Civil-Military Relations and Strategy: Theory and Evidence Dissertation
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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND STRATEGY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Jon A. Kimminau, Lt Col, USAF ***** The Ohio State University 2001 The views expressed are those of the author And do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US Government Advisory Committee: Approved By Professor Donald A. Sylvan, Chair/Advisor Professor Richard Herrmann ___________________________ Professor Ted Hopf Adviser Professor John Mueller Department of Political Science Copyright by Jon A. Kimminau 2001 ABSTRACT Do civilians deliberate national strategy differently than military officers? This dissertation begins with that question because the cross-disciplinary efforts of civil-military relations have to date shown relatively little empirical evidence on the differences between civilian and military strategy. There are a number of propositions about such differences that lie at the heart of theories of state and group behavior at international and domestic levels. In addition to thinking about civilians and the military as homogeneous groups, this research focused on civilian and military subgroups in order to better understand the divergent influences such groups exert on strategy as it is being developed. The design used content analysis to systematically measure differences between specified groups in their communicated strategies, which were gathered from four domains: analysis, organization, operations, and planning of US actors from 1995- 2000. The results are both significant and interesting for those interested in strategy and civil- military relations. Eight hypotheses concerning differences between civilians, the military, and their subgroups were tested on each of the dependent variables of offensiveness, uncertainty outlooks, and use of history in strategy. An enduring theoretical notion about civil-military relations is supported by evidence that the military is indeed significantly more offensive than comparable civilians. However, this offensiveness differential only seemed substantively large in ii the arena of doctrine, and was reversed in national missile defense. More importantly, offensiveness is critically related to context: “whether-to” deliberations of strategy reveal a more offensive civilian group, while only “how-to” discussions support the “offensive military” paradigm. Civilians are also greater users of history than is the military. The difference existed across all domains of strategy, but was most significant in doctrine and national missile defense. Civilians invoke the current case and the most recent war more often than the military—a strong indication that civilians are predisposed towards case-based reasoning. Civilians and military are characterized as approximately equal in including uncertainty in analytic and operational strategy; but civilians are significantly less uncertain in doctrine than the military, and more uncertain in NMD. An important proposition offered is that groups may be more likely to include more uncertainty when they feel competence in or responsibility for strategy. Among key findings here were the clustering effect of military services into Air Force/Navy and Army/Marine groups, and the intermediary role of defense civilians. One domain of strategy also proved to be vital in understanding strategy: evidence showed that doctrine is an exemplar of strategy, an area within which groups clarify their roles and reinforce uniqueness of function. Lastly, cultural explanations for civil-military relations and strategy were critically reviewed, and on each of the characteristics of strategy studied—offensiveness, use of history, and uncertainty—reasonable explanations can be cited as to the causal roles of both material resources and social structure, rather than iii organizational culture. Civil-military scholars will be well advised in future studies to consider that subgroups may consistently vary in values, beliefs and behavior in their approaches to the formulation of strategy. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I owe every good thing in my life to God, my parents and family, my wife and best friend Trish, and my kids Bekah, Erin, Riley and JJ. I want to especially thank Trish for her full and loving support throughout the experience of graduate school and this research. A number of people and organizations were also critical to my success. My adviser and mentor Don Sylvan not only shares a number of interests and perspectives in political science, he also is an excellent taskmaster, teacher, writer, and friend. The United States Air Force is my life profession, and it is also the source of outstanding jobs and the full-time support it took to engage in and complete this phase of my life. The Ohio State University aided me immensely by giving me a University Dean’s Fellowship that supported my book binges, supplies, and research. Last but not least, my other committee members—Rick Herrmann, Ted Hopf, and John Mueller—provided the encouragement and support necessary to complete this task in the time that military requirements allowed. I would be remiss if I did not finally mention the remaining faculty and graduate students of Ohio State as a continuous source of knowledge, friendship, and one of the best environments for learning I have ever seen. You truly do learn something every day. This task was immensely challenging and rewarding for an Air Force officer trained to be a military strategist supporting this nation’s security requirements. I was exceptionally lucky in that v neither the subject nor the research effort ever seemed tedious or boring, despite its intellectual and physical demands. I pray its results prove interesting and helpful to others. vi VITA May 4, 1960 …………………………… Born – McAllen, Texas 1982 …………………………………… B.S., US Air Force Academy 1984 ……………………………………. Master’s in Public Policy Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 1998 …………………………………… Master’s in Airpower Arts & Science Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL PUBLICATIONS 1. Kimminau, Major Jon A. (1997) “Joint Vision 2010”: Hale or Hollow? 1997 Colin L. Powell Joint Warfighting Essay Contest Winner, Proceedings 123/9/1, 78-81. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Other Fields: Political Psychology Airpower and Military Strategy Public Policy vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ……………………………………………………………………….. ii Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………… v Vita …………………………………………………………………………… vii List of Figures ………………………………………………………………… xi List of Tables ………………………………………………………………… xiv Chapters: 1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………….. 1 2. Civil-Military Relations and Strategy ……………………………………… 11 Hypotheses about Strategy ………………………………………………. 15 Strategy and Service Cultures ……………………………………………. 24 Hypotheses and Contexts for Study ……………………………………… 29 3. Methodology and Design …………………………………………………. 31 Methodology ……………………………………………………………… 32 Design …………………………………………………………………….. 37 Domains of Strategy ………………………………………………….. 38 Offensiveness …………………………………………………………. 44 Uncertainty …………………………………………………………… 54 Use of History ………………………………………………………… 60 viii 4. Civil-Military Actors and Factors ………………………………………… 66 Civilian and Military Subgroups ………………………………………….. 67 Cultural Factors and Symbolic Language ………………………………… 76 Strategic Reasoning Factors ……………………………………………… 83 Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Strategy ………………………… 86 5. Offensiveness ……………………………………………………………… 90 Offensiveness in Strategy Language ……………………………………… 91 Hypothesis A1 ……………………………………………………………. 97 Hypothesis B1 …………………………………………………………….. 103 Symbolic Language and Organizational Offensiveness …………………… 111 Summary ………………………………………………………………….. 114 6. Uncertainty ………………………………………………………………… 118 Uncertainty in Strategy Language ………………………………………… 119 Hypothesis A2 …………………………………………………………….. 124 Hypothesis B2 …………………………………………………………….. 128 Symbolic Language and Organizational Uncertainty ……………………… 134 Summary ………………………………………………………………….. 136 7. Use of History …………………………………………………………….. 139 Use of History in Strategy Language ……………………………………... 140 Hypothesis A3 …………………………………………………………….. 146 Hypothesis B3 …………………………………………………………….. 153 Symbolic Language and Organizational Use of History …………………… 161 Summary …………………………………………………………………… 162 8. Implications for Civil-Military Relations …………………………………... 165 Findings concerning the hypotheses ……………………………………….. 167 Offensiveness: A revised theory for civil-military relations and strategy …. 172 Doctrine: Is it strategy? Is it different? …………………………………… 179 Institutional Identities and Bureaucracy …………………………………… 189 The Organizational and Strategic Culture Hypotheses ……………………. 205 ix 9. Hypotheses for Future Study ……………………………………………… 221 Actors in Strategy-Making and Going beyond the US ………………….… 223 The “Price of Admission,” Contexts of Strategy, and theoretical categories .. 228 Doctrinal Strategy as leverage ……………………………………………… 233 Content Analysis Factors …………………………………………………… 236 Summary …………………………………………………………………… 241 10. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 244 Appendix A: Correspondence and Variable Functions ……………………….. 256 Appendix B: Coding Handbook ………………………………………………. 270 Appendix C: Conceptual Elements and Dictionaries …………………………. 284 Appendix D: Methodological Background……………………………………. 293 Appendix E: Strategy Essays Data …………………………………………… 309 Bibliography …………………………………………………………………… 314 Data Set Bibliography …………………………………………………….