Genshagener N° 27 Papiere March 2021

Florent Marciacq Towards more cohesion Tomasz Żornaczuk in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle

Table of contents

Executive summary 2

Introduction 3

I. Motives for and attitudes towards enlargement 4

II. Reform of the accession process 8

III. Perspectives on conditionality and the rule of law 11

IV. Regional cooperation and bilateral disputes 13

V. A blueprint for the Weimar Triangle’s enhanced engagement in the Western Balkans 16

The Genshagen Foundation 22

About the authors 24

Imprint 25 2 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

Executive summary

In the past couple of years, France, Germany and Poland Accordingly, this analysis argues that enlargement has have all played an active role in advancing and/or the potential for becoming a new area of cooperation reshaping the EU’s enlargement approach vis-à-vis the for the Weimar Triangle. Enhanced consultations in Western Balkans. At the same time, they have expressed this format, building on shared strategic thinking and interest in relaunching intergovernmental cooperation security motives, could help to consolidate the EU’s under the Weimar Triangle formula. While fraught approach to the Western Balkans. To that end, the with notable differences, their respective approaches to Weimar Triangle could also build on existing bi- and enlargement intersect with one another in key areas trilateral initiatives pursued in the fields of reconcilia- of EU-Western Balkans relations. The three countries do tion, regional cooperation and conflict resolution. By not support enlargement with the same energy intensifying consultations in enlargement matters, and consider the reform of the accession process from France, Germany and Poland would not only further various perspectives. Although they recognise the energise the Weimar Triangle, but would also make importance of conditionality, they draw different a meaningful contribution to strengthening EU cohe- conclusions when it comes to promoting it. However, sion vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. these dissimilarities do not preclude the pursuit of converging geopolitical, security-related and economic interests in the region as well as a shared endorsement of regional cooperation and good-neighbourly relations. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 3

Introduction

At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb in 2000, membership, has been reluctant – at best – to consent the Union pledged to support the countries of the to any fresh progress in this area. Instead, it emphasises region on their path towards EU membership. In 2003, the need to reform the EU before it can expand, at the Thessaloniki Summit, it reiterated its promise of triggering a reform of the accession process itself in the prospect of EU membership and formally included 2019 after opposing the opening of membership the Western Balkans in its EU enlargement policy. talks with Albania and North Macedonia. Poland, by To date, however, the only country of the region that contrast, remains one of the most adamant advocates has acceded was Croatia, in 2013. The remaining of EU enlargement. six countries, often referred to as the Western Balkans Six or WB6, have not completed their journey and Notwithstanding these nuances and differences among remain at different levels of integration with the their approaches, France, Germany and Poland adopted Union. Montenegro and Serbia opened their accession a joint statement at the beginning of 2020 under negotiations in 2012 and 2014 respectively; Albania the Weimar Triangle format, in which they »reaffirmed and North Macedonia await the Council’s unanimous their commitment to the enlargement of the EU«2. The decision to start negotiations over their future acces- meeting of these countries’ foreign ministers on 15 sion. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well October 2020 – the first in the Weimar formula in four as Kosovo1 have yet to be granted the official status of years – and the announcement of enhanced coopera- candidate countries. tion within the Weimar Triangle signals a rising level of interest in exploring spaces for common actions in Although the EU maintains its proclaimed commit- enlargement matters. ment to enlargement, the process has, in practice, experienced a serious slowdown since the 2004/2007 This paper sheds light on the respective approaches enlargement round. The slow pace of reforms in the of France, Germany and Poland in enlargement policy Western Balkans and the eroding credibility of the EU vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. It explores the three in the region, amplified by geopolitical competition, countries’ attitudes and motives underpinning their has prompted the EU to support complementary engagement in the region and identifies the role they initiatives such as the Berlin Process, to adopt a new have played in shaping the accession process in the enlargement strategy in 2018 and, more recently, to past few years. It scrutinises their respective views on revise its accession methodology. France, Germany and key areas and mechanisms in the accession process – Poland have all been very proactive against this back- conditionality, the rule of law, regional cooperation drop in advancing and/or reshaping the EU’s approach. and conflict resolution – identifying both a series Germany, which initiated the Berlin Process in 2014, of common ground and conflicting points. Based on remains a firm supporter of the Western Balkans’ EU these findings, this paper formulates a series of integration and insists on the application of strict recommendations seeking to enhance cooperation conditionality. France, although declaring its general among the countries of the Weimar Triangle in support for the Western Balkans’ prospect of EU enlargement matters.

1 Kosovo has not yet been recognised by five EU member states or by 2 Joint statement of the Ministers for European Affairs of the Weimar Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, among others. Based on a 2012 agree- Triangle, Lens, 21 January 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country- ment, Kosovo has since been represented in regional forums as Kosovo*, files/germany/the-weimar-triangle/article/joint-statement-of-the-minis- with the annotation that »This designation is without prejudice to positions ters-for-european-affairs-of-the-weimar-triangle, retrieved on 5 January on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the 2021. Kosovo declaration of independence«. 4 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

I. Motives for and attitudes towards enlargement

Geopolitical and strategic motives: France, Germany and focused on North Africa, France too, under the leader- Poland’s respective approaches to enlargement are ship of President Emmanuel Macron, has increasingly underpinned by a variety of motives. A first set, shared come to look at the Western Balkans through the prism by the three countries, is constituted by the under- of geopolitics. Unlike others, however, it tends to standing that the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the Western decouple geopolitical reasoning from the EU’s enlarge- Balkans should be informed by strategic and geopoliti- ment rationale. For Macron, there is a geostrategic cal reasoning. The primary advocate of pushing for imperative in »anchoring the region« in Europe, but enlargement for strategic reasons is Poland. »Always this anchoring should build on »infrastructures, a firm supporter of EU enlargement to the Western education, languages and culture« and much less so on Balkans«3, in the words of then Minister of Foreign the opening of negotiating chapters7. The French Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz, Warsaw has increasingly argument is that discussions about enlargement should come to perceive the process as strategic and in the always be linked to broader strategic reflections, that interests of Europe, the Balkans and Poland itself. they should be part of a »bigger picture«. This re-ap- The Polish government has repeatedly cautioned that praisal echoes French efforts in the past few years to the region is an arena for strategic rivalry and that reassert the leadership of Paris on European questions, Russia and China would benefit from the EU’s weak- claiming that the overall priority for the EU today is to ness in the Western Balkans. Previous cabinets have boost European sovereignty and strategic autonomy, also pointed to this risk4. while ensuring that enlargement will make the Union stronger and not weaker. This geopolitical reasoning has gained traction in Germany, too. As argued by German Minister of State This concern is particularly relevant given the influence for Europe Michael Roth, »any political vacuum that we geopolitical actors have already gained in the region Europeans allow to emerge [in the region] will inevita- over the past few years8. Russia’s disruptive diplomacy bly be filled by others«5. However, for Germany, this and disinformation campaigns have been successful in geopolitical reasoning comes with reservations: only propagating narratives discrediting the EU, further enlargement to »safe, stable and democratic countries« undermining Serbia’s convergence with the EU in can serve a geostrategic purpose6. Traditionally more foreign policy matters and exacerbating neighbourly tensions. Likewise, China’s economic diplomacy has 3 Marceli Sommer, Czaputowicz: Polska od zawsze za rozszerzeniem UE o enabled Beijing to gain a foothold in the EU’s »soft Bałkany Zachodnie, Polska Agencja Prasowa, 12 March 2018, https://www. underbelly«, disregarding principles of good governance pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1325139%2Cczaputowicz-polska-od- zawsze-za-rozszerzeniem-ue-o-balkany-zachodnie.html, retrieved on promoted by the Union, and has allowed authoritarian 5 January 2021. regimes to thrive. For better or for worse, the EU’s 4 Laure Mandeville, Beata Szydlo: Non à une Europe à plusieurs vitesses engagement in the Western Balkans has therefore qui creuse les divisions, Le Figaro (Online), 28 September 2017, https://www. become a matter of geopolitics. lefigaro.fr/international/2017/09/28/01003-20170928ARTFIG00321-beata- szydlo-non-a-une-europe-a-plusieurs-vitesses-qui-creuse-les-divisions. php, retrieved on 5 January 2021. 7 Discours du Président de la République Emmanuel Macron à la confé- 5 Michael Roth, Der Westbalkan ist Europas Innenhof, FAZ, 2 June 2018, rence des ambassadeurs et des ambassadrices 2019, Paris, 27 August 2019, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/roth-frankfurter- https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/27/discours-du- allgemeine/2102814, retrieved on 5 January 2021. president-de-la-republique-a-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs-1, retrie- 6 Benjamin Pargan, German Minister Roth: ‘EU expansion is also in our ved on 5 January 2021. interest’, Deutsche Welle, 8 April 2015, https://www.dw.com/en/german- 8 See for instance: Florian Bieber/Nikolaos Tzifakis N. (eds.), The Western minister-roth-eu-expansion-is-also-in-our-interest/a-18369610, retrieved Balkans in the World – Linkages and Relations with Non-Western Coun- on 5 January 2021. tries. Abingdon: Routledge, 2020. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 5

Security-related motives: A second set of motives is intensive engagement on the ground in the 2000s (e.g. constituted by Germany, France and Poland’s acknowl- heading UNMIK, EULEX and KFOR) and withdrawal in edgement that security in the Western Balkans is the 2010s, it now appears to be gradually »re-investing« important for European security as a whole. Then Prime in the area. One of the most notable developments in Minister Beata Szydło argued that Poland, because of its this regard was the launch, together with Germany, of own past, appreciates the candidate countries’ aspira- an OSCE initiative on the Fight against Firearms tions for the security guarantees provided by EU Trafficking in the Western Balkans in late 2017, which accession9. Today, security continues to be a central also received the support of Warsaw. argument for enlargement in Poland, and the govern- ment regularly links the Western Balkans’ accession Economic motives: A third set of motives informing directly to Poland’s safety, also emphasising that this Germany’s and to a much lesser extent the approach to region is key to security in Europe10. In Warsaw’s view, enlargement taken by France and Poland is of economic instability in the Balkans makes it necessary for the EU nature. Unlike France and a fortiori Poland, Germany and the countries of the region to work together to has a large diaspora of migrant workers – popularly address such challenges as illegal migration, organised known as »Gastarbeiter« – from the Western Balkans crime, hybrid threats and interference by external (see Table 1). Their access to the labour market has made actors. Poland also maintains its hard-security related a remarkable contribution to the German economy11. presence on the ground. It continues to make military German companies have likewise greatly benefited contributions to the EU’s Operation Althea in Bosnia from the gradual integration of the Western Balkans and Herzegovina and the NATO-led Kosovo Force into the German and Central European supply chain (KFOR) where it contributes 230 troops – the sixth- and from the availability of skilled and cheap labour in biggest contingent among 27 – compared with 70 from the region12. Germany has, accordingly, been Serbia’s Germany and none from France. Poland also partici- main economic partner for years, with over 400 compa- pates in the EU’s rule of law mission to Kosovo EULEX nies funded by German capital employing more than with currently the only international police officers on 60,000 people13. Support for infrastructure investments the ground. as a cornerstone of the Berlin Process should also be seen in the light of German economic interests. More actively engaged in soft security areas, Germany nonetheless remains a keen supporter of NATO en- largement towards the Western Balkans and likewise contributes to KFOR, for example. It also stresses, politically, that peace and security in Europe depend on 11 Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel nach dem Europäischen the Western Balkans and views enlargement as a way Rat am 18. Oktober 2019 in Brüssel, Brussels, 18 October 2019, https://www. bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenz-von- to consolidate both. As for France, after years of bundeskanzlerin-merkel-nach-dem-europaeischen-rat-am-18-oktober- 2019-in-bruessel-1683376, retrieved on 5 January 2021. 9 Laure Mandeville, Beata Szydlo: Non à une Europe à plusieurs vitesses 12 OECD, Global South East Europe: Unleashing the Transformation qui creuse les divisions (see footnote 4). Potential for Growth in the Western Balkans (Global Relations Policy 10 Sejm, Response to interpellation no. 33689 on cooperation with new Insights), 2019, http://www.oecd.org/south-east-europe/programme/ NATO Member States and support for the process of further enlargement Unleashing_the_Transformation_potential_for_Growth_in_WB.pdf, retrie- of the North Atlantic Alliance by Maciej Lang, Undersecretary of State at ved on 4 January 2021. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 October 2019, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/ 13 Federal Foreign Office, Germany and Serbia: bilateral relations, Sejm8.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=BGMHT8, retrieved on 14 December 29 October 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/ 2020. serbia/228080, retrieved on 15 December 2020. 6 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

Table 1: Citizens from the Western Balkans Table 2: Trade in goods of Germany, Poland and France Six residing in France and Germany14 with the Western Balkans (WB6)17

Exports to WB6 2019 Imports from WB6 2019 France 68,900 (2012) 96,900 (2017) (in million euro) (in million euro)

Germany 363,564 (2012) 675,212 (2019) Germany 5686 5764

Poland 1378 543 With no such systemic ties in the Balkans, France is nonetheless present in the region economically. Its France 892 594 operators remain scarce: the region’s trade with France is dwarfed by Germany’s by a factor of eight. To revital- ise its position, France adopted a Western Balkans Political attitudes and public opinion: The countries of the Strategy in May 2019 aiming, in particular, at »enhanc- Weimar Triangle all remain committed to EU enlarge- ing bilateral cooperation« in economic matters. An ment. However, it has become highly unpopular among important tool in this strategy is the intervention of the French and German citizens. In 2018, the two countries French Development Agency (AFD), now mandated to were the third least favourable to its pursuit, just after support »ecological and energy transition as well as Austria and Finland: 61% and 63% of the French and territorial transition, fields in which the AFD can use Germans respectively were against further enlarge- French experience and expertise«15. As for Poland, its ment. Although Turkey’s prospect of accession certainly trade with the Western Balkans has doubled over the exacerbates this opposition, enlargement in general last decade16, with a sharp increase in the past few remains a politically sensitive topic, especially in years, and surpasses French trade with the region (see France. Poland, on the other hand, is on the opposite Table 2). These economic questions do not play an end of the spectrum, with support for enlargement only important role in shaping Polish motives for enlarge- being stronger in two member states (Spain and ment, however. Lithuania). In 2018, 65% of Poles were in favour of further enlargement (see Table 3). 14 Unlike those for France, the numbers for Germany exclude people with a »migration background« (i.e. who received German citizenship), de facto indicating an even bigger difference between the two countries. The number of citizens from the Western Balkans Six in Poland is incomparably lower than in France and Germany. Sources: INSEE, Étrangers – Immigrés: pays de naissance et nationalités détaillés, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statist iques/4510522?sommaire=4510556, retrieved on 5 January 2021; Eurostat, Population on 1 January by age group, sex and citizenship, https://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_POP1CTZ__custom_415726/default/ 17 Eurostat, Western Balkans-EU – international trade in goods, table?lang=en, retrieved on 5 January 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index. 15 France Diplomacy, France’s strategy for the Western Balkans, May 2019, php?title=Western_Balkans-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_ https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/europe/ statistics&oldid=479958#The_Western_Balkans_trade_with_the_EU_and_ western-balkans-62918/, retrieved on 4 January 2021. other_main_partners, data retrieved on 15 December 2020. According 16 Ministry of Development, Syntetyczna informacji o eksporcie i imporcie to the Polish national data, imports from the WB6 to Poland in 2019 Polski, styczeń–grudzień 2019 rok w mln euro, August 2020 (and earlier amounted to 879 million euro (over half bigger than quoted by Eurostat), synthesis), https://www.gov.pl/web/rozwoj-praca-technologia/analizy-z- whereas exports amounted to 1372 million euro (slightly smaller compared obszaru-handlu-zagranicznego, retrieved on 15 December 2020. to Eurostat). See footnote 16 for the source. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 7

Table 3: Public support for enlargement in France, Germany and Poland18

2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

France 39% 31% 31% 26% 25% 23% 23% 31%

Germany 36% 28% 33% 21% 20% 21% 28% 31%

Poland 78% 72% 74% 69% 62% 55% 53% 65%

EU average 53% 45% 47% 40% 36% 37% 37% 44%

The circumspection found in France vis-à-vis enlarge- dispositions in this area. To counter the widespread ment is fuelled by the suspicion that further widening belief that previous enlargements were too hasty and might lead to the »dilution of the European project«19, secure tacit consent from citizens, German governing and also by the persistence of a certain nostalgia for parties insist on tough conditionality, while recalling »little Europe«. Other factors in this regard include the that »there will only be a truly united Europe with the belief that the EU’s unbridled expansion should come to states of the Western Balkans«20. In Poland, there is a an end, as well as diffuse fears that enlargement, broad consensus among the political elite and the coupled with economic liberalism, accelerates produc- citizens that »Europe cannot be perceived as fully tion relocation and downward social mobility. united without the Western Balkans«21. Poland, for that Enlargement, for these reasons and others such as matter, is a member of the Friends of Enlargement islamophobia, remains highly unpopular in France – be informal group, consisting of 14 member states and also it among the wider public or French political elites. known as the Tallinn Group. Germany, by contrast, displays a high degree of conti- nuity over time in its support for enlargement towards the Western Balkans, even though this support is not reflected in opinion polls. This continuity, however, is not set in stone: the entry into the German Bundestag of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in 2017, which calls for a referendum on any further enlargement to be 20 Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem Ministerpräsi- held, is indicative of an inflection in Germany’s denten der Republik Ungarn, Viktor Orbán, Sopron, 19 August 2019, https:// www.bundeskanzlerin.de/bkin-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenz-von- 18 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 62, 65, 69, 73, 77, 81, 85, bundeskanzlerin-merkel-und-dem-ministerpraesidenten-der-republik- 89 (»Are you for further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in ungarn-viktor-orb%C3%A1n-1661858, retrieved on 15 December 2020. future years?«). 21 Polska Agencja Prasowa, Czaputowicz: Europa nie może być postrzega- 19 Yves Bertoncini/Sami Andoura, »Europe« and its »enlargements«: na jako w pełni zjednoczona bez Bałkanów Zachodnich, 4 July 2019, https:// enough… or do we want more? (Notre Europe Viewpoint), 27 June 2013, www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C478675%2Cczaputowicz- https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/europe-and-its-enlargements- europa-nie-moze-byc-postrzegana-jako-w-pelni-zjednoczona-bez, enough-or-do-we-want-more/, retrieved on 15 December 2020. retrieved on 21 January 2021. 8 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

II. Reform of the accession process

The differences in the attitudes of Germany, France and reforms and numerous initiatives vouch for Germany’s Poland towards enlargement, as articulated by specific critical role as a policy-shaper in the region. Its mark stakeholders, have shaped distinct preferences over the can be found in the EU’s »renewed consensus« (2006) reform of the accession process. In France, the tradi- and »new approach« (2011) toughening conditionality. tional domination of the Elysée over the enlargement Other examples here include the launch (and aim) of question, given its strategic character, has been rein- the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations that have been forced under Macron’s leadership. Little scope in the ongoing since 2011, the launch of the Berlin Process formation of enlargement-related positions is now left and the German-UK initiative on Bosnia and Herzego- to ministries, the Parliament or societal actors, al- vina in 2014 and the initiation of the Priebe Report though a constitutional requirement for referendum in 2015, delivering recommendations on systemic gives citizens the ultimate say in all future cases of rule of law issues in Macedonia. In most instances, accession22. In Germany, by contrast, preferences are Germany received the support of France, who accepted moulded and mediated by a variety of actors and the pre-eminence of its neighbour across the Rhine. institutions – from the Federal Foreign Office and the Enlargement reforms were also endorsed by Federal Chancellery to the Bundestag, which has a Poland before and after the new impetus injected into decisive say throughout the accession process (via the its foreign policy towards the region in the mid- 2009 Federal Act on Cooperation). It is also closely 2010s25, strengthened from 2018 by the participation followed by political parties, which have stepped up of Warsaw in the Berlin Process. their monitoring of the accession process, and other societal actors23. In Poland, decisions on enlargement Germany’s leadership in EU enlargement was chal- had been traditionally taken within the Ministry of lenged in 2018 when France opposed the opening of Foreign Affairs24. The enlargement portfolio remained accession negotiations with North Macedonia and there and the position is approved by the Minister Albania (in the latter case together with Denmark and for European Affairs, who, however, has been part of the Netherlands). After the conclusion of the Prespa the Chancellery of the Prime Minister as of 2020. The Agreement in 2018, which put an end to the 25-year- Parliament, in turn, adopts the accession treaty by long name dispute between Athens and Skopje, and simple majority, which is subsequently ratified by the extensive reforms in Albania, the EU considered moving President of the Republic. ahead with the two countries. Germany and Poland, like most EU member states, along with the European Until recently, Germany’s leadership in reforming the Commission and the European Parliament, supported accession process was barely contested. Previous the opening of accession negotiations. However, the Council was blocked by the position taken by France. 22 Natasha Wunsch, Between Indifference and Hesitation: France and Paris’s move was at first justified by a series of tactical EU enlargement towards the Balkans, South East European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 27 (2017), no. 4, pp. 541-554. 25 For example, in 2010 Poland launched an annual Skopje Conference – a 23 Theresia Töglhofer/Cornelius Adebahr, Firm Supporter and Severe Critic bilateral instrument for passing pre-accession experience to Macedonia. – Germany’s two-pronged approach to EU enlargement in the Western Based on this, it established the Belgrade Conference in 2017 and the Tirana Balkans, South East European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 27 (2017), no. 4, pp. Conference in 2018, in addition to an annual Enlargement Academy for 523-539. civil servants from the Western Balkans, launched in 2015, among other 24 Tomasz Żornaczuk, Poland, in: Rosa Balfour/Corina Stratulat (eds.), EU initiatives. For details, see: Tomasz Żornaczuk, Poland’s Policy towards member states and enlargement towards the Balkans (EPC Issue Paper 79), the Western Balkans, in: Yearbook of Poland’s Foreign Policy 2011-2015, July 2015, pp. 63-72, https://wms.flexious.be/editor/plugins/imagemanager/ Warsaw: PISM, 2020, pp. 291-307; Tomasz Żornaczuk, Polityka Polski Wo- content/2140/PDF/2015/Issue_Paper_79_-_EU_member_states_and_ bec Bałkanów Zachodnich, in: Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2017, enlargement_towards_the_Balkans.pdf, retrieved on 15 December 2020. Warsaw: PISM, 2020, pp. 195-210. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 9

considerations, including the threat that the far-right French blockade, the V4 convened an additional meet- constituted ahead of the European elections of May ing with the political leaders from the Western Balkans, 2019, the number of Albanian asylum-seekers in France the first ever at prime ministerial level, in September rendering enlargement decisions too unpopular and 2019. On that occasion, they not only called on »all the overriding priority that Brexit negotiations needed EU stakeholders« to open the talks, but also argued that to be accorded at that time. What appeared to be »a credible enlargement policy represents a strategic temporary opposition on the part of France took a more investment in the security, stability and prosperity strategic turn in the course of 2019, when President of the EU as well«29. Immediately prior to the October Macron started to condition the opening of negotia- Council, the V4 foreign ministers published a tions with North Macedonia and Albania to a reform of joint article in Politico arguing in favour of starting the accession process, which he deemed »unsuitable«, the talks30. »too bureaucratic« and »cut off from people«26. This insistence of Paris to first reform, and only then open Germany, whose parliament in the meantime over- negotiations, caused tensions. whelmingly backed opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, sought a diplo- In the months that followed, Poland, Germany and matic solution that would at least allow the latter to other member states supportive of enlargement mobi- move forwards. It considered the proposal made by lised considerable diplomatic efforts to overcome the Greece and others to decouple the decision on opening blockade of the accession process. Roughly a month accession negotiations, focusing on North Macedonia, before the Poznań Summit of the Berlin Process, Poland but France – and above all Italy – did not accept this issued a joint statement together with its partners of idea. In the end, despite the pressure exerted by Berlin, the Visegrád Group (V4) expressing »the belief that the Warsaw and other capitals, France refrained from reform of the Union and the transformation and agreeing on opening accession negotiations at the integration processes of the candidates and potential Council’s meeting of October 2019. German Minister of candidates could and should be carried out in Foreign Affairs, Heiko Maas, bluntly criticised President parallel«27. Moreover, together with Slovenia and Italy, Macron’s »biggest mistake«31 in the Union’s recent Poland initiated a joint statement supporting the history. Poland’s Foreign Minister Czaputowicz simi- opening of accession negotiations28 that was finally larly described the non-decision in the Council as »a endorsed by 11 member states and published shortly mistake that has already caused negative consequences before the June 2019 Council meeting. In anticipation of in the Western Balkans«32. what Poland, Germany and others considered to be a 29 V4 Statement on the Western Balkans, Prague, 12 September 2019, https://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/v4-state- 26 Les principales déclarations de Macron à l’issue du Conseil européen, Le ment-on-the-190912, retrieved on 15 December 2020. Figaro, 18 October 2019, https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/brexit-macron- 30 Tomáš Petříček/Péter Szijjártó/Jacek Czaputowicz/Miroslav Lajčák, Let’s souhaite-que-la-date-du-31-octobre-soit-respectee-20191018, retrieved move forward in the Western Balkans, Politico, 14 October 2019, https:// on 15 December 2020. www.politico.eu/article/european-commission-western-balkans-north- 27 V4 Foreign Ministers’ Joint Statement on the Western Balkans, Bratis- macedonia-albania-accession-talks-eu/, retrieved on 15 December 2020. lava, 28 May 2019, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-state- 31 Ansgar Graw, Maas will den »größten Fehler« der EU abfedern, Die Welt, ments, retrieved on 15 December 2020. 13 November 2019, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/ 28 Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers on the EU commitment to article203483756/Nordmazedonien-Maas-will-den-groessten-Fehler-der- the Western Balkans’ European integration, 11 June 2019, https://www.gov. EU-abfedern.html, retrieved on 14 December 2020. pl/web/diplomacy/joint-statement-of-the-foreign-ministers-on-the-eu- 32 Jacek Czaputowicz: Polska wspiera Bałkany Zachodnie, Rzeczpospolita, commitment-to-the-western-balkans-european-integration, retrieved on 18 December 2019, https://www.rp.pl/Publicystyka/312189902-Jacek- 15 December 2020. Czaputowicz-Polska-wspiera-Balkany-Zachodnie.html, retrieved on 14 December 2020. 10 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

France’s role thus shifted from being a passive follower Czaputowicz flew to Skopje and to Tirana – together of Germany’s lead in the region to a policy-shaper on its with the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and own terms. In a »non-paper« on reforming the acces- Estonia – to express commitment to the aspirations of sion process, written shortly after the Council meeting both capitals. of October 2019, France specified its expectations and urged the Commission to issue a proposal to this end33. The new accession methodology proposed by the Both the stalemate caused by France in the Council and European Commission37 was unanimously endorsed the French non-paper were widely criticised in Poland by the member states in March 2020. This was by the government and experts. An alternative non- crucial because it allowed the Council to move for- paper was issued by nine countries, including Poland, wards (at least temporarily and on that issue), in December 2019. It contained a few converging points but does not mean that France, Germany and Poland with the French proposals for improving the process, have come to understand enlargement in univocal but more fundamentally stated that »internal EU ways. Differences in their approaches remain. reform cannot be a precondition for enlargement«34. The new methodology can rather be considered as a consensus reached under time pressure, which Poland continued its pro-enlargement efforts in mirrors the most important elements brought to the multiple regional initiatives after the termination of fore by Paris, i.e. a more »differentiated, reversible and its presidency of the Berlin Process. In February 2020, clearer« approach to enlargement38. However, being the V4 foreign ministers met with their counterparts clear about enlargement, for France, implies commu- from the Western Balkans, Austria, Croatia, Slovenia nicating that the EU membership prospect of the and with the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Western Balkans will not be fulfilled anytime soon39, Enlargement. They backed the Commission’s »intention while Germany and Poland prefer to underscore the to make the accession process more effective and EU’s commitment to making the accession process credible by allowing the Western Balkans to move more effective and credible. Eventually, reaching forward based on real progress in fundamental re- consensus on the accession methodology did not forms« and stated »a positive decision of the Council in mean starting membership talks with Albania and March is the only just way forward«35. A call for the North Macedonia, as the latter was blocked by Bul- opening of accession negotiations with North Macedo- garia due to bilateral historical and identity issues at nia and Albania was also jointly reiterated by the the December 2020 Council meeting. foreign ministers of the V4 and Germany36. Meanwhile,

33 Tallinn Group, Non-Paper: Reforming the European Union accession process, November 2019. 34 Nine EU Members release a new proposal for the reform of enlar- gement process, European Western Balkans, 11 December 2019, https:// 37 European Commission, Enhancing the accession process – A credible europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/12/11/nine-eu-members-release-a- EU perspective for the Western Balkans, Brussels, 5 February 2020, new-proposal-for-the-reform-of-enlargement-process/, retrieved on 14 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/enlar- December 2020. gement-methodology_en.pdf, retrieved on 14 December 2020. 35 Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the V4 countries 38 Discours du Président de la République Emmanuel Macron à la on the Western Balkans, 27 February 2020, https://www.visegradgroup.eu/ conférence de Munich sur la sécurité 2020, Munich, 15 February 2020, documents/official-statements/joint-statement-of-the-200323, retrieved https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/02/15/conference-sur- on 21 January 2021. la-securite-de-munich-faire-revivre-leurope-comme-une-puissance- 36 Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrád politique-strategique, retrieved on 5 January 2021. Group and Germany, Prague, 13 March 2020, https://www.visegradgroup. 39 Ibid. eu/documents/official-statements/joint-statement-of-the-200323-1, retrieved on 15 December 2020. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 11

III. Perspectives on conditionality and the rule of law

While agreeing on their importance, Germany, VMRO-DPMNE42. Germany similarly spared no efforts France and Poland hold slightly different views on to convince Gruevski and his allies to accept the conditionality and the rule of law as part of their change of government after snap elections in Decem- respective approaches towards the Western Balkans. ber 201643. Germany’s critical stance is conveyed all Germany, to start with, is often seen as a critical across the region through different channels – at the supporter of enlargement policy. Its constant insist- intergovernmental level, as well as via parliamentar- ence on »strict and fair conditions« being imposed on ians and political foundations. would-be member states is rooted in the belief that conditionality is key to the EU’s transformative France, in principle, shares Germany’s insistence on power, that effective transformation is necessary to conditionality and the rule of law. It similarly views avoid any potential disruptions to the EU’s rules- compliance as indispensable in order to preserve based order, and that tougher accession criteria will the credibility of the process and prevent a further rise eventually make enlargement more palatable to of euroscepticism. However, France’s leverage and European (and German) citizens. This insistence goes channels of communication are less diverse, given hand in hand with Germany’s support for the Regatta the concentration of the authority held by the Presi- Principle, an approach that contrasts with the en bloc dent in enlargement matters. France is therefore less expansion of the EU in 2004 and is shared by all directly engaged in Western Balkans’ domestic member states today. It contends that »progress of politics than Germany, and less eager to enter the each country towards the EU will depend on its own frontline on violations of the rule of law. Its insistence merits«40 or, put differently, that the countries of the on conditionality is rather projected onto the EU’s region »should have the opportunity to join the accession policy, as recently exemplified by the European Union if [and only if] they fulfil the acces- emphasis on reversibility enshrined in the new sion requirements«41. methodology. On the ground, France sometimes lacks consistency in addressing the issue of state capture Germany has thus adopted a critical stance towards in the Western Balkans and criticising those who domestic developments in the Western Balkans are responsible for democratic backsliding, for in- in numerous cases. For instance, it was among a stance when Emmanuel Macron praised Serbian handful of Western countries that resisted the president Aleksandar Vučić for doing »a fantastic job« international financial institutions’ granting of loans and having »a lot of leadership in his country«44. to Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s regime in the 2010s. Against the backdrop of major Notwithstanding their principled support for the democratic backsliding, Germany’s ruling party, Commission’s work, France and Germany both rely the Christian Democratic Union, similarly cooled its on their own assessment when it comes to deciding relations with its conservative sister party if conditions have been fulfilled. This quasi-parallel

42 VMRO-DPMNE stands for Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Orga- nisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity. 40 Presidency Conclusion of the European Council, Santa Maria da 43 Ioannis Armakolas/Igor Bandovic/Dimitar Bechev/Bodo Weber, North Feira, 19–20 June 2000, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ Macedonia: What’s Next, Brussels: Open Society European Policy Institu- fei1_en.htm, retrieved on 4 February 2021. te, 2019, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/north- 41 Merkel seeks to strengthen EU ties to Western Balkans, Euractiv, macedonia-what-s-next, retrieved on 4 January 2021. 29 August 2014, https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/ 44 Discours du Président de la République Emmanuel Macron à la merkel-seeks-to-strengthen-eu-ties-to-western-balkans/, retrieved conférence de Munich sur la sécurité 2020 (see footnote 38). on 15 December 2020. 12 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

monitoring is key to broadening the interface in sense, should not be a moving target, or else it runs the enlargement matters between the countries of the risk of being perceived as biased. Warsaw considers Western Balkans and the member states. However, existing criteria as set and (unlike France to some it can also be a source of inconsistency when assess- extent) does not question the European Commission’s ments diverge or political considerations prevail. This control over benchmarks, including on the rule of law. is, for instance, the case with regard to visa liberalisa- It has traditionally refrained from expressing critical tion for Kosovo, which France, together with some concerns over the failure of Western Balkans’ leaders to other member states, has resolutely opposed in recent implement reforms. In the past, Poland has often years. France has justified its opposition with the backed an even softer approach than the one pursued justification that »some recent progress has been by the Commission48. made, but not enough to stop the corruption«45 – an assessment that is not shared by the European Com- mission, which confirmed the fulfilment of all criteria in 2018, the European Parliament, which voted for opening negotiations, and by neither Germany nor Poland for that matter.

Poland, for its part, also remains a strong supporter of the conditionality principle. However, unlike France or Germany, which equate conditionality with tougher conditions, Poland stands for refraining from raising the accession bar or deviating from existing condi- tions. Regardless of the composition of its govern- ment, it is keen to view the accession process as primarily technical in nature and therefore sees no need to burden it with additional political elements that might delay the Western Balkans’ EU rapproche- ment46. For Warsaw, it is important that the prospec- tive member states »receive a tangible perspective of the next step on the path of integration once they implement the required reforms«47. Accession, in that

45 Réponse du Ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères à la question écrite n° 10179, Journal officiel de la République française, Sénat: débats parlementaires, 16 May 2019, http://www.senat.fr/questions/ jopdf/2019/2019-05-16_seq_20190020_0001_p000.pdf, retrieved on 14 December 2020. 46 Tomasz Żornaczuk, Polityka Polski wobec Bałkanów Zachodnich (see footnote 25). 47 Sejm, Response to interpellation no. 30610 on the slowdown [of the activities] of the Polish government regarding the enlargement of the European Union and NATO by Konrad Szymański, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 April 2019, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/ sejm8.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=BBCHMF, retrieved on 14 December 48 Tomasz Żornaczuk, Poland (see footnote 24). 2020. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 13

IV. Regional cooperation and bilateral disputes

Germany, France and Poland have all intensified The flexible structure of the Berlin Process also granted their support for regional cooperation in the Western the successive hosts of the yearly summit a degree Balkans in recent years, in particular within the of freedom in setting the agenda, pushing for certain framework of the Berlin Process. The initiative, priorities and (refraining from) following up on some launched outside the realm of the enlargement policy issues. Germany, for instance, started by prioritising by Angela Merkel in 2014, gathers a small group of connectivity, or, in Chancellor Merkel’s words, »doing member states and the United Kingdom, working everything for the growth of the region«52. France together with the countries of the Western Balkans to focused more on »soft« reconciliation and worked with keep enlargement on the EU’s agenda. The group Germany to prepare the establishment of the Regional endeavoured »to make additional real progress in the Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO). The organisation reform process« by focusing on resolving outstanding was modelled on the Franco-German Youth Office and bilateral and internal issues, achieving reconciliation has been promoted by a series of Franco-German joint and enhancing regional economic cooperation49. visits to the region at the ministerial and ambassadorial To achieve that end, the Berlin Process was initially level. France, at that time, did not follow up on the established for a period of five years, as a flexible, new focus set by Austria the year before – settling mini-lateral platform with no institutional setup, no bilateral disputes. For Poland, the priorities were the budget and no built-in steering or monitoring mecha- economy, connectivity, civil society and – inherited nism50. While the involvement of France as host of from the UK – security issues. Despite the London the yearly Summit in 2016 – following Austria and Summit’s failure to launch RECOM53, Poland followed preceding Italy – raised no eyebrows (given Paris’ upon reconciliation as it had some experience in relationship with Berlin), the co-optation of the UK and cooperating with the Balkans in this regard from the Poland as hosts of the Berlin Process Summit in 2018 Reconciliation and Memory initiative (later renamed and 2019 respectively came in some circles more as a Remembrance, Understanding, Future), which aimed to surprise: the former was caught up in Brexit while the pass the Polish-German experience to young people latter was historically more interested in the East and from the Western Balkans. A novelty brought to the was locked in a dispute with the European Commission Berlin Process by Poland was the Think Tank Forum. over the rule of law51. Moreover, Poland financially supported both RYCO and the action plan on small arms and light weapons (SALW), a Franco-German initiative seeking to tackle firearms trafficking within the framework of the OSCE.

49 Emphasis added. Final Declaration by the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans, 28 August 2014, https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/ archiv-de/meta/startseite/final-declaration-by-the-chair-of-the-confe- 52 Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, Ministerpräsident Rama rence-on-the-western-balkans-754634#, retrieved on 14 December 2020. und EU-Kommissionspräsident Barroso, Berlin, 28 August 2014, https:// 50 Florent Marciacq, The European Union and the Western Balkans www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressekonferenz-von-bun- after the Berlin Process: Reflecting on the EU Enlargement in Times of deskanzlerin-merkel-ministerpraesident-rama-und-eu-kommissionspra- Uncertainty, FES: Sarajevo, 2017, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sara- esident-barroso-am-28-august-2014-846734, retrieved on 16 December jevo/13948.pdf, retrieved on 14 December 2020. 2020. 51 Florian Bieber, It is time to ditch the Berlin Process, European Western 53 RECOM is the Regional Commission for establishing facts about war Balkans, 10 July 2018, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/07/10/ crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed on the time-ditch-berlin-process/, retrieved on 14 December 2020. territory of the former Yugoslavia. 14 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

All in all, the emphasis placed by the Berlin Process on To diffuse tensions and – tentatively – put an end to regional cooperation has been largely beneficial54. It any discussion implying an exchange of territory, accompanied key efforts at resolving outstanding France and Germany took the lead in organising an bilateral disputes in the region, for instance on the intergovernmental dialogue on the Kosovo-Serbia Macedonian name issue (in the course of which dispute. A first intergovernmental meeting within this negotiations with Greece were conducted under the framework held in Berlin in April 2019 was, according auspices of the United Nations). Angela Merkel visited to Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, »not about Skopje ahead of the renaming referendum of September accession negotiations«56 but »about a policy of stability 2018, Emmanuel Macron published a video message that we want for the region«57. Due to the limited expressing his support for the renaming agreement, progress achieved on that occasion and given the points and Jacek Czaputowicz backed the dialogue with Greece of contention on the EU’s accession policy agenda during a visit to Skopje prior to the conclusion of the ahead of the Council’s meeting, the second meeting Prespa Agreement. initially planned for June 2019 eventually took place in July 2020, under the auspices of the French President. The resolution of the name dispute gave rise to expecta- Ahead of this event, which likewise yielded scant tions that the stalled Belgrade-Pristina dialogue could results, the foreign ministers of France and Germany also gain new momentum, finally leading to a compre- jointly co-authored an article published in Serbia and hensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisa- Kosovo, calling on the leaders of the two countries to tion of relations between Serbia and Kosovo required stop any political manoeuvring and get serious about prior to accession. Instead, the idea of an exchange of solving the dispute58. territory as a solution to the Serbia-Kosovo dispute resurfaced. Supported with different motives and levels of intensity by the United States, the EU’s High Repre- sentative and the Presidents of Serbia and Kosovo (among others), the »land swap solution« did not trigger much opposition in France at first. This changed when Chancellor Merkel, anticipating the potential implica- tions of the deal for regional stability (and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular), voiced her firm and resolute rejection, arguing that »the territorial integrity of the states of the Western Balkans has been established and is inviolable«55. Poland, although not outspoken on this 56 Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem französischen question, likewise opposed any border changes. Präsidenten Macron zum Westbalkantreffen, Berlin, 29 April 2019, https:// www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pressestatements-von- bundeskanzlerin-merkel-und-dem-franzoesischen-praesidenten-macron- zum-westbalkantreffen-1604114, retrieved on 15 December 2020. 54 Florent Marciacq, Reviving Solidarity: A New Regional Approach to 57 Kosovo and Serbia agree to resume talks after Macron, Merkel push, Eu- Integrating the Western Balkans into a Stronger European Union. Sarajevo: ractiv, 30 April 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/ FES, 2019, http://oefz.at/2019/05/28/florent-marciacq-2019-reviving-solida- serbia-and-kosovo-agree-to-resume-talks-after-macron-merkel-push/, rity-a-new-regional-approach-to-integrating-the-western-balkans-into- retrieved on 14 December 2020. a-stronger-european-union/?lang=de, retrieved on 16 December 2020. 58 Jean-Yves Le Drian/Heiko Maas, Germany and France: »Restart the 55 Andrew Gray, Angela Merkel: No Balkan border changes, Politico, 13 Au- dialogue now!«, Koha Ditore/Kossev/Blic, 23 May 2020, https://www. gust 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-no-balkan-bor- auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-le-drian/2343952, retrie- der-changes-kosovo-serbia-vucic-thaci/, retrieved on 15 December 2020. ved on 15 December 2020. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 15

While many issues remain unresolved, the engagement of France, Germany and Poland in this highly political field remains promising. Mini-lateral formats of interaction, like the Berlin Process, have helped to more closely enmesh the Western Balkans with the EU’s political order and thus constitute an important complement to EU-driven accession approaches. For one, with its emphasis on regional cooperation, the Berlin Process has been an invitation to consider the Western Balkans from a holistic perspective, as more than the sum of the six countries that make up the region. This consideration is anything but innocuous, considering the enmities inherited from the past, deep-rooted regional interdependences, and the persistence of bilateral disputes across the region and beyond. The limited impact of the Berlin Process on the EU’s reformed approach to accession in this impor- tant area may come as a disappointment. The new methodology barely refers to regional cooperation and rather calls for intra-regional (country-specific) differ- entiation. However, this shortcoming in the EU’s approach renders the role of key member states such as France, Germany and Poland even more critical. 16 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

V. A blueprint for the Weimar Triangle’s enhanced engagement in the Western Balkans

With its three major member states, the Weimar The following blueprint offers a series of recommenda- Triangle is an influential grouping in the EU, but, tions for the countries of the Weimar Triangle that interestingly, enlargement has never occupied an takes into account the national sensitivities and important part of this trilateral format’s cooperation perspectives of France, Germany and Poland. It identi- agenda. Since the three countries have been particu- fies potential areas of cooperation, which could be larly active in the past few years in advancing and/ tapped for the benefit of the Weimar Triangle, the EU or reshaping the EU’s approach in enlargement mat- and the Western Balkans. ters, it appears that this lacuna in the Weimar Triangle’s agenda is not rooted in France, Germany or Poland’s lack of interest in these questions. Differ- ences on the surface among the approaches of the three countries to EU enlargement in the Balkans may explain their reluctance to explore untapped potential for cooperation.

Enhanced consultations in this format, building on shared strategic thinking and security motives, would not only further energise the Weimar Triangle by adding a new field in which France, Germany and Poland can join forces. It would also help to consolidate the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans and increase EU cohesion. To that end, the Weimar Triangle should build on existing bi- and trilateral initiatives pursued in the fields of reconciliation, regional cooperation and conflict resolution. By intensifying consultations in enlargement matters, France, Germany and Poland would then take one further step towards demonstrat- ing that this formula of cooperation »can play an important role to promote a strong, sovereign, demo- cratic and fair Europe«59.

59 Joint statement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Weimar Tri- angle, 15 October 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/ news/weimar-triangle/2405716, retrieved on 16 December 2020. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 17

1. 2. Send a joint political message Discuss contentious points within underlining the Weimar Triangle’s the Weimar Triangle unwavering commitment to the The potential for intergovernmental cooperation unification of Europe – with the among the countries of the Weimar Triangle is not limited to declaratory support. It goes beyond the countries of the Western Balkans as surface of converging interests and could be used future member states by France, Germany and Poland to strengthen affinities, foster mutual understanding and, consequently, The EU’s commitment to enlargement was repeatedly strengthen the Weimar Triangle as a constructive shattered in recent decades when individual member discussion format within the EU. However, this implies states used their veto right to block enlargement policy that the exchange of ideas between the three countries for undeserving reasons. Joint initiatives undertaken does not shun those issues on which France, Germany by Germany, Poland and France could help to reaffirm and Poland hold distinctive views. Perceptions on that the EU’s commitment to a fair and merits-based the importance of conditionality, on the EU’s credibility accession process is not just hot air and that member and the role of the rule of law in the accession process, states should refrain from unilaterally blocking the but also on Kosovo’s visa liberalisation and economic Western Balkans’ rapprochement towards the EU when cooperation, should not be omitted. Some of them this undermines the EU’s credibility. The experience directly reflect, or are rooted in, the countries’ respec- of the three countries in reuniting the continent proved tive positions regarding ongoing EU debates, e.g. on that they have the moral standing to do so: any block- the prerogatives of the EU as a political order. However, ade of the EU accession prospects of the countries of the while building common views among the member Western Balkans is an obstacle to the unification of a states on the future of the Union remains a challenge »strong, sovereign, democratic and fair Europe«. In for the years (or indeed decades) to come, exchanging this sense, a political declaration on a strong commit- views on the same issues within a circumscribed ment to the seriousness of EU enlargement policy based framework committing future (rather than actual) on existing conditionality would be of paramount member states would offer opportunities to approach importance, also given Bulgaria’s blockade of the these contentious points with greater distance accession negotiations with North Macedonia as of late and possibly pave the way for future convergence. 2020. The German Presidency of the Council took a very clear position on Bulgaria’s unilateral actions, but a strong voice from a leading coalition such as the Weimar Triangle would be beneficial. This could be supported by a number of other member states. 18 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

3. 4. Work on concerted communications Coordinate communications on on hybrid threats from Russia systemic threats posed by China

Common ground for the Weimar Triangle in enlarge- The geopolitical interest in boosting the EU’s strategic ment matters is the countries’ strategic interest in autonomy by – among other things – limiting anchoring the region in the EU’s political and legal the reinforcement of China’s positions in the Western order, with an emphasis placed on further democratisa- Balkans is shared by the countries of the Weimar tion. The pursuit of this strategic interest is hampered Triangle. Poland’s modest benefits – at best – from by Russia’s disruptive diplomacy. France’s advocacy for cooperation with China within the framework of the a reset in EU-Russia relations in 2019 – which has 17+1 initiative, France’s insistence on China being a yielded few results and caused disappointment in Paris – technological rival and Germany’s gradual understand- is unlikely to remain on the table. Meanwhile, in ing that China’s influence in Europe needs to be taken Germany, Alexei Navalny’s attempted poisoning trig- seriously suggest that convergence among the coun- gered an internal debate over Nord Stream 2. The tries of the Weimar Triangle on this issue is rising. consequence of this is growing convergence among the While the Economic and Investment Plan adopted by countries of the Weimar Triangle in acknowledging the the EU in October 2020 might help re-position EU disruptive role of the Kremlin in Europe. The Weimar funding opportunities vis-à-vis Chinese loans, the Triangle should thus explore concerted actions, includ- countries of the Weimar Triangle would gain in coordi- ing in the field of public diplomacy, to support the EU’s nating communications in that field. It would be communication instruments in countering more important, in particular, to underline the downsides, effectively Russian hybrid threats in the Western risks and vulnerabilities of Chinese economic diplo- Balkans. Concerted communications on the part of the macy. These countries could similarly be more vocal in Weimar Triangle regarding external (cyber) risks calling on the countries of the Western Balkans to emanating from Russia could enhance the EU’s cred- align their views with the EU’s, i.e. recognising China as ibility and support the European anchoring of the »a systemic rival promoting alternative models of countries of the region. governance«60 and countering China’s public diplo- macy. Since the Economic and Investment Plan is unlikely to meet the massive needs of the region, the countries of the Weimar Triangle could, furthermore, seek to increase the capacities of their respective development agencies to boost bilateral investments in the Western Balkans. In response to China’s soft power diplomacy (especially in the educational sector), they should finally step up the promotion of European culture and languages.

60 European Commission, EU-China – A strategic outlook, 12 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-eu-china-a-stra- tegic-outlook.pdf, retrieved on 14 December 2020. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 19

5. 6. Engage together in Put reconciliation higher on the security-related initiatives agenda and advocate jointly

The countries of the Weimar Triangle all view security The process of reconciliation has long been an impor- in the Western Balkans as an important priority for the tant element in Franco-German and Polish-German EU and as part of the accession process. This common relations. The three countries have, accordingly, devel- ground could serve to explore joint actions in this area, oped a vast legacy of achievements at the political and notwithstanding the different levels of engagement societal level, which they could share in more concerted among Weimar Triangle countries. Arguably, the ways. In the Western Balkans, the need for making Weimar Triangle could be used as a platform to reflect progress on reconciliation is cardinal, although the on the EU’s mediation efforts in the Western Balkans. approach to reconciliation cannot be imposed from the Chancellor Merkel and President Macron already set a outside. Lending support to regional reconciliation precedent with the intergovernmental dialogue on initiatives would send a strong signal with respect to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute. Its lack of results should not the most fundamental drivers of European integration. discourage the Weimar Triangle from establishing France, Germany and Poland could thus step up their channels of security-related dialogue with the coun- joint support for RYCO and jointly advocate the estab- tries of the region. The intergovernmental nature of the lishment of RECOM. The Weimar Triangle should Weimar Triangle could help to create an atmosphere finally express its firm commitment to depoliticising beneficial to political discussions on bilateral disputes European historiographies. The recent decision by in a way that complements the more technical negotia- Bulgaria to oppose the start of accession negotiations tions mediated by the EU. On a different note, Poland with North Macedonia shows that reconciliation issues could be associated more closely to the Franco-German go beyond the western part of the Balkans and also initiative aiming at controlling small arms and light affect the member states. The political use of historical weapons (SALW). The countries of the Weimar Triangle and linguistic issues to block the EU accession could consider carrying out a joint evaluation of the of neighbours undermines enlargement policy and results of this initiative and advance it further together runs counter to the spirit of reconciliation on the should the prospects be promising. European continent. 20 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

7. 8. Think together about the future of Support inter-parliamentary the Berlin Process cooperation

The Berlin Process, which aims to inject fresh momen- Inter-parliamentary cooperation between the countries tum into regional cooperation, covers a wide range of of the Western Balkans and EU member states is issues and flagship initiatives. While bringing benefits important in terms of advancing European integration to the region, their implementation remains difficult beyond government officials. In 2020, France planned and sometimes lacks consistency. In order to improve an inter-parliamentary conference within the frame- its effectiveness, the Weimar Triangle countries could work of the Berlin Process, which had to be postponed consider taking the lead in advancing a strategic due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Germany and Poland reflection on the future of the Berlin Process. This could could further intensify their association with this be achieved by convening an expert group to work on project, having both already entered into parliamentary looking back at what has been achieved and what the cooperative arrangements with partners from the prospects should be, including with regard to post- region, by supporting the initiative and perhaps host- pandemic recovery assistance. The fact that the 2021 ing its future meetings. Summit will be hosted by Germany, that France will take over the Presidency of the Council in 2022 and that the Weimar Triangle is about to celebrate its 30th anniversary would offer an opportunity to look forward and launch such strategic reflections. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 21

9. 10. Step up track-II and track-III Ensure that the Western Balkans diplomacy can actively participate in the

Experts and civil society organisations play an impor- Conference on the Future of Europe tant role in paving the way for greater convergence of In recent years, the EU, together with the Western views on enlargement matters. France, Germany and Balkans, has faced a long list of serious challenges, from Poland are no exception. These countries could use the the global economic and financial crisis in the late Weimar Triangle framework to intensify track-II and 2000s to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in the track-III dialogue with and among experts and civil early part of last year. These challenges have put the EU society representatives, as part of an exclusive formula to the test and a Conference on the Future of Europe (limited to the three countries) or with an inclusive one has been launched with the aim of overhauling the (i.e. open to representatives from the Western Balkans). general functioning of the Union. The Western Balkans The aim of such a dialogue would be to promote mutual should participate in, and contribute to, this reflection understanding and identify potential areas of coopera- on the future of Europe as its participation is crucial to tion. It would also allow the countries of the Weimar strengthening a community of purpose connecting the Triangle to step up their communication with broader region with the EU. The countries of the Weimar audiences. Triangle should push for the meaningful inclusion of the Western Balkans in the Conference on the Future of Europe. In so doing, they would signal their commit- ment in enlargement matters and enhance the cred- ibility of the EU’s strategic vision. 22 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

The Genshagen Foundation Germany, France and Poland for Europe

The Foundation European Dialogue – Political Thinking on Europe The Genshagen Foundation evolved from the Berlin- Convinced that European integration must be preserved and Brandenburg Institute for Franco-German Collaboration in deepened in order to secure peace, freedom, solidarity and Europe, which was founded in 1993 by historian Rudolf von prosperity in Europe in a sustainable manner, the Genshagen Thadden and Brigitte Sauzay, who later became an advisor Foundation is committed to the political dimension of to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Since 2005, the Europe’s future in the working section European Dialogue – Foundation has been run as a non-profit foundation under Political Thinking on Europe. Its projects promote reflections German civil law. Its founders and main sponsors are the on the internal cohesion of the European Union, its political German Government, represented by the Federal Govern- capacity to act and its role in the world. A solution-based ment Commissioner for Culture and the Media, and Land exchange takes place between experts and decision-makers Brandenburg. The most important third-party donor is the from politics, diplomacy, business and society in public and Federal Foreign Office. closed formats. Furthermore, the Foundation is focused on civil society in order to give young people in particular an understanding of Europe and to offer them a platform where they can articulate their own ideas. Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 23

Profile Genshagener Papiere The Genshagen Foundation aims to strengthen Europe’s cul- The »Genshagener Papiere« paper series addresses general tural diversity, political capacity to act, social coherence and topics of European politics as well as bi- and trilateral coop- economic dynamism. At the interface between civil society, eration between Germany, France and Poland. the state and the business world, the foundation operates in two working sections: Art and Cultural Mediation in Europe and European Dialogue – Political Thinking on Europe. We The series’ objective is to make the results of the Founda- focus on promoting and intensifying Franco-German and tion’s work available for a broader public. Thanks to the German-Polish relations, as well as facilitating the dialogue format’s flexibility, the series comprises both policy-oriented within the Weimar Triangle, which was founded in 1991 by texts and more scholarly articles and essays. Its authors the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland. As a include both established and younger academics, as well as forum for consultation and conversation, we seek to foster experts in European politics and journalists. The Genshagen- dialogue between the three countries as well as promote er Papiere are published several times a year. They are avail- European integration as a whole. The location of the Foun- able online, and in some cases also in a printed version. dation, Genshagen Castle, offers a space for encounters and exchanges between actors from the worlds of art, culture, politics, business, science and the media. Through its varied events and publications, the Foundation helps to identify new approaches and solutions to current and future chal- lenges in society and politics – always within the context of Europe. 24 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

About the authors

Florent Marciacq is Deputy Secretary General of the Aus- Tomasz Żornaczuk is Head of Central Europe Programme tro-French Centre for Rapprochement in Europe in Vienna and senior research fellow on the Western Balkans and EU and Senior Fellow at the Centre international de formation Enlargement at the Polish Institute of International Af- européenne in Berlin and Nice. Florent Marciacq holds a PhD fairs (PISM). Previously, he worked as a desk officer for the in Political Sciences from the universities of Luxembourg and Balkans at the Ministry of Interior and Administration. He Vienna. He previously worked as an associate researcher at is a graduate of the International Master’s Programme in the European Governance Research Group of the Univer- European Studies from Doğuş University in Istanbul and sity of Luxembourg, as an OSCE researcher-in-residence in from Maastricht University. He also holds degrees from the Prague and as a guest researcher at the Austrian National University of Warsaw in European Integration and in Slavic Defence Academy in Vienna. Florent Marciacq teaches Studies. An author of numerous analyses, policy reports and European politics as a guest lecturer at several universities, articles, he regularly advises the Polish government and the offers professional training in European affairs and engages EU institutions on the Western Balkans. He is also a guest in consultancy work for various ministries. He regularly lecturer at the College of Europe and the University of War- publishes academic peer-reviewed contributions, think tank saw, as well as for the Foreign Policy Study within PISM. policy papers and articles in the press.

Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 25

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This publication was funded by the Federal Foreign Office 26 Genshagener Papiere N° 27

List of previous publications within the paper series Genshagener Papiere

Koepf, Tobias; Koopmann, Martin; Töglhofer, Karolewski, Ireneusz P.: Kunz, Barbara: Theresia; Windwehr, Jana (Hrsg.) Deutschland, Polen und Europa. Eine After the end of the end of History: what Acting European? The European Union and Erfolgsgeschichte in der Bewährungsprobe, Europe should learn from the Ukraine the Weimar Triangle in the Coronavirus Crisis Genshagener Papier N°21, 02/2019 DE crisis for its foreign relations. Four lessons Genshagener Papier N° 26, 11/2020 EN and a ceterum censeo Schäfer, Isabel; Koepf, Tobias: Genshagener Papier N°15, 12/2014. EN Kundnani, Hans; Kuź, Michał Franco-German foreign policy cooperation The Weimar Triangle and the future of towards the Maghreb – converging goals, Mohsen-Finan, Khadija; Schäfer, Isabel: the West diverging policies Die Europäische Union und der Genshagener Papier N° 25, 09/2020 EN Genshagener Papier N°20, 11/2017. DE FR Mittelmeeraum. Deutsch und französische Perspektiven seit den arabischen Heurtaux, Jérôme; Tulmets, Elsa; Zerka, Pawel Delcour, Laure; Kowal, Paweł; Kunz, Barbara; Lang, Umbrüchen (L’Union européenne et l’espace The Third Side of the Weimar Triangle: Kai-Olaf; Parmentier, Florent; Szeligowski, Daniel; méditerranéen. Perspectives allemande Franco-Polish Relations in the Trilateral Tulmets, Elsa: et française depuis les révolutions arabes) Context (Re-)Engaging our Partners to the East: What Genshagener Papier N°14, 04/2014 FR DE Genshagener Papier N° 24, 04/2020 EN the Weimarer Triangle should do for the Eastern Partnership Bastos, Stephen; Fischer, Severin; Gabrisch, EN Grünhagen, Freya; Koepf, Tobias (eds.) Genshagener Papier N°19, 11/2017 Hubert; Kauffmann, Pascal; Koopmann, Martin; The changing global order – Which role for Schäfer, Isabel; Stark, Hans: the European Union? Koopmann, Martin: Europa als politisches Zukunftsprojekt. Europa braucht Weimar. Perspektiven Deutsch-Französische Impulse für die Genshagener Papier N° 23, 10/2019 EN des Weimarer Dreiecks in Krisenzeiten Erneuerung der EU (L’Europe : projet DE Reynié, Dominique Genshagener Papier N°18, 07/2016. EN politique de l’avenir. Impulsions franco- Auflösung des politischen Systems und allemandes pour un renouvellement de l’UE) DE FR Herausforderung Europa: die Präsident- Gustin, Philippe; Martens, Stephan: Genshagener Papier N°13, 02/2014. schaft von Emmanuel Macron am Deutschland und Frankreich. Der Neustart Scheideweg (Décomposition du système des europäischen Motors Demesmay, Claire; Koopmann, Martin; DE politique et l’Europe comme enjeu: la Genshagener Papier N°17, 01/2016. Thorel, Julien: présidence d’Emmanuel Macron fin 2018) Prüfen, straffen, reformieren. Institutionen Bonse, Eric: und Prozesse der deutsch-französischen Genshagener Papier N°22, 03/2019 DE FR Für eine ergebnisorientierte Politik: Zusammenarbeit in der Europapolitik Handlungsoptionen der Europäischen Union Genshagener Papier N°12, 06/2013. DE FR in der Krise (Pour une politique axée sur les résultats : les champs d’action possibles de l’Union européenne dans la crise Genshagener Papier N°16, 09/2015. DE FR Towards more cohesion in EU enlargement policy – tapping the potential of the Weimar Triangle 27

Brandt, Lisa; Kunz, Barbara: Lesser, Gabriele; Ostrowski, Marek; Vaissière, Jean- Transatlantic Relations in a multipolar world. Louis de la: French and German perspectives on security Das Weimarer Dreieck – Neue Impulse für and trade affairs Europa? (Le Triangle de Weimar – une Genshagener Papier N°11, 04/2013. EN nouvelle dynamique pour l’Europe ? Trójkat Weimarski – nowe impulsy dla Europy?) Major, Claudia: Genshagener Papier N°5, 02/2011. DE FR PL Viele europäische Soldaten, aber keine europäische Armee Becker, Peter: Genshagener Papier N°10, 12/2012. DE Auf dem Weg zu einem Europäischen Hochschulraum. Szenarien für die Tran Thiet, Jean-Paul: Fortsetzung des Bologna-Prozesses Das europäische Projekt neu begründen Genshagener Papier N°4, 01/2011. DE Genshagener Papier N°9, 04/2012. DE Andoura, Sami: Stiftung Genshagen; Institut Montaigne (Hrsg.): Energy Cooperation under the Aegis of the L’immigration et l’intégration en France, Weimar Triangle. Springboard for a Common en Allemagne et en Europe. Une enquête European Energy Policy d’opinion franco-allemande dans le cadre du Genshagener Papier N°3, 12/2010. EN Forum de Genshagen Genshagener Papier N°8, 11/2011. DE FR Ziebura, Gilbert: Deutschland und Frankreich in der Meister, Stefan: entstehenden Weltgesellschaft Sicherheitspolitischer Neustart zwischen Genshagener Papier N°2, 03/2010. DE Russland und der EU? Das Weimarer Dreieck, Russland und die östliche Nachbarschaft Demesmay, Claire; Enderlein, Henrik; Évrard, der EU Aurélien; Martens, Stephan; Oppeln, Sabine von: Genshagener Papier N°7, 07/2011. DE Eine neue Agenda für die deutsch- französischen Beziehungen (Un nouvel Adebahr, Cornelius: agenda pour les relations franco- The Comprehensive Approach to Crisis allemandes) Management in a Concerted Weimar Effort Genshagener Papier N°1, 01/2010. DE FR Genshagener Papier N°6, 03/2011. EN 28 Genshagener Papiere N° 26

EN

The »Genshagener Papiere« paper series addresses general topics of European politics as well as bi- and trilateral cooperation between Germany, France and Poland.

The series’ objective is to make the results of the Foundation’s work available for a broader public. Thanks to the format’s flexibility, the series comprises both policy-oriented texts and more scholarly articles and essays. Its authors include both established and younger academics, as well as experts in European politics and journalists. The Genshagener Papiere are published several times a year. They are available online, and in some cases also in a printed version.