The complicated form in which the treaty was signed has also two reasons, each from one author. Fay suggests that it was due to Austrian fear of Russian attack in case the Alliance were to defend themselves to an attack from west or south; Taylor puts the main reason to German concern about Austrian willingness to seize an opportunity and attack Russia. The only points where these authors come to an agreement are Bismarck’s responsibility for creating the alliance, the significance of power dynamics in commissions which were called to see to enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, the subsequent Russian threats to Germany, and divergent opinions of Bismarck and William I on the course of German diplomacy. Apart from these two authors, whose focus on creation of the Dual alliance is substantial, no other report on the events is so detailed. Fischer, however, assesses the influence of forming this pact on German policy: “Even in Bismarck's day, for all his elaborate system of alliances,

47 there were signs that Germany's policy was leading her into isolation. She took the first step along this path when in I879 she opted for alliance with that great question-mark, Austria-Hungary” (Fischer 20). The path to isolation Germany had chosen, as Fischer suggests, lead into failure to become or remain on good terms with Britain and Russia, even though there were multiple chances to ally to these powers afterwards. This led to forming of Russo-French alliance and, later, to forming of Entente Cordiale. Or, as Fischer summarises German policy of the 1890s: “Germany's pursuit of a 'world policy' led straight to an isolation” (Fischer 20). Barnes’ brief narrative on the forming of the Alliance starts with the Triple alliance, yet from the point of view of its power potential in 1914:

The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy had been formed by 1882. It possessed some degree of strength and unity up to 1900, when Italy began negotiations with France that ended in a secret agreement in 1902 which meant for practical purposes the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance […]. From 1908 onward Austria also became more and more of a liability to Germany by her truculent attitude towards Serbia. Several times the Austrian aggressiveness provoked tension between Berlin and Vienna, and in 1914 it was the Austrian initiative which dragged Germany into disaster […]. Hence, during the decade before the War, the Triple Alliance had become an empty shell, inadequate even for defense. (Barnes 68)

Italian entry to the Alliance was commented on by Fay and Taylor. As Taylor claims, Italy had not been a great power before Bismarck made it to be one. Germany and Austria felt that they needed an ally. It was especially Austrian concern, due to its Balkan issues. Here, their relationship with Russia grew cold and to maintain Austria happy, Bismarck had to act. He, as Taylor claims, "had to invent Italy as a Great Power; and then had to take his own pretence seriously” (Taylor 271). Initially, Bismarck started to argue that “the great use of the League of the Three Emperors was to prevent an alliance between Italy and Russia,” (271) then he offered Austria security on the southern border by inviting Italy in the Alliance. Therefore, as Taylor resumes the whole situation, “the League of the Three Emperors, which was a pact of friendship with Russia, led in a roundabout way to the Triple Alliance, which was implicitly a pact against her” (Taylor 272). Fay, however, offers different and even hugely conflicting narrative: “It was not with Bismarck that the Triple Alliance originated, but with Italy” (Fay 81). Italy, as Fay continues, saw an alliance with Austria and Germany as an opportunity to gain prestige and perhaps support in its

48 goal to gain Tunis, at that time occupied by the French. Bismarck was allegedly against the idea; he, as Fay claims, loathed Italy and foresaw the risk of instability of an alliance with the “fickle”, “childish”, and “arrogant” troublemakers (Fay 81). This is again in deep contrast with Taylor’s reasoning – Italy and Germany as two nations were formed at the same time, he even claims that “national Italy had been essential to the victory of national Germany” (Taylor 272). In 1866 the Italians even formed an alliance with Prussia against Austria. These are among the reasons by which Taylor provides his reasoning. These views on forming of the Triple Alliance are a great example of difference of opinions between historians. Either interpretation is, on the one hand, backed by primary sources, however, on the other hand, these sources and their understanding do not tell the same story. On the contrary, the stories are even conflicting.

3.1.3 Forming of the Entente

The events in the middle of Europe could not be left without response in those states whose concern about their safety was greatest, France and Russia. Hobsbawm comments on the creation of Russo-French alliance as on a natural course of events: “once Germany gave up the Russian option [of an alliance], as happened in the late 1880s, it was logical that Russia and France would come together - as indeed they did in 1891. Even in the 1880s Friedrich Engels had envisaged such an alliance, naturally directed against Germany” (Hobsbawm 313). The same rhetoric is to be found in Fay: “[t]he Franco-Russian Entente of 1891, which ripened into the Alliance of 1894, was the natural result of the suspicions, the feeling of isolation, and the irritation against Germany which existed in both countries” (Fay 105). What he emphasises is, that their concern was so great that it even overwhelmed the natural differences of these states – France was a republic, and Russia was an absolutist monarchy. Russia was, according to Fay, concerned by a number of threats. Firstly, it was the existence of the Triple Alliance, which was a well-known fact. Even though, or more likely because, the terms of this pact were kept secret, Russian suspicion of possible aggressive nature of the Alliance were present, especially as far as Balkan was concerned (Fay 105). Secondly, a change in Bulgarian rule upset the Russian Tsar. Alexander III had been greatly irritated at the election of Ferdinand of Coburg, a German, as Prince of Bulgaria. This was seen as Bismarck’s intrigue, and after the French intercepted and forwarded to St. Petersburg a letter in which Germany offers Ferdinand their support, Russian anger even grew. So far, it had been agreed

49 that Bulgaria was under Russian sphere, therefore it was seen in Russia that Germany breached their treaties. However, Fay indicates that the letter might have been a forgery. To add to these problems, there was a sudden fall of the rouble, caused partially by Russian policy, and partially by German newspaper attacks commenting on a new Russian estate law. Many Germans were landowners in western Russia, and the bill seemed to be aimed against them. Moreover, the sudden press campaign in Germany disrupted Russo-German relationship, and it was suspected in St. Petersburg that it was orchestrated by Bismarck. These are the reasons why Russia sought for an ally in France. However, as opposed to the aforementioned authors, Barnes, in his strong anti-French rhetoric, takes a different stand: “The Triple Entente began with the Franco-Russian Alliance cemented between 1891 and 1894 under the direction of Freycinet51. Bismarck had negotiated a reinsurance treaty with Russia, but the Kaiser allowed it to lapse. This left Russia free to be exploited by France, and Freycinet was quick to seize the opportunity” (Barnes 68-69). This very brief simplification of the events is a significant trait of Barnes’ notes on the underlying causes of war. However, neither Fay, nor Taylor, whose descriptions of the events are the most detailed ones, do not attribute to the person of Charles de Freycinet any significant role in forming military and political bonds between France and Russia. As far as the Kaiser is concerned, Fischer offers an interesting view on the person of German ruler. The decade before his coronation was marked by great outbreak of nationalism, during which liberalism completely lost to flag-waving conservative chauvinism. The men of William’s generation, according to Fischer, were “convinced devotees of the 'world policy' devoted to securing for Germany a 'place in the sun', which the young Emperor had been quick to announce as his programme” (Fischer 7). Fischer then continues, that “It was the accession of Wilhelm II in July, 1888, that really unleashed the conservative dynastic forces at home; those calling for pushful expansion abroad got their heads after the dismissal of Bismarck in March, 1890” (Fischer 7-8). This appraisal of German public sentiment is important to take into consideration, especially to fully grasp the following Taylor’s narrative. The origins of the Franco-Russian military convention have, according to Taylor, roots in March of 1890, when the crucial events occurred in Germany. Bismarck resigned after a conflict with the Kaiser William II52, which, among other consequences, resulted in German rejection of

51 French Minister of War (1888-1893) 52 The reign of William II started in 1888, and he ruled Germany until 1918.

50

Russian proposals of renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty between these countries (cf. Hobsbawm and Barnes). Taylor explains this change in German policy in attempting to establish alliance with Britain – not a new course of actions in German diplomacy, yet after Bismarck’s resignation, many diplomats were eager to change the direction of German politics. This development forced Russia to seek for allies elsewhere. A treaty with Britain was impossible to make, because of the countries’ unease about the Straits, therefore France was the only Russian possibility. Nonetheless, as Taylor continues, the first steps were difficult, and the first conversations were “discouraging”. Russia wanted to ally with France, but they did not want a strong military alliance against the “quadruple alliance” (Taylor 330). It was seen that Britain was about to join the Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. Russian reasons for not wanting such an alliance was, as Taylor claims, their fear that “two opposed camps will be formed, one of which will try to destroy the other” (Taylor, 331) Yet France, who felt to have been encircled, needed one, therefore the French applied a strategy of financial support (cf. Barnes), while hoping for better terms. And this paid off in 1891, a year which threatened Russia with a crop’s failure, which forced the Tsar to yield and sign the treaty (Taylor 334). Fay, in partial contrast, does not find the real significance of the French loan in trying to appease Russia. His initial interpretation of the reasons for the loan is merely economic: “France at the moment was looking for a field of investment, because commercial conflict with Italy had shut off the Italian market for French capital” (Fay 107). Later he suggests in a very general manner, that there might have been also secondary, political motives, yet not of much importance, stating that “for the most part Frenchmen were ready to give up an apparently unlimited amount of savings to invest at good profits in a country which might become an ally against the common enemy, and which might one day assist in the revanche which so many Frenchmen had in their hearts” (Fay 108). The talks which were preliminary to the Franco-Russian Entente, as Fay claims in agreement with Taylor, were accelerated by “growing Franco-Russian suspicion that England was adhering to the Triple Alliance to thwart Russian ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Fay 111). This suspicion was strengthened by a speech of Italian Premier Rudini in June 1891, in which he made the renewal of the Triple alliance public, and at the same time he also suggested that it might be possible that Britain would approach the Alliance, too. Yet, this suggestion was at least improbable, being in contrast to British traditional course

51 of international policy, which is generally referred to as “”. The main trait of this diplomatic approach was non-involvement in continental affairs so far as British interests were threatened. Practically, it meant that Britain would interfere with continental affairs only in case the balance of power was to be disturbed. According to Fay, since the Franco-Prussian War Britain refused three Bismarck’s offers of an alliance (1879, 1887, 1889), and the only treaty they signed was in 1887 with Italy and Austria; yet this treaty, which had been signed to maintain peace in Eastern Mediterranean, did not bind Britain to any obligations. As for the Rudini’s speech, Taylor agrees with Fay that it arouse anxiety in France, dragging them to “force on an agreement with Russia” (Taylor 333). Yet he adds another reason which added to the decision, and that reason was “the erratic personality of William II”, which caused that France “genuinely feared that he might attack them for failing to respond to his violent gestures of amity” (333). William, as Taylor puts in a footnote, sent his mother to Paris, where “[t]he empress offended the French by visiting Versailles and other scenes of French humiliation in 1871; after public outcry, she had to be smuggled out of France” (333). The origins of the Russo-French Alliance, or , were according to Taylor, of feeble nature. He claims that by signing the first documents in 1891, France and Russia “agreed to agree on measures” (Taylor 335). But as time passed, the two powers drew closer and their alliance grew stronger. Yet the nature of this treaty remained defensive in its essence. As all the authors agree, the countries promised each other only support in case of an attack by the Central powers. As for the significance of the treaty on diplomacy in general, Fay, for example, stipulates, that “The French Cabinet did not count upon Russian armed support at Fashoda or in Morocco, nor the Russians upon that of France in the Far East or the Balkans” (Fay 119). However, he adds right afterwards: “It was not until much later, in the days of Delcassé, Izvolski, and Poincaré, that the Franco-Russian Alliance was essentially changed in spirit from a defensive to a potentially offensive combination” (119). Taylor at this point reminds the reader that there were two conventions. The first one (1891) was “a diplomatic entente against England,” (Taylor 338) and it was in favour of Russian interests; the second one was a “potential military coalition against Germany,” (Taylor 339) and was advantageous for the French. However, neither side acted in accordance to the treaties – France never acted against Britain, and Russia spent French money on everything but military preparations and building infrastructure. However, Taylor admits that its existence caused a

52 change in German strategy and helped Germany develop its – a strategy for offensive against France and Russia, used (yet, with certain adjustments) in 1914. Anyhow feeble the treaty might appear from Taylor’s discourse, Fay, on the contrary, finds its strengths impressive. Firstly, as he claims, it relieved the countries from their isolation. This, in practical terms, “enabled France to take a stiffer tone towards England” (Fay 122). And what is more important, Fay claims that the military power of France and Russia combined was equal to that of the whole Triple Alliance: “the equilibrium between the Triple Alliance and Franco-Russian Alliance was sufficiently well balanced so that neither combination could dare to risk disturbing it by force” (122). From the aforementioned comments on the origins of Russo-French alliance, it is clear that all the authors agree that it was Russia who was looking for an ally, however only Hobsbawm, Taylor, and Barnes attribute Russian decision to German decision not to revive their former alliance with Russia. Fay, on the other hand, offers a number of alternative reasons why Russia sought for an ally. Fischer omits this topic, uttering only a vague, nonetheless important, comment on the character of Kaiser William II. This is taken into accord also by Taylor. Barnes, as opposed to the rest of authors, argues that the agreement was initiated by France, it served French goals, and was exploiting Russia by French warmongers. Considerable differences are also to be found in Taylor’s and Fay’s assessment of the alliance’s power. Taylor claims it started as a feeble and weak answer to the Triple Alliance, however Fay assesses its power as sufficient to create balance of power in Europe.

3.1.4 Entente Cordiale

Britain, as it may seem, thrived, seeing that continental affairs are, as Taylor put it, “self- adjusting,” therefore there was no need to considerably interfere in them. However, the course of British policy was no longer possible to maintain in the “splendid isolation” approach, since the vastness of the British Empire caused that many zones of friction between Britain and other superpowers had emerged all over the world. Fine examples of such friction are the Fashoda affair and territorial disputes in Congo. As Fay states, it was about the time of forming the Franco- Russian Alliance, when Britain “appeared to have come to the parting of the ways. Isolation, though splendid, was not always safe or comfortable” (Fay 125). At this point Britain had two possibilities: Firstly, it was an alliance with one of the great powers. Secondly, it was strengthening the navy. Britain tried to ally with Germany, suggesting “that the time had come to partition

53

Turkey” (Fay 127). However, German diplomats were suspicious and did not agree to the British suggestions. Taylor adds to this course of affairs that British endeavour in this respect was “half- hearted” (Taylor 346) Therefore, the second option won, leaving Britain further in isolation. These years brought Britain into a rather awkward situation. It had always been the fundamental trait of British diplomacy to form alliances to maintain peace in Europe. However, as Taylor notes: “now alliances escaped [Britain] for the same reason – a European Power which made an alliance with Great Britain would be nearer war than before” (Taylor 346). The only ally Britain could find was Japan, seemingly far away from the European stage. Apparently endless struggle to find a way out of this problem was, according to Fay, surprisingly cured by a conflict between Britain and France. Events in Africa, namely the Fashoda crisis, had surprising impact on Anglo-French relations. As Fay explains: “After the bitter humiliation of Fashoda, Delcassé53 had determined to put an end to the traditional hostility between France and England” (Fay 145). The agreement between France and Britain settled the long-lasting conflict over African territories between Congo and Upper Nile. This, according to Fay, had impact on French colonial policy in North Africa as such, and France could solve another conflict, with Italy, claiming that “the French had no aspirations to the east of Tunis, in the Tripoli region coveted by Italy” (145). However, Taylor appreciates different African affair as a step, and not a major one, which started Anglo-French reconciliation. The settlement “that would erase Fashoda and win over the French advocates of colonial expansion, who were the core of hostility to Great Britain” (Taylor 404) was Morocco. Yet the main reason why the Anglo-French Entente came into existence, according to Taylor, was the Far East. As he explains French position: “This crisis threatened France. At some point Japan would oppose the Russians; and they would appeal for French support. Then France must either break with Russia or find herself at war with Great Britain” (Taylor 412) Therefore, it was necessary for France to reconcile with Britain, in order to prevent losing their only ally against the Triple Alliance. Taylor even continues in his narrative, offering an alternative, more aggressive prospect of French course:

If France won Manchuria for Russia with British, and therewith Japanese, approval, she

53 French Foreign Minister

54

would win also British and Russian gratitude. Then both countries would join France in reordering Europe on national lines the old dream which Napoleon III had had in the days after the Crimean war. The Habsburg monarchy would be divided between Germany and Russia; and France would recover Alsace and Lorraine. The first essential step was the reconciliation with Great Britain. (Taylor 412-413)

Nonetheless, both Taylor and Fay agree, that an important factor which added to French public opinion, and both states’ diplomatic efforts to reconcile, was the visit of King Edward VII in May 1903. This friendly stay was returned a month later, when the French president Loubet visited London. During this visit, as Fay claims, began Anglo-French conversations which resulted in Entente Cordiale. It was a “series of conventions which settled amicably long-standing disputes concerning the Newfoundland fisheries, Senegambia, Siam, Madagascar, the New Hebrides, and other subjects. The most important convention was that by which France at last gave the English a free hand in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco” (Fay 154). The Entente Cordiale, as Taylor continues, was perceived as great success especially by French radicals54, who preferred peaceful direction of French policy. In their view “The Russians expected France to remain hostile to Germany and ready to march, if ever this suited the whims of Russian policy. The British, on the other hand, had no army on a continental scale and no basic hostility to Germany; friendship with them made revanche more remote” (Taylor 413). It was indeed an interesting course of events which brought Britain to mutual understanding with France. Unfortunately, there are only two historians from the authors surveyed in this work who offer complex view on this issue. Their starting point is the same, they describe British policy of “splendid isolation”. But due to British imperialism, this course of events could not be maintained forever. Both authors agree, that Britain sought for an ally in Germany, however the degree to which they were consenting to find themselves affiliated to the Kaiser is reduced in Taylor’s version. The breaking point of Anglo-French animosity is found in Africa, however the events differ in both stories. Also the French reasons why to aspire to Anglo-French Entente differ immensely in the narratives. The significance of the visit of King Edward VII in France, however, reconciled not only both the nations, but also the two historians.

54 A political party who then controlled the French parliament.

55

3.1.5 First Moroccan Crisis

The friendly understanding between Britain and France had, apart from others, a consequence in both countries’ decision not to take part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905. However, even without their endeavour, the Far Eastern conflict had an effect on European diplomacy – an effect both countries feared. Following Russian defeat in the war and revolution, which considerably weakened the eastern superpower, Germany, as Hobsbawm claims, “used the golden opportunity of temporary French weakness and isolation merely to push her imperialist claims on Morocco” (Hobsbawm 311). He continues by evaluation of German perspective, claiming that German Morocco policy was “a manageable issue over which nobody intended to start a major war, or indeed did so” (311). Taylor completely agrees with Hobsbawm’s claim, furthermore he refers to this unprecedented step in German diplomacy as to a “revolution” (Taylor 427). Taylor’s claim is clear. Germany’s position was secure, there was no threat from east nor west – Russian military was “crippled by the Far Eastern war”, Russian politics were concerned with their home policy and the revolution, France was governed by pacifist Radical party, and French army was weaker than German. Germany wanted to seize the opportunity, as Taylor claims, “to show that Germany could not be ignored in any question in the world” (Taylor 428), therefore to gain international prestige. The same time, Taylor sees German main aim “to establish peacefully their predominance over the Continent and thus be free to challenge the British empire overseas” (Taylor 427). Moreover, he claims that a secondary motivation could be “to weaken the Anglo-French Entente or perhaps to shake the Franco-Russian alliance” (Taylor 428). Thus, as Taylor assesses their strategy, they “complained that they had not been officially informed of the Anglo-French agreement over Morocco, as though nothing could happen in the world without their permission” (428). Therefore, Germany presented an idea of calling an international conference. Their proposal was that Morocco should be independent, therefore without French influence. They were hoping that “Italy and Austria-Hungary would support Germany, Russia would do nothing to offend her, the United States would support the open door, and both Great Britain and Spain would be glad to escape from the concessions that they had promised to France” (Taylor 429). However, this course of events did not evolve according to Germany plan, and the outcome of the First Moroccan Crisis was strengthening of the Entente. Fay’s description of the events which triggered the crisis is, however, rather different. It

56 was not German lust for international prestige, nor their attempt to break the Entente, but fear that the Anglo-French Moroccan agreement contained secret clauses against Germany. Furthermore, Fay - not incorrectly - presents that Germany had had its interests in Morocco as well, therefore it should have been invited to the talks. Similar approach, yet using different rhetoric, is represented by Barnes. In his conclusion of the Moroccan crisis, he stipulates that “Germany was in the right legally and morally, but sadly bungled matters in diplomatic procedure” (Barnes 89). This was later used by “Entente propagandists” who used the Moroccan crisis to convey that “the Kaiser brought Europe to the verge of war through wanton and illegal bullying of France” (Barnes 80). Again, two main possibilities are offered to the reader, which one is in favour of Germany, and the other discredits it. Germany was either in right to protect their economic interests, or offensively exploited imbalance of power after Russia lost the war in the Far East. The final antagonism of these narratives is, that Germany either tried to weaken the entente of France and Britain, or acted aggressively because they were threatened by possible secret clauses which might have been signed with the Entente Cordiale.

3.1.6 Anglo-Russian Entente

According to Fischer, the , which was called to find a way out of the First Moroccan Crisis, had significant impact on further development of German policy. As he claims, it “revealed not only how few Germany's friends were, but how unreliable. Italy ranged herself on the side of the Entente, Austria's support was lukewarm. And just at this juncture 'encirclement' became a reality” (Fischer 22). To add to the above mentioned problems, the development on German eastern frontier was not promising either: “Defeated by Japan in the war of 1904-5 and shaken by revolution, Russia switched her attention from the Far East back to Europe. She was thereby brought increasingly into conflict with Austria-Hungary, and also with Germany, while at the same time an understanding between Britain and Russia became possible” (22). And this understanding indeed developed. As Fischer continues, “[a] delimitation of their respective spheres of influence in Afghanistan, Tibet and Persia […] led to the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, after which the Russo-French military alliance and the Anglo-French Entente hardened into the Triple Entente” (22). He attributes to this entente a strong anti-German nature. Russia’s main motive, as Fischer claims, was “fear of German designs on the Baltic coast (which were in fact partly realised during the First World War)” (Fischer 22). Britain followed their

57 interest in India, which were seen to be threatened by German Baghdad Railroad. Fischer concludes, that “[t]he 'encirclement' in turn brought Germany into increased dependence on the policy of her ally, Austria-Hungary” (Fischer 23). Taylor offers British perspective, which had “little to do with Germany” (Taylor, 442). He stipulates that Britain only followed their Persian policy, where “[the] British had wanted a compromise for years and had been working actively for it since 1903. It was the Russians who had changed their mood, just as the French change of mood caused the entente of 1904” (442). Therefore, we can see three perspectives important to three states – Germany, Russia, and Britain. The fact Fischer did not include British point of view to his narrative, and Taylor set it as the base of his narrative, must surely be attributed to these authors’ nationalities.

3.1.7 The Second Moroccan Crisis

Another crisis which subsequently lead to the First World War was the Second Moroccan Crisis. 1909, the German and French diplomats signed a mutual agreement settling Moroccan affairs, recognizing interests of both countries. However, a rebellion broke out and France had to act, sending the military to protect Europeans in a Moroccan city of Fez. In Taylor’s words, “it was certain that a French protectorate would follow” (Taylor 466). This opinion is shared by Fischer and Fay, who also agree that both superpowers had colonial ambitions in Morocco. Also, Hobswbawm agrees, that the crisis “had little to do with revolution, and everything to do with imperialism” (Hobsbawm 321). In a different reasoning, Barnes finds French (and Spanish) actions in Morocco “subversive of the chief principle of the act of Algeciras,” (Barnes 81) claiming that Germany was “within her rights in objecting to these proceedings” (81). German objection to French military operations in Morocco are, on the other hand, seen by Taylor as an act of greed and fear that “the French would take Morocco before they had paid a price for it to Germany” (Taylor 466). German response on French occupation of Morocco was to send their gunboat Panther to Agadir. This move was, according to Fay, Hobsbawm, and Taylor, to strengthen German diplomatic position during consequent talks in Paris. Fay even suggests that German initial goal was to gain the whole French Congo in exchange for Morocco (Fay 283). This German claim is also one of important motives of Fischer’s assessment of the Second Moroccan Crisis. As he argues, German demand for compensation by exchange of Morocco for Congo “revealed one of the essential objectives of Germany's diplomacy: to acquire a continuous colonial empire in central

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Africa” (Fischer 24). By improving Franco-German relationship, as Fischer continues, Germany also followed more “far-reaching” goal to weaken the Anglo-French Entente. The Agadir incident is generally seen as a major cause of problem. For example, Taylor describes British army, following the news of Panther being in Agadir, in state when “[t]he British fleet [was] prepared for action; and, what was more important for the future, the admiralty was forced, for the first time, to subordinate its own plans to the shipping of an expeditionary force to northern France. Nonetheless, it is diminished by Barnes, who argues with a notion that Morocco was “under the very cannon of Panther”, which was later used in Poincaré’s memoirs. In Barnes’ words, “[i]t so happens that the Panther was an insignificant little German gunboat carrying a crew of 125 men - about as much of a ship of war as the Kaiser's private yacht” (Barnes 82). British response to the crisis was articulated by Lloyd George’s55 famous Mansion House Speech, in which Britain demanded to be consulted on the question of Morocco, too. This speech, as Fay claims, was “interpreted as a threat [in Germany], and […] it was felt that England was interfering in Franco-German negotiations” (Fay 289). However, Taylor claims that the threat which was conveyed by Lloyd George’s speech was addressed to France, and not to Germany, therefore being misunderstood by both parties (Taylor 471). The Second Moroccan Crisis was ended by an agreement by which Germany, in exchange for territories in Congo, acknowledged the French protectorate in Morocco. However, this compromise was met with disapproval both in Germany and in France. In France, the negotiators were under harsh criticism, in Germany, according to Taylor, even a decision of hurrying the building of their navy was made, (Taylor 472) and in Britain, according to Fay, Grey told the Russian ambassador that “[i]n the event of a war between Germany and France, England would have to participate. If this war should involve Russia [...], Austria would be dragged in too. [...] Consequently, it would no longer be a duel between France and Germany—it would be a general war” (Fay 290-291). Hence, colonial ambitions of France and Germany nearly triggered another fuse which might have unleashed a world war. As Hobsbawm comments, “[t]he Agadir crisis demonstrated that almost any confrontation between two major powers now brought them to the brink of war” (Hobsbawm 321). Regrettably, the south-eastern Europe provided to be rich source of such confrontations.

55 was British Chancellor of the Exchequer. Later he became the Prime Minister.

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From the aforementioned descriptions of the Crisis, it is clear that Fischer and Taylor agree that the triggering of the Second Moroccan Crisis was German greed. Hobsbawm goes even further, claiming that it was European greed as such, that changed seemingly revolutionary issue of Moroccan people into another colonial struggle of European superpowers. This trait is also between the lines of Barnes’ reasoning – he stipulates that France and Spain breached the Treaty of Algeciras, therefore it is their greed which caused the crisis. As for the significance of German proceedings, an opinion contrasting to the traditional view can be found here, too. Majority of scholars agree, that the crisis brought Britain to the verge of war, however certain voices (in this case Barnes’) object against this assumption.

3.1.8 Development in the Near East

As for the development of Balkan issues, the main event which revived unrest in the peninsula was Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908. As Taylor explains, Austria, namely their Foreign Minister Aehrenthal, wanted to “restore the prestige of the monarchy by some great stroke,” (Taylor 450) and therefore annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fay, on the other hand, adds that the annexation was a part of Austrian and Russian common plan to settle the two countries’ long-lasting rivalry over that region. The annexation itself, according to Fay and Barnes, began in Buchlov56. As Barnes explains, it started, when “[i]n September, 1908, at Buchlau, Izvolski57, […] and Count Aehrenthal58, […] secretly agreed that Austria should annex […] Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Barnes 83). As for the detail of this “bargain”, he explains that “in return […] Austria was to support the Russians in securing from Turkey the freedom of the Straits” (83). However, as Fay admits, their plan was successful only for the Austrian part, because England did not open the Straits to Russia. Barnes, using rather harsher rhetoric, offers even greater picture of this plot: “Poincaré and Izvolski decided that their joint program—the Russian seizure of the Straits and the French recovery of Alsace-Lorraine—could be realized only by war, and they came to the conclusion that the Balkans were the most favourable area in which to foment or seize upon a crisis suitable for a provoking the desired conflict” (Barnes 84).

56 Or “Buchlau”, as they refer to it by its German name. Taylor, however, uses its Czech name, Buchlov. 57 Russian Foreign Minister 58 Austrian Foreign Minister

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However, Taylor disagrees that the seizure of the Straits was such a prominent issue for Russian diplomacy. He agrees that there was certain importance in this matter, but only as far as their prestige was concerned. He stipulates that “China and Persia took up most of the energies of [Russian] foreign ministry until the very outbreak of the European war in 1914” (Taylor 483). His reasoning is quite simple, “[since] 1897 the Russians had consciously turned their backs on Europe in order to seek greater prizes in China and Persia,” (483) and this policy continued even after the Russo-Japanese War and the entente with Britain. Moreover, he claims that Russia “had no ambitions in European Turkey nor interest in the Balkan states, except as neutral buffers against Austria-Hungary and Germany” (Taylor 484). Also, the creation of the is, in Taylor’s narrative, regarded to initiative of individual diplomats, and not as something which had been orchestrated by St. Petersburg; however, the news on the treaties were cheered upon there (Taylor 484). Russia, as he continues, felt that a united body of states in Balkan would protect the Near East from “German penetration [and] Austrian invasion” (484). Nevertheless, the Balkan states, namely Serbia, had different designs of future. This is in contrast with Fay’s view, who refers to the creation of the Balkan League as a situation when Russia “used the unrest caused in the Balkans by the Tripolitan War59 to help bring about the Balkan League, its nominal purpose being the preservation of the status quo, but its practical effect being an encouragement to the Balkan States to open war on Turkey.” Therefore, two views are presented on the creation of the Balkan League. In Taylor’s interpretation, it was established by accident, and its aim was believed to be to maintain peace, in Fay’s view, on the contrary, the League was established on purpose, which was to weaken the Ottoman Empire. The latter, however, happened, and the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 changed not only the situation in the Near East, but also, consequently, in the whole world. As Hobsbawm concludes the overall conflict: “On the territory of the nearest and largest of the potential victims, the long disintegrating Ottoman Empire, war was indeed a permanent possibility as its subject peoples sought to establish or enlarge themselves as independent states and subsequently fought each other, drawing the great powers into their conflicts” (Hobsbawm 303). The local result of the Balkan Wars has been described in the second chapter of this thesis,

59 The Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912

61 therefore it is more meaningful to underline the global consequences these conflicts had. For this purpose, Fay’s summary is the most suitable: "the Balkan Wars resulted in a universal increase of suspicion, hatred, intrigues, and uncertainty, not only among the Great Powers who increased their armaments, but among the Balkan States themselves, and especially in Austria and Serbia” (Fay 543). The last of these issues was accentuated in Sarajevo on the fatal Sunday of 28th June 1914, when a young anarchist Gavrilo Princip twice pulled the trigger of his FN Model 191060, and murdered the Archduke of Austria-Hungary Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie.

3.2 Summary

From the evidence given in the previous part it is certain that history is an extremely complex issue, and from this very nature it can be looked upon from various perspectives. The books which have been analysed in this thesis provide more than satisfactory example of how different, and often contradictory, interpretations of the same events may be. The Long nineteenth century, as Eric Hobsbawm nicknamed the times which were examined in this thesis, provided multiple occasions which, when looked upon from a different perspective, show very different narrative of the events Europe experienced from the fall of Napoleon to the outbreak of even worse war, the First World War. Working with primary and secondary resources which were available at the time and place these historians worked at, following some inner motives unknown to the reader, and bearing in mind the aims of their works, these authors created very different narrations of events which happened and were recorded for the future. The author of this thesis has observed a number of strategies the authors of these monographs have used. Each of them serves different purpose, and it is necessary to be aware of these when reading any book which might influence a person’s opinion. Among the most common strategies there are these. Firstly, it is the choice of primary materials which are used and analysed. This is a crucial point, because it was not very often when two authors cited the same source, even though they referred to the same event, the same minutes and seconds which took place at the same place. As for such complex field as history of diplomacy is, the right choice of documents is crucial.

60 The pistol he used for the assassination

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Secondly, in some cases, only a change of perspective offers to the reader an original point of view. Indeed, an army crossing a border of a state may be seen as an organized group of killers and occupants, and a liberating force at the same time. Not only “beauty”, but also “truth” and “justice” are in the eye of the beholder. What is seen as an occupation by one man, may as well be regarded and cheered upon as an act of saving or liberation by another man, even his neighbour. For example, German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine was seen as the “tearing of children from their mother” in one country, and a “liberation from occupants” in the other. Thirdly, the detail the detail into which an author treats a particular subject may suggest their attitude towards it. We can emphasise important issues by allowing them to be investigated in several pages. On the other hand, we can marginalize them or even omit them completely. Another important aspect of writing is the choice of words an author uses to describe things or events. An “issue” is indeed less of a problem than a “problem” itself. Correct wording, so it seems, is of even greater importance in diplomacy and history of it. As a helpful tool how to discover authors whose works may seem dubious, it is advisable to look at their personal profiles, or any information about them available. This tool, used in the second chapter, helped the author orientate better in the complex monographs analysed in this thesis. When all is said and done, it is desirable to highlight that the underlying motive of this research is variety. A variety of opinions on events and tendencies which have been observed in history is extensive. This thesis, having dealt with a long and complex period of time, fortunately chose to work with very limited body of works, only five books have been analysed, therefore five, often different, approaches have been taken into consideration. Variety is also present in teaching, teachers meet people with variety of opinions, and present variety of information. Therefore, this thesis should help us, teachers, to be able to teach our students how to deal with such variety and understand the pros and cons it brings.

4 Discussion

4.1 Application in history classes

As it was suggested in the previous chapter, the variety of approaches and explanations of history events is uncanny. To add to it, the number of books dedicated to the topic and available to present reader is vast. Therefore, it is likely that multiple different interpretations are to be found.

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On the one hand, this state of affairs is beneficial, because a particular issue can be examined from multiple perspectives. On the other hand, this very same advantage may make harm at the same time, because it is never certain to what extent a book (or any other source of information) is based on truth and to what extent the author’s bias influence their work. However, a teacher can make an advantage from the dissent of opinions. Firstly, a set of lessons based on this topic might become a course on both history and critical thinking at the same time. Having considered differences in the authors and their views, the story of Europe in the 19th and early 20th century can be retold in multiple ways, leading students into different conclusions. A comparison of these may be a proof of the importance of developing critical thinking. At the same time, it may show the students that further research of their sources of information is crucial, especially in the world of Internet and encyclopaedias which are editable by their users. Another suggestion how to put the knowledge from this thesis to use is based on a board game Diplomacy61, which was designed by one of Sidney B. Fay’s students. This communicative game is set in Europe before the World War I, starting by the Vienna Conference of 1815. Forming of alliances and gaining influence over territories is the main goal in this game. Since the focus on communication is enormous, use of such game in English lessons is seen as highly beneficial. However, the game itself is time-consuming, therefore certain modifications are advisable to undertake as to integrate this game into classwork.

Conclusion As the thesis presents, virtually any event, either in the past or present, can be interpreted in multiple ways. Language, in its very essence, conveys not only the information itself, but also the attitude of the speaker or writer towards the fact. Therefore, it should be one of the most important tasks for a teacher, especially a language teacher, to develop critical thinking in their students. This is more and more acute in the time when information travels by the speed unthinkable even several years ago. However, not every information is to be taken as truth. It is more than obvious that the Internet is full of lies and semi-lies, or creative interpretations of the truth. However, many people even in academic domain take an article or a book which meets the formal requirements on an academic paper as an assurance of accuracy and verity of information. However, this thesis, which has analysed five monographs written by

61 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy_(game)

64 influential and well-known historians, whose works have been cited as sources for various academic papers, has found numerous discrepancies in these books. Therefore the overall conclusion of this thesis is that emphasis on critical thinking should be made, mainly in language and history lessons. Or, as René Descartes has famously never uttered: Dubito, cogito, ergo sum. I doubt, I think, therefore I am.

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