Towards More Cohesion in EU Enlargement Policy – Tapping the Potential of the Weimar Triangle 3
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Genshagener N° 27 Papiere March 2021 Florent Marciacq Towards more cohesion Tomasz Żornaczuk in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle Table of contents Executive summary 2 Introduction 3 I. Motives for and attitudes towards enlargement 4 II. Reform of the accession process 8 III. Perspectives on conditionality and the rule of law 11 IV. Regional cooperation and bilateral disputes 13 V. A blueprint for the Weimar Triangle’s enhanced engagement in the Western Balkans 16 The Genshagen Foundation 22 About the authors 24 Imprint 25 2 Genshagener Papiere N° 27 Executive summary In the past couple of years, France, Germany and Poland Accordingly, this analysis argues that enlargement has have all played an active role in advancing and/or the potential for becoming a new area of cooperation reshaping the EU’s enlargement approach vis-à-vis the for the Weimar Triangle. Enhanced consultations in Western Balkans. At the same time, they have expressed this format, building on shared strategic thinking and interest in relaunching intergovernmental cooperation security motives, could help to consolidate the EU’s under the Weimar Triangle formula. While fraught approach to the Western Balkans. To that end, the with notable differences, their respective approaches to Weimar Triangle could also build on existing bi- and enlargement intersect with one another in key areas trilateral initiatives pursued in the fields of reconcilia- of EU-Western Balkans relations. The three countries do tion, regional cooperation and conflict resolution. By not support enlargement with the same energy intensifying consultations in enlargement matters, and consider the reform of the accession process from France, Germany and Poland would not only further various perspectives. Although they recognise the energise the Weimar Triangle, but would also make importance of conditionality, they draw different a meaningful contribution to strengthening EU cohe- conclusions when it comes to promoting it. However, sion vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. these dissimilarities do not preclude the pursuit of converging geopolitical, security-related and economic interests in the region as well as a shared endorsement of regional cooperation and good-neighbourly relations. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 3 Introduction At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb in 2000, membership, has been reluctant – at best – to consent the Union pledged to support the countries of the to any fresh progress in this area. Instead, it emphasises region on their path towards EU membership. In 2003, the need to reform the EU before it can expand, at the Thessaloniki Summit, it reiterated its promise of triggering a reform of the accession process itself in the prospect of EU membership and formally included 2019 after opposing the opening of membership the Western Balkans in its EU enlargement policy. talks with Albania and North Macedonia. Poland, by To date, however, the only country of the region that contrast, remains one of the most adamant advocates has acceded was Croatia, in 2013. The remaining of EU enlargement. six countries, often referred to as the Western Balkans Six or WB6, have not completed their journey and Notwithstanding these nuances and differences among remain at different levels of integration with the their approaches, France, Germany and Poland adopted Union. Montenegro and Serbia opened their accession a joint statement at the beginning of 2020 under negotiations in 2012 and 2014 respectively; Albania the Weimar Triangle format, in which they »reaffirmed and North Macedonia await the Council’s unanimous their commitment to the enlargement of the EU«2. The decision to start negotiations over their future acces- meeting of these countries’ foreign ministers on 15 sion. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well October 2020 – the first in the Weimar formula in four as Kosovo1 have yet to be granted the official status of years – and the announcement of enhanced coopera- candidate countries. tion within the Weimar Triangle signals a rising level of interest in exploring spaces for common actions in Although the EU maintains its proclaimed commit- enlargement matters. ment to enlargement, the process has, in practice, experienced a serious slowdown since the 2004/2007 This paper sheds light on the respective approaches enlargement round. The slow pace of reforms in the of France, Germany and Poland in enlargement policy Western Balkans and the eroding credibility of the EU vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. It explores the three in the region, amplified by geopolitical competition, countries’ attitudes and motives underpinning their has prompted the EU to support complementary engagement in the region and identifies the role they initiatives such as the Berlin Process, to adopt a new have played in shaping the accession process in the enlargement strategy in 2018 and, more recently, to past few years. It scrutinises their respective views on revise its accession methodology. France, Germany and key areas and mechanisms in the accession process – Poland have all been very proactive against this back- conditionality, the rule of law, regional cooperation drop in advancing and/or reshaping the EU’s approach. and conflict resolution – identifying both a series Germany, which initiated the Berlin Process in 2014, of common ground and conflicting points. Based on remains a firm supporter of the Western Balkans’ EU these findings, this paper formulates a series of integration and insists on the application of strict recommendations seeking to enhance cooperation conditionality. France, although declaring its general among the countries of the Weimar Triangle in support for the Western Balkans’ prospect of EU enlargement matters. 1 Kosovo has not yet been recognised by five EU member states or by 2 Joint statement of the Ministers for European Affairs of the Weimar Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, among others. Based on a 2012 agree- Triangle, Lens, 21 January 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country- ment, Kosovo has since been represented in regional forums as Kosovo*, files/germany/the-weimar-triangle/article/joint-statement-of-the-minis- with the annotation that »This designation is without prejudice to positions ters-for-european-affairs-of-the-weimar-triangle, retrieved on 5 January on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the 2021. Kosovo declaration of independence«. 4 Genshagener Papiere N° 27 I. Motives for and attitudes towards enlargement Geopolitical and strategic motives: France, Germany and focused on North Africa, France too, under the leader- Poland’s respective approaches to enlargement are ship of President Emmanuel Macron, has increasingly underpinned by a variety of motives. A first set, shared come to look at the Western Balkans through the prism by the three countries, is constituted by the under- of geopolitics. Unlike others, however, it tends to standing that the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the Western decouple geopolitical reasoning from the EU’s enlarge- Balkans should be informed by strategic and geopoliti- ment rationale. For Macron, there is a geostrategic cal reasoning. The primary advocate of pushing for imperative in »anchoring the region« in Europe, but enlargement for strategic reasons is Poland. »Always this anchoring should build on »infrastructures, a firm supporter of EU enlargement to the Western education, languages and culture« and much less so on Balkans«3, in the words of then Minister of Foreign the opening of negotiating chapters7. The French Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz, Warsaw has increasingly argument is that discussions about enlargement should come to perceive the process as strategic and in the always be linked to broader strategic reflections, that interests of Europe, the Balkans and Poland itself. they should be part of a »bigger picture«. This re-ap- The Polish government has repeatedly cautioned that praisal echoes French efforts in the past few years to the region is an arena for strategic rivalry and that reassert the leadership of Paris on European questions, Russia and China would benefit from the EU’s weak- claiming that the overall priority for the EU today is to ness in the Western Balkans. Previous cabinets have boost European sovereignty and strategic autonomy, also pointed to this risk4. while ensuring that enlargement will make the Union stronger and not weaker. This geopolitical reasoning has gained traction in Germany, too. As argued by German Minister of State This concern is particularly relevant given the influence for Europe Michael Roth, »any political vacuum that we geopolitical actors have already gained in the region Europeans allow to emerge [in the region] will inevita- over the past few years8. Russia’s disruptive diplomacy bly be filled by others«5. However, for Germany, this and disinformation campaigns have been successful in geopolitical reasoning comes with reservations: only propagating narratives discrediting the EU, further enlargement to »safe, stable and democratic countries« undermining Serbia’s convergence with the EU in can serve a geostrategic purpose6. Traditionally more foreign policy matters and exacerbating neighbourly tensions. Likewise, China’s economic diplomacy has 3 Marceli Sommer, Czaputowicz: Polska od zawsze za rozszerzeniem UE o enabled Beijing to gain a foothold in the EU’s »soft Bałkany Zachodnie, Polska Agencja Prasowa, 12 March 2018, https://www. underbelly«, disregarding principles of good governance pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1325139%2Cczaputowicz-polska-od- zawsze-za-rozszerzeniem-ue-o-balkany-zachodnie.html, retrieved on promoted by the Union, and has allowed authoritarian 5 January 2021. regimes to thrive. For better or for worse, the EU’s 4 Laure Mandeville, Beata Szydlo: Non à une Europe à plusieurs vitesses engagement in the Western Balkans has therefore qui creuse les divisions, Le Figaro (Online), 28 September 2017, https://www. become a matter of geopolitics. lefigaro.fr/international/2017/09/28/01003-20170928ARTFIG00321-beata- szydlo-non-a-une-europe-a-plusieurs-vitesses-qui-creuse-les-divisions. php, retrieved on 5 January 2021.