62 | The Secret Doctrine and the Gigantomachia: Interpreting Plato’s Theaetetus-Sophist PAUL DIRADO | 63
Though Cephalus first introduces the topic Cephalus, the Myth of justice in the Republic, he departs from the of Er, and Remaining conversation before he can hear the fruits of his initial conversation with Socrates.1 His absence Virtuous in Unvirtuous raises the question of the value of philosophical Times study for those who are virtuous by convention without philosophy. Let us assume that Plato holds that Cephalus’ departure from the con- versation is an error, and that he would have benefited from taking part in a philosophical analysis of justice. Depending on how the rea- der interprets Plato’s presentation of Cephalus, he is either a habitually just person who has a Paul DiRado good character or a civically just person who University of Kentucky at least acts externally in accordance with [email protected] conventional standards. It is not immediately obvious how a philosophical consideration of the nature of justice would benefit a person virtuous in either of these two ways. The di- fficulty reemerges in the context of the Myth of Er. In that mythic context, Socrates argues that those who live in accordance with virtue ABSTRACT unsupported by philosophy are in the grea- test danger with respect to choosing their next Through a reading of the Myth of Er and Soc- life, and that careful attention to philosophi- rates’ conversation with Cephalus, I will argue cal study is a helpful way of avoiding the dark that merely conventional virtue is highly unstable fate of choosing an unjust future life. In this and unreliable. Virtue acquired by convention context, it again fails to become immediately proves foundationless outside the confines obvious why a soul will be benefited from the of the political regime that establishes those study of philosophy, particularly outside of the conventions, and a tendency toward an unre- immediate mythic context of the story. The flective moral complacency on the part of the puzzle becomes even more perplexing in refe- conventionally virtuous leaves them in particular rence to other comments that Socrates makes danger of committing unjust actions. Socrates throughout the dialogue about the difficulty recommends the study of philosophy because it and danger of philosophical study outside of can ground conventionally acquired virtue and, the kallipolis. even more importantly, because it is capable of In this paper, I will argue that Plato pro- shaking the moral complacency that afflicts the poses that undergoing the Socratic elenchus is conventionally virtuous. beneficial for all citizens, even for those who are already conventionally virtuous and des- Keywords: Republic, conventional virtue, Ceph- pite its many dangers. After a careful study of alus, Myth of Er, ancient political philosophy, Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus and his relation between convention and philosophy
http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_14_5 64 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 65
presentation of the Myth of Er, it will beco- interpretations of Cephalus’ virtuousness—it is me clear that Plato holds that virtue acquired apparent that philosophy plays little to no role without the practice of philosophy is highly in the acquisition of virtue for Cephalus. Con- unstable and unreliable. Rooted fundamentally vention—including both the laws of the city in nomos (custom or law), both habitual and and religious authority—tells human beings civic virtue remain at the mercy of the regime which actions are virtuous, and which actions in which individuals find themselves. Outside are not. Insofar as Cephalus’ primary concern the confines of that regime and the nomos that is to act justly, he seems to see effectively no governs it, such as in the afterlife in the Myth use for a philosophical discussion of what the of Er or in the very concrete circumstance of virtues themselves are, or of what the justice political upheaval and tyranny like the reign is. Nowhere is this orientation more evident of the Thirty, conventional virtue will prove than at the end of his appearance in Republic, foundationless, and the individual will have where Cephalus returns to his conventionally no framework to orient decision making. Even mandated sacrifices to the gods rather than stay worse, a tendency toward a certain sort of mo- to hear an extended discussion of what justice ral complacency or laziness on the part of the is. In this section, I will discuss two ways of conventionally virtuous actually leave them interpreting Cephalus’ character on the basis worse off with respect to these extra-conven- of his speech, and show how on either inter- tional situations than others within the regi- pretation Cephalus fundamentally relies upon me. In the myth, Plato ultimately advocates a conventional understanding of the virtues the study of philosophy because it can grou- that is resistant to elenchic questioning. In the nd conventionally rooted virtue in something next section, I will then discuss the specifics of more secure than convention and, even more Cephalus’ speech in greater detail. importantly, because it is capable of shaking Cephalus’ speech has three main stages. the moral complacency that afflicts the merely First, he argues that old age is, in itself, a bles- conventionally virtuous. sing insofar as it lessens the tyrannical desires of youth. Those who find it odious, he contends, do so because they possess poorly formed and 1: CEPHALUS’ RELATIONSHIP disorderly characters and so are unwilling to TO PHILOSOPHY AND TO let go of desires that a virtuous person would be CONVENTION happy to be abandon. Second, Cephalus argues against the thesis that it is his wealth, and not I will begin by considering the conversation his virtuous character, that allows him to wi- between Socrates and Cephalus concerning the thstand the loss of his youthful desires as well nature of old age and the importance of vir- as he has. Finally, Cephalus argues that wealth tue—particularly justice—for withstanding is still valuable to the virtuous person insofar as old age well. In this conversation, Cephalus it promotes justice by allowing the virtuous to shows himself to possess a kind of conventional pay off old debts and to avoid unintentionally virtue that is rooted in obeying various sorts lying or cheating anyone on account of poverty. of conventional norms. However this virtue In this way, he argues, the virtuous person who should be understood—and as I will argue possesses some means can avoid going to the below, the text admits of at least two plausible afterlife in fear. Socrates then attempts to con- 64 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 65
sider the nature of justice with Cephalus—in of the afterlife—and who is only concerned particular, he wants to know whether or not with the appearance of justice. Many—perhaps justice fundamentally consists in paying off even most—commentators read Cephalus in debts—at which point Cephalus departs from this more dismissive light. Such commentators the conversation. tend to read Plato’s portrayal of Cephalus as Though there are a number of different indicating someone who is generally shallow ways Cephalus’ speech gets interpreted by and someone who is far less concerned with commentators, most take one of two general virtue than he presents himself as being to approaches. Some hold that Cephalus is what I Socrates. Variations of this sort of interpreta- will call habitually virtuous—that he is a per- tion are found, for example, in Schleiermacher, son who has habitually internalized the norms White, and Annas.5 of his society concerning what is just and unjust I will not here attempt to decide between and so generally behaves in accordance with these two interpretation of Cephalus. Both rea- those norms because of the way this interna- dings can appeal to textual support, as I will lization of the norms has shaped his desires. discuss in the following, and Socrates himself On this interpretation, Cephalus’ self-presen- raises and leaves open the question of whether tation is basically correct: he is a man of good or not Cephalus’ self-assessment is accurate. character who withstands his old age relatively Indeed, it is possible that Plato intended whe- easily on account of his virtue. Examples of this ther Cephalus is describing his own character reading are found, for instance, in Beversluis honestly to be ambiguous so that he could in- and McKee, who both argue that Cephalus is troduce both habitual and civic virtue into the unfairly treated by the roughness of Socrates’ dialogue with one character. My focus will be questioning.2 Though neither read Cephalus on how either interpretation of Cephalus’ spee- as positively as McKee, weaker versions of this ch and character reveals a tension between con- general approach are also found in Taylor and ventionally acquired virtue and philosophical Reeve.3 virtue. Both habitual and civic virtue remain Others hold that Cephalus is a person who unphilosophical and are instances of what I will is at best a latecomer to virtuous behavior. call conventional virtue. In either case, what is Cephalus is newly attempting to reform his responsible for the virtuous behaviors demons- life on account of newfound fears about what trated by the individual is the nomos of the re- awaits him in the afterlife as a result of a life- gime and society in which the individual finds time of wrongdoing.4 On this interpretation, him or herself. The habitually virtuous person Cephalus would only display what I will call internalizes this nomos, and does not want to civic or external virtue—he acts justly not by violate it, whereas the civically virtuous person desire but on the basis of external compulsion, only outwardly manifests virtuous behavior as and his publically virtuous deeds and spee- established by nomos while secretly desiring ches are only an appearance that hides a cor- to be unjust. In both cases, however, nomos rupt character that really desires to do unjust determines what seems just to the individual, things. He would therefore be a person of the and not philosophy or ethical knowledge. What sort described by Glaucon and Adeimantus in benefit a philosophical analysis of virtue has Book 2, who only acts virtuously on account of to offer to both the habitually and the civically external compulsion—in Cephalus’ case, fear virtuous person, whichever Cephalus himself 66 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 67
is taken to represent, is made problematic by -respected in the community for not cheating, his departure from the conversation. How does lying, or failing to pay off debts. Even if he is the philosophical analysis of virtue benefit the merely acting just to avoid future punishment, individual who does in fact behave virtuously Cephalus nevertheless acts justly by imitating conventionally?6 the conventionally regulated standards gover- ning what a good businessperson should do. His disinterest in philosophy stems from a 2: CEPHALUS’ SPEECH: ON WHY confidence that these conventional standards IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE of justice have taught him all he needs to know TO RECOGNIZE JUSTICE concerning the just and the unjust. Cephalus’ financial orientation shows itself In his speech, Cephalus both introduces the in the way that Cephalus thinks of old age as idea of justice and, implicitly, argues that one supplying him with a net profit: the cost of old of the most important skills a human being can age—the diminishment of certain pleasures— possess is the ability to recognize just and un- does not offset the benefits of old age—freedom just actions. As a result, his utter disinterest in from certain desires and freedom for cultiva- the Socratic project of interrogating the nature ting new kinds of pleasure. He begins his spee- of justice itself becomes all the more urgent and ch by volunteering that “I want you to know problematic. Three basic issues lead Cephalus that as the other pleasures, those connected to argue for the importance of justice in his with the body, wither away in me, the desires speech: (1) the way in which old age modifies and pleasures that have to do with logos grow the desires of the elderly, (2) the role of money the more” (Rep. I 328 d 2-4).7 While old age is in a virtuous life, and (3) a consideration of responsible for the loss of certain pleasures, it what a person should anticipate following his or also brings about the gain of new ones, such as her own death. Cephalus argues that old age has the pleasures of logos. Conversely, it also frees brought him a sort of peace that he was inca- the old person from the desire for those bo- pable of finding while under tyrannical rule of dily pleasures that are so compulsive in youth. certain violent passions, but it has also brought Cephalus’ describes his friends as finding the profound fears about what awaits him in death. waning of bodily pleasures a great hardship To mitigate these fears, Cephalus finds the just and something that makes old age practically use of money invaluable—by paying off any inhuman, a living death. In contrast, Cephalus preexisting debts to men or gods, Cephalus can finds himself agreeing with Sophocles, who assure himself of tranquility in any afterlife and once was asked: so enjoy his remaining years in peace. Justice is therefore invaluable for a happy life: the just “Sophocles, how are you in sex? Can you person will be able to calculate how to avoid still have intercourse with a woman?” “Si- actions that will lead to punishment and how lence man,” he said. “Most joyfully did I to make restitution for any injustices that are escape it, as though I had run away from committed. Cephalus’ basic intuitions about a sort of frenzied and savage master.” I justice come from conventions pertaining to thought at the time that he had spoken economics and business. Cephalus’ model of a well and I still do. For, in every way old just person is a businessperson, someone well 66 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 67
age brings great peace and freedom from desires in the first place, and would not require such things (Rep. I 329 b 10-c 7). old age as a curative. Conversely, someone who thinks Cephalus is habitually virtuous could Sophocles characterizes the bodily desire argue that he at least seems to have some lon- as fundamentally painful, and thus as some- gstanding sense that despotic bodily desires are thing blissful to escape, and Cephalus agrees. intrinsically unprofitable, and that he presently These sorts of desire are bad in themselves, seems to want to be free from them, unlike and a blessing in disguise of old age is that his cohorts for whom the diminution of the- these passions no longer make a claim to rule. se pleasures makes old age painful. On either Thus, old age brings freedom from the slavery reading, however, Cephalus’ goal remains the of this despotic ruler’s demands. It is, as he same. He wants his old age to be profitable in first presents it, net profitable. the way that he describes. Old age is only profitable in this way, howe- Old age, however, has another hidden cost ver, if one possesses a good character. Cephalus’ that complicates the effort to make it profitable friends do not experience old age as profitable for a person. Cephalus indicates that a new fear on account of their poor character. emerges for the old and threatens the peaceful serenity that old age could otherwise bring. But of these things [the sufferings of old age] […] there is just one cause: not old When a man comes near to the realization age, Socrates, but the character of the that he will be making an end, fear and human beings. If they are orderly and care enter him for things to which he gave content with themselves, even old age is no thought before. The tales told about only moderately troublesome; if they are what is in Hades—that one who has done not, then both age […] and youth alike unjust deeds here must pay the penalty turn out to be hard for that sort (Rep. I there—at which he laughed up to then, 329 d 2-6). now make his soul twist and turn because he fears that they might be true (Rep. I In contrast with his friends, Cephalus pre- 330 d 5-e 2). sents himself as someone with a good character. Unlike them, he is not so immoderate as to This passage marks the first instances of think being deprived of certain bodily pleasu- both justice, dikaiosynē, and of an afterlife res is a great loss. He recognizes the tyrannical myth in the Republic. The particular myths nature of the desire for such pleasures and is to which Cephalus refers all say that the un- capable of enjoying other pleasures, like those just in life are punished in death. Cephalus of logos. At this point, the reader might wonder says that the old turn back to such stories, and whether Cephalus’ self-assessment concerning fears about injustice threaten to make old age this matter can be trusted—indeed, Socrates’ unbearable. response to this speech is to wonder whether Cephalus is being disingenuous. Someone who Now, the man who finds unjust deeds in thinks Cephalus is only civically virtuous could his life often even wakes from his sleep argue that a truly moderate person wouldn’t in a fright as children do, and lives in have such overwhelming and tyrannical bodily anticipation of evil. To the man who is 68 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 69
conscious in himself of no unjust deed, one has accumulated—and to make amends sweet and good hope is ever beside him for any injustice that a person discovers has (Rep. I 330 e 6-331 a 2). been committed. Money, he says, is therefore of some value to the just person who seeks to be Precisely which of these two figures Ce- free of fears concerning injustice, but is of no phalus himself is supposed to represent once use at all to unjust people, who will most likely again hinges upon the overall interpretive use their wealth to commit further injustices: strategy the reader adopts. Cephalus presents “the decent man would not bear old age with himself as the second sort, a person who is poverty very easily, nor would the one who is conscious of no (or at least few) unjust deeds. not a decent sort ever be content with himself A more cynical reader, however, could interpret even if he were wealthy” (Rep. I 330 a 3-6). him as the first sort, someone living in constant Thus, according to Cephalus’ speech one fear of what awaits him in the afterlife and who of the central requirements of the just elderly in his last few years remaining is desperately person is the ability to distinguish between trying to make up for past injustices. Cephalus those actions which are just, and those which certainly acts as if he were at peace with himself are unjust. To discover whether or not he has and his old age during his appearance within committed any unjust deeds, the virtuous per- the dialogue, but there is no definitive way for son “reckons up [analogizetai] his accounts and the reader to know for sure that this appearan- considers whether he has done anything un- ce is not either deliberately or unconsciously just to anyone” (Rep. I 330 e 5). Analogizesthai deceptive. On both interpretations, however, appears very rarely in the Republic. One such acting justly is revealed to be of crucial im- usage, as we shall see, is in a crucial juncture portance to Cephalus. Either Cephalus must in the Myth of Er.9 Cephalus claims that, be- continue to act justly in order to preserve his cause of this newfound importance of afterlife clean conscience, or he must begin to act justly myths, an old man must look back through his in order to make up for a lifetime of wrong- life for injustices. The model here is plainly doing. Only then will his old age—and indeed the conventionally well-respected businessper- his death—be truly profitable. son. Such people are well-respected precisely According to Cephalus, acting justly re- because they successfully keep tabs on their quires some measure of wealth. Despite the wealth—and so avoid promising money they fact that Cephalus is fairly wealthy, however, do not possess—and because they are adept at he is not presented by Plato as possessing a accurately gauging their debts and paying them particularly oligarchic soul.8 He is not presen- off in a timely manner. Money is valuable, Ce- ted as someone who is fanatical about hording phalus holds, precisely because it aids the just money or excessively resistant to spending his man in coming out ahead in his balance sheet. wealth, though he also does not spend frivo- lously (Rep. I 330 b1-10). As a result, Cephalus’ For this I count the possession of mo- orientation toward his wealth is quite properly ney most worth-while, not for any man, instrumental. Wealth is valuable, according to but for the decent and orderly one. The Cephalus, insofar as it ensures that a person possession of money contributes a great is able to both avoid injustices—for instance, deal to not cheating or lying to any man to always be capable of paying off the debts against one’s will, and, moreover, to not 68 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 69
departing for that other place frightened various conventional standards are supposed because one owes some sacrifices to a god to cohere with one another. or money to a human being (Rep. I 331 a 10-b 4). Socrates: Take this case as an example of what I mean: everyone would surely If the well-ordered man has money, he will say that if a man takes weapons from a be able to avoid being forced into situations that friend when the latter is of sound mind, would require cheating or lying.10 Moreover, and the friend demands them back when decent people with money use their wealth to he is mad, one shouldn’t give back such pay off their debts, both to the gods through things, and the man who gave them back sacrifices, and to men through more mundane would not be just, and moreover, one means. The ability to reckon up one’s accounts should not be willing to tell someone in is thus revealed to be of central importance to this state the whole truth. Cephalus. Whether he has lived a moral life in Cephalus: What you say is right (Rep. I the past or not, his task now is to evaluate his 331 c 5-d 1). past and present actions with respect to their justice or injustice—to continue to act justly Socrates here argues that it is better to lie (if he has in the past), and to make amends for and withhold the weapon from the insane any discovered injustices.11 friend, even if normally a just person keeps his or her word and pays debts swiftly. The model Given his speech, the reader should expect of the good businessperson that Cephalus has Cephalus to be quite concerned with the stan- relied upon in discussing just action is poten- dards by which he gauges a particular action tially misleading if applied outside of a finan- just or unjust. If his criteria for distinguishing cial context.13 The convention appropriate in just deeds from unjust ones are mistaken or that arena—that one must always pay off his poorly understood, then he will be incapable or her debts—is not appropriate in the diffe- of “reckoning up” his accounts with any ac- rent arena of friendship, where one “owes” the curacy and in great danger of leaving behind friend more, and in a different way, than one unpaid debts. His condition would be analo- owes a business associate. gous to that of the businessperson who does not However, Socrates does not take himself to know enough mathematics to accurately keep be telling Cephalus something that he does not the books no matter how earnestly he or she already know. Everyone, Socrates says, already attempts to do so. Socrates’ seemingly abrupt agrees that the just friend or family-member transition from what old age is like to what would withhold the sword and the truth in this makes a just action just is not as unprovoked as sort of circumstance, and Cephalus readily many commentators have previously argued.12 agrees. When considering justice with respect The purpose of Socrates’ response is, on my to friendship, Cephalus does not take as his account, to get Cephalus (and the reader) to conventional standard the one appropriate to recognize that Cephalus is relying upon unexa- the businessperson, but rather the one appro- mined conventional standards for determining priate to the friend who should sometimes whether or not an action is just or unjust, and violate the normal requirements of fair treat- that it is not immediately apparent how these ment that one citizen owes to another.14 Using 70 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 71
this different conventional standard, Cephalus Instead, Cephalus prefers to carry out sacrifices is able to again correctly determine what the to the gods, one form of actively paying off just behavior is in this new context. Indeed, one’s debts and thus being just toward the gods everything that we see of Cephalus indicates in accordance with conventional standards.18 that he is capable of shifting back and forth Everything that Plato writes about Cephalus between these different conventional contexts suggests that he is already either habitually vir- as needed, and that he is generally confident tuous—certainly, this is how Cephalus presents in his ability to recognize the virtuous action himself—or at least now in his old age striving in a given situation in this general manner. to act externally virtuous in order to avoid pu- Rather than directly refuting Cephalus, I take nishments in the afterlife. In either case, what it that Socrates is attempting to provoke him value would the philosophical study of virtue into recognize the complexities and various in- offer to a person such as Cephalus? Or, to make consistencies underlying the different conven- the question even more urgent, is Cephalus in tional standards of justice held to be applicable some way harmed as a result of his relying upon in different contexts. So provoked, Cephalus conventional standards of justice—standards would hopefully want to discover philosophi- that admittedly give him correct instructions cally what justice in itself entails in a way that concerning how to behave in normal circums- will explain why it looks different in different tances—and turning away from philosophical contexts.15 accounts of these same matters? However, Cephalus does not respond to this Socratic challenge in the way that Socra- tes would have hoped. Instead, Cephalus po- 3: THE DANGERS OF litely leaves the conversation in the hands of CONVENTIONAL VIRTUE his son Polemarchus. He then departs to tend AND THE MYTH OF ER to the sacrifices he had made before Socrates’ arrival. Plato does not present this departu- The answer to the preceding question su- re as a mere accident, or as a minor dramatic ggested by the rest of the Republic, especially incident. At Rep. I 328 c, Cephalus began his in Book X, is that those who are virtuous by speech by declaring his desire to converse with merely obeying conventional standards (whe- Socrates, and he was perfectly content to do so ther habitually or merely externally) are, despi- until the conversation began to seek non-con- te their virtuous behavior, in great ethical risk ventional justification for why a particular act in certain contexts. Indeed, I will argue that in is just. The contrast between his initial desire some contexts such people are at even greater to converse with Socrates and his abrupt de- risk of damaging their souls than those who parture once the conversation turned to philo- fall short of conventional standards of virtue sophical questions is striking and deliberate.16 without becoming completely vicious. The (ba- Cephalus is presented by Plato as departing sically correct) moral intuitions of the conven- because the conversation turned philosophi- tionally virtuous person only hold insofar as cal. He evidently attaches no special value to these conventional intuitions and standards are acquiring philosophical accounts of the virtues consistently reinforced and re-asserted within separate from the conventional standards by the city that promotes them. They are acquired which they are grasped in different contexts.17 by the conventionally virtuous person through 70 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 71
his or her adherence to nomos. The Republic reasons why Socrates might choose to present suggests, however, that such ethical standards his response to the problems raised by Cephalus can never be fully internalized without also in the form of a myth, and why he does not di- being accompanied by “true speeches” and rectly respond earlier in the dialogue. Finally, I “philosophizing in a healthy way” (Rep. VIII will turn to a direct analysis of how a particular 560 a 6 and Rep. X 619 d 10, respectively). They incident within the myth directly indicates the can therefore be lost if not constantly reinfor- harmfulness of merely conventional virtue in ced, particularly in those who are constantly certain contexts. fighting unnecessary and potentially lawless Plato’s presentation of the Myth of Er at immoderate desires. When the conventionally the end of the dialogue harkens back to the virtuous person is removed from this reinfor- opening conversation between Socrates and cement—either through a regime change, relo- Cephalus in multiple ways. Cephalus is the cation to a new city, or, in the mythic context, first figure in the dialogue to discuss afterlife after 1000 years of walking the easy road of myths at all—it is in the context of such myths, heaven—the conventional standards cease to he indicates, that the elderly fear the coming guide that person’s judgment, and are either of death. Afterlife myths then play a minimal replaced by whatever new standards have be- role in the remainder of dialogue until Socrates come conventional, or by whatever appetites presents the Myth of Er. Additionally, the lan- were being suppressed by the old conventions. guage Socrates uses to frame his introduction All that remains of the conventionally virtuous of the myth directly refers back to Cephalus’ person’s virtue is the self-confidence and sel- main concern—the repaying of debts. Socrates f-assurance that he or she is a virtuous per- presents this myth, he says, to repay a debt: son who knows in what virtue consists. Such a person is described by Socrates as morally Well […] they [the rewards earned in life lazy, “unpracticed in labors”, and he says that for justice] are nothing in multitude or such a person tends to impulsively assume that magnitude compared to those that awaits however a situation superficially appears mo- each when dead. And these things should rally to him or her is correct (Rep. X 619 d 3). be heard so that in hearing them each of While this attitude was justified insofar as the these men will have gotten back the full person was fortunate enough to be raised up measure of what the argument owed him in a city with virtuous conventional standards, (Rep. X 614 a 5-8). outside of that good fortune such an individual is susceptible to committing acts of extreme Cephalus understands justice as having an injustice that a more corrupt individuals would instrumental value in the afterlife—the person approach with hesitancy. who possesses it will be able to avoid displea- The context in which Plato most directly sing the gods through unjust acts in life and argues to this effect is in the Myth of Er, though thus will not face punishment in the afterlife. it will be helpful to appeal to earlier passages Socrates agrees with Cephalus that justice does in the Republic in order to help interpret and in fact have a role to play in determining what demythologize the myth. 19 I will first indicate a person faces in the afterlife—or at the very the basic interconnections between the myth least, he believes that it is good for people to and Cephalus’ speech. Next, I will present some believe that their fate in the afterlife will hinge 72 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 73
on the just or unjust actions they committed in adequate for fulfilling the expectations of the life. The argument will not be complete, then, gods and avoiding their punishment. and Socrates will not have paid off his debts If conventional standards are not adequate to the listeners, until he comments about the for avoiding all moral danger, however, then relative merits of these myths, particularly sin- these sorts of myths are poorly structured and ce Cephalus indicates that these sorts of myths do not instill the proper attitude toward the played an important role in inspiring his love study of justice. Given that this is Socrates’ of justice. considered position, a different sort of myth It is in response to this context, I argue, that is required. Such a myth will have to highlight Socrates frames his response to the challenge the moral dangers that would result from fai- raised by Cephalus in the form of a myth, thou- ling to study virtue philosophically while still gh to be sure a myth that can only properly be preserving the sense in which the gods really understood in light of the rest of the dialogue. do reward just deeds (whether supported by Part of Cephalus’ problem is that the myths to philosophy or not) and punish injustice. The which he is beholden do not completely articu- Myth of Er is structured in such a way that it late the advantages of caring about justice, thus perfectly accomplishes both tasks. While the leaving Cephalus with an incomplete view of unjust are still sentenced to punishment in precisely how he should live with respect to jus- this myth —judges decree that the just walk tice in order to avoid the outcome that he fears. a blissful upper realm and the unjust walk a The central problem of the myths that Cephalus lower realm of punishment—these sentences mentions is that they do not attribute any value are not eternal outside the extreme case of the to being capable of discerning just from unjust irredeemably vicious. Each journey lasts 1000 actions once a person has died. While Cephalus years, after which time both those who travel does not indicate precisely to what myths he the upper road and those who are cursed to the is referring, it is apparent from his description lower road come to the Spindle of Necessity. that the sentencing of the gods is absolute: if Each soul must then pick from a multitude of a man is judged unjust, he will suffer for his possible lives, with the order determined by crimes for presumably an eternity in the after- lot. After making a choice, each person is then life. Cephalus’ focus is correspondingly entirely reincarnated after drinking from the river of on this other world—he wishes to avoid this Carelessness and forgetting what has transpi- eternal punishment in the afterlife, and so only red. Given this mythic framing, the punish- cultivates a love of justice insofar as it leads to ments undergone by the unjust souls compel- being judged worthy by the gods. From such led to walk the lower road are fundamentally a perspective, all that would matter would be educative, and not fundamentally vindictive to satisfy the demands of the gods, and the or retributive. This myth therefore inverts ability to discriminate just from unjust actions Cephalus’ initial understanding—justice is is only relevant insofar as it helps a person live not for the sake of avoiding punishment, but in conformity with the laws of the gods—which punishment is itself for the sake of becoming presumably correspond to the laws of the city.20 better at judging what is just and what is unjust. The myths that have influenced Cephalus give The ability to distinguish justice from injustice him no reason for thinking that conventional remains invaluable even outside the context of standards are anything other than completely civic religious life, particularly insofar as the 72 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 73
mythic choice of lives that awaits all those who He was one of those who had come from die falls far outside the conventional context heaven, having lived in an orderly regime of the polis. in his former life, participating in virtue Now that I have shown the narrative con- by habit, without philosophy. And, it may nections between the Myth of Er and Cephalus’ be said, not the least number of those who speech and presented an argument for why So- were caught in such circumstances came crates might want to respond to the challenge from heaven, because they were unpracti- posed by Cephalus’ departure in the form of a ced in labors (Rep. X 619 c 6-d 3). myth, I will now turn to Socrates’ claim within the myth that those who are conventionally Within the context of the myth, those virtuous are in a sort of moral peril. I will first who walk the easy upper road quite literally indicate Socrates’ argument within this mythic are freed from certain kinds of toil and work context, and then attempt to demythologize during their walk.22 As a result, they are des- the argument. Within the myth, Socrates ar- cribed as unpracticed, poorly prepared for the gues that those who gauge what is virtuous difficult labors involved in choosing an entire only by relying upon the conventions of their life. The conventionally virtuous have been society—those who walked the blissful upper long separated from contexts in which they road without studying philosophy—are more were able to exercise their virtue—there are likely to choose their next lives poorly com- presumably no sticky moral difficulties on the pared with those whose virtue was supported upper path, and so no cause to call upon the by philosophy. While this result might not be conventional standards of virtue in decision particularly surprising, his second contention making. It would be entirely natural, then, for is genuinely startling and has troubled many such people to have a diminished capacity to commentators.21 He argues that the conven- remember what those conventional standards tionally just are prone to do an even worse job actually are and to be out of practice in actually of choosing than those who fell short of the employing them in moral decision-making. conventional standards of their society—those Yet it must still be explained why the con- who were forced to walk the painful lower road. ventionally virtuous—those who have lost Within the context of the myth, the rea- their conventional intuitions about virtue due son that the conventionally virtuous are worse to time and the ease of the upper road—do a at choosing their next life is because they are worse job with the choice of lives than tho- “unpracticed in labors.” While presumably the se who did not behave virtuously in the first upper road of heaven does not require extensive place. Socrates’ answer to this question is that labor of any sort, in the context of the myth the journey along the lower path has taught the most relevant sort of “labor” involved in the non-virtuous souls that avoided complete the choice of lives is making concrete moral wickedness to approach moral decisions with determination about which lives are better, and more caution than the conventionally virtuous which are worse. The first person that Socra- do.23 “But most of those who came from the tes describes as choosing a life picks a horrific earth, because they themselves had labored and tyranny. had seen the labor of others, weren’t in a rush to make their choices” (Rep. X 619 d 2-5). Hard experience and punishment has taught those 74 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 75
who walked the path of the earth to approach to reassert themselves. Now what immediate- moral matters with care. They were constantly ly seems best to this particular out-of-prac- confronted with the consequences of poor mo- tice ex-conventionally virtuous person is the ral decision making and so are prone to act life of hedonism, and in making this choice more cautiously and with less confidence in the man elides the full consequences of the their immediate moral inclinations because life that he has chosen. In this regard, those such inclinations served them so poorly in who came from the upper road without the life. In contrast, those who were conventio- study of philosophy are at greater risk for nally virtuous have been taught by life and by damaging themselves through injustice than their reward in the afterlife that they are good the conventionally unjust, who have become judges of what is right and what is wrong, and cautious as a result of punishment for past that their determinations of what is just and injustices. what is unjust will conform with the virtuous Let us now begin demythologizing the myth standards of the polis. Nothing they experience and connecting it to the earlier conversation on the upper road will challenge their basic with Cephalus and other books of the Repu- tendency be self-confident and self-assured in blic.24 The easy-goingness of the conventionally moral matters—indeed, these tendencies will virtuous person can be understood as operative have been reinforced, because there is no need even outside the context of the myth. Conven- to take great care in considering anything on tionally virtuous people only behave virtuou- the upper road. sly by a sort of luck—they happen to be living This tendency toward quick self-confidence in a regime whose conventions more or less will have disastrous consequences, however, reflect virtue.25 That is not to say that there now that the moral intuitions that were instil- nothing praiseworthy in their virtue—a great led through convention in life have atrophied many people live in the same regime and never- through disuse. All that will remain is the ten- theless fail to live in external accordance with dency to rely on an immediate impression of the conventional standards that such societies which life looks best, and such a quick look hold up for virtuous behavior. Insofar as the will—at the very least—miss all sorts of rele- conventionally virtuous rely on pre-given crite- vant details. ria (conventional standards of virtue) in deter- mining what behaviors are virtuous, however, The man who had drawn the first lot they do require the good fortune to live in a came forth and immediately chose the society that sets forward correct standards. In greatest tyranny, and, due to folly and a tyrannical regime, as an example, one might gluttony, chose without having conside- well expect to find very different conventions, red everything adequately; and it escaped perhaps emphasizing slavish subservience to his notice that eating his children and the tyrant as an example of courageous or other evils were fated to be a part of that moderate behavior. Examples of such regimes life (Rep. X 619 b 8-c 2). would include the Greek understanding of the Persians, the reign of the Thirty Tyrants, and Outside of the context of cultivated con- even the reign of a “tyrannical” democratic ventional virtues, all the immoderate desires majority that insists that virtue is gratifying that were suppressed by those habits are able the desires of the majority.26 74 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 75
Cephalus is lucky in this manner—the dards of virtue advanced within a city, once Athens in which he lives contains enough di- such a tyrannical regime seizes power and versity that it does praise behaviors that are ge- institutes new conventions, the conventionally nuinely virtuous, and he has internalized these virtuous person will begin to internalize these standards, particularly those relating to just new, non-virtuous standards of in what vir- businesspersons and Sophoclean moderation, tue consists.31 Indeed, based on the argument to distinguish just from unjust actions.27 He is found in the Myth of Er, they will do so quiet additionally lucky because old age has silenced swiftly and self-confidently, mistakenly assu- many of the despotic immoderate desires that red that they possess the ability to distinguish would strain against the cultivation of these just actions from unjust actions in some relia- civic virtues, and indeed did strain against ble way outside of convention. Such a person them in his youth.28 This waning of desire is will go along with unjust actions just as rea- a bodily accident, not the result of deliberate dily as just actions in a different context, and decision or habituation. Thus, he is fortunate the tyrannical regime has every motivation to have undergone this accident—at the very to reorient its virtuous citizens to vicious or least, it has made his situation easier than it slavish habits.32 My central contention in this otherwise might have been for him. paper is that those who are only conventio- Both sorts of luck are fundamentally un- nally virtuous are in grave moral danger in reliable, however. Just as in the Myth of Er this sort of circumstance—indeed, as per the the dead are tasked with the novel and unpre- Myth of Er, their conventional virtuousness cedented project of choosing an entire life makes them at an even greater moral risk of for themselves, in non-mythic contexts the being persuaded to go along with the crimes conventionally just may well be faced with of the new regime or of reacting horrifically many novel circumstances that do not have in the face of a novel situation. any obvious conventional standard, or cir- Plato alludes to this phenomenon in the cumstances in which the obvious standards Apology when Socrates describes the reign of are actually misleading in a given context the Thirty in Athens following the Pelopon- and will lead to unjust actions.29 Even worse, nesian War. political instability is entirely capable of up- setting what is praised and blamed within a When the oligarchy was established, the city for the worse. Indeed, the historical fates Thirty summoned me to the Hall, along of Cephalus and his sons directly invoke po- with four others, and ordered us to bring litical instability and the decline of a regime Leon from Salamis, that he might be into tyranny and legal injustice. Everything executed. They gave many such orders that Cephalus has built in his life will soon to many people, in order to implicate as be destroyed after his death by the reign of many as possible in their guilt (Apol. 32 the Thirty Tyrants—his son Polemarchus will c 3-d 2).33 be killed along with countless others, and the estate he hoped to leave behind will be seized While Socrates violated the new nomos, by the tyranny.30 Given that the virtue of the most citizens, including many of whom pre- conventionally virtuous relies entirely upon sumably behaved justly under the old regime, their conformity to certain conventional stan- went along with the new regime’s crimes as 76 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 77
a matter of course. Some of the conventio- 4: PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL nally just citizens were likely motivated on INSTABILITY account of a fear of death, and were willing to abandon their old standards of just and An immediate difficulty confronts any in- unjust behavior to avoid it now that their old terpreter of the Republic who wants to argue habits no longer found conventional appro- that everyone, and not just the rare natures val. Others, those who only obeyed the old suitable for becoming philosopher-kings, wou- conventions as a result of an external fear ld potentially be benefited by undergoing the of punishment, were perhaps motivated on Socratic elenchus. Plato’s Socrates spends a account of the promise of the tyrant to satis- great deal of the middle books of the Republic fy immoderate desires that were suppressed arguing that the study of philosophy is dan- by the conventions found in the old regi- gerous and corruptive outside of the confines me but which are now free to rule the soul of the kallipolis, and even within the ideal city unopposed. Even more disturbingly, there its study should be reserved for those exceptio- were probably many who simply were used nal natures capable of mastering the dialectical to doing what they were told and what won study of the Forms, especially the Form of the them praise, and put no thought into the di- Good.34 I do not want to minimize these argu- fference between the virtuous conventions of ments, or the concerns of commentators who the old regime and the vicious conventions struggle to reconcile them with the broader of the new. Socratic elenchic practice found in dialogues What is apparent in all such cases is that the like the Apology. However, I want to argue conventional acquisition of virtue does little to that Books I and X of the Republic at the very prepare those just by convention for actually least complicate the position in the middle of having to choose to live virtuously rather than the dialogue that the Socratic elenchus should viciously once conventional standards are no not be practiced on most people. In this last longer applicable. Indeed, the confidence and section, I will attempt to show that Plato’s So- easygoingness with which the conventionally crates holds that philosophy is the only way of virtuous distinguish virtuous from vicious ac- training oneself to respond morally in contexts tions makes them especially susceptible to mis- in which conventional virtue is of no use, or taken and hasty judgments about such matters. even actively harmful. If this analysis holds, we can see that Cephalus’ I will first return to the mythic context of merely conventional acquisition of virtue is not the Myth of Er. With respect to the choice of morally adequate in those situations in which lives, Socrates says: conventions are either undergoing change (as in a regime change) or unhelpful (as in a novel Now here, my dear Glaucon, is the whole circumstance). What remains is to demonstrate risk for a human being, as it seems. And why Plato thinks that the study of philosophy on this account each of us must, to the can serve as a corrective and helpful supple- neglect of other studies, above all see to ment to conventional virtue with respect to it that he is a seeker and student of the those cases where it is necessary to actually study by which he might be able to learn choose how to live virtuously outside of a con- and find out who will give him the ca- ventional framework. pacity and knowledge to distinguish the 76 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 77
good and the bad life, and so everywhere tionally virtuous person with a stronger and and always choose the better from among more permanent foundation for his or her mo- those that are possible. He will take into ral intuitions. The dialectical philosopher will account [analogizomenon] all the things genuinely understand what the virtues are and we have just mentioned and how in com- the reasons why certain just conventions are bination and separately they affect the held up as desirable within the city. However, virtue of life […] From all this he will be even those who are incapable of attaining the able to draw a conclusion and choose— full heights of dialectic can be benefited by in looking off toward the nature of the discovering true accounts about virtue.35 For soul—between the worse and the better instance, at Rep. VII 532 e-533 a, Socrates des- life, calling worse the one that leads it cribes Glaucon and Adeimantus as being cur- toward becoming more unjust, and better rently incapable of the dialectical science of the the one that leads it to becoming juster philosopher-kings, but they are still benefited (Rep. X 618 b 6-e 2). by the non-dialectical philosophical methods found in the Republic that provide a rational The first thing to note in this passage is account of what the virtues are and correct how strongly it invokes Cephalus’ initial speech justifications of why the life of justice is supe- about the importance of justice. “Taking into rior to the life of injustice.36 Such accounts can account” here is analogizomenon, the same provide a foundation for virtuous behavior that word Cephalus uses to describe the way the is capable of surviving political instability and old man looks back upon his life for injustices adapting to circumstances that lack obvious and unpaid debts. Only whereas Cephalus was conventional standards. Elenchic practice is fundamentally concerned with taking stock therefore potentially beneficial insofar as it is of the justice or injustice of various actions, capable (though by no means assured) of pro- Socrates here advocates taking stock of whole viding a more secure foundation for virtuous ways of life and determining which lives, if beliefs than mere convention and habit alone.37 any, contribute to virtue and thus happiness. However, the study of philosophy is presen- To accomplish this reckoning, Socrates says ted in the myth as providing an even more im- that we must pay careful attention to “all the portant function. The difficulty that those who things we have just mentioned” in the course of are conventionally virtuous face in choosing the Republic, especially including the accounts their next life is not fundamentally that they of the soul, its virtues, and the effects of vice have wrong beliefs about what is virtuous and upon it. Indeed, we must neglect all other stu- what is not, though they well might. Rather, the dies and activities for the sake of pursuing the central problem is that they are morally lazy: ability to discern virtuous lives from lives that self-confident in their virtuousness despite the lack virtue. Conventionally acquired virtue, fact that their virtue is the result of luck instead as we have already seen, is not enough for this of deliberate effort. If their luck changes, by the task. It must therefore be supplemented with rise of a tyranny for instance, such individuals philosophical explorations of virtue and vice. will lose the entire foundation that supported The purpose of the study of philosophy their virtuousness and so be cast adrift with in this context is twofold. First, it is at least nothing but confidence in their own recti- in principle capable of providing the conven- tude. They thus choose to act in accordance 78 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 79
with their basic moral intuitions too quickly. c 4-6). It is quite true that many people who Usually, this haste doesn’t harm them insofar commit terrible crimes would not do so if they as the conventional standards they rely upon had not found themselves in certain bad si- are correct. In contexts where those standards tuations.38 Plato’s argument in the Republic is do not apply or have actively been replaced by that the unjust actions of such people are not new, vicious standards, however, this haste can thereby excused. become morally ruinous. Yet the sudden onset Philosophy therefore has an even more im- of bad luck that overturns virtuous conven- portant task than reinforcing correct beliefs tions does not excuse injustice or ward off the about virtue and vice. It must also awaken a harms of unjust actions. In the Myth of Er, the sense of responsibility and personal care for spokesman of the goddess Lachesis says: virtue within the souls of its practitioners. By encouraging individuals to care about what the Let him who gets the first lot make the virtues are, philosophy encourages them to care first choice of a life to which he will be about the virtues as such: to honor virtue, as the bound by necessity. Virtue is without a goddess commands, rather than merely prac- master, as he honors or dishonors her, ticing virtuous actions. In this context, even each will have more or less of her. The the potentially destabilizing consequences of blame belongs to him who chooses; god the Socratic elenchus has positive as well as is blameless (Rep. X 617 e 2-5). negative value. Even if all the elenchus leaves behind is some small measure of aporia and In the context of the myth, though there is a knowledge of one’s own ignorance, a person in lottery and thus some chance is involved in the such a condition might at the very least slow procedure of choosing lives, there are enough down and approach difficult moral considera- virtuous lives available to souls that everyone tions with care rather haughty self-assurance. has the potential to choose a virtuous life whe- Such an achievement, as Plato presents it, is rever their lot falls. Outside the mythic context, no small advance. Cephalus will not be able to it is clear that Plato holds that virtuous action attain this achievement no matter how many remains possible even in the worst—the most sacrifices he attends to or how many debts he unlucky—circumstances. Socrates personally repays. All such actions will only reinforce his demonstrates this fact by his conduct during feeling of moral achievement. It is therefore the reign of the Thirty. It is possible to disobey correct to hold his departure in error and to the corrupt commands of the tyrant, or to re- assert the value of philosophy even amongst main cautious in the face of novel circumstan- those virtuous by convention. ces. Because the conventionally virtuous are so convinced of their own virtuousness by habit, however, these sorts of people are not descri- WORKS CITED bed by Plato as acknowledging their personal agency in these cases—they instead blame luck Annas 1981: J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Re- and the gods for their unjust deeds: “For he public, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981. [the man who chose the tyranny] didn’t bla- Beversluis 2000: J. Beversluis, Cross Examining Soc- rates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s me himself for the evils but chance, demons, Early Dialogues, Cambridge University Press, and anything rather than himself” (Rep. X 619 Cambridge 2000. 78 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 79
Bloom 1968: A. Bloom, The Republic of Plato, 2nd ed., Arno Press, New York 1973. Basic Books 1968. Steinberger 1996: P. J. Steinberger, ‘Who is Cephalus?’, Cashen 2011: M. Cashen, ‘Cephalus and Euthydemus’, «Political Theory» 24:2 (1996), 172-199. 2011 Meeting of the Ancient Philosophy Society, Taylor 1966: A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, 15 April 2011. Methuen & Co, London 1966. Cooper 1997: J.M. Cooper (ed.) Plato: Complete Works, Thayer 1988: H.S. Thayer,The Myth of Er, «History Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis of Philosophy Quarterly» 5:4 (1988), 369-384. 1997. White 1979: N. White, A Companion to Plato’s Repub- Crane 2015: G. Crane, Perseus Digital Library Proj- lic, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis ect, Tufts University 2015,
4 I am indebted to an anonymous referee of this 7 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the paper, who forcefully and persuasively argued on behalf Republic are those of Allan Bloom in: The Republic, 2nd of this kind of reading of Cephalus. ed., Basic Books 1968. References to the Greek text are 5 Schleiermacher 1836, 353 writes that Ceph- from: Politeia. in Platonis Opera Vol 4, Oxford University alus “is already too far advanced in years” for serious Press 1902
and which unjust. And Cephalus’ discussion of the value allow Socrates to deprive him of them. Cephalus’ inability of money for the just person closely matches the account to defend his views does not call his life into question. offered by Socrates at Euthydemus 278 e-282 b, as Cashen It reveals that his practical ability to be just outstrips 2011 argued in a paper delivered at the 2011 meeting of his theoretical ability to explain justice. Theoretical the Ancient Philosophy Society. In that passage, Socrates inability does not entail moral bankruptcy.” The problem says wealth really is valuable, but only insofar as it is with Beversluis’ reading is that Cephalus’ own account employed rightly. indicates that just behavior requires a kind of calculation 12 Even amongst readers who otherwise greatly concerning which actions are just and which unjust. differ in their reading of Cephalus, there is a widespread Cephalus is content to rely upon conventional standards sense that Socrates is misconstruing Cephalus’ speech, for justice in this calculation. Plato, however, ultimately deliberately or otherwise, as an account of justice in a argues in the Republic that this approach puts a person in way unfair to what Cephalus himself intended. See for a kind of moral danger. instance Schleiermacher 1836, 353, Bloom 1968, 314, 18 McKee 2008, 79 defends Cephalus’ departure Beversluis 2000, 198, and McKee 2008, 70. because modern gerontological studies have determined 13 While Cephalus has not presented a ‘defi- that the elderly “typically have an increased interest in nition’ of justice in his speech that is restricted to only ritual. Seen in this light, Cephalus’ preference for partic- financial matters, later comments from Polemarchus (his ipation in religious rites over philosophical dialectic is son) give some support to the claim that there is a danger natural for his advanced age, not a personal failing.” Even in overlooking non-financial instances of injustice. if this is true, and even if the results of modern empirical Polemarchus is presented as the “heir of the argument” social sciences can fairly be applied to the ancient Greeks, (Rep. I 331 e 1), and as carrying on the conversation in just because something is the case does not mean that it the departed Cephalus’ stead. Polemarchus explicitly ought to be the case. Even if the elderly generally prefer presents justice as a matter of finances, saying that justice religious ritual to philosophy, that does not mean that is primarily useful “in money matters” (Rep. I 333 b 10). they must, or that they ought. The actions of a rather old 14 As an example, think of Amphitryon’s Socrates in the Phaedo and the Crito clearly demonstrate treatment of his son, the insane Heracles, in Euripides’ an example of an elderly person who at the very least Heracles. Amphitryon refuses to tell his son what has makes room for philosophy along with ritual practices. happened—that in a fit of madness, Heracles murdered For McKee to be correct, Cephalus ought to prefer reli- his family—and leaves him bound up against his will gious ritual to philosophy, if not in general then at least until he is sure that Heracles has returned to sanity. in this case. And the Myth of Er strongly indicates that 15 There is nothing unusual in the way that he is not correct to prefer ritual to philosophy, either as a Socrates approaches Cephalus in this regard. For in- young man or an old one. Indeed, interpreting Cephalus stance, Euthyphro first gives examples of pious actions as some sort of paragon of Greek religious life has itself (Euthyphro 5 d), and then is called by Socrates to give a been challenged. Dobbs 1994, 672, for instance, has quite definition Euthyphro( 6 d). Laches and Socrates do the compellingly argued that Cephalus represents a rather same concerning courage (Laches 190d-192 b), and The- shallow and inadequate understanding of pious religious aetetus and Socrates do the same concerning knowledge life, in comparison with both Socrates and even his own (Theaetetus 146 c-d and 148 d). This common Socratic son, Polemarchus. challenge does not necessarily indicate that there is any 19 That there seems to be a connection between problem with the examples his interlocutors employed in the myth and Cephalus’ speech has been remarked first attempting to understand a given concept—Laches, elsewhere in the scholarship. For instance, see instance at the very least, is quite correct to say that soldiers who McKee 2008, 73-75, who argues that Cephalus is the hold their ground on the battlefield in the face of danger exemplar that the hearer of the myth is supposed to emu- are courageous. The fact that courage does not reduce to late, and Bloom 1968, 436 and Steinberger 1996, 194, both this one example does not make it a bad example or does of whom argue that Cephalus’ condition is like that of the not imply that Laches’ moral intuitions about courage are man who chooses the worst tyranny within the myth. incorrect, it only means that his example is not philo- 20 Describing Cephalus, Bloom 1968, 315 writes: sophical. “For Cephalus the just is identical to the law of the city, 16 The contention in Beversluis 2000 that Ceph- and the law is protected by the gods. The problem of alus is ambushed by this unexpected Socratic shift in the justice is simply expressed in his view: if there are no conversation would indicate that Cephalus is not familiar gods, there is no reason to be just or to worry; if there with Socrates and his style of argumentation. This read- are, we must simply obey their laws, for that is what they ing seems at odds with the familiarity between the two wish.” While Cephalus himself never expresses any real that the text seems to suggest. skeptical doubts about the existence of the gods, Bloom’s 17 Beversluis 2000, 200-201 defends Cephalus’ reading here seems basically correct, if the “law” in departure on the grounds that acting justly is a practical question is not interpreted strictly as the written laws of and not theoretical concern: “his fundamental decency the city but rather as the broad nomos, both written and and resultant contentment and tranquility of mind are unwritten, that governs the intuitions of the citizens. This the hard-earned fruits of a lifetime, and Plato does not qualification is necessary, as Cephalus is more than will- 82 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 83
ing to agree with Socrates that the written laws govern- standards of virtuous behavior—for instance, parts of the ing economic exchanges might be unjust under certain city would praise and part would condemn the example circumstances, like if you promised your insane friend a of the tyrant. Indeed, the same person in such a city could sword. Still, what motivates Cephalus in agreeing that the plausibly both envy and condemn a tyrant at different return of the sword under these conditions is unjust is the times and in different contexts. conventional attitudes of the Athenians, and so can still 28 In terms of descriptions of the various kinds be characterized as nomos. of souls in Book VIII, Cephalus therefore most resembles 21 See for instance Halliwell 2007, 451-452, 465- the fortunate democratic-souled person. “Then, I sup- 466. pose that afterward such a man [the democratic souled 22 Socrates spends little time talking about person in whom unnecessary and useless pleasures have precisely in what this journey consists, other than that emerged] lives spending no more money, effort, and time it involves witnessing beautiful sights, at Rep. X 615 a. on the necessary than on the unnecessary pleasures. That the path is free of toil, however, is implied by his However, if he has good luck and if his frenzy does not comments in this passage. go beyond bounds—and if, also, as a result of getting 23 Souls that fall prey to extreme, irredeemable somewhat older and the great disturbances having viciousness and wickedness are trapped in the lower passed by, he readmits a part of the exiles [oligarchic realm and doomed to eternal torment, as it says at Rep. X desires for moderation and financial justice] and doesn’t 615 c-616 a. The myth does not directly address how such give himself wholly over to the invaders [immoderate people would do in choosing their next lives, insofar as unnecessary pleasures]” (Rep. VIII 561 a 4-b 2). This sort they are not allowed to make the choice either way. One of democratic-souled person is described as fundamen- presumes, though, that they would do far worse than the tally flighty, and drifts back and forth between imitating conventionally virtuous, who are described as making whatever exemplary figures strike his or her fancy: “… bad choices by carelessness rather than deliberately. and if he ever admires soldiers, he turns in that direction 24 See also Thayer 1988, 370, who similarly reads [i.e. toward cultivating courage]; and if its money-makers, the myth as illustrating what occurs in concrete moral in that one [i.e. toward cultivating moderation and justice deliberation. “I believe that one purpose of Plato’s myth is understood in terms of financial standards]” Rep( . VIII to illuminate these two aspects of choice in any and every 561 d 5-6). It is this last figure that Cephalus most fully instance where moral choice occurs. But, of course, the resembles—he is one who admires businesspeople and so examples presented to us in the myth are exceptional and is concerned with making himself like the conventionally the most dramatic that can be imagined: one’s choosing just businessperson in accordance with the conventional to live a certain kind of life. The drama simplifies the standards of the Athenian society in which he currently otherwise complex contingent and incidental factors lives. involved in real choices; the essential features are clarified 29 McCoy 2012, 136 similarly sees the myth as and vivified in the idealized setting.” contrasting the habitual life of virtue with the philosophi- 25 By referring to “luck” in this context, I am cal, and praises the philosophical life as better able to deal attempting to make sense of a passage that I will discuss with novel circumstances in which tradition applies only in greater detail in the last section of the paper: “For he ambiguously. “Habit proves to be insufficient for virtue [the man who chose the tyranny] didn’t blame himself for insofar as the future presents us continually with novel the evils but chance, demons, and anything rather than situations… Socrates himself navigates these novel situa- himself” (Rep. X 619 c 4-6). As I am reading this passage, tions remarkably well. In the Apology, he offers the jurors the conventionally virtuous person has it backwards—it examples of two different situations in which he chose a is not luck that caused him to choose poorly in this spe- just act rather than an unjust one.” Her account agrees cific context, but rather luck that allowed him to choose with the one I am advancing insofar as it emphasizes that well in his earlier life and in other contexts—the conven- philosophical virtue is the only secure foundation for tions in those contexts that he was raised accidentally moral life. Habitual attitudes toward justice and injustice happened to guide him correctly. will always encounter some circumstances in which it 26 See for instance Rep. VIII 558 b 8-c 2: “How will not be immediately obvious what action is best. magnificently [such a city] tramples all this underfoot 30 See Nails 2002, 84-85, 190-194, 251 for a and doesn’t care at all from what kind of practices a man discussion of the life of Cephalus and his family. goes to political action, but honors him if only he says he’s 31 Plato advances a similar argument in the well disposed toward the multitude.” For other dialogues Laws. The Athenian argues that a tyrannical regime will where Socrates raises similar points, see also Gorg. 513 a-c be able to change the habits of its citizens far more easily and Apol. 32 b-c. than in any other owing to its unique capacity to provide 27 To be sure, however, Athens holds incorrect an exemplar for the citizens to follow in the person of the standards of virtuous behavior as well. Democratic tyrant and the ability to mix persuasion with unre- regimes are described in Republic VIII as containing strained violence. “Athenian: You’d see that if a tyrant a plurality of different regimes within themselves on wishes to change a city’s habitual ways, he doesn’t need to account of their diversity and freedom, as said at Rep. exert great effort or spend an enormous amount of time… VIII 557 d. It therefore would contain contradictory He need only first trace out a model in his own conduct of 82 | Cephalus, the Myth of Er, and Remaining Virtuous in Unvirtuous Times PAUL DIRADO | 83
all that is to be done, praising and honoring some things most people. There is a real tension between the discus- while assigning blame to others, and casting dishonor on sion of the usefulness of philosophy in Book VII and in anyone who disobeys in each of the activities. Kleinias: Book X that cannot be easily swept aside. All I am argu- And why do we suppose that the other citizens will swift- ing here is that Book X does have a use for philosophy ly follow someone who has adopted such a combination that would benefit the conventionally virtuous person in of persuasion and violence? Ath: Let no one persuade us, some circumstances, even if it could also be dangerous to friends, that there will ever be a quicker or easier way for such a person in other contexts. a city to change its laws than through the hegemony of 38 Ogihara 2011, 10 also emphasizes the way in all-powerful rulers” (Laws IV 711 b 2-c 3). Unless other- which the myth is intended to inspire personal responsi- wise noted, all translations of the Laws are from Pangle bility in its listeners. “However, some individuals strike 1988. us as being victims of bad luck, such as a very ill person, 32 In discussing Republic VI, White 1979, 168 and someone who is given the chance to be a tyrant and sees Plato making an argument similar to mine. Philo- who takes the chance and becomes miserable in the end. sophical natures are corrupted outside of the kallipolis, Such cases might lead us to think that luck exercises on White’s reading, because “The potential philosopher decisive power over human destiny… The implication is misled into following the multitude in its view of the of the myth that at least some of our misfortunes, which good, and in expending his energies in an attempt to may look to happen by bad luck, are really a result of please it.” As White argues here, conventional attitudes our choice has the effect of preventing us from being compel those not liberated by philosophy into going impressed too much by the power of luck.” along with whatever the conventional understanding of justice and injustice is operative in the city. 33 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Apology are from the G.M.A. Grube translation in Cooper 1997. 34 For a particularly strong recent interpretation of the Republic along these lines, see Lublink 2011, who argues that Plato has joined Socrates’ accusers from the Apology and asserted that Socratic questioning really does harm the young. In response to Lublink, I would point to the already discussed passages from X and the Myth of Er. While Plato does view the elenchic method as dangerous, it is clear from these later passages that the conventional life of virtue is not safer, at least in certain contexts. 35 The distinction between properly dialectical philosophy and the sort of philosophy practiced in the main text of the is best explicated in Miller 2007, 310- 311. Dialectical philosophy is characterized by the way in which it attempts to move beyond imagistic ways of thinking about the Forms and the method of combining and dividing Forms found in dialogues like the , , , and . 36 See for instance VIII 560 b, which describes the corruption of the democratic soul. “I suppose they took the acropolis of the young man’s soul, perceiving that I was empty of fair studies and practices and true speeches, and it’s these that are the best watchmen and guardians in the thought of men whom the gods love.” The conventionally just person engages in (at least some of) the practices that are conducive to preserving virtue, but lacks the fair studies and true speeches that could truly secure their virtue in the face of all challenges. 37 To be sure, Socrates also argues that this kind of philosophy, particularly when practiced by the young, is also capable of having the opposite effect and actually destabilizing conventionally acquired virtuous habits (see especially VII 538 c-539 a). See Lublink 2011, 4-9 for a discussion of this and other relevant passages. It is this passage that leads many commentators to argue that Plato holds in the that philosophy should not be practiced by