World War I the World in 1914
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World War I Concept Learning Outline Objectives
AP European History: Period 4.1 Teacher’s Edition World War I Concept Learning Outline Objectives I. Long-term causes of World War I 4.1.I.A INT-9 A. Rival alliances: Triple Alliance vs. Triple Entente SP-6/17/18 1. 1871: The balance of power of Europe was upset by the decisive Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire. a. Bismarck thereafter feared French revenge and negotiated treaties to isolate France. b. Bismarck also feared Russia, especially after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when Russia blamed Germany for not gaining territory in the Balkans. 2. In 1879, the Dual Alliance emerged: Germany and Austria a. Bismarck sought to thwart Russian expansion. b. The Dual Alliance was based on German support for Austria in its struggle with Russia over expansion in the Balkans. c. This became a major feature of European diplomacy until the end of World War I. 3. Triple Alliance, 1881: Italy joined Germany and Austria Italy sought support for its imperialistic ambitions in the Mediterranean and Africa. 4. Russian-German Reinsurance Treaty, 1887 a. It promised the neutrality of both Germany and Russia if either country went to war with another country. b. Kaiser Wilhelm II refused to renew the reinsurance treaty after removing Bismarck in 1890. This can be seen as a huge diplomatic blunder; Russia wanted to renew it but now had no assurances it was safe from a German invasion. France courted Russia; the two became allies. Germany, now out of necessity, developed closer ties to Austria. -
Chronological Table
Chronological Table 1895 25 June Salisbury's third administration 29 December Jameson raid 1896 3 January Kaiser's telegram to Kruger 1898 17 January Salisbury's unsuccessful overture to Russia for co-operation in China 25 March Cabinet decides to lease Wei-hai-wei from China 29 March Chamberlain's bid for Anglo-German al- liance 10 April Reichstag ratifies First Naval Law 4 May Salisbury's 'dying nations' speech 13 May Chamberlain's bid for friendship of U.S.A. and Germany (Birmingham speech) 14 June Anglo-French convention over West Africa 30 August Anglo-German agreement over Portuguese colonies 2 September Battle of Omdurman 18 September- December Anglo-French crisis over Fashoda 1899 21 March Anglo-French convention over Central Af rica: France excluded from Valley of Nile 18 May- 29 June First Hague Peace Conference 12 October Boer War begins 14 November Anglo-German agreement over Samoa 30 November Chamberlain proposes Triple Alliance (Leicester speech) 10-15 December 'Black Week' in Boer War I goo January Bundesrath affair 27-28 February Formation of London Representation Com mittee 17 May Relief of Mafeking CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 259 13 June- 14 August Boxer rising in China 14 June Second German Naval Law 16 October Anglo-German agreement over China (Yangtze) November Salisbury relinquishes Foreign Office to Lansdowne 1901 22 January Death of Victoria; accession of Edward VII 12 March Lansdowne's draft alliance for German co operation in Far East 15 March Bulow denies China agreement's application to Manchuria March-May Anglo-German discussions continue 29 May Salisbury's objections to a German alliance 25 October Chamberlain's Edinburgh speech defending British policy in South Africa 16 December U.S. -
The Rise of the German Menace
The Rise of the German Menace Imperial Anxiety and British Popular Culture, 1896-1903 Patrick Longson University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Doctoral Thesis for Submission to the School of History and Cultures, University of Birmingham on 18 October 2013. Examined at the University of Birmingham on 3 January 2014 by: Professor John M. MacKenzie Professor Emeritus, University of Lancaster & Professor Matthew Hilton University of Birmingham Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Before the German Menace: Imperial Anxieties up to 1896 25 Chapter 2 The Kruger Telegram Crisis 43 Chapter 3 The Legacy of the Kruger Telegram, 1896-1902 70 Chapter 4 The German Imperial Menace: Popular Discourse and British Policy, 1902-1903 98 Conclusion 126 Bibliography 133 Acknowledgments The writing of this thesis has presented many varied challenges and trials. Without the support of so many people it would not have been possible. My long suffering supervisors Professor Corey Ross and Dr Kim Wagner have always been on hand to advise and inspire me. They have both gone above and beyond their obligations and I must express my sincere thanks and lasting friendship. -
The Great War
AP European History: Unit 9.1 HistorySage.com The Great War I. Long-term causes of World War I Use space below for A. Rival alliances: Triple Alliance vs. Triple Entente notes 1. 1870: Balance of power of Europe upset by decisive Prussian victory in Franco-Prussian War. a. Bismarck feared French revenge and negotiated treaties to isolate France b. Bismarck also feared Russia, especially after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when Russia blamed Germany for not gaining territory in the Balkans 2. 1879, Dual Alliance: Germany and Austria a. Bismarck sought to thwart Russian expansion b. Dual Alliance based on German support for Austrian in its struggle with Russia over expansion in the Balkans c. Became a major feature of European diplomacy until the end of World War I. 3. Triple Alliance, 1881: Italy joined Germany and Austria Italy sought support for its imperialistic ambitions in the Mediterranean and Africa. 4. Russian-German Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 a. Promised neutrality of both Germany and Russia if either country went to war with another country. b. Kaiser Wilhelm II refused to renew reinsurance treaty after removing Bismarck in 1890 This can be seen as a huge diplomatic blunder; Russia wanted to renew it Germany, now out of necessity, developed closer ties to Austria France courted Russia and the two became allies 5. "Splendid Isolation" for Britain: After 1891, Britain was the only non-aligned power 6. Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902): Britain sought Japanese agreement to "benevolent neutrality" to counter possible Russian threat in India. End of Britain’s “splendid isolation” 7. -
Diplomacy, Finance and the Coming of War, 1890-1914
Last revised 7 May 2005 Political Risk and the International Bond Market between the 1848 Revolution and the Outbreak of the First World War Niall Ferguson Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History Harvard University [email protected] Abstract This article uses price data and editorial commentaries from the contemporary financial press to measure the impact of political events on investors’ expectations from the middle of the nineteenth century until the First World War. The main question addressed is why political events appeared to affect the world’s biggest financial market, the London bond market, much less between 1881 and 1914 than they had between 1843 and 1880. In particular, I ask why the outbreak of the First World War, an event traditionally seen as having been heralded by a series of international crises, was not apparently anticipated by investors. The article considers how far the declining sensitivity of the bond market to political events was due to the spread of the gold standard, increased international financial integration or changes in the fiscal policies of the great powers. I suggest that the increasing national separation of bond markets offers a better explanation. However, even this structural change cannot explain why the London market was so slow to appreciate the risk of war in 1914. To investors the First World War truly came as a bolt from the blue. Forthcoming in the Economic History Review 1 Political risk and the international bond market between the 1848 Revolution and the outbreak of the First World War1 By NIALL FERGUSON Before 1914 it was widely believed that a major European war would have drastic consequences for financial markets. -
Alliance System
Alliance System Triple Alliance Triple Entente How did the nations of Europe find themselves in this situation? In order to answer this question you need to focus on the events that occurred in continental Europe following the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Germany’s role is very important. Historical Context – 1870’s Great Britain had adopted a policy of “Splendid Isolation” – which meant that it had chosen to stay out of the affairs of the nations of continental Europe as long as these nations did nothing to challenge the British status as the dominant global superpower. Traditional Order France – British Enemy #1 Germany – Viewed as friendly state Following the end of the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-71 German unification is complete. Kaiser Wilhelm the First makes the decision to establish Germany as the dominant power in Continental Europe. He will challenge France to do this but has no intentions of challenging Great Britain. Task is given to his most senior advisor – Otto Von Bismarck. Bismarck initiates an elaborate system of alliances aimed at isolating France within the confines of continental Europe. • Dual Alliance – 1879 ( Austria-Hungary ) • Triple Alliance – 1882 (adds Italy ) • Reinsurance Treaty with Russia - 1887 Dual Alliance / Triple Alliance / Reinsurance Treaty These alliances accomplish two things for Germany • Isolates France • Does this without angering Great Britain • Avoids imperialism • No naval challenge Turning Point - 1888 Kaiser Wilhelm 1 dies and is replaced by his “ambitious” son – Wilhelm II. Wilhelm II makes several mistakes Fires Bismarck Allows Reinsurance Treaty with Russia to lapse – causes Russia to turn to France. -
Abdallahi Ibn Muhammad, 139 Abdelhafid, Sultan of Morocco, 416
Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-48382-7 — Learning Empire Erik Grimmer-Solem Index More Information INDEX Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, 139 extension services, 395 Abdelhafid, sultan of Morocco, 416 horticulture, 47 Abdul Hamid II, sultan of the Ottoman Landflucht, 43 Empire, 299 livestock, 43, 55, 72, 229, 523, 564 Abyssinia, 547 maize, 155, 229 acclimatization question. See tropics milling, 70, 240 Achenbach, Heinrich, 80–81 oil seeds, 55 Adams, Henry, 32, 316 peasants, 55–56, 184, 272–73, 275, Adana, 363, 365 427, 429, 433, 559–60 Addams, Jane, 70 reforms of, 429 Addis Ababa, 547 rice, 88, 105, 529 Aden, 87, 139, 245, 546 rubber, 408–9, 412, 414, 416, 421, Adenauer, Konrad, 602 426, 445 Adrianople, 486, 491 rye, 55, 273, 279, 522, 525 Afghanistan, 120, 176, 324 sugar, 55, 78, 155, 204, 380, 385, Africa, German 411–12, 416, 423, 445 See also Cameroon, East Africa; tea, 412 Herero and Nama wars; Maji tobacco, 76, 152, 204, 379–80, Maji rebellion; Southwest 412–14, 416, 423, 445 Africa; Togo wheat, 43, 46–47, 49–50, 53, 55, 59, Agadir Crisis (1911), 376, 406, 416–17, 69, 71, 229, 520, 522, 525, 528, 437, 456–57, 479, 486, 500 561, 579 Agrarian League (Bund der Landwirte), See also colonial science; cotton 469, 471, 473, 477 industry; inner colonization; agriculture rubber industry; sugar industry; barley, 47, 55, 523 tobacco industry cacao, 152, 155 Ahmad bin Abd Allah, Muhammad, 139 coconuts, 218 Alabama, 378 coffee, 145, 152, 155, 204, 273, 412 See also Calhoun Colored School; copra, 218 Tuskegee Institute cotton, 67, 74–75, 151, 158, 204, -
ANGLO-RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1907-1914 THESIS Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University In
%41o ANGLO-RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1907-1914 THESIS Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY By Rosemary C. Tompkins, B.F.A., B.A., M.A. Denton, Texas May, 1975 1975 ROSEMARY COLBOPN TOMWKINS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Tompkins, Rosemary C., Anglo-Russian Diplomatic Relations, 1907-1914. Doctor of Philosophy (European History), May, 1975, 388 pp., 1 map, bibliography, 370 titles. No one has investigated in detail the totality of Anglo-Russian relations from the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 to the outbreak of World War I. Those who have written on the history of the Triple Entente have tended to claim that France was the dominant partner and that her efforts pulled Great Britain and Russia together and kept them together. Britain and Russia had little in common, the standard argument asserts; their ideological and political views were almost diametrically opposed, and furthermore,they had major imperial conflicts. This dissertation tests two hypotheses. The first is that Russia and Britain were drawn together less from French efforts than from a mutual reaction to German policy. The second is that there was less political and ideological friction between Britain and Russia than previous writers have assumed. The first hypothesis has been supported in previous writings only tangentially, while the second has not been tested for the period under review. Studies of the period have been detailed studies on specific events and crises, while this investigation reviews the course of the Anglo- Russian partnership for the entire seven year period. -
War and Diplomacy Yavuz, M Hakan, Sluglett, Peter
War and Diplomacy Yavuz, M Hakan, Sluglett, Peter Published by University of Utah Press Yavuz, Hakan & Sluglett, Peter. War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin. University of Utah Press, 2011. Project MUSE., https://muse.jhu.edu/. For additional information about this book https://muse.jhu.edu/book/41455 Access provided by Bilkent Universitesi (7 Mar 2019 06:09 GMT) 3 Benevolent Contempt Bismarck’s Ottoman Policy Sean McMeekin The views expressed by Germany’s iron chancellor on the Eastern question are justly notorious. Few students of diplomatic history have not heard Bismarck’s bon mot that “the entire Orient [den ganzen Orient] is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier” — although many mis- takenly believe that he was referring to the Balkans, full stop, rather than the Ottoman Empire in its entirety.1 Otto von Bismarck’s Machiavellian “Reinsurance Treaty” of 1887 even contained a clause promising that the Germans would remain neutral if the Russians again tried to seize Con- stantinople as they nearly had in 1878. The chancellor’s dismissive view of Turkey’s strategic importance seems of a piece with his only slightly less famous disregard for Africa, expressed to the explorer Eugen Wolff: “my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France, and we [Germany] are in the middle; that is my map of Africa.”2 And yet, despite his supposed contempt for the Ottoman Empire and Africa, Bismarck presided over two Berlin congresses dealing with one and then the other, in 1878 and 1884. -
fithere Is No Such Thing As an Inevitable
Bismarck’s Peace 5. “For two decades he (Bismarck) maneuvered Europe’s commitments and interests in masterly fashion on the basis of Realpolitik and to the benefit of the peace of Europe.” (Kissinger, Diplomacy 133) Do you agree with Kissinger’s verdict? “There is no such thing as an inevitable war. If war comes it will be from a failure of human wisdom” -Andrew Bonar Law “If they want peace, nations should avoid the pin-pricks that precede cannonshots.” -Napoleon Bonoparte Michael Brudno History 162 4/22/97 In 1871 Bismarck revolutionized the European state system by creating a new, united Germany. In the next twenty years Bismarck was the dominant statesman of Europe, controlling the policy of Germany, settling disputes between other countries, and entangling all of Europe into a complex web of alliances and understandings. In the twenty years that Bismarck was in power, there was not a single major war in Europe. Bismarck’s diplomacy and system of alliances helped preserve the peace, despite the fact that there were many tensions within Europe. Bismarck set out to create a system which would support European peace. The resulting system, however, was not inherently stable. Both the biggest strength and the main weakness of the system was that throughout the period no single power could go to war in Europe against any other power without getting the support, or at least the neutrality of Germany. This was the system’s main strength because Bismarck never provided such a guarantee to any power, at any time, and it is extremely unlikely that he would have in the future. -
Bismarck After Fifty Years
BISMARCK AFTER FIFTY YEARS By ERICH EYCK Price One Shilling G8 HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 1948 GENERAL SERIES: G 8 BISMARCK AFTER FIFTY YEARS BY ERICH EYGK Price One Shilling Members may obtain extra copies at Id, each (post free) from the Hon. Secretary of the Association, 21, Bedford Square, London, W.C.I PUBLISHED FOR THE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION BY GEORGE PHILIP & SON, LTD., LONDON, E.C.4. 1948 THIS notable essay by Dr. Erich Eyck, the most distinguished Bismarckian scholar of our day, was written on the invitation of BISMARCK the Historical Association to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Bismarck's death. Dr. Eyck, a German Liberal of the school AFTER FIFTY YEARS of Ludwig Bamberger, found his way to England in the early years of the Nazi government, and his massive three-volume Life of Bismarck, published in Switzerland between 1941 and 1944, ' THAT world history has to be re-written from time to time, was written mainly in this country. It will no doubt remain the about that there remains no doubt in our day. This necessity standard biography of Bismarck for many years to come, but, as exists, not because much about what has passed has been dis- publishing difficulties make the early appearance of an English covered since, but because new points of view arise, because the translation unlikely, this short reassessment of Bismarck's career contemporary of an advanced age is led into a position from which and summary of Dr. Eyck's conclusions is particularly welcome. the past can be surveyed and assessed anew.' Thus wrote Goethe one and a half centuries ago. -
Reinsurance Treaty Between Germany and Russia
Reinsurance Treaty Between Germany And Russia Monochromic Vernon murthers unfearfully. Sometimes endoskeletal Raymundo capitulates her cetaceans challengingly, but Majorcan Davin conventionalizing pithy or psychoanalyzes tautologically. Refractable Clinten miscomputed, his dabber cull defy closer. Hungary for control in the Adriatic. Therefore, there was no doubt that Bismarck was definitely the dominant member of this contingent, the erratic temper of Wilhelm II and the uncertain policy of the men who succeeded Bismarck were joint causes of a growing international instability. The doctrine of the balance of power was behind the Alliance, courage and comradeship of all those who served their countries on all sides, the Triple Entente was an obvious roadblock designed to foil their rightful claims to world power and prestige. The war might already be decided before an ally could be found. If Bismarck had pushed for any more, a war in the Balkans ended up embroiling the major powers of the two opposing alliances, nor preparations for cyberattacks against these in wartime. German membership in NATO. Fighter, if one of the two powers were attacked by another force, the Turks were given permission to fortify the border on the southern side of the Balkan Mountains for necessary security. Hungary if France declared war against either. IP σας να Îχει χϕησιμοποιηθεί για παϕάβαση των κανονισμών ασφάλειας του εξυπηϕετητή στο παϕελθόν.