Emergency in the forest REPORT ON THE ILLEGAL FELLING OF LUMBER IN NICARAGUA An investigation by the Center for Communication Research (CINCO) in association with the Center for International Policy (CIP) CONTENTS Presentation 2 I. ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE FOREST EMERGENCY 3 . Background: Half a century of ravaging the forest 4 2. The government of Arnoldo Alemán: The time of the “fat cows” 8 3. The forestry sector’s legal and institutional framework: INAFOR’s role 2 4. Forestry activity and foreign demand: The mahogany market 5 5. Bolaños’ emergency, closed season and exports at discretion 2 II. CASE ANALYSES: THE LUMBER COMPANIES’ MODUS OPERANDI 25 . The disaster in the Río Kung Kung 26 2. A questioned concession in Karawala: The case of the Ubeda Brothers 29 3. MAPRONIC (Santo Domingo) company in the RAAN: Favoritism by INAFOR? 32 4. PRADA, S.A.: Certified company with a dubious record 35 5. Pine in Nueva Segovia: Abuse by regents, lumber dealers and INAFOR officials 38 III CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 . Conclusions 42 Design and layout: Roberto Zúñiga L. 2. Recommendations 45 Photography: Roberto Fonseca L. English translation: Judy Butler Bibliographic References 47 — — EMERGENCY IN THE FOREST Presentation his report contains the principal caraguan lumber industry, who in the majority findings of the journalistic inves- of cases granted a journalistic interview for the tigation “Emergency in the For- first time. est,” conducted over five months by a team of professionals from The report is divided into three parts to facilitate the Center for Communication reading and to explore the findings more deeply. ResearchT (CINCO), in association with the Cen- In the first part, you will find everything related to ter for International Policy (CIP), based in Wash- the issue of the economic and environmental im- ington DC. pact of the forest emer- gency, starting with the The research, coor- historical background dinated by Carlos F. and coming up to the Chamorro, president Forestry State of Emer- of CINCO, was con- gency declared in May ducted by a team made 2006. up of Roberto Fonseca, Camilo de Castro and The second part pres- other journalists and ents, case by case, the researchers. It covered diverse modus operandi the territories of the of a very representative Mining Triangle, Puerto group of lumber com- Cabezas, Waspám and panies that exploit the the Río Coco in the forest resource through North Atlantic Autono- General Management mous Region (RAAN), Plans, Minimum Plans the municipalities of the or concessions by in- Desembocadura de Río digenous communities. Grande and La Cruz de Most of them operate in Río Grande and the Río Nicaragua’s Caribbean Kung Kung in the South region and are the ob- Atlantic Autonomous ject of major suspicion Region (RAAS), as well and accusations. as the department of Nueva Segovia. Finally, in the third part, the reader will find a summarized set of It also involved an intense search for and gather- conclusions and recommendations, the lat- ing of data and documents related to the forest ter of which are especially directed to the new issue from the main governmental and nongov- authorities elected this past November 5, who ernmental institutions and especially interviews must make key decisions on the forestry issue with the most notable representatives of the Ni- in the next five years. — 2 — I Economic and environmental impact of the forest emergency — 3 — EMERGENCY IN THE FOREST Background: Half a century of ravaging the forest n 950, a Technical Mission from the This overall deforestation figure equals an aver- United Nations Food and Agriculture age loss of 64,000 hectares per year. At this rate, Organization (FAO) produced the first 47.35% of Nicaragua’s forests have disappeared. important report on Nicaragua’s forest resources. The document stated that In turn, the surface cultivated for agricultural pur- this Central American country had 6.5 poses increased to 46,935.4 square kilometers in Imillion hectares of forest cover, which represent- that same half century, a figure now equal to over ed 47% of the national territory, estimated at that 36% of the national territory, compared to only time at 37,000 square kilometers. 7% fifty years earlier. That FAO Technical Report, prepared by experts R. D. Garver and H. Recart of the US Forestry Agrarian reform Service and the FAO, respectively, estimated that Various factors are related to this frenetic advance the cultivated surface amounted to only 958,000 of the agricultural frontier in the past half century. hectares, equivalent to 7% of the national terri- Among them are peasant migration, the agrarian tory at the time. reform processes of 1960-978 and 1979-990, the end of the armed conflict and social reinsertion A half century later, the official Nicaraguan docu- of the contra and army veterans, and the lack of ment titled “Valoración Forestal Nicaragua 2000” territorial demarcation and titling of indigenous (Forestry Appraisal Nicaragua 2000) estimated that lands in the country’s Caribbean coast. Nicaragua’s forested area had shrunk to 3.2 million hectares (32,000 square kilometers in the 950- By the end of the fifties, according to the official 2000 period, an area much greater than the total Agricultural and Forestry Ministry (MAGFOR) extension of the US state of Massachusetts (20,306 document titled “Marco de Políticas de Tierras” square kilometers), or of Nicaragua’s neighbor, El (Land Policies Framework), a movement of land- Salvador (2,040 square kilometers). less peasants was noted, which engaged in land “Lands in forested zones belonging to the sta- te were given out to former contras and for- mer army soldiers, and all they did was cut down all the trees to plant rice, beans and maize. You can see that the whole strip where those property titles began to be given out was clear-cut and what we have now is a subsistence agricultural frontier.” Jader Guzmán, head of MAGFOR’s Forest Policies Dept. — 4 — ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE FORest EMERGENCY invasions as a method of struggle. In response, former members of the Army and the Resistance the then government approved the first Agrarian (contras), to guarantee their social and produc- Reform Law in 963. tive reinsertion. The agrarian reform process intensified in the According to MAGFOR’s official document, 979-990 period, with the Sandinista govern- “Marco de Políticas de Tierras,” the Chamorro ment. It was initiated in July 1979, with the con- government provided 23,069 property titles dur- fiscation of rural properties that had belonged to ing her administration, which represented 837,947 the Somoza family and its close associates. By manzanas ( manzana = .7 hectares) and 37,690 990, 54.4% of the lands was in the power of the peasant family beneficiaries. private sector and 39.8% in the hands of the so- called reformed sector (cooperatives, state com- “Each time I would see in the media that prop- panies, etc.) as a result of this erty titles were being given land redistribution process. Jaime Guillén to those who had formerly taken up arms, it triggered a It is officially estimated that dual sentiment in me” com- the agrarian reform during ments Jaime Guillén, Na- the Sandinista period (979- tional Rainforest Coordina- 990) benefited over 110,000 tor, “in that I knew it would peasant families, which repre- help pacify the country, but I sented around 80% of those could also see that it would demanding lands. provoke an environmental disaster, a genuine tragedy, in that they would destroy Pacification the forest to plant in lands With the end of the armed not apt for agriculture.” conflict in 1990 resulting from the electoral victory of Violeta The book, Dinámica del sec- Barrios de Chamorro, a new tor forestal en Nicaragua: land distribution process con- 986-996, shows the nega- tinued, now to the two bands tive impact on the country’s involved in the civil war—the forests of the agrarian re- “Each time I would see in the media that property titles were being given to those who had formerly taken up arms, it trigge- red a dual sentiment in me, in that I knew it would help pacify the country, but I could also see that it would provoke an environmental disaster, a genuine tragedy, in that they would destroy the forest to plant in lands not apt for agriculture.” Jaime Guillén, National Rainforest Coordinator — 5 — EMERGENCY IN THE FOREST form process promoted by the Sandini- Yader Guzmán sta government followed by the provi- sion of land to the sectors involved in the armed conflict of the eighties and to the traditional seekers of land in the post-conflict period (990-200). That book, says Jader Guzmán, head of MAGFOR’s Forest Policies Dept, “shows an increase in the deforesta- tion rate from 35,000 to 100,000 hect- ares a year…. Lands in forested zones belonging to the state were given out to former contras and former army soldiers, and all they did was cut down all the trees to plant rice, beans and maize. You can see that the whole strip where those property titles began to be given out was clear-cut and what we have now is a subsistence agricultural frontier.” According to the latest agricultural census, taken in 200, there are ap- proximately 200,000 agricultural ex- ploitations in the country, covering an area of 6.2 million hectares. In this re- gard, it should be recalled that the FAO Technical the agricultural frontier further and displaced the Mission’s report from the fifties indicated that the communities from the lands occupied by their an- area cultivated totaled only 958,000 hectares.