Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality
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THE CODE of the PLATFORM Abbey Stemler* Joshua E
THE CODE OF THE PLATFORM Abbey Stemler* Joshua E. Perry** Todd Haugh*** * Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business; Consultant, World Bank Group; Affiliate, Ostrom Workshop. ** Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics and Glaubinger Chair for Undergraduate Leadership, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business. *** Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business; Board Member, the Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics and American Institutions; Supreme Court Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States. The authors would like to thank Harvard Law School’s Berkman Klein Center and the World Bank Group’s Macroeconomics, Trade & Investment Climate division, as well as participants of the University of Pennsylvania Law School’s conference on the Harmonization of Business Law, the Northeast Privacy Scholars Workshop at Fordham University School of Law, and the Law and Ethics of Big Data colloquium at Babson College, for helpful comments on early drafts. THE CODE OF THE PLATFORM Abstract Digital platform-based businesses such as Uber, eBay, and Google have become ubiquitous in our daily lives. They have done so by expertly harnessing technology to bring supply and demand side users together for commercial and social exchange. Users are happy to let these platform companies play “matchmaker” because transaction costs are lowered—it is easier to find or give a ride, buy or sell a product, or obtain almost any kind of information than ever before—and platforms are happy to be at the center of the exchange, taking advantage of network effects to grow wildly successful. -
GOOGLE ADVERTISING TOOLS (FORMERLY DOUBLECLICK) OVERVIEW Last Updated October 1, 2019
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The Code of the Platform
THE CODE OF THE PLATFORM Abbey Stemler* Joshua E. Perry** Todd Haugh*** Digital platform-based businesses such as Uber, eBay, and Google have become ubiquitous in our daily lives. They have done so by expertly harnessing technology to bring supply- and demand-side users together for commercial and social exchange. Users are happy to let these platform companies play “matchmaker” because transaction costs are lowered—it is easier to find or give a ride, buy or sell a product, or obtain almost any kind of information than ever before— and platforms are happy to be at the center of the exchange, taking advantage of network effects to become wildly successful. Despite the success of these platforms, however, there is an increasing unease with the methods that platforms use to sustain their multi-sided markets—namely, users question whether they are being manipulated by some of their favorite companies. This Article offers a first-of-its kind analysis into both the legality and ethicality of platform companies, specifically their use of technologically enhanced * Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business; Faculty Associate, Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University; Consultant, World Bank Group; Affiliate, Ostrom Workshop. ** Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics and Glaubinger Chair for Undergraduate Leadership, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business. *** Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business; Board Member, the Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics and American Institutions; Supreme Court Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States. The authors would like to thank the University of Pennsylvania Law School’s conference on the Harmonization of Business Law, the Northeast Privacy Scholars Workshop at Fordham University School of Law, and the Law and Ethics of Big Data colloquium at Babson College for helpful comments on early drafts of this Article. -
The FCC Is Involved in a Never Ending Fight to Ensure Net Neutrality As a Law Volume 1 (2) 2015
The FCC is Involved in a Never Ending Fight to Ensure Net Neutrality as a Law Volume 1 (2) 2015 Fast Lanes without Slow Lanes: The FCC is Involved in a Never Ending Fight to Ensure Net Neutrality as a Law Matthew C. Quattrochi* 1. Introduction The overall purpose of this work is to discuss the current state of net neutrality. Given Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) Chairman Tom Wheeler’s most recent proposal to pass net neutrality into law, net neutrality is ripe for discussion.1 The court ruling striking down the infrastructure of the Open Internet Order in Verizon v. F.C.C., and the devaluation of Title I regulatory authority exhibited in the decision made in Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C. bring about an appropriate point to stop and reflect concerning the options the FCC has to instill net neutrality regulation.2 Part II of this work will be dedicated to explaining net neutrality and addressing the overall question of whether net neutrality needs to be enacted into law. Part III will be dedicated to discussing Verizon v. F.C.C. and Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C. as well as other applicable case law concerning net neutrality violations. Part IV will address FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler’s most recent net neutrality proposal, now law. Part V will consider the authoritative options that the FCC has in regulating net neutrality violations. * Matthew C. Quattrochi is a 3rd Year law student at Barry Law School in Orlando Florida. He is an Orlando Chapter Attorney Liaison and the member of American Constitution Society. -
Google Overview Created by Phil Wane
Google Overview Created by Phil Wane PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. See http://code.pediapress.com/ for more information. PDF generated at: Tue, 30 Nov 2010 15:03:55 UTC Contents Articles Google 1 Criticism of Google 20 AdWords 33 AdSense 39 List of Google products 44 Blogger (service) 60 Google Earth 64 YouTube 85 Web search engine 99 User:Moonglum/ITEC30011 105 References Article Sources and Contributors 106 Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 112 Article Licenses License 114 Google 1 Google [1] [2] Type Public (NASDAQ: GOOG , FWB: GGQ1 ) Industry Internet, Computer software [3] [4] Founded Menlo Park, California (September 4, 1998) Founder(s) Sergey M. Brin Lawrence E. Page Headquarters 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, California, United States Area served Worldwide Key people Eric E. Schmidt (Chairman & CEO) Sergey M. Brin (Technology President) Lawrence E. Page (Products President) Products See list of Google products. [5] [6] Revenue US$23.651 billion (2009) [5] [6] Operating income US$8.312 billion (2009) [5] [6] Profit US$6.520 billion (2009) [5] [6] Total assets US$40.497 billion (2009) [6] Total equity US$36.004 billion (2009) [7] Employees 23,331 (2010) Subsidiaries YouTube, DoubleClick, On2 Technologies, GrandCentral, Picnik, Aardvark, AdMob [8] Website Google.com Google Inc. is a multinational public corporation invested in Internet search, cloud computing, and advertising technologies. Google hosts and develops a number of Internet-based services and products,[9] and generates profit primarily from advertising through its AdWords program.[5] [10] The company was founded by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, often dubbed the "Google Guys",[11] [12] [13] while the two were attending Stanford University as Ph.D. -
Revisiting Search Engine Bias Eric Goldman Santa Clara University School of Law, [email protected]
Santa Clara Law Santa Clara Law Digital Commons Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2011 Revisiting Search Engine Bias Eric Goldman Santa Clara University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 96 (2011-2012) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. REVISITING SEARCH ENGINE BIAS † Eric Goldman I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 96 II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST HALF-DOZEN YEARS .................. 97 A. Google Rolled Up the Keyword Search Market but Faces Other New Competitors ........................................................ 97 B. Google’s Search Results Page Has Gotten More Complicated ...................................................................... 102 C. Google’s Portalization ........................................................ 103 D. “Net Neutrality” and “Search Neutrality” ........................... 105 III. THE END OF RATIONAL DISCUSSION ABOUT SEARCH ENGINE BIAS........................................................................... 107 I. INTRODUCTION Questions about search engine bias have percolated in the academic literature for over a decade. In the past few years, the issue has evolved from a quiet academic debate to a full blown regulatory and litigation frenzy. At the center of this maelstrom is Google, the dominant market player. This Essay looks at changes in the industry and political environment over the past half-dozen years that have contributed to the current situation,1 and supplements my prior contribution to † Associate Professor and Director, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University School of Law. -
Collection of Business Videos (April 2021)
COLLECTION OF BUSINESS VIDEOS (APRIL 2021) Check out my Twitter/Instagram for my favorite video extracts and updates to this list https://twitter.com/DanielNHaddad https://www.instagram.com/DanielNHaddad/ E: [email protected] www.victoricapital.com Favorites of this update Disney CEO Robert Iger talks with Oprah Winfrey about his life and career at Disney https://youtu.be/OS4y0giPVaE All about SEMICONDUCTORS | A special episode of The Knowledge Project https://youtu.be/r6NUO_bymuA Alex Danco - Shopify: The E-commerce On-Ramp https://www.joincolossus.com/episodes/85946038/danco-shopify- the-e-commerce-on-ramp?tab=blocks Trillions of Questions, No Easy Answers: A (home) movie about how Google Search works https://youtu.be/tFq6Q_muwG0 Today’s Economy and Its Discontents, N. Gregory Mankiw https://youtu.be/bhn3ZFC0Dj0 Os Pregões que fizeram história: #4 - Câmbio flutuante https://open.spotify.com/episode/64SP5qEONw8eL7w1zyhtWD?si=to3G8tGKRLuB7NCA1whVHg Honestidade Intelectual - Marcos Lisboa https://youtu.be/eObvz0w2o3w Family Centers’ Titan Series Event with Stephen Mandel https://vimeo.com/493377247 Warren Buffett & Charlie Munger - How To Read Annual Reports https://youtu.be/BQHILdryQ_o [PT] Investindo no Brasil do Futuro: Valuations na Era da Tecnologia https://youtu.be/SPMUp1Y3iZY Ajay Agrawal - Power and Prediction https://youtu.be/n0cRKjbvjIc FINO 50 ANOS | Uma vida dedicada ao esporte https://youtu.be/7h6NGML2qYA FAVORITES BY TOPIC (also included in the Full list) Business people Entrevista Jorge Paulo Lemann - Movimento -
Before Google: a Pre-History of Search Engines in Analogue Times ¬ Anton Tantner 122 Society of the Query Reader
The History of Search 121 René König and Miriam Rasch (eds), Society of the Query Reader: Reections on Web Search, Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2014. ISBN: 978-90-818575-8-1. Before Google: A Pre-History of Search Engines in Analogue Times ¬ Anton Tantner 122 Society of the Query Reader Before Google: A Pre-History of Search Engines in Analogue Times1 ¬ Anton Tantner Googling – that is, searching the internet using the Google search engine, which was developed in 19972 – is by now taken so much for granted that resources for search- ing and finding used before Google seem outdated, whether they are library catalogs on index cards, printed bibliographies, or address and telephone books – as though they belonged to a past age, an age that may be described as the ‘analogue age’ in the future. On various occasions over the last few years, research has tried to consider past in- formation technologies as precursors of the digital age. Technologies facilitating the location of information within early modern books, card catalogs, servants, and even popular German television series such as Robert Lembke’s Was bin ich? or Eduard Zimmermann’s Aktenzeichen XY, have been described as part of the prehistory of computers.3 In my habilitation treatise on intelligence or registry offices, I attempted to describe these institutions as pre-modern search engines. These offices were in- creasingly established in major European cities from the 17th century onwards; they brokered information, but also all too often served as watchdogs.4 In an overview article and in a collection edited with Thomas Brandstetter and Thomas Hübel in 1. -
Network Neutrality: a Thematic Analysis of Policy Perspectives Across the Globe
© 2010, Global Media Journal -- Canadian Edition Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 75-86 ISSN: 1918-5901 (English) -- ISSN: 1918-591X (Français) Network Neutrality: A Thematic Analysis of Policy Perspectives Across the Globe A Policy Review by Christine M. Stover Oakland University, United States This policy review looks at four types of Internet traffic management policies across the globe: legal regulation, transparency, non-neutrality, and government control. Each of these has been employed to varying degrees by states to addressing the growing concern about “network neutrality”. Policymakers have used the term “network neutrality” to refer to a variety of perspectives about whether or not openness is a “fundamental” aspect of the Internet. This issue has been hotly debated across the globe as policymakers have sought to create appropriate Internet policies within their countries. In essence, policy makers must decide whether to keep the Internet “open” through regulation that would restrict Internet Service Providers (ISPs) from deciding the speed of service based upon content or financial interest. This review will provide a general summary of network neutrality and the concerns raised from different perspectives on the issue. Moreover, this review will present a thematic analysis of current policy positions from countries in North America, Europe, Australia and Asia to demonstrate the variety of approaches governments may take in developing network neutrality policies. From this analysis, four thematic positions are clear: legal regulation, transparency, non-neutrality, and government control. Background: What is Network Neutrality, and Why does it Matter? Network neutrality is a concept that suggests ISPs or other user access networks should not advocate restrictions or regulations on content, specific Internet sites, or Internet platforms. -
Non-Network Barriers to Network Neutrality
Fordham Law Review Volume 78 Issue 6 Article 6 2010 Non-Network Barriers to Network Neutrality Mark R. Patterson Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Mark R. Patterson, Non-Network Barriers to Network Neutrality, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2843 (2010). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss6/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Non-Network Barriers to Network Neutrality Cover Page Footnote Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Mark Riley for valuable research assistance. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss6/6 NON-NETWORK BARRIERS TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY Mark R. Patterson* INTRODUCTION From outside the cyberlaw community, "network neutrality" can seem a shibboleth. The concept receives a great deal of attention, but its central importance is not obvious, at least to outsiders. On the contrary, it seems narrow and technical: "Network neutrality is best defined as a network design principle. The idea is that a maximally useful public information network aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally." 2 For most users, who operate beyond these "network design principles," legal and practical considerations make the Internet non-neutral in a number of respects. -
Technology Giants the “Moligopoly” Hypothesis and Holistic Competition
Work in progress, 20 October 2016. TECHNOLOGY GIANTS, THE “MOLIGOPOLY” HYPOTHESIS AND HOLISTIC COMPETITION: A PRIMER Nicolas Petit* INTRODUCTION This paper originates from a disconnect. On the one hand, technology pundits daily describe the information and communications technologies giants (the “technology giants” or the “tech giants”) as oligopoly firms at war with each other. In 2012, Farhad Manjoo wrote in Fast Company a column entitled “The Great Tech War of 2012: Apple, Facebook, Google, and Amazon Battle for the Future of the Innovation Economy”.1 A year later, Manjoo inaugured in Slate a fictional dialogue with Matt Yglesias entitled “WarGames: Google vs. Apple” with the following sub-narrative “what would happen if the world’s two great powers went to (actual) war”.2 Their fictional conversation closed with Microsoft Bing becoming the default search engine in the US. On the other hand, antitrust lawyers and economists tend to classify the technology giants as entrenched monopolists, shielded from competition. In 2010, Columbia Law School Professor Tim Wu concluded an op-ed titled “In the Grip of the New Monopolists” in the Wall Street Journal with the following statement “let's not pretend that we live in anything but an age of monopolies”.3 Since then, not a year has passed without a major antitrust jurisdiction levelling monopolization concerns against companies like Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple or Facebook (hereafter, “GAFAM”).4 * Professor, University of Liege (ULg), Belgium. [email protected]. This study has benefited from no funding. I wish to express my gratitude to Jorge Marcos Ramos for excellent research assistance. -
Ad Tech and the News
Ad Tech and the News Background on the rise of surveillance advertising and its effects on journalism By Matt Stoller A PART OF THE OPEN MARKETS INSTITUTE 1 1 Contents Introduction ........................................................................................... 3 I. The American Tradition of Advertising-Supported Journalism ............ 4 Early Internet Advertising ............................................................................ 6 The Rise of AdTech ....................................................................................... 8 II. The Rise of Google ........................................................................... 11 Applied Semantics and AdSense ................................................................ 12 Google Acquires Its Way to Dominance .................................................... 13 Leveraging Android Into Mobile Search Domiance ................................... 16 Taking the Measure of Google's Dominance ............................................. 16 III. The Rise of Facebook ...................................................................... 20 Early Business Model Choice ..................................................................... 21 Colonizing The Web: Like and Share Buttons ............................................ 24 Mobile Ad Strategy .................................................................................... 25 Cementing Mobile Dominance Through Acquisitions ............................... 28 Taking the Measure of Facebook's Dominance