Issue 62, 3d Quarter 2011

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

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USSOUTHCOM Inside Issue 62, 3d Quarter 2011

Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 From the Chairman Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Forum Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick Executive Summary Visual Design Editor Tara J. Parekh 6 Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A 8 Chairman’s Conference on Military Professionalism: An Overview Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich By Albert C. Pierce Design John Mitrione, Jeremy Swanston, U.S. Government Printing Office 10 Identity in the Profession of Arms By Ann E. Rondeau Who Is a Member of the Military Profession? By Matthew Moten Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 14 by 18 The Enlisted Force and Profession of Arms By Bryan B. Battaglia 20 Keeping Integrity By Leon A. Edney NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Professional Disagreement and Policy By Paul D. Eaton cross-component, professional military and 22 academic publishing house. It publishes books, journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, 25 A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism monographs, and special reports on national By Thomas P. Galvin security strategy, defense policy, interagency cooperation, national military strategy, regional 32 Know Yourself Before the Enemy: Military Professionalism’s Civil security affairs, and global strategic problems. Foundation By Ian Bryan

This is the official U.S. Department of Defense Special Feature edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without The Strategist as Hero By Colin S. Gray permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 37 Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever A Diplomat’s Philosophy By Marc Grossman material is quoted from or based on its content. 46 52 Planning Is Everything By Mark A. Bucknam COMMUNICATIONS On Military Theory By Milan Vego Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force 59 Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more Establishing a Framework for Intelligence Education and Training on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of 68 JFQ articles, and access to many other useful By Rebecca L. Frerichs and Stephen R. Di Rienzo NDU Press publications. Constructive com- ments and contributions are important to us. Commentary Please direct editorial communications to the link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: 74 Building the Security Force That Won’t Leave By William B. Caldwell IV Editor, Joint Force Quarterly and Nathan K. Finney National Defense University Press 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair 81 A Road Map for Beating Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Washington, DC 20319 Organizations By Martin Edwin Andersen Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 89 America’s Endangered Arsenal of Democracy By M. Thomas Davis FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 and Nathaniel C. Fick Email: [email protected] JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu

3d Quarter, July 2011 ISSN 1070-0692

From the Chairman

I recently spoke at the graduation for the West Point Class of 2011, and while my remarks were mostly directed to the next generation of Army leadership, there is a broader message for all of us. What follows is the crux of those remarks:

ver the last 4 years, one of the to formation,” “hair out of regs,” and my greatest privileges of this posi- personal favorite, “throwing snowballs,” for tion has been getting to know which he logged three demerits. O the men and women of the I have to admit, I beat Custer in this United States Army. Days like today remind department, having racked up 115 demerits us why our Army has played such a singular in a single day during my last year. What hap- and essential role in our nation’s history. In pened back then remains highly classified, many ways, the story of the United States but let’s just say that my offense was a little Army is the story of America—from our bit more serious than throwing snowballs. founding through the Civil War, a tumultuous So, yes, I have “walked the Area” a few times. 20th century, and right up until today. There were times when I owned the Area. I I was thinking about a figure so promi- could have built condos. who helped make it happen. So you ought nent in that story, someone with whom I Custer graduated last in his class, known to remember those who got you here: your can in many ways relate: George Armstrong as “the goat,” which I note is the same name moms, dads, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, Custer. His story as a Cadet isn’t too far from as Navy’s mascot. I also finished near the grandparents, and other family members. my own as a Midshipman, and, no, Custer and bottom. I just hope our stories end differently. Families, thank you for raising these I did not know each other personally. I went to If my record in school said anything, it fine women and men in small towns and large school in the ’60s, but not the 1860s. was, “Mullen, you are really going to have to cities all over this country, indeed, all over the Just as my performance at that “other” work hard in the Navy”—and I did, and the world. You instilled in your kids a desire to Academy was, shall we say, less than ideal, opportunities this life of service has provided serve, a willingness to sacrifice and to suffer— Custer’s record at West Point left something far exceeded anything I ever expected. I’ve quite and I’m not just talking about mechanical to be desired as well. A review of conduct simply had the chance to work with some of the engineering class. records at the time—and they do keep track best people in the world, gaining friends and Four years ago, you drove them through of those things—suggests he had marginal mentors who have supported and enriched me. the Stony Lonesome Gate, and you handed study habits and a proclivity for petty Indeed, none of us get to where we them over. You said, “Here, take my child in offenses, scoring demerits for “being late are on our own. There’s always someone this time of war, teach them how to lead and

2 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley)

Chairman delivers commencement address at United States Military Academy, May 2011

how to fight, teach them how to be good public or 12 years old, getting your braces off and It’s an Army tempered by 10 years of stewards and good leaders to good Soldiers.” getting yelled at for leaving dirty socks on the combat, an expeditionary force that has liter- It was a brave thing you did, and difficult. bathroom floor. ally rewritten just about every rule and every But it was probably more difficult driving away. We have been at war nearly half your scrap of doctrine it follows to adapt to the As the parents of two Naval Academy gradu- young lives. Yet all of you made a choice freely reality it now faces. ates, my wife, Deborah, and I know that feeling to serve your country, to come here to West It’s an Army not much bigger than it was all too well—the pride, the fear, the incredible Point. Your choice, your commitment, speaks on September 11 that is now organized around elation of returning home and knowing you well not only of your character, but also of Brigade Combat Teams instead of divisions, won’t have to pick up dirty socks off the bath- your courage. For that, I deeply respect and that deploys more modular and more flexible room floor anymore or scrape pizza cheese thank each of you. capabilities than ever before, that can kill the off the inside of the microwave or jump in the Today, you become a commissioned enemy swiftly and silently one day and then family car only to find the gas on “E.” officer in the ranks of the most respected help build a school or dig a well the next. Today, of course, is really all about military on Earth, the vast majority of you It’s an Army that understands the the Class of 2011. When this country was heading into the Army, the very center of power of ballots as well as bullets and culture attacked on 9/11, most of you were just 11 gravity of our force. as well as conflict, an Army that has surged ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 3 Afghanistan, the support we are providing over the skies of Libya, and the security we ensure around the globe. You’re going to be a member of that team. You’re going to be expected to support and to have courage and to lead that team almost from day one, and that is a tall order, hard enough all by itself. But today I’m going to give you another assignment. I’m going to ask you to take on yet another duty, an obligation far more complex and yet just as important as small- unit leadership. I’m going to ask you to be a Statesman as well as a Soldier. I’m going to ask you to remember that you are citizens first and foremost. This great republic of ours was founded on simple ideas—simple but enduring. One of these is that the people, through their elected representatives, will, as the Constitution stipulates, raise an army and maintain a navy. The people will determine the course Soldiers take cover behind hill while receiving enemy fire near that the military steers, the skills we perfect, village of Mereget, Logar Province, Afghanistan, May 2011 the wars we fight. The people reign supreme. We answer to them. U.S. Army (Sean P. Casey) We are therefore—and must remain—a neutral instrument of the state, accountable to to the fore of our national consciousness, not observation posts. By morning, they our civilian leaders, no matter which political by being a bulwark but rather by being an encountered an enemy force that not only party holds sway. agent of change. outnumbered them, but also surrounded But we can never forget that we, too, It’s an Army of flesh and blood, an their position, closing into within hand are the people. We, too, are voters and little Army of young men and women like your- grenade range. Greg fiercely led his Soldiers league coaches and scout leaders and crossing selves who signed up willingly to face danger to safety, placing himself in the line of fire. guards—or at least we should be. We, too, and to risk their lives for something greater Under his lead, they repelled the opposing have an obligation to preserve the very institu- than those lives. force long enough for support to arrive, tions that preserve us as a fighting force. Your job is to lead them and lead them denying the enemy key terrain. As George Washington so eloquently well. That is what they expect of you. Actually, When asked what inspired him to lead put it, “When we assumed the soldier, we did it isn’t a job at all; it’s a duty. For those of you like that, he looked down at his boots and said not lay aside the citizen.” who have no prior service, you are going to be simply, “My Soldiers.” So it is not enough today that we deploy. awestruck at the manner in which these young I spent more time with the Army in my It is not enough today that we fight. It is not Soldiers do their duty every single day. two terms as Chairman than I have any other enough today that we serve, unless we serve A couple of years ago, I visited a unit Service, and I know what he means. also the greater cause of American self-gov- high atop a hill in the Korengal Valley in Those troops had been out there 14 ernment and everything that underpins it. Afghanistan. You stand up there and you look months. They had seen a lot of tough fighting Self-government is not some sweet dish at the utter desolation of the place and the and lost a lot of good Soldiers, good buddies. upon which a people may indulge themselves. spartan conditions these young people are They knew they were going home soon, but It requires work and effort, sacrifice and living in and you cannot help but get a little they wanted to point out to me all the places strain. It may at times leave a bitter taste, and thick in the throat. nearby where they could venture because they because it does, self-government burdens us I awarded the Silver Star to a young had learned about the culture and had figured equally with obligation, as well as privilege. officer at that outpost, Captain Greg Ambro- out how to work with the tribal leaders. Now, please don’t misunderstand me. sia, Class of 2005. He earned that medal for When they yelled “hooah” after the I do not understate the importance of mili- actions the year prior when he was a first ceremony, it wasn’t because they were proud tary service, and I am not suggesting that lieutenant, just 2 years after graduating from of their new medals. It was because they were one who serves in uniform has not wholly West Point. proud of the difference they knew they were or without honor rendered the Nation its Leading his Soldiers in a nighttime making together as a team. It’s that team due. Quite the contrary. I have been to the air assault into enemy territory, Lieuten- that has made possible the success we’ve seen field hospitals. I have been to Dover. I’ve ant Ambrosia established key high ground in Iraq, the progress we are now making in seen good men and women laid to rest at

4 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ­Arlington. I know well the full measure of been a little busy. But that doesn’t excuse us Today’s operating environment is a devotion that so many have paid. from making the effort. That doesn’t excuse dynamic landscape that grows more intercon- Some of them have come from the Long us from our own constitutional responsibili- nected and interdependent every day. Yet Gray Line, like First Lieutenants Chris Goeke, ties as citizens and Soldiers to promote the we still struggle to make the most basic of Sal Corma, and Robert Collins from the Class general welfare, in addition to providing for connections, the relationships that matter so of 2008, and most recently, First Lieutenant the common defense. We must help them much. As you go from here, please seek also Daren Hidalgo, Class of 2009. understand, our fellow citizens, who so des- to go beyond the technical knowledge you’ve Daren was hit by shrapnel in early perately want to help us. gained and broaden your views. Try to see February but declined surgery to his left leg, The first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs things through others’ eyes and leverage every opting instead for antibiotics and pain meds of Staff, General Omar Bradley, once said, opportunity to better understand and to be so he wouldn’t be sidelined from his Soldiers. “Battles are won by the infantry, the armor, better understood. He joked with his dad on the phone about the artillery and air teams, by soldiers living Know that our trust and confidence setting off metal detectors. Sixteen days later, in the rains and huddling in the snow. But go with you. The American people go with Daren was killed by an antitank mine, the wars are won by the great strength of a nation, you. We are grateful for who you are and all 81st graduate in these wars to be added to the the soldier and the civilian working together.” that you will do for the Army, and shoulder- somber role in Cullum Hall. It’s not enough that you learn your to-shoulder with your fellow citizens, for the Daren came from a proud military skill and lead your troops. You must also Nation and for the world. family, his dad a 1981 West Point grad; his help lead your nation, even as second Thank you for your service. May God oldest brother, Class of 2006, currently serving lieutenants. You must win these wars, yes, bless each and every one of you and your his fourth tour in Afghanistan; and another by working alongside civilians and with families, and may God bless America. JFQ brother, a Marine who served twice in Iraq. other departments of our government, with Yes, you all understand quite well the international forces, contractors, and non- MICHAEL G. MULLEN sacrifices demanded by military service. governmental agencies. Admiral, U.S. Navy What I am suggesting is that we in But you also must win them at home Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff uniform do not have the luxury anymore of by staying in touch with those of your troops assuming that our fellow citizens understand who leave the Service; by making sure the it the same way. families of the fallen are cared for and thought Our work is appreciated. Of that, I am of and supported; by communicating often certain. There isn’t a town or a city I visit and much with the American people to the where people do not convey to me their great degree you can. pride in what we do. Even those who do not support the wars support the troops. But I fear they do not know us. I fear they do not comprehend the full weight of the burden we carry or the price we pay when we return from battle. This is important because a people uninformed about what they are asking the military to endure is a people inevitably unable to fully grasp the scope of the responsi- bilities our Constitution levies upon them. Were we more representative of the population, were more American families touched by military service, like that of the Hidalgo family, perhaps a more advanta- geous familiarity would ensue. But we are a small force, rightly volunteers, and less than 1 percent of the population, scattered about the country due to base closings, and fre- quent and lengthy deployments. We are also fairly insular, speaking our own language of sorts, living within our own unique culture, isolating ourselves either out of fear or from, perhaps, even our own pride. The American people can therefore be forgiven for not possessing an intimate knowl- U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley) edge of our needs or of our deeds. We haven’t Chairman arrives at Forward Operating Base Jackson, exactly made it easy for them. And we have Afghanistan, April 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 5 Executive Summary

he keys to success in any opera- well-organized, -trained, and -equipped force it means to wear the military uniform and tion include intense preparation can have on the strategic level of war with lead in today’s joint force. You will have an and a constant “scan of the the killing of Osama bin Laden. Demonstrat- opportunity to reflect on Admiral Mullen’s skies” to be aware of changes ing the ability to leverage the lessons of past thoughts on leadership and military profes- T sionalism while reading the views of others on in the operating environment. While flying, operations, U.S. joint forces have set the stan- pilots call this skill “keeping your head on dard for military professionalism in execution this critical component of continued military a swivel” in order to keep the craft headed of their assigned missions worldwide. Every success. Not everyone agrees on just what a to the target while being ready to react to American has the right to be proud of what military professional is, so the discussion of changes. Clearly, world events are causing these men and women have done after nearly what it means to be a professional in the U.S. all of us to have a robust scan to absorb the 10 years of war. military should be renewed from time to time changes we are experiencing. Being a profes- One of the key issues that Admiral Mike as a measure of where our force is and where sional member of the U.S. military requires Mullen has highlighted and reinforced during it needs to go. JFQ is proud to offer just such a all who serve to be prepared to execute the his term as Chairman is military professional- jumping-off point. mission when called on, regardless of expecta- ism. As he repeatedly states, leadership is the In the Forum, in addition to the tion. Change is a constant, we are told. one characteristic of military service that he speeches from the Chairman’s January 2011 As I write this summary, we have been cares about most. In this issue, Joint Force Conference on Military Professionalism, given a clear demonstration of the impact a Quarterly provides several aspects of what introduced by Dr. Al Pierce, we present two

U.S. Navy SEAL team conducts U.S. Navy (Ashley Myers) direct-action mission training

6 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ELIASON articles on the subject. In the first of the two companion pieces, Colonel Thomas Galvin suggests a “domain-based” model for examining the question of whether the DOD (Donna Miles) profession of arms is indeed a profession. Next, an experienced and highly success- ful faculty member from the School of Advanced Air and Spaces Studies, Lieutenant Colonel Ian Bryan, enters the debate on when officers should begin seriously considering and learning how to be successful within the civil-military environment in which all general and flag officers operate (far sooner than most do, in his estimation) by offering some suggestions on how this is best done. The Special Feature section has five articles that offer a chance to expand “think- ing space” in terms of strategy, diplomacy, planning, and theory, as well as intelligence training and education. Professor Colin Gray, who has been an important contributor to Air Force Aeromedical Evacuation and Critical Care Air Transport Team prepares Soldier wounded by IED JFQ over the years, places the label of “hero” attack to travel to Walter Reed Army Medical Center on the strategist and explains why becoming a good strategist is both a difficult road for and secure Afghanistan. Martin Andersen much neglected area of joint professional the individual and of ultimate importance to then suggests a plan for defeating transnational military education and nuclear issues, Pro- the nation he or she serves. While thinking of criminal organizations in Latin America, fessor Steven Cimbala discusses the calculus strategy, members of the military often have which have so far adapted and survived many of nuclear arms in today’s complex strategic no direct means for gaining an understanding efforts to stop them. Given the state of our mili- environment. Colonel Reginald Smith helps of how the “line officers” of the State Depart- tary forces after more than 20 years of overseas us understand the strategic considerations ment think or the role a diplomat plays in the operations from Desert Shield/Desert Storm of the Arctic, an area that is now under the areas that he operates in. Written well before onward, M. Thomas Davis and Nathaniel Fick responsibility of U.S. Northern Command. he was selected as the second U.S. Special suggest that despite the fact that the United With an increasingly costly environment for Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambas- States retains the best defense industrial base traditional power generation, Colonel Paul sador Marc Grossman discusses his insights, in the world, the relationship between this base Roege lastly discusses several important which will no doubt be validated as he works and the government needs to be improved in options for powering our military operations through the issues of his new position. Next, light of the steady consolidation and specializa- in the future. National War College faculty member Colonel tion of the industries involved. Given the addi- As always, JFQ provides four engag- Mark Bucknam, a former member of the tional $400 billion reduction in the Defense ing book reviews along with a joint doc- Secretary of Defense planning team, helps us budget over the next 10-plus years, this rela- trine update. Lieutenant Colonel Robert get a better understanding of how the combat- tionship will become increasingly important to ­Holdsworth adds to the doctrine debate with ant commands’ Adaptive Planning efforts get right because of the obvious reconstitution his discussion of securing airspaces around have fared under Secretary of Defense Robert needs of all Services. airfields in the joint battlespace. Gates. Expanding JFQ’s partnerships across The Features section offers an impor- We continue to receive many high the Defense Department’s education institu- tant set of articles to remind us of how quality submissions to JFQ each week to tions, we present Professors Rebecca Frerichs complex our world is—and the likely need select from for the October edition, and we and Stephen Di Rienzo of the National Intel- for an agile joint force in the years to come. will showcase the winners of the Secretary ligence University, who advocate a path to Rear Admiral Steven Romano provides an of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs better organizing how our intelligence profes- excellent case study in complex operations of Staff Essay Competitions as well. Given sionals learn how to support national security. based on his experiences as the U.S. Euro- the continuing turbulence in the Middle The Commentary section has three pean Command J4 during the Georgia crisis East and the likelihood of operating in con- distinct, strategically important articles that of 2008. Throughout the past few issues, JFQ tested spaces in the future, we need to keep take us from Afghanistan to Latin America has had a number of articles about China, expanding our scan and thinking ahead of and back to the homeland. Lieutenant General but none that provided the level of insight our position to remain the best in the world William Caldwell and Captain Nathan Finney that Major Mark Snakenberg does on the at what we do. JFQ provide a timely and in-depth assessment of critical subject of China’s junior officer and efforts to organize, train, and field the Afghan noncommissioned officer education. In an —William T. Eliason security forces that will enable a more stable effort to provide ammunition to support a Editor ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 7 Chairman’s Conference on Military Professionalism AN OVERVIEW

By ALBERT C. PIERCE

eaders of Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) and others who With able logistical and administrative support from NDU’s follow his speeches know that Admiral Mike Mullen Center for Strategic Conferencing, INSEL organized a 1-day program of has been concerned for the past several years over pos- featured speakers and panels. It also commissioned and produced two sible erosion of the professional military ethos. A decade products on military professionalism and has made them available on R 1 of war, the so-called Revolt of the Generals, active campaigning for its Web site. INSEL is in the process of posting on its Web site a video Presidential candidates by retired flag officers, and other factors have of all the conference speakers and panels. It is also planning to publish challenged many of the traditional tenets of military professionalism an anthology of readings on military professionalism through NDU in the Armed Forces. The Chairman has called for introspection and Press. Other products and programs are being considered as part of this reflection on the part of the members of the profession and asked that ongoing INSEL project. more attention be paid to these issues across the spectrum of profes- As another way to share the conference deliberations more widely, sional military education (PME) and training. JFQ graciously offered to publish edited versions of some of the confer- Admiral Mullen asked the Institute for National Security Ethics ence presentations. This special section that follows includes edited and Leadership (INSEL) at the National Defense University (NDU) transcripts of remarks by Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, USN (Presi- to explore these issues, and specifically to convene a conference that dent of NDU); Colonel Matthew Moten, USA; Sergeant Major Bryan would stimulate such introspection and reflection and encourage the Battaglia, USMC; Admiral Leon Edney, USN (Ret.); and Major General PME community to rethink how it approaches such questions. Paul Eaton, USA (Ret.). The conference took place at NDU on January 10, 2011. The Chair- As INSEL director, I am pleased that we were able to host the man’s guidance helped INSEL determine both the kind of speakers and conference and produce materials that can be used across the military audience for the conference. In the spirit of introspection and reflection, education and training community and beyond. I thank the editors of all but one of the speakers were Active-duty or retired military profession- JFQ and the leadership and staff of NDU Press for their active support als. To respond to the Chairman’s appeal to PME, INSEL invited leaders and assistance. JFQ from across the military and education community. Admiral Mullen served as keynote speaker. A former Chairman, General Richard B. Myers, now the Colin Powell Chair of Leadership, Ethics, and Character NOTE at INSEL, was also a featured speaker, as was a former Deputy Secretary of 1 See Richard Swain, “The Obligations of Military Professionalism: Service Defense, The Honorable John Hamre. Unsullied by Partisanship,” December 2010, available at ; and “Military Professionalism: An Annotated Bibliography on the Nature and Ethos Dr. Albert C. Pierce is Director of the Institute for National Security Ethics and of the Military Profession,” December 2010, available at .

8 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu PIERCE

Chairman presents keynote speech at military professionalism conference held January 10, 2011, at National Defense University National Defense University (Katherine Lewis)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 9

RONDEAU especially for those of us in the business of ­demonstrated by showing the moral courage Vice Admiral Rondeau professional military education and training, to offer dissenting views and opinions where speaks at NDU military this comes down to what and how we teach, and when appropriate. I believe in healthy and professionalism conference and how we learn, and how we transmit to transparent relationships with Congress. those around us in our profession what we say, what we believe, and ultimately, and perhaps His beliefs, our beliefs, any beliefs are most importantly, who we are. important because they drive culture, and Transmitting belief and culture is fairly culture provides meaning, and meaning basic. How that belief and culture are then guides behavior. As members of the Armed understood, interpreted, translated, internal- Forces of the United States, our beliefs, our ized, and applied—that is, put into prac- culture, and our meaning are such that we— tice—can be complicating and complicated. and the American people we serve—simply Meaning is essential and significant both per- assume, even know, that we will sacrifice when sonally and culturally. Leaders set the tone for needed, and ultimately, if necessary, give that the culture of their organizations. Meaning “last full measure of devotion” that President of the community, no matter how defined, Abraham Lincoln invoked at Gettysburg. becomes essential for interconnectedness, Admiral Mullen and his generational for bonding, and for understanding. It all peers—I am one of them—were part of has to do with the relationship between the the Vietnam generation, a generation that organization and the individual. What does perhaps lost sight of traditional military the Navy mean to me? What does it mean for beliefs, or even came to abandon some of me? Meaning becomes essential as a reference them. Having lost sight of our own beliefs, point for integrity in all its parts and in all its and maybe adopting some new ones, we were definitions. Meaning serves to define authen- not in a sound position to positively affect ticity and can be both the inspiration and an the American people’s beliefs about and aspiration. Understanding meaning can also attitudes toward their military. It took us a National Defense University (Katherine Lewis) give coherence to our actions. long while to work our way out of that—and Leaders matter. And it is our leader, to win back the respect and support of the the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, people we serve. own memory, but what had I read that might Admiral Mike Mullen, who has been asking Ethos, culture, and meaning are matters be useful? us to think about what we have become external to us as individual military members, If we contend that personal account- over time. He began his time as Chairman things that help shape, inform, and provide ability is critical to a sense of ethical by articulating a set of beliefs. Why is this reference points and touchstones. What I conduct, then we must also contend that important? Because cultures are set by leaders intend to turn to now is that which is inside of identity—how someone sees himself/ and what they believe, and what they instill us: our identity. How does identity influence herself—is essential to ethical understand- in us helps mold us. Cultures are about belief. and inform what is inside of us, how we act ing. If we claim that we should own our In this all-volunteer military and in this and behave, and what we believe? Let me enter actions, then our personal identity must be precious democracy, our people will draft or this topic with a story. connected with moral responsibility. walk or march away from us if our culture When I first got assigned to Great It was that notion that struck me as I and our beliefs are misaligned, misguided, Lakes as the commander for Navy training reread Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam, misinterpreted, or misused. If we are not clear and accessions, training for both enlisted Malham Wakin’s War, Morality and the Mili- about who we are, how can the people we cadre and officer corps outside of the Naval tary Profession, and James D. Hunter’s The serve understand who we are? Academy, I had a 22-day turnaround, and the Death of Character, and other books, while When he became Chairman, Admiral move occurred a month after the events of in transit to Great Lakes. Identity becomes Mullen clearly laid out what he believed in: 9/11. I did not have much time to study about important—both in how we identify ourselves what I needed to do to understand this new and how our culture identifies us. Identity I believe in civilian control of the military. . . . I mission I was given. is thereby linked to some social connection believe in preserving the trust and confidence So I pulled out from my library a of the American people. . . . I believe in holding number of books that I read in the past and myself accountable and others. . . . I believe that I decided to review, so that I could better if we contend that personal obedience to authority is the supreme military understand the context of training, especially accountability is critical to a virtue underpinning the very credibility with as we entered a period of war. I would focus which we exercise command and control. . . . on methodologies, pedagogy, and the science sense of ethical conduct, then I believe true loyalty to our superiors is best of learning. What was some of the historical we must also contend that context that I could draw upon from books I identity is essential to ethical Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, USN, is President of had read? I had the personal and professional understanding the National Defense University. experience of the Vietnam War era in my ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 11 FORUM | Identity in the Profession of Arms

Soldiers return fire during combat operations in Kunar Province, Afghanistan U.S. Army (Cameron Boyd) U.S. Army (Cameron

with responsibility. To be defined as a “profes- on accountability when anyone—whether ing principles and desegregating realities? sional,” in contrast with being an “amateur” deemed by some to be a professional or not— What is the common identity? We need to or a “nonprofessional,” has implications for embarrasses the institution or otherwise vio- understand these matters as leaders, learners, meaning, expectations, standards, tolerance, lates basic norms of professional conduct and educators, teachers, and trainers because they and qualifying criteria. We need to say what comportment. Why should any individual feel are central elements and key attributes of the we mean and mean what we say as we link morally responsible, professionally respon- military profession. words of identity with accountability and sible, to an organization if others in that We are willing to discuss what we responsibility. organization define that individual in negative believe, but we are much more conflicted as to For example, there is an ongoing terms: that he or she is “not a professional”? what that means—the meaning of that Soldier, debate about whether noncommissioned Or, in another example, “nonrated”? Sailor, Marine, Airman, and Coastguardsman officers (NCOs) and other enlisted person- We Sailors talk a lot about things on point—because while we can say that it is nel are members of the military profession, that are important to us, things that have tactical, today it is also strategic. or whether only officers are members of the always been important to us as Sailors and We must understand ourselves as pro- profession. I find that Samuel Huntington as military professionals. But circumstances fessionals if we want to further this conver- argument from 1958 (that enlisted personnel change, and new circumstances pose new sation about professional ethics. It is then are not members of the profession) to be a challenges and raise new questions. For that we can better answer Admiral Mullen’s conceit of intellect rather than a wisdom of example, in the contemporary environment, question about what we have become. We understanding, and not just an artifact of the can we Sailors understand what the moral talk about being a profession of arms, and time in which he wrote. I find the argument conflict is in close-order combat, the way we nod our heads that we understand what about who is a professional, and who is not, to that the ground Soldier has to understand it? this means. be an interesting issue about identity, so let me Do we who do distance-firing truly under- Yet I submit this issue in the context act as provocateur. stand the moral dimensions of close-order of our present age: The “profession of arms” There is something wholly undemo- weapons and the effects of ordnance and of has been encroached upon mightily by the cratic, I would argue, about denying that weapons that come close, even as close as ethics of the contractor on the battlefield, by entire groups of skilled people are not profes- knives? What is the identity of a Sailor in the information age, and by what command sionals by some conceit of definition, when, in this context? What is a Soldier if we put her authority is all about. How do we under- reality, we fully expect professional conduct to sea? Does environment matter? How are stand what is required in the profession from them and become incisively focused decisions made when we are outside the cul- of arms in the context of the health of the tural context, norms, and standards of the force? How do we understand the profes- professional culture in which we have been sion of arms as we train our good people to there is something wholly trained and educated and that we experi- be effective and lethal warfighters at one undemocratic about denying ence? Is our identity as a Sailor the same as turn, and then humanitarian responders that entire groups of skilled that of the Soldier or Marine, or is it inter- at another turn, and strategic communica- people are not professionals estingly, even significantly, different? tors at yet another—the same people doing What is it that brings all of us military all three functions alternately, sometimes by some conceit of definitio professionals together? What are the aggregat- simultaneously? We do so always with an

12 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu RONDEAU

the moral requirement for the American military member today is exquisitely more demanding than that for my Admiral Mullen emphasizes point at NDU generation military professionalism conference

expectation of effects and affects that ensure alignment with and allegiance to the ethics and moral principles of “the culture.” How do we as teachers, trainers, mentors, learn- ers, and leaders ourselves put that across in our schoolhouses, our training environ- ments, our commands? So, to come back to my story, when I got to Great Lakes, I recognized that all the Services had been doing some interesting work, and the Army was doing some great work, but here I was, in November 2001. National Defense University (Katherine Lewis) And there was confusion in most of our students as to what we—as a military and What does that mean in the cyber age? How and for our oath demands that we continue as a nation—were going into and what we do we define the enemy’s will in the cyber to remain an apolitical instrument of the were facing. So at Great Lakes we began to age? How do we attribute cause in the infor- state. That means being apolitical in our acts do things like the Sailor’s Creed, which has mation age and cyberwarfare, so that just and in our words, whether outside the ward everything to do with identity. The words “I retribution is exacted, rather than random room, on the flight line, within the barracks, am” become essential: “I am a United States acts of revenge being committed? How do we or in the halls of the Pentagon. Over nine Sailor. I will support and defend the Con- measure “sacrifice” and “violence” in these years of close-quarter combat has changed stitution of the United States.” Note that the particularized contexts of warfare outside many aspects of what we do. It must not “am” (the identity, who we are) comes before the short sword and knife? These are impor- change who or what we are as a professional the “will” (what we do). A creed connects tant leading questions that we have to ask disciplined force. self-professing identity and belief with the and that are being asked of us. skill sets required for action. Reflection and Earlier this year, I was exchanging Admiral Mullen has it right. The introspection precede action—identity comes emails with my two nephews, one an ensign young folks are beginning to talk about this, before reasonable and rational accountabil- in flight training and the other a college and it is important for us as leaders and ity. Professionals profess before they act. This graduate and philosophy major. The con- educators to set off on the mark. Who are discipline is older than the Spartans. versation evolved into a discussion about we? What and who have we become? What The moral requirement for the Ameri- standards and conduct and about what the do we do, and why do we do it the way we can military member today is exquisitely more American people expect of their public do? We owe this introspection and reflec- demanding than that for my generation. So servants and in particular those public tion to the young ones who wear the same we talk about the warfighter ethic and the servants who wear the Nation’s cloth. It was uniforms we do. “Take care of your people” warrior ethos, but I would submit that it is the philosophy major nephew who made a means more than providing them the beans no longer just about being the Spartan with most interesting declaration: “So much is and bullets they need to do their jobs and a short sword. It is also not just about being asked of . . . the military. We need to under- to accomplish the missions we give them. on the bomber or ship that delivers weapons stand what we ask of them, and they need to It also means providing them with an ethos from afar, and thus perhaps not having the understand what we trust. Do we establish and a culture and a meaning that will clarify sense of what’s right and wrong—and the intolerances even as we ask for more from for them who they are—their identity—and consequences of each—that the infantryman the military?” therefore what they should do—and what has. To what extent does distance remove us In his Chairman’s guidance for 2011, they should not do—in the demanding and from our conscience, or challenge it, or make Admiral Mullen offers a partial answer: dangerous assignments we send them on. it work differently? They belong to the American people, and One of the realities that has always As we advance these priorities within this on behalf of the American people, we, the informed us in the past has been the level of guidance, our professionalism must remain seniors, officer and NCO, are their custodi- sacrifice. Blood is the risk, blood is the price, beyond reproach. The American people and ans. If we do our part in forming them, they and so blood is our measure and our mod- their political leadership closely scrutinized will surely do their part—out there where it erator. Is that true anymore in a cyber age? our conduct and rightly so. Respect for them counts the most. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 13 FORUM | Who Is a Member of the Military Profession?

Who Is a Member of the Military Profession?

By MATTHEW MOTEN

rom time to time in the United States, a clearly defined word will find itself dragooned by popular culture to serve the common lexicon. Before long, that proud old word will get bandied about so much that it changes and morphs into F something that is at once broader and less than its former self. The term profes- sional is such a word. Today, everyone wants to be a professional. All sorts of trades, skilled and unskilled, bill themselves as professional. The sides of many 18 wheelers advertise that their firms are “the professionals.” Gargantuan human beings entertain us at sporting events, insisting that they are professional. The toilet paper dispenser in the latrine near my office proudly declares that it is a “Kimberly-Clark Professional.”

Naval officer renders salute during national anthem

U.S. Marine Corps (Andrea M. Olguin)

14 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MOTEN

We should applaud the efforts of the Armed Forces to commence a debate Secretary Gates teaches political science class at U.S. Military Academy about the profession of arms. I will argue, however, that the effort is only worthwhile if we manage to establish some rigor in the terms profession and professional. We must have clear standards about what we mean by those terms. We need to understand what professions are and who professionals are before we try to define the profession of arms. Moreover, to be meaningful and useful, these definitions have to have some measure of historical consistency. We have to understand the history of the military profession if we are to attempt to guide its future. Making policy absent a thorough understanding of history is akin to planting cut flowers, and it will yield a similar result. Some writers loosely use the term profes- sional when describing the Armed Forces, DOD (Cherie Cullen) meaning that the Services are a standing force or that its members serve for long periods schools, customs, traditions, uniforms, insig- of time. Such imprecision conflates “profes- nia of rank. the most salient characteristic sional” with “regular” and a “professional Expertise: attaining professional exper- of professions has been the military” with a “standing army.” Those terms tise requires a lengthy period of formal educa- accumulation and systematic are not synonymous, largely because they tion; and professional knowledge is intellec- exploitation of specialized demand too little of military professionalism. tual and capable of preservation in writing.1 Over the past half-century, scholars have Sociologist James Burk has derived his knowledge applied to studied the nature of professions quite rigor- own triad. He argues that a profession is: specialized problems ously. Thus, we may stand on their shoulders as we attempt to define ourselves. Samuel a relatively high status occupation whose P. Huntington started the debate with The members apply abstract knowledge to solve who argues that professional attributes Soldier and the State. His first chapter begins: problems in a particular field of endeavor. . include the following. The occupation: “The modern officer corps is a professional . . My definition identifies three prescriptive body, and the modern military officer, a factors that, when found together, mark an ■■ is a full-time and stable job, serving professional man. This is, perhaps, the most occupation as a profession. One is mastery continuing societal needs fundamental thesis of this book.” For Hun- of abstract knowledge, which occurs through ■■ is regarded as a lifelong calling by the tington, the military profession and officer a system of higher education. Another is practitioners, who identify themselves person- corps are synonymous and exclusive. He then control—almost always contested—over ally with their job subculture defines professionalism in terms of three jurisdiction within which expert knowledge is ■■ is organized to control performance attributes—responsibility, corporateness, and applied. Finally is the match between the form standards and recruitment expertise—and locates military professional- of professional knowledge and the prevailing ■■ requires formal, theoretical education ism within those categories. cultural belief or bias about the legitimacy of ■■ has a service orientation in which Responsibility: military forces are an that form compared to others, which is the loyalty to standards of competence and to obedient arm of the state strictly subordinate source of professional status. We can refer to clients’ needs is paramount to civilian authority; professional officers use these simply as expertise, jurisdiction, and ■■ is granted a great deal of collective their expertise only for society’s benefit; and legitimacy.2 autonomy by the society it serves, presumably society is the profession’s client. because the practitioners have proven their Corporateness: the profession restricts Burk’s profession is continuously com- high ethical standards and trustworthiness. entrance and controls promotion; complex peting to maintain its elite status in relation to vocational institutions define an autono- society. His principal contribution is the idea The most salient characteristic of profes- mous subculture; and journals, associations, that professions vie for control over a body sions has been the accumulation and system- of expert knowledge. To succeed, that is to atic exploitation of specialized knowledge continue as professions, they must win that applied to specialized problems.3 Colonel Matthew Moten, USA, is a Professor and competition for jurisdiction. The Huntington, Burk, and Millett Deputy Head of the Department of History at the U.S. My preferred definition is one offered in definitions have historical consistency, which Military Academy. the 1970s by military historian Allan Millett, means that we can compare professions over ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 15 FORUM | Who Is a Member of the Military Profession?

U.S. Army officer observes supply airdrop to Forward Operating Base Waza Kwah, Afghanistan

U.S. Air Force (Adrian Cadiz) U.S. Air Force (Melanie Rodgers) time. For example, historians can qualitatively it was isolated from society. For the last 50 measure expertise or autonomy or jurisdic- years, historians have been debating those after World War II, global tional control from one period to another, conclusions, and historical consensus is responsibilities required an end and thereby trace professional development that Huntington was wrong. Historians to the traditional American bias through history. now generally agree that the Army officer Historians debate when certain occu- corps began to professionalize as early as against standing peacetime pations became professions, but the late the 1820s and that the profession matured armed Services 19th century is generally accepted as the era over the rest of the century. That maturation of professionalization. Physicians formed proceeded not in isolation from society, but the American Medical Association, and in consonance with broader social trends, the language, behavior, and traditions that lawyers the American Bar Association. They same trends that fostered legal, medical, and delineated their cultures from each other aimed to govern professional standards, academic professionalization. Likewise, the and the rest of society. demanding formal and theoretical schooling maritime officer corps began to specialize in Twice in the 20th century, the American beyond a liberal education afforded in the the 1830s and 1840s and moved ahead of the professional military and naval officer corps best colleges. Waning were the days when Army in the 1880s and 1890s. mobilized the Nation to man, equip, and train an ambitious young man might apprentice But by the beginning of the 20th formidable forces of civilian-soldiers, -sailors, himself to an attorney, read the law, and century, the Army, Navy, and Marines were and -marines. Those armies and armadas won quickly hang a shingle in front of an office all on a professional par, with general staffs two world wars, and just as quickly demobi- across from the courthouse. Instead, to meet controlling expertise at the strategic and lized when victory was complete. the new standards, he needed to attend law operational levels; separate and distinct After World War II, global responsi- school and pass a bar exam. Associations set professional jurisdictions over land power bilities required an end to the traditional up licensing examinations and wrote codes and sea power expertise; a system of hier- American bias against standing peacetime of ethics to guide professional behavior and archical education, including war colleges, armed Services. Despite demobilization, practice. Academics improved their stan- to instruct officers in those esoteric skills; the Army and Navy have never again been dards of scholarship, codifying requirements strict standards of entry and promotion small forces. The U.S. Air Force gained its to attain doctorates in various disciplines. based upon both seniority and merit; Service independence, grew prodigiously during Huntington argues that the military ethics that valued military subordination the Cold War, and rapidly professional- officer corps professionalized in the late 19th to civilian authority; and clearly defined ized; it stood on the accomplishments of century, and that it did so largely because occupational cultures comprising uniforms, its parent Service, the U.S. Army, and it

16 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MOTEN

Senior Service and civilian leaders attend Joint Flag Officer Course at Air Force Wargaming Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base

Marine officer briefs Secretary Gates in Afghanistan

DOD (Cherie Cullen)

offered a new expertise: the delivery of has occurred in the armed Services. Various control of it when required, and being clear nuclear weapons. populations within and near the uniformed about who exercises authority and responsibil- Large peacetime forces changed mili- military have laid claim to professional ity delegated to us by society. JFQ tary culture. Enlisted persons could now status. The goal is laudable, and the fact that see a path to viable, long careers, something so many want to be part of the military pro- that had never before been assured. Gener- fession is a novel and welcome phenomenon. NOTES ous programs for Servicemember health Yet as we attempt to define what the military 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the care and retirement added to the attraction profession is and what it means to be a mili- State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela- of military life. These advances caused the tary professional, we must be mindful of the tions (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 7–18. noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps in choices we make. We can embrace historic These descriptions of responsibility, corporateness, each Service to grow in size, responsibility, definitions or invent new ones to suit today’s and expertise are my abbreviated versions of Hun- and stature, and NCOs began a long process goals. We can choose between inclusivity tington’s discussion. of professionalization. Within 20 years after and exclusivity, between populism and 2 James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and World War II, commanders at all levels had elitism. We can opt for strict standards of the Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in The senior NCOs assisting them in leading a membership or loose ones. Obviously, we Future of the Army Profession, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews large, regular enlisted force. NCO training can also try to compromise between these (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis Custom Publishing, schools began to flourish in every branch poles. Whatever we decide, we must have a 2002), 21. 3 of Service. Over time, NCOs have come to clear-eyed understanding that our choices Allan R. Millett, Military Professionalism and Officership in America (Columbus: The Mershon manifest several of the professional attributes have consequences for the future of the mili- Center of the Ohio State University, 1977), 2. that Huntington, Burk, and Millett define, tary profession. but their professionalization is incomplete Professions are not professions simply in the areas of formal and theoretical educa- because they say they are. Their clients, tion, accumulation of specialized expertise, society as a whole, have to accept their claims and autonomous jurisdiction over a body of and trust the professions with jurisdiction professional knowledge. The NCO corps is over important areas of human endeavor. professionalizing, but not yet professional. If we can define our profession in ways that As the term professional has metasta- society will accept and trust, we will remain sized in society, as more and more groups viable and relevant. Doing so demands defin- have claimed professional status, the same ing our professional expertise, contesting

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 17

BATTAGLIA

first beat as rookie cops professional? Yes. no matter what our rank, Do they belong to a professional organiza- specialty, or discipline, we join, tion? Yes. Perhaps they do not match the enlist, and enter into the same experience of a police lieutenant with 25 professional organization as years of experience on the force, but they are bona fide member professionals nonetheless. The same analogy applies to an athlete brought onto a profes- U.S. Army (Michael L. Casteel) sional football team as a rookie quarterback. He does not equal the experience, stature, ­military was not the all-volunteer force that pay, responsibilities, popularity, or lucrative it is today. I do not mean this statement in a endorsement opportunities of the veteran condescending manner, but rather with the quarterback, yet neither is less professional greatest respect for our former enlisted Ser- than the other—and both are accredited Army senior NCO directs Soldiers from landing zone vicemembers who served in times of greater members in their profession. during live-fire exercise near Basra, Iraq challenge and with the utmost patriotism. I must also mention the position and I am confident that the majority of our stance of our Services’ senior enlisted advi- Some may argue that one is either military leaders will concur that our non- sors. We are all in agreement as to who a professional or not. I argue that the all- commissioned officer (NCO)/petty officer are members of our profession. The “we” or-nothing approach may not be our best corps easily fall within the realm of what mentioned here also includes doctrinal pub- option. So if we cannot come to grips with we recognize today as a professional and lications—Service-owned and -operated. For the Nation that everyone on the team is a authentic member in the profession of arms. example, let me make mention of the young- member of the profession, maybe there is To emphasize this point, it seems utterly est of our Service branches and use the Air some maneuver room to categorize—not contradictory for then–Marine Corps Com- Force’s Professional Development Guide, necessarily the marksman, sharpshooter, mandant General Charles Krulak to orga- signed and endorsed by its Chief of Staff. and expert design, but rather the rookie nize, develop, and implement the “strategic Discussing this topic with the Chief Master and veteran, the nurse and surgeon, and corporal” and at the same time consider that Sergeant of the Air Force, it was easy for the policeman and commissioner. All are same NCO something other than profes- him to define as written in the development accredited members of their professions, just sional or a member of the profession. guide that all Airmen are professionals, at significantly different levels as the junior My challenge as an enlisted voice will and that point commences the moment one professional and the senior professional. be to articulate to some why the Specialist, transforms from trainee to Airman. Identi- Surely a second lieutenant would not carry Seaman, Private First Class, and Airman are cal responses from the other Services assert the same substance, experience, intellect, also members of this profession, and thereby that the instant a trainee, recruit, or candi- and education in the profession of arms as, should be considered, treated, and held date surpasses the Service standard set forth for instance, General Martin Dempsey or accountable as professionals. These warriors by its institution and achieves that coveted one of the other four-star generals. may operate and execute at a different level title of Soldier, Marine, Sailor, Airman, or Lastly, while we attempt to clarify the than that of their senior enlisted and officer Coastguardsman marks the licensing into definition of professional within our own corps, but nonetheless, we all play in the our profession of arms. military departments, we need not forget same league. To further support “all-hands member- that we are a member of the North Atlantic I am not speaking alone as I assert ship,” let me promote this in a more non- Treaty Organization. For the most part, 27 that all Servicemembers are professionals. linear manner. To solely associate military other countries look to us as the lead pro- We hold that a young man or woman who leader when we define members of the mili- ponent in many functions and methods of chooses to serve the Nation in this organiza- tary profession would be quite parochial. To operating across the span of the Alliance. So tion matters. Doing so equates a minute an extent, we are all subordinate to someone, this position of leadership is another catalyst percentage of society’s youth who even meet but junior Servicemembers who may not for us to make sure we get this right. Some the criteria to become a uniformed member have leadership responsibilities by virtue of nations are currently experiencing a massive in the first place. However, that alone cannot their rank or billet should not be a disquali- upgrade of their enlisted corps. Some are be the credential. The licensing validates fier to the membership or even question their ending conscription, while others have itself when a Servicemember graduates from status as a professional. I completely under- added more enlisted ranks. For example, basic training. Tried and tested, that trans- stand the commitment, hard work, cost, and the army of the Czech Republic considers formation marks an official commencement sacrifice of our commissioned leaders to all members professionals, and they take on and membership in this profession of arms. achieve a college degree (a credential) prior that title during the swearing-in portion of Are the police officers who graduate to accession and the subsequent requirement accession. I am not endorsing that we stretch from the police academy and then walk their to pursue additional or advanced education it that far for our own folks, but the message while serving. It is partly the reason why we I carry to you today is that all of our Service- Sergeant Major Bryan B. Battaglia, USMC, is the have the most highly educated and effective members are bona fide professionals in our Command Sergeant Major of U.S. Joint Forces military officer corps in the world. profession of arms. JFQ Command. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 19 FORUM | Keeping Integrity Keeping Integrity

By LEON A. EDNEY DOD (R.D. Ward)

Admiral Leon A. Edney, USN (Ret.), was Former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Command. Honor guard marches into position at Tomb of the Unknowns, Arlington National Cemetery

he best way to voice disagree- Secretary of Defense that require a National because he had concluded that his advice to ment in policy or strategy, Security Council or Presidential input have the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the for an Active-duty officer, is political and monetary considerations. Air Force on key issues that were important during the formulation stage The National Security Strategy, to him and to the Air Force was no longer T being accepted. before execution. The President of the National Defense Strategy, and National United States and Secretary of Defense are Military Strategy are all thoroughly What were these issues? General the two most senior civilians in the military staffed. Each Service Chief and Combat- Fogleman believed that year’s Quadrennial chain of command. One level below that are ant Commander has plenty of chances to Defense Review did not properly represent the Service secretaries. get their views presented, as well as any Air Force requirements for air superior- Officers are expected, most would say disagreements. This is the proper time ity out into the future. Consequently, the required, to support the administration’s to influence these policies and strategies. number of F–22s in the budget was inad- policies and budgets when testifying before These are broad statements and usually do equate in his judgment. His recommendation Congress as well as in a dialogue with the not generate redline opposition. Disagree- to court-martial Lieutenant Kelly Flinn after public. However, when officers are asked ments of this nature are more likely to lying about a relationship was disapproved by their opinions by a Member of Congress, arise during a declining budget environ- the Secretary of the Air Force. Major General while testifying before that body, they ment when officers are losing a procure- Terryl Schwalier’s promotion was denied as a should give their best professional military ment program that they believe is essential result of the Khobar Towers incident. These judgment. That may or may not agree with to them, or during the grand strategy for were not light issues. When an officer gets to the administration’s position. In my experi- employment of military forces during this position, he will have similar situations, ence, it is not difficult to get key staffers to periods of conflict, or in the personal and only he can make the choice. have their principal ask the type of questions accountability held for certain failures. During the first 4 years of the Iraq needed to get a point across. Once a disagreement is voiced in staff- War, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld repeat- The perception that senior Active-duty ing, and the decision is made by civilian edly stated if the commanders in the field officers have to give up their integrity during leaders not to address military concerns, an wanted more troops, they could have them. this process is nonsense. These occasions officer’s only options are to comply, resign, The public assumption was that no senior normally address budget, military readiness, or retire. Several examples from the more generals on Active duty, in Iraq or Afghani- personnel, or key procurement issues. It is recent past may be helpful. stan, other than General Eric Shinseki also clear that the press will seek officers General Ronald Fogleman chose to officially stated the need for or requested out, if they voice an opinion that is counter resign/retire 1 year before his normal tour more forces to stabilize Iraq after Saddam to the current strategy of the administration. as Chief of Staff of the Air Force was com- was removed. General Shinseki was literally In my experience, all decisions made by the pleted. General Fogleman took this action hung out to dry by Secretary Rumsfeld when

20 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu EDNEY

President meets with security advisors in

White House Situation Room White House (Pete Souza)

his ­replacement was announced 18 months stated publicly that the repeal of “Don’t become a lightning rod, President George W. early. The general was transforming the Ask, Don’t Tell” was inappropriate while his Bush was not going to accept his resignation at Army well before that word became drama- Marines were engaged in war. General Amos the call of these generals, particularly during tized by Secretary Rumsfeld. He developed also testified that if the law was changed, he a midterm election. It would have been an the Stryker Brigade concept of fast, lighter would salute and that the Marines would exceedingly bad precedent. His resignation wheeled vehicles and the Future Combat execute the law smartly. The Secretary of was accepted immediately after the election. Systems program. He took the embarrass- Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of My concerns on this issue are twofold. ment of the Secretary’s disapproval in order Staff had publicly endorsed the repeal before These public statements from senior retired to guide these significant changes for the General Amos’s testimony. Admiral Mullen military officers, particularly those who future of the Army. He is a good man. publicly rebuked General Amos for stating served and had commands in Iraq or Afghan- Major General John Batiste turned his opinion before the analysis of a Defense- istan, add stress to the families and loved ones down a third star and the opportunity to wide survey on the subject was completed. of those serving in those wars and particularly return to Iraq for the second time because Concerning public disagreement those who have lost loved ones. These types he disagreed with the strategy and under- with national security issues after leaving of actions contribute to the politicization of resourcing for the Iraq War. the Service, clearly each individual has the the military, which has been increasing, in Admiral William J. “Fox” Fallon, as freedom to do that. Some officers such as my judgment, since the Goldwater-Nichols commander of U.S. Central Command, General Wes Clark and Rear Admiral Joe Department of Defense Reorganization Act of privately (as is appropriate) voiced his objec- Sestak chose to enter politics directly and 1986. This politicization could lead to seeking tions to the President concerning any mili- run for public office under one political a litmus test on sensitive political issues when tary solution to the Iranian nuclear program party or the other. I support these endeavors, promoting general officers to the ranks of and also to a surge in Iraq. He then shared no matter which party they represent. I do three and four stars. these thoughts with a reporter traveling with not believe that retired military officers not The military as an institution must him. He thought it was an off-the-record running for or in public office should call remain apolitical. What these examples discussion. The subsequent media cover- for the resignation of a sitting Secretary of demonstrate is that there are no two similar age of an actual or perceived disagreement Defense. As career military officers, we have issues. As senior military officers, we have to between Admiral Fallon and the President all worked for superiors we liked. We also understand the process of military-civilian led to his resignation/retirement. We can have worked for those who are opinionated interaction as well as interaction with never let our hair down. and seemingly arrogant. The so-called revolt the press. There is no time off the record. General James Amos, Commandant of of the retired generals probably resulted in Mr. However, we can maintain our integrity, act the Marine Corps, recently testified before Rumsfeld remaining in office 4 to 6 months within our own personal convictions, and the Senate Armed Services Committee and longer. Although Secretary Rumsfeld had do what is right. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 21 FORUM | Professional Disagreement and Policy

Professional Disagreement

By PAUL D. EATON and Policy

Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates discuss findings of working group report on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley)

22 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu

FORUM | Professional Disagreement and Policy

fight, and actually called for a reduction of General James Amos testifies that the Army and the ground force Marines. Marine Corps will carry out new policy if “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is repealed In March 2006, the press was largely silent, giving Secretary Rumsfeld a bye.

DOD (Myles D. Cullen) Congress went silent. All power was concen- trated in the hands of the executive branch, and there, in the hands of three men, the President, Vice President, and Secretary of Defense. The first two were inappropriate targets for a retired general, but the third as an appointee was fair game. Enter the Revolt of the Generals and the attendant controversy surrounding a handful of men who had read Major (now Brigadier General) H.R. McMaster’s Derelic- tion of Duty and chose to not walk past a mistake. In the words of Richard Whalen, we responded to a constitutional crisis. On a personal note, I have to admit a personal component. My father, an Air Force fighter pilot, was killed over Laos, missing in action for 38 years, and is now buried in Arlington. His death occurred January 13, 1969, well On March 19, 2006, the New York prosecution of the war (from insufficient after the timeframe that sparked McMaster’s Times published my op-ed, which was criti- troop strength in the beginning and through book. And I had two sons serving 18-month cal of Secretary Rumsfeld, shortly after my 2006), failure to organize for fighting an tours in Iraq and in Afghanistan. retirement. In it, I essentially provided the insurgency that was largely denied, and While my assessing Secretary Rums- Secretary a 360-degree performance review, an unwillingness to fight today’s war led feld in the New York Times was viewed by declaring him incompetent tactically, opera- to a lack of preparation for what Massoud many as an inappropriate means of influ- tionally, and strategically. That op-ed did Barzani promised me would happen in ence, the picture of a lieutenant general (in not go down well in some circles, notably at January 2004 while I was on a Kurdish uniform) on Fox and Friends defending West Point and with Professor Don Snider soldier recruiting trip in the north. Secretary the Secretary of Defense from the retired and some Active-duty academics such as Rumsfeld and the generals who passively generals was not discussed. Nor was the Colonel Matthew Moten. Whereas I had watched him did not violate every principle public affirmation of the Secretary’s solid been an absolute advocate for the Army and of war, but did so with several. performance by other very senior generals ground Marine force in particular, but the American Soldiers were serving vari- both active and retired, in Pentagon press other Services as well, I was now perceived able length tours in harsh combat conditions conferences and other venues. by many as an activist general, a role deemed of up to 18 months, sometimes exceeding Finally, let us look at the men behind wholly inappropriate. that figure. The Secretary and his Chairman the so-called surge. Retired General Jack Normally I would agree, but March had both stated that we did not need to grow Keane, in concert with Fred Kagan of the 2006 was a special case, and I would like to the Army or Marine Corps to meet what American Enterprise Institute, went around explain why I attacked Secretary Rumsfeld, was admittedly a heavy demand for ground the Secretary and Vice President and con- a political appointee, and avoided attacks forces. Furthermore, they had not moved to vinced President George W. Bush to increase against our elected officials. man, train, or equip the force for the insur- Iraq troop strength by 30,000—influence March 2006 was a really bad year for gency that they were fighting or to do the to be sure, but with absolute interest in the our troops in Iraq and for the Iraqi Security concurrent nation-building work required. welfare of our troops and the mission. Forces that I had helped to develop. With The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected So the question is a bit more complex the February 22 bombing of the al-Askari vehicle was stalled, the force assigned to than simple disagreement. We are really Mosque in Samarra, the incompetence of the develop the Iraqi Security Forces was inad- talking about influence across a spectrum Secretary came to its logical head. Multiple equately manned and equipped, and we had and whether it is appropriate for retired offi- simultaneous and sequential errors in the not implemented the structure to integrate cers to disagree. I suspect that if we couple the diplomatic/political and economic tools influence with personal gain, ethicists could to adequately fight the war. have a more nuanced opinion than they when the retired office And then I read the 2006 Quadrennial might have with the deployment of influence disagrees in the media with Defense Review Report, my trigger point for where there is not only absence of personal policy, the alarms go off action. That document continued Cold War gain, but also potentially disagreement with acquisitions, did not address the current its consequences. JFQ

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Marine Civil Affairs specialist interacts with Afghan children during medical outreach program in Marjah

U.S. Marine Corps (Shawn P. Coover)

A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism

By THOMAS P. GALVIN

Colonel Thomas P. Galvin, USA, is Director of the Commander’s Action Group at U.S. Africa Command.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 25 FORUM | A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism

n a previous edition of Joint Force exercise better professional behavior than Quarterly, Kevin Bond drew needed some physicians. This should be explored in the approach to definin attention to the dialogue on the light of presumptions that professional activi- what is and is not professional nature of professionalism within the ties tend to be white-collar or intellectual in has been based on an I 1 U.S. Armed Forces. In his article “Are We nature. These characterizations may not be evaluation of what is generally Professionals?” he raised important ques- correct, which then sheds new light on voca- tions concerning our professional identity tions that have a heavier physical component, considered professional, as and addressed them in a fashion that begins such as the military. opposed to what should be useful dialogue. The third challenge concerned the This question has interested me since promotion of military professionalism in FM my time as an Army Reserve Officer Train- 1, which promotes the profession of arms by most of them. One possible set of definitions ing Corps cadet nearly 30 years ago. There, I describing it as “unlike other professions” follows. The domain of medicine is the art attended the required briefings and seminars such as medicine and law. This can be seen and science of healing. Likewise, law serves promoting the U.S. military’s status as a as an uncompelling apples-to-oranges com- as the art and science of regulating societies, profession and answering criticisms by others parison. A stronger argument would include education (for example, the work of teachers, that it was not. Ever since, the same themes fields whose functions have some overlap with professors, librarians) transmits knowledge expressed on both sides surfaced in one way those of the military or that currently perform and experience, finance (accountants, actu- or another, but it always seemed that the dia- roles previously belonging to the military. For aries, statisticians) manages and regulates logue was disjointed and never led to a conclu- example, militaries and police forces both resources, engineering (architects, engineers) sion. Some observations follow. exercise lethal force, and the U.S. military designs systems, structures, and processes First, some of the terminology used historically performed some functions now that address a societal need, and clergy is ambiguous and needs clarification. For done by police. (leaders and providers of all religions) guides example, terms such as society and the public These three challenges stem from a and administers religious beliefs and faith. are used as though their meanings were common root—that the approach to defin- Initially, the domain related to the mili- assumed to be that of a single collective. ing what is and is not professional has been tary is referred to as arms, defined as the art Rather, there are multiple societies that are based on an evaluation of what is generally and science of employing violence to defend served (or not served) by professionals at considered professional, as opposed to what a society. global, national, local, and other levels. These should be. This article proposes an alterna- Most domains are aligned against relationships need to be well defined as they tive approach that centers professionalism multiple lines of work because each is too could impact how one might weigh profes- in the context of fields of knowledge rather broad for individual practitioners to apply sional behaviors. than lines of work. From this, we can look effectively. Societies have thus developed divi- Another ambiguous term is profession. systematically at how such fields of knowledge sions of labor (vocations) in which individuals It could mean lines of work, such as doctors, are applied by professionals for the benefit of master a portion of the arts and sciences to lawyers, and nurses. Field Manual (FM) 1, The particular societies and the roles of the com- perform specific applications. These portions Army, describes the concept more as a field munities to which professionals belong. This will be called subdomains, which can overlap of knowledge, such as “medicine” and “law,” approach addresses the ambiguities, provides within a domain although they represent and this description is found under the subject a rational model for determining profes- discrete applications that practitioners cannot heading of “The American Profession of sionalism in general, and permits an apples- readily migrate from one vocation to another. Arms.”2 Unfortunately, the Merriam-Webster to-apples reevaluation of the fundamental A pharmacist aspiring to become a physician Dictionary accepts both interpretations, each question about the presence and nature of may gain some educational credit for pharma- of which can potentially lead to different professionalism in the U.S. Armed Forces. ceutical training, but still must meet all other analyses about professionals. eligibility requirements of a physician. Another challenge concerns how deter- Domains Which domains should be considered mination of professional status, whether yes/ This approach begins with adding a new as having the greatest potential for “profes- no or to some “degree,” could be affected by term to the lexicon, one borrowed from math- sional” application? Domains considered cultural choices rather than be a reflection of ematics. Domain refers to a “field of knowl- important toward the functioning or stability professional necessity. The successful efforts edge” along with its purpose, associated sci- of societies or the welfare of individuals, of nurses to achieve professional status bear ences (data, analysis, and processes), and arts and that are complex, specialized, and this out. Physicians and nurses are both prac- (application, attributes, and ethics). Domains outside the realm of knowledge ordinarily titioners of the field of medicine, so why was are global, unitary, and dynamic, fed by the attained by the average person, ought to be one but not the other professional until now? continuous discovery of new knowledge and considered suitable. The level of importance Was the division of labor professionally neces- the refutation or elimination of that which is can also be measured in the results of misap- sary, such that the application of knowledge obsolete or proven wrong. plication, whether intentional or not. Can between the two vocations was utterly incom- Domains are defined by their purpose, unprofessional activities cause indelible patible, or did it reflect a cultural choice that and a quick review of the lines of work com- harm that should not be ignored? Analyzing caused physicians to perform certain tasks monly identified as professional suggests that domains against these criteria is straight- and nurses others? Certainly, some nurses there is a small number of domains that cover forward. Medicine is unquestionably vital

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Soldiers swear oath during reenlistment ceremony in Afghanistan U.S. Army (Jeanita C. Pisachubbe)

for individual­ and societal welfare, requires and collectives of practitioners. These classes Attributes and values held by individual advanced education and training, and causes have attributes that generally apply to all spe- practitioners include specialized education, considerable harm to life and limb when cific instances of each class and relationships certification, selfless service to others, ethical misapplied. Law provides a foundation that are consistent among entities. standards, and others that are above and for stable and peaceful societies, but when Societies can be any bodies of people. beyond those of ordinary citizens. Pertinent misused can be a source of instability and Those most relevant to this discussion fall to this discussion is how, in the abstract, strife. This is not to say that all application into three overlapping categories—the “global practitioners: of the knowledge is professional in nature, commons” that include all people and societ- only that vocations that apply the domain ies, the “U.S. national” society that includes ■■ acquire and sustain the art and science should be considered automatically eligible the citizenry of the United States, and the set of a domain in ways beyond that of ordinary for professionalism. of “U.S. state” societies that encompass the citizens On the other hand, some domains that citizenries of each state. U.S. citizens therefore ■■ apply the domain in ways that con- have had the “professional” label applied belong to an instance of all three. Where tribute to the continued functioning and might not satisfy these criteria. Musicians, the interests of these societies differ can be stability of societies or the welfare of their athletes, and advocates have been tradition- sources of conflict. individuals, and not in ways that promote one’s ally considered as professionals as these The global commons is a special case of self-interests domains of knowledge tend to be specialized society and is greater than the largest multina- ■■ show professional and personal char- and their application culturally enhancing, tional construct such as the European Union acter—exercise behaviors and attributes that but harm attributed to unprofessional appli- or United Nations. The global commons estab- reflect favorably on the community, avoid cation in these domains is limited compared lishes a universal expectation that a domain of those that reflect negatively, and demonstrate against medicine and law, and one could knowledge is available to all worldwide, and moral courage when professional actions can argue the extent to which their functions are that what would be considered a professional carry good and bad consequences. vital to societies or individuals within them. application of that domain can reasonably be expected to be considered professional else- Collectives of practitioners form for Entities where. World travelers carry such expectations three purposes. Associations bring practi- Interfacing with domains are three when they get sick away from home and seek tioners together to further the knowledge of classes of entities—societies, practitioners, foreign medical attention, for example. the domain, improve the arts and sciences, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 27 FORUM | A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism U.S. Air Force (Katie Gieratz) U.S. Air Force

Air Force nurse prepares surgical equipment for operation

and advocate needs and positions to societ- Relationships license that certifies the practitioner’s ability ies. Usually, membership in an association is Relationships among various enti- to serve. Undertaking oaths and licensing are voluntary. Enterprises are how practitioners ties—practitioner to community, practitioner common practices, but not necessarily the organize to provide their services. These to the community’s primary society, and only ones. can range from individual practices such community to its primary society—are The relationship between practitioners as clinics to large organizations such as constructed differently, so each should be and their communities has these essential hospitals. Communities are the most for- considered separately. mechanisms: malized, consisting of the regulatory bodies The natures of these relationships are governing the domain within a society, and described through the presence of several ■■ establish entry-level requirements— all constituent practitioners whether actively mechanisms that constitute an agreement that is, what an individual must master of serving or inactive. The regulatory body, or contract between the entities. In the case the domain to be considered worthy of entry sometimes called a board, determines entry of community and society, for example, the into the community and therefore certifiable or certification requirements, metes out community ensures the application of the for service as a practitioner—such as formal rewards and punishments, and adjudicates domain or subdomain in exchange for auton- education, training, examinations or other acceptable and unacceptable applications omy. The challenge has been to determine means of demonstrating sufficient mastery, of the domain on behalf of the society. In what would serve as an acceptable general- and contractual requirements such as oaths the United States, communities of practi- purpose checklist that a budding professional that a practitioner promises to the community tioners mainly exist at the state level, such community must satisfy without introducing or society in exchange for membership and as state boards of medical examiners with elements that presuppose cultural decisions ability to practice all licensed medical personnel. Although unrelated to the domain of knowledge or its ■■ establish sustainment requirements— these are generally headquartered within arts and sciences. For example, the public what the community provides to the practi- the structure of a state government, they are oath is a common means for a practitioner tioner to stay current in the domain—such as still autonomous and are mostly comprised to express intent to provide faithful service publications or other communications of other practitioners specifically selected to as a member of a community in support of ■■ establish controls over the application serve in regulatory roles. a society, upon which the society confers a of knowledge, such as laws and ethics that

28 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GALVIN promote or prohibit certain activities, and lengthy periods of time. This is especially attributes and values that describe the manner true if the society has devoted resources (for roles of militaries within in which practitioners are expected to perform example, investment) to training and educat- societies have evolved their services, which includes how practitioners ing the budding practitioner. Although the since Samuel Huntington’s are encouraged or required to work together choices of practitioners may reflect on their seminal work on military ■■ create systems of rewards and prestige commitment to the profession, the duration and ensure that advances in the art and science of service does not directly bear on the suc- professionalism from the 1950s or faithful service are appropriately recognized cessful application of knowledge. Rather, we ■■ create systems of censure and disre- expect that applications that put the practitio- pute, such that practitioners who misuse or ner personally at risk of physical or emotional ­community or practitioner nonprofessional or misapply knowledge, or whose activities reflect harm would see a greater turnover of practi- ­unprofessional. Instead, degrees of profession- negatively on the community or fellow practi- tioners. Acceptability of the level of turnover alism are reflective of how strongly the con- tioners, are suitably punished. becomes a matter of perception. Regardless, tracts are honored as assessments of the health practitioners contemplating departure from of relationships among societies, communities, The relationships between communities the community are expected to perform pro- and practitioners. High professionalism sees and their societies extend the above for three fessionally while still in service. the proper and fair application of the domain main purposes: Global Access to Service. The vital by the community; continually reduced influ- importance of professional domains should ence of external factors from the society; and ■■ establish and sustain a contract mean that all members of society should the demonstrated and sustained competence, between the community and society be served equally and equally well. This is character, and quality of service provided by ■■ advocate for the profession on behalf a matter of professional necessity, for any the practitioners. of their member practitioners preferential treatment or lack of access ■■ manage in autonomous fashion has deleterious effects on any or all of the The Domain of “Arms” those controls that societies have yielded relationships described above. Yet factors We should now reexamine what has (for example, the application of censure and unrelated to the domain are ever-present and been referred to as the profession of arms, discipline by the community that reduces the affect access, such as politics, commercial specifically the American variety discussed in need for societies to provide direct oversight in influences, insufficient numbers of practitio- Army FM 1, in a modern context. professional matters). ners, practitioner self-interests, and others. The first step is defining the domain. How communities and practitioners appor- This is actually a complex undertaking for Relationships between practitioners and tion their services is therefore culturally several reasons. The roles of militaries within societies become matters of performance. influenced. For example, medical profession- societies have evolved since Samuel Hunting- Practitioners apply the knowledge in accor- als must deal with the demand for emergency ton’s seminal work on military professionalism dance with the norms and rules of their com- care, increasing costs, malpractice suits, and from the 1950s. Some of that evolution resulted munities and in satisfaction of societal needs, influence of insurance companies. in the creation of new communities whose whether that is the society as a whole or from This manifests itself in the relation- purposes overlapped with their respective mil- specific clients. In matters of conflict between ship between societies and their professional itaries, and in some cases assumed, even dupli- professional necessity and societal expecta- communities. Societies’ expectations are that cated, formerly military roles. So in practice tions, practitioners make decisions based communities and practitioners minimize the military is one of few (perhaps the only) on established ethics, challenge those ethics these influences as much as possible, even communities that often exercises roles that fall if they are inappropriate or inapplicable, or though the same societies may take actions that outside what society (and indeed the military recuse themselves, even withdrawing from the induce these complicating factors. Therefore, itself) might consider the military’s role. profession if necessary. professionalism of the community means that Traditionally, militaries were the Included in the course of defining these it is upholding its contract with the society. ­societies’ guarantors of security and the relationships are cultural factors that influ- Professionalism of the practitioner combines primary elements of the state that had the ence the decisions of practitioners and the measures of performance that demonstrate authority to wage war and use lethal force. expectations of society, but that are not of competency in the domain and of behavior that Militaries often addressed both internal and professional necessity, meaning they are not reflect properly to society on the community. external threats to societies. The Oath of part of the knowledge, art, and science of the The above suggests that being a profes- Commissioning in the U.S. Armed Forces still domain. Two relevant to the discussion of sional is more of a binary (yes/no) proposition makes reference to “defending the Constitution military professionalism are offered here. than a matter of degrees such as how doctors against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Practitioner Duration of Service. This may be perceived as more innately professional The American experience, stemming is a function of the relationship between com- than nurses due to higher entry-level require- from the days of the Revolution and its cultur- munities and their practitioners. Because the ments and greater prestige. Either all require- ally imbued distrust of standing armies, led to domain is vital to society and the entry-level ments and conditions are met as expressed the growth and development over time of sep- requirements fall above and beyond those in these relationships or they are not. Failing arate institutions to focus on external threats of ordinary citizens, expectations may arise to meet or sustain even one requirement (armed forces) versus internal ones (law that practitioners have signed up to serve for invalidates the contract and renders the enforcement organizations such as police), ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 29 FORUM | A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism

exercise overlapping knowledge suggests that the professional domain in question is much broader and more encompassing than the military alone. This is the professional domain of secu- rity, which is the art and science of protection against danger, damage, or loss. The profes- sion of arms, therefore, describes a subdo- main, reflective of a division of labor preferred by American society that separates militaries from other security communities. Using FM 1 as a start point, we can define the subdomain as the art and science of defending the secu- rity of a nation or state—its geographic ter- ritory, its society and institutions, its people, and its way of life. The U.S. military is both the com- munity and the enterprise that apply this domain for U.S. society. This is an important Navy chief trial judge addresses law distinction from communities associated students at moot court competition with medicine and law, whose enterprises are largely independent from the regulatory body. But this is not unique. Other security U.S. Navy (Anthony Casullo) professions such as police forces, border patrols, and coast guards similarly see the each of which independently pursued and was also found in the United Kingdom. community and enterprise as one and the achieved professionalization. Each assumed Meanwhile, other European nations created same, or very extensively overlapped. some roles and authorities when it came to hybrid entities called gendarmeries that are The mechanisms employed by the the use of lethal force—the military having essentially military units performing police U.S. military to regulate its practitioners are greater freedom to exercise it in offensive duties. Other nations whose security institu- straightforward. For officers, warrant officers, means against external threats whereas the tions are less robust due to lack of need or and enlisted, there are entry-level require- police were largely limited to self-defense. limited resources have kept military and law ments and sustainment requirements—such As law enforcement requirements enforcement organizations and missions com- as professional military education, individual became more sophisticated and nuanced, bined, such as among some African nations combat skills such as marksmanship, and new institutions arose. Two are particularly whose navies perform both military and coast oaths of service—that vary appropriately noteworthy. The first is the U.S. Customs and guard tasks. depending on the Service and rank. Awards, Border Protection, which has responsibility The same threats that one nation per- promotions, fitness reports, the Uniform Code to secure U.S. borders with its neighboring ceives as external may be perceived by other of Military Justice, and other mechanisms nations, Canada and Mexico. The other is the nations as internal and therefore be handled govern good and bad conduct or performance. U.S. Coast Guard, which exercises maritime by different communities within the nation. Some may look upon the Services as law enforcement and protects U.S. maritime Countering the threat of violent extrem- different communities, but these reflect divi- borders. U.S. law delineates responsibilities ist organizations (VEO) is an excellent sions of labor, albeit with longstanding his- between these agencies and the U.S. Army example. In the United States, the military torical precedent. The overlap of functions (especially U.S. State National Guards) and has a significant counter-VEO role as it is a and capabilities among the Services, par- Navy; however, there are instances where threat largely emanating from outside the ticularly enablers such as communications these agencies cooperate with one another homeland. Other nations assign this role to and logistics, plus the increase in jointness to deal with external threats, with the nature its ministries of interior which, due to U.S. seen in the force since the Goldwater-Nichols of the threat determining which agency has law, places restrictions on direct cooperation Department of Defense Reorganization Act primary responsibility and therefore who between the U.S. military and its most direct of 1986, bears this out. determines the rules of engagement. Collec- counterparts in key nations. Similarly, the traditional stratification tively, these agencies combine to protect the As FM 1 declares, “the profession of of officers and enlisted (junior and senior) Nation’s geographic territories and manage arms is global.”3 However, it is clear that reflects divisions of labor that are much more the use of lethal force. there is not a direct one-to-one correspon- blended in today’s environment than in times This historical experience is common dence between any particular military com- past. Senior enlisted are taking on roles and among other nations, but manifested dif- munity and the area of uniquely specialized responsibilities once reserved exclusively for ferently. The formation of law enforcement knowledge that it applies in service to its officers, and some are now attending officer institutions as separated from the military society. That so many disparate communities professional education programs. Taken to

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that by virtue of membership in an organiza- the traditional stratification o tion a person is a professional.”4 However, the NEW officers and enlisted (junior an two positions are actually quite similar as all from NDU Press senior) reflects divisions of labo professionals are required to adhere to the for the Institute for that are much more blended entry-level and sustainment requirements of National Strategic Studies the community. Those who do not are subject in today’s environment than in to censure, such as revocation of their license April 2011 times past to practice law or medicine, or less-than- STRATEGIC FORUM honorable-discharge from the military. National Defense University

Meanwhile, some concerns about the About the Author Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Michael Eisenstadt is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Military Lessons for the Arab Spring and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near of 2011? an extreme, there is nothing inherent about state of today’s military—high turnover rates East Policy. Key Points by Michael Eisenstadt ◆◆ Iran’s experience in 1978–1979 and after highlights key factors that could shape the outcome he Islamic Revolution surprised senior U.S. policymakers as the profession of arms that would preempt a and erosion of a sense of professional commit- of the political struggles defin- ing the Arab spring of 2011: the well as the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. On the eve quality of regime leadership; the of revolution, Iran—a key U.S. ally—seemed relatively stable nature of civil-military relations; the training, equipment, employ- despite bouts of urban terrorism in the early and mid-1970s. At the first ment, and cohesion of regime T signs of escalating unrest in early 1978, neither Iranian nor U.S. officials move to make Officer Candidate School the ment (“calling”)—are indicative of unhealthi- security forces; and the extent of considered the possibility that Iran’s armed forces, the largest and most foreign support. modern in the region (next to those of Israel), would prove unable to deal ◆◆ The Shah’s military was the main pillar of his rule but failed to with whatever trouble lay ahead. The fall of the Shah a year later, therefore, quash the Islamic Revolution in raised searching questions regarding the role of the armed forces during 1978–1979. Reasons include the sole accession means for new officers, essen- ness among the relationships between the the crisis and its failure to quash the revolution. The recent emergence of Shah’s weak leadership, a military incapable of acting coherently to popular protest movements that have overthrown authoritarian regimes counter opposition demonstra- tions and propaganda, and the in Tunisia and Egypt—and that are challenging similar regimes in Libya, Shah’s belief that the United Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria—has revived memories of the Shah and his fall. States no longer supported him. tially causing the military to resemble more military and its Servicemembers that certainly These developments have again raised questions regarding the role of armed ◆◆ The leadership of the Islamic forces during revolutions and whether Iran’s experience during the Islamic Republic has avoided repeating the many mistakes of the Shah. Revolution and after holds relevant lessons for current developments in the It has acted resolutely, created Middle East. specialized security forces and closely the rank structure of police forces. needs to be addressed, but do not constitute employed them effectively, cali- The Shah and Armed Forces brated the use of force to prevent escalating violence, and cowed much of the opposition through a Both the Shah and his father, Reza Shah, owed their positions and sur- campaign of intimidation. vival to the armed forces. 1 Reza Shah came to power in a 1921 coup that This would likely never happen in the United the loss or reduction of professional status. eventually toppled the Qajar dynasty that had ruled Iran for more than a century. In 1941, British and Soviet armies occupied Iran and forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza. The new Shah also owed his political survival to a 1953 coup engineered by the United States CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH

States, but it shows how separating officers Although this article presents a different www.ndu.edu/inss

SF No. 267 1 from enlisted for the purposes of comparing model of professionalism from the traditional professionalism is not viable. views expressed elsewhere, its application is hardly complete, and there is further study Strategic Forum 267 Bottom Line to do. Important in today’s context is the Iran’s Islamic Revolution: So are the members of the U.S. military professional status of civilians and contractors Lessons for the Arab Spring of 2011? professionals? performing functions once done by military The bottom line answer is yes. The U.S. members. This article assumes U.S. Service- Michael Eisenstadt, Director of the Military military as a community applies the subdo- members are volunteers, and conscription in and Security Studies Program at the main of arms for its primary society, the United an unknown future scenario might alter the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, States. It performs a vital function, mastery professional status of the force. examines the Iranian Islamic revolution of the art and science of arms to protect the Hopefully, the domain-based model of 1978–1979 for key factors that could society in the manner that the society accepts: offered in this article helps simplify and shape the outcome of the political struggles “defend the Constitution.” The military has harmonize the terms and relationships so as of the Arab spring of 2011. After a close established the appropriate mechanisms for its to advance the dialogue. After all, the U.S. examination of the Iranian revolution, he practitioners, the Servicemembers, to achieve military’s professional identity is impor- identifies he following key factors: the quality and sustain professional status, and the practi- tant to its mission accomplishment and its of the regime leadership; the nature of civil- tioners generally sustain the community norms longstanding honored relationship with the military relations; the training, equipment, employment, and cohesion of regime security and adhere to societal expectations. American people. JFQ forces; and the extent of foreign support. Because the military is an organization, While pointing out that the leadership of the actions of individual Servicemembers The author acknowledges Command Sergeant the Islamic republic has avoided repeating directly affect the actions of others, and Major Mark S. Ripka, USA, and Sergeant the many mistakes of the Shah, it is unclear in combat this can have significant conse- Major Matthew Grucella, USA, for their con- how the example of the successes to date of quences. This makes military professionalism tributions to this article. the opposition movements in Tunisia and at all levels vital, as the manner in which Egypt will influence the staying power of the individual Servicemembers perform their opposition in other Arab states, or how it duties is as important as the results that are NOTES will influence the morale and cohesion of the achieved. Tactical successes that undermine security forces of other embattled regimes. 1 Kevin M. Bond, “Are We Professionals?” Joint our societies’ confidence risk strategic failure Force Quarterly 58 (3d Quarter 2010), 62–68, avail- and constitute a violation of the relationship able at . society. This is consistent with the qualifier in 2 Field Manual 1, The Army (Washington, DC: the Soldiers’ Creed: “No one is more profes- Headquarters Department of the Army, June 2005), sional than I.” It is a personal commitment to 1–10. the U.S. military community, rather than a 3 Ibid., 1–11. collective comparative stance against those of 4 Bond, 68. other professions. On the surface, this countervails Dr. Visit the NDU Press Web site Bond’s assertion that “it does a disservice to for more information on publications the very ideals of professionalism . . . to declare at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 31 National Defense University (Katherine Lewis)

Former Chairman General Richard B. Myers speaks at military professionalism conference

Know Yourself Before the Enemy MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM’S CIVIL FOUNDATION

By IAN BRYAN

eneral Richard Myers, Chair- anecdote at a January conference on military overlooked. And it is the arena where our man of the Joint Chiefs and professionalism organized by the Institute for military leaders seem to fail most often, or at principal military advisor to National Security Ethics and Leadership at least most spectacularly. G President George W. Bush the National Defense University, held at the This is not a topic just for generals. Offi- from 2001 to 2005, received a collection of request of Admiral Mike Mullen, the current cers of every rank routinely make decisions articles on civil-military relations from a Chairman. That conference focused on the that affect the military’s complex relationship long-time friend and professor to help him profession’s connections with civil society. with society. Moreover, an officer is far behind prepare for the job. In the 20 years between With grave international and budgetary if he only begins developing civil-military sen- attending the Army War College and challenges facing our military, however, some sibilities after donning a star. Military leaders becoming Chairman, he had received no officers might not agree that the profession need to earn trust and respect while gaining formal education to prepare for managing should focus now on civil-military relations. influence with civilian policy elites—politi- the civil-military relationship, neither at the Yet civil-military relations, starting with its cians, political appointees, lawyers, bureau- CAPSTONE course for general officers nor constitutional underpinnings, is at once the crats, and the like—who have been immersed at the Harvard Kennedy School program for most fundamental component of American in the domestic political milieu throughout senior executives. General Myers shared this military professionalism and the one most their careers.

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Education across the Department of the profession will resist anything that Defense inadequately prepares officers for detracts from that perceived purpose. In Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen hold this arena, giving little attention to the civil- military institutions, this means that only news conference at Pentagon military relationship and its constitutional by understanding the domestic context underpinnings. Even among the select field that gives rise to the officer’s authority and DOD (Cherie Cullen) grade officers whom I taught at the School mission can he understand his role. Those of Advanced Air and Space Studies with an in uniform agree that the military exists to in-residence military Intermediate Devel- bring force to bear in pursuit of the Nation’s opmental Education under their belts, few interests, but beyond that, consensus frays. have studied or even read the Constitution An officer’s conception of the military’s role that they swore to defend since high school must begin with understanding society’s or college, even though most are hungry values and how those values are expressed to engage on the topic. We have failed to in the form and philosophy of a government tend the foundation of American military that supplies and legitimates the officer’s professionalism. work. The officer will be a more trusted Neglect of civil-military expertise servant and thus more persuasive if his words internal military relations, including issues among officers manifests in views incompat- and deeds reflect a grounding in, and a broad of command and doctrine; and civil-military ible with our oath, hindering representative congruence with, the philosophy of Ameri- relations. Officer professional development government and undermining the societal can government and the bedrock American focuses on the first two. trust prerequisite to provisioning a strong political compact, the Constitution. Military expertise in managing all military. I have heard a well-known retired these relationships only serves the Nation general officer imply, off the record, that the Professionalism when geared tightly to the third compo- law is what the President and his administra- Samuel Huntington penned a seminal nent of professionalism: duty. It is of little tion say it is, notwithstanding the Constitu- study of civil-military relations, The Soldier value for officers to absorb a vague duty to tion’s contrary assertion. Officers have argued and the State, in which he defined professions country. Officers need a sophisticated and to me in private and in class, and one recently as possessing corporateness, expertise, and even theoretical sense of duty that helps in print, that their personal sense of right and a duty to society.1 Experts debate a profes- them answer to what end, by what ways, wrong trumps judgments made via our politi- sion’s exact components, but Huntington’s and with whom duty lies amid an ever- cal process and the chain of command. framework endures and captures the essence changing context. Democracy shifts much The profession has permitted a blind of most competing schemes. The framework of the moral as well as political autonomy spot to form at the center of the officer’s duty. provides a good vantage point for analyzing and responsibility from the government, This neglect of civil-military competence the military professional’s relationship to especially the military, and places it on the makes it more difficult for officers to serve civil society. The first of Huntington’s three society for which the military acts. This can effectively, leaving them less perceptive of tenets of professionalism, corporateness, only be so if the military is a faithful instru- the Nation’s needs and wants. Civil society is refers to the degree that military profes- ment of the elected leadership. Direction of course where resources are provided and sionals perceive themselves as an institution from higher authority, however, is never where military leaders must look to decipher with a set of values and standards separate comprehensive at any level. The officer must parameters for sustainable action and to from others and designed to promote the constantly assume ideological and material divine unclear objectives. institution’s purpose. Combat effective- values as he crafts advice and action. Such It will not be enough to bolt civil- ness demands institutional physical and judgments should sprout from the American military literacy onto an already constructed psychological separateness from society that political compact that the officer has sworn idea of officer professionalism framed around no other profession matches, transcending to defend. It is an institutional failure that technical competence. Relations with civil vocation to become a way of life. That divide the military demands more attention from society must undergird the American officer’s is deeper still as the classically conservative officers on the proper use of the Internet professional identity. For if civil-military and communal military outlook stands apart than it demands they spend on packing this relations are unhealthy, then technical com- from the classically liberal and individualistic professional foundation. petence is unsustainable or may even work American society that it serves. against the Nation’s values and interests, Corporateness is an avenue to profes- particularly as military measures increasingly sionalism’s second component, expertise. Pro- it is an institutional failure that impinge on the homeland. fessionalism is sometimes used as a synonym the military demands more A profession’s mores will coalesce for technical and leadership expertise that attention from officers on th around its members’ sense of purpose, and puts fire on the target, but the officer requires a broader conception of expertise. The offi- proper use of the Internet Lieutenant Colonel Ian Bryan is an Active-duty cer’s expertise can be divided among the man- than it demands they spend Tennessee Air National Guardsman and a Professor agement of three key relationships: relations on packing this professional of Strategic Studies in the School of Advanced Air with entities outside the United States that foundation and Space Studies at Air University. include training friends and fighting enemies; ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 33 FORUM | Know Yourself Before the Enemy

itself the final say on anything. Concern for a while military officers ar standing military’s political role is reflected in dedicated to their mission and the constitutional debates and the document country, they are susceptible to itself, not fear that political leaders might issue the same cognitive limitations unwise or immoral orders, policy, or legisla- tion. Moreover, safety is not the warrior’s that groups typically impose mission or even a preeminent military value. on their members Military honor requires facing risk from the enemy, and U.S. Servicemembers swear to accept the risk inherent in serving a govern- A System of Law ment of dispersed powers. Commanders are The American political order centers to care for their troops, but they must also put not on geography or person but on a set them at risk, and the commander does not get of ideas about domestic political relation- the final word on when or for what reasons ships. External security being secondary, that occurs. Where the question is between the Founders rejected the protection of the civil and military authority, the Constitution’s world’s most powerful nation, Britain, to weight falls entirely on the civil side. Officers pursue a system of diffuse political power taunt the public trust to suggest otherwise. that would permit a classically liberal society. Our country’s founders sought a government Trust that ruled through law, written and executed Without trust, military opinion by elected representatives. The Founders would fall on deaf ears and society would built our system around a suspicious and rightly hobble the force with safeguards and realist conception of human nature where oversight. Our national security apparatus ambition would counteract ambition among already labors under myriad legislative the political branches of government. The restrictions and reporting requirements preeminent law is the Constitution, setting imposed partly because overzealous govern- forth a Federal Government of limited powers ment officials have sometimes behaved as wherein no Federal officer may act without though they were ignorant of the American authority tracing back to that document, system. To navigate this uncertain political usually via statute. A standing military is not terrain, the officer needs grounding in the required by the Constitution and was created fundamentals of our government and the by legislation, and thus the Armed Forces are tools to conceptualize the military’s role in an entirely beholden creation of the political society. The professional officer must work branches without any constitutional grant of to inspire trust that he will limit his craft independent political power. In fact, fear that to the means and purposes authorized by a standing army would become untethered proper civilian authority—executive, legisla- from its masters led many Founders to look to tive, or judicial. the state militias as a check against the regular Trust in the military, although wide- army, inspiring the Second Amendment’s spread today, is counterintuitive and inorganic proclamation that a well-regulated militia is to a representative government jealous of its necessary to the security of a free state. liberty, and so trust needs constant care. The Burdened by heavy responsibility and nonmilitia soldier is a danger to society by imbued with patriotism, officers want to use virtue of his access to and proficiency with ­military, a wise nation will “exert all its pru- power for good. Like others in government, weapons and the potential divergence of dence in diminishing both the necessity and they focus on their technical function, secu- his interests from those of society, or so the the danger of resorting to one which may be rity, and sometimes see law as an obstacle. Founders generally agreed. The military’s inauspicious to its liberties.” Military officers find orders especially dif- privileged access to information about threats The fear today is not a coup but, as ficult to swallow when they imperil the men and capabilities, much of which it makes President Dwight Eisenhower explained in and women under their command without secret, likewise bequeaths power. Military his farewell address, that the military and its a justification the officer finds convincing. information and the military opinion it vendors will drive policy and become an end Some have concluded that the officer’s duty stands behind influence national policy and rather than a means, shaping the political transcends law, arguing that conscience and the resources allocated to defense. The chief landscape to their interests. Ignorance and perceptions of national security imperatives author of the Constitution, James Madison, complacency replace nefarious intent as patri- should instead be the lodestar. began “Federalist No. 41” by acknowledging otic men and women seek expedience and too Our constitutional system, however, the danger that so worried his countrymen, conveniently see in their own interests the cannot abide a military that reserves for warning that with regard to a standing Nation’s as well.

34 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BRYAN

Signing of the Constitution by Howard Chandler Christy

Architect of the Capitol

While military officers are dedicated to constitutional mandate and are accountable to extra-constitutional powers for officers is not their mission and country, they are susceptible the voters. controversial among those with a rudimentary to the same cognitive limitations that groups President Abraham Lincoln defended his understanding of the system. It is patently typically impose on their members. The actions that arguably violated the Constitution illegitimate for an unelected officer to make Department of Defense, Services, and every during the Civil War by asking rhetorically, decisions for the Nation in contravention of his subordinate military tribe see the Nation’s “Are all the laws but one, to go unexecuted, and elected civilian masters. interests from institutional perspectives. the government itself to go to pieces, lest that Senior officer resignation would be a That each faction thinks it should have more one be violated?” But the President is elected way to pressure the President and Congress control and a larger share of the budget is as to lead one of the three branches of govern- short of disobedience. This might bring quick certain as celestial motion. It is silly to think ment with a duty to interpret and preserve satisfaction but at a high price to long-term that military officers are not swayed by their the constitutional system, which affords him legitimate military influence. Modern voters institutional interests. Of course, elected greater legitimate leeway to act. The idea of respect military opinion, so politicians fear leaders pursue institutional and personal Presidential powers ­expanding in a national public conflict with officers. If political advantage, too, but they have a popular and emergency is controversial, but the idea of leaders suspect generals will wield ­resignation ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 35 FORUM | Know Yourself Before the Enemy

interests and how to pursue them in military political responsibility will damage the mili- hands have fared poorly. tary’s long-term ability to secure the Nation’s Besides, the idea of a single military interests, potentially triggering a sustained opinion on any issue is an illusion. Debates cycle of institutional decline. rage throughout the military on nearly every Averting policy responsibility can be issue. For example, although the Depart- especially tough when politicians want to turn ment of Defense projected an image of policy over to generals and draft behind the unified military support for General Stanley military’s popularity. President George W.

USSOCOM Public Affairs (Victoria Meyer) USSOCOM Public Affairs McChrystal’s 2009 call for more troops in Bush, for example, repeatedly asserted during Afghanistan, large factions inside the mili- 2007–2008 that he would do just as General tary advocated quite different approaches. David Petraeus advised in Iraq. Influence is Resignation over such issues would confuse good, but public military liability for policy is the public, devalue military opinion, and rob not. Getting out from under policy delegation Members of inaugural class of Joint Special Operations us of experienced leaders. and responsibility can be tricky, but officers Forces Senior Enlisted Academy pose for graduation photo need the acumen to recognize it, the wisdom Duty to What? to fear it, and the political skills to resist it. Obedience is important not only Deflecting the Nation’s foreign and defense for subordinating the military to civilian policy authority and responsibility is perhaps authority but also for creating combat power. ironically the most legitimate purpose for Military effectiveness demands concentrat- which the officer can employ his domestic ing power at key points in time and space. political advantages. Orchestrating precise movements, especially The military has ridden a wave of public with large organizations and in the face esteem for decades, throughout controversial of mortal danger, places a premium on action in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and obedience. But obedience to what? That the Libya. Trust and respect strengthen the mili- Service chiefs and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of American officer must be a faithful servant tary in many ways, from recruitment to the Staff testify before Senate Armed Services Committee of the people through their elected represen- sway accorded to military advice. This reputa-

U.S. Air Force (Scott M. Ash) U.S. Air Force tatives does not close the issue. Under the tion and moral authority would not survive U.S. Constitution, obedience is only allowed if the military acted as a political branch and as a political weapon, then administration to proper authority and lawful orders. The took greater responsibility for policy. officials will simply not seek military advice, Congress’s and Supreme Court’s legisla- Individuals and institutions seek power or they will choose pliant or like-minded uni- tive and judicial authorities may clash with to promote their values and interests. Intel- formed advisors. power claimed by the Commander in Chief, lect, however, can provide the basis to restrain Although lawful and far more profes- presenting the officer with a constitutional and channel this basic drive in order to serve sionally honorable than disobeying legal dilemma. Officers cannot delegate their interests beyond the self and institution. The orders, resignation nevertheless rests on an constitutional duty to their legal counsel, and officer corps has either taken this intellect incorrect notion of the officer’s role. The international or domestic crisis is hardly the for granted or failed to see its importance, officer is not a policy advocate but an advisor, time to start thinking in constitutional terms leaving us with inadequate civil-military helping political leaders make informed about professional duty. Officers should competence. Society’s trust is always at stake, choices. Civilian leaders should listen to mili- expect as much since they take an oath to the modulating the resources and autonomy tary advice, but are always free to act contrary. Constitution—and to no one else and to no delegated to those in uniform. Moreover, Political leadership is better placed to blend other end. the officer needs civil-military expertise to society’s diverse values, which is the essence of comprehend the Nation’s ends, to predict the the politician’s craft. Military advice has been Policy Responsibility domestic reaction to his ways and means, and rejected sometimes for the better and some- Much of what constitutes a sound civil- to articulate military risks and opportunities. times for the worse. History does not support military basis for officer professionalism The civil-military foundation of officership is the argument that the country would be better boils down to deflecting domestic political woefully underprioritized, and at least a more off if the military’s advice were followed more power and responsibility for policy success serious treatment in professional military often. History does suggest that countries and failure that would come with that power. education, starting with the Constitution, is placing authority for determining national Paradoxically, this is not an abdication but the justified. JFQ height of military duty, stemming from the institutional imperative to preserve influence obedience is important not only and trust, and the national imperative to leave NOTE for subordinating the military political authority in the hands of the people 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the to civilian authority but also for and their civil representatives. While an State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela- officer may be able to steer policy in the short creating combat power tions (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957). term by leveraging information and prestige,

36 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu President Obama meets with Secretary of Defense and Chairman

DOD (Chad J. McNeeley) The Strategist as Hero

By COLIN S. GRAY

ith undergoverned space as its paintings of Carl von Clausewitz but not of his theory. context, the purpose of strategy is to Strategy is ethereal. It can be explained and understood, secure control of that turbulent zone. but in common with love, happiness, pain, fear, or secu- W More often than is acknowledged rity, for example, it cannot be represented directly. Its in history books, the political and military battlespace presence or absence, as well as its quality, can be inferred for the strategist is, or certainly approaches, a condition from behavior as registered in the course of events, but of chaos. The theme of this essay is the struggle by the then only if there is a plausible connection between strategist to devise, sustain, and satisfactorily conclude known intention and that record. It is notable that the purposeful behavior. There are grounds for doubt as to media, especially the electronic media, do not often try to whether or not most strategists are heroes. However, the address strategy. Rare indeed are the books on great (or impediments to even adequate, let alone superior, strate- gic accomplishment are so numerous and so potentially Dr. Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics at the damaging that there is little room for skepticism over the University of Reading, United Kingdom. His most recent book is proposition that the strategist’s profession is a heroic one. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford University Press, One can photograph an army but not the strategy 2010), and this article is adapted from chapter seven. His next by which the strategist seeks to direct it. One can have book will be Airpower for Strategic Effect.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 37 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Strategist as Hero

task to be feasible, the strategist first must DOD ensure that he controls his own capacity to do the harm he intends. This is the practice of command. Not for nothing is command paired with control in the standard military formula. So complementary are the two concepts that in effect, command and control are fused as a meta-concept. The purpose of command is to control friendly armed forces so that they can prevail in combat with an enemy whose strategists also are exercising command in search of control (in their case, over us) so as to shape and even dictate the course of strategic history. This is what strat- egy is all about. This is the answer to Foch’s fundamental question. But the strategist as would-be controller of history is ever locked in a struggle against severe odds. The political- bureaucratic policymaking, the military President Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall watch Major execution, and the political consequences of General George S. Patton, Jr., award Congressional Medal of Honor the strategy process in those distinctive but to Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, 1943 overlapping phases always threaten to dis- solve process into chaos. Preparation for war and war itself and its warfare inherently are hostile environments for good order in strat- poor) strategists, and the television channels That granted, successful strategic conduct egy. Unfortunately for good predictive order, that provide vicarious military excitement for should not be so difficult as to evade plausible confusion verging upon chaos approaches the armchair warriors almost go out of their way explanation. natural condition of war writ large and of its to avoid discussing strategy. When, excep- warfare, as well as being a constant menace to tionally, strategy is the subject, the program The Purpose of Strategy the invention, development, and execution of more often than not limits its ambition to De quoi s’agit-il?—“What is it (all) rational and reasonable strategy. The strate- coverage of operational level effort. One must about?” “What is the problem?”—to borrow gist must operate in “bandit country,” and sympathize. The medium, be it print, film, from Marshal Ferdinand Foch and Bernard that country has both domestic and foreign or PowerPoint, has a way of commanding its Brodie.1 If the strategist’s most potent question provinces. The enemy is apt to be the single subject more than it ought. And of course, one is “So what?” Foch’s question must be directed largest factor among the problems that can should not forget the client. Publishers can at strategy itself. Strategy functions as the frustrate the strategist with his preferred sell books about famous generals or admirals only purpose-built bridge connecting political strategy. But a policymaking process at home but not about little known strategists (for ends with the methods and means for their and among allies that is more than marginally example, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery attempted achievement, most especially the dysfunctional and a military that is something but not Viscount Alanbrooke, or General military tools. While the basic function of this less than tailored and razor-sharp will come a George Patton but not George Marshall). metaphorical bridge necessarily is to connect, close second. Strategy is a familiar word and is widely say, policy and army, the purpose for which believed to be an important concept, but it is this key task is performed is to achieve some Strategy and Strategies: barely comprehended. Indeed, even today, it is degree of control over the polity’s security Theory and Practice little understood that the concept commonly context. Those holding the strategy bridge are It would be unwise, though not wholly is misidentified and that the word, especially charged with the planning and higher orches- implausible, to risk an unwelcome historical in adjectival form, is misapplied. tration of the policy instruments that in threat echo by declaiming for strategy what might Unquestionably, strategy is as impor- and action should impress themselves upon read as a severely parsimonious declaration of tant as it is awesomely difficult to do well the bodies and minds of those who ought to enough. The title of this essay is not a casual be concerned by such behavior. The strategist choice. Only rarely are medals for outstand- needs to be able to influence enemies, allies, the strategist needs to be able ing performance won easily. The subject and neutrals, which means influencing minds truly is challenging, and the strategist’s role, and actions, foreign and domestic. To bend to influence enemies, allies properly understood, is a heroic one. To be an enemy’s will to resist and, if required, to and neutrals, which means performed well, its multiple demands require reduce the capacity of his military means to influencing minds and actions extraordinary natural gifts, advantages that do harm, the strategist needs to have control foreign and domestic need nurturing by education and experience. over the course of events. For this heroic

38 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GRAY DOD (Cherie Cullen)

General Petraeus successfully overhauled U.S. and Iraq military strategy during implementation of “surge” in 2007

faith: “One theory, one theorist, one historical authors at most. Apart from Clausewitz, a forms and styles. Such singularity has a challenge!” Translated, this trinitarian credo list of the greatest strategic theorists should fundamental authority over a vastly vari- would claim that there is only one general include Sun Tzu, Thucydides, ���������������Niccolo �������Machi- able historical domain. This imperium—for theory of strategy; there is only one strategic avelli, Antoine Henri de Jomini, Basil Liddell that is its nature through the whole course theorist fully worthy of the job title; and there Hart, J.C. Wylie, Edward N. Luttwak, Bernard of strategic history—witnesses the creation is only one set of strategic problems, eternally Brodie, and Thomas C. Schelling.2 Each of and execution of specific strategies keyed to and universally. This extreme example of these authors augments, enriches, and cor- command and control in unique contexts. reductionism happens to be useful because rects the Prussian sufficiently to warrant a Thus, the realm of general strategic theory it does highlight two all but axiomatic truths place on the all-time short list of outstanding is unchanging, while that of the practicing while it exaggerates a justifiable, though argu- strategic theorists. executive strategist is always liable to alter by able, claim. First, there has been, is, and can be Third, it is reasonable—strictly, it is una- evolution and even revolution. only a single general theory of strategy. Differ- voidable—to argue that one general theory, There is an inescapable sense in which ent theorists will present this theory in ways and potentially even one general theorist, has the apparently clear conceptual distinction that reflect the conditions unique to their eternal and universal validity because the fun- between theory and practice may mislead. historical context as well as their personalities; damentals of strategic challenge do not alter. Although making and executing strategy as nonetheless, they must all paint pictures of the Each of the theorists identified here speaks to a plan for action lie within the realm of prac- same essentially unchanging landscape. the problems that every practicing strategist tice, every such plan inherently is a theory, Second, it is not wholly unreasonable to has to solve, regardless of his circumstances paradoxical though this may seem. A strategy argue that the one general theory of strategy and historical location. This is less true of �����Bro- expressed in the form of a plan, formal or is located and explained well enough by Carl die’s������������������������������������������� writings, but some of his strategic analy- informal, must be a theory of victory, however von Clausewitz in On War. Although I no ses, despite their period-piece Cold War foci defined for its historical context. This strategic longer endorse this judgment, it is appropri- and flavor, nonetheless reflect an exceptional plan or strategy, more or less detailed, more ate to record a massive note of confidence awareness of the general theory of strategy. or less optimistic, predicts a desirable course in Clausewitz’s theorizing. I am prepared It is vital to recognize the persisting of events. In effect, the plan, which is to say to defend the claim that our general theory authority of a single general theory of strat- the strategy, explains how military, inter alia, of strategy is to be found in the works of 10 egy, no matter that it is presented in various success will be made to happen. It will specify,

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 39 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Strategist as Hero in whatever detail is appropriate for its level kind of professional expertise that deep rative (Thucydides), all but PowerPointed (overall military, operational, tactical), and in knowledge of war planning experience both cryptically (Sun Tzu), or more than a little more or less discretionary terms, who will do needs and attracts is not an expertise often entangled in a challenging philosophical what, with what, in what sequence, where, and inclined to spark creative theorizing by its exposition (Clausewitz)—can only educate; when. The strategy may or may not explain owner. On the one hand, historical war plan- it cannot instruct with specific advice for why tasks are to be performed. Anchored in ning experience is reasonably well understood today. The general theory explains the nature time and place, and hence in strategic context, by historians, but they tend to be profession- of strategy everywhere, for all times and for the pragmatic and responsible executive strat- ally allergic to bold theorizing, including that all conditions. What it can do is to educate egist is obliged to practice theory. To plan is to with a strategic focus. On the other hand, our practicing executive strategists so that they theorize. Theories appear in many guises, but contemporary war planners, competent and are mentally adequately equipped to tackle nonetheless the practicable looking military even occasionally creative as they may be, are their historically unique problems. In short, solution to a pressing real-world problem is, in inhibited from contributing to the theory of the practicing strategist is taught, if he proves a vital sense, a theory of victory. The practic- strategy with respect to the role of planning teachable, how to think about his real-world ing strategist must engage in “if . . . then” logic by both the need for official secrecy and their challenges. By category, he knows what he and prediction. own lack of professional proficiency in such needs to worry about and he understands, Whereas all strategies are plans, not all theorizing. The predictable result of the situa- again by broad category, how he might plans are strategies. Military action may be tion just described is a strategic studies litera- succeed in evading or defeating many of the guided by a plan, but the plan might simply ture that is weak in its general understanding causes for his anxiety. Alert both to complex- direct forces to be used in a tactically effective of the roles and significance of what generi- ity and to the wholeness of his subject, the manner, with no careful attempt to relate such cally has been known as war planning, though strategist also knows that the categories he intended use to the achievement of goals that today often is called defense planning. Plans, employs to achieve some mental order all have much operational, strategic, or political formal and informal, explicit and implicit, interpenetrate to help produce messily com- value. Many of strategic history’s so-called are of crucial significance for the translation pounded strategic effects and consequences. war plans have been nothing of the kind. They of politically guided, strategically educated Between high theory and command practice can fail the strategy test in several ways. For intention into military achievement. for and in combat lies the enabling agency example, they may be designed with no more of doctrine. Only the educated strategist can discernible ambition than the intention to The Value of Strategic Theory be trusted to develop the multilevel body of bring on a “decisive” battle. In the best Napo- For many defense professionals, military doctrine that must serve to staple together leonic tradition, one would maneuver in order and civilian, theory is a word and concept synergistically efforts in performance at every to fight at an advantage. But this could be in more likely to induce hostility, certainly indif- level of warfare. the worst Napoleonic tradition of not having ference, than respect. Pragmatic strategists, Clausewitz—who else?—provides a thor- a clear idea how victory would conclude a war their staffs, other advisors, and their executive oughly persuasive explanation of why theory satisfactorily; just what would the purport- agents in the military field can have no small has value for practice. In justly honored edly decisive battle decide? For another class difficulty grasping the connection between, language, we are advised that “theory exists of example, armed forces can be committed say, most of Clausewitz’s philosophizing about so that one need not start afresh each time to the fight in the absence of any reasonable the nature of war and solutions to their own sorting out the material and plowing through expectation that the fight, no matter how well contemporary problems. it but will find it ready to hand and in good or poorly conducted, will achieve any posi- Officials usually are not interested in the order.”5 He advises also that “theory need not tive result. An all-too-plain example of this nature of strategy. Instead, for example, they be a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for second category of mainly expressive violence need to know how best to bring down Hitler’s action.” Rather, “it is meant to educate the would be a large-scale bilateral nuclear war. Third Reich. Strategic philosophy can seem mind of the future commander, or more accu- Nuclear war plans are a practical necessity, more useful for alleviating insomnia or sup- rately, to guide him in his self-education, not but in execution above a modest level of well- porting a damaged table leg than as a source to accompany him to the battlefield.”6 calibrated firepower delivered for intended of useful advice. The practical strategist, The case for general strategic theory is coercive effect, they must require destructive locked into a contextually unique challenge, inscribed in the whole practice and malprac- behavior indulged for its own sake. In actual- will look in vain to the classics of strategic tice of strategy throughout history. Theory ity, the use of nuclear weapons on a large scale theory in his search for usable specific answers would mean only that their owner could think to particular problems. In 1944, Dwight D. of nothing else to do, even though such action Eisenhower and his master commanders when policymakers, soldiers, could serve no strategic or political purposes.3 on the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee The literature on war planning is needed to decide how to win the war in the and commentators are ill voluminous but typically is so concerned to West in the context of the war(s) as a whole, educated in strategic theory, turn over every bureaucratic stone that as a European and Asia-Pacific. They could have they misuse concepts, and result, the plot at several levels often is lost.4 found few usable particular answers in the such misuse contributes The context for, and consequences of, specific pages of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, or Clausewitz. readily to unsound planning cases of war planning have a way of evading The general theory of strategy, however and faulty behavior the attention they merit. Furthermore, the it is presented—mingled in a historical nar-

40 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GRAY

Admiral Mullen addresses Marines deploying to Afghanistan as part of President Obama’s troop surge U.S. Navy (Cherie Cullen)

requires clarity and suitability of definition should be able to employ usefully. In addition or certainty; it must always leave a margin for and the specification of relationships among to book-learned theory, the strategist will uncertainty, in the greatest things as much as distinguishable elements in the structure of be educated by professional enculturation, in the smallest.”8 the subject. Also, not least, theory provides informal as well as formal, by personal experi- These words should shake the con- explanation of causation. When policymakers, ence, and by wider extra-strategic learning. fidence of theorists who seek to purvey a soldiers, and commentators are ill educated Probably the example of examples was the science of strategy. There continue to be theo- in strategic theory, they misuse concepts, and influence of Homer on Thucydides, and rists who believe that, for example, war’s fog such misuse contributes readily to unsound indeed on all Greeks of that period.7 Whatever and friction can be dispersed and avoided by planning and faulty behavior. For a leading may be said in praise of the Iliad and the reliable material means. Such foolish people example, a fundamental lack of intellectual Odyssey, in the military dimension they are fail, or at least refuse, to recognize that the grip upon the distinctive natures of policy, far more tactical than strategic. How much, most significant dimension to the strategic strategy, and tactics licenses appalling self- how well, and what the strategist acquires by function is the human. Moreover, a note- harming misuse of the adjective strategic. If way of strategic education will depend con- worthy aspect to this human dimension of theory does not educate as to the difference siderably upon his biology, psychology, and difficulty and achievement is the adversary’s between a policy instrument and that instru- the accidents of time and place that provided nature and character. ment itself—as, for an historical example, the unique contexts, perhaps the strategic Stripped to the barest, one can claim that in the Strategic Air Command, or strategic moments, for his instruction. The strategist strategic theory is an aid to clear, perhaps just missiles, or the strategic deterrent—then the learns his strategy not only with reference to clearer, thinking about all aspects of war and strategy function is unlikely to be well served. what the classics and culture and events bring peace, nested in political and other contexts, If a military force is called strategic, an exis- to him. Just as much, the strategist’s educa- domestic and foreign. In its general form, tential meaning of that force is asserted. Such tion is shaped, even sometimes determined, this theory provides clarity in definition, in a claim is a logical, and often will be a practi- by what the mind and body of the individual identification of relationships, and in causa- cal, absurdity. Since the tactical behavior of human being bring to the education on tion, which is to say in the crucial matter of all troops has strategic consequences, be they offer. It is agreeable to note that Clausewitz consequences. In truth, strategic theory is not ever so modest, it follows that the adjective is advises that: “[theory] must also take the an optional extra. All practical strategists prac- deprived of sense. human factor into account, and find room for tice the theory of strategy. They differ only in By no means can the general theory courage, boldness, even foolhardiness. The art the quality of their practice, a quality that most of strategy provide all the education that a of war deals with living and with moral forces. historical experience tries to tell us can and practicing executive strategist requires and Consequently, it cannot attain the absolute, should owe much to strategic education.

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GRAY history, the absence of a strategy, a theory of potential for multiple disharmonies warrants victory in war worthy of the name, does not special mention. No matter how clearly the even a strategically well- mean that that behavior must lack strategic human actors leading a belligerent polity in conducted conflict might no consequences. Far from it. One need look no war and warfare understand the essential be succeeded by a sustainably further than to America’s record of warfare unity of all their behaviors, the reality of stable, tolerable political order waged tactically with adequate competence performance on the different levels of conflict in Southeast Asia between 1965 and 1973 unavoidably promote what can be a lethal and the apparently paradoxically abysmal cumulative mega-disharmony. In theory, in domain and severity—for example, a cata- strategic and political result.10 Since history each of war’s levels should complement each strophic collapse in the morale of the polity’s abhors a vacuum, the gap that the strategy other. War is so much a gestalt that the rela- main army, such as the Italian army at and bridge should span is filled by encroachment tions among policy, grand strategy, military following the disastrous battle of Caporetto on the part of the political, operational, and strategy, operations, and tactics need to be (October 24–November 12, 1917)—fungibility tactical functions. Such mission creep may be understood to be horizontal in their interde- may be commanded to ride to the rescue.15 characterized as the politicization and������� tacti- pendencies, as well as vertical in their chain For a while the U.S. Navy loses its battle line cization of strategy, though it might be more of command authority.13 But each of these in the Pacific because of the tactical loss at perceptive to recognize that enhanced roles standard levels of behavior has its own nature, Pearl Harbor, so the fleet aircraft carriers must for politics and tactics substitute for, rather reflected in unique dynamics, needs, and step up to take the strain. Of course, there will than capture, strategy.11 The strategy bridge concerns. For example, tactical performance be occasions when no compensation fit for cannot be seized by politics or by tactics (or does not naturally serve operational design purpose can be located and applied. However, operations). If the bridge is not manned by optimally. And operational success need not not for nothing is the strategist’s second master strategists, it does not function—period. contribute to strategic achievement in a way question, “What are the alternatives?” (The It is important to be clear as to the at all proportionate to its costs. For a capstone first question is, “So what?”)16 The U.S. Navy in inherent difficulty of purposeful strategic per- negative, we have to note that even a strategi- 1942 did not answer the second of the strate- formance. It is no small task to plan military cally well-conducted conflict might not be gist’s questions by refraining from offensive operations such that one should be able to succeeded by a sustainably stable, tolerable action pending the restoration to health of its control events militarily in such a way and to political order. When military and strategic battle line in the Pacific. such a degree that the political future is shaped performances retire from center stage, largely favorably. This strategic function necessar- to be replaced by active diplomacy (and rel- Strategists, Command, ily entails prediction in the face of typically evant domestic politics), there will be no guar- and Strategic Effect formidable problems. Moreover, ironically, if antee that the blood and treasure expended The strategy bridge, like Florence’s one succeeds militarily far beyond one’s expec- will be cashed competently by the politicians. Ponte Vecchio, can carry many buildings (as tations—the Germans in May-June 1940, for Tolerable cooperation among the levels of a well as, incredibly, a secret passage), but it example—the challenge is extreme in deciding polity’s or coalition’s effort in conflict has to is the human strategist who must make the how far, indeed how, to exploit such success. be made to happen, but such harmonization bridge work. One can identify with confi- Again more than a little ironically, if one is will never be a natural process than can safely dence a standard set of distinguishable roles dealt too weak a military hand to succeed tac- be left to some Hidden Hand of History that that always need to be performed if purpose- tically and operationally, strategic excellence functions on autopilot. ful strategy is to be a reality. For a polity to may, or may not, be demonstrated in the way Incredibly, purposeful centralized have and attempt to execute a strategy, it must in which one copes with defeat. strategy can and sometimes does function in provide for performance of the following Several senior American military profes- practice, though rarely as well as in theory, let roles: politician-policymaker; theorist-plan- sionals, whose names must be withheld in alone elegantly, but frequently well enough. ner; and commander who has to manage and order to protect the guilty, have confided to How can this be, given the problems that can lead. The three functions indicated almost this theorist an astrategic, bordering on an threaten to render it irrelevant or worse? with unduly graphic clarity by the bridge antistrategic, proposition. They have sug- First, every category of difficulty that in metaphor are purpose, strategy, and tools gested that when a country is so potent in the principle must threaten to defeat a belligerent (ends, ways, and means). The bridge need not quantity and tactical effectiveness of its armed strategically also must menace the enemy in only be anchored on its political and military forces that it should always win the warfare, principle. One can hardly repeat too often the banks, but it can also extend some distance it has scant need for strategy. Rephrased: reductionist Clausewitzian mantra that “war overland from the water. Since the nature of perform well enough tactically and perhaps is nothing but a duel on a larger scale.”14 There the broad strategic function is to staple mili- operationally, and strategy, as the necessary is no need to excel strategically in order to tary and other behaviors to political interests, strategic effect, will take care of itself. This is a win a war or succeed in competition. Rather, motives, and goals, it is obvious that there vintage misreading of Field Marshal Helmuth there is need only to perform to better net cannot be barriers at each end of the bridge. Graf von Moltke’s expression of apparent strategic effect than does the enemy. Second, The executive strategist, as contrasted with disdain for strategy in favor of tactics.12 war’s very complexity contains within its a scholar writing strategic theory, has some Of all the problems that beset the strate- diversity the possibilities of compensation for need to think and talk politically in order to gist and fuel yet further difficulties, the super particular failures and weaknesses. Provided understand and probably try to influence the category of sheer complexity and consequent a competitive weakness is not unduly imperial content of his policy guidance for a better fit

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 43 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Strategist as Hero with his practicable ways and available means. design, decision, and execution in an adver- Also, he often will be better served should he sarial environment are inherently complex strategists cannot escape the be able to improve the strategic and military and typically are uncertain far into the zone laws of physics, even though education of both his political masters and his of unpredictability. Strategic effect is one their job requires them to military and civilian subordinates. among those mysterious qualities that cannot seek to control some aspects be observed and measured directly—security, The strategic function—hence, the of the future domain of the strategist—cannot be confined love, happiness, and grief are examples of to the realm of ideas, even when those ideas others. But even if we are unable to record are expressed in plans and doctrine manuals. strategic effect exactly, we can and must try After all, “strategic theory is a theory for hard to recognize evidence of its current tactical action, commanded for operational action.”17 The strategist is not only a sponsor of condition. Its future impact typically will be level consequences, will shape the course of the world of practice—at least, he should not a topic fit only for guesswork, but we can find future events; assessed overall, this is strategic only be such. His strategy exists strictly as a material evidence of its recent and current effect. For more reasons than it would be sen- contingent theory for victory, a plan devised to presence. For example, the hasty retreat by the sible to attempt to itemize comprehensively, solve—or, at the general level, to help solve via ragged remainder of the German army from it is difficult to perform even competently education—actual or anticipated problems. It Normandy toward the frontier of the Third as a strategist, let alone as a strategist of true follows that the role of the strategist is mean- Reich in August 1944 yielded unmistakable historical distinction. Happily for most of ingless absent provision for strategy execution. evidence of massive positive strategic effect history’s would-be strategists, which is to say Whether or not the principal conceptualizer achieved by Allied command performance. for those with average biological endowment, of a strategy is designated to command its But what did this German retreat-cum-rout education, experience, and luck, there is need implementation in the field, the function of mean? Would the war be over in 1944? How only to be good enough. command must feature prominently on the much fight was left in the Wehrmacht? The Strategic effect is felt and has conse- strategy landscape. Both as general theory answer could not be calculated. This was not a quences in stages and across levels of conflict, and as historically unique plans, the purpose metric challenge. and the transitions from one level to another of strategy is to improve a polity’s competitive Strategists cannot escape the laws of are not reliably predictable. By stages, stra- performance. And the quality of that per- physics, even though their job requires them tegic effect happens and is felt in first-order, formance should be influenced to advantage to seek to control some aspects of the future. second-order, and probably third-order by a choice of strategy executed by armed Although competent strategists and more and beyond, consequences, untraceably in forces commanded by people who endeavor than adequate commander-managers often do confirmable detail. Tactical first-order effects to achieve a purposeful control of events. This succeed in shaping events to a broadly advan- should have second-order tactical and opera- apparently complex, yet essentially simple, tageous outcome, it is never possible for them tional effects, and those effects should have process is most likely to happen advanta- to remove entirely the potentially sovereign meaning in strategic effect. Alas, strategy is geously when all the many��������������� behaviors �����com- role of chance in war. Yet again, Clausewitz is apt to be curved in its trajectory of conse- manded are controlled for complementary and thoroughly persuasive. He specified chance quences. Tactical behavior may well be the synergistic impacts and consequences. Such and its dependent associate, uncertainty, as an trackable product of a grand strategic design, command and control, no doubt devolved as organic component of the “climate of war.”18 but in its turn, it could blow back to reshape it must be to and among many layers in the No matter how cunningly theorists strive, the strategy itself. military hierarchy, is integral to the strategic they cannot eliminate uncertainty from war. Theorists of a metric persuasion who function. To repeat the logic: a master strategic In truth, knowledge of nearly everything strive against heavy odds to convert the art of idea, a dominant narrative, should drive the about the future, in almost any detail below strategy into applied quantifiable science are design of actual plans, and those plans must the generic, is precisely unknowable. And yet always going to be outmaneuvered fatally by be executed by forces that are commanded the strategist’s core duty is to develop, and the authority of the contextuality as well as and controlled so that their efforts serve a to see commanded in physical performance, the contingency of events. Strategic effect and common, centrally intended purpose. The plans that are predictions and contingent its achievement via command performance existence, promulgation, understanding, and intentions—in other words, theories. The strategically, operationally, and tactically must use of a coherent body of authoritative sound strategist’s plans purport to explain how be a product whose weight is determined by military doctrine should contribute notably to desired endstates will be achieved. dynamic and unique circumstances. Defeat in the achievement of such purpose. Strategic effect, the dynamic and more battle may, or may not, so demoralize an army What does strategy produce? The than slightly unpredictable result of the or a nation that its morale sags beyond recov- answer is as challengingly opaque as it is strategist’s labors, is the product of every ery.19 The strategic meaning of tactical and ­unavoidable: strategic effect. Apparent tautol- element specified as acting and interacting operational success and failure can be antici- ogy or not, this concept has to be the keystone in the complete general theory of strategy. In pated, guessed intelligently, but by no means in the arch of the strategy bridge. Performance principle, nothing in this general theory is can it be predicted with rock-like reliability. of the strategic function can only be to gen- irrelevant to any particular historical context, erate desired effect upon the future course but the many subjects must play roles of The Good (Enough) Strategist of events. The subject is as straightforward variable significance from case to case. The To conclude on a moderately upbeat as this, even though all matters of strategy strategist’s plan must seek to anticipate how note, strategy is possible; the strategist often

44 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GRAY can succeed because true excellence in his Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); calling is rarely necessary. The victorious strat- ch. 2, and War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, Jeffrey Record, The Wrong War: Why We Lost in egist need not even be the particularly good 1973), ch. 1. Vietnam (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998); 2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, tr. Michael Mark W. Woodruff, Unheralded Victory: Who strategist. Because the strategist has to perform Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Won the Vietnam War? (London: HarperCollins as a duelling competitor, he need only be good University Press, 1976); Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Publishers, 1999); and C. Dale Walton, The Myth of enough to achieve by his command perfor- tr. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam (London: Frank mance a necessary measure of control over the 1994); Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Cass, 2002). enemy’s decisions. The quality and quantity of Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War, 11 Although by definition warfare is waged for that enemy (and enmity) decide just how good ed. Robert B. Strassler, rev. tr. Richard Crawley political ends, this necessary fact does not mean the strategist has to be, always assuming obe- (New York: Free Press, 1996); Basil H. Liddell Hart, that politics and warfare are fused. Acts of organ- dience to the rule of prudence in the provision Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber ized violence committed for political purposes may of his political guidance. For some comfort, and Faber, 1967), and The Revolution in Warfare be regarded as a form of political behavior—war is it is more than a little encouraging to reflect (London: Faber and Faber, 1946); J.C. Wylie, Mili- armed politics and suchlike formulae—but warfare upon these words by the journalist-novelist tary Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control has a lore and dynamic all its own, no matter (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989); Edward what the political intentions might be. Clausewitz Robert Harris: “In the absence of genius there N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, is admirably explicit on this point: “Its [war’s] is always craftsmanship.”20 The strategist rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.” strictly does not require the right stuff, only 2001); Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, tr. Ellis Clausewitz, 605. On the malady of the tacticization enough of the right-enough stuff to meet the Farneworth (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), of strategy, see Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: challenge of the day. For him to do that, he can Discourses on Livy, tr. Julia Conaway Bondarella Classical Strategic Thought, 3d ed. (London: Frank only benefit from some education by a general and Peter Bondarella (Oxford: Oxford University Cass, 2001), 355–360. theory designed and refined to assist practice. Press, 2003), and The Prince, tr. Peter Bondarella 12 Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of Happily, perhaps, although the general and Mark Musa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, War: Selected Writings, tr. Daniel J. Hughes and theory of strategy can be rewritten endlessly, 1998); Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War Gunther E. Rothenberg (Novato, CA: Presidio with each drafting reflecting the time, place, (London: Greenhill Books, 1992); Bernard Brodie, Press, 1993), 47. 13 circumstance, and personality of the theorist, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and See Handel, 353–360. World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), 14 Clausewitz, 75. it does not necessarily register progress in Strategy in the Missile Age, and War and Politics; 15 German General Otto von Below assaulted comprehension. The general theory can be and Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 41 Italian divisions with 45 (7 German, 38 Austro- identified and explained at any time and in (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), and Hungarian) divisions and routed them in a classic any place and circumstance in history. This Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University panic. The Italians lost 40,000 casualties, and theory for the strategic function must be Press, 1966). 275,000 were taken prisoner. The loss of materiel expressed in the manner characteristic of the 3 A period piece that has residual significance was formidable (2,500 guns were captured by von period, but it does not have a linear and pro- is Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Stra- Below’s storming troopers), but his victorious forces gressive intellectual narrative. Clausewitz is tegic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University lacked the logistical means to convert a tactical superior in important respects to Thucydides Press, 1986). Also see Lawrence Freedman, The victory into either an operational or a strategic d and Sun Tzu, but that is not because he wrote Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3 ed. (Basingstoke: decision. The complexity of war and warfare has 2,200 and more years later than did they. The Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and Keith B. Payne, a way of frustrating those who are only tactically strategic function is universal and eternal and The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory outstanding. and Practice from the Cold War to the 21st Century 16 See Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: is not the product of culturally circumscribed (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008). Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University conceptualization. It follows, therefore, that 4 General wisdom on war planning is in short Press, 2010), 16. great works of general strategic theory in supply; one should begin with Clausewitz, book 17 Brodie, War and Politics, 452. principle can have equal value for today and eight, “War Plans.” After On War, one admittedly 18 Clausewitz, 104. tomorrow and can be written at any location struggles to find much enlightenment. Some help 19 For example, in the estimation of the victor, and at any of history’s many moments, those can be derived from Steven T. Ross, American War Hannibal Barca, the catastrophic defeat of the both allegedly momentously “strategic” and Plans, 1941–1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1997), xiii– army of the Roman Republic at Cannae in 216 BCE those that plainly are much less plausibly so. xx, and Talbot C. Imlay and Monica Duffy Toft, should have led to Rome suing for the best peace Everything there is to know about strategy eds., The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military terms with Carthage that it could negotiate. In the as the basis for general theory was as know- and Strategic Planning under Uncertainty (Abing- instructive words of Adrian Goldsworthy, “[b]y don: Routledge, 2006). his own understanding of war Hannibal won the able in ancient Greece as it was in early 19th- 5 Clausewitz, 141. Second Punic War at Cannae, but the Romans were century Prussia and as it is today. Strategy, not 6 Ibid. Emphasis in original. following a different set of rules and when they JFQ strategies, endures. 7 See M.I. Finley’s introduction to Thucydides, did not admit defeat there was little more that he History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. Rex Warner could do to force them.” See Goldsworthy, Roman (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 9–32. Warfare (London: Cassell, 2002), 85. Britain’s defeat NOTES 8 Clausewitz, 86. in Flanders in May 1940 was far less bloody than 9 See Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illu- was Rome’s at Cannae, but it appeared to place her 1 Marshal (Ferdinand) Foch, The Principles of sion?” International Security 25 (Fall 2000). in scarcely more hopeful a strategic situation. War, tr. Hilaire Belloc (London: Chapman and Hall, 10 For a range of perspectives, see Andrew 20 Robert Harris, The Ghost (London: Hutchin- 1921), 14. See Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Bal- son, 2007), 141.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 45 SPECIAL FEATURE | A Diplomat’s Philosophy A Diplomat’s Philosophy

By MARC GROSSMAN

Sir Henry Wotton, 17th-century author

National Portrait Gallery, London National Portrait Gallery, and British ambassador to Venice

46 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GROSSMAN

ne damaging consequence of Wiki Leaks has been the res- American diplomats know that the choices their own urrection of the statement by country makes about issues such as resilience, health care, O Sir Henry Wotton, who served infrastructure, and the balance between rights and security will King James I as ambassador to Venice, that form the foundation for their representation around the world “an Ambassador is an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the good of his country.”1 There are questions to answer about how best diplomats are optimists. They believe to study, whereas the statesman’s problems 250,000 State Department cables found in the power of ideas. They believe that are imposed on him. The analyst can allot their way to Wiki Leaks, but a lingering sustained effort can lead to progress. They ­whatever time is necessary to come to a clear public impression that diplomacy is tainted believe that diplomacy, backed when needed conclusion; the overwhelming challenge for because it is carried out by patriotic people by the threat of force, can help nations and the statesman is the pressure of time. The pledged to the advancement of their country groups avoid bloodshed. analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove and may sometimes be better accomplished This belief in optimism and the pursuit wrong, he can write another treatise. The in private than in public leads to a larger of action on behalf of the nation requires statesman is permitted only one guess; his challenge: trying to define a diplomatic making choices, often between two poor mistakes are irretrievable. The analyst has world view. Is there a philosophy that alternatives. John W. O’Malley, in his book available to him all the facts; he will be judged describes diplomacy’s uplifting qualities? In Four Cultures of the West, describes the pro- on his intellectual power. The statesman must this essay, I draw on my career to consider, phetic, academic/professional, humanistic, act on assessments that cannot be proved at in light of Wiki Leaks, how I would describe and artistic cultures all as being part of larger the time that he is making them; he will be a diplomat’s philosophy. Western philosophy. He puts statesmen in judged by history on the basis of how wisely he Such a personal essay begins with three “culture three” (humanistic) because they are managed the inevitable change and, above all, statements of what such a philosophy is not. concerned with contingencies. O’Malley says by how well he preserves the peace.3 First, it is not a consideration of a philosophy a statesman must ask: “Is war required of us of international relations or a commentary now, under these circumstances?” A states- Put another way, the diplomat sees on thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and their man argues, therefore, from: herself or himself as the person Theodore relevance to and impact on the international Roosevelt described as “in the arena,” who system in which diplomats work. Second, it is probabilities to attain a solution not certain strives “to do the deeds.”4 not a scholarly work. My perspective remains but more likely of success than its alternatives. Second, a commitment to justice. Kiss- that of a practitioner of diplomacy. Third, Like the poet, then, the statesman deals with inger, often criticized by those who subscribe this reflection is not designed to be univer- ambiguities, very unlike the protagonist from to Wotton’s description of diplomacy, is clear sal. American diplomats may recognize the culture two, who traditionally argued from that the only successful international orders are fundamentals of this philosophy, and perhaps principles to attain truth certain and proved those that are just.5 He goes on to note that this some of our friends and allies will as well. to be such; cultures two and three represent, requirement for justice is intimately connected However, as I will argue below, if pluralism thus, two different approaches to problem to the domestic institutions of the nations that is one of the foundations of this diplomat’s solving. Like the prophet of culture one, the make up the international system. That is why, philosophy, then we should not be surprised statesman of culture three wants to change for this diplomat’s philosophy, the American to find other diplomatic constructs operating society for the better, but to do so he seeks commitment to political and economic justice, around the world. common ground and knows that to attain his not just at home but also abroad, is a crucial end he must be astute in compromise. He does connection.6 It is this link that emerges in Four Principles of a not shun the negotiating table.2 the press reports of Wiki Leaks as American Diplomatic Philosophy diplomats pursue policies that promote the If Sir Henry Wotton does not accu- Henry Kissinger, in his book Diplomacy, sanctity of the individual, the rule of law, and rately portray a philosophy for a diplomat, made a similar observation: fairness in economic life. American diplomats what might constitute one? Let us consider know that the choices their own country makes four principles as a foundation: optimism, a Intellectuals analyze the operations of inter- about issues such as resilience, health care, commitment to justice, truth in dealing, and national systems; statesmen build them and infrastructure, and the balance between rights realism tempered by pluralism. there is a vast difference between the perspec- and security will form the foundation for their First, optimism. Twenty-nine years in tive of an analyst and that of a statesman. The representation around the world. the U.S. Foreign Service taught me that the analyst can choose which problem he wishes Third, truth in dealing. Sir Henry Wotton and his contemporary Wiki Leaks–inspired Ambassador Marc Grossman is the United States Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. He prepared celebrants are wrong. Untruthful diplomacy is this article in a personal capacity prior to his return to U.S. Government service in this position. Previously, unsuccessful diplomacy. As Harold Nicolson he served as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Under wrote in his classic book Diplomacy, first pub- Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The author expresses his appreciation to The Cohen Group, the Harvard JFK School Project on the Future of Diplomacy, Toni Getze, and Jill O’Donnell for their support in making lished in 1939, “My own practical experience, this article a reality. The views herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the and the years of study which I have devoted Department of State or the U.S. Government. to this subject, have left me with the profound

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and justice. The recalcitrant forces in the historical drama have a power and persis- tence beyond our reckoning.”11 Or, in words particularly relevant to a post-Afghanistan and Iraq United States, Niebuhr says, “For our sense of responsibility to a world com- munity beyond our own borders is a virtue, even though it is partly derived from the prudent understanding of our own interests. But this virtue does not guarantee our ease, comfort, or prosperity. We are the poorer for the global responsibilities which we bear and the fulfillments of our desires are mixed with frustrations and vexations.”12 Niebuhr challenges (or at least compli- cates) the diplomat’s philosophy of optimistic, realistic actions in the pursuit of justice:

The ironic elements in American history can be overcome, in short, only if American idealism comes to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all Ambassador Grossman (center) speaks with U.S. and Tajik officials at bilateral consultation with Tajikistan government in Dushanbe human wisdom, the precariousness of all his-

State Department toric configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in all human virtue. America’s moral and spiritual success in relating itself conviction that ‘moral’ diplomacy is ulti- after the American invasions of Afghanistan creatively to a world community requires not mately the most effective, and that ‘immoral’ and Iraq has led some observers back to so much a guard against the gross vices, about diplomacy defeats its own purposes.” In his the work of Reinhold Niebuhr. Andrew J. which the idealists warn us, as a reorientation chapter on the “Ideal Diplomatist,” Nicolson ­Bacevich has written an introduction to a of the whole structure of our idealism. That says that the first virtue of the ideal diplomat reissued edition of Niebuhr’s The Irony of idealism is too oblivious of the ironic perils to is truthfulness. “By this is meant, not merely American History. Brian Urquhart high- which human virtue, wisdom and power are abstention from conscious mis-statements, lighted Bacevich’s introduction and Niebuhr’s subject. It is too certain that there is a straight but a scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion words and warnings in a review in the New path toward the goal of human happiness; too of the false or the suppression of the truth. A York Review of Books. Robert Kagan called confident of the wisdom and idealism which good diplomatist should be at pains not to leave on Niebuhr’s insights to help him define the prompt men and nations toward that goal; any incorrect impressions whatsoever upon debate between what he described as “old and too blind to the curious compounds of the minds of those with whom he negotiates.”7 and new realism.”9 The return of interest in good and evil in which the actions of the best Garrett Mattingly expands on this conviction Niebuhr (including from President Barack men and nations abound.13 when, after describing the fundamentals of Obama) is based both on Niebuhr’s pessimis- diplomacy, he notes that: tic view of the international system and on his President Obama’s speech in Oslo at the belief in the limits of what America can do to acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 If all this says more about the value of patience, change the world in which we find ourselves. started with an optimistic view of the future. truthfulness, loyalty and mutual confidence, Bacevich maintains that the truths But Obama then reminded the audience that and less about bluff, bedazzlement, intrigue Niebuhr spoke are uncomfortable for us “we must begin by acknowledging the hard and deception than might be considered to hear: “Four such truths are especially truth: we will not eradicate violent conflict appropriate for the century in which Machia- underlined in The Irony of American History: in our lifetimes. There will be times when velli was born, perhaps it is not the less realistic the persistent sin of American exceptional- nations—acting individually or in concert— on that account. Scholars and literary men ism; the indecipherability of history; the will find the use of force not only necessary often seem more given to the inverted idealism false allure of simple solutions; and, finally, but morally justified.” President Obama of real politik than working diplomats. In the the imperative of appreciating the limits of recognized that this conflicts with the vision long run, virtue is more successful than the power.”10 As Niebuhr himself wrote: “Our of Martin Luther King, Jr., to whom the Presi- most romantic rascality.8 dreams of bringing the whole of human dent acknowledges he owes so much, and with history under the control of the human will the philosophy of Gandhi. However: Fourth, realism tempered by a commit- are ironically refuted by the fact that no ment to pluralism. It is not a coincidence that group of idealists can easily move the pattern As a head of state sworn to protect and the search for useful foreign policy paradigms of history toward the desired goal of peace defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their

48 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GROSSMAN State Department

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Secretary Clinton talk at State Department

­examples alone. I face the world as it is, and Berlin’s ideas about pluralism, Kwame Anthony cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the Appiah’s description of cosmopolitanism, and most diplomats have seen too American people. For make no mistake: Evil my belief in the continuing importance of much in too many places to does exist in the world. A non-violent move- American values and power. remain unvarnished optimists ment could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Just as those seeking a framework for Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaeda’s U.S. foreign policy after Iraq and Afghanistan leaders to lay down their arms. To say that have returned to the writings of Reinhold to adjudicate these conflicts was one which force may sometimes be necessary is not a call Niebuhr, some have also sought the wisdom privileged their liberty, for only conditions to cynicism—it is a recognition of history; the of Isaiah Berlin. The Oxford University Press of liberty could enable them to make the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.14 has reissued many of Berlin’s greatest works, compromises between values necessary to including “Two Concepts of Liberty.” In his maintain a free social life.16 The Diplomat’s Dilemma review of a new book of Berlin’s letters in the So what has become of the diplomat’s New York Review of Books in February 2010, Berlin himself writes in “Two Concepts philosophy? Part is rooted in Niebuhr’s realism. Nicholas Kristof asks: “What exactly is Berlin’s of Liberty” that: Most diplomats have seen too much in too legacy and philosophy? To me, it is his empha- many places to remain unvarnished optimists. sis on the ‘pluralism of values,’ a concept that pluralism . . . seems to me a truer and more But while diplomats are children of Niebuhr, suggests a non-ideological, pragmatic way of humane ideal than the goals of those who seek he is not their only intellectual parent. For me, navigating an untidy world.”15 In his biography in the great disciplined, authoritarian struc- the debt to Niebuhr is tempered by two other of Berlin, Michael Ignatieff writes that Berlin: tures the ideal of “positive” self mastery by points: first, a commitment to political and classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. economic pluralism and, second—recogniz- never claimed to have been the first to think It is truer, because it does, at least, recognize ing the importance of Niebuhr’s cautions—a about pluralism. But Berlin had reason to the fact that human goals are many, not all belief, based on America’s founding principles, believe that he was the first to argue that of them commensurable, and in perpetual that the United States has an important and pluralism entailed liberalism—that is, if rivalry with one another. To assume that all potentially unique role to play in the modern human beings disagreed about ultimate ends, values can be graded on one scale, so that it is world. This is Niebuhr leavened by Sir Isaiah the political system that best enabled them a mere matter of inspection to determine the

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 49 SPECIAL FEATURE | A Diplomat’s Philosophy

of the weak on the other. This success requires President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary a modest awareness of the contingent elements Mikhail Gorbachev meet at 1985 summit in Geneva in the values and ideals of our devotion, even when they appear to us to be universally valid; and a generous appreciation of the valid ele- ments in the practices and institutions of other nations though they deviate from our own.21 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Ronald Reagan Presidential And what of American values and power? It is with trepidation that I disagree with Niebuhr when it comes to the impor- tance of maintaining America’s commitment to acting on behalf of freedom and justice in the world, but Niebuhr also says that we must never come to terms with tyranny.22 America was founded, as Robert Kagan has written, with the Declaration of Independence as its first foreign policy document.23 The United States still has a special role to play in support- ing political and economic pluralism around the world. It will cause us the discomfort highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge even the more formal ties of a shared citizen- that Niebuhr describes, but it is both part of that men are free agents, to represent moral ship. The other is that we take seriously the our destiny and among the most important decision as an operation which a slide rule value not just of human life but of particular reasons that American diplomats go out each could, in principle, perform.17 human lives, which means taking an inter- day to do our nation’s bidding. est in the practices and beliefs that lend The issue is joined by Kagan in his Wall Kristof highlights the final paragraphs them significance. People are different, the Street Journal article “Power Play.” Kagan calls of “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in which Berlin cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to for a “bit of realism” to challenge “the wide- speaks to a seeker of diplomatic philosophy: learn from our differences. Because there are spread belief that a liberal international order so many human possibilities worth explor- rests on the triumph of ideas alone or the natural It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ing, we neither expect nor desire that every unfolding of human progress.” He notes that: ends without claiming eternal validity for person or every society should converge on a them, and that the pluralism of values con- single mode of life. Whatever our obligations The focus on the dazzling pageant of progress nected with this, is only the late fruit of our are to others (or theirs to us) they often have at the end of the Cold War ignored the wires declining capitalist civilizations: an ideal the right to go their own way . . . there will and the beams and the scaffolding that had which remote ages and primitive societies have be times when these two ideals—universal made such progress possible. The global shift not recognized, and one which posterity will concern and respect for legitimate differ- toward liberal democracy coincided with the regard with curiosity, even sympathy, but little ence—clash. There is a sense in which cos- historical shift in the balance of power toward comprehension. This may be so; but no skepti- mopolitanism is the name not of the solution those nations and peoples who favored the cal conclusions seem to me to follow. Principles but of the challenge.19 liberal democratic idea, a shift that began are not less sacred because their duration with the triumph of the democratic powers cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire Appiah’s ideas connect to Berlin’s credo: over fascism in World War II and that was for guarantees that our values are eternal and “One distinctively cosmopolitan commitment followed by a second triumph of the democra- secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only is to pluralism. Cosmopolitans think that cies over communism in the Cold War.24 a craving for the certainties of childhood or the there are many values worth living by and that absolute values of our primitive past.18 you cannot live by all of them so we hope and President Obama made the same point expect that different people and different soci- in Oslo: “But the world must remember that it Appiah’s book Cosmopolitanism takes a eties will embody different values (but they was not simply international institutions—not commitment to pluralism and embeds it in a have to be values worth living by).”20 philosophy which many diplomats will recog- To be fair, Niebuhr is part of this plural- nize as part of their world view. Appiah writes: istic vision as well. Keeping in mind that he the United States still has was writing in 1952, Niebuhr notes that: So there are two strands that intertwine in a special role to play in the notion of cosmopolitanism. One is the Today the success of America in world politics supporting political and idea that we have obligations to others, obli- depends upon its ability to establish community economic pluralism around gations that stretch beyond those to whom with many nations, despite the hazards created the world we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or by pride of power on the one hand and the envy

50 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu GROSSMAN just treaties and declarations—that brought NOTES stability to a post–World War II world. What- NEW ever the mistakes we have made, the plain 1 Quoted in Sir Ivor Roberts, Satow’s Diplo- from NDU Press matic Practice, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University fact is this: The United States of America has for the Institute for helped underwrite global security for more Press, 2009), 82. 2 National Strategic Studies than six decades with the blood of our citizens John W. O’Malley, Four Cultures of the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 16. and the strength of our arms.”25 3 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: While trying to graft pluralism to Simon and Schuster, 1994), 27–28. March 2011 realism, it is vital to avoid thinking that all 4 Theodore Roosevelt, “The Man in the STRATEGIC FORUM National Defense University values are equal. Appiah writes, “Universalism Arena,” speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, France, April without toleration, it’s clear, turns easily to About the Author Brazil and the United 23, 1910. Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow in States: The Need for the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic 5 Studies, at the National Defense Strategic Engagement University. He is also a Member of murder,” and so there are limits to cosmo- Kissinger, 79. the Advisory Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson by Luigi R. Einaudi International Center for Scholars. The Power of Uniqueness 6 Key Points politan tolerance. “We will sometimes want to Marc Grossman, “Supporting Political and ◆◆ Brazil’s economic performance, po- ashington’s identification of Brazil with Latin America and the litical stability, and cultural vitality ensure that Brasilia’s foreign and Third World hampers its appreciation of Brazil’s power and im- defense policies will help shape portance to the United States. It is true that Brazil is geographi- st global as well as regional politics Economic Pluralism: A 21 Century Diplomatic in the decades ahead. More than cally part of Latin America, and it is also true that Brazil, a founder of the Group a Latin American or even Third W intervene in other places, because what is going of 77, was, with India, among the original leaders of the “Third World.” World leader, Brazil has become an autonomous global power. But Brazil is Brazil—as large and every bit as unique as the United States or China. Brazil, for many years the seat of the Portuguese empire, is the ◆◆ U.S. relations with Brazil have Approach,” American Diplomacy.org, 2010, evolved from alliance during and world’s largest Portuguese-speaking country. It never had the large settled on there violates our fundamental principles immediately after World War II to Amerindian populations that became a repressed underclass in the Andes and skeptical distance today. Distrust is exacerbated by outmoded stereo- Mesoamerica; Brazilians today are as diverse as their North American cousins types and hubris on both sides. but growing faster. available at . United States accepts its rise and lems and “making things work.” Both have governments capable of reaching be- that more can be achieved working yond their borders, but are deeply inward-looking and characterized psychologi- when it is serious enough—genocide is the with Washington than against it. cally by a sense of their own exceptional nature (and, sometimes, by the hubris 7 ◆◆ Three practical approaches would have a substantial, positive born of an excessive sense of self-worth). Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (Oxford: impact. Both countries should But if these traits make Brazil closer to the United States than to its consult widely on global issues, Spanish-American neighbors, its unique culture, history, and worldview also uncontroversial case—we will not stop with strengthen personal and institu- tional ties, and learn to cooper- separate it from the United States. The “automatic alliance” of the past is ate more effectively on conflict gone; both countries need to strengthen personal, professional, and insti resolution, energy, and trade. Oxford University Press, 1950), 49, 110. - CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH tutional relationships that will create common ground for advancing their conversation. Toleration requires a concept of 8 www.ndu.edu/inss Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy SF No. 266 1 26 the intolerable.” And Kristof quotes Berlin as (New York: Penguin Books, 1964), 35. saying, “I am not a relativist. I do not say, ‘I like 9 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American Strategic Forum 266 my coffee with milk and you like it without; I History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952; am in favor of kindness and you prefer concen- Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Brian Brazil and the United States: tration camps.’” As Kristof concludes, “Finding Urquhart, “What You Can Learn from Reinhold The Need for Strategic Engagement the boundary between what can be tolerated Niebuhr,” New York Review of Books, March 26, with gritted teeth and what is morally intoler- 2009; Robert Kagan, “Power Play,” The Wall Street Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi opens with able may not be easy, but it does not mean Journal, August 30, 2008, W–1. a survey of Brazil’s dynamic economic 10 that such a boundary does not exist.”27 This Andrew J. Bacevich in Niebuhr, x. performance, political stability, and cultural 11 Niebuhr, 2–3. vitality. More than a Latin American or is at the root of the diplomat’s dilemma and 12 Ibid., 7. Thi d World leader, Brazil has become an why a combination of philosophies speaks to 13 Ibid., 133. autonomous global power whose foreign those charged with pursing America’s interests 14 Barack Obama, remarks by the President and defense policies will help shape regional around the world. at the acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, Oslo, and global politics of the future. However, Norway, December 10, 2009. the U.S relationship with Brazil has devolved No Room for Wotton 15 Nicholas Kristof, “On Isaiah Berlin,” New from alliance during World War II to one An American diplomat starts her or his York Review of Books, February 25, 2010, 26. of skeptical distance today. The author calls 16 career by taking an oath of office to the Con- Michael Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin: A Life (New for the United States to welcome Brazil’s stitution of the United States. These officers York: Henry Holt, 1998), 286. emergence as a global power that is culturally 17 come to their profession having formed their Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy and politically close to it, and for Brazil to own values, instincts, and philosophies. But (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 216. realize that the United States accepts its rise 18 Ibid., 217; Kristof, 26. the professional pursuit of diplomacy requires and that much can be achieved by working 19 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism a philosophy of diplomacy and a commit- with Washington. He recommends three (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), xv. approaches: consultation on global issues, ment to an America founded on optimism, a 20 Ibid., 144. strengthened personal and institutional commitment to justice and truth in dealing, 21 Niebuhr, 79. ties, and increased cooperation on confli t and the sobriety described by Niebuhr, 22 Ibid., 143–144. resolution, energy, and trade. complemented by a belief in the pluralism of 23 Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation (New York: Berlin and Appiah. In the search for a name Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 41. for one’s professional credo, perhaps this can 24 Kagan, “Power Play,” W–1. be termed “optimistic realism,” the belief 25 Obama. 26 that strategic, determined effort can produce Appiah, 140–144. 27 results, tempered by a recognition of the limits Kristof, 26. 28 Grossman. on where, when, and how fast these results can be achieved.28 Looking back over almost 30 years of service to America as one of its diplomats, this is my attempt to define my motivations and beliefs. Sir Henry Wotton is Visit the NDU Press Web site not my guiding philosopher. JFQ for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 51 Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III meets with USSOUTHCOM commander and Joint Directors at USSOUTHCOM headquarters DOD (Cherie Cullen)

n January 31, 2007, just a few weeks after the surprise announcement that Robert PLANNING O Gates would replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates was briefed on military plans and the key role envisioned for him in the develop- IS ment of those plans. This was not a detailed briefing of the 50-plus contingency plans then in existence. It was an overview of the plan- ning process itself and an introduction to the 15 or so top priority plans that the Secretary EVERYTHING would review in greater detail in the months ahead. At the meeting, Secretary Gates con- By MARK A. BUCKNAM firmed his commitment to play an active role in the process for developing and reviewing plans. This would be a priority for him. As he saw it, involvement in the planning process was one of his core responsibilities as Secre- tary—indeed, it is one of the few responsibili- ties of the Secretary enumerated in Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

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In late 2008, after nearly 2 years in his position, Secretary Gates declined a sugges- USNORTHCOM and Joint Task Force North tion that he delegate authority to approve commanders discuss updates to Defense Support some of the lesser priority plans by noting, to Civilian Law Enforcement Agency operations “Looking at the list, I think it would be a der- eliction of my responsibilities to not approve the subject contingency plans.” At the initial plans briefing in early 2007, Secretary Gates also agreed to his briefers’ recommendation to consolidate disparate planning guidance documents, so as to bring greater coher- ence and consistency between planning for wartime contingencies and planning for Department of Defense (DOD) day-to-day activities around the world. In agreeing to these things, Secretary Gates was furthering an initiative called Adaptive Planning begun by his predecessor. He was also strengthening civilian control of the military. Whoever replaces Robert Gates as

Secretary of Defense must be prepared to DOD (Armando Carrasco) immerse himself in the DOD planning process. This article first considers some barriers to the Secretary’s involvement in crises, such as the political revolutions that planning and then looks at the benefits of have roiled the Middle East in 2011. If recent the responsibilities that go planning beyond just the production of plans. history is a reliable guide, the next Secretary with running the world’s It next describes how the Adaptive Planning will also be forced to contend with stories largest and most powerful process improves civilian control of the mili- questioning the loyalty of top military leaders bureaucracy are so vast that tary—bringing military planning into tighter and with media storms over the state of civil- alignment with administration policies and military relations in America. Indeed, the the job has been described as priorities. After explaining the current plan breadth and depth of responsibilities that go “nearly impossible” development and review process, the article with running the world’s largest and most highlights the vital role that the Secretary powerful bureaucracy are so vast that the job plays in the planning process. has been described as “nearly impossible.”1 hire an architect to design a high-rise office As one former Secretary explained, “The list building, obtain building permits, retain Barriers to Involvement of secretarial responsibilities is so imposing lawyers to draw up contracts, and advertise for The Secretary of Defense after Dr. Gates that no single individual can totally fulfill tenants if that person had no intent to build. will confront a multitude of challenges that them all.”2 Gates’s successor will have to Yet the U.S. military routinely devotes enor- will compete for his attention and make it choose carefully the areas that he will want to mous amounts of time and energy to detailed difficult to focus his time and energy on the focus his attention on, and then work to stay planning for contingencies that are unlikely, department’s planning processes. Not least focused on them. and that the U.S. Government also energeti- among his concerns will be the ongoing Regardless of the background, talents, cally strives to prevent.3 operations in Afghanistan, the wider war and expertise with which the next Defense Military planning will seem arcane to against al Qaeda and its affiliates, and coping Secretary enters office, certain aspects of mili- the new Secretary because it is arcane. Even with America’s worldwide commitments in tary planning will seem unnatural and arcane. within the military, the detailed workings of an era of declining defense budgets. Other It will seem unnatural because military plan- military planners remain relatively obscure— challenges will include unpredictable natural ning includes planning not only for operations part science and procedure, and part art. It disasters, such as the earthquakes and tsu- one intends to conduct, but also for those is the product of specialized training, educa- namis that have devastated Indonesia, Haiti, things one hopes never to do. Even long-serv- tion, and experience. Furthermore, as with and Japan in recent years, and manmade ing foreign policy professionals sometimes fail any professional subspecialty, planning has to grasp this aspect of military planning and its own language. Perfectly ordinary words, assume that the existence of a plan indicates such as assumption and supported, have very Colonel Mark A. Bucknam, USAF, is a Faculty an intent or desire to execute that plan. Such precise meanings for military planners; and Member in the National War College at the National thinking is not unreasonable. Human success, many uniformed officers who have not been Defense University. He previously served as Director even survival, depends on efficiency—that is, planners themselves have enjoyed full and for Plans in the Office of the Under Secretary of on not wasting time and energy on unneces- successful careers without mastering the Defense for Policy. sary things. No mentally sound person would nuances of “planner-speak.” Finally, military

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BUCKNAM and agencies of the executive branch, thereby of Adaptive Planning, and can safely be without any clear articulation of which guid- helping to ensure that the benefits cited above credited for recent major improvements in ance trumped which, or how consumers of the spread beyond DOD. DOD campaign and contingency planning. guidance should prioritize among the dispa- Secretary Gates’s predecessor, Donald Rums- rate signals sent from Washington. In 2008, Adaptive Planning feld, formally launched the Adaptive Plan- with Secretary Gates’s approval, Pentagon The Adaptive Planning initiative, as it ning initiative in 2003 to get the military to officials promulgated one overarching policy has evolved under Secretary Gates, has gone produce better plans more quickly10—though document to guide planning for employment a long way toward realizing the four benefits the impetus for the initiative could be traced of forces—for both actual employment (plan- just described and rectifying deficiencies in back even further, to Rumsfeld’s intense dis- ning for worldwide, day-to-day activities) the DOD planning processes that existed satisfaction with his minuscule role in the and potential employment (planning for prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of development of plans, and with the slow pace contingencies). The rationale underpinning Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.6 Before of military planning after the terrorist attacks the new consolidated guidance stipulated Goldwater-Nichols, civilian policymakers did of September 11, 2001. that all planning started at the top, with the not participate in the plan development and By 2005, despite significant resistance President’s priorities, as established in the review process. Then, as now, military plans within the bureaucracy, DOD began in National Security Strategy. From there, the were built by combatant commanders—the earnest to implement Adaptive Planning. First Secretary of Defense’s staff would lead efforts four-star officers who report directly to the and foremost among the “essential elements to devise a National Defense Strategy, while Secretary and President and who are respon- of Adaptive Planning” was the imperative the Chairman’s staff spearheaded production sible for geographic or functional commands for “clear strategic guidance and frequent of a National Military Strategy. Although each (for example, U.S. Central Command and dialogue.”11 The new planning process would subordinate strategy added somewhat greater U.S. Strategic Command). However, before “feature detailed planning guidance and specificity to guide the combatant command- Goldwater-Nichols, the Secretary of Defense frequent dialogue between senior leaders and ers in implementing the National Security was the only DOD civilian who got to see planners to promote a common understand- Strategy, all three documents remained military plans, and that was after the plans ing of planning assumptions, considerations, couched in high-level terms and were of had been finalized and approved by the Joint risks, courses of action, implementing limited use to DOD military planners. The Chiefs of Staff.7 actions, and other key factors.”12 Although new consolidated planning guidance of 2008 Goldwater-Nichols provided a sound the initiative was designed to yield other provided the details combatant commanders legal basis for ensuring greater civilian improvements, the interactive and iterative needed to prioritize their efforts and to write involvement in military planning. The law engagement between senior policymakers and their own regional or functional strategies. gave the Secretary the statutory authority and military planners was the most important of The combatant commanders’ strategies were responsibility to “provide to the Chairman [of them all. Without the Secretary’s involvement, in turn implemented through campaign plans the Joint Chiefs of Staff] written policy guid- combatant commanders and senior civilian drawn up by their staffs. Those campaign ance for the preparation and review of contin- policymakers would devote far less time and plans implemented strategies mainly designed gency plans.”8 By law, the Secretary’s guidance attention to plans than they do today, result- to prevent crisis and conflict—in accordance is to be approved by the President, and the ing in a concomitant lessening of interest with the National Security Strategy goals. But Chairman adds his own strategic direction among their subordinates, and an overall campaign plans also helped prepare the way in a separate guidance document. To aid the diminution in the quality of plans and ben- for success in conflict if prevention efforts Secretary in discharging his responsibilities, efits derived from the planning process. failed—consistent with the guidance for con- the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy was tingency planning approved by the President. tasked with assisting “the Secretary of Defense Consolidating Guidance in preparing written policy guidance for the As noted in the opening paragraph, The Plan Review Process preparation and review of contingency plans; Secretary Gates gave the go-ahead early in Secretary Gates’s consistent involvement and in reviewing such plans.”9 The changes to 2007 to consolidate policy documents so as to in the planning process helped to ensure that DOD planning procedures wrought by Gold- bring greater coherence to the guidance and policy and strategy guided the bureaucracy— water-Nichols were not self-implementing, planning for DOD worldwide, day-to-day particularly the uniformed military planners and throughout the 1990s, the Secretary’s staff activities and the guidance and planning within it—and not vice versa. But how does struggled to attain the larger role for civilian for contingency operations. Following the the Secretary get involved? What is the plan policymakers envisioned by Congress when it terrorist attacks of September 11, the White development and review process? The best crafted the law. House and Pentagon generated a bewildering one-word description of the process is itera- The Adaptive Planning initiative has tangle of strategy and guidance documents tive. For a new plan, a combatant commander steadily strengthened the hand of civilian policymakers in the military planning process and has kept plans more up to date and the new consolidated planning guidance of 2008 provided the relevant to the ever-changing security envi- ronment. The Secretary of Defense’s personal details combatant commanders needed to prioritize their efforts involvement in the process of developing and and to write their own regional or functional strategies reviewing plans has been the cornerstone

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importance these policymakers ascribed to Secretary’s calendar unless the DASD for prebriefings educate planning. Janine Davidson, another veteran Plans confirmed that the plan was ready to go policymakers by making of OSD Policy and a former U.S. Air Force to the Secretary. On several occasions during clear the true feasibility (or pilot, has held that position since its creation. Secretary Gates’s tenure, IPRs were cancelled Since early 2009, then, DOD has had a civilian when a combatant command attempted to infeasibility) and likely costs of political appointee whose order of precedence bypass the prebriefings to the DASDs or to preferred policy options ranks above Active-duty two-star officers, the Under Secretary for Policy. Similarly, IPRs and whose primary responsibility is to focus with the Secretary would fall from his calen- on the development and review of plans. The dar when combatant commands attempted to in ­muddling through sterile discussions of next Secretary of Defense will thus inherit an put off the prebriefings until just a few days complex issues that should have been thought organization and a process designed to enable before the briefing to the Secretary, making it through and clarified by the staffs. In several effective civilian involvement in and direction impossible for the commands to incorporate instances, the prebriefings educated policy- of military planning. policy guidance or make needed changes in makers by making clear the true feasibility their briefings—a practice that subverted the (or infeasibility) and likely costs of preferred Vital Role of the Secretary intent of the prebriefings while appearing to policy options. Thus, the prebriefing process For the Adaptive Planning processes to adhere to the IPR process. More than one IPR has tended to improve policymaking as well as work, the Secretary and those who manage was cancelled when a combatant commander plans, and most combatant commands have his calendar must support the OSD staff attempted to change the purpose of the slowly come to see the process as value-added in fulfilling its role, and enforce the review meeting or substitute a different briefing in for themselves, rather than as mere bureau- process that goes first through the DASD for lieu of the one that had been scheduled. cratic hoop-jumping. Plans, then the Under Secretary of Defense for To his credit, Secretary Gates and his The plan review process, including the Policy, before reaching the Secretary. Other- administrative staff did a much better job prebriefings, comprises a fundamental aspect wise, combatant commanders and their plan- than Gates’s predecessor at enforcing dead- of civilian control of the military. Civilian ners would almost certainly revert to develop- lines for the combatant commands to provide control, as the term is used here, involves more ing plans with little or no input from civilian briefing materials prior to plan reviews. Gates than just ensuring military respect for civilian policymakers and attempt to go straight to the had a widely held reputation for reading authority and compliance with the orders of Secretary for approval. Secretary Rumsfeld everything that his staff provided him, and the President and Secretary—those aspects and his senior staff assistants were wont to he came to the IPRs well prepared to discuss of civilian control are not in doubt. Civilian allow combatant commanders to effectively the plans. Moreover, Secretary Gates was control also includes making sure military bypass the OSD staff, particularly with com- impatient with any general or flag officer who leaders understand and adhere to the priori- batant commanders who were known to be attempted during an IPR to introduce new ties and policies of the administration and the Secretary’s close confidants. This would at or updated briefing materials that had not that military planning reflects those priori- times result in a situation where no one from been vetted by the OSD staff. If a combatant ties and policies. No Secretary of Defense is the OSD staff who had actually read the plan commander produced a document at an IPR likely to ever read an entire theater campaign in question, and who had significant expertise for the Secretary to sign, Dr. Gates would look plan or operation plan—typically amount- on the policies and issues relevant to the plan, to his Under Secretary for Policy, in effect ing to hundreds of pages of written text. But was able to know the content of the com- asking why it was not part of his read-ahead the action officers who work directly for the mander’s IPR briefing in time to adequately material. A disapproving look from the DASDs will. That is why the Under Secretary prepare the Secretary. Nor were these OSD Under Secretary would settle the matter, and of Defense for Policy was given a statutory experts always allowed to attend the actual Secretary Gates would leave the paper on the role under Goldwater-Nichols legislation to review sessions—the IPRs—with the Secre- table, unacknowledged and unsigned. That assist the Secretary in producing the guid- tary and the combatant commanders. This happened more than once, despite warnings ance for, and in the development and review absence made it impossible for the experts on from senior uniformed and civilian officials of, contingency plans. Indeed, the Obama the Secretary’s staff to faithfully follow up on in the Pentagon to the combatant commands administration populated the key positions his tasks, questions, or decisions. In short, this to avoid the practice. in OSD Policy with political appointees who lax enforcement of the plan review process The ability of certain combatant com- were seasoned policymakers with previous allowed certain combatant commanders to manders to evade strategic discussions with tours in the Pentagon. The Honorable Michèle control the process and to sidestep difficult their boss and to avoid difficult issues during Flournoy, James Miller, and Kathleen Hicks issues. For example, DOD plans for counter- Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure, and the more rig- filled the top strata in the Policy hierarchy ing weapons of mass destruction stagnated for orous implementation of Rumsfeld’s Adaptive responsible for plans. All had previously most of 2007, after experts on the OSD staff Planning procedures under Secretary Gates, served in OSD Policy leadership positions were unable to adequately participate in the highlights an important point: very few people with responsibilities for plans or were closely preparation for an IPR with Secretary Rums- can tell a combatant commander what to do. associated with the planning process. With feld in late 2006. Though the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the transition to the Obama administra- With Secretary Gates, the practice of of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense tion, OSD also created a new position—the end-running the OSD staff came to an end, for Policy stand higher in the pecking order DASD for Plans—highlighting the increased and no plan review could be placed on the than combatant commanders, they are not

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in the chain of command. Only the Secretary ning process will these hard-won improve- NEW of Defense and the President can technically ments become institutionalized and further from NDU Press order combatant commanders to do anything. improvements accrue. JFQ for the Africa Center That is why the Secretary’s involvement in the for Strategic Studies planning process and his support for his own staff in enforcing that process are so vital. One NOTES example illustrates the point well. Through- 1 Charles A. Stevenson, SECDEF: The Nearly

NO. 13 / MAY 2011 out 2007 and much of 2008, U.S. Central AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense (Washington, A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES Command refused to bring plans to the Pen- DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 3. Optimizing Africa’s Security Force Structures tagon, despite the importuning of Pentagon 2 BY HELMOED HEITMAN The citation appears in Stevenson, where it

◆ African security forces must be able to counter and defeat experienced, highly mobile, and well-armed irregular forces that are often tightly embedded with local communities. officials of three- and four-star rank—both is attributed to James Schlesinger, “The Office of ◆ Security forces must be demonstrably competent and professional if they are to be accepted by local populations, whose support is indispensible to defeating irregular forces.

◆ Small units of balanced general purpose forces capable of conducting operations over dispersed territory without support are key to effective force design when facing irregular forces. uniformed and civilian. More than one staff HIGHLIGHTS Secretary of Defense,” in Reorganizing America’s

- There is much happening in Africa that is posi- Nigeria’s total oil production. Moreover, illegal fish tive—economically, socially, and politically. But a ing costs the continent $1 billion annually. Illegal large share of the continent remains fragile, putting logging and mining, arms trafficking, and general - those gains at risk. The most pressing challenges fac- smuggling further add to the dimension and com plexity of these threats. officer in the Pentagon has speculated that ing many African states are paramilitary threats— Defense: Leadership in War and Peace, ed. Robert - threats that are beyond the ability of most police Irregular forces include guerrillas fighting per forces and frequently transcend national borders. ceived disenfranchisement (Darfur) or injustice Organized crime, rural banditry, piracy, local war- (Niger Delta), for secession (Cabinda, Angola, and lords, guerrillas, ethnic and religious violence, and Casamance, Senegal), or for other causes. They also extremist Islamist groups are just a few of an array of comprise militias protecting territory and resources such threats. (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]), one factor in Admiral William Fallon’s abrupt Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington These paramilitary threats are growing in size private armies hired by illegal miners, loggers, and and scope. Organized crime is increasingly linked to smugglers, and groups with no rational cause (the narcotics trafficking from South America through Lord’s Resistance Army). There is also a growing West Africa and from Asia through East Africa—a problem of terrorism, including groups such as al trade now running in the tens of billions of dollars. Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Oil theft (“bunkering”) amounts to 10 percent of Shabaab in Somalia, and efforts by international (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985), 262. 1 and premature departure in March 2008 as commander of U.S. Central Command might 3 The advent of disaster response planning well have been that the admiral refused to conducted by the Department of Homeland Secu- Africa Security Brief 13 bring plans through the OSD staff to the Sec- rity (DHS) comes closest to matching the level of planning done by DOD, and was in fact modeled on Optimizing Africa’s Security Force Structures retary of Defense—a failing he was known for the DOD planning system. However, DHS plans are by Helmoed Heitman in his earlier capacity as commander of U.S. not yet sufficiently detailed and complete to be on Pacific Command. Combatant commanders par with the most detailed DOD plans. The author, a correspondent for Jane’s Defence can get away with such behavior for a while, 4 Weekly and a retired officer of the South African Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke on the Art of Army, contends that African security forces must be for no Secretary will be eager to expend the War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, able to counter and defeat a variety of experienced, time and political capital necessary to rein 1993), 45. highly mobile, and well-armed irregular forces in a wayward four-star commander. But any 5 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at the that are closely embedded in local communities. Secretary who wishes to manage the plan- National Defense Executive Reserve Conference,” If African forces are to be accepted by local ning process to ensure that the President has November 14, 1957, available at . to defeating irregular fighters—they must be 6 Senate Committee on Armed Services, demonstrably competent and professional. The the “least worst” options for dealing with Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff author describes the types of balanced general situations that all would rather avoid—must Report to the Committee on Armed Services, 99th purpose forces that are key to effective force be willing to engage in the planning process Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print, S. Prt. 99–86, design—such as the modular battalion, the battalion and see to it that difficult policy issues get group, specialized forces, and airpower—and that October 16, 1985, 184–187, referenced in James R. are capable of conducting independent operations addressed as far as possible in the develop- Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater- over the wide expanses of African territory. ment and review of plans. In short, without Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Secretary Gates’s involvement in the planning Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 303. See also process, and his enforcement of the process James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked? The Goldwa- for reviewing plans, the combatant commands ter-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Air Power Journal would have been held to much lower stan- 1, no. 2 (Winter 2006), 171. 7 dards of planning and thinking. Moreover, Locher, “Has it Worked?” 171. 8 there would have been much less interaction 10 United States Code (USC), Section 113, paragraph g. (2). among the staffs of the various organizations 9 10 USC, Section 134, paragraph a. (2)(A) and with stakes in the plans, and that would have (B). Forging Partnerships for Africa’s Future redounded to the detriment of those plans and 10 Adaptive Planning Memorandum, Ryan The Africa Center offers a variety of resources that the DOD ability to cope with crises. Henry, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for keep readers abreast of the Africa-related news and The iterative plan development and Policy, August 26, 2003, cited in Adaptive Planning research published on this site. review process that exists today under Roadmap 2005 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2005), 3. http://africacenter.org/ Adaptive Planning represents a significant 11 Adaptive Planning Roadmap 2005, 7. improvement over pre–Goldwater-Nichols 12 Ibid. To subscribe to Africa Center’s Daily Media practices and over the practices of the 1990s 13 The Secretary’s availability has rarely been Review and/or Africa Security Briefs, go to and early 2000s, but it cannot succeed without a factor in these delays. For operations plans, the http://africacenter.org/subscribe/, enter email the Secretary of Defense’s support and delays in planning have been due in no small part to DOD failure to field appropriate information address, check the box next to the name enforcement of the process. It would be easier technology to assist military planners. of the newsletter(s) desired, and click the for combatant command planners, and worse “Submit” button. for U.S. national security, if the Secretary did not take such an interest in planning. Only Visit the NDU Press Web site if the next Secretary commits to being an for more information on publications active and engaged participant in the plan- at ndupress.ndu.edu

58 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Marines patrol in Garmsir district of Helmand Province, Afghanistan On Military Theory By MILAN VEGO

ll too often, the critical importance of military theory either is not well understood or is completely ignored by many offi- A cers. A reason for this is their apparent lack of knowledge and understanding of the relationship between theory and practice and the real purpose of military theory. Many offic s are also contemptuous of theory because they overemphasize the importance of technology.1 U.S. Marine Corps (Colby Brown)

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Purpose and Importance DOD Carl von Clausewitz wrote that the primary aim of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become con- fused and entangled. Only after terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in examining a question clearly and simply and expect the reader to share one’s view.7 Clausewitz believed that the main purpose of theory is to cast a steady light on all phenomena. It should show how one thing is related to another and keep important and unimportant ele- ments separate.8 The purpose of theory is not to provide rules and regulations for action—to pre- scribe a certain road that an officer should follow.9 Military theory should develop a way of thinking rather than prescribe rules of war. Clausewitz wrote that military General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General “Hap” Arnold theory is most valuable when it is used to discuss Allied progress during World War II analyze and critically assess all the com- ponents and elements of warfare. It then becomes a guide for anyone who wants to read about war. Theory prevents one from What Is Military Theory? a whole, regardless of purpose and scale. having to start fresh each time, plowing In generic terms, a theory can be There are also military theories focused through material and then sorting out the described as a coherent group of general on specific types of hostilities and the use pertinent details.10 propositions used to explain a given class of military force such as insurgency and A sound military theory is essential or phenomenon.2 It is a precise consider- counterinsurgency, terrorism, support both for an understanding of past wars and ation of a subject to obtain fundamental of foreign policy, and peace operations. for the successful conduct of a future war.11 knowledge. It is the teaching of the truth Theories of land, naval, and air warfare are It provides the badly needed broader and or development of the truth of a subject.3 intended to explain the nature, character, deeper framework for understanding the In the scientific sense, a theory does not and characteristics of war in each physical entire spectrum of warfare. The lack of an need to be supported or contradicted by medium. Theories of military art and of accepted body of theory leaves a void in the evidence. In addition, it does not necessarily strategy, operational warfare (or operational basic philosophy that should guide people mean that the scientific community accepts art), and tactics are focused on explaining, in distinguishing between cause and effect, a given theory.4 respectively, the methods, planning, prepa- trivial and important, and peripheral and In the broad definition of the term, ration, and execution of actions aimed to central.12 Even an imperfect or incomplete military theory can be described as a com- accomplish military objectives. Each of these theory can clarify many obscure matters.13 prehensive analysis of all the aspects of theories also describes the inner structure Military theory deepens and clarifies one’s warfare, its patterns and inner structure, and mutual relationships of the elements of understanding of various concepts and ideas and the mutual relationships of its various warfare in the respective fields of study. In on the conduct of war. It serves as a guide in components/elements. It also encapsulates addition, they have to describe a larger stra- obtaining proper understanding of warfare political, economic, and social relationships tegic or operational framework. in all its aspects. One of the most important within a society and among the societies that Clausewitz recognized that every age practical values of a sound military theory create a conflict and lead to a war. Sound had its own kind of war.6 A new theory of is to assist a capable officer in acquiring a military theory explains how to conduct and war emerges as a result of a combination win a war. It also includes the use of military of drastic changes in the international force to prevent the outbreak of war.5 security environment, diplomacy, domes- Military theories are differentiated tic politics, ideology, economics, and military theory is most according to their purpose and scope. revolutionary advances in technology. For valuable when it is used to General theories of war deal with war as example, a new theory of war was devel- analyze and critically assess all oped in the aftermath of the French Revo- the components and elements Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the lution and the Napoleonic Wars, World of warfare Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War I, and World War II. War College.

60 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO broader outlook of all aspects of warfare. some fundamental laws (that is, predictable). military theoreticians are also affected by The commander armed with solid theoreti- There is overwhelming evidence that the major political and military events of their cal knowledge would have a firmer grasp of universe is in fact determined. Yet the course eras. For example, Henri Antoine de Jomini the sudden change of a situation and could of war and its outcome are by no means pre- was influenced by Newtonian scientific act with greater certainty and quickness to determined. One cannot realistically search ideas in developing his theory of war.17 He obtain an advantage over the opponent than for and find certainty in a war. Hence, any believed that war, like other fields of nature the commander who lacks that knowledge. philosophy based on determinism is of and human activity, was susceptible to a Another value of having a sound military limited value in the conduct of war.15 comprehensive and systematic theoretical theory is that it provides major input to a The two main scientific methods are study. Jomini argued that war in part could valid tactical and service-wide doctrine. At inductivism and deductivism. Inductivism is be reduced to rules and principles of univer- the same time, a comprehensive knowledge described as a method of reasoning by which sal validity and possibly even mathematical and understanding of military theory should one proceeds from specific observations to certainty for which Newtonian mechanics help an officer to appreciate strengths and make general conclusions. The main idea set the example. Yet he also recognized that weakness of military doctrine. behind deductivism is to proceed from the like art, war is also partly in flux, constantly general to the specific. Theory is developed changing, dependent on circumstances, Science-Philosophy- by deductively testing data. Sir Isaac Newton affected by unforeseen and incalculable Military Theory Nexus was the first to use both inductivism and events, and always requiring application In the past, military theories were deductivism as scientific methods. For through the general genius.18 usually based on the dominant science of Newton, one started with a hypothesis and To understand Clausewitz’s theory of the age in which a military theoretician then deduced what one would expect to war, it is necessary to examine significant lived. This is not necessarily the case in find in the empirical world because of that political and military events of his era and the modern era because of the prolifera- hypothesis—hence the name hypothetical philosophical and scientific debates of the tion of various scientific theories and their deductivism. This method requires rigor- early 19th century.19 Philosophical trends of interpretation by many philosophers. Some ous proof because one cannot be sure that the era of Enlightenment shaped the ideas of the new sciences and philosophies are all data were examined. There is always the of Clausewitz.20 He was also influenced by based on dubious premises or are in fact possibility that an observation could conflict the French Revolution and the Napoleonic pseudosciences. with a known scientific law. Every theory Wars.21 Clausewitz was especially influenced Modern military theory was heavily has an infinite number of expected empiri- by the ideas of the German Romantic Move- influenced by empiricism and determinism. cal outcomes. Not all of them can be tested. ment embodied in Immanuel Kant.22 Empiricism is described as a logical process But even if a theory can be proven to some J.F.C. Fuller was greatly influenced based on pursuing knowledge through extent by empirical data, it can never be con- by well-known philosopher and Darwinian observation and experiments. One can make clusively confirmed.16 Herbert Spencer. He wrote The Foundations sensible, if restricted, deductions and then The ideas of military theoreticians of the Science of War and The Reformation check them by reference to observed facts. have never developed in a vacuum but rather of War in response to what he saw as a This, in turn, puts great emphasis on obser- have been products of a complex interplay failure of military theory in World War I.23 vation and historical study.14 Determinism of the scientific, philosophical, and social Spencer’s vision of an orderly, deterministic requires that events occur in accordance to influences of a given era. The ideas of universe led Fuller to think that war is a

Sir Isaac Newton by John Georg Brucker Maurice de Saxe by Maurice Quentin de La Tour Gerhard Johann von Scharnhorst by Friedrich Bury

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an adequate account of the endless complexi- complexity is caused not by the number of parts within a ties involved. As we have seen the conduct of system but by the interactive and dynamic nature of the system war branches out in almost all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model has the finite nature of a synthesis. science. Consequently, there must be certain or nondynamic. A dynamic system exhibits An irreconcilable conflict exists between this laws or principles of war, just as there are a change in response over time due to input, type of theory and actual practice. . . . [These laws of chemistry, physics, and psychology.24 force, information, or energy. A dynamic attempts] aim at fixed values but in war every- Methods developed by Sir Francis system can be conservative or dissipative. thing is uncertain and calculations have to be Bacon and Newton were used in science for A conservative dynamic system does not made with variable quantities. They direct the about 300 years.25 The Newtonian science lose energy from friction, while a dissipative inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, dominated Western civilization both as a dynamic system does.31 whereas all military action is entwined with framework for scientific investigation and as Since the 1960s, complexity theory psychological forces and effects. They consider an idea that the universe was ordered, mech- has gradually emerged. Its supposed aim only unilateral action, whereas war consists of anistic, and predictable. Two major scientific is to unify aspects of the universe that continuous interaction of opposites. Thus, an developments in the early 20th century were escaped due to both Newtonian science and irreconcilable conflict exists between this type Albert Einstein’s theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. Complexity theory of theory and actual practice.36 quantum mechanics, which was developed describes the behavior of complex adaptive by a group of young European physicists led systems.32 Its roots are systems theory and The Process by the Danish physicist Niels Bohr. These so-called chaos theory.33 A complex system The reality of war is a starting point new developments replaced the Newtonian is any system composed of numerous parts for the development of a military theory. idea of cause and effect with a world of or agents, each of which must act individu- Practice, in turn, puts military theory probability and trend. They showed that our ally according to its own circumstances and under a searching examination.37 Prussian understanding of the universe will always be requirements, but which by so acting has a General Gerhard von Scharnhorst said that incomplete and tenuous.26 global effect, which simultaneously changes the theory of scientific evaluation should be The theories of relativity and quantum the circumstances and requirements affect- based on experiences. He highlighted the physics had major influences on the devel- ing all other agents. Complexity is caused mutual relationship between theory and opment of modern military theory. Both not by the number of parts within a system practice. For him, there was no progress by redefined the factors of time, space, matter, but by the interactive and dynamic nature just having bland experiences without theo- and force. Quantum mechanics has shown of the system.34 Complexity theory explains retical education and analysis.38 The process that uncertainty cannot be eliminated but why certain complex adaptive systems that of developing a military theory is usually only managed by observation. In contrast appear to operate close to the realm of very long. It sometimes takes decades or to the Newtonian science where repeated chaos are not chaotic and why the second even longer before a general consensus is observations have to be made to reduce law of thermodynamics did not appear to reached about changes in the character of uncertainty, quantum mechanics requires apply to biology.35 war. Some of the strongest and most endur- multiple observations within short spans Since the mid-1990s, the systems (or ing influences in creating a new theory of of time to reduce uncertainty to the small- systemic) approach to warfare emerged as war are the works of military theoreticians, est possible level. The theory of relativity the dominant school of thought in the U.S. as the examples of Clausewitz, Jomini, J.F.C. implies that multiple observations must be military, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, Aleksandr A. compared with each other to obtain a better zation, and most other Western militaries. Svechin, Alfred T. Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, understanding of the phenomena.27 This was exemplified by the wide and almost Raul Castex, Giulio Douhet, and William Systems theory was developed in the uncritical acceptance, by not only the U.S. “Billy” Mitchell illustrate. early 20th century in response to the sup- but also other militaries, of numerous pro- Clausewitz wrote that in the process posed inadequacies of Newtonian science ponents’ claims of the supposedly enormous of developing military theory, war has to in the new era.28 A system29 exists when a benefits of adopting network-centric warfare be divided into related activities. Combat set of elements is interconnected so that (NCW), effects-based operations (EBO), sys- is essentially the expression of hostile feel- changes in one element or its relationship temic operational design (SOD), and its most ings. In addition, large-scale combat is a war with others result in changes elsewhere, and recent evolution, design. where hostile feelings often become hostile the entire system exhibits properties and Despite the claims to the contrary by intentions. Modern wars are seldom fought behaviors different from the parts.30 The systems proponents, Clausewitz was not a pro- without hatred between nations. Hence, main types of systems are open and closed. ponent of the systems approach to warfare— theory becomes infinitely more difficult An open system continuously interacts with just the opposite. In On War, he wrote: as soon as it touches the realm of moral its environment. Depending on the type of values.39 In general, the more physical the system, these interactions can be in the form Efforts were therefore made to equip the activity in a war, the less difficulty there will of material transfers, energy, or information. conduct of war with principles, rules, or even be in developing a theory. The more activity The opposite of the open system is the closed systems [emphasis added]. This did present becomes intellectual and turns into motives or isolated system. Systems can be dynamic a positive purpose, but people failed to take that exercise a determining influence on the

62 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO

U.S. commander and Iraqi police chief discuss joint operation between Department of Border Enforcement and Iraqi army at the regional level, Basra, Iraq, October 2010

U.S. Army (James Benjamin) commander, the more difficult developing a the passage of time, there are lessons to be ples should be used to clarify or illustrate sound theory becomes.40 A clear distinction identified or learned by studying wars of the that particular aspect of war. Historical should be made between what is important ancient era. Obviously, the most valuable examples can be used as an explanation and what is unimportant or even trivial. area of studies is wars in the modern era. Yet or application of an idea or to support a The history of warfare is the very recent wars should be studied with a great certain theoretical statement or construct.44 foundation of military theory. Military/naval deal of caution because most of the pertinent A historical example provides the broader history is inherently broader, deeper, and information is lacking. Also, it takes some context in which an event occurred. more diverse than the study of any other area time to evaluate recent events in a proper There are also dangers in selectively of human activity.41 It encompasses every light. Not only military, but also political, using examples from military history. aspect of the experience of humanity.42 Its diplomatic, economic, and social history Sources for a particular example might be value transcends national, ethnic, or reli- should be studied as well. Wars are never misleading or even utterly false. Clausewitz gious boundaries. It is the record of universal fought in a vacuum but are an integral part warned that improper use of historical experience.43 Historical events are an integral of the general history of an era. examples by theorists normally not only part of complex and highly dynamic interre- Study of military/naval history is lationships between humans and machines of barren and lifeless without the use of his- war. History does not and cannot predict the torical examples. Theoretical discussion is future. However, it can teach us not to repeat easily misunderstood or not understood at theoretical discussion is the errors and blunders of our predecessors. all without the use of empirical evidence. A easily misunderstood or not When developing a military theory, as certain aspect of military theory is derived understood at all without the many wars, campaigns, and major opera- from the analysis of many wars, campaigns, use of empirical evidence tions as possible should be studied. Despite and major operations. Then, selected exam-

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 63 SPECIAL FEATURE | On Military Theory leaves the reader dissatisfied but even insults peacetime and, if necessary, modified or his intelligence.45 German general and abandoned. Very often, the main reason the main components of theoretician Hans Bronsart von Schellendorf for an erroneous vision of the character military theory include the observed that it is well known that “military and duration of a future war was ignoring nature and character of history, when superficially studied, will or mislearning the lessons of more recent modern war and its elements furnish arguments in support of any theory wars. For example, in the years preceding and how these elements are or opinion.”46 the outbreak of World War I, the German The study of military history would be military focused almost exclusively on related to and interact with incomplete if not accompanied by deduc- studying and deriving lessons from the each other tion of the lessons learned. In terms of their Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. The scale and importance, lessons learned can Germans believed that any future war would be technological, tactical, operational, and be a war of movement and therefore decisive in theories of high-intensity conventional strategic. Technological lessons are derived and short. The Germans believed that the war. A sound theory of war should also from the use of weapons and sensors and planned campaign against France would describe the ways and means of preventing their platforms and equipment. They have last no more than 8 to 10 weeks and the war the outbreak of war.55 great value in improving existing or design- would end in 4 to 6 months.49 As it turned All wars consist of features that are ing new weapons, sensors, and equipment. out, the war went on for over 4 years, with unchangeable or constant regardless of Tactical lessons are derived from the study horrendous losses of personnel and materiel the era in which they are fought and those of planning, preparing, and executing on both sides. The French military likewise that are transitory or specific to a certain battles, engagements, strikes, and other tac- failed to correctly anticipate the character of era. The first category makes up the war’s tical actions. In contrast, operational lessons the future war in the years preceding August “nature,” while the second comprises its are deduced from a thorough study of all 1914. The prevalent French view was that a “character.” In general, “nature of war” aspects of major operations and campaigns. future war would be short and that maneu- refers to those constant, universal, and Strategic lessons are learned from the com- vering would play the predominant part; it inherent qualities that ultimately define war prehensive study and analysis of a war as a would be a war of movement.50 throughout the ages, such as the dominant whole and its political, diplomatic, military, During the 1930s, the French and role of policy and strategy, psychologi- economic, informational, and other aspects. British mistakenly believed that the next war cal factors, irrationality, violence, hatred, The higher the level of war, the greater would be a positional war, as World War I uncertainty, friction, fear, danger, chance, the importance of the lessons learned or had been. Thus, in contrast to the Germans, and luck.56 In contrast, “character”57 refers to mislearned. Also, the higher the level, the they failed to prepare for a war of movement. those transitory, circumstantial, and adap- longer the value of the lessons. Hence, In retrospect, the French vision of the future tive features that account for the different operational lessons are by their nature war was deeply flawed because it was based periods of warfare throughout history.58 The more durable than tactical lessons. Like- on three false readings of military develop- character of war is primarily determined by wise, strategic lessons last longer than ments at the time: the exaggerated destruc- prevailing international security environ- operational or tactical lessons. Lessons on tiveness of firepower, the dominant role of ment, domestic politics, and the economic, intangible aspects of warfare are generally defense, and the superiority of the so-called social, demographic, religious, legal, and more durable than lessons derived from methodical battle.51 other conditions in a certain era, and also the physical aspects of a given situation. the influence of new technological advances. War is a clash of human will; hence, the Content In studying the character of war, the focus human element is a critical part of it and The main components of military should be on those elements that are more will remain so in the future. Therefore, theory include the nature and character durable and tend to display certain pat- lessons pertaining to leadership, doctrine, of modern war and its elements and how terns. New technological advances, which unit cohesion, morale and discipline, and these elements are related to and interact are inherently ephemeral in their character, training are essentially timeless. In con- with each other. A sound military theory should not be used in the development of trast, technological lessons are by their should encompass not only military but also military theory. Any theory of war based very nature short term. Lessons learned are nonmilitary aspects that affect preparation predominantly on technology is bound to interrelated. For example, tactical lessons for and conduct of war.52 A general theory not be valid for too long. More important, a learned greatly influence the theory and of war should analyze the impact of social theory based on current technologies (such practice of operational art, while opera- factors on the conduct of war, specifi- as NCW or EBO) or, even worse, future and tional lessons affect the theory and practice cally ideology, science, and technology.53 unproven ones (for example, the French of strategy and even policy. It should encompass broad description of Navy’s “Young School” or Giulio Douhet’s By conducting a comprehensive analy- nonmilitary elements of power.54 It should theory of strategic bombing) would lack the sis of past wars, it is possible to construct link war with other constituent parts of most critical element in any sound military some hypotheses about future war.47 They society. In relative terms, nonmilitary ele- evidence—historical examples. The most could be sound or partially or even com- ments of power should play a larger role in durable military theory focuses less on the pletely false.48 Hence, they should be tested developing theories of insurgency, counter- latest technology and more on the infinite in exercises/maneuvers and wargames in insurgency, and combating terrorism than complexities in its use.59

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SPECIAL FEATURE | On Military Theory can be most realistically tested during a The history of the conduct of war Studies Institute, Occasion Nr 47, printed in war.71 Everything else is a poor substitute in all its aspects is the very foundation of United Kingdom under arrangements of Astron and inadequate for combat experience.72 any sound military theory. It is military/ Document Services, 2004), 10. 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and Hence, a military theory must reflect the naval history that allows a theorist to select trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ- realities of war; otherwise, it must be modi- historical examples to either clarify or eton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 132. fied or drastically changed to bring it in obtain evidence in support of a given state- 8 Cited in Robert P. Pellegrini, The Links harmony with reality. ment or theoretical construct. Without between Science, Philosophy, and Military Science: In the application of a military theory, historical examples and lessons learned, it Understanding the Past, Implications for the a compromise should be made between what is difficult to see how sound military theory Future (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, is ideal and what is realistically possible. can be developed. Another critical part August 1997), 26. However, the subject of warfare is so broad of military theory is the vision of future 9 Stenzel, 14. and complex that a single theoretical con- war. A sound military theory should take 10 Clausewitz, 132, 141. 11 struct cannot explain it. The best educated fully into account the effect of current and Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle and most theoretically ready commander future technologies. However, it should not of Annihilation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 4. might not actually win on the battlefield. be based predominantly or, even worse, 12 Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, 22. Victory remains a matter of tactical, opera- exclusively on technologies. A sound mili- 13 Henry E. Eccles, “Military Theory and tary theory should be general and flexible. tional, or strategic skill, because the conduct Education: The Need for and Nature of,” Naval of war is, and will remain, largely an art, not It should focus on the constants, not on War College Review (February 1969), 72. a science, as apparently too many propo- ephemeral occurrences in the conduct of 14 J.P. Storr, Human Aspects of Command nents of information warfare believe. war. It should discern war’s patterns. It (Pewsey, Wiltshire, UK: Directorate General of A sound military theory is the key should be all encompassing but uncompli- Development and Doctrine, British Army, 2003), 6, 5. prerequisite for having a comprehensive cated and simple at the same time. It should 15 Ibid., 3, 6. and deep knowledge of all aspects of war. be articulated in simple, clear, and easily 16 Tisthammer. 17 Its main purpose is not to provide a com- understandable language. The only test of Wallach, 6–7. 18 mander with a checklist on how to make validity of a military theory is to practice Cited in Patrick Kelly III, Modern Scientific quick and sound decisions and then skill- war. A military theory can approach the Metaphors of Warfare: Updating the Doctrinal Paradigm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army fully execute them. Its purpose is to provide reality of war but it cannot completely match Command and General Staff College, May 1993), 4. a solid knowledge and understanding of it. It must be modified, altered, or even 19 Ibid., 3. war so a commander can act swiftly and discarded if it is in a serious disconnect with 20 Pellegrini, 42. decisively in combat, especially when faced reality. JFQ 21 Kelly, 3. with an unforeseen situation. Knowledge of 22 Pellegrini, 21. military theory is essential to understanding 23 Ibid., 31, 33–34. and then creatively applying doctrine. NOTES 24 Ibid., 34. Military theory is greatly affected by 25 “History of the Scientific Method,” avail- 1 Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Phi- scientific theories of a certain era and their able at . Press, 1965), 24. 26 th Pellegrini, 1–2. Since the turn of the 20 century, numerous 2 Webster’s Third New International Diction- 27 Ibid., 50. scientific theories have emerged. They have ary, Unabridged (Springfield, MA: Merriam- 28 Paul J. Blakesley, Operational Shock and been accompanied by a large number of Webster, Inc., 1981), 666. Complexity Theory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 3 diverse philosophic interpreters. Some of the Alfred Stenzel, Kriegfuehrung zur See. Army Command and General Staff College, May new theories, such as general systems theory, Lehre vom Seekriege (Hannover/Leipzig: Mahn- 2005), iii. are highly controversial and even pseudo- sche Buchhandlung, 1913), 12–13. 29 From the Latin word systēma; system is 4 scientific. Postmodern philosophy is also Wade A. Tisthammer, “The Nature and defined as a functional group of related elements controversial, and it represents just one of Philosophy of Science,” 1, available at . ers, social science, planning, organization, man- 5 Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, adopted as a foundation of SOD and the U.S. agement and business, mathematics, physics, and cited in J.P. Storr, Human Aspects of Command Army’s “design.” so forth. Steven M. Rinaldi, Beyond the Industrial (Wiltshire, UK: Directorate General of Develop- Web: Economic Synergies and Targeting Method- Military theory is derived from prac- ment and Doctrine, British Army, 2003), 3; Julian ologies (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, tice. Hence, from a multitude of empirical Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Prob- April 1995), 7–8, 10. The U.S. military defines a examples, certain commonalties are derived, lems (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 15. system as a functionally, physically, or behavior- 6 which are then included in the body of mili- Colin S. Gray, “Clausewitz, History, and ally related group of elements that interact as a tary theory. In contrast, a theory of science the Future Strategic World,” presentation at the whole. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine such as mathematics, physics, or chemistry Strategic and Combat Institute Conference Past Series, Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of is based on certain hypotheses that are Futures, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, July Effects-based Operations (EBO) (Norfolk, VA: repeatedly tested and then eventually dis- 3–4, 2003, and Marine Corps Command and Staff United States Joint Forces Command, November carded, modified, or accepted as a theory. College, Quantico, VA, September 9–10, 2003 2004), 2. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Strategic and Combat

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30 Robert Jervis, “Complex Systems: The Role Random House College Dictionary, rev. ed. (New of Interactions,” in Complexity, Global Politics, York: Random House, Inc., 1980), 225. NEW and National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and 58 Sheehan, 216. from NDU Press Tom Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National 59 Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree, “Mil- Defense University Press, 1997), 1. itary Theory and Information Warfare,” Param- for the Africa Center 31 Blakesley, 24. eters (Autumn 1998), 11; available at . NO. 12 / APRIL 2011 AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF 34 John Schmitt, “Command and (Out of) 60 Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Urban Fragility and Security in Africa

Control,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and 28, 73–74. BY STEPHEN COMMINS 61 ◆ Unprecedented rates of urban migration over the past decade have contributed to a dramatic expansion National Security, 6–7. Eccles, “Military Theory and Education,” 72. in the size of urban slums and higher levels of poverty, violence, and instability in Africa’s cities. ◆ The drivers of violence associated with urban fragility are primarily related to weak and illegitimate governance, inequitable development, limited livelihood opportunities, and legal structures that inhibit 35 62 land tenure and new business start-up. ◆ Solutions to Africa’s urban fragility cannot be addressed solely through security structures but must Blakesley, 28. Henry and Peartree, 3. be part of a broader development strategy. 36 63 HIGHLIGHTS Africa’s rapid urbanization is a new and un derappreciated driver of state fragility. Fostered by- zones for state security forces. And as urbaniza Clausewitz, 154–155. Storr, 3. - prospects of economic opportunity, conflict-related tion accelerates, the security problems are likely displacement, and environmental pressures in rural to grow worse. areas, Africa’s cities are growing by an estimated 15 Urban fragility is a form of state fragility—a to 18 million people each year. context of deteriorating governance and prolonged 37 64 1 With more than 40 percent of Africans below the age of 15, many of political crisis or conflict—with a locus in urban them destitute, Africa’s cities have become densely areas. Fragile governments lack either the will or Wallach, 4. Scot Robertson, The Development of RAF capacity to deliver basic services to and provide se concentrated centers of unemployed young men. - This is a combustible mix that can intensify vio curity for their citizens. Grievances around this lack lent crime, gang activity, illicit trafficking, links- of essential services, coupled with increased inse - to transnational organized criminal syndicates, curity, crime, and lawlessness, contribute to greater 38 and political instability. The repercussions affect levels of urban violence. virtually every country on the continent. The Urban centers, especially capitals and regional Werner Hahlweg, “Umformungen im Mili- Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919–1939 (Westport, slums of Kibera (Nairobi), Karu (Abuja), Soweto cities, are also typically seats of government and (Johannesburg), Camp Luka (Kinshasa), Bonaberi therefore sites of intense competition for political (Douala), and elsewhere are already largely no-go power and resources. As African urban areas are frequently represented by all of the major ethnic taerwesen und das Verhaeltnis von Theorie und CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 6. 1 Praxis,” Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau, Nr. 65 Pellegrini, 26. 66 4, 1969, 189. Peter Paret, “The Genesis of On War,” Africa Security Brief 12 39 Clausewitz, 157–159. in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. 40 Ibid., 162. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Urban Fragility and Security in Africa 41 Herbert Richmond, National Policy and Everyman’s Library, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 16. by Stephen Commins Naval Strength and Other Essays (London/New 67 Clausewitz, 97. Unprecedented rates of urban migration in Africa York/Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1934), 279. 68 Director, Force Transformation, The Imple- over the past decade have contributed to a dramatic 42 C.B. Mayo, “The Study of History for mentation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washing- increase in urban slums as well as higher poverty, Naval Officers,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings ton, DC: Office of Force Transformation, January violence, and instability. The drivers of violence are (November 1921), 1757. 5, 2005), 16. primarily related to weak governance, inequitable 43 69 B.H. Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn Pellegrini, 23–24. development, limited economic opportunities, and From History (London: Allen & Unwin, 1944), 7. 70 David A. Fastabend, A Theory of Conflict legal structures that inhibit land tenure. The author 44 Clausewitz, 171. and Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. argues that solutions to Africa’s urban fragility 45 Ibid., 170. Army Command and General Staff College, May cannot be addressed through conventional security 46 Cited in Jay Luvaas, “The Great Military 1988), 34. approaches, but must be part of a broader strategy Historians and Philosophers,” in A Guide to Use 71 Robertson, 5. that recognizes urban fragility as a development and security problem, that improves local government of Military History, ed. John E. Jessup and Robert 72 Pellegrini, 21. and accountability, that increases opportunities W. Coakley (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for the unemployed to earn a livelihood, and that of Military History, 1988), 76. reforms legal structures to enable the urban poor to 47 Storr, 4. gain land tenure and a stake in society. 48 Jacob Bronowski, The Ascent of Man (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1974), 140, 240. 49 Christian Mueller, “Anmerkungen zur Entwicklung von Kriegsbild und operativ-strate- gischem Szenario im preussisch-deutschen Heer vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” Militaergeschichtliche Mitteilungen 57 (1998), 412. 50 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1925), 29. 51 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Forging Partnerships for Africa’s Future Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, 1st The Africa Center offers a variety of resources that ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 215. keep readers abreast of the Africa-related news and 52 Lider, 15. research published on this site. 53 Ibid., 3. http://africacenter.org/ 54 Eccles, “Military Theory and Education,” 74. 55 Lider, 15. To subscribe to Africa Center’s Daily Media 56 Michael Sheehan, “The Changing Charac- Review and/or Africa Security Briefs, go to ter of War,” in The Globalization of World Politics: http://africacenter.org/subscribe/, enter email An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th address, check the box next to the name ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216. of the newsletter(s) desired, and click the 57 The aggregate of features and traits that “Submit” button. form the individual nature of some person or thing; moral or ethical quality; an account of the qualities or peculiarities of a person or thing. The Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 67 Soldier briefs Afghan police during operation to assess night

activities and gather intelligence in Paktika Province U.S. Army (Kevin Martin)

Establishing a Framework for Intelligence Education and Training

By REBECCA L. FRERICHS and STEPHEN R. Di RIENZO

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n January 2010, Major General Michael T. Flynn, in conjunction with Captain Matt Pottinger and Paul I D. Batchelor, published a paper that made the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) stand up and shout. Titled Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, the paper attempted to address the weaknesses the authors saw in the col- lection and use of intelligence in the field. However, the paper inadvertently situated itself in a debate regarding the utility of education and training in the intelligence world—a context that has real effects on the subject the authors sought to improve. For Flynn and his colleagues, the “tendency to overemphasize detailed infor- mation about the enemy at the expense President meets with intelligence and security officials in Oval Office of the political, economic, and cultural environment that supports it”1 highlights White House (Pete Souza) the difference between tactical and strategic thinking. This dichotomy, however, betrays Intelligence respond to threats from adversaries for DOD. the essence of a debate that, in more detail, The IC’s primary mission “is to collect Trying to identify and define the “essential underscores the importance of mental flex- and convey the essential information the information,” let alone “collect and convey” ibility and agile adaptive behavior. For while President and members of the policymaking, that information, can become overwhelming. training equips a person with necessary law enforcement, and military communities For NIU, intelligence studies are based skills and attributes that can be robotically require to execute their appointed duties.”3 upon the National Security Strategy of the replicated, education allows an individual to Yet each agency and organization has its own United States of America (NSS). This, however, move beyond the “instructions” and adapt to culture, goals, and approaches to identify and does nothing to narrow the understanding incorrect or poorly written instructions, or convey “essential information.” For example, of intelligence. On the contrary, the NSS is none at all, to improvise training in order to what the U.S. Department of State (DOS) iden- “focused on renewing American leadership so get the job done. In other words, the reason tifies as “essential” is different than what the that [America] can more effectively advance why the IC can be “failing” in the field is Department of Defense (DOD) deems “essen- [American] interests in the 21st century.”6 By that operators are trying to bend the envi- tial.” DOS goals are to “[a]dvance freedom for identifying the world “as it is” and the world ronment to their training instead of being the benefit of the American people and the “as [America] seeks,” the NSS details the flexible and agile enough to make their international community by helping to build domestic and foreign goals for the Nation. knowledge fit the environment. and sustain a more democratic, secure, and These goals include strengthening U.S. The National Defense Intelligence prosperous world composed of well-governed national capacity (defense, diplomacy, eco- College, now being redesignated the states that respond to the needs of their people, nomic, development, homeland security, stra- National Intelligence University (NIU), is reduce widespread poverty, and act respon- tegic communications, the American people, chartered to provide intelligence educa- sibly within the international system.”4 The and the private sector); disrupting, disman- tion to members of the IC. Its programs DOD mission “is to provide necessary forces tling, and defeating al Qaeda and other violent are focused on national security challenges and capabilities to the Combatant Command- extremists; reversing the spread of weapons of including the more traditional intelligence ers in support of the National Security and mass destruction; advancing peace, security, goal of understanding adversarial capa- Defense Strategies.”5 and opportunity in the Middle East; invest- bilities and intentions, along with broader While the missions of the two depart- ing in strong and capable partners; achieving intelligence challenges such as sociocultural ments are complimentary, DOS is best cyber security; strengthening education and trends and conflicts, failed and failing states, described as proactive, while the DOD human capital; encouraging technological terrorism, proliferation, and the rise of non- mission can be considered reactive. Thus, innovation; achieving sustainable growth state actors.2 However, creating and imple- the intelligence needed to craft policy and and development; strengthening institutions; menting education programs that address conduct foreign policy for DOS is different and promoting traditional American goals the broad and divergent needs of the IC to than the intelligence needed to assess and of democracy, human rights, and religious allow it to successfully carry out its mission necessitate an understanding of intelligence, Dr. Rebecca L. Frerichs is a faculty member at the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) in the importance of training, the need for and Washington, DC, where she teaches Social/Cultural Analysis and Intelligence and Regional Studies. nature of intelligence education, and the Dr. Stephen R. Di Rienzo is Director of the NDIC European Academic Center and teaches Terrorism, ability to synthesize all of these elements. Counterterrorism, and Social/Cultural Analysis and Intelligence.

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Civilian training developer observes Army human intelligence collector during role-playing exercise to improve Soldiers’ information-gathering skills U.S. Army (Seth Laughter)

freedom.7 Intelligence, or the “essential infor- circumstances, the IC should focus on train- human rights, and in a manner that retains mation,” then, is the information needed to ing, education, or both. the trust of the American people.9 support or implement the goals of the NSS.8 Implementation of the NSS requires Education Is Not an Assembly Line There is no more established way of information from a vast array of sources The rapid pace of globalization, coupled standardizing engagement and integration and disciplines. The information needed to with the rise of nonstate actors and other than through education. In an ethnographic disrupt a single terrorist is different than the nontraditional adversaries, means an ever- manner, one can witness the full life cycle of information needed to dismantle a terrorist changing threat environment. The fact that knowledge transference when a group of indi- organization. More important, the informa- the IC has made ongoing training and educa- viduals—preferably from a mixed cultural, tion needed to prevent future terrorists or tion a priority is easily identified in the Vision linguistic, and/or professional background— terrorist organizations from threatening and Mission statement posted by the Office of learns, deconstructs, debates, and recon- U.S. interests requires knowledge from the the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI): structs ideas. In this manner, education serves disciplines of political science, psychology, as a vehicle for engagement that few, if any, sociology, and economics, among others, and The United States Intelligence Community other forums can replicate or even simulate. the patience to wait decades—or more—to see must constantly strive for and exhibit three By way of agility, the best way to ensure the fruition of policy. Vital to these efforts is characteristics essential to our effectiveness. an analyst’s aptitude to adapt is to continually an understanding of when, and under what The IC must be integrated: a team making value nonlinear thinking that is based on the the whole greater than the sum of its parts. initiative of asking questions that may seem We must also be agile: an enterprise with an outlandish, facile, or even downright bizarre, the information needed to adaptive, diverse, continually learning, and in order to process the full spectrum of infor- mission-driven intelligence workforce that mation before reconstructing a solution from disrupt a single terrorist is embraces innovation and takes initiative. the complex, palpable amount of information different than the information Moreover, the IC must exemplify America’s that is exposed in the search for an answer. needed to dismantle a terrorist values: operating under the rule of law, consis- These aforementioned attributes, if they organization tent with Americans’ expectations for protec- are to form the proposed endstate for how the tion of privacy and civil liberties, respectful of IC should function, must find a home within

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the organic nature of what education com- The goal of intelligence education, then, is be an ­advantage for intelligence education as prises. However, training and education are to produce individuals who can creatively the removal of discipline-specific standards different concepts, and while these differences explore, describe, or explain intelligence means that the focus of student education is should be celebrated for what they are and issues or problems. Succinctly, the ultimate the development of intellectual capacity and what they do, an understanding of the minute goal of intelligence education is the acquisi- critical and creative thinking.13 details that make them unique offers a way of tion of transferable knowledge. While the IC is fond of the term subject not confusing the strengths that make each of Beginning with a foundation of informa- matter expert, the necessity of adopting an them mandatory for the IC mission. tion literacy, and given the breadth of what interdisciplinary approach calls it into ques- In the simplest terms, training is the constitutes intelligence, developing an intel- tion in relation to intelligence education. process of skills acquisition, while educa- ligence education program can be daunting. This term is used to lend authority and cred- tion is the process of knowledge acquisition. In particular, an effective and “standard” ibility to particular individuals or analytical Training and education are related and often canon—a selection of authors, books, or other products, but it has little relevance in intel- overlap, but the goals are different. The IC information that is considered the basis of the ligence education. An educator or student routinely engages in training activities—from discipline—is impossible to create. Intelligence may become knowledgeable on a particular learning how to utilize technology to learning relies on research from a variety of recognized topic or region; however, there is no endpoint how to write an analytical product. At the disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, in knowledge acquisition. Therefore, the heart of IC training is learning how to be a physics, engineering, history, political science, possibility of a student knowing more than “good” analyst. Over time and with repeated communications, agriculture, economics, and the educator in intelligence education is an training, the goal is to produce a highly skilled finance. In short, the field of intelligence is a established, welcomed fact that lends to a and competent IC professional—or an indi- true interdisciplinary field encompassing the more diverse and rich learning environment. vidual who knows the “instructions” and how full range of both the social and the natural In other words, educators are forever students, to effectively and efficiently implement them. sciences. Each of these disciplines (and the and students have the ability to sharpen and Education has different goals, but there subdisciplines they have spawned) has its expand an educator’s knowledge. As educa- are specific skills—or training—necessary own canon. These canons, however, create tionalist John Dewey noted, “Education is not to achieve those goals. The required skills unique perspectives that can unintentionally a preparation for life, education is life itself.” are referred to as “information literacy” and stymie critical and creative thinking and Perhaps more importantly in under- describe “a student’s competency in acquir- reasoning in intelligence—for example, the standing the difference between intelligence ing and processing information in search for discipline of economics approaches political education as practiced by the NIU compared understanding.”10 Those skills include the instability differently than the discipline of to other, nonclassified environment “intel- ability to determine the type of information sociology. But the lack of a canon and the ligence education” institutions, the NIU needed; access that information effectively itinerant educational goals associated with an positions itself inside the tactical intelligence and efficiently; critically evaluate sources and interdisciplinary approach present their own environment but also draws from continuing content of information; effectively use infor- ­problems: educational goals “can rarely be advances in research throughout the social and mation and understand the social, economic, stated in terms as student mastery of a specifi- natural sciences. This dictates the NIU need to and legal issues that surround its use; and able body of knowledge, although certain continually “churn” educators and education observe appropriate regulations, laws, and skills may be identified.”12 This may, however, by infusing the cadre of IC professionals with policies related to the access of information.11 The acquisition of these skills is fundamental to any education program; however, it is only Kent essay published in inaugural issue of the means to the goal and not the goal itself. Studies in Intelligence explains literature In many respects, “knowledge for its needed for intelligence profession own sake” is the ultimate goal of education. But beyond this philosophical aspiration, education seeks to expose students to a wide variety of knowledge sources (traditional and nontraditional), epistemologies (“ways of knowing”), and the critical thinking and reasoning skills necessary to synthesize and integrate knowledge. Undergraduate programs typically seek to create consum- ers of knowledge, while graduate programs Sherman Kent is aim to create producers of knowledge. Both considered “the father of require students to challenge and question intelligence analysis” established beliefs, but, more important, both require students to challenge and question their own mindsets or perspectives (“way of understanding an issue or problem”). Central Intelligence Agency

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Secretary Gates speaks at U.S.-Afghan security consultation forum at Pentagon

Academic, government, military, and international Soldiers from military intelligence battalion experts discuss broad range of deterrence issues parade during change of command ceremony during U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium

U.S. Air Force (Lou Czarnecki) DOD DOD (R.D. Ward)

fresh epistemologies and perspectives, result- exploration cannot focus on teaching students This quote, in the immediate context ing in new approaches to problem-solving and to merely regurgitate information and to pass of this article, betrays an interesting mental- research. The world is not static, and neither is exams; rather, it must communicate models ity when contemplating the conversion of a knowledge. While the institutional knowledge and material that introduce, and ultimately tradecraft practitioner into a strategic thinker that specialists in the IC bring to intelligence stimulate, independent investigations. Accom- and palpably highlights the difficulty in education is invaluable, an occasional shakeup plishing this should be not only the aim of assuring people that education and training in education is a necessity to avoid becoming intelligence education, but also the point of are not a matter of a bipolar choice. Instead, locked into one epistemology, one perspec- departure from training to education. training and education represent a phased tive, and one approach to understanding Whether about war, counterterrorism, developmental process in which training intelligence. New and creative approaches are counterinsurgency, or the impact of religion will reach its limit but further enhancement paramount to remain forward-thinking and on threat analysis, intelligence education through education is necessary to confront relevant to supporting U.S. national security should accentuate critical and creative rea- national security challenges. Thus, if the objectives. In other words, when an IC call for soning and thinking and the application of Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) suc- standards becomes an excuse to sideline inno- theoretical constructs into current events. By cessful incorporation of academics, led by vation, the result is nothing more than stagna- challenging educators and students to move Sherman Kent, lays the very foundation of tion masquerading as standardization. For the beyond the superficial treatment of course today’s IC, then it is time again to see the IC, this is the most dangerous route that can material as “dead” (in the case of historical utility of “academic” culture when contem- be imagined because, as opposed to gradu- studies) or “inapplicable” (in terms of “aca- plating how the IC will engage with a world ates from other universities, NIU graduates demic” theory), education programs must where globalization and the “openness of have a vested interest in identifying concepts, focus on the construction of paradigms of modern information networks . . . undermine techniques, and even radical hypotheses (think understanding that foster personal growth, U.S. interests.”15 This is why strategic think- “red team” assessments) that will quell nominal including an appreciation of individual ers require a background beyond ­tradecraft indicators before they become violent enablers. potential and an acknowledgment that there with an aggressive propensity toward taking is a definitive symbiotic relationship between on whatever challenges exist. For the IC, ’Til Death Do Us Part the educator and the student. This foundation therefore, a lessons-learned future needs to The interdisciplinary and broad nature avoids the detrimental effects of becoming be rebuilt upon the foundation that the CIA of intelligence education stands in sharp the student’s “friend” by promoting profes- intuitively understood to be the best ground- contrast with the specific training needs and sional development only or of conveying an work for strategic analysis (long-term fore- goals of the 17 agencies and organizations image of the frightening, unapproachable, casts and short-term solutions, methodologi- that comprise the IC. The ODNI was created know-it-all professor. With this approach, cal integration, and so forth) that is based on to coordinate these needs and goals as well therefore, a balance is devised where flexibil- the fundamental principles of an inclusive as develop IC-wide analytical standards.14 ity and structure coexist to create an atmo- education and not the personalized, exclusive IC professionals are trained on these stan- sphere of inquisitiveness and tactical engage- tradecraft techniques of individual agencies. dards, and they do complement intelligence ment. After all, the student will become the There is uniform appreciation for edu- education. But the standards should not educator one day. cation as a tool, but few beyond the profession dictate educational goals. Education inspires Examples of the success of the above are prepared to welcome, let alone absorb individuals to critically evaluate information model abound. However, there seems to be a and understand, the complex methodologies and creatively engage in transformational culturally ingrained belief in the IC that there and theoretical constructs that influence problem-solving. In other words, as opposed is an exclusive nature between training and strategic planning and tactical implementa- to training, which is didactic in its approach, education. This belief, while not overtly stated, tion. Yet despite educationalist tendencies to higher education is essentially Socratic learn- is covertly contemplated and symbolically organically think outside the box and see pos- ing. As such, to maintain a vivacious and given form as: “Those who can, do. Those who sibilities beyond short-term solutions based networked strategic education, knowledge can’t, teach.” on tradecraft training, few practitioners are

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laboration. Accordingly, conceptualizing the Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, the IC need not frame the complex task involved in managing the IC DC: Center for a New American Security, January argument as “either training or enterprise is less likely to be productive in the 2010), 7–8, available at . to say, those who “do”—as it is in the fluidly where each, much like in a solid 2 National Defense Intelligence College, Aca- instinctive capabilities of Socratic modelers, relationship, builds on its strengths demic Year 2010–2011 catalog, 7, available at . As in all partnerships, arguments over 3 Ibid. who does the most work will ensue, and the 4 U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2010 conscious of the utility of moving the concept temptation to “choose sides” will be compel- Agency Financial Report: Smart Power in Action, 5, of education away from being understood as ling. The choice, however, would be a false available at . 5 and integrating it into the “doing” part of “either training or education,” but must look U.S. Army, 2005 Posture Statement, available the IC. Therefore, success for the IC is truly at where each, much like in a solid relation- at . 6 The National Security Strategy (Washington, a matter of “’til death do us part” and not ship, builds on its strengths to fill the other’s DC: The White House, May 2010), 1, available a matter of “divorce” based on mistrust of deficiencies. In terms of a historical example, at . put this another way, look no further than the able in the Apollo 13 mission, the “successful 7 Ibid. environments created from “big thinking” failure,” where the steadfast knowledge that 8 See John G. Heidenrich, “The Intelligence that directly influence the course of tacti- training brings successfully complemented Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence,” cal tradecraft remodeling that happens, or the improvisational nature of education. Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2, 15–25, for a compre- should happen, when the environment of the To create an environment that institu- hensive examination of strategic intelligence. operators changes. tionalizes success, the IC must first come to 9 Office of the Director of National Intel- terms with the value of intelligence education. ligence, “Vision and Mission,” available at . Emphasis in original. 10 Tactical Advantage what intelligence education is and what it can Middle States Commission on Higher Edu- cation, Characteristics of Excellence in Higher Edu- In 1947, George F. Kennan’s “The do, as opposed to overemphasizing train- cation: Requirements of Affiliation and Standards ing, which is better understood but does not Sources of Soviet Conduct” (originally pub- for Accreditation (Philadephia, PA: Middle States lished under the pseudonym “X” and also address the full spectrum of the threat con- Commission on Higher Education, 2006), 42. known as “The Long Telegram”) changed the fronting the United States today. As such, only 11 Ibid. entire foreign policy approach to the Soviet in this manner can the IC justifiably assess the 12 Michael Field and Russell Lee, “Assessment Union and ushered in the Cold War strategy point at which more training or more educa- of Interdisciplinary Programmes,” European of containment.16 More recently, Francis tion is better suited to gauge those threats and Journal of Education 27, no. 3 (1992), 278. Fukuyama’s 1989 paper “The End of History” to make strategic suggestions for the future. 13 J.W. Astin, Assessment for Excellence: The and 1992 book The End of History and the Last This debate over the role of training and Philosophy and Practice of Assessment and Evalu- Man and Samuel Huntington’s 1993 response education is long overdue and is necessary for ation in Higher Education (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 6. to Fukayama, “The Clash of Civilizations?” the most efficient allocation of threat analysis 14 Office of the Director of National Intel- combined to set the stage for post–Cold War and intelligence resources. While NIU is ligence, Intelligence Community Directive Number focused on strategic education, advocating for thinking on the future of the nation-state with 203, “Analytical Standards,” June 21, 2007, avail- implications for the future of U.S. national strategic engagement without tactically appli- able at . tinuum still spawns discussion, debate, and world. Only when education is seen as the 15 Office of the Director of National Intel- dissent within academic, government, and IC necessary next step to training can the United ligence, “DNI Names Robert Bryant New National circles. Kennan, Fukuyama, and Huntington States ever hope to establish a tactically agile Counterterrorism Executive,” news release no. did not adhere to ODNI analytical standards: and mentally flexible community of intelli- 31–09, September 18, 2009. 16 instead, they represent the possibilities associ- gence professionals who rise to the challenges “X” (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of ated with inspired critical and creative think- of the moment. And while the stakes may Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947), 566–582. ing and reasoning. Education affords students seem exceedingly small between these two 17 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” and educators the opportunity to engage in forms of analyst improvement, it is only in The National Interest (Summer 1989), which was such detail that relationships build a platform this type of “big thinking” and reevaluation of expanded into The End of History and the Last JFQ the “conventional wisdom.” for sustainable success. Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Also, Samuel P. Lying between the binary positions of Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign defensive and offensive operations and pro- Affairs 73, no. 3 (Summer 1992), 22–49, later active and reactive mission statements, both NOTES expanded into The Clash of Civilizations and the education and training are committed to Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & 1 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul protecting the integrity of that indispensable Schuster, 1996). D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making component of successful operations: col-

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he Taliban and other insurgent call for an increase in our capability to build ers, and standing up a Recruiting Command. elements fighting against the partner capacity, there is still more to be In addition, we contracted for a major Afghan Government of the Islamic done. NTM–A has been charged with build- media recruiting campaign, authorized a Republic of Afghanistan ing Afghan capacity primarily through four further increase in recruiters, and set up 16 T mobile subrecruiting stations to coincide with (GIRoA) are convinced that they will succeed areas: the development of the Afghan National if they simply wait us out. They think they Army (ANA) and Police (ANP), the develop- the start of the challenging summer months only have to maintain their influence in areas ment of the Ministries of Interior (MoI) and and the decrease in operations in winter. like Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, and Defense (MoD), improving the country’s To increase quality, programs were when coalition forces begin to leave in the human capital, and investing in Afghanistan’s reoriented to place a greater emphasis on the next few years, they will be poised to control physical capital. In each of these areas, the factors that lead to a professional security force: the entire country. capacity we need to build must be applied education, training, and leadership. Education What these enemies of GIRoA fail to at two levels: first, through direct growth has taken two forms. First, at basic training grasp is that they will not be able to wait out and development, and second, by indirectly and through traveling training teams, soldiers the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), enabling Afghan capacity to endure by teach- and police are provided basic literacy. Second, which are now on the verge of becoming the ing Afghans both to nurture and to develop enduring institutions like the National Mili- enduring force in the country. Insurgents will themselves. As we move to transition the tary Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), the not be able to outlast a national force that will campaign, our focus switches from the first National Police Academy (NPA), and the Air not go away. As North Atlantic Treaty Orga- level (training Afghans to fight) to the second School were established to develop officers who nization (NATO) Secretary General Anders (training Afghans to train themselves). The have the knowledge and skills to increase the Fogh Rasmussen has stated, “[the Taliban] actions that NTM–A has taken to address professionalization of their force. Training has might think they can wait us out. But within a these areas can serve as a case study in build- been reformed to include a necessary increase year or so, there will be over 300,000 Afghan ing partner capacity. in quality, from marksmanship to tactics soldiers and police trained and ready to to driver training. Additionally, the former defend their country. And they can’t be waited Developing the Afghan National Army police training model of “Recruit-Assign” was out.”1 The mission to develop these forces, and and Police replaced with a new model that makes training the capacity of their government to sustain In Afghanistan, improved capacity mandatory for all police recruits—creating them into the future, belongs to NATO Train- requires an increase in the quantity and a “Recruit-Train-Assign” model. Leadership ing Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A). quality of the ANSF. One cannot take pre- training has been increased through courses The mission of building partner capacity cedence over the other, and the ANSF will for all levels of leadership, from junior noncom- is not only a strategic necessity for the Inter- neither grow into an effective force, nor missioned officers (NCOs) to senior officers. national Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but endure in a self-sustaining manner without Troop Leader Courses, NCO Staff Courses, also a national security imperative that has equal attention to both. We have found that and a Sergeants Major Academy are now been dictated by all levels of the U.S. Govern- to create an enduring, self-sustaining Afghan developing a nascent NCO Corps. The NMAA, ment. In the National Defense Strategy, our security force requires leaders—leaders of Company Commanders courses, a Staff military has been directed to “support, train, character, competence, and integrity. There- College, and the National Security University advise and equip partner security forces to fore, we have begun to focus on increasing the are all either running or in the process of being counter insurgencies, terrorism, proliferation, quality of the personnel in the ANSF. This created to develop a competent Officer Corps. and other threats.”2 To support this position, is important because it creates professional- NTM–A supports the overall mission Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote two ism and integrity in those institutions with of building Afghan capacity by producing articles in Foreign Affairs that charge the U.S. which the local population has the most daily the forces required to provide security and military with “building partner capacity: contact. These contacts between citizens and stability for the population, and to safe- helping others defend themselves or, if neces- their professional and honorable public ser- guard the nation’s borders. Impressively, the sary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing vants enable mutual credibility and respect. ANA grew fast enough to meet the growth them with equipment, training, or other When the Afghan people have faith and trust goal of 134,000 troops by October 2010 3 forms of security assistance . . . [because] in their government institutions, they can months early. Its quality is also improving building the security capacity of other coun- focus on their daily lives and not be worried through increased institutional trainer tries must be a critical element of U.S. national about extortion, threats of criminal activity, support and subsequently, once fielded, by security strategy.”3 and basic survival. partnering with coalition forces. Most sig- Although the U.S. defense establish- To increase quantity, training facili- nificant of all, increased resources and dedi- ment has progressed since the Secretary’s ties have been expanded and throughput cation to leader development institutions increased. Additionally, faced with low like the NMAA are developing educated, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, USA, is recruiting last year, it was apparent we would capable, and motivated leaders who will Commanding General of the North Atlantic Treaty not reach our growth objectives without continue to professionalize the ANA. Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan taking drastic action. Working with Afghan To support troop movement and in Kabul. Captain Nathan K. Finney, USA, is a leadership, together we implemented several logistical support, Afghan air capability Strategist who recently served with the NATO initiatives to mitigate low recruiting, includ- has grown through the acquisition of addi- Training Mission–Afghanistan. ing pay raises, tripling the number of recruit- tional C–27 airframes. To increase leader

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­development, an air school for education and further to 378,000. The position of NTM–A training has been developed. The Afghan is that growth to 352,000 personnel will allow Air Force (AAF) has increased its capabilities the Ministries of Interior and Defense to in battlefield mobility, casualty evacuation, sustain the momentum created in the last 20 forward observer training, humanitarian months, including building a stable institu- support, and mission planning. tion that includes most enablers required The ANP also met its growth goal for basic army and police forces. Regardless (109,000 personnel by October 2010) early, of the end strength of the ANSF, one of the though its growth is less robust than the ANA. greatest challenges to growing beyond current The greatest strides in building ANP capacity levels (284,500 personnel going to 305,600 and quality are in leader development, pri- by the end of October) is retention. Retention marily through the establishment of profes- is defined as the ability to retain person- sional development schools and systems. This nel, whether by reenlistment, prevention of increase in quality has stemmed from many injury to include death, or mitigation against programs set into place when NTM–A was desertion. Historically, retention issues have activated. Professional education has grown to plagued both the ANA and ANP, preventing 236 concurrent courses, with Afghans leading the long-term development of soldiers and almost half of the instruction. The MoI has police and predictable growth in end strength. developed and instituted a National Police To maintain growth to 305,600 and beyond, Strategy and Plan that provides the vision NTM–A has set a reenlistment goal of 60 to for a future that their personnel can follow, 70 percent within the ANSF. Both the MoD leading to a dramatic increase in their execu- and the MoI have been able to attain this goal, tion of budgets and programs (to 99 percent with the ANA reaching 69 percent in March executed in this last solar year, ending in and the ANP 60 percent (in that same month), March 2011). The greatest growth in quality, as examples. Attrition (including losses due which has made a significant impact on both to medical reasons/death and desertion) the quality of officer sent to the field and the remains the most difficult aspect of retention. public’s perception of their law enforcement NTM–A has set a goal of 16.8 percent attrition officers, is the increase of literate patrolmen. per year or less (or 1.4 percent each month). Today we have over 70,023 ANSF in training, Some months, segments of the ANSF are able together with 75,682 who have completed to attain this goal, to include the Afghan Uni- training. We have educated them to almost formed Police (AUP), the ANA Commandos twice the literacy rate of the country as a and Special Forces, and the ANA Corps in whole (approximately 50 percent versus 28 the north and west. However, high-tempo percent), producing better police by decreas- operations in the east and south have led to ing corruption, increasing stewardship, and high attrition rates in the ANA Corps in those reducing drug use. This is gradually garnering areas, as well as the elite national Afghan more respect from the Afghan people. National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). Recent quantity debates have occurred Overall, ANA attrition rates were 27 percent in the international community about the annually in March and 12 percent in the ANP. overall size of the ANSF, primarily regarding Much work has been done in the past 20 how it will be funded. Early this year, discus- months to address retention and attrition. In sions began about the size of the ANA and fact, most measures taken by the MoI, MoD, ANP, or more precisely, whether the ANSF and NTM–A have focused on this area. Pay should grow from 305,600 personnel (to be has been increased, coalition units have been ity of the ANSF, our main focus remains on attained by the end of October this year) to partnered with Afghan units, mandatory lit- outcomes. As David Kilcullen has written, 352,000, or whether it should be enlarged eracy courses have been created more widely, “These indicators [inputs] tell us what we and all measures have been taken to create a are doing, but not the effect we are having more predictable rotation in and out of high- [outcomes].”4 There are three outcomes that the greatest growth in quality, conflict areas of the country. These actions we are interested in for the ANSF. First, that have steadily created an increase in retention ANSF units are capable of doing in the field which has made a significan and overall quality of the ANSF, but more what they are trained to do. Second, that the impact on the public’s must be done by all stakeholders to continue people served by the ANSF have sufficient perception of their law to decrease attrition. confidence in their security forces to take the enforcement officers, is th Although our inputs (trainers, funding, necessary actions to promote stability and increase of literate patrolmen and leadership) and outputs (trained ANSF, conduct their normal business (for example, facilities built) are key to building the capac- engaging in commerce, children attending

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Afghan National Police Crisis Response Unit members clear compound during training conducted by ISAF

U.S. Air Force (Joseph Swafford) school). Finally, that the Afghan people are officers and NCOs, gaps in the midgrade the fielded force. Steps have also been taken to willing to resist attempts by insurgents to ranks, and corrupt senior officers—pose ensure that higher quality and highly literate reassert themselves (providing actionable the greatest threat to our Afghan allies. Sig- officers are distributed based on operational intelligence, refusing to support insurgent ele- nificant efforts have been made to improve need, not cronyism or favoritism. ments, and engaging in the political process). leader development programs, but critical NTM–A has created a three-pillar strat- These outcomes will indicate the success with shortages in officers and NCOs persist. There egy that includes experience, education, and which we have developed the capacity of the is a need to continue to invest energy and training. Leader development for most begins ANSF to provide security. creativity into ANSF leader development, and with training that is conducted through Leader development remains our we will continue to focus on junior officers professional military and law enforcement number one priority, and it is essential to and NCO programs. To this end, ANA and courses taught at the Regional Training developing a professional ANSF. To be blunt, ANP leader development courses have been Centers. Education is provided through civil- ANSF leadership deficiencies—across the developed, reorganized, and improved to ian schools (high school diploma or college spectrum of insufficient numbers of junior support increased throughput requirements of degree) and military channels such as NMAA,

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of the ANA and 43 percent of the ANP are building activities we conduct in Afghanistan experience is gained through Pashtun, compared to 44 percent nationally. are enduring. They are the foundation upon a career that is set up to be While the overall inclusion of Pashtuns has which the future capacity and capability of the progressively more challenging been successful, of real concern is the inclu- security sector will be built. and broad enough to create a sion of Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan, In the same article in which Secretary as this is the demographic most hostile to the Gates called for an increase in our ability to professional leader government and most likely to provide the conduct partner capacity–building missions, insurgency with fighters. Specific recruitment he also stated, “There has not been enough Afghan Army War College, Command and programs have been instituted to increase attention paid to building . . . the human Staff College (CSC), and the Sergeants Major their participation in the ANSF. The programs capital (including leadership skills and atti- Academy. Finally, developing leadership include radio marketing and billboards as well tudes) needed to sustain security over the capacity within the ANSF is based on experi- as recruiting teams led by a general from that long term.”5 We have recognized the severe ence. As in any security force, experience is area that assist in the formation of Provincial shortage of human capital in Afghanistan, gained through a career that is set up to be Recruiting Councils. These measures have particularly for leaders. Increasing this asset progressively more challenging and broad been largely successful, increasing recruitment is a Herculean task. The human capital enough to create a professional leader. of southern Pashtuns in early 2011 to 3.3 to 3.5 needed to recruit, train, equip, and sustain a percent per month. This still does not meet the security force and organize sustainable min- Developing the Ministries of Interior MoD’s near-term goal of the 4 percent neces- isterial systems is severely underdeveloped. and Defense sary to fully integrate southern Pashtuns into With literacy rates for the overall population Improving the ministerial capacity to the ANSF, but recruitment has been trending at roughly 28 percent and among the ANSF generate, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF upward since late 2010, when all of the recruit- recruits at less than 14 percent, there is a is critical to a self-sustaining force. A lack of ment measures were instituted in earnest. low educational base from which to draw. quality leaders, mid-level staff, and an effi- Finally, to sustain the force, the minis- This affects both the training of soldiers and cient bureaucracy at the ministerial level poses tries have created a regional logistic system. police and their job performance once train- challenges to accomplishing this, but these This system has developed a Regional Logistic ing is complete. shortfalls are mitigated through dedicated Center in each region, pushing supplies When NTM–A was activated last advisors. Day in and day out, these advisors beyond the typical hubs in Kabul and Kan- November, it was clear that illiteracy was work with key leaders in the Ministries of dahar. There is still much to do in this area. affecting the speed and depth of instruction. Interior and Defense to increase their capacity Soldiers and police in the field are consistently Training had to be provided through hands- and capability to generate, train, and sustain short of supplies, from food to clothing. The on instruction—each element had to be dem- their forces. This has been done in three key first step will be to create a “push” system, onstrated. The inability to provide written areas: structural changes, crafting policies and where logistics planners identify what should material to “prime the pump” for instruction laws (in support of Parliament), and develop- be needed at each unit and push it to them, means every new block of instruction must ing a logistics system. not waiting for a request. This system provides start from scratch. One of the most effective differences the supplies to those in need before they other- Even more important than improving ministries have had on the generation, train- wise would miss them. In the current “pull” training, illiteracy affects the professionaliza- ing, and sustainment of their forces is through system, units request supplies only when they tion of the ANSF. Key elements of job perfor- policies and laws. These have created a tashkil are needed. There is no forecasting supplies mance for capable security forces are tied to (a formal document detailing the size and they will need, so units often go without. This the basic ability to read letters and numbers composition of the force) and sustainable bud- is unacceptable in any security force, and even and to write. How do we professionalize a geting, funding, and procurement systems; more in one that is consistently in combat and soldier who cannot read a manual on how and in the near future they will deliver a facing an insurgency. to maintain a vehicle, read a serial number comprehensive personnel system that includes Each of these areas has gotten better to distinguish his weapon from another, merit-based promotion, established career because of the work of dedicated Afghan calculate trajectory for a field artillery call paths, and retirement systems. leaders, with the support of knowledgeable for fire, or write an intelligence report for a One such policy instituted by the coalition advisors. There remains much to do, higher command? How do we professionalize Afghan government is the ethnic balance of however, and advisor manning levels must a policeman who cannot read the laws he is the ANSF. Both the ANA and the ANP have continue to improve, increasing our support enforcing, write an incident report, or sign a strict guidelines that the number of person- to a larger proportion of the Afghan leader- citation? How can the rule of law be enforced nel from each ethnic group in Afghanistan is ship. Ministerial development is the most if he cannot build a case based on written evi- properly represented in their security forces. important aspect of building enduring capac- dence? How can either a soldier or policeman Of particular concern, given the fact that the ity for the ANSF, and we must treat it that way. ensure accountability of both superiors and insurgency is made up of fighters primarily subordinates if he cannot read what equip- from Pashtun tribes in the south, is the repre- Improving Afghanistan’s Human ment his unit needs or a pay chart to know sentation of that ethnic group in the ANA and Capital what he should receive? ANP. Looking at the overall numbers, these Literacy and leader development are Creating the highly structured systems policies have been very successful: 45 percent critical to ensuring that the partner capacity– that are needed to run complex organizations

78 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CALDWELL and FINNEY within the security sector requires literacy. An educational foundation must be estab- lished to create the literate security forces and ministerial bureaucrats who can be trained to run district, provincial, and national institu- tions effectively. Unlike previous voluntary literacy training efforts, we are beginning the process by providing mandatory literacy training to all soldiers and policemen. From basic training to unit training, and including educational facilities like the National Police Academy and NMAA, we are moving the ANSF from illiteracy to basic functional and then advanced literacy.

Investing in Physical Capital U.S and Afghan National Army soldiers secure landing zone during air assault The development of ANSF capacity mission in Saroobi district, Afghanistan requires significant physical (infrastructure) and economic (funding to build industries) support. This has made NTM–A the largest U.S. Army (Zachary Burke) foreign investor in Afghanistan. Investment in everything from construction of training Personnel systems within the U.S. as described previously, calls for more than centers to boot factories, from literacy teach- military are not designed to support building just teaching how to shoot a weapon or arrest ers to food procurement through the Afghan capacity within partner nations. The systems a criminal. Building human and physical First, Afghan Made Initiative, is creating do not possess the flexibility or selectiveness capital to professionalize security forces is ripple effects across Afghan society. needed to identify required skill sets and just as important. We currently do not have Money that is now spent in the deploy personnel to the right positions. As the ability to secure funding from the private Afghan military industrial complex is stated earlier, one of the greatest impacts we sector without a lengthy and laborious con- jump-starting industry. Manufacturing have on building partner capacity is through tracting process. We need the authority to companies in the private sector have begun our provision of advisors to the security min- match the right capability within the private making boots, uniforms, and other items istries. There are no current processes within sector with the requirement in the partner for soldiers and police. These companies our personnel systems to ensure that we select nation. Sometimes this may mean only one and those like them could just as easily the leaders with the right rank, skills, and company can deliver specific capabilities; the transition from military to civilian goods. temperament to serve in these positions. The operational context occasionally demands Workers making boots and uniforms can majority of selections for trainers, instruc- that speed of delivery take precedence over make shoes and clothes for sale on the open tors, and advisors are ad hoc; these billets are peacetime contractual regulations. market. The huge investment that the inter- primarily filled with personnel who need a national community is providing for the deployment and have the correct rank. Skills Solutions Afghan military base, whether in the ANSF and experience are rarely determining factors. To fully implement the U.S. National or the civil base that supports it, is building Beyond personnel issues, our current Defense Strategy and policy put forth by more than just the capacity of the ANSF. structures for funding and authorities are Secretary Gates to build partner capacity, we It is also building the human and physical inappropriate. Within the U.S. Department must make significant changes. Our person- capital required to jump-start the Afghan of Defense (DOD), we largely possess only nel system must be able to identify and select economy and society. authorities and funding to support military the appropriate personnel to train, instruct, forces. This is also true of most NATO and advise other nations’ military and police Obstacles countries. When NATO gives multinational leaders. These jobs must be treated with the There have been and remain signifi- support, this, too, delivers only military and/ same importance as equivalent jobs within cant challenges to NTM–A accomplishing or defense forces. In the Afghan environment, our own Services. Advisors in particular its mission to build Afghan capacity and and in most areas where we would be build- should go through a selection process similar ensure that GIRoA is able to sustain it. ing partner capacity, the police may be more to those being selected for advisor positions in Systems within the U.S. Government must important than military forces. To truly bring DOD. An advisor for a Minister of Defense or be addressed to ensure that future efforts stability to an area and build partner capacity, Minister of Interior should be selected based to increase the capacity of critical security the ability to support interior forces (police on the same criteria used for the military forces will be successful. Inflexible person- and gendarmerie) is essential. advisor to the Secretary of Defense. These nel systems and inappropriate approval and In addition to governmental funding, advisory positions are critical nodes for funding structures must be improved to better the ability to acquire private sector support building partner capacity. The training for provide for this mission. is also required. Building partner capacity, these advisors should also be commensurate

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in dangerous­ areas and partnering with host and economy ravaged by sustained conflict. our personnel system must nation forces are highly probable. Caveats The payoff for this patience and investment be able to identify and select must be kept to a minimum to allow a greater is a professional security force that is able the appropriate personnel probability of success. to provide security, creating room for the to train, instruct, and advise Much progress has been made filling foundation of prosperity and stability that will other nations’ military and NATO trainer shortfalls as well as filling support subsequent generations for decades to positions to the appropriate rank, skill, and come, and providing a reliable ally to support police leaders knowledge. From the aftermath of the Lisbon a positive influence in the region. Summit in November 2010 to the release No matter how the political winds may of our current statement of requirements, blow in the future, whether here in the United with their critical effect in building partner NTM–A saw an addition of approximately States or among our coalition partners, we capacity. This training must include courses 440 coalition trainers, a 45 percent increase. must leave the Afghan people with an endur- that impart advisory skills (particularly at These trainers came from 15 partner nations, ing capability and force generation capacity to the ministerial level), language, culture, and increasing the overall national contributions provide security. By educating and develop- scenario-based exercises, which teach through to the training mission to 32 nations. These ing the Afghan National Security Forces, we challenging situations. trainers have been invaluable to the improve- ensure that Afghanistan will be safe in the The authorities and funding provided ment of specific skills within the ANSF, hands of a security force that won’t leave— to forces that are building partner capacity particularly the operation and maintenance their security force. To deliver this education must be better tailored and more flexible. of Russian-made aircraft (for example, Mi-17 and development, we need a reenergized and The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund cargo helicopters) and policing skills (with reapplied focus within the U.S. Government should be given greater flexibility. There are personnel trained by national police forces and DOD, dedicated to building our partners’ more ways to support and build the ANSF like the Italian Carabinieri, the French Gen- capacity across the globe. JFQ than just buying equipment or building darmerie Nationale, and the Royal Canadian facilities. The greatest effect we can have is Mounted Police). by partnering and advising. We need the Finally, forces that are building partner NOTES flexibility of funds to support coalition capacity must be given a more flexible 1 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, monthly press forces to provide these capabilities. system to engage with the private sector. A briefing, June 7, 2010, available at . and orientation have been addressed in the approach and procure support and funding 2 Department of Defense (DOD), National recently published paper on the new strategic from private sector organizations, whether a Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, June 6 concept. First, NATO must orient itself not nongovernmental agency, corporation, or uni- 2008), 15. only to provide security for its members, versity. Building partner capacity requires the 3 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend but to “place a premium on helping host authority to match the right capability within Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assis- nation security forces to improve their own the private sector with the requirement of the tance,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2010), 3. ability to maintain order and to protect non-­ partner nation. 4 David J. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency combatants from harm.”7 This reorientation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 58. 5 will protect member states before threats In for the Long Haul Gates, 4. 6 “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic come to their shores. Building partner nation Ultimately, the task of building the Engagement,” Analysis and Recommendations of capacity will “require working with an effec- capacity of the ANSF is a “duel in strategic the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept 11 tive mix of partners to piece together the endurance” with both the insurgent forces for NATO, May 17, 2010. 8 diverse elements of a single shared strategy.” and the international community. The duel 7 Ibid., 32. This strategy must include interior forces with the former sees insurgents trying to wait 8 Ibid., 22. (police and gendarmerie) and those with us out, while the international community is 9 Ibid., 34. the capabilities to develop them. NATO trying to determine the best way to support 10 Ibid., 32. must also “review [their] financial rules”9 the effort while moving toward the exit. In 11 Anthony Cordesman, “Realism in Afghani- to include the funding and support of these contrast, NTM–A, in some form or another, stan: Rethinking an Uncertain Case for the War,” interior forces. Finally, NATO nations must will have an enduring presence supporting Center for Strategic and International Studies, June “minimize national caveats that they attach the ANSF. Whether it evolves into an Office 16, 2010. when contributing troops to Alliance opera- of Security Cooperation like those in our tions.”10 These caveats can damage efforts in Embassies across the globe or something Afghanistan, and will do the same in future more robust and far-reaching, America will efforts if not kept in check. All NATO nations have a significant military relationship with want to ensure the safety and security of their Afghanistan for years to come. personnel, but they must also ensure that Recovery from 30 years of warfare does caution does not hinder the ability to accom- not occur in 1 year or 3. Political patience and plish the mission. During a mission that a large initial investment in building capac- includes building partner capacity, training ity are needed to restart an Afghan society

80 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ANDERSEN

7th Special Forces Group Soldier watches Dominican commandos enter building during joint assault and close quarters battle training in exercise Fused Response

U.S. Army (Alex Licea) A Road Map for Beating Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Organizations

By MARTIN EDWIN ANDERSEN

The brotherhood of the well-­ he challenges posed by transna- an extensive survey of people’s sense of trust tional criminal organizations in national police forces around the Americas, intentioned exists even though it is (TCOs)—networks that meld the respected Americas Barometer found— impossible to organize it anywhere. T international syndicates with not surprisingly given the region’s racial and domestic gangs for greater and deeper illegal ethnic stratification—a “positive correlation —ALBERT EINSTEIN, 1934 reach—today cut a searing path through Latin between self-identifying as white (compared America’s political, social, and economic land- to all other groups) and trust in the police.” scape, morphing what once seemed strictly Other factors, it reported, “such as a history law enforcement problems into national of crime victimization, fear of crime, and vic- security threats. At the same time, throughout timization by corruption contribute negatively the region, a fierce debate has arisen about the to people’s perceptions.”1 Add the fact that in efficacy and appropriateness of military versus most countries of the region police forces are law enforcement responses, and combinations dramatically underpaid and underresourced, of the two, thrust into this violent chasm. In while facing criminal groups of sophisticated

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 81 COMMENTARY | Beating Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Organizations organization and high-octane lethality, and it ­asymmetric challenges includes nonstate is clear that much has to be done. actors competing for territorial control or transnational actors are To combat TCOs, criminals, terrorists, advancing their illicit agendas by providing multibillion-dollar businesses and their quasi-legal facilitators need to be public goods in the absence of weak or ineffec- whose resources often dwarf confronted by an integrated law enforcement, tive national and local governments. The mul- those of national governments intelligence, and military effort as part of a tidimensional TCOs’ threats include narcotics “whole-of-government” approach. As such, trafficking, financial crimes, cybercrimes, desired state objectives are pursued through corruption and extortion, counterfeiting, and ­particularly dangerous, development is the the government’s use of formal and/or infor- trafficking in humans and arms. Equipped effort by Mexican [drug-trafficking organiza- mal networks across the different agencies with sophisticated weapons and other tech- tions, or DTOs], such as the Zetas and the under its control to coordinate the design nologies that enable them to train a path of Sinaloa DTO, to themselves control territory in and implementation of the range of interven- destruction on all that is in their way, these transshipment countries of Central America.3 tions that those agencies can and will make transnational actors are multibillion-dollar to increase effectiveness. This new emphasis, businesses whose resources often dwarf those In Mexico, in particular, narcotics in which the police and military are integral of national governments. Their dirty money organizations field paramilitary units with parts of a larger effort, would foster collabora- can buy elections, politicians, and power itself. weapons of war that—in a perverse replica of tion and reinforce (and—where needed— This organized savagery has a global the role of the Colt revolver of the American create) communities of interest at national, reach that outstrips the power, resources, Wild West—equalize and sometimes trump regional, and international levels. The and imagination of many law enforcement the firepower of the legal forces.4 This assault whole-of-government approach needs to be agencies. Illicit traffic from one continent can on the legitimate monopoly on the instru- accompanied by a whole-of-learning model in traverse a second on its way to being sold in a ments of violence can lead to weak or failed which U.S. strengths and weaknesses can be third—unchallenged when it is not detected. states. And as each nation feels the brunt of shared and frankly discussed for the benefit The innovation of transnational communica- these growing threats, new “security dilem- of tomorrow’s security and defense policies tions has helped international organizations mas” emerge in which one state’s efforts to within a democratic framework. and multinational corporations to act with maximize its own security create inexorable For many in Latin America, state power greater independence of national borders perceptions in its neighbors of greater insecu- has historically cast a shadow on both per- and international regulations. TCOs have rity, resulting in increased tensions (witness sonal security and human rights. The debate also been able to take advantage of these new recent and ongoing border friction between about its ultimate ownership, purposes, and opportunities to lay waste to the common Colombia and Venezuela, for example, or outcomes continues. The legacy of state secu- good. These heterodox threats—such as between Costa Rica and Nicaragua). rity forces in most countries is one in which the narcotics trade, smuggling, piracy, and The endemic problems associated with political rights and civil liberties were severely human trafficking—are felt across the public the region’s law enforcement institutions, long conditioned or were perhaps the object of spectrum, by individuals, communities, gov- a Gordian knot affecting social development full-scale assault for some of the population—a ernments, and nations themselves. and stability, mean that neither local police painful inheritance that mobilizes citizens to The powerful criminal networks in nor border patrols—even when buttressed by demand greater respect for democratic prac- Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and class-circumscribed private security institu- tices. At the same time, the globalization of Central America—and growing threats else- tions—are empowered and equipped to crime brings with it an enhanced potential for where—have come to resemble multinational match the threat. Into the vacuum, in several lethality and reach that demands increases in felonious insurgencies, with their size and the countries of the region—Colombia, Brazil, the capabilities of state institutions. In Mexico, violence they can bring to bear challenging and Mexico, among others—vicious militia where some 150,000 people are involved in a not only a growing number of civilian gov- groups “pose significant threats to both com- narcotics business that has spilled over into ernments and civil societies throughout the munities and the state, even while presenting about 230 U.S. cities, the challenge has become hemisphere, but also the concept of national themselves as protectors of the citizenry so acute that the government has had no alter- sovereignty itself. As Brookings Institution against crime.”5 native but to call in the military, particularly expert Vanda Felbab-Brown recently noted in During a time of rapidly expanding given a level of police corruption and institu- testimony before the U.S. Congress, Mexico’s transnational criminal networks, security tional deficiencies that may take a decade or paramilitary narco-cartel, the Zetas, and Bra- solutions being pursued in a number of more to overcome, if it ever is.2 zil’s Comando Vermelho: Latin American countries—most notably From the Rio Grande to Tierra del in Argentina—offer community-based, Fuego, the wide range of irregular and seek to dominate the political life of a commu- decentralized remedies. Inhibiting clear- nity, controlling the community’s ability to orga- eyed responses to these real and present Martin Edwin Andersen, a former Assistant nize and interact with the state, determining the dangers in many countries is a bipolar Professor of National Security Affairs in the Center extent and functions of local government, and reaction by both the public and by special for Hemispheric Defense Studies, is the Editor of sometimes even exercising quasi-control over interest groups that pits memories of recent Security and Defense Studies Review. He was a the local territory. Thus they too can represent military-led dictatorships and the fear that Senior Advisor for Policy Planning in the Criminal an intense and acute threat to governments, such regimes could reemerge in the current Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. at least in particular locales. . . . A newer, and context against public outrage and feelings

82 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ANDERSEN of impotence in the face of corrupt and inef- fective civilian institutions. Some human rights groups, rooting their critique in the manner in which U.S. security assistance was given during the Cold War, put priority on the first focus—warning that Washington should do no harm by only offering assistance with no potential for dual-use by would-be military dictators. They demand that aid from Washington strictly reflect what they insist is how North Ameri- can institutions operate. “Preach what you practice,” the influ- ential Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) recently demanded, charging that even today U.S. foreign assistance practices often “encourage Latin America’s armed forces to take on internal security roles that the U.S. military cannot legally play at home.” Not all those worried about today’s risks to U.S. and Brazilian special forces soldiers democratic civilian institutions share the prepare to fast-rope from UH−60 during combined training at Fort Bragg thrust of the v critique, however. For instance, a civil libertarian supreme court justice in 7th Special Forces Group, Airborne (Gino Palu) Argentina, noting the marked trend toward keeping armed forces at the margin of security roles, finds the police a greater threat to dem- ­military and entrusting their national sover- ­proliferation of weapons. The “complemen- ocratic rule. He counters, “Today coups are eignty to volunteer militias and international tary” role of the military, noted General done by the security forces, not by armies.”6 law since 1948, the dispute caused Costa Ricans Ernesto Gonzalez, chief of the armed forces Once backburner questions associated to rethink the wisdom of not having an army, joint command, will last until “the police with a handful of countries undergoing demo- particularly after its heavily armed police sent reorganize and have the operational capacity cratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s, such to the border reportedly suffered a “profound that we want.” The drug lords, he added, have as Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, and Gua- fear of fighting against Nicaraguan soldiers.” 8 enormous power that can put the security of temala, the issues of crime and civil-military Along Nicaragua’s poor and isolated the state at risk.10 and police-community relations have become Mosquito Coast, indigenous peoples who In Argentina, a country plunging into searing priorities. Consider: formed a pillar of anti-Sandinista resistence the front ranks of regional narcotics transit as in the 1980s, only to be largely abandoned well as personal consumption, a government In Mexico, a “narcoligopoly” where in 2010 to their own poverty later, find their lands palpably distant from its own police forces drug trafficking–related deaths numbered and waters a hub of transnational narcotics insists on a program of demilitarization, more than 11,000 people, municipal police shipments. The burgeoning local narco- decentralization, and “democratization” of law around the country are paid off by narcotics economy has led separatist Miskito Indians enforcement. Claiming their efforts are reflec- traffickers with an estimated $100 million a to formally consider using the drug money tive of the U.S. model of posse comitatus, gov- month. The cartel money, noted Minister of for local needs. “We also have the right to ernment officials and their citizen allies state Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna, “is the use these resources,” states one indigenous their opposition is strongly rooted in fears of part of a salary that the State doesn’t pay the leader, ignoring both traditional values and returning to a situation where the military not uniformed officers so that they can live in the public health risks that such trafficking only eventually subordinates the police under dignity.” Meanwhile, the Mexican cartel, Los entail. “The laws that prohibit it are the laws of its command, but could use them once again Zetas, themselves former soldiers trained in Nicaragua and not the laws of the indigenous in extraconstitutional efforts to take power. counterinsurgency, are recruiting Guatemalan people.” Meanwhile, long-time Miskito foe exmilitary elite—los kaibiles—and training and strongman President Daniel Ortega with them on Guatemalan territory.7 claims the high road for leading the subregion once backburner questions 9 in drug arrests and seizures. associated with a handful of Along the Central American isthmus, In Ecuador—between neighbors to the where the narcotics trade and gang violence north and south that are major contributors countries, the issues of crime rival Mexico’s bleak insecurity panorama, to world narcotics trafficking—a climate of and civil-military and police- Costa Rica’s long-simmering border dispute insecurity resulted in the president calling community relations have with Nicaragua almost broke into full-scale in the military to participate with the police become searing priorities fighting in 2010. Having abolished their in efforts to quell land invasions and the

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­judicial recourse and informal dispute resolu- tion, and the absence of education and health care facilities. Within this context, law enforce- ment remains the key to a state’s assertion over national territory. However, since “trust in the police force is important because security is

U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force one of the principal directives of a sovereign state,” pollster Mitchell Seligson notes that there is “a general sense of distrust in the police within the Americas” that is all the more worrisome.11 Meanwhile, citizen-reformers’ emphasis on democratizing and decentralizing the police while leaving only external defense missions to the military creates growing secu- rity deficits that tend to increase the insecurity of frightened and largely, although not entirely, defenseless publics.

Secretary Gates and Chilean defense minister Mirandize vs. Vaporize talk during break at Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas in Bolivia Today, police reform advocates through- out Latin America seek to respond to demands for public safety by promoting community policing models. Although it is ill suited to carry out the organizational heavy lifting that Faced with evolving security challenges might be called the low-intensity democracies fighting transnational criminal organiza- that range from common crime to guerrilla of the region—characterized by weak demo- tions requires, such advocates argue that insurgents, Latin American policymakers are cratic institutions, rampant corruption, and community policing helps to demilitarize, finding that traditional police and military social institutions monopolized by economic democratize, and decentralize law enforce- institutions are particularly ill-equipped to elites unreflective of their countries’ racial and ment institutions, putting an operational beat back intermediate threats, such as narco- ethnic makeup—civilian insurrections and emphasis on agents’ in-the-field judgment cartels, other TCOs (including organized land occupations (a primary source of con- and greater control over the use of force. Calls criminal gangs and arms-traffickers), and flict) are also a problem. When uncontrolled, for demilitarization are based in large part on terrorists. Despite the occasional flaring of these uprisings—often based on legitimate bitter memories of military institutions not border tensions, the region remains essentially demands not fairly channeled through the only engaging in human rights violations, but a “zone of peace” when it comes to interstate political system—can significantly add to also exercising their tutelage over the security conflict, calling into question in cash- regional instability. In a democracy, these forces, both in the region’s troubled democ- strapped countries conventional missions challenges in particular require deft manage- racies and in the armed forces’ politicized for large standing armies. At the same time, ment by the forces of order, even when those ascent to power through the front door of the midlevel threats characterized by extreme protesting operate outside the law. When the presidential palace. In this context, police work violence, with easy access to manpower, large state is unable or unwilling to exercise control has been seen as inferior to that of military sums of money, and sophisticated weapons, over territory, the risk grows of communities missions, and the police are treated as herma- overwhelm regular law enforcement capabili- coming to depend on—or, like in the case nos menores (“little brothers”) by their armed ties. This includes Central American criminal of the infamous Colombian drug czar Pablo forces colleagues. The functional superiority of gangs, narco-syndicates such as the Mexican Escobar, becoming supporters of—criminal the military, where its members often held the cartels, narco-terrorists (Sendero Luminoso enterprises and illegal economies. most senior posts in law enforcement agencies, in Peru, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of The term ungoverned spaces favored historically has exacerbated frictions between Colombia [FARC]), and others. by geostrategists makes more sense when the armed forces and police. This has usually Midlevel threats are not only those understood in terms of state failure to respond resulted in the latter feeling relegated to a lesser posed by organized criminal groups. In what to street crime, consistent lack of access to status in their own institutions. The military emphasis was also of ques- tionable value in winning necessary support in the populace. People understood that in the term ungoverned spaces makes more sense when developed democracies, the police were to use understood in terms of state failure to respond to street crime, the minimum force needed to apprehend (or consistent lack of access to dispute resolution, and the absence “mirandize”) suspects, while armies around of education and health care the world used maximum force to (“vapor- ize”) enemies. Regional police forces were also

84 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ANDERSEN in the front lines of U.S.-supported counter- meant to guarantee public safety,” where “the insurgency campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s functions of national defense have merged by bringing law enforcement against leftist guerrillas and other dissidents, dangerously with the maintenance of internal closer to the community, using tactics ranging from illegal surveillance order,” has led to a series of public safety the police—particularly in 14 to unlawful detention and torture. Police col- scandals embarrassing to the Brazilian army. intelligence-gathering—can laboration with the military resulted in the El Salvador’s separation of police and military maximize citizen cooperation detention of hundreds of thousands of politi- roles, with the former charged with internal cal foes, some armed, others not. As former security, withered under the threat of well- and shared risk Colombian President Alvaro Uribe recently armed transnational criminal gangs. noted, military-oriented national security The emphasis on “civilianizing” the but not enough by itself. “Our past is rich of doctrines from that time, and the institutions police draws much inspiration from the police glory, it is not only [a] shame,” Orlando stated and practices that were the result, drove a reform efforts undertaken in the global north of his fellow Sicilians, adding (in an aside as wedge between the armies and security forces during the 1980s and 1990s, in which forces valid for the millions of indigenous peoples and the populations they were supposed to were taken out of heavily armed patrol cars in living in or alongside ungoverned spaces in serve and protect.12 favor of “community-based” initiatives. At the Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru as With the swing back to democratic rule most functional level, strong arguments can it is for citizens of the mezzogiorno) “if you in the 1980s and 1990s, regional police forces be made that, by bringing law ­enforcement want to fight identity criminals you need to were largely separated from the military and closer to the community, the police—par- promote your identity.”15 were placed institutionally under the control ticularly in intelligence-gathering—can The Palermo model has already been of ministries of interior and public security, maximize citizen cooperation and shared risk. used successfully in Colombia, but only rather than defense. Argentina established a In addition, the efforts of professionalized within a larger context that included military strict legal firewall between national defense police forces within the context of a whole-of- participation in the regaining of public spaces. and internal security and assigned only police government approach can be seen as having Orlando played a key role in advising Medel- and security forces to the latter. Panama, had a dramatic effect in one of the most noto- lin Mayor Sergio Fajardo, whose own efforts and later Haiti, followed Costa Rica and rious instances of organized crime—that of at promoting local civic participation helped eliminated its military entirely. At the close the Sicilian mafia. to significantly reduce violence in a city once of a particularly vicious civil war, El Salvador Like other TCOs, the mafia has been a synonymous with narcotics-related mayhem created a new National Civilian Police force complex organization with global reach that and murder. The Medellin example points to that, in the beginning, was the sole guardian penetrates the state, private financial institu- the necessary context provided by a whole-of- of internal security. tions, and religious organizations while creat- government approach, pioneered through Pres- In these and other countries, significant ing a myth of an invincible counterculture ident Uribe’s “democratic security” strategy. efforts were made to move away from the of illegality. Before Palermo Mayor Leoluca Like Mexico today, Colombia faced military inheritance of centralized command Orlando took office in 1985, mafia-related being overrun by a “narcoligopoly” that and control, as well as the structures, sub- murders in the city numbered more than included not only drug cartels, but also cultures, and institutional loyalties innate to 240 a year; his predecessor belonged to the Marxist insurgents such as the FARC and armed forces organization. Nonetheless, these shadowy illegal organization, and two famed right-wing death squads. Previously, when the efforts have not in and of themselves assured anti-mafia judges whose names were on a military entered into ungoverned spaces the police professionalization and an end to either mob hit list were murdered, with Orlando’s FARC had controlled for years, it could drive rampant corruption or extra-legal violence, own name the third on that roster. Orlando out the guerrillas usually only as long as they as the failure in Central America of various would not allow his wife or children to be remained in situ. They found that security mano dura—heavy handed—law enforcement photographed or seen at his side for fear they alone, while essential, was not enough. The approaches to criminal gangs has shown. In would be killed. FARC provided public goods that could only too many countries, police forces still have In response, Orlando enlisted citizens in be challenged by the state; the latter brought military-like organization but without the tra- the promotion of a culture of lawfulness and in the ministries of justice, education, public ditional capacity of armed forces, a recipe for human rights. Rather than combat the threat works, public health, and others. Uribe used failure in today’s challenging environment. with counterinsurgency strategies, Palermo’s the military and police to consolidate control In recent years, the civilian leadership successful assault of the mafia featured a fight of Colombian territory, promoting democratic of a number of countries has found they have against impunity that included strengthen- civilian oversight of the armed forces while been forced, by necessity or convenience, to ing democratic governance and participa- at the same time initiating a wide range of involve or reintroduce the military more in tion. Orlando described the approach with political reforms to dramatically increase internal security. In March 2008, the Boliv- an analogy of a cart with two wheels—the government efficiency, transparency, and ian government enacted a decree giving the first, the wheel of legality, represented law accountability. The assertion of control over military a key role, including arrest powers, enforcement; the second, the wheel of culture, areas previously ungoverned by the state in customs enforcement and confiscating included other community organizations such enabled a whole-of-government effort, out of contraband at the borders, despite growing as the church, schools, and the media. Both which the population could be protected and friction with the police.13 And in Brazil, “the wheels, he claimed, need to move at the same mobilized against violent and illegal antigov- growing militarization of those operations speed, with law enforcement being necessary ernment forces.

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The intimate knowledge of the territory organized crime for most Latin American democratic, community-based that the police patrol, their use of force with countries pose difficult choices and uncertain policing brings to the table skills restraint, their skills at defusing threatening futures. In some nations, for example Chile that can significantly enhance situations through mediation—all of these and Argentina, the gap between the police the fight against transnational help them to be seen as citizen protectors. and military is filled by hybrid security forces So do their rules of engagement: principles criminal organizations uniquely qualified to take on intermediate of necessity (react with violence only when threats, having both internal security and attacked), proportionality (meet threats national defense missions. Although central- Another example—that of Rio de according to their magnitude, duration, and ized and organized hierarchically with mili- Janeiro—also underscores the need for an intensity), rationality (do not provoke and, tary capabilities when needed, the Chilean approach in which security is part of an where possible, use nonlethal methods first), Carabineros and Argentina’s Gendarmeria integrated effort that creates social capital and discrimination (know how to separate Nacional are well educated in police science (that is, social relations that have productive violent protestors from the rest). and have as their primary peacetime mission benefits). Brazil was recently ranked by the At the same time, and for some of those the maintenance of public order. Pan American Health Organization as the same reasons, the type of community polic- In both countries, the Carabineros and sixth most violent of 100 countries, with 20 ing promoted by democratic reformers is ill Gendarmeria receive high marks for conduct murders per 100,000 residents. In one of Latin prepared to take on TCOs or other powerful in duties ranging from controlling borders America’s most dangerous cities, residents of criminal networks. Their small unit size, to handling public disturbances, while Rio de Janeiro’s sprawling slums—favelas— lighter weapons, greater exposure, and decen- playing important roles in the fight against and those forced to commute daily through tralized structures work against them. Clearly, organized crime and narcotics trafficking. In them were terrorized by heavily armed drug when faced with sustained and truly danger- Chile, which ranked highest in the Americas gangs wearing Bermuda shorts and flip-flops. ous threats, specialized (and centralized) in a region-wide poll of citizen trust in the The fear and mayhem is a special preoccupa- capabilities are needed. When the existence national police, the Carabineros use highly tion given that the city is to host a number of of the state itself is imperiled, or even when skilled social communication as a way of world events, including the Rio Plus 20 Earth violent crime rates soar, military participation maintaining an ongoing dialogue with the Summit in 2012, 2014 World Cup, and 2016 is sometimes required. people, and their recruits are subject to exten- Summer Olympics. Beginning in 2007, with In Latin America, however, the emer- sive background checks before they can enter the police taking back smaller favelas from gency decrees that come with calling in the the force. In the case of Argentina, where the thugs carrying Kalashnikovs, the state reas- armed forces generally lean heavily in favor Gendarmeria, created in 1938, has been in serted itself block by block. During November of security and against civil liberties. The the forefront of controlling disturbances by 2010, the government began its most ambi- challenges are even greater when the threats jobless protestors trained in erecting strategic tious effort to “pacify” the slums by launching form part of urban society, so that the state’s roadblocks in major metropolitan areas, the a massive military and police operation—a use of its monopoly on violence must be force has won praise for its skill and restraint. “shantytown counterinsurgency.” The secu- matched with Solomonic restraint in favor of It is, notes one U.S. scholar, “deeply empa- rity forces stormed and then occupied two innocent life. Furthermore, militaries rarely thetic with protestors, and highly respectful enormous favelas where 200,000 people lived, have the training to carry out internal secu- of what they consider their fellow citizens’ setting up a permanent police presence. By rity missions within the framework of law. human rights.”17 integrating themselves into the communi- (While groups such as WOLA are mistaken ties, the specially trained police established when they suggest that within the United A Key Ingredient permanent state control of the city’s most States Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 [18 U.S.C. The United States can play an important dangerous neighborhoods. Although police Section 1385] is an almost unsurmountable role in promoting whole-of-government brutality remains a problem that is only slowly barrier to American military participation approaches to asymmetric security and being addressed, by bringing a palpable sensa- in law enforcement, the 133-year-old law did defense challenges based on its own experi- tion of security and safety to the one-time no over time help keep the Armed Forces out ences and vocation to participate in com- man’s land, doctors, social workers, teachers, of domestic law enforcement and, by exten- munities of interest at national, regional, and other government employees are able to sion, partisan politics, while allowing for the and international levels. Together the United return, creating again the minimal conditions development of professional civilian policing, States and its regional friends and allies need needed to generate social capital.16 mostly at the local level.) Perhaps the most to share their experiences in coordinated, difficult tight-wire act of all is that if militaries integrated, and mutually supportive efforts Hybrid Models participate in internal security—remolding reaching all sectors of the states, as well as Democratic, community-based policing their training and updating their doctrine among nations. As Secretary of Defense brings to the table important skills that, in a without well-defined “sunset” provisions— Robert Gates has stated about U.S. security whole-of-government approach, can signifi- moving the armed forces back into the bar- assistance, effectiveness and credibility will cantly enhance the fight against transnational racks when the threat recedes is a bet many only be as good as the effectiveness, credibil- criminal organizations, particularly when civilians are shy to take. ity, and sustainability of our local partners. In coupled with other improvements such as Calls for reform, recent past history, this regard, building partner capacity, includ- judiciary reform and anticorruption efforts. and the unexpected virulence and reach of ing the sharing of research and education as

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Sailors show Dominican Republic Defense Forces proper way to maneuver rigid-hull inflatable boat during subject matter expert exchange

U.S. Navy (Rachael L. Leslie)

racies around the world. Led by a dedicated National Police and its replacement with a building partner capacity is team of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) new force modeled after that in El Salvador. key—particularly in terms of professionals, ICITAP played key roles in the Instead, ICITAP led an effort to purge a international coordination, creation of national police forces in El Salva- limited number of National Police officers dor and Panama, and carried out successful and subject the rest to limited training before cooperation, and collaboration reform operations in several other countries being restored to their posts. More than a as well. By the mid-1990s, however, control of decade later, the Guatemalan police remain well as experiences, is key—particularly in ICITAP was wrested away from the FBI. In its one of the biggest obstacles to effective pros- terms of international coordination, coopera- place, ICITAP became a second job largely for ecution of the war there against transnational tion, and collaboration. ad hoc teams of retirees mainly from different criminal organizations. Other U.S. Government departments U.S. municipal, county, and state police forces, The U.S. model does have much to offer. also have an important role to play. Several whose community-based policing experience The juridical effect of the U.S. Posse Comitatus dozen law enforcement agencies provide was touted as better than the FBI hierarchical Act in restricting the authority of the military tens of millions of dollars in training law enforcement model. to conduct operations in the domestic arena around the hemisphere. Police training, At the same time, political consid- or against U.S. citizens remains a matter of however, only goes so far, as those trained erations meant that several promising or domestic debate. However, it may be that do not always remain in their jobs—a key successful police development efforts begun time-honored practices—reflecting as much problem in many poorly paid law enforce- under FBI leadership, including that in the spirit as the letter of the law—are what ment institutions in Latin America. More El Salvador, were stripped of manpower sustain a successful civil-military relations than police training, police development— and resources in order to curry favor with model in the world’s oldest democracy. Where the creation of institutions and sustainable image-conscious senior officials in the the U.S. military has intervened in the domes- practices—is needed, and here is where Justice Department who wanted to be seen as tic arena, such as in urban riot control, their significant improvement is required. building security forces in an impoverished participation has been both geographically At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. postdictatorship Haiti that could not in fact and temporally limited, with soldiers’ involve- Justice Department’s International Criminal sustain their efforts. And following the end ment carefully calibrated and monitored by Investigative Training Assistance Program of the decades-long civil war in Guatemala, civilian political oversight. (ICITAP) was well positioned to carry out broad community support existed for the The Act and the principles it embod- police development in many emerging democ- abolition of the notoriously corrupt and brutal ies do remain deeply imbedded in the U.S.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 87 COMMENTARY | Beating Latin America’s Transnational Criminal Organizations national political discourse, and they continue bring civil society into partnership with the 13 Andean Information Network, “The Boliv- to serve as major fault line in the debate—in Carabineros and the political authorities in 50 ian Armed Forces’ Growing Mission,” June 1, Congress, in the courts, and by members municipalities. Brazil, Colombia, and Canada 2008, available at . others—over appropriate roles for both the outside the hemisphere examples—such as 14 Jorge Zaverucha, “La militarizacion de la military and security forces in a democracy. Norway, Denmark, Germany, Britain, Italy, and seguridad publica en Brazil,” Nueva Sociedad, At the same time, it should be pointed out Malaysia—raise new questions and offer new no. 213, enero-febrero, 2008; see also Gary Duffy, in this age of international terrorism that answers to our common deliberations. JFQ “Judge Censures Brazilian Troops,” BBC News, the Armed Forces are not prohibited from June 19, 2008; and “Lula ‘indignant’ over Army acting against a foreign enemy in the U.S. officers’ alleged ties to killings,” DPA, June 17, 2008. domestic territory, and the oath of every U.S. NOTES The news reports chronicled the fate of 11 army military officer is to uphold the Constitution officers involved in anti-gang enforcement in Rio 1 Mitchell A. Seligson et al., eds., “Trust in the and defend it from all enemies, foreign and de Janeiro who allegedly turned over three youths Police,” AmericasBarometer Insights, no. 59 (2011), 1. to a local drug gang who later killed them. The BBC domestic. (In addition, the overwhelming pre- 2 Aldo Civico, “Hillary Clinton and the Drug reported that in the wake of the killings, a judge dominance of local law enforcement agencies Cartel Violence in Mexico,” Huffington Post, March referred to the army’s “inability and lack of prepara- in the United States, which has the additional 14, 2009. tion” in guaranteeing order in the city, and stated advantage of helping keep police corruption 3 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “A Shared Respon- that “using the military for this kind of operation local rather than generalized nationwide, is sibility: Counternarcotics and Citizens’ Security violates the constitution [and likely intensifies] not the model generally in use in the belea- in the Americas,” testimony before the Senate debate over exactly what role, if any, the army can guered countries of Latin America.) Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on play in helping to deal with Rio’s complex security Other examples are also relevant. Rio the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Global problems.” de Janeiro’s current efforts to fight organized Narcotics Affairs, March 31, 2011; Julian Miglierini, 15 See Leoluca Orlando, Fighting the Mafia and crime in its vast slums appear in some ways to “Tamaulipas: ‘Failed state’ in Mexico’s war on Renewing Sicilian Culture (New York: Encounter drugs,” BBC, April 14, 2011. resemble the “weed-and-seed” program of the Books, 2001); Civico; Kallie Jones, “Former Sicilian 4 June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug-Related Vio- U.S. Department of Justice. The community- mayor speaks on Mafia,” Miami Student, February lence (Washington, DC: Congressional Research based strategy sponsored by Justice—“an 14, 2010. Service, May 27, 2009), 10–11. 16 See, for example, Mac Margolis, “Brazil’s innovative, comprehensive multiagency 5 The term Gordian knot in this regard was Top Cop,” Newsweek, April 24, 2011; and Tom Phil- approach to law enforcement, crime preven- coined by Latin America historian Richard Millett; lips, “Rio’s drive to remove drug gangs from slums tion, and community revitalization”—has see Felbab-Brown. brings calm to hospital A&E,” The Guardian, April 6 for more than two decades helped local law George Withers et al., Preach What You 1, 2011. enforcement take back crime-ridden areas Practice: The Separation of Military and Police 17 Seligson et al; Eric Stener Carlson, “The (albeit less violent that Rio’s slums) and sup- Roles in the Americas, Washington Office on Gendarmarie’s Response to Social Protest in Argen- plied them with viable social safety nets and Latin America, November 2010; Martin Pique, tina,” in Broken Promises? The Argentine Crisis the chance to build social capital. “Entrevista con el Integrante De La Corte Suprema and Argentine Democracy, ed. Edward C. Epstein De Justicia Eugenio Zaffaroni,” Tiempo Argentino, The examples of tribal courts and police and David Pion-Berlin (Lanham, MD: Lexington January 17, 2011. on many American Indian reservations brings Books, 2006), 198. 7 Gabriela Calotti, “México, una potencia to mind Leoluca Orlando’s dictum about the víctima de un ‘narcoligopolio,’” Agence France- importance of social self-concepts: “If you Press, April 12, 2011; “Narcos pagan a policias want to fight identity criminals you need to municipales mexicanos 100 millones de dolares promote your identity.” It suggests that similar al mes,” Agencia EFE, August 6, 2010; E. Eduardo efforts might help in troubled democracies Castillo, “Cartel mexicano Los Zetas recluta ex kai- such as those of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, biles por $5,000,” Associated Press, April 7, 2001. Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Mexico, where 8 Adam Williams, “Costa Rica foreign min- indigenous peoples both are an important ister sparks army debate,” Tico Times, January 13, percentage of the national population and 2011; “Costa Rica May Not Look at Nicaragua—or Itself—the Same Way Again,” InsideCostaRica, live in or near areas favored by transnational March 9, 2011. criminal organizations. 9 Tim Rogers, “Narco-Dividends: White Where the adoption of U.S. models are Lobster on the Mosquito Coast,” Time, April 14, not appropriate, or are not applicable to local 2011. conditions, models from other countries can be 10 “El narcotráfico, una amenaza para FF.AA,” shared. For example, Colombia’s “democratic El Comercio, January 13, 2011. security” program is the object of study by 11 Seligson, 2–3. many countries around the globe, as well as 12 Uribe speech on “Leadership and Demo- by its Latin American neighbors. In Chile, in cratic Security,” April 1, 2011, Center for Hemi- many respects a regional “model,” a recently spheric Defense Studies, National Defense Univer- launched neighborhood protection effort, sity, Washington, DC. Programa Barrio en Paz Residencial, seeks to

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Sparks fly during production of mine resistant ambush protected vehicle DOD (Cherie A. Thurlby)

America’s Endangered Arsenal of Democracy

By M. THOMAS DAVIS and NATHANIEL C. FICK

Colonel M. Thomas Davis, USA (Ret.), is Vice President for Strategic Planning at General Dynamics Corporation. Nathaniel C. Fick is Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security.

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anuary 2011 marked the 50th anniver- sary of two of the most memorable Presidential addresses in American J history. The more famous speech is John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address of January 20, 1961, with its crisp cadence and ringing request that Americans “ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.” The second speech is Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farewell Address delivered 3 days earlier. Like the man himself, Eisenhower’s tone was measured, efficient, and businesslike. It is most remembered for his caution that “in the councils of govern- ment, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of mis- placed power exists and will persist.” President Eisenhower likely never imag- ined that this one passage would be so long remembered. Yet because of its tenor, and the World War II poster for National fact that Eisenhower himself was a product of Association of Manufacturers the complex he warned about, the American promotes industry public has subsequently held a lingering sus- picion of the influence of the Nation’s defense sector, an exaggerated impression of its size, and an insufficient understanding of the vital role it plays in national security. Years earlier, President Franklin D. Roo- sevelt had referred to America’s ability to build “more ships, more guns, more planes—more of everything” as the free world’s “arsenal of democracy.” Now commonly referred to as the defense industrial base (DIB), this arsenal has helped the United States emerge victori- ous in many of its wars, including the Civil University of North Texas Digital Library War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Though it usually escapes mention, elsewhere in his farewell speech President provided military equipment that is often the official recently noted, “Having a vibrant, Eisenhower recognized the value of the DIB world standard, but also has stimulated the capable defense industrial base is not a God- when he stated, “A vital element in keeping development of many technologies that are given right.” The DIB is under stress as the the peace is our military establishment. Our now a major component of modern Ameri- American manufacturing base erodes, the arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, can life, including high-performance jet vital engineering skills it requires become so that no potential aggressor may be tempted aircraft, satellite communications, the Global scarce, and tightening budgets reduce cash to risk his own destruction.” Positioning System (GPS), high-speed com- flows. Systemic flaws in U.S. military procure- Today, the DIB continues to be a vital puters, and even the Internet. Additionally, ment processes, as well as past missteps by strategic asset and an important source of American aerospace and defense create the the DIB itself, have also contributed to the advantage for the United States. As Barry largest foreign trade surplus of any manu- overall endangerment of America’s arsenal of Watts, the former Director of the Pentagon’s facturing sector, and constitute the second- democracy during an age when rapid field- Office of Program Analysis and Evalua- largest export sector behind only agriculture. ing of high-tech military equipment against tion (PA&E), has written, if a nation had to Over the years, the DIB has indisput- nimble adversaries will increasingly deter- choose a defense industrial base to serve its ably given the United States a major strategic mine whether the United States wins or loses national interests, “the American military- advantage, particularly since the massive wars. A primary national security challenge industrial complex would surely be the one mobilization required for World War II. The of the coming decade will be sustaining the most people and nations would choose.” It question today is whether that will continue arsenal of democracy so it is both viable and is, after all, the complex that not only has in the years ahead. As a senior government responsive to the needs of the Nation.

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was a spirited debate over the ships’ design automobile manufacturer builds a car and the DIB is under stress as the before and during their construction. They hopes it can sell it; a naval ship builder sells American manufacturing base suffered from significant cost and schedule a ship and hopes it can build it. Second, a erodes, as the vital engineering overruns, and they were the subject of consid- commercial manufacturer generally aspires to skills it requires become scarce, erable congressional scrutiny. Over their long sell a million things with a hundred parts; a history of active service, more than once they defense manufacturer generally aspires to sell and as tightening budgets were allowed to fall into disrepair only to be a hundred things with a million parts.” reduce cash reconstituted, and were the focus of several An understandable tension exists unsuccessful efforts to develop cheaper alter- between today’s major defense suppliers and Origins of Power natives. In other words, the ships weathered their governmental military customers. While Throughout its history, the United many of the trials that still face major weapons both are determined to ensure that the Armed States has enjoyed several significant strategic systems today. The sometimes torturous chal- Forces in the field have the most modern, advantages. Foremost are the oceans that lenges of procuring military equipment are high-quality, and reliable equipment possible, shielded both coasts once the Nation achieved deeply rooted in U.S. history. both also have their unique responsibilities: continental size, enabling the United States as suppliers to their shareholders, and as cus- to ignore the threat of major invasion that Understanding the DIB tomers to the taxpayers. Corporations are in was a constant concern of European nations. The modern defense industry is different business to earn a profit. The financial condi- Moreover, with its vast size spanning the from both its earlier incarnations and its com- tion of defense firms is of interest to defense North American continent, the United States mercial counterparts today. As the corporate customers, but it is not a primary interest. benefited from enormous natural resources, behavior of the American DIB has developed Thomas Rabaut, the former chief executive which were used by an industrious popula- in ways similar to that of other manufacturing officer (CEO) of United Defense, once com- tion that grew rapidly thanks to large-scale entities, it has assumed a shape quite different mented that he had to strike a balance among immigration. Geography, bountiful resources, from the one existing during the Eisenhower three competing communities: “A customer and a large and diverse population define administration. who thinks my prices are a bit too high. the natural elements of American strategic Today’s DIB exists primarily as publicly Highly skilled employees who feel their pay- advantage, and they laid the basis for other owned private companies. As Ashton Carter, checks are a bit too small. And shareholders traits—such as representative government, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, who feel their dividends are a bit too low.” an innovative economy, and a robust higher Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), recently This dilemma is, of course, faced by education system—that developed over time commented, “I have a title that suggests other- senior executives in businesses with a com- into enduring U.S. strategic assets. wise, but the truth is I don’t build anything.” mercial focus, but the additional challenge An equally important U.S. advantage This evolution away from a reliance on pro- for defense industries is with the customer. has been the Nation’s historical ability to duction facilities owned and operated by the Whereas commercial firms have millions of transform its resources and ingenuity into government to the modern corporate-based customers, the DIB in many cases has only usable military power. Indeed, the roots of industrial capability occurred mainly during one: the U.S. Government. In essence, this America’s DIB can be traced to the Nation’s the post–World War II and Cold War periods. is a monopsonistic market where one buyer earliest years. The decision by President It happened because the government wished chooses between many sellers. As in any George Washington in 1794 to build a Navy to take advantage of the technological innova- monopsony, the sole buyer has tremendous was a pivotal early step. Warships, then as tion and production efficiencies of the com- leverage in setting terms to its numerous now, were costly and represented much of petitive private sector. Moreover, in the later competing suppliers. The suppliers are largely what resided on the outer edge of the tech- decades of the 20th century, this shift found left with the difficult choice of meeting nological frontier. There was considerable significant support in a political ideology demanding conditions or exiting the market, debate in Congress over the need for a Navy favoring smaller government and a reliance on and over the past two decades many have to protect American commerce from threats the private sector. chosen the latter. such as piracy and the confrontational Although the DIB shares common traits tactics of major trading nations. And as with many other American manufacturing Cuts and Consolidation always, concerns over projected costs and enterprises, there are clear differences. During The period between 1992 and 1998 saw the national debt figured prominently in a discussion in 1992 with a Russian academic the cancellation or contraction of numer- lawmakers’ debates. charged by the Boris Yeltsin government ous large defense programs such as the B–2 The Navy’s first six frigates were among with finding ways to convert the old Soviet bomber and the Seawolf-class submarine. the best designed and constructed warships military-industrial complex to commercial After the Soviet Union collapsed, the defense of their day, offering an impressive combina- production, a former Pentagon official who procurement account was cut by over 40 tion of speed, maneuverability, and firepower. had spent considerable time working with percent as both national and defense priorities They were well and professionally crewed, and and in American industry offered a suc- shifted significantly in the new post–Cold in the War of 1812 performed stunningly well cinct summary of the distinction: “You have War security environment. This reprioritiza- against a British fleet that was over 100 times to understand,” he urged, “that a defense tion meant that there would not be sufficient larger. Despite this record, which has now industry is quite different from a commercial work to sustain the efforts of the nearly 30 become a part of our national heritage, there industry in very important ways. First, an large defense firms comprising the DIB, a

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 91 COMMENTARY | America’s Endangered Arsenal of Democracy point driven home by Defense Secretary sales, which account for about half of its defense industry produced fewer than 250—a William Perry in a 1993 meeting with defense corporate revenue. While the defense sector is 99.9 percent reduction. company executives, commonly known as still large, profitable, and influential, it is far One major reason for this change is “the last supper.” The result was an industry from the economic power it was in President clear: with the abandonment of conscrip- consolidation that lasted nearly a decade, with Eisenhower’s time. tion and the transition to the all-volunteer many firms selling out to others, merging, force in the early 1970s, smaller numbers of or simply exiting the defense business. Many Evolving Requirements volunteer Servicemembers had to be much facilities were closed and others sold, with the The modern DIB is not only much better and more elaborately equipped than end result being that these 30 firms consoli- smaller in size, but it also produces a much their predecessors. A Soldier on duty today dated into 5—the companies now comprising smaller and enormously more sophisticated in Afghanistan will likely go on patrol the foundation of the American DIB: Boeing, product line. Over 12 million Americans wearing nearly $20,000 worth of equipment: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, served in uniform during World War II, a sophisticated automatic rifle, an advanced Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. approximately 9 times the number on Active night vision device, lightweight but effective A major force in this effort was Norm duty today. The war rapidly mobilized a body armor, a ballistically protective Kevlar Augustine, the legendary CEO of Martin citizen military, which was mirrored by the helmet, and a cutting edge communications Marietta who became the Chairman and rapid and massive mobilization of the exist- suite allowing him to receive and transmit CEO of Lockheed Martin when Martin ing industrial base. Many commercial firms real-time information. By comparison, his Marietta and Lockheed merged. Although were pressed into the war effort, including World War II counterpart carried about this evolution changed the defense industrial aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing and $200 in basic gear. landscape and its competitive composition, Convair, and automobile companies such Today’s infantryman must cover a Augustine believes the overall results have as Chrysler and Ford Motor Company. much larger space on the battlefield. He been positive: “I’d rather have a few strong Large serial runs of items that could be must be more selective about the targets he companies than a whole bunch of weak produced simultaneously on only slightly engages in order to avoid costly civilian casu- companies,” he commented, adding that “as retooled commercial assembly lines, such as alties. He must have tremendous situational a buyer, I prefer five competitors, but I can Chrysler’s production of the M4 Sherman awareness, knowing exactly where he and his live with two. And if I’m a seller, I don’t want tank powered by a Ford V8 engine, were buddies are, coupled with an accurate idea of to compete against a weak company that’s the preferred production method. During where the enemy is. And he must be able to desperate for business. Weak companies do the course of the war, Chrysler produced share what he sees while accessing complex irrational things.” about 40,000 M4 tanks, of which about external combat assets such as aircraft, artil- The DIB of today is smaller not only 30,000 went to Europe where they faced— lery, and drones—each capable of delivering in numerical size but also in economic and overwhelmed—2,000 larger and more precision-guided munitions. Some of this scope relative to the U.S. economy overall. sophisticated German tanks. In the case capability can be derived from commercial The defense industry President Eisenhower of aircraft, just to provide one illustrative off-the-shelf items, but most cannot. What referenced in January 1961 was sprawling. example, the Ford assembly plant at Willow works well in a living room or at a camp- During his tenure in office, defense spending Run, Michigan, produced 8,635 B–24 Libera- ground may lack the ruggedness to operate ranged between 9 percent and 13 percent of tor bombers, turning out 1 aircraft every 55 reliably when lives hang in the balance in gross domestic product (today it is about 4 minutes at its peak. rough terrain and extreme weather. percent). Nearly 60 percent of the Nation’s Such serial runs no longer exist. Today’s During nearly a decade of war, Ameri- industrial research and development (R&D) defense industry looks less like Ford and more can Armed Forces have put uncommonly was invested in the defense sector (today it is like Ferrari. Major items of equipment are heavy demands on their equipment. As one less than 10 percent). The defense industry highly sophisticated, extraordinarily complex senior officer commented regarding the was then the largest industrial sector of the to manufacture, and have little in common Army wheeled vehicle fleet, “Nearly every U.S. economy, larger than automobiles, steel, with commercial products other than the truck we have is grossed out and worn out,” or oil. Today, in contrast, the annual revenue incorporation wherever feasible of selected meaning these vehicles are carrying consider- of the major oil companies is nearly four commercial components, mainly electronics. ably more weight because of the addition of times that of the major defense firms. Even In the 3 years between 1942 and 1945, Ameri- various types of armor, and have been driven in their current state, the top-tier automobile can industry produced over 200,000 military many miles beyond their expected usage companies generate more than twice the aircraft to support the Services in World War rates. The peacetime Army of the 1990s, for revenue of their aerospace and defense coun- II. Between 2001 and 2004, the first 3 years instance, attempted to fund its tank fleet to terparts. Only the American steel industry, of the current period of conflict, the modern drive 800 miles per year, believing that that a faint shadow of its previous size, is smaller than the aerospace and defense sector. To draw an even more dramatic comparison, the annual combined revenue of the five largest major items of equipment are highly sophisticated, American defense firms is only slightly extraordinarily complex to manufacture, and have little in greater than half that of Wal-Mart, even common with commercial products when counting Boeing’s commercial aircraft

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USNS Washington Chambers is launched into San Diego Bay during ceremony at General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company

U.S. Navy (Sarah Burford) operating level was sufficient to exercise unleashed by the Internet and globalization requiring similar experience exist in other the equipment and keep the crews trained have combined to make it easier for potential parts of the commercial sector, the specific to readiness standards. Some of the Army’s American adversaries to acquire deadly, high- skills of the defense industry can be quite major combat vehicles in Iraq have been tech capabilities at low cost, the U.S. military different. For instance, a welder working on a driven as much as 100 miles per day, or about is constantly scrambling to keep up with the building superstructure does not use the same 36,000 miles per year. Imagine the implica- innovations of our adversaries, both actual techniques or adhere to the same standards as tions of driving a fully loaded automobile and potential. a welder assembling the hull of a submarine such distances over difficult, largely unim- that will house a nuclear reactor, carry several proved roads. The debate is already raging Persistent Challenges 455-kiloton nuclear warheads, and operate in over how much of the equipment deployed to The steady erosion of the American a wide range of inhospitable conditions. Iraq and Afghanistan needs to be returned manufacturing base is painfully obvious in There is also a decreasing pool of sci- to American repair depots and, of the equip- many parts of the country. In 1950, 1 in 3 jobs entists and engineers possessing the primary ment returned, how much should be retrofit- in the U.S. economy involved manufactur- skills that underpin the industry. Of science ted to the most modern configurations and ing. Now that number is 1 in 10, with the and engineering doctoral degrees awarded by how much should just be replaced. However national security industrial sector accounting U.S. universities in 2007, over 40 percent went this is eventually resolved, it will be an enor- for only 15 percent of total manufacturing to noncitizens who were either permanent mous and costly effort. jobs. In other words, only about 1 out of residents or temporary visa holders. This Given these requirements for success every 70 workers in the United States is now proportion is expected to grow: the number of in modern conflicts, it is not surprising that involved in aerospace and defense. The jobs science and engineering doctorates awarded to even as the numbers of men and women in they perform are high-skilled and technically noncitizens increased by 43 percent between the Armed Forces have fallen, the costs of challenging, yet like those in the American 2003 and 2007. The legendary firms of Silicon equipping them on a per capita basis have manufacturing base itself, these defense jobs Valley that have led the Nation into the infor- increased significantly. Whereas once only a are starting to evaporate despite the consoli- mation age can take full advantage of this pool relatively small number of American military dation of the industry. Since the first quarter of talented people. But since most sensitive units were truly high-tech, now nearly all of 2009, over 40,000 jobs in the defense defense jobs require security clearances, they are. Moreover, as the information revolution industry have been lost. Although positions cannot be filled by non–U.S. citizens.

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World War II–era P−38F Lightning and modern F−35 Lightning II displayed at Lockheed Martin facility

U.S. Navy (D. Keith Simmons)

As American manufacturing and itself today with a defense acquisition system I don’t see the level of scrutiny and the level engineering jobs have moved overseas, and offering industrial-age performance. The of culture necessary for the precision work as the general interest in science, technology, Government Accountability Office (GAO) that’s required,” explained Lieutenant General engineering, and mathematics (STEM) educa- found that the suite of 96 major defense acqui- Patrick J. O’Reilly. David Altwegg, the agen- tion has decayed, a vicious cycle emerges that sition programs was a combined $296 billion cy’s executive director, added that government raises serious questions about whether the over budget in 2008. In contrast, the suite of officials “continue to be disappointed in the skills necessary to maintain a vibrant defense 75 programs was only $43 billion over budget quality that we are receiving from our prime manufacturing base are likely to exist in the in 2000. Total overruns increased by 588 contractors and their subcontractors.” Given future workforce. The British discovered this percent in 8 years. In 2008, the average delay the prominent role played by the Obama problem a few years ago when they began in delivering initial capabilities for major administration’s revamped “Phased Adaptive designing the Astute-class submarine to weapons systems was 22 months, a holdup Approach” missile defense scheme in thwart- replace the existing Swiftsure- and Trafalgar- that adds to development timelines, which ing the budding Iranian missile threat, these class boats, the first of which are nearly 40 can take decades. Too often, these cost and ongoing quality control problems constitute years old. Having neither designed nor built a time overruns are due to government’s lack a clear and present danger to U.S. national submarine for nearly two decades, and strug- of clarity about what it wants coupled with an security. gling to master modern computer-assisted endless series of costly and time-consuming Performance and behavioral shortcom- design techniques, the British discovered change orders. In short, too often government ings can have lingering effects. In the recent that many of the engineering and design is not an ideal customer. These cost overruns past, a 22-year-old arms dealer secured a con- skills essential to submarine production were and schedule slippages threaten to consume tract with the Army and then provided unreli- simply not available in Britain. The premier budgetary resources that are already expected able and obsolete ammunition to Afghan U.S. submarine design yard, Electric Boat to be in shorter supply as the United States forces. Earlier, and more seriously, a corrupt of Groton, Connecticut, was brought in to redeploys its combat forces from Afghanistan government acquisition official steered assist, and worked for over 3 years with British and Iraq. numerous high-value contracts to a major engineering teams in stabilizing and refining But at times, the DIB has struggled with supplier and then sought jobs there for herself the design. Should the United States face such its own demons. Ensuring quality control in and her family. Procurement scandals such as a circumstance because of lost capability, the complex products and services has always these are infrequent, but they cast a pall over only other country able to offer similar assis- been a challenge, and it continues to vex the entire DIB. Such corruption looks espe- tance would be China—an unlikely partner- military customers and suppliers today. For cially bad to the public when combined with ship. This is why the 2010 National Security example, missile defense components pro- reports of defense industry lobbying expendi- Strategy called for a renewed commitment to vided recently to the U.S. Government have tures. While the DIB today may not be the one science and technology to help advance U.S. come under intense scrutiny by Pentagon offi- President Eisenhower warned about in terms national security priorities. cials. The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency of size or activity, it does sometimes exhibit Enduring flaws in U.S. Government pro- decided to penalize contractors for delivering the problems of quality control and corporate curement processes also pose enormous chal- parts that did not meet quality control stan- behavior he cautioned against. lenges. The United States is trying to protect dards. “I am withholding funding because

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Review (QDR) was encouraging. First, it consequences diminish American military the U.S. military’s slow initial devoted two pages to discussing the need for effectiveness and thereby invite disregard response to the tactical a healthy industrial base—in itself a posi- for and aggression toward the United States challenge posed by improvised tive development because previous QDRs and its core interests. Strengthening the rela- explosive devices almost did not even mention the subject. Second, tionship between the U.S. Government and it concluded that the Pentagon must “build the DIB, as well as enabling the continued doomed America’s entire the agile, adaptive, and innovative structures vitality of the DIB itself, is no longer just strategic war effort in Iraq capable of quickly identifying emerging gaps about saving taxpayer dollars or increasing and adjusting program and budgetary priori- industry revenues. It has become a national Future Security Requirements ties to rapidly field capabilities that will miti- security imperative. Technological advancement and global- gate those gaps.” In pursuing these objectives, The U.S. Government has taken steps ization are making it easier for state and non- the cooperation of the Defense Department in recent years to improve acquisition state actors to acquire deadly capabilities that with a healthy, competitive, and dynamic DIB practices within the Pentagon. Noteworthy threaten Americans at home and abroad. For is absolutely essential. reforms include passage of the Weapons example, cyberattackers today can launch syn- There is much work to be done. The Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 chronized, dispersed, and untraceable assaults U.S. Navy is smaller today than at any time and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’s against U.S. military and civilian networks since 1916, when the United States was just ongoing campaign to reduce spending with little more than a laptop and an Internet discovering its global role and embracing on underperforming and lower priority connection. The U.S. Government faces an its emerging strategic importance. Though weapons systems, along with his focus on inherent disadvantage in defending against the U.S. fleet remains dominant, the Nation certain administrative costs. These valuable such attacks because cumbersome bureaucra- retains vital interests around the globe, and improvements, however, are only a start. The cies struggle to observe, orient, decide, and no matter how able our frontline combat- Defense Department needs to take additional act as quickly as smaller, more decentralized ants are, they can only be in one place at a steps including adding greater discipline to adversaries. America’s vulnerability to nimble, time. In addition, the challenges of nuclear its requirements process, more fully evaluat- adaptable enemies exists not only at the high- proliferation only increase the demand for ing systems from a full life-cycle ownership tech end of the conflict spectrum, but also in sea-based missile defense for U.S. forces perspective rather than a 1-year budget so-called low-end operations such as irregular and those of our allies. Despite these con- viewpoint, and rebuilding a solid partner- warfare and counterterrorism. cerns, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan ship relationship with industry. On this last For instance, the U.S. military’s slow released this past spring includes fewer point, Secretary Gates and Under Secretary initial response to the tactical challenge ships than the one before. After its release, Carter have initiated a significant outreach posed by improvised explosive devices almost Northrop Grumman, the largest supplier of to senior industry leaders, but another senior doomed America’s entire strategic war effort naval ships to the Pentagon, announced the officer recently confessed he was nervous in Iraq. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq closure of one of its major shipyards, the about meeting with industry representatives have often demonstrated that the Pentagon’s Avondale facility in New Orleans. Without because he was concerned about “violating acquisition processes complicate efforts to serious rethinking of the current ship- some law somehow.” This reticence must be provide rapidly needed battlefield capabilities building plan, along with more program overcome if the mutual objective of provid- if doing so runs counter to bureaucratic busi- stability so shipbuilding programs do not ing the best possible technologies to our ness as usual. The Pentagon was eventually continue to suffer from cost and schedule deployed forces is to be met. successful in quickly fielding a large number overruns, further “rationalization” of the President Eisenhower was right to warn of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) shipbuilding industrial base may be neces- against unwarranted influence by the DIB. trucks for our forces in Iraq, but that effort sary at the very time more and newer ships However, the DIB also continues to repre- was greatly facilitated by the unambiguous are required to meet the threats of emerg- sent a vital strategic asset that provides the support of the Secretary of Defense, a large ing nuclear states, regional instability, United States with an enormous advantage and rapidly approved congressional appro- humanitarian relief, or—as we have seen over those who would seek to do us harm. priation, and existing vehicle designs deemed recently—piracy. Sustaining the health of America’s arsenal suitable for the requirement. The MRAP of democracy today—while continuing to example shows what industry can do when Restoring America’s Endangered monitor relentlessly for waste and under- conditions are right and some of the normal Arsenal of Democracy performance—will maximize U.S. national acquisition steps, such as extensive and elabo- The U.S. military, Pentagon civil security in dealing with a complex world rate testing, are either waived or abbreviated. servants, and the DIB are all part of a during tough economic times. The modern Preparing for the immediate future, unique partnership that brings the power American industrial base retains its capac- however, requires rapid adaptation. Policy- and resources of the United States to bear ity for innovation, creativity, efficiency, and makers must develop processes that rapidly when it is called for. If mishandled, defense responsiveness in getting needed capabili- identify emerging threats, consistently gener- acquisition processes can waste taxpayer ties into the hands of our Servicemembers. ate high-quality solutions, and expeditiously dollars, delay the procurement of equipment Preserving these qualities, and the strategic reorient toward agreed-upon priorities. In that U.S. troops need, and undermine public advantage they provide, is a matter of endur- this regard, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense trust in the Government. These broader ing national importance. JFQ

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 95 Logistics Planning and Collaboration in Complex Relief Operations By STEVEN J. ROMANO

n the past several years, the Depart- While DOD has the airlift capacity, disas- to DOD’s support to the Indonesian tsunami ment of Defense (DOD) has increas- ter funding, critical supplies, and logistics in 2004, the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, ingly participated in complex relief systems to be an effective interagency partner or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the Georgia I operations with other U.S. Government in responding to these crises, additional humanitarian assistance crisis (named agencies and nongovernmental organizations efforts are needed to provide military logisti- Operation Assured Delivery, or OAD) in response to humanitarian crises. These cians with the appropriate capabilities, tools, nonetheless provides a microcosm of HA/ operations pose significant challenges for and training to meet the varied challenges DR logistics operations and challenges. military logisticians. Most humanitarian associated with complex HA/DR operations. Furthermore, it offers a useful framework for assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) opera- This article focuses on the U.S. Euro- conducting analysis and developing recom- tions are characterized by rapidly changing pean Command’s (USEUCOM’s) efforts mendations for improving DOD’s future circumstances and a lack of clear and accurate to support disaster relief operations with response capabilities. The article shares my information; they are also distinguished by logistics in the country of Georgia during observations, insights, and lessons learned substantial pressure to quickly provide relief August and September 2008. While admit- while supporting Georgia relief operations supplies and materiel to an affected area. tedly a relatively small operation compared as Director of Logistics for USEUCOM

U.S. and Georgian forces unload humanitarian aid at Tbilisi International Airport for victims of Georgia-Russia conflict U.S. Air Force (Scott Wagers) U.S. Air Force

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High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) about the humanitarian situation deteriorat- a more effective and reported that some 127,000 people were ing further as Russian troops remained in coordinated approach to crisis forced from their homes throughout Georgia Georgia, impacting relief efforts. logistics planning and HA/DR by the conflict, adding to an already displaced Following media reports that Russian operations is required population of some 223,000 uprooted by armed forces had damaged infrastructure at conflicts in the early 1990s in South Ossetia the port of Poti, staff from the World Food and Abkhazia. Program (WFP) conducted a site visit on In response to the crisis, USEUCOM August 15 and reported that commercial during OAD operations. While the team of supported USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign activity had resumed at the port despite some USEUCOM and its component forces—U.S. Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to assist these damage to military facilities there. WFP also Army Europe, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, displaced people. Housed within USAID, the noted that trucks weighing up to 5 to 7 tons U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Marine OFDA is designated as the lead U.S. Govern- could safely use the southern route between Corps Forces Europe, the Defense Security ment (USG) office for providing coordinated Tbilisi and the ports at Poti and Batumi.4 Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense humanitarian assistance in response to inter- Also on August 15 (7 days after the Logistics Agency (DLA), the U.S. Agency national emergencies and disasters. In cooper- start of the crisis), the USAID/OFDA Disas- for International Development (USAID), ation with other USG offices and international ter Assistance Response Team (DART) several nongovernmental organizations humanitarian experts, OFDA continuously arrived in Tbilisi to conduct humanitarian (NGOs), and U.S. Transportation Command monitors global hazards, identifies potential needs assessments in coordination with (USTRANSCOM)—were collectively able to areas of need, and stands ready to respond the GoG and other relief agencies. Their deliver significant relief supplies within 96 whenever and wherever disaster strikes.1 efforts would help define USAID assistance hours of the crisis, a more effective and coor- To respond to the crisis, USAID com- priorities. While the arrival of the DART dinated approach to crisis logistics planning mitted an initial $250,000 in emergency was certainly helpful, it would have been and HA/DR operations is still required. assistance funds on August 9. This funding more beneficial had it deployed earlier As DOD continues to embrace was used to provide emergency relief supplies, in the crisis to augment DOD planning complex and often large-scale HA/DR with a capacity to assist up to 10,000 people. efforts and assist in the development of a operations as a core mission during a period The U.S. Embassy, located in the Georgian disaster relief concept of logistics. USAID/ of declining resources, we cannot afford to capital city of Tbilisi, released pre-positioned OFDA continued to work closely with the conduct these types of missions in a repeti- disaster packages that included tents, blan- U.S. Department of State (DOS), DOD, tively ad hoc fashion. A more structured kets, bedding, hygiene items, clothing, beds, approach is needed that combines coordi- cots, and medical supplies. On August 10, the nated systems, procedures, and, perhaps U.S. Embassy issued a Disaster Declaration in Humanitarian supplies cover flight deck of most important, a common operating response to the crisis, and the government of USCGC Dallas bound for Georgia picture with a supporting framework for the Georgia (GoG) officially requested humani- whole-of-government crisis dialogue, plan- tarian assistance—specifically, medicines, ning, and information exchange. medical supplies, emergency shelter items, and food. The Georgian Minister of Refugee Crisis Timeline and Accommodations indicated approxi- On August 8, 2008, Russia deployed mately 3,000 internally displaced persons were combat troops in South Ossetia and launched expected in Tbilisi and the immediate area, bombing raids deep into Georgia in response and also cited a need for emergency shelter to a large-scale Georgian military attack items (tents, blankets, cots, bedding, hygiene against South Ossetia the previous day. The items, and clothing). conflict continued for the next several days On August 13, 2008, the first shipments and, by mid-August, BBC News was reporting of U.S. humanitarian aid arrived in Georgia, that Moscow claimed a death toll of 2,000. with officials stressing the American govern- According to USAID reports, an estimated ment’s commitment to its ally.2 As the number 30,000 people were displaced within South of displaced personnel in Tbilisi increased, Ossetia, and more than 135,000 were dis- the UNHCR and the GoG began coordinating placed in other parts of Georgia. An addi- plans for international assistance. With each tional 35,000 South Ossetians were reported passing day, more people arrived in Tbilisi to have had fled across the Russian border after fleeing their homes. Later that month, into North Ossetia. The United Nations the GoG’s coordinator for humanitarian affairs, Koba Subeliani, told BBC News that Rear Admiral Steven J. Romano, USN (Ret.), served more than 230,000 people were believed to as Director of Logistics at U.S. European Command have been displaced.3 On August 14, there supporting the 2008 Georgia relief crisis. He now were growing concerns in Tbilisi about works for LMI in McLean, Virginia. the extent of the crisis, as well as concerns USCG (Lauren Jorgensen) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 97

ROMANO

reliance on DOD-only assets could have resulted in the shipment of some inappropriate supplies as well as excess quantities U.S. Air Force (Ricky A. Bloom) U.S. Air Force goal was to leverage all the capabilities of its components to either source or deliver mate- riel. Following requests from the GoG for tents, blankets, and additional commodities, USEUCOM planned to dispatch two C–130 flights per day from August 15 through 21, with each flight carrying emergency relief supplies. Again, without prior knowledge of interagency capabilities, USEUCOM planners USEUCOM Joint Humanitarian Assistance Assessment Team members arrive in Tbilisi to tried to find sources for tents, blankets, and work with U.S. and international governments and nongovernmental aid organizations additional supplies within DOD inventories. This reliance on DOD-only assets could have resulted in the shipment of some inap- mation-sharing and the use of shared tools HA/DR exercises or HA/DR planning-related propriate supplies as well as excess quantities. are essential to logistics planners’ ability events per year. USSOUTHCOM has also Fortunately, USAID had deployed a liaison to organize, source, and deliver relief sup- supported the construction or improvement officer to USEUCOM by mid-August. This plies. At the beginning of the Georgia crisis, of several Emergency Operations Centers individual was able to advise USEUCOM USEUCOM EDDOC planners hosted daily (EOCs) and Disaster Relief Warehouses planners of the availability of blankets and collaboration sessions to synchronize and (DRWs) and has provided and stocked pre- hygiene kits at the USAID warehouse in share information with the USTRANSCOM, positioned relief supplies across the region. Pisa, Italy. Once these assets were known, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Construction and refurbishment of additional USEUCOM planners requested theater- Command, various USEUCOM components, EOCs and DRWs are ongoing. This type assigned U.S. Navy aircraft to pick up and and DLA. As a result, USEUCOM was able of multinational disaster preparedness has deliver thousands of blankets and hygiene to quickly locate thousands of in-theater cots increased the ability of USSOUTHCOM to kits. A U.S. Navy C–9 jet carrying humani- from Marine Corps stocks and ship them to work with partner nations in HA/DR opera- tarian assistance arrived in Tbilisi on August the point of need. However, since the partici- tions.9 Furthermore, this was played out in 18, marking the Navy’s first humanitarian pants were all DOD entities, the bulk of this Operation Unified Response in Haiti, where assistance mission to the region. collaboration took place in a classified forum, coalition, interagency, and NGO coordination As the need for food continued to grow thereby excluding several key interagency and collaboration were at an all-time high in during the crisis, USEUCOM’s next major representatives who could have helped in the terms of quantity—truly a “unified” response. planning challenge was to develop a sourc- development of logistics solutions. These types of events would be benefi- ing and distribution plan for hundreds of Need for More Humanitarian cial for all COCOM logistics planners. Prac- thousands of humanitarian daily rations Assistance Exercises. Given the inherent ticing HA/DR planning, coordination, and (HDRs). These rations needed to be moved complexity of HA/DR operations, and the collaboration pre-crisis, in a series of exercises from Albany, Georgia (in the United States), intense effectiveness requirement for detailed designed to include coalition forces, the inter- to Tbilisi. These HDRs were required for coordination across the interagency and agency, and NGOs, would be invaluable and the purpose of providing additional emer- NGOs, DOD logistics planners should have would significantly improve COCOM’s ability gency food until larger NGO efforts could opportunities to establish and develop these to plan and execute future HA/DR operations. be established. EDDOC engagement with skills in an exercise environment. While USTRANSCOM resulted in the scheduling of USEUCOM had not sponsored any HA/DR Solutions dozens of C–17 flights, together with the two exercises in advance of the Georgia crisis, the The above problems are reflective of daily C–130 flights, to deliver HDRs to Tbilisi, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) those I experienced at USEUCOM during the thereby creating a sustained flow of logistics. had. In order to improve the collective ability Georgia crisis. We have lived through other The importance of USEUCOM’s EDDOC of the United States and its partner nations to HA/DR crises since then and there are others as an ad hoc HA/DR logistics enabler—and respond effectively and expeditiously to disas- that could be enumerated. Likewise, some the need to replicate this capability in all ters, USSOUTHCOM, beginning as early as problem areas I have cited have seen improve- regions—should be obvious by now. 2002, sponsored disaster preparedness exer- ment. For example, there is very encouraging Need for Unclassified Information- cises, seminars, and conferences on the issue. progress in the area of developing web-based, sharing and Collaboration Tools. Infor- The command is currently averaging three unclassified collaboration tools that are ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 101 FEATURES | Logistics in Complex Relief Operations inclusive enough to bring the interagency and When asked about the lasting impact “untapped” experience in HA/DR missions— NGOs under the logistics planning and coor- of the Georgia relief operations during a are preferred. The Department of Defense, dination umbrella. USEUCOM logistics lessons learned session, together with other USG agencies, should Another positive development was a I responded that the keys to our success in the consider a number of possible actions. November 22, 2010, American Free Press future are to: Logisticians must gain full visibility of article in which Secretary of Defense Robert interagency relief supplies and a complete Gates expresses support for a proposal ■■ develop pre-crisis integrated logistics understanding of the processes to source and to establish crisis cells specifically to aid planning with the interagency transport supplies during a crisis. By their Latin America in disasters. The proposal ■■ gain visibility of all relief supplies nature, HA/DR operations offer very com- was discussed at the ninth Conference of within the affected theater pressed timelines for identifying appropriate Defense Ministers of the Americas in Santa ■■ define desired HA/DR processes and supplies and seeking solutions to move them. Cruz, Bolivia. Secretary Gates told repre- outcomes Military logisticians need to gain visibility of sentatives from some 30 countries that the ■■ develop an interagency framework for all NGO HA/DR activities and inventories in proposal followed “honest assessments of collaboration in advance of HA/DR situations order to assist with managing and deconflict- what worked and what didn’t in Haiti” in ■■ practice and refine HA/DR response ing the flow of logistics into the affected area. the aftermath of that country’s catastrophic frequently through exercises and other pre- This should include a framework for control- earthquake that killed 250,000 people. crisis events and forums. ling and sequencing relief flights to ensure the The proposal involves creating a series of affected country’s priorities are being met and Military Assistance Collaboration Cells, or There are many HA/DR logistics actions logistics bottlenecks do not impede the flow of MACCs, which would share information that DOD needs to perform better in the relief supplies. It should also include processes and technology with all HA/DR partners. future. Doing all, or even some, of these things to identify HA/DR materiel that transits via More of this is what is needed and will surely will lead to improved HA/DR responses. the Defense Transportation System, regard- benefit future HA/DR planning, coordina- Solutions extensive enough to include not less of source. DOD has extensively used AIT tion, and response efforts. only DOD and the interagency but also key media to capture shipment and content data NGOs—many of which have extensive yet for in-transit visibility. However, during OAD, several HA/DR shipments arrived in Tibilsi without proper radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, which hampered the expeditious distribution of supplies to IDPs. COCOM Sailors aboard USS McFaul guide staffs should update and implement RFID crane cable to transfer pallets of policies, test them during humanitarian relief humanitarian aid to barge exercises, and ensure they are rigidly applied during actual HA/DR operations. All COCOMs need an integrated logistics planning construct with the interagency in advance of HA/DR crises. To promote inte- grated logistics planning, we should identify gaps in processes and knowledge within DOD and interagency partners and build a strategy to address these shortcomings. The initial delivery of relief supplies to Tiblisi took approximately 96 hours and could have been delivered more effectively if DOD and the interagency had developed an integrated logistics planning capability and documented and tested a concept of logistics support plan in advance of the crisis. Connecting with rel- evant NGOs and having an understanding of key local participants and authorities is criti- cal to complex HA/DR operations. Success depends on early engagement and planning and is enabled by open communications networks with maximum sharing of infor- mation in unclassified forums to the extent possible. We should develop an interagency U.S. Navy (Eddie Harrison) framework supporting continuous dialogue between logistics departments in advance

102 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ROMANO

their HA/DR planning skills. At a minimum, was able to provide $17.5 million of the $39 solutions extensive enough to tabletop exercises specifically focused on million in relief activities imparted by the U.S. include not only DOD and the the logistics aspects of HA/DR operations Government during OAD. Between August 13 interagency but also key NGOs should be scheduled on a frequent basis and and September 4, USEUCOM conducted 59 are preferred attended by representatives of both DOD and humanitarian missions, delivering a total of the interagency. Logistics planners should 356,380 humanitarian daily rations, 154,368 also consider developing regularly scheduled meals-ready-to-eat, 10,432 cots, 19,184 sleep- of a crisis as well as ongoing education and seminars, workshops, roundtables, and panel ing bags, 26,422 hygiene kits provided by training to provide the ability for planners to discussions designed to engage all HA/DR USAID/OFDA, 9,254 blankets, 6,040 sheets, better understand processes associated with partner organizations. In addition, mecha- 3,431 mattresses, 653 boxes of medical sup- HA/DR operations and interagency and NGO nisms to capture the lessons learned in these plies, and other relief commodities from collaboration. Joint and interagency doctrine evolutions should be created that will influ- DOS and DOD warehouses in Germany and should be updated for these types of complex ence the development of interagency doctrine. USAID stockpiles in Italy.10 All told, DOD operations to better identify processes, roles, USEUCOM recently planned and conducted delivered over 2 million pounds of relief sup- responsibilities, and structured organizational Flexible Response ’10, a command post plies and materiel during the 23-day period of interactions. exercise focusing on Foreign Consequence crisis relief operations. DOD needs a standing coordination cell, Management and Humanitarian Assistance We are a nation that recognizes human established to provide continuous planning Disaster Relief planning and operations. This suffering and will take action to help. As and coordination with the interagency and exercise was designed to strengthen a whole- noted in an article on the 2005 Pakistan relief NGOs. DOD should consider development of-government approach through engagement operation, “Humanitarian assistance and of a deployable Foreign Humanitarian Assis- with various U.S. agencies as well as partner disaster relief remain a powerful strategic way tance Coordination Center and/or MACC nations and nongovernmental organizations. to achieve political ends. In an ideological capability to synchronize and coordinate The exercise helped USEUCOM identify gaps struggle, HA/DR campaigns project the best logistics requirements and capabilities in in its logistics capabilities and allowed it to of American values abroad.”11 Accordingly, it advance of a crisis. The MACC could serve as become more familiar with the crisis response is vitally important to get the logistics aspects the principal Department of Defense HA/DR capabilities of component organizations. of the operation right in order to deliver planning cell for logistics, provide an entry Military leaders at the COCOM level a timely and effective U.S. Government point for USAID-generated requests for DOD need a strengthened understanding of the response, since failing to do so could cause support, facilitate the sourcing of DOD and interagency and their HA/DR crisis response strain in international relations as well as other USG-owned relief supplies, interface roles and responsibilities. What does each tension within the interagency. JFQ with NGOs to determine their assets and element of the interagency bring to this distribution processes, and begin to develop a type of crisis? What is the best approach for NOTES badly needed common operating picture. harnessing and mobilizing their capabilities? 1 Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance DOD should continue to develop and Who is in charge and why (i.e., who is the (OFDA), Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009. deploy collaborative tools to facilitate HA/DR lead Federal agency and what are its spe- 2 Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humani- information sharing and coordination. These cific roles and responsibilities)? Many U.S. tarian Assistance (DCHA), OFDA, Georgia— tools must reside in or migrate to an unclas- Government agencies have the capacity for Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1, August 14, 2008. sified forum as much as possible to allow HA/DR support. Efforts should be taken to 3 Helen Fawkes, “Despair Among Georgia’s participation by other government agencies develop a catalog or matrix of their respective Displaced,” available at . during HA/DR exercises and operations and develop more comprehensive and inclusive 4 DCHA, OFDA, Georgia—Complex Emergency ensure our interagency and NGO partners HA/DR solutions. Fact Sheet #3, August 16, 2008. 5 have access to and training in such systems. DOD needs a capability to assess the Ibid. 6 In order to develop a complete set of response overall effectiveness of relief supplies provided. Cynthia Bauer, U.S. Transportation Command Public Affairs, “U.S. Defense Transportation, options, DOD logistics planners likewise Did they get to the affected population or were Distribution Expertise Aids Georgian Refugees,” should have access to and be trained in the use they stored in country for a future crisis? Were September 2, 2008. of systems and processes used by other U.S. the quantity, type, and quality of materiel 7 DCHA, Fact Sheet #1. Government agencies and NGOs to manage appropriate to the need? Were there gaps? Was 8 Ibid. relief supply inventories and to better under- there expensive and wasteful duplication of 9 U.S. Southern Command official Web site, stand their logistics capabilities, activities, some capabilities? Did relief supplies result in accessed September 28, 2010, at . planners should have a broad familiarity with stated effects during the crisis? USAID should 10 DCHA, OFDA, Georgia—Complex Emergency NGO and other relevant organizations (i.e., refine and share its existing measurement Fact Sheet #19, September 30, 2008. 11 commercial and academic partners) operating tools and processes to assist DOD in assessing William J. Bowers, “Pakistan Earthquake Relief in their area. the overall effectiveness of HA/DR efforts. Operations: Leveraging Humanitarian Missions for Strategic Success,” PRISM 2, no. 1 (December 2010), All Combatant Commands should have Despite many challenges and faced by 132. a robust series of logistics exercises to refine complex problems as described above, DOD ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 103 Junior Leader PME in the PLA

Implications for the Future

PLA troops await arrival of Defense Secretary Gates in Beijing

U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison)

By MARK K. SNAKENBERG rmies develop leaders for certain purposes, to operate under a common doctrinal approach.1 Thus, an outside observer can learn much about an army by analyzing its professional military educa- A tion (PME) and the desired characteristics of the people it pro- duces. Careful analysis of the education and training of an army’s junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is particularly insightful. The substance of these leaders’ instruction indicates the likely development of a foreign army’s tactical conduct for the next 5 to 10 years and reveals much about its expectations for warfare at the tactical level during that period. It is therefore a useful tool in conducting predictive analysis of how that army will fight in the near term. However, there is a secondary benefit to studying junior officer PME that is of equal significance. Because it takes 15 to 20 years for junior officers to become senior leaders, military establishments must anticipate two decades in advance what characteristics will be required of its senior leaders and inculcate them into junior leader PME so those personnel are fully prepared to operate under the expected conditions. Thus, study of current junior officer PME may provide a glimpse into a nation’s long-term goals and vision of its geopolitical situation.

104 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SNAKENBERG

This article explores the junior leader PME of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) study of current junior officer PME may provide a glimpse into of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in nation’s long-term goals and vision of its geopolitical situation an effort to achieve this insight. Far from a comprehensive examination, this work is intended to provide predictive analysis of transformations represent significant shifts NCO PME: A Nascent Professionalism Chinese expectations and conduct of tactical from the historical PLA doctrine and force Judged against historical norms, non- operations during the next 5 to 10 years and structure that relied on mass armies of rela- commissioned officer professional military strategic expectations during the next 15 to 20 tively uneducated peasants operating under education is significantly advancing within years, based on an evaluation of the ongoing the concept of “People’s War.” the army from a relatively low starting point; development of company-grade officers and Central to the Two Transforma- however, analysis reveals that the PLA’s NCOs in the army component. Although tions and Chinese leaders’ vision of future current system is unlikely to produce the a number of factors, such as domestic and warfare is the concept of informatization, desired outcome of NCOs capable of operat- foreign political considerations, the economy, which is the linchpin of PLA reform and ing under informatized conditions without and social developments, will ultimately the major evaluation criterion for all opera- further serious reform. This section explores determine China’s course, this approach tions. Justin Liang and Sarah Snyder, in recent army policy regarding education, con- is useful in establishing what China wants their definition of informatization, say that, trasts it with current practice, and identifies militarily under ideal conditions, and what “more than just a convenient organizing the system’s strengths and weaknesses while problems Beijing expects its military leaders evaluating their impact on China’s goal of to be able to resolve in the year 2025. conducting informatized tactical operations. Historically, the PLA invested very little Junior Leader PME and PLA Reform PME into its NCOs. Early in the PLA’s history, Historically, the development of all PME the limited instruction received tended to within the Chinese army has been nonlinear. focus on literacy, basic tactics, and political That is especially true of junior officers and instruction.8 After independence, instruction NCOs.2 Tied to internal political requirements was expanded to include technical training on as much as global military developments,3 assigned weapons systems under the Soviet junior leader development evolved erratically PME model.9 The army expended little effort since the founding of the PLA in 1927 and has in educating NCOs beyond minimum func- varied in intensity from virtually no educa- tional requirements, and did not intend for tion during the Cultural Revolution to today’s them to perform any meaningful leadership stated goal of higher education for all officers role. Officially, this trend is changing. As one and NCOs. The current Chinese system must PLA observer notes: therefore be viewed not as the product of 80 years of uninterrupted development (as in Requiring education and training for NCOs Western armies), but as a manifestation of the is something the PLA is focused on in both the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) current principle, [it] is a sophisticated idea about officer and NCO corps. In the case of NCOs, military goals. aligning capabilities and requirements in this is to address the need for better educated Building upon the limited reforms and the face of perpetual change [engendered and more skilled personnel to compensate for U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) dramatic downsizing of the PLA initiated by modern warfare].”6 To meet the intent its shortcomings on the conscription side of the under Deng Xiaoping, in 1995 President Jiang of the Two Transformations, the army is force and take some of the burden off of offi- Zemin announced the Two Transformations significantly reshaping its officer develop- cers, as well as to create a more effective NCO that underpin the current Chinese strategy ment to produce a well-educated New Type corps in a more modernized military.10 of Active Defense.4 Initially based on observa- Officer capable of conducting informatized tions of U.S. military conduct during the 1991 warfare through mastery of high technol- To meet this challenge, the army Persian Gulf War against Iraq—and rein- ogy.7 Various indications suggest that this increased education standards in 2005, forced by lessons from the 1995–1996 Taiwan PME reform is taking hold in senior and stipulating that “individuals selected as Strait Crisis, the 1999 Kosovo campaign, field-grade officer institutions—tradition- NCOs must have a specified level of educa- and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi ally the most important figures in China’s tion and must go to military academies for Freedom—these transformations directed the centralized military. However, to truly training.”11 It established a goal of raising all military to prepare for wars under modern, achieve the Two Transformations and chal- junior NCOs’ education levels to high school high-tech conditions, and to form an army lenge modern informatized militaries, the equivalency, and all senior NCOs to the level based on quality, not quantity.5 Both of these PLA must expand these concepts to junior of 3-year college (the Chinese equivalent of officer and NCO PME. The following two technical school) graduates by 2008.12 That Major Mark K. Snakenberg, USA, is assigned to the sections examine whether the Chinese year, the PLA added the requirement to U.S. Army Pacific Executive Engagements Services believe this is necessary, and what progress possess a relevant certificate of professional Directorate, Fort Shafter, Hawaii. they have made to achieve reform if desired. qualification for all types and levels of NCO.13

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Department Cadre, General Staff Department produce a senior NCO who is increasingly for an army with no tradition (GSD) Service Arms and Training, and GSD effective due to his extensive education, in the of a professional, educated Military Affairs—are responsible for various short term current practices undercut efforts NCO corps, the PLA’s goals are aspects of the overall program; however, the to professionalize the NCO corps by limiting revolutionary practice of selecting NCO candidates at the young personnel’s experience prior to arrival regimental/brigade level from volunteers who at their first units. Embedding candidates in extend their service at the conclusion of their colleges/academies with units should help For an army with no tradition of a profes- 2-year term of conscription, and then sending alleviate this problem, but it cannot fix it. sional, educated NCO corps, the PLA’s goals them to 1 of 35 NCO PME institutions, dozens Such a program cannot substitute for pro- are revolutionary; and in many cases, the of civilian universities, or military training longed daily line experience. This issue must PLA’s demands exceed the required education centers across the various military regions, be resolved for the PLA to achieve the Two levels of NCOs in established informatized severely complicates the PLA’s ability to Transformations. armies. Most impressively, evidence is emerg- adhere to a common developmental program. Of equal significance is the lack of ing that many NCOs are earning more than Further, graduates of these various institu- emphasis on leadership development. In this one professional certificate.14 Whether this tions receive differing educational experi- regard, the army is still a prisoner of its tradi- is a function of wholesale reform or early ences: academy graduates receive college core tion of creating technicians. Nearly all the indication of institutions “teaching the test” to courses and technical training in 2- to 3-year advances in education policy focus on increas- increase the population holding professional programs; civilian graduates earn a profes- ing NCO general and technical education— degrees remains to be seen. sional certificate or technical degree. Some leadership development is conspicuously While the educational goals are clear, NCOs do not attend any of these colleges and absent from the discussion. In fact, aside from the system for achieving them is cumbersome instead study 2- to 3-year technical courses courses preparing NCOs to become squad and almost precludes uniform development of online or receive training at their units. Some leaders, the vast majority of PME focuses on quality across the force. Unlike most modern candidates are embedded with operational technology—on mastering equipment—rather armies, which possess a unified strategy and units to observe and learn the duties of an than leading people. This is as true of induc- process for developing NCOs from selection NCO; others are not. Following general/tech- tion training as it is of later sustainment to retirement, the PLA’s method is complex nical education, candidates receive specialty PME.19 This is not to argue that leadership and difficult for outsiders to understand technical training consisting of 1- to 3-month development is not occurring within the based on the fact that “no single Chinese courses either at a military training center or context of NCO PME; however, the fact that source [outlines] the totality of the training online before officially becoming an NCO. this aspect of professional preparation is not system for conscripts and NCOs.”15 Basically, Responsibility for sustainment training over prominent in studies of the system suggests it PME consists of general/technical training, an NCO’s 30-year career16 is split between is of secondary importance. The informatized specialty training, and sustainment training. corps level for major training and regiment/ battlefield requires NCOs capable of leading The lack of a clear plan for NCO development brigade level for on-the-job training; it is independent operations over an increasingly stems from the fact that perhaps hundreds of unclear at what intervals/milestones this dispersed and complex terrain. Technical army and civilian activities are responsible for occurs. Taken as a whole, this system offers training and rudimentary cognitive skills no institutional development. Theoretically, three significant risk of producing leaders who longer suffice even in the most centralized national departments—General Political lack a common doctrinal approach to their armies. NCOs must be educated, trained, and profession.17 empowered to exercise initiative on the battle- Among the many criticisms of this field without an officer’s direct supervision. system within the PRC is the argument that Despite its efforts to empower NCOs through current PME produces graduates who are reductions in officer strength and assignment “unable to function in their jobs after gradu- of NCOs to duties traditionally performed by ation from professional military schools”18 junior officers,20 the PLA’s continued failure due to lack of line experience. Unlike other to cultivate leadership and initiative through modern armies that select seasoned soldiers PME puts the army’s attempts to conduct to serve as NCOs, the PLA identifies an informatized warfare at significant risk. essentially minimally trained soldier as a Clearly, China is embracing the impor- candidate, sends him to school for up to 3 tance of education within its NCO corps.21 years, and returns him to a unit where he is This represents a major break from PLA expected to supervise similarly inexperienced tradition and is a key element of achieving the conscripts. Because young Chinese NCOs— Two Transformations. However, despite sig- though long on educational and technical nificant advances from its low starting point knowledge—lack real army experience, junior in the late 20th century, the current system officers (with a similar lack of line experi- contains many flaws that must be reformed in ence) are forced to heavily supervise conscript order to produce a truly modern army. In this PLA soldiers train to disassemble and soldiers—duties best left to NCOs. Although regard, NCO PME must be considered a work reassemble assault rifle the current system should, in the long term, in progress. As analyst Thomas J. Bickford Xinhua News Service

106 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SNAKENBERG notes, “an effective educational and training system that is capable of turning out the kind China’s officer development i of officers and NCOs the PLA wants . . . is radically changing to produce 22 something that takes years to build.” The the desired New Type Office National Archives PRC must address these deficiencies before capable of mastering high it can succeed in its objective of conducting informatized war at the tactical level. technology

Developing the New Type Officer Sixty-seven PLA academies provide high Unlike NCO development, junior school graduates and active duty soldiers an officer PME is much discussed within the undergraduate education en route to becom- context of PLA reform and therefore more ing officers, and furnish existing officers with easily understood by outsiders. Both systems a graduate education.28 Increasingly, however, “Tianhe” supercomputer is one example of resources share key similarities including a focus on the army is turning to civilian institutions to China has invested in information technology general/technical education and decen- provide both advanced degrees and especially tralized accession training. Unlike NCO pre-accession education, observing a model mander. A later course prepares officers PME, however, post-accession education is that approximates the American Reserve for company command. These courses structured and predictable. The PLA’s junior Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program.29 reportedly promote “active learning [by] officer development is therefore commensu- As of January 2009, 117 colleges and uni- encouraging debate, creativity, innovation, rate with other modern militaries and does versities30 provided nearly half31 of the PLA’s and spontaneity.”35 If that is true, they are not require the wholesale reform that NCO new officers through the National Defense a far cry from traditional Chinese military education does. In evaluating this system, Student program. Chinese leaders reportedly instruction, which stressed rote solutions and policy will again be contrasted with practice. prefer civilian-educated officers because of unquestioning obedience. The validity of this Strengths and weaknesses will be identified, the questionable quality of PLA educational claim is difficult to determine and certainly and their impacts on conducting informa- institutions32 and implicitly believe that does not extend to political matters, but the tized operations will be evaluated. “graduates of civilian universities are better fact that such methods are being paid lip China’s officer development is radically geared to leading a modern military.”33 service suggests the PLA takes the require- changing to produce the desired New Type Following general/technical education, ments of informatized warfare seriously. The Officer capable of mastering high technology. which includes opportunities for civilian practice of pre-assignment training prevails Historically, junior officer PME, like NCO cadets to embed with operational units along over the rest of the officer’s career and indi- PME, developed in a nonlinear manner based the NCO model,34 cadets report to a PLA cates a well-thought-out system. What is not on the CCP’s prevailing goals, and focused on military school to receive pre-assignment known is the quality of instruction at these technical specialization primarily with leader training. This includes instruction in basic institutions. Additionally, many Chinese training afforded only to officers selected as military subjects and is designed to prepare junior officers pursue graduate degrees platoon or company commanders.23 All edu- the officer for duties as a platoon com- from a variety of sources including PLA cation was through military institutions. This is no longer the case. Starting in 1987, techni- PLA Navy sailors participate in honor guard cal and command training were increas- ingly combined to produce a more-rounded officer.24 Following the U.S triumph over Iraq in 1991, the PLA recognized “the importance both of modern hi-tech conditions and of having officers educated in the new technolo- gies necessary to fight under such conditions. This led to a further deepening of educational reforms and an even greater emphasis on officer education, reflecting a major rethink of the PLA’s basic strategy.”25 Since 1999, civil- ian schools have been increasingly integral to officer development.26 A “process of con- tinuous officer education, requiring officers to periodically upgrade their education and military knowledge”27 is in effect, and promo- tions are becoming more tied to education and professional skills. As with its NCOs, China’s junior officers come from a variety of sources. U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 107 FEATURES | Junior Leader PME in the PLA institutions, civilian universities, and even the A shortfall in tactical conduct is likely their ability to extend informatization into the National Defense University. to emerge, however, while implementing operational and strategic realms later in their Taken as a whole, officer development— these concepts. Successful execution of careers as senior leaders. Today’s junior officer though again not administered by a single informatized warfare results from regular is setting the stage for future success. unifying activity—seems to demonstrate real field experimentation and detailed analysis Over the next decade, China’s adversar- potential for producing personnel capable of lessons learned over years by multiple ies should exploit weakness at the tactical level of conducting informatized operations. The units under various conditions. Armies, by striking PLA formations quickly, using factors potentially precluding this include the even if intellectually ready to adopt modern various means simultaneously and in diver- suspect quality of PLA pre-accession training, techniques, cannot execute them overnight. gent locations. The resulting tactical problem uncertainty as to the extent junior officers Having adopted a doctrine of modern tacti- is likely to overwhelm a command and control are allowed to exercise operational initia- cal conduct, the PLA will endure a period of system that, although enjoying the trappings tive, and the burgeoning Chinese economy, frustration at not being able to execute the of modern computers and communications which threatens to entice these well-educated doctrine in actual field conditions—training technology, is still reliant on centralized direc- individuals away from army service into or otherwise. This period is likely to last at tions from officers. In potential antinarcotics, corporate life. Compared to its starting point least half a decade. A window of vulnerability peacekeeping, antiterrorism, and counter- and NCO PME, however, the junior officer at the tactical level thus emerges between the insurgency operations, this is a tremendous system shows great promise in developing the time current techniques are abandoned and liability; and during this period, only China’s desired New Type Officer. This has tremen- desired techniques are mastered. Compound- most elite units are likely to be equal to the dous implications for future PLA operational ing the natural difficulty of this transition task of informatized warfare. conduct in both the near and far term. is the inability of the NCO corps to shed its technician legacy and become a truly profes- Probable Long-term Implications Probable Near-term Implications sional institution. This is a daunting chal- By 2025, China will be well on the way Based on an examination of NCO lenge because it is difficult to create a culture to achieving its stated goal of “accomplishing and junior officer PME, the next 5 to 10 of initiative among personnel who have mechanization and making major progress in years promise to be an era of transition for never been entrusted with significant leader- informatization.”36 By that time, today’s junior the PLA at the tactical level of war. Forma- ship responsibility. Second, because it runs officers will have between 15 and 25 years of tions are increasingly capable of mastering counter to existing practice, the army will army service with at least half that time expos- the sophisticated weapons systems being struggle to effectively implement necessary ing them to informatized warfare. The tactical acquired by the PRC due to increased techni- PME reforms in the near term even though shortcomings noted above should be mostly cal training among NCOs, and officers in it recognizes the desirability of professional- resolved within the next 15 years. Addition- turn are increasingly capable of employing izing the corps. This puts the entire conduct ally, by that time the focus on technical educa- these systems effectively. Initially, doctrine of informatized tactical operations at risk tion and credentialing should provide the PRC will remain defensive but will transition to until the deficiency is resolved, and may delay with one of the world’s premier cyber-warfare, a more offensive approach as the PLA gains the adoption of modern tactics beyond the electromagnetic warfare, and information confidence. Sophisticated techniques relying anticipated window. warfare capabilities—areas China views as on combined arms and joint tactics are likely Junior officers will be subject to the providing it with an asymmetric advantage to emerge later in the decade based on tactical same frustrations as the NCO corps, but their over potential adversaries. Assuming constant leaders’ intellectual readiness to absorb such participation in informatized warfare experi- (but not necessarily spectacular) economic advanced methods. ments over the next 10 years bodes well for growth and political stability, the PLA should be a force capable of physically conducting informatized operational-level maneuver regionally—inadequacy of strategic lift and sustainment capabilities notwithstanding— supported by strategic enablers including the asymmetric advantages mentioned above.

Xinhua News Service Because Taiwan remains the PLA’s primary mission, and an invasion requires integration with the navy, air force, and Second Artil- lery Force, emphasis on joint training and education will continue to escalate. Courses at the National Defense University and recent exercises with Russia are means of educating PLA officers in established joint procedures and might represent an attempt to extrapolate PLA soldiers train on firing range best practices from a military historically recognized for operational excellence. Because of their advanced civilian/military educa-

108 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SNAKENBERG

focus on technical education should provide the PRC with one PLA land, naval, and air forces conduct joint exercise to improve combat capabilities of the world’s premier cyber-warfare, electromagnetic warfare, and information warfare capabilities Xinhua News Service tion and development under informatized roles, and a centralized training and educa- conditions, the PLA’s officers will be ideally tion command capable of synchronizing PME suited to participate in and/or command an for the modular force. Emphasis on technical invasion of Taiwan if called upon by the CCP. skills will be reduced in favor of developing Examining an invasion scenario from the strategic competencies including an under- ground forces’ point of view, the PLA should standing of the impact of nonmilitary dynam- be capable by 2025 of defeating Taiwanese ics on military affairs. The generation of offi- forces and successfully challenging modern cers produced by the PLA in 2025 is likely to armies (including the U.S. military) either compare favorably with the officers produced there or elsewhere in East Asia. The emerg- by other armies in their ability to conceive and 5 Kristen Gunness and Fred Vellucci, “Reforming ing system of junior leader PME is designed execute informatized operations. the Officer Corps: Keeping the College Grads In, to ensure this occurs. Like forecasting the weather, predictive the Peasants Out, and the Incompetent Down,” in China’s anticipated geopolitical situa- analysis is fraught with the danger of being Kamphausen et al., 192. tion also lends itself to potential small-scale wrong; however, it is important to provide at 6 Liang and Snyder, 3. operations outside the region including least a sense of what the future holds. Various 7 Gunness and Vellucci, 192–193. 8 peacekeeping, actions to preserve economic factors outside of PME will impact China’s Bickford, 25. 9 interests, and actions to secure ethnic Chinese tactical operations over the next decade and Ibid., 27. 10 Gunness and Vellucci, 200–201. in foreign countries. By 2025, political leaders its geopolitical situation in 2025, but this work 11 Ibid., 201. will cease viewing PLA capability as a liability provides a basis for further research and intel- 12 Ibid., 211. and increasingly see the army as providing lectual debate. With China as an emerging 13 Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Conscript and Noncom- options when conducting diplomacy or react- power and potential rival in East Asia, the missioned Officer Individual Training,” in Kam- ing to crises. The temptation to use such a United States and its Army in particular must phausen et al., 112. force thus increases, although it is impossible expend the effort to understand the PLA, its 14 Ibid. to determine just how attractive such a course people, and its doctrine. A good first step 15 Ibid., 125. will be. Army leaders must be comfortable would be addressing the existing knowledge 16 Gunness and Vellucci, 200. conducting modern, independent operations gaps regarding junior leader PME. In doing 17 For detailed treatment of the varieties of PLA supported by other services—an eventuality so, U.S. leaders may be able to anticipate NCO education, refer to Blasko. 18 for which junior officer PME seems to be pre- China’s future course and even learn lessons Ibid., 115. 19 Gunness and Vellucci, 211. paring the leaders of 2025. applicable to the U.S. Army, which China 20 Ibid., 193. Projecting current trends 15 years into views as its most likely competitor. JFQ 21 Blasko, 126. the future, the army’s structure is likely to 22 Bickford, 20. NOTES be dramatically changed. Barring a major 23 Ibid., 27. deterioration in CCP/PLA relations or politi- 24 Ibid., 33. 1 Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis cal stability, the PLA will be unified under a 25 Ibid., 34. Tanner, “Introduction,” in The “People” in the single controlling headquarters to facilitate 26 Ibid., 36. PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in 27 Ibid., 35. control and joint interoperability rather than China’s Military (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 28 John F. Corbett, Jr., Edward C. O’Dowd, and broken down into four general headquarters/ Studies Institute, 2008), 19, available at . Utilization,” in Kamphausen et al., 144. end-strengths based on increasing defense 2 Thomas J. Bickford, “Trends in Education and 29 Corbett et al., 147. expenditures, particularly in personnel Training, 1924–2007: From Whampoa to Nanjing 30 Information Office, 17. Polytechnic,” in Kamphausen et al., 20. and equipment modernization. The army 31 Liang and Snyder, 2. 3 Justin B. Liang and Sarah K. Snyder, “The is likely to adopt a modular approach to 32 Corbett et al., 156–157. ‘People’ in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and force structuring in line with other modern 33 Kamphausen et al., 8. Education in China’s 80-Year-Old Military,” 2, militaries. Units will increasingly train to 34 Corbett et al., 156. available at . 36 Information Office, 7. generate further reforms in PME including 4 Information Office of the State Council of the consolidation of military schools, reduction or People’s Republic of China (Information Office), elimination of the PLA’s role in providing pre- China’s National Defense in 2008 (Beijing: Informa- accession, general/technical education and tion Office, 2009), 7–8, available at . ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 109 Matrix OF Nonlinearity Minimum Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Nuclear Arms Reductions White House (Chuck Kennedy)

President Obama and Russian President Medvedev sign New START in Prague, April 2010

By STEPHEN J. CIMBALA he strategic nuclear arms reductions of the Cold War era may have been procedurally painstaking, but they took place in a relatively uncomplicated technology and policy world compared to now. The New Strategic Arms T Reduction Treaty (START), which entered into force in February 2010, is a possible bridge between the sitzkrieg era of nuclear superpower arms control and the more demanding requirements of the early 21st century. The context for post–New START is highly embedded in national security policy complexity, including:

■■ the possible, but uncertain, continuation of the “reset” in U.S.-Russian political relations ■■ U.S. interest in maintaining Russian political support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) diplomatic and military actions in Afghanistan, and Russian- American convergent interests on the issue of preventing terrorism

110 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA

■■ Russia’s declared intention to modern- that could induce helpful expectations about ize its conventional and nuclear armed forces, minimum deterrence might be deterrence stability and security cooperation, including drastic reforms in conventional force acceptable to military planners given favorable political winds. From the same structure and operations designed to leave who want to maintain a viable perspective, the “adequacy” of a minimum or behind the mass mobilization and conscript- U.S. nuclear deterrent at an larger deterrent cannot be defined by numbers based military of the past in favor of a smaller, of weapons alone, but by the political and more professional, and more deployable force acceptable cost military-strategic context within which they ■■ Russia’s 2010 military doctrine that might be used—for deterrence or otherwise. leaves the United States and NATO among the for any transition to a post–New START Defining minimum deterrence for placeholders for threat assessment, but without regime of minimum deterrence by the United a plurality of worlds poses a potentially attributing to either a proximate menace, while States and Russia compared to the currently open-ended research agenda. The present acknowledging that the threat of global or shrink-wrapped version of assured destruc- international system, or possible iterations of major coalition war is less immediate than that tion or assured retaliation. Second, it analyzes it during the first quarter of the 21st century, of local wars and unconventional conflicts. whether a minimum deterrence regime at offers a sufficient number of uncertainties either of two levels could provide for U.S. and unknowns to challenge theorists and Even within the narrower spectrum of and Russian nuclear security and deterrence planners. What might minimum nuclear arms control per se, as between Russia and its stability. Third, it discusses how defenses deterrence mean in the present and near term, arms control interlocutors, there is no obvious might complicate the picture of offensive force or uncontestable next step after New START. reductions as described. On one hand, prominent experts, including former Russian and American foreign policy Everything Old Is New Again officials, have urged a speedup in implement- The idea of minimum deterrence has ing the New START reductions, perhaps by caught fire among civilian and military as much as 4 years ahead of the agreed treaty policy analysts and other close students of schedule.1 In addition, the Obama adminis- nuclear arms control. Minimum deterrence tration has already directed the Department might seem an acceptable alternative to the of Defense (DOD) to consider the feasibility more utopian construct of nuclear abolition, of additional reductions below New START endorsed in principle by President Barack levels.2 On the other hand, some American Obama and a number of leading former (Angelina Drake) U.S. Air Force politicians might be leery about revisiting the policymakers and military commanders. spirited New START ratification debates in a Minimum deterrence might also be acceptable post–New START framework any time soon. to military planners who want to maintain a U.S. and NATO plans to deploy missile viable U.S. nuclear deterrent at an acceptable defenses in Europe increase the uncertainties cost. In addition, experts on nuclear nonpro- related to post–New START reductions in liferation might favor minimum deterrence as long-range offensive nuclear weapons and a way station toward multilateral nuclear arms launchers. The Obama administration plan reductions and further measures of coop- for future ballistic missile defense (BMD) erative threat reduction, as among nuclear deployments in Europe, although less provoc- weapons states as well as nuclear-threshold or ative to the Kremlin than the earlier proposal nuclear aspiring powers.5 by George W. Bush, roiled the debate over However, discussion of minimum deter- New START and promises to figure into any rence can bring participants into the land of post–New START negotiations.3 On the other mystery and confusion, unless the discussion hand, NATO and Russia in March 2011 began is disciplined by political and military- high-level talks on possible cooperation in strategic clarity. A nuclear deterrent force can developing and operating a European regional be described as “minimum” or “maximum” missile defense system.4 Can a possible path depending on the security dilemmas facing to minimum deterrence, based on post–New various states, including their expectations START reductions in offensive nuclear about probable opponents’ security objectives, weapons, coexist peacefully with joint or sin- military capabilities, and decisionmaking gular missile defense deployments in Europe styles. Pakistan, Great Britain, and Israel are by NATO and Russia? This article considers all regarded as nuclear weapons states, but some of the political and military backdrop their perceived security dilemmas, expecta- tions about deterrence requirements, and Ground-based interceptor is launched from Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor decisionmaking patterns vary markedly. Vandenberg Air Force Base during test of of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State Minimum deterrence is not one remedy that ground-based interceptor system University–Brandywine. fits all states, but a conceptual framework ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 111 FEATURES | Matrix of Nonlinearity given the inexorable weight of precedent on During the high Cold War, this might U.S. Navy policymakers and on their available options? have led to a spectrum of possible nuclear How viable might any minimum deterrence deterrent strategies as summarized below. regime be, even if agreed to by the leading The table cannot capture all the nuances nuclear weapons states or all of them? or possible variations within and among these three kinds of strategies. In addition, Definitions and Measurements states’ declaratory strategies are not always The meaning of minimum deterrence consistent with their operational policies.6 is not necessarily obvious without having But the table illustrates some of the qualita- addressed the question, “Compared to what?” tive and quantitative points of similarity Nuclear strategists would probably agree that and difference among these kinds of generic minimum deterrence lies somewhere between nuclear strategies. assured destruction, as emphasized during For present purposes, minimum Cold War discussions about nuclear strategy, deterrence in today’s world implies that U.S. and nuclear abolition. Exactly where is more and Russian arsenals would be limited to a debatable. At least four kinds of variables are maximum of 1,000 operationally deployed in play in classifying nuclear strategies: strategic nuclear weapons, or fewer if pos- sible. “Fewer if possible” means that for ■■ political and military objectives for Washington and Moscow to go below 1,000 which forces are tasked deployed weapons on transoceanic or inter- ■■ specifics of nuclear targeting plans, continental launchers, other acknowledged related to retaliatory objectives but not nuclear weapons states would have to commit Missile launched from Japanese Maritime Self- necessarily reflecting the actual intent of to proportional reductions and/or limitations. Defense Force destroyer successfully intercepted policymakers Substrategic nuclear weapons, including ballistic missile target fired from Hawaii ■■ numbers of weapons and launchers tactical or operational weapons deployed deployed and their assumed rates of surviv- on land or at sea or air delivered, have both ability against first or later strikes political and military-operational contexts minimum deterrence in ■■ command and control systems and requiring separate discussion. There is cer- today’s world implies that U.S. operational protocols of the state’s nuclear tainly the possibility that, in any multilateral, and Russian arsenals would forces including their dependency on constrained nuclear proliferation regime, high states of alert or prompt launch for some weapons of medium or intermediate be limited to a maximum of survivability. range might have to be included as “strategic” 1,000 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons

Attributes of Generic Nuclear Deterrence Strategies Counterforce-warfightin Assured destruction Minimum deterrence Objectives and targeting Victory or “prevailing” in a protracted conflict Inflicting retali tory strikes sufficient to impose Imposing unacceptable damage to the by imposing escalation dominance on the “unacceptable” damage on any attacker, attacker’s society and civilian population opponent at any phase including its remaining forces; command, and/or national infrastructure, although control, and communications (C3); industry; and with forces less than those required for population assured destruction Numbers of weapons Numbers of survivable weapons capable Numbers of survivable weapons capable of Numbers of survivable weapons launchers required of attacking or holding at risk military, C3, attacking military, C3, industry, and population sufficient to destr y major infrastructure industry, and population targets, if necessary targets and inflicting “unacceptable” damage. and the sinews of a modern national through phases of a protracted war. May also Allows for flexible targeting but does not envision economy, while not necessarily require antimissile defenses for protecting fighting a protracted nu lear war to a successful emphasizing the destruction of urban- population and/or forces. Requires numbers conclusion. Requires numbers of deployed industrial areas, but also not necessarily of deployed warheads in the thousands, well warheads in the thousands, fewer than required guaranteeing “city avoidance.” Requires above the threshold for assured destruction. for counterforce-warfighting str tegies. numbers of deployed warheads in the hundreds. Command-control and Political and military C3 must be not only Political and military C3 must be survivable for Political and military C3 must be alert-launch protocols survivable against initial attacks but enduring second-strike retaliation and for postattack survivable for second-strike retaliation. through various phases of a protracted negotiation for war termination. No forces on high No forces on high alert in peacetime. conflict Some proportion of the force will be alert required in peacetime but not precluded on hair trigger alert even in peacetime. either.

Sources: Author. See also Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 74–106; Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strat- egy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. 58–97; Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” in Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 57–83; Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. chapters 3 and 4; and Desmond Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?” in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 215–244.

112 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CIMBALA based on their potential effects against likely Figure 1. U.S.-Russia Total Strategic Weapons (1,000 deployment limit) regional adversaries. The figures that follow permit us to examine the deterrence stability of two 7 minimum deterrence regimes. In the first AIR case, U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces are limited to a maximum of 1,000 operation- SLBM ally deployed weapons for each state. In the second case, a lower limit of 500 operationally UNITED STATES RUSSIA ICBM deployed weapons is imposed on each. For AIR these larger and smaller minimum deterrent Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No SLBMs ICBMs forces, we calculate their expected numbers Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers Only of second strike surviving and retaliating Balanced No No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMsSLBM warheads under four operational options Triad ICBMs Bombers Only Triad Bombers SLBMs Only n ICBM 300 0 300 0 342 342 917 977 of alertness and launch protocols: gener- UNITED STATES RUSSIA ICBM n SLBM 048 864 648 960 576 640 0 0 ated alert and launch on warning; generated nBalanced AIR No48 ICBMs 48No SLBMs0 0 Balanced 76 No No0 SLBMs 76ICBMs 0 alert, riding out the attack, and retaliating; Key: TriadICBM: Intercontinental ballisticBombers missile;Only SLBM: Submarine-launchedTriad ballisticBombers missile; AIR: Aircraft Only AIR day-to-day alert and launch on warning; and DAY, ROA day-to day-alert and riding out the attack. Figure 2. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads (1,000 deployment limit)SLBM One might anticipate that, in general, the DAY, LOW numbers of surviving and retaliating war- ICBM heads would diminish as we proceed from the UNITED STATES RUSSIA GEN, ROA first to fourth option, but that progression is DAY, ROA Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No SLBMs ICBMs not necessarily automatic, depending on the Triad UNITED BombersSTATES Only Triad BombersRUSSIA Only GEN, LOW specific circumstances of attack and response. DAY, LOW Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMs In addition, for purposes of comparison, Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers SLBMs Only each state’s 1,000 or 500 maximum deployed GEN, ROA forces are deployed with four alternative force structures: for the United States, these include UNITED STATES RUSSIA GEN, LOW a balanced triad of intercontinental ballistic DAY, ROA missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched bal- Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMs Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers SLBMs Only listic missiles (SLBMs), and bomber delivered DAY, LOW Balanced No No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMsAIR weapons; a dyad of SLBMs and bombers Triad ICBMs Bombers Only Triad Bombers SLBMs Only without land-based missiles; a dyad of ICBMs n GEN, LOW 830 735 795 778 830 826 881 879GEN, ROA and SLBMs without bombers; and a force n GEN, ROA 587 735 552 778 575 549 138 88SLBM made up entirely of SLBMs. For Russia, the n DAY, LOWUNITED622 STATES469 622 521 401RUSSIA411 825 879GEN, LOW alternative force structures include a triad of n DAY, ROAUNITED379 STATES469 379 521 77RUSSIA83 83 88ICBM land- and sea-based missiles and bombers; a KeyBalanced: GEN: GeneratedNo ICBMs alert; LOW:No Launch onSLBMs warning; ROA: RidingBalanced out the attack;No DAY: Day-to-dayNo alert; ICBMs ICBM:Triad Intercontinental ballisticBombers missile; SLBM:Only Submarine-launchedTriad ballistic missileBombers SLBMs Only AIR dyad of land- and sea-based missiles; a dyad of Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No SLBMs ICBMs Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers Only land-based missiles and bombers; and a force Figure 3. U.S.-Russia Total Strategic Weapons (500 deployment limit) SLBM composed entirely of ICBMs. (Although triads might seem to have been decided upon by UNITED STATES RUSSIA ICBM both states as their preferred configurations, Russia’s current and prospective force mod- Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No SLBMs ICBMs Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers Only ernization problems, as well as U.S. current AIR and foreseeable deficits, make the consider- ation of alternative force structures more than SLBM DAY, ROA a heuristic exercise.) The results of this analysis appear in ICBM UNITED STATES RUSSIA DAY, LOW figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the strategic nuclear retaliatory forces of Russia and the Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No SLBMs ICBMs Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers Only GEN, ROA United States under a maximum limit of 1,000 deployed weapons for each state. Figure 2 Balanced No No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMsDAY, ROA UNITEDTriad STATESICBMs Bombers Only TriadRUSSIABombers SLBMs OnlyGEN, LOW summarizes the numbers of second strike sur- n ICBM 115 0 115 0 257 244 424 499 DAY, LOW viving and retaliating warheads for the United n SLBMBalanced No336 ICBMs 432No 384SLBMs 480 Balanced 192No 256No ICBMs0 0 States and Russia, under each of the opera- n AIRTriad 48 Bombers48 0Only 0 Triad Bombers51 SLBMs0 76Only 0 tional conditions listed above, for the case of Key: ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: Submarine-launched ballistic missile; AIR: Aircraft GEN, ROA

UNITED STATES RUSSIA GEN, LOW ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ DAY,113 ROA Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMs Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers SLBMs Only DAY, LOW

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FEATURES | Matrix of Nonlinearity

Figure 4. U.S.-Russia Surviving and Retaliating Warheads (500 deployment limit) However, proposals to reduce U.S. or Russian forces to these post–New START levels may fail in politics despite the claims of analysts. One of the obvious speed bumps for Russia DAY, ROA is the revised U.S. plan to deploy phased adaptive missile defenses in Europe.8 Russian DAY, LOW leaders have insisted that they must be involved in U.S. and NATO missile defense GEN, ROA planning, deployments, and operations. During the NATO-Russia Summit in Lisbon UNITED STATES RUSSIA GEN, LOW in November 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to future talks with NATO Balanced No ICBMs No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMs Triad Bombers Only Triad Bombers SLBMs Only about joint missile defense deployments. In February 2011, Medvedev appointed Russian Balanced No No SLBMs Balanced No No ICBMs Triad ICBMs Bombers Only Triad Bombers SLBMs Only ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin as the n GEN, LOW 411 385 415 389 424 427 437 449 special presidential envoy for missile defense, n GEN, ROA 318 385 321 389 238 229 94 45 adding to the presumed diplomatic status of n DAY, LOW 286 234 312 260 262 261 382 449 the issue.9 On the other hand, both Medve- n DAY, ROA 193 234 219 260 39 43 38 45 dev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Key: GEN: Generated alert; LOW: Launch on warning; ROA: Riding out the attack; DAY: Day-to-day alert; ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: Submarine-launched ballistic missile Putin warned in November 2010 that any U.S.–NATO European missile defense plan 1,000 maximum deployed weapons for each not necessarily reflecting the likelihood of that excluded Russia could lead to a nuclear country. Figure 3 shows the peacetime forces actual operations), either Russia or the United arms race, including new deployments by of each state under a lower maximum limit of States, under conditions of “generated alert, Russia of offensive nuclear weapons and 500 deployed weapons, and figure 4 provides riding out the attack” could provide for “strike forces.”10 information equivalent to that summarized some hundreds of retaliating weapons across Russia’s objections to U.S. missile in figure 2, but for the more restrictive case in various force postures. When the prewar defenses deployed in Europe under the NATO which maximum deployments are capped at deployed forces are reduced to a maximum of aegis have more to do with politics than with 500 weapons for each. 500 weapons, each state still retains enough the logic of nuclear deterrence.11 The inferior- The results summarized in figures 2 and second strike retaliatory power to inflict ity of Russia’s conventional forces to those 4 show that either the 1,000 maximum-mini- socially and politically unacceptable damage of NATO makes Russia more reliant on its mum deterrence regime or the 500 maximum regardless of the force posture or condition of nuclear forces for missions other than deter- alternative provides for sufficient numbers of operational readiness. rence of a U.S. or NATO nuclear first strike. second strike surviving and retaliating war- Russia’s military doctrine allows for the first heads to guarantee unacceptable retaliation Missile Defenses—Again use of nuclear weapons by Russia in a conven- under each of four operational conditions. The preceding figures are necessarily tional war that includes attacks near Russia’s Russian and American forces provide for hypothetical outcomes for nuclear force periphery or into Russia’s state territory with several hundred retaliating weapons under exchanges under each of the two regimes. the potential to jeopardize its vital interests a deployment limit of 1,000 with the excep- tion of Russian forces under the “day-to-day alert, riding out the attack” configuration. Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opens at UN Headquarters, New However, under the conditions of any political York, May 2010 crisis in which the United States and Russia were actually considering the use of nuclear weapons, both states’ forces would doubtless be raised to higher alert levels and/or poised for prompt instead of delayed launch. In the

canonical case often used for analysis (but National Archives

Russian leaders have insisted that they must be involved in U.S. and NATO missile defense planning, deployments, and operations

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it can be argued that deploying U.S.–NATO or Russian missile defenses is necessary to help deter or defeat attacks from nuclear hostiles such as Iran or North Korea

and sovereignty.12 Russia in particular fears mass mobilization army based on conscripts NATO capabilities for conventional deep to a professional army, the latter structured strike missions and the Alliance’s relative around brigades manned with voluntary con- superiority in information-based technologies tract soldiers and trained for rapid deploy- for conventional warfare. However improb- ment into hybrid wars with conventional Jr.) Roscoe Washington, U.S. Army (Lawree able or illogical these Russian concerns might and/or unconventional features. seem from a U.S. or NATO perspective, Rus- Politics excepted, are Russian concerns sia’s sense of conventional military inferiority about future NATO missile defense capabili- invites its military planners to fill in the gap ties entirely self-serving? By the last phase of with its nonstrategic nuclear weapons for Obama’s European missile defense plan in deterrence and escalation control. 2020, U.S. BMD technology will presumably Politics as well as military art also have improved over present models. Fourth- dictate that Russia hold fast to its image generation SM–3 interceptors and support- of strategic nuclear parity with the United ing command, control, communications (C3), States. This perception of Russia and the computers, intelligence, surveillance, and United States sharing a singularity in stra- reconnaissance could conceivably have some tegic nuclear capabilities compared to other intercept capabilities against intercontinental powers carries political overbite for Russian missiles launched from Russia or elsewhere, negotiators in various international forums especially if the missile defense launchers Soldier trains Polish servicemembers to maintain and provides Russia a toehold on great power were widely deployed across terrestrial and Patriot missile system during first-ever rotational military status. Russia’s sensitivities about maritime space. On the other hand, whether training program held in Poland U.S. missile defenses are as much about this the Obama plan provides “game changing” perception of Russian-American strategic missile defenses depends upon Russia’s nuclear equivalence regardless of military- fulfillment of its offensive missile modern- will feel Russian pressure or even threats of technical realities. Thus, fears expressed by ization plans, including possible counter- targeting by Russian nuclear forces. Russia’s politicians and military divas about measures against defenses. An additional It can be argued that deploying a creeping U.S. nuclear first strike capabil- complication is that futuristic antimissile U.S.–NATO or Russian missile defenses is ity are not based on realistic perceptions of defenses will have some commonality with necessary to help deter or defeat attacks from American intentions. Instead, these senti- technologies also contributory to air defenses nuclear hostiles such as Iran or North Korea. ments perform two functions in Russian against bomber attack. Further uncertainty Defenses can provide insurance against the domestic politics. First, the Russian general exists in the politics of NATO decisionmak- consequences of light attacks, although those staff can continue to use NATO and the ing with respect to which member states same technologies could not preclude an United States as bell ringers in threat assess- will host missile interceptors or other American or Russian second strike, thereby ments. Second, NATO-centric threat assess- components of the regional missile defense leaving a mutual deterrence relationship ments help to forestall the transition from a system—with the possibility that those hosts between Washington and Moscow intact. Devils remain in the details, including Admiral Mullen meets with South Korean defense officials in Seoul to confirm whether a Euro-zone BMD would be managed strength of U.S.­–South Korea alliance during tensions with North Korea and operated as a unified structure with NATO and Russian substations, or as a col- laborative endeavor with shared early warning and launch detection systems but separately operated NATO and Russian C3 and launch decisions. Whether politically fused or decen- tralized, a Euro-zone missile defense system based on NATO-Russian partnership invites U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley) hubristic proposals from software consultants. A U.S.-Russian minimum deterrence regime with a maximum of 1,000 or 500 deployed long-range nuclear warheads could certainly provide for adequate numbers of surviving and retaliating weapons to ensure

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deterrence and crisis stability. If political Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at relations between the two states continue National Strategy and Requirements: Final Report to improve, the probability increases for an (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing NEW Office, 1998), especially 3.15–3.18, on the practical- agreed minimum deterrence standard that from NDU Press ity of nuclear abolition or drastic reductions in the becomes the new benchmark for bilateral for the U.S. nuclear arsenal to hundreds of weapons. Africa Center for Strategic Studies negotiations (and, perhaps, for multilateral 6 On this point, see especially Desmond Ball, excursions into strategic nuclear force reduc- “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” in tions or arms limitations). On the other hand, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. Desmond Ball and ACSS Research Paper No. 2 the overlap of minimum deterrence and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Africa’s Evolving Infosystems: missile defenses is sufficiently complicated Press, 1986), 57–83; and Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: A Pathway to Security to keep NATO and Russian arms control How Would They Be Used?” in Strategy and and Stability negotiators engaged in continued technical Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton: Political instability and violence and political skirmishing. Additional nonlin- Princeton University Press, 1984), 215–244. 7 in Africa are often the products earity in the post–New START arms control Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James Scouras for the use of his @AWSM model as modi- of rumor and misinformation. equation will be introduced by U.S. interest in fied by the author. He has no responsibility for its Against this backdrop, Steven Livingston shows that reducing the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear use here, nor for any arguments or conclusions in the emergence of new information and communica- weapons deployed in Europe and by Russia’s this study. tion technologies—together with new democratic equally strong interest in rearranging the 8 “US launches new missile defense program for institutions—is noteworthy. In the past 5 years, Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in Europe,” Associated Press, March 1, 2011, avail- the annual growth rate for mobile telephones in view of its conventional military inferiority able at ; “U.S. Says Radar global average. Linked by these new technologies Ship Deployment Part of Missile-Defense Shield,” and geographical information systems, civil society NOTES Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 2, 2011, networks in Africa now are able to monitor security, available at . services, and provide marketing information to influence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 9 “Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russia farmers. Mobile communications has helped to 19, 2011, available at ; Robert Bridge, “Albright and Ivanov make experts_panel/32937.html>. paper traces the remarkable development of these the case for early US-Russian strategic arms cuts,” 10 “Warning of New Arms Race, Medvedev Calls infosystems and their effects in Africa. The paper April 8, 2011, available at . Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, available at 2 as well as basic research on the political, economic, See “Pentagon Studying Additional Nuke . 11 by mobile telephony and related technologies. 2011, available at . Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, told a 3 On current and prospective U.S. missile defense press conference in March 2011 that the proposed programs, see Unclassified Statement of Lieuten- U.S. missile defense plan for Europe presented ant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile no threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces. He Defense Agency, before the House Armed Services added that European missile defense agitation “is Committee (HASC), Subcommittee on Strategic created by politicians on one side and the other for Forces, Regarding the Fiscal Year 2011 Missile gaining certain concessions and resolving totally Defense Programs (Washington, DC: HASC, April unrelated problems with package agreements.” See Forging Partnerships for Africa’s Future 15, 2010). Arguments for a more ambitious program “U.S. missile defense in Europe does not threaten The Africa Center offers a variety of resources that in missile defenses than the Obama plan appear in Russia—Solomonov,” Interfax, March 17, 2011. keep readers abreast of the Africa-related news and James Jay Carafano, “Resetting Missile Defenses,” 12 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federa- research published on this site. available at . org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010>. 4 See, for example, “Russia, EU should set up expert group for missile shield talks,” To subscribe to Africa Center’s Daily Media April 14, 2011, available at ; and Simone http://africacenter.org/subscribe/, enter email Baribeau and Henry Meyer, “Russia Wants ‘Red address, check the box next to the name Button’ Rights on U.S. Missile-Defense Systems,” of the newsletter(s) desired, and click the April 8, 2011, available at . 5 Visit the NDU Press Web site See Center for Counterproliferation Research for more information on publications and Center for Global Security Research, U.S. at ndupress.ndu.edu

116 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ArcticThe A New Partnership Paradigm or the Next “Cold War”?

By REGINALD R. SMITH

lobal climate change is bringing region, and all except the United States have about epochal transformation in acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Arctic region, most notably the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides through the melting of the polar an international legal basis for these rights and G 1 ice cap. The impact of these changes, and how claims. Similarly, while most Arctic nations the global community reacts, may very well have been planning, preparing, and program- be the most important and far-reaching body ming resources for many years in anticipation of issues humanity has yet faced in this new of the Arctic thaw, the United States has been century. A number of nations bordering the slow to act on any of the substantive steps Arctic have made broad strides toward exer- necessary for the exercise of sovereign rights cising their perceived sovereign rights in the or the preservation of vital national interests in the region.2 The United States must move outside the construct of unilateral action in order to preserve its sovereign rights in the Arctic, capitalize on the opportunities available, and U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien) safeguard vital national interests in the region. In today’s budget-constrained environment and as a Nation at war with higher resource priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan than in the Arctic, it is unrealistic to believe that any significant allocation will be programmed for addressing this issue.3 Since the United States is too far behind in actions necessary to preserve its critical interests as compared to the other Arctic countries, the Nation must take the lead to cultivate a new multilateral partnership paradigm in the region. USS Connecticut crew clears ice from hatch after surfacing in Arctic Ocean during exercise ICEX 2011

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A new partnership framework is vital to pooling the many capabilities of the Arctic two of the three U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers that constitute nations and ultimately leveraging them for the America’s entire heavy ice capability have exceeded their preservation of U.S. interests. Analysis shows service lives and are currently nonoperational a dearth of unifying military partnership constructs on anything other than a bilateral or trilateral basis and reveals that search and sovereignty projection, SAR, resource protec- ation” on the issue.14 Their rationale asserts rescue (SAR) operations may be the glue that tion, and rule of law enforcement. Notably, that accession to UNCLOS forfeits too much ultimately binds the Arctic nations’ military none of the U.S. icebreakers is configured U.S. sovereignty and that existing customary forces together. While the opportunity for and for these additional duties.7 Polar Sea and international law and a powerful navy already types of partnerships are expansive, the scope Polar Star, two of the three U.S. Coast Guard protect national interests.15 Further argu- of the recommendations is limited to acces- icebreakers that constitute America’s entire ments claim that UNCLOS will curtail the sion to UNCLOS, sponsorship of a unifying heavy ice capability, have exceeded their U.S. Navy’s freedom of movement and that multinational Arctic exercise, and establish- service lives and are currently nonopera- the historical precedence of international law ment of a comprehensive military partnership tional.8 Polar Sea is undergoing repairs with preserving the peace in the Arctic need not framework. To this end, background informa- an expected return-to-service date of June be altered.16 Others propose a new regulatory tion illustrating the magnitude of the problem 2011; Polar Star requires extensive repairs regime, reasoning that UNCLOS founders is offered, followed by a brief review of dif- and upgrades with an expected completion could not have envisioned the Arctic circum- fering opinions on U.S. partnership, analysis in 2013.9 The third icebreaker is a medium- stances we face today. One such proposal is a of the actions and preparedness of other class ship that is configured for scientific construct modeled after the Antarctic Treaty Arctic nations, examination of some existing research support and is unable to handle that designates the Arctic north of a selected partnership frameworks and opportunities, thick Arctic ice. Cost estimates in 2008 parallel as a wilderness area.17 Finally, a small and concluding recommendations for the U.S. dollars are $800 million to $925 million for a subset of conservative Congressmen intro- theater-strategic leader in the Arctic. new icebreaker with a 10-year lead time and duced a bill in 2009 proposing complete with- $800 million to extend the lives of the two drawal from the United Nations, effectively Background Polar-class ships.10 The National Research ending U.S. participation in a wide variety The Arctic is the fastest-warming region Council in its 2007 report to Congress stated of multilateral partnerships; the bill is under on the planet, and scientific models forecast that “U.S. icebreaking capability is now at review in the House Foreign Affairs Commit- an ice-free summer Arctic sea within 30 years, risk of being unable to support national tee.18 Strong opposition to partnership is bal- with some predictions as early as 2013.4 As interests in the north and the south.”11 anced by those who have durable arguments the Arctic ice cap recedes, expansive virgin In contrast, the Russians and the in favor of this action. areas rich in natural resources and new, Canadians maintain fleets that are over six In support of multilateral Arctic part- commercially lucrative maritime routes will times and four times larger, respectively, than nerships are a number of broad-based and dis- open for exploitation by those nations most that of the United States.12 To catch up with parate organizations and policies nonetheless prepared to capitalize on these opportunities. other Arctic nations in icebreaking capability unified in support of the issue, and additional The potential for economic gain is enormous alone, the expenditure would be at least $20 support comes from consequential benefits as 10 percent of the world’s known and an billion and would take decades to complete.13 inherent in UNCLOS accession. Overarching estimated 25 percent of undiscovered hydro- While the icebreaker issue outlined above is is National Security Presidential Directive carbon resources, 84 percent of which are off- but one of many aspects of the U.S. inability (NSPD) 66, “Arctic Region Policy,” released in shore, exist in the region.5 Transport of these to address vital national interests in the 2009. Among the directive’s policy statements resources poses high profit potential as well. Arctic, it is indicative of the magnitude of is a robust admonishment for accession to For example, tanker traffic between northern the problem facing this nation. With little UNCLOS: Russian terminals and Southeast Asian ports organic capability in the region, partnership can save $1 million in fuel costs using an may seem a natural solution to the U.S. Arctic Joining [the UNCLOS treaty] will serve the Arctic routing instead of the Suez Canal.6 issues, with accession to UNCLOS providing national security interests . . . secure U.S. Those countries with the requisite capability the international cooperative basis for further sovereign rights over extensive maritime stand to be handsomely rewarded. multilateral endeavors. However, there are a areas . . . promote U.S. interests in the An essential resource in the Arctic is a number of differing opinions on partnership environmental health of the oceans . . . give fleet of ships capable of icebreaking opera- and UNCLOS. the United States a seat at the table when tions. They are needed not only for the main- the rights that are vital to our interests are tenance of waterways and ship escort when Opposing Views of Partnership debated and interpreted . . . [and] achieve sea ice is present, but also for year-round There is significant resistance within international recognition and legal certainty Congress against not only UNCLOS, but also for our extended continental shelf.19 Colonel Reginald R. Smith, USAF, is Professor of any multilateral partnerships. A small but National Security Affairs and Senior Developmental influential group of conservative Senators has Furthermore, NSPD 66 persuasively Education Student (Strategy and Policy) at the Naval ardently blocked the UNCLOS treaty from promotes multinational partnership in the War College. ratification for some 16 years of “consider- Arctic to address the myriad issues faced in

118 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SMITH the region.20 Likewise, the Department of Defense, as articulated in its 2010 Quadren- nial Defense Review, strongly advocates accession to UNCLOS in order “to support cooperative engagement.”21 Also among the tenacious supporters of accession are the U.S. Navy, whose leadership stresses that UNCLOS will protect patrol rights in the Arctic, and a number of environmental groups who want to advocate on behalf of Arctic fauna and flora.22 In addition, the oil industry lobby represent- ing Chevron, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhil- lips asserts that oil and gas exploration cannot reasonably occur without the legal stability Marines conduct brigade assault afforded in UNCLOS.23 In a consequential with NATO partners during maritime and amphibious operations exercise benefit of accession, the extended U.S. conti- Cold Response 2010 in Norway nental shelf claims could add 100,000 square miles of undersea territory in the Gulf of U.S. Marine Corps (Michael Q. Retana) Mexico and on the East Coast plus another 200,000 square miles in the Arctic.24 Acces- strides in its Arctic preparedness and has maintains a staunch position on the sover- sion acts to strengthen and extend Arctic asserted its bold national Arctic policy eignty of the Northwest Passage as internal jurisdiction, open additional hydrocarbon through both rhetoric and action. In refer- waters, a claim refuted by the United States, and mineral resource opportunities, add ence to claims of sovereignty in the region, which contends these waters are international to the stability of the international Arctic Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper straits.35 Similarly, Canada asserts overlap- framework, and boost the legal apparatus for has frequently declared, “Use it or lose it,” ping territorial claims with the United States curtailing maritime trafficking and piracy.25 illustrating a new, almost nationalistic fervor in the Beaufort Sea and the maritime border The benefits appear to outweigh the costs as that resonates well with the Canadian popu- between Alaska and Yukon, with Russia in the United States is increasingly moving to a lace.29 National impetus to support extended conflicting extended continental shelf claims, position of strategic disadvantage in shaping continental shelf claims and secure economic and with Denmark over Hans Island in the Arctic region policy outcomes by failing to interests has resulted in the allocation of $109 Nares Strait.36 With its fleet of 12 existing ratify UNCLOS.26 million for Arctic seabed scientific research icebreakers and the programmed additions intended to be complete by 2014.30 Similarly, noted above; national level emphasis on plan- Analysis of Multinational Moves in the Canada is expanding the existing deep-water ning, preparedness, and presence; and the Arctic docking port, a project dating to 2009, into legal basis granted as a signatory to UNCLOS, International state actors are far out- a $100 million naval base on Baffin Island.31 Canada appears to be well ahead of the United pacing the United States in Arctic presence Additional allocations include a new $675 States in its ability to address vital national and preparedness for what the future of the million icebreaker in 2010, establishment of interests in the Arctic.37 region may hold. The so-called Arctic Five a Canadian Forces winter fighting school in Danish extensions into the realm of nations of Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Resolute Bay near the Northwest Passage, Arctic issues track along the major subject Norway (via Svalbard), Russia, and the United and an initiative to build six to eight ice areas of sovereignty and security, economic States all have sovereign coastlines in the hardened offshore patrol vessels, the first of interests, and political activism. Denmark’s area.27 The first four of the five nations are which will be delivered in 2014.32 Presence precarious tie to being one of the Arctic Five making obvious and in some cases aggressive and visibility in the Arctic have been bolstered lies in Greenland, historically a colonial programmatic initiatives in preparation for by sponsorship of three major sovereignty possession whose relationship to the parent their exploitation of Arctic opportunities. exercises annually, including the joint and Denmark has evolved into the present-day The promise of vast, predominantly untapped combined Operation Nanook.33 Incorporating status of self rule. Under self rule, Greenland resources and national security concerns air, land, and maritime forces to demonstrate is autonomous in many domestic respects but is at the heart of these international moves. and exercise operational capability in the is still supported by Denmark in the areas of Infrastructure improvements, fleet expansion, Arctic region, the purpose of these exercises “defense, foreign policy, sovereignty control, increased military presence, and often con- is unequivocally “to project Canadian sov- and other authority tasks,” providing the flicting territorial claims dominate the actions ereignty in the High Arctic.”34 Canada also parent country broad powers to deal with of the Arctic Five in extending the protec- tion of perceived national interests, sans the United States, which “has remained largely on Canada has demonstrated significant strides in its Arcti the sidelines.”28 preparedness and has asserted its bold national Arctic policy Via uncharacteristic political maneuver- through both rhetoric and action ing, Canada has demonstrated significant ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 119 FEATURES | The Arctic

United Nations Commission on the Limits Denmark has attempted to become a more influential politica of the Continental Shelf, it was the first such player in addressing international Arctic issues and appears to claim to be recognized and approved.46 This be well on the road toward the ability to deal with vital national development, combined with skillful bilateral interests in the region Russian engagement resulting in the resolu- tion of a 40-year-old border dispute in the Barents Sea, solidified Norway’s impressive Arctic issues.38 Denmark shares competing frigates in the world built to operate in Arctic Arctic maritime domain in international claims to the hotly contested Lomonosov ice conditions, demonstrates credible Danish law.47 The country quickly put this success Ridge with both Canada and Russia, and all resolve and capability to exercise presence in to work by opening up a new oil field in the three countries believe the ridge is an exten- the region.43 Economically, Greenland and western Barents Sea ahead of its Russian sion of their continental shelves and is rich surrounding waters promise a resource-rich counterparts.48 As articulated in Norway’s in hydrocarbon reserves.39 In an interest- environment, with 2008 estimates ranking High North Strategy, a whole-of-government ing dichotomy, Denmark and Canada are the area as 19th out of 500 of the world’s largest approach characterizes the nation’s resolve working in a joint scientific venture to map potential oil-producing areas. In addition, to “exercise our authority [in the Arctic] in their respective continental shelves despite receding ice is exposing potential mining a credible, consistent and predictable way.”49 the perceived encroachment by the Canadians areas rich in a number of minerals including With largely successful diplomatic efforts into Danish-claimed Hans Island waters.40 In large diamond reserves.44 Leveraging both and an ongoing commitment to bilateral and response to sovereignty concerns generated by credible forces and a possible economic boom, multilateral cooperation, Norway has also Canadian and Russian moves and the general Danish international politics has improved strengthened its military presence, demon- increase in Arctic activity, Danish military the country’s standing in the Arctic arena. strating a northward shift in strategic focus. forces are adapting by reorganizing and Through leadership on the Arctic Council, A large portion of the armed forces, including combining their Greenland and Faroe Com- organizing support for and brokering the its modern frigate fleet, jet fighter forces, and mands into a joint service Arctic Command Ilulissat Declaration, and assuming the lead the army staff, has been moved north with and creating an Arctic Response Force.41 for the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, relocation of the joint headquarters inside the While neither of these moves will increase Denmark has attempted to become a more Arctic circle.50 Oslo has also committed to buy the size of the Danish forces appreciably, they influential political player in addressing inter- 48 F–35 fighter aircraft and negotiated the nonetheless demonstrate the emphasis Danes national Arctic issues and appears to be well addition of advanced air-to-sea missiles to the place on the region.42 Force basing at both on the road toward the ability to deal with purchase.51 This action clearly demonstrates Thule Air Base in northwestern Greenland vital national interests in the region.45 the nation’s stated objectives of enabling and Station Nord in extreme northeastern Norway has capitalized on a concerted “Norway to exercise its sovereign authority Greenland, combined with $117 million in national planning and preparation effort and . . . maintain its role in resource manage- military upgrades in country, use of combat driving a number of key successful regional ment [in the High North].”52 aircraft for surveillance and sovereignty mis- actions in preservation of its High North Norway’s strategy also underscores sions, and an impressive maritime presence interests. As the second nation to submit programs necessary to further develop the including RDN Vaedderen, one of a select few an extended continental shelf claim to the capacity to safeguard Nordic interests; coordi- nated research programs are in force in both governmental and private sector institutions.53 USCGC Alder transits iceberg Anticipating the increase in maritime traffic field above Arctic Circle during through Norwegian exclusive economic Operation Nanook zone waters and following an aggressive development program, Norway launched an experimental advanced technology satellite to provide high-fidelity regional ship tracking.54 The multifaceted and pragmatic approach to Arctic policy issues, combined with advanced planning, strong presence, diplomatic efforts, and rule of law in approved continental shelf extensions, has Norway well positioned to exploit and capitalize on opportunities in the Arctic. With the largest swath of Arctic ter- ritory in the world, state policy and action have garnered Russia the reputation of “the most determined and assertive player in the [region].”55 Economic interests, infrastructure U.S. Coast Guard (George Degener) and transportation means, and a formidable

120 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SMITH military presence illustrate the advanced state port Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2030, of Russian preparedness for Arctic oppor- which includes upgrades of existing Arctic tunities. Both major policy documents, the ports and new development on both Russia’s National Security Strategy of the Russian Fed- regional oceans and its inland waterways.65 eration until 2020 (published May 2009) and Also key to the transportation strategy are the

the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Northern Sea Route and Northeast Passage, a U.S. Navy (Ashley Myers) Federation in the Arctic in the Period up to number of straits in and between the Russian 2020 and Beyond (adopted September 2008) Arctic archipelagos that Moscow claims as strongly articulate the critical importance of sovereign internal waters to be administered the region as its “top strategic resource base.”56 according to state regulations. Among these Navy SEAL freefalls This stance appears well founded, as one-fifth regulations is the requirement for all ships to from Austrian of the country’s gross domestic product and provide advance notice of passage and apply C−130 above Arctic exports totaling 22 percent are generated in for guidance through the route; implied here Circle during NATO the Arctic. Similarly, estimates of up to 90 is also the payment of a fee for services ren- winter exercise Cold percent of Russia’s oil and gas reserves are in dered, a sea-based toll way of sorts.66 Response 2010 the Arctic region; expansion, exploitation, In defense and protection of the border and protection of these resources are deemed and resource areas, Russia continues to bolster “crucially important for Russia’s further military presence and capability in the Arctic. attitudes of other Arctic nations, presents the wealth, social and economic development and In addition to the Northern Fleet, whose naval opportunity for U.S. partnership in the region. competitiveness on global markets.”57 To gain military capabilities run the full gamut of access to these lucrative riches, Russia was the surface and subsurface operations, Moscow Opportunities for Partnership first to file an extended continental shelf claim has created the Federal Security Service Each of the Arctic Five participates in in 2001. However, the United Nations Com- Coastal Border Guard.67 Additional activi- a number of multilateral political venues mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ties in the border and coastal areas include and has expressed interest in partnership determined there was insufficient evidence to development of control infrastructure and to address current and emerging regional approve the claim.58 As a result, an ambitious equipment upgrades for the border guard, issues. The Arctic Council, one such venue, research effort including use of the North- implementation of an integrated oceanic was formed in 1996 as a high-level member- ern Fleet submarine forces is under way to monitoring system for surface vessels, and a ship forum to engender collaboration and complete the geographical studies necessary number of equipment and weapons testing cooperation on issues in the region; it has no to support the claim. These efforts are to be and deployment initiatives.68 Many of these legal authority through charter but has func- completed by 2015.59 initiatives demonstrate presence and resolve, tioned well to promote multinational visibility Russia appears to perceive itself as the such as the 2007 launch of cruise missiles over and study on Arctic issues by all the Arctic leading Arctic power with the most to gain, a the Arctic, additional Northern Fleet exercises states and indigenous peoples.72 The 2009 perception supported by impressive plans and in 2008, and the resumption of Arctic aerial report Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment, resources.60 It operates the largest icebreaker and surface patrols not seen since the end of a combined effort of a council working group fleet in the world: 20 ships, 7 of which are the Cold War.69 While many of these actions from Canada, Finland, and the United States, nuclear powered.61 Nonetheless, many of these may appear provocative, Russia has also identified many areas ripe for cooperation, ships are reaching the end of their service asserted its commitment to working within including development of hydrographic data lives, which will result in significantly reduced the framework of international law, partici- and charting, harmonization of regulatory icebreaking capability by 2020.62 However, pated actively in the Arctic Council and other shipping guidelines, and the critical lack of continued investment in new icebreaking international bodies, and expressed interest SAR capability in the region.73 Russia has technology and partnership with the Russian in partnership in the region, particularly in taken the lead on SAR within the council for private sector drove the deployment of new the area of SAR.70 In the aggregate, Russia developing an international cooperation plan. double-acting tankers and cargo vessels. emerges as among the most prepared of Arctic With the Obama administration’s intent to These vessels employ azimuthal pod propul- nations for the opportunities available and reset relations with Russia by seeking areas sion with the ability to cruise bow-first in may well be poised to gain early regional where the two nations can work together, SAR open water for good performance and stern- commercial and military supremacy with the may prove to be a unifying construct benefi- first in ice conditions using its reinforced ice- goal of similar successes in the international cial to all the Arctic nations, especially the breaking aft hull. The newest such vessel was political arena.71 Russian commitment to mul- United States.74 Initial groundbreaking work commissioned in 2010, bringing the fleet of tilateral venues, along with the demonstrated on the issue occurred in December 2009 in the state-owned shipping company, Sovcom- flot, up to three, each with a 70,000-ton capac- ity.63 Additional capability in the form of die- key to the transportation strategy are the Northern Sea Route sel-electric icebreakers is intended to replace and Northeast Passage, a number of straits in and between the that lost as the Soviet-era nuclear fleet ages.64 Russian Arctic archipelagos that Moscow claims as sovereign Maritime fleet upgrades are interwoven with internal waters planned infrastructure support in the Trans- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 121 FEATURES | The Arctic

delegitimized the notion to administer the sharing and interoperability through training while NATO supports member Arctic along the lines of an Antarctic-like exercises and may provide a model for similar states and has exercised treaty preserving the notions of sovereignty cooperation in the Arctic region.86 Another member militaries in the and resource exploitation in the region.79 With program that shows promise for a more Arctic areas off Norway, it is a U.S. participation and declaration of support broad-based cooperative effort is the U.S. for UNCLOS in these venues, failure to ratify Coast Guard’s “Shiprider” initiative, under divisive influence when t ying the treaty suggests that U.S. credibility and which the United States and partner nations to include Russia in an Arctic legitimacy, and hence the ability to build exchange maritime law enforcement officials solution set cohesive multilateral partnerships, are appre- on each other’s patrol vessels, allowing rule ciably degraded. This conclusion is illustrated of law enforcement in both host and partner Washington, DC, with additional discussions in Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s refusal to join nation waters.87 To one extent or another, all in Moscow the following February under an the Proliferation Security Initiative using the “Arctic coastal states have indicated a willing- Arctic Council resolution to develop a SAR U.S. refusal to accede to UNCLOS as their ness to establish and maintain a military pres- agreement. The archetype for a U.S.-Russian main argument.80 Accession to the treaty ence in the high north.”88 However, decidedly effort is thus coming into being.75 Regional appears to be a key first step to preserving lacking among the Arctic nations’ military synchronization of SAR assets would address U.S. vital interests in the Arctic and build- forces is a unifying construct to promote one of many U.S. critical capability shortfalls; ing necessary credibility for regional and cooperation and mutual interests in an all- the United States has no Coast Guard bases global partnerships in the political spectrum. inclusive multilateral basis. This is similarly on the northern coast of Alaska (the closest is Equally important to political partnerships in reflected in the U.S. military enterprise as 1,000 miles south), and the closest deep-water the region are those available through military there are currently no “mechanisms for joint port is Dutch Harbor, over 800 miles south collaboration of the Arctic nations. operations in the Arctic.”89 Promoting a new of the Arctic circle.76 Another multilateral There are a number of existing con- broad-based military partnership paradigm to collaboration was the Danish-led Ilulissat structs for military partnership, most of which complement those opportunities available and Initiative, which resulted in the unanimous are currently bilateral and trilateral military- emerging in the political arena seems to be the Ilulissat Declaration. In the declaration, all to-military ventures among the Arctic states next logical step for preservation of the United the Arctic Five nations affirmed that “an and other interested states. The majority of States’ vital Arctic interests. extensive legal framework applies to the these constructs are military exercises, such as Arctic Ocean . . . notably, the law of the sea the joint Canadian-Danish-American North- The New Arctic Paradigm [UNCLOS] provides for important rights and ern Deployment 2009, that promote interop- Using SAR—a nonthreatening and obligations [and] we remain committed to this erability and cooperation among participating apolitical issue of interest to all Arctic and legal framework. . . . [UNCLOS] provides a nations.81 Others include longstanding mutual other user nations—as the means to open solid foundation for responsible management defense organizations such as the U.S. and the “partnership door,” the United States, in by the five coastal states and other users. Canadian integration in the North American coordination with Russia, should develop the We, therefore, see no need to develop a new Aerospace Defense Command, a standard Multinational Arctic Task Force (MNATF). comprehensive international legal scheme to that has been suggested for an overall Arctic Foundational support for development of govern the Arctic Ocean.”77 collaboration model.82 Similarly, the North the organization will be facilitated through The significance of the declaration is Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a joint U.S.- and Russia-sponsored multina- paramount to cooperation in that UNCLOS includes among its membership all Arctic tional SAR exercise involving all the Arctic provides the international rallying point for states except Russia. While NATO supports nations, notionally entitled Operation Arctic the Arctic states.78 Similarly important, by member states and has exercised member Light (OAL). Through the planning and virtue of the unanimous and strong affirma- militaries in the Arctic areas off Norway, it execution of OAL, Arctic nations will build tion of UNCLOS, the declaration effectively is a divisive influence when trying to include trust, exchange ideas, build relationships, and Russia in an Arctic solution set.83 Ad hoc see and experience the benefits of collabora- Medical supplies for Alaskans in remote villages are arrangements also promote cooperation as in tion. The natural progression over time can loaded aboard Alaska Air National Guard C–130 during Operation Arctic Care 2011 the 2010 agreement between Norway and the be shaped toward formalizing the exercise United States solidifying a plan for the two into an overarching coordination organiza- national navies to train together in the north- tion that perpetuates OAL, along the lines of ern Norwegian waters.84 Another ad hoc rela- the North Atlantic and North Pacific Coast tionship is also forming among the Scandina- Guard Forums, which evolves into the desired vian countries seeking to “enhance security in MNATF construct. MNATF would initially the Arctic.”85 The North Atlantic and North be comprised of the military representatives Pacific Coast Guard Forums are multilateral of the Arctic Five plus the additionally recog- organizations that promote information nized Arctic nations of Iceland, Sweden, and sharing and cooperative efforts in a number of Finland. The mandate of the organization maritime issues including SAR. These forums would be the regional coordination, syn- have been generally successful in promoting chronization, and combination of member maritime cooperation through information countries’ SAR activities, resources, and U.S. Air Force (Brent Campbell)

122 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SMITH

NOTES the United States has lagged dangerously behind other nations in these preparations and is at a strategic crossroads if it wants 1 Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Back- to influence and shape the Arctic for its benefit ground and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2010), 6–7. 2 Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, U.S. Strategic capabilities to meet the needs of the region. accession nonetheless demonstrates U.S. will- Interests in the Arctic: An Assessment of Current The initial operational capability concept is a ingness to operate in a cooperative rather than Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation regional SAR organization that leverages the a unilateral manner within the international (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna- contributions of each member country into a arena. Through UNCLOS, the United States tional Studies, April 2010), 26. synergistic operational command capable of will gain international recognition of exclusive 3 O’Rourke, 38. responding rapidly to SAR crises in the Arctic rights over an additional 300,000 square miles 4 Conley and Kraut, 2. region. Building on a model similar to the of undersea territory along with the expected 5 U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008–3049, “Shiprider” program, MNATF may expand potential for lucrative hydrocarbon and “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates mission sets commensurate with perceived mineral resources therein. Accession will also of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic regional needs and the desires of member secure the United States a strong position to Circle,” 1, 4, available at . 6 Oleg Nekhai, “Russians Take Arctic Sea the high seas, resource protection, and anti- vation of its vital interests. Route,” Alaska Dispatch, August 20, 2010, avail- piracy/antiterrorism. The outgrowth of this ■■ In collaboration with Russia, develop able at . rity, and stability of the region to the benefit tion Arctic Light inclusive of all the Arctic 7 Lance M. Bacon, “Ice Breaker,” Armed Forces of not only member nations, but also the nations. OAL will be a unifying catalyst Journal 147 (March 2010), 19. world at large. Corollary benefits of this new among the Arctic nations promoting trust, 8 O’Rourke, 30–31. Arctic paradigm will include the partnerships cooperation, and mutual understanding, and 9 Mark Thiessen, “CG Admiral Asks for Arctic formed and cooperation of nations through it will demonstrate the inherent benefits of Resources,” Navy Times, October 18, 2010, avail- information sharing and capability integra- capability synchronization. The attendant able at . 10 effectively fills a critical capability gap, adds and propagate the exercise will provide O’Rourke, 30–31. 11 Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast credible action to the NSPD 66 Arctic Region the roadmap and foundational impetus for Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs, Policy directives, and supports the preserva- further regional partnership, solidifying the Transportation Research Board Report, Polar tion of U.S. vital interests in the Arctic region. gains hereto achieved. Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of ■■ Using SAR as the unifying point and U.S. Needs (Washington, DC: National Academies Recommendations building on existing multinational venues, lead Press, 2007), 1. Global climate change is a reality that the formalization of regional partnership into 12 Charles K. Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, “The offers opportunities in the Arctic for those the Multinational Arctic Task Force. MNATF Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” International Affairs 85, nations prepared to capitalize on them. Many will be a cohesive and enduring organization no. 6 (2009), 1220. nations have moved forward with significant that unites the Arctic nations’ military forces 13 Ibid. 14 programmatic initiatives designed to extend and will complement political collaborations. Yuri Morozov, The Arctic: The Next “Hot Spot” sovereignty, expand resource and infrastruc- MNATF mission sets will expand from SAR to of International Relations or a Region of Coopera- tion? (New York: Carnegie Council, December ture bases, and build cooperative relation- meet the emerging needs of safety and security 16, 2009), available at . perceived national interests in the region. The Ultimately, the United States in particular and 15 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The United States has lagged dangerously behind the world at large will benefit from a stable and Economic and Security Implications of Global other nations in these preparations and is at secure Arctic region. Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March 1, 2008), a strategic crossroads if it wants to influence 63. and shape the Arctic for its benefit. Vital to The United States must become more 16 Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1224. these preparations is for the United States involved in the preparation for an ice-free 17 O’Rourke, 7. to exercise a more active and leading role in Arctic and in the leadership of the region’s 18 H.R. 1146, “American Sovereignty Restora- Arctic policy shaping and to demonstrate issues. The issues in this area are as expansive tion Act of 2009,” Govtrack.us, February 24, 2009, credibility to act within the international legal as its geography and require multilateral available at . system. To this end, the United States must: solutions to multinational problems. The rec- 19 John R. Crook, “Comprehensive New Statement ommendations mentioned herein are a foun- of U.S. Arctic Policy,” The American Journal of ■■ Ratify and put into full force the dational starting point for the United States International Law 103, no. 2 (April 1, 2009), 345. UNCLOS Treaty. This is a key first step to to once again assert its historical leadership Emphasis added. provide the international legal baseline and role during times of great change and in issues 20 Ibid., 345–346, 348–349. credibility for further U.S. actions in the of great importance. The opportunity is pre- region. While not essential to partnership, sented; will the Nation answer the call? JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 123 FEATURES | The Arctic

21 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Submissions to the Commission: Submission 75 U.S. Department of State, “Arctic Search and Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of by the Kingdom of Norway (New York: United Rescue,” available at . 22 Telis Demos, “Arctic Circle Oil Rush,” Fortune un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ 76 Thiessen; David W. Titley and Courtney C. 156, no. 4 (August 20, 2007), 12. submission_nor.htm>. St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the 23 Ibid. 47 Walter Gibbs, “Russia and Norway Reach U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the Arctic,” Naval War 24 Neil King, Jr., “U.S. Resistance to Sea Treaty Accord on Barents Sea,” The New York Times, College Review 63, no. 2 (April 1, 2010), 42. Distance Thaws,” The Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2007, April 27, 2010, available at . Harbor, AK, to the Arctic Circle boundary line at 25 Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1225. 48 Ibid. 66 degrees, 32 minutes north latitude. 26 Conley and Kraut, 26. 49 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 77 “The Ilulissat Declaration,” presented at the 27 Nikolaj Petersen, “The Arctic as a New Arena Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy (Oslo: Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, May for Danish Foreign Policy: The Ilulissat Initia- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2008, 1–2, available at . Emphasis Yearbook 2009 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 50 Conley and Kraut, 23. added. International Studies, 2009), 44. 51 Huebert, 1. 78 Petersen, 57. 28 Borgerson, 63. 52 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5. 79 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 53 Ibid., 6, 23–34. 80 King, A6. 30 Conley and Kraut, 17. 54 “Norway’s AIS Satellite Enhances Marine 81 Conley and Kraut, 11. 31 Ibid., 18. Safety,” Maritimejournal.com, July 22, 2010, avail- 82 Borgerson, 63. 32 Bacon, 18. able at . International 11, no. 9 (May 29, 2009), available at 1–2, available at . 56 Ibid.; Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy html>; Michael Byers, Cold Peace: International 34 Conley and Kraut, 18. Ambitions and Constraints,” Joint Force Quarterly Cooperation Takes Hold in the Arctic (New York: 35 Borgerson, 63. 57 (2d Quarter, 2010), 103; Conley and Kraut, 24. Carnegie Council, December 16, 2009), available 36 Conley and Kraut, 16, 20. 57 Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy,” 105; Katarzyna at . tions of, Accessions and Successions to the Conven- September 2008,” Geopolitics in the High North, 84 Huebert, 1. tion and the Related Agreements as of 05 October June 15, 2009, available at . Guard Forum,” available at . 58 Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1226. e0003559>; Canadian Coast Guard, “North Pacific 38 Petersen, 38. Under self rule, Greenland has the 59 Conley and Kraut, 24; Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Coast Guard Forum: NPCGF—What Is It?” avail- option to become an independent nation, though to Strategy,” 106. Completing the geographical studies able at . The North date it has not exercised it. necessary to support their claim is also articulated Atlantic Coast Guard Forum member countries 39 Ibid., 44. as a top national priority in the Russian National include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, 40 Ibid., 53. Security Strategy. Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, 41 Danish Ministry of Defence, Danish Defence 60 Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy,” 103–104. Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Agreement 2010–2014 (Copenhagen: Danish Min- 61 Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1220; Zysk, “Russia’s Russia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the istry of Defence, June 24, 2009), 12, available at Arctic Strategy,” 106. United States. The North Pacific Coast Guard . cal Pivot: The Russian Arctic in the Twenty-first areas for both forums include maritime security, 42 Ibid. Century,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 3 (July maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, 43 Ibid., 12, 28; Rob Huebert, Welcome to a New 1, 2010), 25. illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, fisheries Era of Arctic Security (Calgary: Canadian Defence 64 Ibid. enforcement, and combined operations. They are and Foreign Affairs Institute, August 2010), 1. 65 Ibid., 31. forums for dialog and coordination but have no 44 Conley and Kraut, 20; Peterson, 40; Ebinger and 66 Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy,” 107. legal or policymaking powers. The cohesive nature Zambetakis, 1230. 67 Antrim, 29. of the forums promotes good relations and coopera- 45 Peterson, 35; Conley and Kraut, 20. The Ilulissat 68 Ibid. tion among the member nations’ coast guard forces. Initiative was a Danish-led conference of the Arctic 69 Conley and Kraut, 25. 87 Michael P. Attanasio, “The U.S. Coast Guard 5 at which all countries unanimously affirmed that 70 Ibid.; O’Rourke, 33. Maritime Law Enforcement Academy: Standard- no additional international frameworks beyond 71 Conley and Kraut, 25. ized Training Brings the U.S. Coast Guard Closer the law of the sea were necessary in the Arctic, 72 Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1226–1227. to U.S. and International Partners,” Proceedings of effectively eliminating international proposals for a 73 Arctic Council, Arctic Maritime Shipping the Maritime Safety and Security Council 66, no. 1 treaty modeled after the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Assessment, 2009 Report, April 2009, 5–6, avail- (Spring 2009), 68. 46 Ebinger and Zambetakis, 1226; United Nations, able at . 89 Ibid., 38. Shelf (CLCS) Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf 74 O’Rourke, 32–33. beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines:

124 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ROEGE

Photovoltaic battery system developed by Office of Naval Research can provide continuous power to troops in field

U.S. Navy (John F. Williams) Scalable Energy Networks to Promote Energy Security

By PAUL E. ROEGE

n an age of fluctuating energy prices and environmental concerns, engineers and scien- tists are locked into a worldwide race to improve energy technologies. Through hard work and investment, these innovators are creating more efficient photovoltaic cells, responsive I energy management software, and wireless energy transmission devices. Some of the greatest potential gains, however, remain to be harvested through energy system integration and networking, which ultimately will transform all forms of energy into a fungible commodity. Consider current challenges of converting energy and synchronizing sources with loads—for example, capturing solar energy to provide hot water and heat at night, or supplying transporta- tion fuel. We need a paradigm shift that dissolves existing boundaries and enables us to manage energy seamlessly and interchangeably. Modern information networks enable data conversion, distribution, and access through flexible hardware/software components that readily integrate into an endless variety of applica- tions. This network approach has evolved rapidly in recent years, and may offer a useful example for energy systems. Two decades ago, only a few imagined the capability to check out a book or rent movies online; today, school children routinely download entire movies onto their tele- phones with high-resolution screens that are too small for older adults even to watch. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 125 FEATURES | Scalable Energy Networks

Figure 1. Regions and Balancing Authorities some of the most dramatic recent advances in energy performance reflec integration of information and energy

■■ applications: lighting, automobiles, personal electronic devices.

With increased public awareness and an apparent inflection point in both the impor- tance of (and global competition for) energy, the time has come to advance holistic and systematic energy concepts, using an analogy of modern information networks. Some of the most dramatic recent advances in energy performance reflect integration of information and energy— manifested, for example, in digital systems that control modern automobile engines and home heating/air conditioning systems.

As of August 1, 2007 The North American electrical grid, often Key: FRCC: Florida Reliability Coordinating Council, Inc.; MRO: Midwest Reliability Organization; NPCC: Northeast Power termed the world’s largest machine, illustrates Coordinating Council; RFC: Reliability First Corporation; SERC: SERC Reliability Corporation; SPP: Southwest Power Pool; TRE: Texas Regional Entity; WECC: Western Electricity Coordinating Council the challenges inherent in connecting and synchronizing diverse energy sources and Imagine replacing today’s taxonomy of with insufficient capability to power onboard loads (see figure 1). Hundreds of utilities discrete energy components and machines systems in an extended silent watch mode; coordinate with independent system opera- with a pervasive, integrated architecture, and combat forces diverted to secure resupply tors and regional transmission authorities,4 akin to modern information systems. Energy convoys, largely delivering water and fuel.3 using state-of-the-art sensors, modeling, would be collected, stored, converted, redis- communications, and information-driven tributed, and used in a plug-and-play manner. Historical Context control technologies to manage the dynamic Transcending even the latest concepts for Energy concepts have evolved over the balance of electrical power across the conti- smart electrical distribution grids or devices, centuries, but have not achieved a maturity nent.5 As Eric Lerner and others point out, the this construct would encompass all forms level that provides for the flexible architec- expanse, complexity, and dynamic nature of of energy—electrical, chemical, thermal, or tures and seamless integration such as those the grid demand extensive systems modeling kinetic—enabling seamless conversion and that have transformed information and and control to manage it in a reliable manner, exchange. Such scalable energy networks knowledge. Since the industrial revolution, seeking to avoid such contingencies as the could help mitigate some of our most urgent energy systems such as vehicles, lighting, and massive East Coast power outage of 2003.6 energy challenges, such as operational insta- manufacturing equipment have reflected a Given the challenges of integrating and bility and vulnerability of the domestic power steady progression of performance, efficiency, synchronizing real-time electrical power, it grid, especially considering the incipient and reliability improvements, benefitting might seem impossible to implement practical proliferation of dynamic influences such as largely from advancements in materials and energy networks that somehow connect the distributed micro-generation1 (for example, manufacturing. Unlike modern notions energy in our automobiles, iPods, furnaces, roof-mounted solar panels) and plug-in elec- of information as a ubiquitous and fluid and bath water. Given the right perspective, tric/hybrid vehicles. medium, however, we still conceive of energy however, these complicating factors of time The imperative extends to our national in terms of basic components: and physics may actually contribute the addi- security when one considers American tional degrees of freedom needed to take that Soldiers who defend us by patrolling rugged, ■■ sources: oil reservoirs, coal mines, leap. Consider today’s flexible, resilient infor- remote areas of the world while carrying wind, geothermal wells, nuclear fuel mation networks woven with strands of satel- tens of pounds of batteries;2 combat vehicles ■■ storage: batteries, fuel tanks, thermal lite communications, fiber optics, 4G—and mass, flywheels even copper wire. These information archi- Colonel Paul E. Roege, USA, is Special Assistant to ■■ conversion: boilers, generators, com- tectures leverage asynchronicity and diversity the Director for Energy in the U.S. Army Capabilities pressors, transformers, battery chargers through buffers, redundant pathways, and Integration Center at the U.S. Army Training and ■■ distribution: pumps, pipes, switches, backup storage functions to enable nearly Doctrine Command. cables

126 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ROEGE seamless access to knowledge and communi- thermal mass (concrete floor) or chemical/ cations upon which we have come to rely. electrochemical energy (fuel, batteries). Admiral Mullen Intelligent systems will monitor energy speaks at energy Network Thinking flows, anticipate usage patterns, and manage security forum at In The Rise of the Network Society, buffers, improving energy use in work tasks, Pentagon Manuel Castells describes how the infor- home lives, and leisure activities. Much as mation technology revolution has trans- we configure preferences and applications formed personal relationships and business on today’s personal computers, future work processes, and has driven globalization.7 processes will integrate indicators, options, We once thought of information as static and settings, enabling the energy network data—books, file cabinets, and libraries. In to balance parameters such as reliability, contrast, the words information technology speed, and economy—all consistent with evoke images of dynamic processes and tools our needs. Separate charge indicators, fuel that enhance both capabilities and lifestyles. gauges, and thermometers will give way to In the 21st century, a typical American house- intuitive, composite icons, accompanied by hold needs cable television, Internet service, selection options. To appreciate the nature cellular telephones—even smart appliances. of this ergonomic shift, one need only con- Personal electronic devices have become trast the intuitive functionality of today’s adaptive tools that not only enable multi- Web search engines—helpful to the point of media communications, but also perform annoyance—to the challenge of program- U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley) any number of other tasks ranging from ming a home thermostat based, at best, upon home shopping to metal detection. With a interpretation of household energy bills. rail cars ferry coal across America, parallel- few keystrokes, consumers can customize In a constrained or dynamic situa- ling but independent of the fuel tanker fleets, their telephones simply by selecting any of tion, the scalable energy network concept power grids, and pipelines that collectively the hundreds of thousands of programs or could provide a critical edge. Consider, power our country. Moreover, many systems applications available from friends, vendors, for example, a small Army unit ordered are vulnerable to disruptions in any one of or app stores, such as the iPhone Store or to search a particular neighborhood. The several energy sources. Winter power outages, Android Market. platoon would convoy from its forward for example, remind us of the unpleasant In the industrial sector, automotive engi- operating base, then dismount and patrol the truth that a typical oil or gas furnace will not neers can now reproduce a classic car using community using various devices, includ- heat the house without power for electrical automated information systems to manage ing weapons, sensors, radios, and electronic valves, switches, and fans—no consolation the process from end-to-end. A laptop com- translators. Such networks might allow that the car in the garage has a full tank of puter running off-the-shelf photogrammetry vehicles and Soldier-carried devices to be gasoline and a charged battery. In contrast, by software uses laser scanners to capture every charged at the base camp, drawing power enriching connectivity and increasing liquid- surface contour and dimension.8 Computer- from the local grid, if available. During the ity of energy resources, the scalable energy aided design and manufacturing systems, movement phase, all systems would share network concept would enable not only more coupled with modern manufacturing equip- vehicle power, with energy priority allocated efficient design, but would also replace com- ment, can quickly reproduce the car body to propulsion, sensors, and communications pound failure modes with increased resilience. with remarkable fidelity. At the customer’s systems. During the subsequent dismounted option, the design team can produce under- search, Soldier batteries would continue Component Technologies the-hood systems that mimic the original or, to charge when within range of a vehicle- How might we transform traditionally alternatively, customize the drive train and mounted wireless energy hotspot, while rigid energy systems architectures into the suspension for state-of-the-art performance. radars sleep to conserve energy in favor of sort of flexible, resilient, and useful informa- infrared search devices and translators. By tion networks that have essentially flattened Scalable Energy Networks providing interoperability, flexible configu- the world? As a first step, consider apparent In the new reality, scalable energy ration, and intelligent/transparent energy parallels between information and energy networks will enable energy to be managed management schema, the energy network system components (see table). safely, efficiently, and interchangeably. Flex- would support critical mission tasks. Energy- Sources. Networks ultimately require ible, ad hoc networks will produce, store, sharing and management capabilities would energy captured or extracted from some convert, prioritize, allocate, and distribute/ simultaneously enhance performance, source, whether coal combustion, nuclear redistribute energy as needed. Through reduce operational delays, and improve integrated architectures, industrial and home resource efficiency. systems will gradually incorporate more The network concept is not revolution- in a constrained or dynamic closed cycles—for example, capturing energy ary in the sense that nearly every machine situation, the scalable energy from renewable sources (wind, sun) or waste comprises a combination of energy compo- network concept could heat (stove, dryer exhaust) and storing it in nents such as springs, wheels, batteries, and provide a critical edge displays. Yet most Americans see no irony as ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 127 FEATURES | Scalable Energy Networks

fission, wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, U.S. Air Force (Quinton Russ) or waste heat. Compare this function to data collection through keyboards, microphones, sensors, database searches, and Web crawlers. Scalable energy network designers will stress alignment of source and application char- acteristics, such as voltage, temperature, or entropy to the respective process interface (for example, mating solar or waste heat sources with domestic water heating). Storage. We store energy in respective forms and quantities to support applications and to optimize network functions. Just as we configure caches, buffers, and hard drives to archive documents, enrich video displays, and optimize complex calculations, so we use capacitors, batteries, fuel tanks, and thermal mass to start automobiles, Airmen prepare to run fiber optic cables to improve connectivity at Camp Herat, Afghanistan maintain building temperatures, and run solar-powered lights at night. among collection, storage, and conversion vehicles, homes, and radios. While many Conversion. Nearly every process nodes. Maturing information technology con- information applications have become virtu- involves energy conversion from one form to cepts have driven a proliferation of transfer ally indistinguishable from the tools that we another. Winding a watch converts motion technologies, such as portable media, wired use to conduct business—witness the trans- to spring tension; car engines burn fuel to and wireless protocols, and management parent integration of Internet search, GPS produce motion. In general, energy conver- functions integrated into routers and switches. location, and communication functions into sion accounts for most system efficiency Today’s energy distribution technologies a smart phone—energy applications remain losses. With many of today’s thermodynamic remain segregated by the respective media, relatively discrete. Automobiles, stoves, processes, such as internal combustion such as fuel, electricity, and batteries. A scal- and lights each embody energy to perform engines, operating at 10 to 30 percent effi- able network approach might lead to new or singular functions, although plug-in hybrid ciency, and theoretical constraints (depending improved media-specific technologies, such vehicles, for example, reflect a trend toward upon the process) below 50 percent, energy as free-space transmission (wireless “energy synergistic integration of energy technolo- practitioners appropriately are pursuing beaming”), as well as development of hybrid gies to improve flexibility and efficiency. incremental improvements and alterna- systems that would simultaneously manage In this example, the vehicles may someday tives. Considering the room for improve- multiple forms of energy. serve an additional function as distributed ment, success could bring disruptive overall Applications. Energy brings the energy buffers for the electrical grid. Will process improvements—just as information motion, heat, or signal propagation to we eventually use our “smart Joule” device systems processes have been transformed by to draw from the most readily available and conversion process migration from ancient many information applications inexpensive energy source, selecting among storytelling traditions and primitive painting energy “hotspot” providers to warm our to electronic processors, Web crawlers, and have become virtually hands or power our laptop, or will such a intelligent speech recognition routines. indistinguishable from the tools device be unnecessary as the energy network Distribution. To be useful, networks that we use to conduct business is seamlessly integrated into vehicles, homes, must efficiently move and manage energy and information systems?

Table. Parallels Between Information and Energy System Components Function Information examples Energy examples Observation, printed media, sound, Web sites, databases, sensor/ Motion (induction), piezoelectric, waste/solar heat, photovoltaic, wind, Sources camera, transducer petroleum, nuclear Book, optical media (CD/DVD), flash media Storage Thermal mass, flywheel inductor, battery, fuel tank hard drive

Conversion Keyboard, scanner, printer, modem, interface card, optical drive Fire, light, generator, fuel cell, battery charger, motor, compressor

Mail, telephone, email, wireless, infrared, 4G, microwave, twisted Wire (AC/DC), pipeline, tanker, truck (fuel, batteries), microwave, laser, Distribution pair, router, switch transformer, breaker, switch Word processor, online shopping, entertainment, engine controller, Heating/cooling/lighting, entertainment systems, transportation, power Application computer-aided design, radar tools, radar

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1996 and 2010, for instance, German Gustav Line and Finnish ization when the sense of invul- shows only one dealing with Mannerheim Line, respectively). nerability the barriers provide is the topic, Breaching the Fortress Making the final cut are ancient punctured by their failure. Wall, a RAND Corporation Athens’s Long Walls, Hadrian’s Sterling concedes the limits monograph from 2007 focused Wall in Britain, the Ming Dynas- that a single researcher faces in on the vulnerability of modern ty’s Great Wall, Louis XIV’s Pre dealing with such a wide range infrastructure to terrorism.) By Carre, the French Maginot Line, of subject matter in his introduc- and large, the available literature and the Israeli Bar-Lev Line. tion, and at the same time, the examines particular defensive Ultimately, Sterling limited diversity of the cases works, conflicts, or periods (for concludes that barriers are (with four of the six involving instance, Medieval castles or neither useless nor a panacea. European conflicts), but his Civil War forts), or is part of Properly constructed barriers individual chapters are compre- broader histories of wars and are frequently effective militar- hensive in their treatment of their warfare (such as John Keegan’s ily, imposing costs on hostile subjects, running a dense 40 to Do Good Fences Make Good 1992 A History of Warfare, penetrations, slowing enemy 50 pages each (counting notes), Neighbors? What History which Sterling cites three times advances, forcing the attack- while offering enough range and Teaches Us About Strategic in his discussion of basics in his ers to change their behavior depth for a search for historical Barriers first chapter—a reliance that is in significant ways (such as by lessons. Together, along with the By Brent L. Sterling telling). seeking ways around the barrier), concise chapter in which Sterling Georgetown University Press, Naturally, serious book- and offering other uses (such offers his conclusions, they make 2009 length studies offering cross- as providing a base for forward for a robust, lucid, and persuasive 354 pp. $32.95 cultural comparisons, or dealing operations). (as well as accessible) examina- ISBN: 978–1–5890–1571–5 specifically with strategic bar- However, barriers are costly tion of the issue. riers as a class, are even rarer to adequately build, maintain, It might be protested that Reviewed by than writing on fortification in and man, enough so that the the cases Sterling examines NADER ELHEFNAWY general, which is by itself enough builders commonly fail to sustain bear little relevance for current to make Sterling’s book worthy the required investment over debates about strategic barriers, o Good Fences Make of attention. The interest of the time. Sterling also notes the ten- which are less concerned with Good Neighbors? book is reinforced by its par- dency of the military balance to thwarting invading armies than D addresses the histori- ticular approach to the subject shift away from the wall-builders controlling population and mate- cal impact of strategic barriers, matter, emphasizing the effect over time, as their opponents rial flows (with respect to issues defined here as “continuous of such defenses on the behavior learn to circumvent or overcome like illegal immigration)—a or mutually supporting works of major actors involved by way the barriers (a problem that may matter Sterling brings up early denying the enemy avenues of of three central questions: first, have worsened with the increas- on but devotes little space to (and attack across a front.” In his how the barrier affects “adversary ing rapidity of technological none at all outside of the Roman introduction, Brent Sterling perceptions of the building state’s change in modern times), while and Ming cases). However, much argues for the relevance of such intent and capability,” and how it the “deterrence by denial” that of Sterling’s broader analysis (for an appraisal given the renewal shapes their subsequent behavior; the barriers provide must often instance, regarding the changes of interest in strategic defense second, the effect of the system be backed by “deterrence by forced on behavior by a wall’s around the world (old fashioned on the immediate and long-term punishment” in the case of highly presence, maintenance costs, and walls, as well as more novel “military balance”; and finally, motivated opponents. impact on perceptions) is appli- missile defenses) and the shallow the influence of the barrier on More fundamentally, stra- cable to those matters as well, debate surrounding it, the the “subsequent outlook, policy tegic defenses cannot substitute and readers primarily interested “dynamic” of which “is for critics debate, and behavior within the for a sound strategic orientation in those issues can also expect to and proponents to talk past each organizing state.” toward both allies and oppo- find the book worth their while. other, adding highly subjective In trying to answer these nents, who can be alienated or Do Good Fences Make Good versions of the past to bolster questions, Sterling opts for even antagonized by the barriers. Neighbors? is a solid start to a their arguments,” with even in-depth examinations of a half- Additionally, such barriers can sounder debate about this impor- normally circumspect historians dozen cases, each a situation in foster a sense of “subjective” secu- tant subject and is likely to prove “prone to apply sweeping charac- which plausible alternatives to rity that reinforces existing ten- essential reading for students of terizations on this topic.” barrier-building existed. Accord- dencies in behavior that may be its subject for years to come. JFQ That problem is in all likeli- ingly, he excludes defenses hur- inappropriate to a given situation, hood a byproduct of the paucity riedly thrown up in wartime, or such as excessive risk-taking or Nader Elhefnawy has published of serious research on the subject those made unavoidable by the the avoidance of deeper solutions widely on international security of fortification in recent years. weakness of the building power to problems that arise (political issues. He holds a degree in (An examination of Parameters’ compared with its adversary or military), which also raises the International Relations from Florida index of books reviewed between (as with the World War II–era risk of disproportionate demoral- International University.

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The premise behind the detailed background of counterinsurgents in Iraq . . . Moyar’s analysis is that coun- Filipino political personalities [and] in Afghanistan.” terinsurgency is, above all else, and movements in the 1950s, If there is one widely leader-centric warfare. Moyar and his rehashing of the all-too- acknowledged lesson to emerge defines effective leadership familiar history of the Coalition from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is through his “ten attributes of Provisional Authority in Iraq, that counterinsurgency warfare effective counterinsurgency Moyar proves that less can often is difficult. It is an exercise in leaders”—initiative, flexibility, be more. Additionally, the author physical and mental willpower creativity, judgment, empathy, claims a level of exclusivity for for the leader on the ground, who A Question of Command: charisma, sociability, dedication, his idea of leader-centric warfare is required to motivate, think, Counterinsurgency from the integrity, and organization— in his opening chapter, and plan, articulate, learn, and adapt Civil War to Iraq which he highlights in accounts ultimately takes the “gospel” of at a constant pace. In the end, By Mark Moyar of nine counterinsurgency cam- counterinsurgency doctrine to though, the ability of a leader to Yale University Press, 2009 paigns. Moyar’s analysis covers task. Specifically, Moyar writes do all of these things is often not 301 pp. $19.80 the full spectrum of counterin- that Field Manual (FM) 3–24, enough. David Kilcullen states ISBN: 978–0–300–15276–0 surgency conflict throughout Counterinsurgency, makes no as much in his book Counterin- history, which is evident in the mention of “empowering quality surgency, where he unearths two Reviewed by equal attention given to the more American or host-nation com- historical trends that have often KIRBY R. DENNIS studied, modern campaigns in manders” and therefore fails to made the difference between Afghanistan and Iraq and the address a central tenet of coun- victory and defeat. Kilcullen f the many military lesser known conflicts of post– terinsurgency warfare. While found overwhelming evidence historians who have Civil War Reconstruction, the Moyar may be technically correct to indicate that, first, fighting Oexamined the art and Philippine insurrection of 1899, in his assertion, it is a stretch to in one’s own country provides a science of battlefield leadership, and the Salvadoran insurgency in intimate that U.S. Army doctrine marked advantage, and second, few can match the accomplish- the early 1980s. Moyar concludes does not advocate empowerment success in counterinsurgency ments of John Keegan, who is the book with a chapter titled at all levels of command. To be often depends on a willingness to perhaps best known for The Face “How to Win,” in which he seeks sure, FM 3–24 clearly endorses negotiate with the enemy. Kilcul- of Battle (1976). Keegan’s analysis to provide a roadmap for the mil- the concept of decentralization len’s argument is instructive in has proven relevant over decades itary to use in its recruitment and in its opening chapter under the that it softens Moyar’s claim that of evolving conflict and remains development of future leaders. principle “Empower the Lowest effective leadership is the most instructive to this day. In 1988, While noble in its efforts Levels.” More to the point, in the important aspect of defeating an Keegan produced an equally and interesting in its content, 3 years between the publication insurgency. To be sure, achiev- important analysis of general- the book has limited success in of FM 3–24 and Moyar’s book, it ing tactical, operational, and ship in times of conflict. In The achieving its purpose. Moyar has become abundantly clear that strategic goals in a counterinsur- Mask of Command, he examines states from the outset that his empowering American and host gency campaign requires a host the evolving nature of wartime analysis aims to assist counter- nation leaders in the execution of factors to work in harmony. leadership and posits that a insurgents in the execution of of counterinsurgency operations Among these are effective police confluence of factors—among their mission, yet the overall is a cornerstone of not only the forces, a viable host nation them, societal norms and tech- purpose is lost in the interven- Nation’s strategy, but also the government, and, indeed, com- nology—influences the nature of ing pages where he delves into military’s education and training petent military leaders on the command and ultimately affects the historical minutiae of each programs. frontlines. In the end, A Question the manner in which leaders counterinsurgency campaign. To his credit, Moyar calls of Command is a thoughtful make decisions. Now, over two Broadly speaking, history is to mind the importance of analysis from which we all can decades later, Mark Moyar offers central to any effective analysis sound leadership at all levels learn, but Moyar’s notion of A Question of Command, a coun- of battlefield command, and of command, and in doing so, leader-centric doctrine addresses terargument to Keegan’s analysis Moyar acknowledges such in his reinforces a bedrock tenet of only part of the solution to an of counterinsurgency warfare. sweeping account of counterin- warfare for the contemporary enormously complex problem, Moyar extracts 10 attributes of surgency warfare. However, this student. However, this book and, therefore, is not the panacea effective counterinsurgency lead- book offers much more history could be more fittingly described that he claims it to be. JFQ ership from a historical analysis than analysis, which ultimately as a history of counterinsurgency of 150 years of conflict, and in mutes its bottom line and leaves conflict rather than the playbook Major Kirby R. Dennis, USA, is an doing so, applies what Keegan the reader grasping for clear that the author intends. After Infantry Officer with experience in Iraq refers to as the traits method of examples of Moyar’s 10 attributes all, using the Myers-Briggs Type and Afghanistan. He is assigned to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. His analysis—a notion that univer- in practice. Indicator to select counterinsur- next assignment will be with the 3d sally applied common character- Through his description gency leaders does not exactly Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain istics can determine success or of 18 Civil War officers and fit a timely purpose—which, in Division, in Afghanistan. failure on the frontlines of battle. their experiences in combat, Moyar’s own words, is “to assist

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of the argument and insights governments overreact. In other example, Cronin points out al of the entire book. Successive words, the question may not be Qaeda’s “resilient structure” but chapters detail the six potential how terrorism succeeds, but how later suggests that its methods of avenues for the demise of a ter- governments fail. recruitment and forms of com- rorist movement: decapitation The chapter devoted to munication move it further away (leader/leaders are killed or the end of a terrorist movement from being an organization and captured), negotiation, success due to its success is perhaps the closer to a larger social move- (movement’s aims are achieved), weakest of those presented (the ment with various like-minded failure, repression, and reori- cases are Irgun in Israel and affiliates. If the latter is the case, entation (group/movement Umkhonto in South Africa). then is it even valuable to discuss shifts from terrorist violence to Much of Cronin’s own analysis a structure to al Qaeda? Cronin something else). These avenues suggests these causes are won herself seems to note this, sug- How Terrorism Ends: are developed from an analysis despite the use of terrorist vio- gesting “the debate over the size, Understanding the Decline and of over 400 terrorist groups (a lence (and indeed, such violence structure, and membership of Demise of Terrorist Campaigns description of the dataset and may have been counterproductive al Qaeda is a quaint relic of the By Audrey Kurth Cronin more detail from the statistical to achieving the goal). Regard- twentieth century” (p. 176). Princeton University Press, 2009 analysis are given in an appen- ing the “success” of establishing Cronin’s argument illumi- 330 pp. $29.95 dix). Each chapter then presents the state of Israel, Cronin notes nates more than it obscures but ISBN: 978–06911–394–87 a few cases as illustration of how that Irgun chooses to lay down still touches on only part of the the particular avenue ends (or its arms rather than engage in problem. Ultimately, the reasons Reviewed by does not end) the terrorist move- a civil war in Israel (p. 247, note for the end of terrorism, despite ERIC SHIBUYA ment in question. The cases are 43, which also points out that the categorizations offered selected for variance in terms this decision coincided with here, are almost as varied as the udrey Kurth Cronin has of leadership, goals, and other the sinking of a ship carrying reasons given for the causes of produced a work that factors. A seventh chapter applies arms for Irgun). The goal of an terrorism. While Cronin cor- Ais both insightful and the various frameworks to al independent Israel was certainly rectly recognizes that focusing on frustrating—but it is frustrating Qaeda, putting forward an initial achieved, but Irgun’s contribution single groups or only the current for all the right reasons. Readers analysis on that group’s possible to that goal could be contested. phenomenon is ahistorical and searching for definitive answers end, and a short conclusion closes Its role could be considered akin misses valuable potential lessons, for the end of terrorism will be out the text. to that of a spectator at a sporting the reasons and factors for the disappointed. So, too, will critics While some may view the event trying to distract the oppo- end of terrorism are too broad to expecting a presentation of how conclusions from the data as sition. Can those actions really be valuable in and of themselves. “simple” it is to end terrorism. basic, Cronin’s analysis brings be connected to “victory”? More The preoccupation with an What readers will find is a book them into stark relief, especially importantly, Cronin’s argument ongoing terrorist organization written conditionally and with considering shortcomings in U.S. regarding the role of terrorist misses valuable precedents, much argument by counterfact, counterterrorism policy to apply violence in achieving a particu- while simply noting “factors” of but active readers will find a rich such “conventional wisdom.” lar goal does not mention the terrorism’s demise is too vague. source for debate. More criti- Some of the findings include possibility of the terrorist orga- The value is in the synthesis of cally, it is the right debate to have the point that the arrest and nization’s value as the “greater these approaches: “The lessons regarding terrorism and its threat discrediting of a terrorist leader evil.” Terrorist violence may be of the past must be considered, today: namely, how will it end? are generally more effective than counterproductive politically, but comprehended, and then care- One of the most effective themes assassination as a decapitation it may also move a government to fully calibrated for the particular throughout the book is that technique. Negotiation may not negotiate with a more moderate circumstances and the particular despite all of the contemporary be possible with core members entity sharing the goals of the strategy of a particular group, hyperbole, historical experience of an organization, but may have terrorist group. Terrorist violence directing its energies at the vul- shows that terrorist movements value in creating factions within may not “win” in and of itself, but nerabilities of a particular kind generally do not last long, and at the group. More importantly, it may make some compromise of state” (p. 206). Alliteration and some point in time, practically the historical record shows that more palatable to a government. repetition notwithstanding, the all of them come to an end. How negotiations are not linear, that Another point for debate combination of deep knowledge that end is achieved—whether setbacks will inevitably occur, lies in the application of the of a specific group with a broader it is done by or at the expense and that the most successful various approaches to al Qaeda. conceptual framework of the of the state—and what lessons negotiations occur with terrorist Cronin suggests the various ways overall phenomenon is the way to states today can take from past organizations with clearly articu- al Qaeda may be unique (consid- greater understanding. JFQ experiences are the major themes lated goals. The findings are ering most of them as matters of of this book. important, but a deeper insight degree rather than type), and a Eric Shibuya is Associate Professor of The introduction serves as may be the underlying point that reader can take issue with some Strategic Studies at the Command and an effective executive summary terrorism is most effective when of the conclusions drawn. For Staff College, Marine Corps University.

134 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Airman secures base flightline in Southwest Asia

U.S. Air Force (Scott T. Sturkol)

Securing Aerial Approaches to Joint Airfield

By ROBERT B. HOLDSWORTH

he national security of the penetrating and indirect fire attacks, the lack man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) United States relies on the ability of clear joint guidance regarding respon- circulate outside of state control and that to project airpower around sibilities for securing aerial approach and “tens of thousands more missiles are stored the globe. The 2011 National departure corridors creates a vulnerable seam in government arsenals with questionable T 2 Military Strategy articulates key capabilities for which no single Service or functional com- stockpile security.” Furthermore, the Con- of airpower crucial to securing U.S. national ponent has clear accountability. This seam in gressional Research Service has reported interests: the direct employment of globally joint doctrine could be mitigated by revising an unclassified list of 26 separate nonstate integrated command and control, intelligence, the Air Base Defense Considerations section rebel, militant, and/or terrorist groups pos- surveillance, reconnaissance, and aerial strike in Joint Publication (JP) 3–10, Joint Security sessing SAMs.3 U.S. military aircraft have capabilities, as well as the use of strategic and Operations in Theater.1 This revision should employed onboard countermeasures and tactical airlift assets to effectuate rapid global emphasize the importance of securing aircraft modified flight procedures to defeat this mobility for joint forces in order to protect approach and departure corridors and defin- threat, but unclassified reports describe and advance national interests on the ground ing responsibilities as a joint force priority on dozens of incidents of successful insurgent worldwide. America’s airpower capabilities par with the specific direction provided for ground-fire attacks on U.S. aircraft since are unmatched; however, low-cost weapons defense of approaches to seaports found in 2001. These successful attacks have included systems with the potential to blunt U.S. aerial JP 3–10’s Seaport Facility Defense Consider- SAM strikes against Air Force C–5 and C–17 strike and power projection advantages have ations section. cargo aircraft in 2003 and 2004, respectively, proliferated extensively among state and non- The Government Accountability and against nine Army helicopters between state adversaries, threatening approach and Office has estimated that 5,000 to 7,000 October 2003 and January 2004.4 departure corridors for these key assets. While the Services and Joint Staff have invested significant doctrine, organization, the lack of clear joint guidance regarding responsibilities for training, materiel, leadership, education, securing aerial approach and departure corridors creates a personnel, facilities, and policy resources to vulnerable seam secure aircraft carriers and airfields against ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 135 JOINT DOCTRINE | Securing Aerial Approaches to Joint Airfields

The need for these low-density/high- demand aviation assets to remain available the current lack of clear joint guidance regarding Service and/or for response across multiple theaters magni- component responsibilities for the defeat of SAM threats increases fies the importance of defeating these threats the importance of Service doctrine in mitigating this threat to U.S. aerial might. Additionally, hazards to the Nation’s airpower capabilities are exac- erbated by “increased budget pressures” and This publication identifies the ACE MP corps’ area security responsibilities to prolonged acquisition lead times associated commander as retaining responsibility for protect critical assets and sites.7 Field Manual with replacing lost aircraft.5 The specula- area security once air operations have moved (FM) 3–39, Military Police Operations, asserts tion surrounding China’s procurement of from aircraft carriers to land-based airfields. It that “airbase protection and defense is a key F–117 stealth fighter wreckage from Serbian specifically tasks aviation units with organiz- component of MP [area security] operations farmers after the downing of a Nighthawk ing active defense measures based on threats . . . when the threat exceeds the airbase capa- in 1999, and the subsequent demonstration to operations including equipping support bilities.” The manual goes on to establish that of their own J–20 stealth fighter in January and augmentation Marines with weapons and another MP mission, route security, includes 2011, provides additional reinforcement for ammunition, conducting security patrols, the establishment of a movement corridor that the need to provide insurance against combat using aerial reconnaissance, integrating close “would typically include the airspace above it losses in order to “continue to maintain air and fire support, and tasking Marine Air to allow the establishing unit to conduct aerial our margin of technological superiority.”6 Ground Task Force Ground Combat Element reconnaissance and fires.” While not specifi- Straightforward joint guidance and careful (GCE) units as an emergency last resort to cally identified with defeating SAM threats, attention from planners in tasking are defend Marine airbases. Though arming these two MP missions could be combined required to emphasize the strategic nature of ACE Marines to conduct threat-based patrols via joint coordination to develop a procedure airfields and their approaches. and employing GCE Marines in emergency whereby Army MP forces are used to secure The current lack of clear joint guidance situations could be inferred as measures to airfield approach and departure corridors. regarding Service and/or component respon- address a SAM threat to Marine and/or Navy This potentiality could hardly be inferred sibilities for the defeat of SAM threats to joint aviation operations, MCWP 3–21.1 provides and would require extensive justification airfield approach and departure corridors no specific guidance with regard to mitigating and coordination by Joint Force Air Com- increases the importance of Service doctrine SAM threats to aerial approach and departure ponent Commander (JFACC) staff members in mitigating this threat. Unfortunately, a corridors. The publication also references the to ensure the Joint Force Land Component review of Service doctrine reveals no defini- obsolete JP 3–10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, Commander (JFLCC) Provost Marshal’s and/ tive answer to the question of responsibility and Procedures for Base Defense (July 23, or Joint Security Coordinator’s staff tasked it for security of aerial approaches for even 1996), an indication that MCWP 3–21.1 has appropriately and provided the requisite over- single Service-owned/component-owned and not been updated recently in light of even the sight to ensure the approach and departure -operated airfields. scant guidance to be found in the most current corridor security mission was not subsumed version of JP 3–10, published February 3, 2010. by the MP corps’ numerous other mission sets Current Doctrine Army doctrine tasks the MP corps to and competing JFLCC priorities. The Department of the Navy published serve as its functional component responsible Air Force guidance for mitigating the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication for the defense of airfields as a subset of its SAM threat to airfield approaches is found in (MCWP) 3–21.1, Aviation Ground Support, which identifies Marine Corps Military Police (MP) assigned to the Aviation Combat Airman patrols perimeter of airfield during combat Element (ACE) Marine Wing Support Squad- training exercise with U.S. and allied air forces ron as having the primary responsibility for organizing and training Marines for airbase ground defense duties in flightline security, control of access to aircraft in restricted areas, and so forth. Since this publication is pub- lished by the Navy, which does not normally conduct single-Service operations in contested land areas, we can assume that MCWP 3–21.1 is the authoritative guidance for defense of Navy as well as Marine aircraft operating from land-based airfields.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Holdsworth, USAF/ ANG, is Commander of the 123d Security Forces Squadron, 123d Mission Support Group, 123d Airlift U.S. Air Force (Brett Clashman) Wing, Kentucky Air National Guard.

136 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HOLDSWORTH

As a practical matter, when allocat- Chinese J–20 prototype aircraft ing missions and resources among the optimizes aspects of Very Low components of the joint force, this staff Observable performance coordination does not normally rise to the attention of the component commanders or the joint task force commander and is thus left to the cooperative efforts of their respective staffs. This cooperation after establishment of the joint command is then further complicated by the fact that chapter II of JP 3–10 goes on to direct that a “component commander with unique security requirements (for example, those related to the shoulder-launched SAM foot- print around a joint operating base) should expect to provide the majority of forces for the defense of those assets/bases.” Since the JFACC does not normally control the JSAs located around the air component’s airfields, a function normally tasked to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31–101, Integrated approach and departure corridors against an Army, Marine Corps, coalition, or host Defense, which directs that “commanders SAM threats. JP 3–10 articulates the fact nation battlespace owner (with movement, must coordinate necessary security opera- that aircraft are “especially vulnerable when maneuver, protection and/or sustainment tions support within the Base Security Zone operating in the ‘low and slow’ take-off and requirements of their own), securing the (BSZ) . . . by coordinating via their operational landing flight regimes” and that “approach approach and departure corridors to joint chain of command with the appropriate base and departure corridors . . . are critically airfields is further challenged. Moreover, cluster commander, area commander, or important and a challenging joint force the JFACC senior officers on joint bases, command authority/host nation responsible security consideration.” The publication often designated as the Senior Airfield for ground forces operating within the BSZ.” goes on to pronounce that the airspace above Authority (SAA), normally have organic This instruction implements in Air Force JSAs is not normally included therein, but security assets sufficient only for close-in doctrine the aforementioned air base defense is governed by procedures in JP 3–52, Joint security of the facilities, ramps, taxiways, guidance from JP 3–10 and introduces the Airspace Control. However, JP 3–52 states runways, and so forth located on or imme- Air Force–specific term base security zone for that the “JFACC may have to orchestrate diately adjacent to the joint airfield.9 use in describing what JP 3–10 articulates as special procedures (ground patrols in vicin- On a joint base, the commander may the “base boundary.” AFI 31–101 goes on to ity of approach path)” to defend against not necessarily be “dual-hatted” as the SAA, instruct Air Force planners to “support the SAM threats. and may have competing priorities and/or establishment and adjustment of the [joint] JP 3–52 does not address the fact that limited resources to perform base perimeter base boundary . . . to include the area from the JFACC does not normally have dedicated security even when the boundary is estab- which a threat can launch an attack against ground forces assigned or attached capable lished well short of the SAM threat’s total . . . aircraft approaching/departing the base.” of performing this requirement over the 25 footprint. The JFACC SAA is thus dependent Essentially, Air Force doctrine seeks either to square kilometers out from the joint airfield upon the JFLCC JSA commanders or base request extension of the joint base boundary that “historical experience with irregular commanders to dedicate limited manpower (secured by another component’s/Service’s threat forces and their use of . . . shoulder- resources to occupying or patrolling poten- base defense force) out to the edge of the launched [SAMs] gives [as] a planning tial SAM launch sites along aircraft approach SAM footprint or to mandate that Air Force factor.”8 The unaddressed assumption implies and departure corridors in support of the commanders identify this threat area when that the JFACC must request from the JFLCC JFACC security requirements. requesting support from joint security area that either the Joint Security Coordinator This situation drives the need for (JSA) commanders outside the base boundary. extend what JP 3–10 refers to as the base enhancing the joint doctrine for air base Unfortunately, the document offers no recom- boundary beyond the immediate perimeter defense found in JP 3–10 to provide directive mended solution as to how to secure the area of the base cantonment area to encompass guidance that will assist in identifying the if forces are not made available from either the “footprint” of potential SAM launch sites SAM threat to aerial approach and depar- another Service or the host nation. when hosting JFACC assets, or task the bat- ture corridors as a joint force priority (and tlespace owners of JSAs outside base boundar- delineate component responsibilities for Shortfalls ies to use their own resources to undertake addressing it) during the tasking process in Current joint doctrine does little to the actions necessary to meet JFACC security order to incorporate these requirements into address the seams in Service guidance requirements for defense of aircraft approach either the JFACC or JFLCC allocated forces regarding responsibility for securing and departure corridors. and command and control responsibilities. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 137 JOINT DOCTRINE | Securing Aerial Approaches to Joint Airfields

A Way Forward air fields, opportunities for disagreements in defensive concept of JFLCC responsibili- It can be argued that no seam actually the definition of critical assets and account- ties for approaches to JFACC airports, as exists with regard to securing approach and ability for defeating the SAM threat to air well as JFMCC seaports, during high-risk departure corridors because JP 3–10 mentions assets demand revised and joint guidance. operations would provide the clear joint that “in support of the JFC’s concept of opera- Fortunately, a model for resolving this guidance needed to mitigate the doctrinal tions, the JFLCC plans and conducts security disconnection between defending airfields seam presented by SAM threats to joint operations to ensure protection of US . . . criti- and their approaches can be found under airfield approach and departure corridors. cal assets” and goes on to comment that the Seaport Facility Defense Considerations in JP This approach would also provide further “JFLCC will normally assign an Army maneu- 3–10. Outside of the land combat command- assurance for the continued availability ver enhancement brigade [MEB] for security er’s area of operations and in conjunction of strategic airpower capabilities across of defined geographic areas.” The MEB is with the host nation, Navy and Coast Guard theaters worldwide while providing an described as “a modular support brigade [that] forces are tasked with securing the shore additional layer of insurance and security . . . performs joint security and protection boundaries for joint seaport facilities as well for the continued technological superiority tasks.”10 MEBs do not normally deploy with as “waterside harbor approach[es]” during of U.S. airpower in a constrained budgetary their own subordinate units, but can provide normal operations.12 While it is intuitively environment. JFQ command and control for MP and airspace obvious that JFMCC forces are tasked with management units as well as engineer, air providing security for their own sea or river NOTES defense, and various other specialties assigned approaches, the solution for securing shore 1 Joint Publication (JP) 3–10, Joint Security to other brigades and divisions.11 approaches is instructive in resolving the Operations in Theater (Washington, DC: The Joint The MEB was also designed to incor- apparent doctrinal seam with regard to aerial Staff, February 3, 2010), available at . area security and control mission set, which In “high risk situations” where the 2 Government Accountability Office (GAO), could provide the joint platform necessary for shore boundary of the harbor facility of Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in assessing potential SAM launch sites and con- a seaport is not located within the com- U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable trolling patrols and observation posts to defeat mander’s area of operations, JP 3–10 sug- Air Defense Systems, 04–519 (Washington, DC: this threat to joint air operations. Unfor- gests attaching a unit from another Service GAO, June 3, 2004). tunately, as previously indicated, JP 3–10 as a mobile security force for defense of 3 Christopher Bolkcom, Andrew Feickert, and provides conflicting guidance with regard to the seaport under the tactical control of Bartholomew Elias, Homeland Security: Protecting component responsibilities for securing aerial the Harbor Defense Commander (HDC). Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, RL31741 (Washing- ton, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006). approach and departure corridors for joint This approach to seaport facility defense 4 Ibid. airfields, and although the MEB is an implied should instruct efforts to revise the Air 5 The National Military Strategy of the United solution for securing the areas outside of joint Base Defense Considerations section in JP States of America 2011: Redefining America’s Mili- 3–10. During lower threat operations at joint tary Leadership (Washington, DC: Chairman of airfields, the SAA should be tasked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), available at . after insurgent attack and departure corridors off the airfield in 6 Ibid. conjunction with the host nation, similar to 7 Field Manual (FM) 3–39, Military Police Opera- the HDC commitment of JFMCC security tions (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department forces to shore approaches. During higher of the Army, February 16, 2010). 8 Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures threat operations, JP 3–10 should suggest the 3–10.2, Integrated Base Defense Command and provision of a detachment of JFLCC forces Control (Washington, DC: Headquarters Depart- in support of the JFACC and under the tacti- ment of the Air Force, March 1, 2008). cal control of the SAA to provide enhanced 9 JP 3–17, Air Mobility Operations (Washington, security for the air assets landing at and DC: The Joint Staff, October 2, 2009), available at departing from joint airfields while preserv- . ing the command and control responsibili- 10 JP 3–10. ties outlined in chapter II of JP 3–10. 11 FM 3–90.31, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade The United States enjoys airpower Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters advantages that are the envy of friend Department of the Army, February 26, 2009). 12 and foe alike. As adversaries continue the JP 3–10. search for inexpensive, low-tech counters to U.S. military superiority, joint doctrine must evolve to ensure that low-density/

U.S. Air Force (Horace Murray) U.S. Air Force high-demand assets are afforded the security commensurate with their impor- tance to national security. Standardizing a

138 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Joint Terminology At the Heart of Doctrine

By GEORGE H. HOCK, JR.

ecently, the largest component 250,000 individual page views and 23,000 full are in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, of the joint force, the U.S. document downloads per month. begging the question of their utility as entries. Army, confirmed its new Over 25 years after the Goldwater- In late 2005, however, the joint/Service chief of staff, General Martin Nichols Department of Defense Reorgani- terminologist’s working group embarked on R zation Act of 1986 mandated “jointness,” the sourcing project guided by the mantra Dempsey. General Dempsey, speaking 2 days after his nomination, outlined issues Service personnel still sometimes struggle to “precise terms used precisely” and nears that he thinks are important for the Army communicate with one another during joint completion today. The results of this multi- going forward—one of which is “getting the operations. No doubt there has been marked phase long-term effort is that from the high words right.” Dempsey, who previously com- improvement, but there is room for more. water mark of approximately 6,000 DOD and manded U.S. Army Training and Doctrine In 1989, OSD decided that joint terminol- North Atlantic Treaty Organization terms in Command, emphasized that the Service is ogy should be consolidated in one place and 2005 in JP 1–02, approximately 2,500 of them making changes to its core doctrine, and for managed accordingly. The responsibility was (without approved sources and those that are that reason he is serious about getting the transferred to the J7. The Secretary of Defense, deemed unnecessary) have been removed. The definitions right. Words matter. He went on in DOD Directive 5025.12, Standardization of fourth and final term sourcing coordination is to stress why doctrinal language is so impor- Military and Associated Terminology, directed in progress. There are still 1,250 terms without tant by quoting Mark Twain: “The difference the use of JP 1–02 (originally called JCS Pub 1) sources annotated in JP 1–02, but they have between the almost-right word and the right throughout DOD to ensure standardization of candidate sources identified for resolution word is really a large matter—it’s the differ- military and associated terminology. The idea during the current JP revision cycle. It should ence between the lightning bug and the light- was not to capture the voluminous Service- be noted that each removed term is kept if ning.” Current joint terminology efforts are specific technical terms but those of a broader ever needed again, along with over 20,000 consistent with its Service counterparts’ com- nature that have significance in the planning other entries in the JTMD archive. Wave is mitment to ensuring concise, clear language. and conduct of joint operations. Currently, now more appropriately defined in a military It is Department of Defense (DOD) there are ongoing initiatives to improve JP context in JP 1–02, but white cap remains a policy to improve communications and 1–02 which include appropriately standard- target of our project. mutual understanding within the department, izing and annotating source publications for The other joint terminology initiative among other Federal agencies, and between all entries. in progress is standardizing entries by enforc- the United States and its international part- As early as 1993, source documents were ing the brief “Definition Writing Guide” ners through standardization of military and identified and noted in JP 1–02 and the newly benchmarks. This guide is part of the recently associated terminology. Joint Publication developed Joint Terminology Master Database updated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JP) 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and (JTMD) in order to provide a contextual basis Instruction (CJCSI) 5705.01D, “Standardiza- Associated Terms and its associated database for proper understanding of each term. Addi- tion of Military and Associated Terms,” which are the key documents within the joint tionally, a process was established for terms governs JP 1–02. Concise terminology is criti- doctrine discipline that support this policy. to be reviewed regularly as part of the normal cal to military communication, and the CJCSI It is the primary terminology source when revision cycle of the source document to guidance makes a stark distinction between preparing correspondence, including policy, ensure relevance. This methodology of sourc- desired definitions and unwanted descrip- strategy, doctrine, and planning documents ing terms in conjunction with the normal tions. A definition is a formal statement of the and applies to the Office of the Secretary of joint doctrine development process continues. exact meaning of a term that enables it to be Defense (OSD), Services, Joint Staff, combat- Yet even with such a process, entries such as distinguished from any other. A description, ant commands, DOD agencies, and all other “white cap—a small wave breaking offshore as in contrast, is a narrative containing informa- DOD components. As such, it is by far the a result of the action of strong winds. See also most widely referenced document within the wave” remain in JP 1–02. White cap and wave Lieutenant Colonel George H. Hock, Jr., USAF, is a entire body of joint doctrine, receiving nearly were defined in JP 1–02 almost exactly as they DOD Terminologist and Joint Doctrine Planner in the Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Doctrine Branch.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 139 JOINT DOCTRINE | Update tion about the term that is not constrained relevance of entries in JP 1–02 for the user. operations that much more important. J7 is in format or content. Only definitions are The U.S. military is the most advanced, spe- committed to furthering the mantra of precise permitted in JP 1–02. cialized, and complex joint force the world terms used precisely and will continue to The primary focus of J7 guiding instruc- has ever seen, which makes a broad, overarch- ensure joint terminology is maintained at the tion and efforts is to ensure the quality and ing joint lexicon designed to cross-connect heart of doctrine. JFQ

JPs Under Revision JP 3–33, Joint Task Force Headquarters JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States JP 3–34, Joint Engineer Operations JP 1–0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations JP 1–04, Legal Support to Military Operations JP 3–40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction JP 1–06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations JP 3–41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High- JP 2–0, Joint Intelligence Yield Explosives Consequence Management JP 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military JP 3–50, Personnel Recovery Operations JP 3–57, Civil-Military Operations JP 2–03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations JP 3–59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations JP 3–0, Joint Operations JP 3–60, Joint Targeting JP 3–00.1, Strategic Communication JP 3–63, Detainee Operations JP 3–01, Countering Air and Missile Threats JP 3–72, Nuclear Operations JP 3–03, Joint Interdiction JP 4–0, Joint Logistics JP 3–04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations JP 4–01, The Defense Transportation System JP 3–07, Stability Operations JP 4–01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations JP 3–07.3, Peace Operations JP 4–01.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Trans- JP 3–07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations portation Terminal Operations JP 3–08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint JP 4–01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations JP 4–02, Health Service Support JP 3–12, Cyberspace Operations JP 4–06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations JP 3–13, Information Operations JP 4–08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare JP 4–10, Operational Contract Support JP 3–13.3, Operations Security JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning JP 3–13.4, Military Deception JP 6–01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations JP 3–15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint JPs Revised (within last 6 months) Operations JP 2–01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support JP 3–15.1, Counter–Improvised Explosive Device Operations in Joint Operations JP 3–16, Multinational Operations JP 3–05, Special Operations JP 3–27, Homeland Defense JP 3–68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations JP 3–28, Civil Support JP 4–03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine JP 3–32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations

140 JFQ / issue 62, 3 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu USEUCOM Department of Defense – Department of State Inside AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY Issue 62, 3d Quarter 2011 USEUCOM Every 2 years, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff s required by law to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographi- USNORTHCOM Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue cal boundaries of each geographic combatant command in the U.S. military and recommend to the President, through the Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Secretary of Defense, any changes that may be necessary. The review process includes combatant commanders, Service chiefs, and Department of Defense (DOD) leadership. Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 From the Chairman Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. DOD Unifi d Command Plan (UCP) 2011 is a key strategic document that established the missions, responsibilities, and Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Forum geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) for commanders of combatant commands. DOD geographic commands’ areas are encompassed within designated borders. President Barack Obama signed the document April 6, 2011. Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 6 Executive Summary Visual Design Editor Tara J. Parekh Adjustments in the 2011 UCP make U.S. Northern Command responsible for advocating for Arctic capabilities; U.S. Africa Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A 8 Chairman’s Conference on Military Professionalism: An Overview Command’s maritime boundary will include the Cape Verde zone; and U.S. Southern Command will include the maritime Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich By Albert C. Pierce boundary of the South Sandwich Islands. Design John Mitrione, Jeremy Swanston, Functional Command Revisions Identity in the Profession of Arms By Ann E. Rondeau U.S. Government Printing Office 10 U.S. Strategic Command’s responsibility for combating weapons of mass destruction and developing a Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations is expanded. U.S. Transportation Command is assigned responsibility for synchronizing planning of Who Is a Member of the Military Profession? By Matthew Moten Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 14 global distribution operations. by 18 The Enlisted Force and Profession of Arms By Bryan B. Battaglia The mission of the State Department Regional Bureaus is to implement U.S. foreign policy, conduct diplomatic relations, and manage and promote U.S. interests in their respective regions. State Department Regional Bureau areas of responsibility include Keeping Integrity By Leon A. Edney land areas within DOD AORs and overlap multiple DOD AORs (see color key). 20 North Atlantic Ocean NDU Press is the National Defense University’s N o rth Professional Disagreement and Policy By Paul D. 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Foundation By Ian Bryan USPACOM Department of Defense Geographic Commands Gulf of Aden This is the official U.S. Department of Defense Special Feature edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without The Strategist as Hero By Colin S. Gray U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Pacific Ocean permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 37 USEUCOM Indian Ocean Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever A Diplomat’s Philosophy By Marc Grossman U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) material is quoted from or based on its content. 46 USPACOM NORTH 52 Planning Is Everything By Mark A. 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Please direct editorial communications to the USAFRICOM link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: Building the Security Force That Won’t Leave By William B. Caldwell IV Department of State Regional Bureaus 74 South Pacific Editor, Joint Force Quarterly and Nathan K. Finney National Defense University Press Ocean Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs USSOUTHCOM 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) ANTARCTICA Fort Lesley J. McNair A Road Map for Beating Latin America’s Transnational Criminal 81 d Washington, DC 20319 Organizations By Martin Edwin Andersen Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 3 Quarter 2011 A Professional Military Journal Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Bureau of African Affairs USSOUTHCOM 89 America’s Endangered Arsenal of Democracy By M. Thomas Davis Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 and Nathaniel C. Fick by National Defense University Press Indian Email: [email protected] Institute for National Strategic Studies Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Ocean JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu National Defense University, Washington, DC USAFRICOM Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs South Atlantic Ocean 3d Quarter, July 2011 ISSN 1070-0692 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Issue 62, 3d Quarter 2011

NEW from NDU Press Understanding War in Afghanistan by Joseph J. Collins JFQ Call for Entries for the Academic Year 2011–2012 The author describes this concise book as an “intellectual primer on war in Afghanistan.” Joseph J. Collins is one of few people qualified to make such a claim. His career as a Soldier, Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and the policymaker, and academic has kept him involved for more than 30 years with the various wars in this central Asian country, from the Soviet occupation through current U.S. operations. The book Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Defense and attempts to provide military leaders, civil servants, diplomats, and students with the intellectual basis to prepare for further study of or assignment in Afghanistan. After examining the land, people, and Military Strategy Essay Competition culture, the book covers the history of the country, including the Soviet-Afghan War, the civil war, the advent of the Taliban, the war against the Taliban, and the U.S. effort from 2001 to the present. It also includes a chapter on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, which Collins describes As a military or civilian defense professional and student, Who’s Eligible: You, the military or civilian student—including international students— as essential to understanding the nature of the current conflict. He concludes with the potential of a U.S. senior war college, staff college, or advanced warfighting school, or Service choices and issues facing national leaders for the future, notably the necessity for the United States to you probably have something to say about a U.S. national redouble its efforts in building Afghan capacity so that the country can stand on its own two feet. research fellow. security topic familiar to you. Start NOW to explore ideas, map out research, and outline your argument before you What: Research and write an essay, with options to write a concise opinion piece (1,500 are caught up in the school year. words max) or a documented research paper (5,000 words max). Must be original research

or informed commentary, unclassified, and submitted via your college after an internal se- PRISM JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY lection process. May relate to a course writing requirement. Not a school solution—but an A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations innovative, imaginative approach to a national security-related issue of your choosing. PRISM 2, no. 3 (June 2011) takes on a variety of topics on complex operations, although several offerings focus on aspects of criminal activities. The Features section opens with Lieutenant MILITARY General Robert Caslen and Major Bradley Loudon writing on forging a comprehensive approach When: The deadline for colleges to submit entries to NDU Press is April 25, 2012. After an to counterinsurgency. The next three articles deal with aspects of the criminal challenge for initial round of judging, final judging occurs May 15–16, 2012, by a panel of PME faculty counterinsurgency and complex operations, and include Douglas Farah on terrorist-criminal pipelines and criminalized states, Colonel Robert Killebrew on criminal insurgency in the . PROFESSIONALISM judges who meet at National Defense University Americas, and Professor Bruce Baker on building law-enforcement capacity in Africa. The remaining Feature articles present Professor Stephen Krasner on state-building, the Honorable Franklin Kramer on irregular conflict, Dr. Max Manwaring on three cases of transnational USEUCOM It is strongly recommended you begin your planning and research in fall 2011 in order to criminal organizations, and Dr. James Carafano on interagency reform. Next, From the Field allow time for your school to evaluate and select nominations for the contests. To keep articles include, from Germany, Dr. James Derleth and Jason Alexander on stability operations; . from Haiti, David Becker on gangs and “community counterinsurgency”; and from the Pacific, the competition manageable, the number of entries is capped for each school Dr. Andrew Leith on regional assistance to the Solomon Islands. The Lessons Learned article, by STRATEGIST AS HERO USEUCOM Dr. Stephen Mains and Dr. Gil Ad Ariely, discusses the management of operational knowledge. USNORTHCOM Why: A chance to help solve a national security problem. A chance to catch the ear of the Finally, the issue concludes with an interview of General David Petraeus. COMPLEX RELIEF OPS Secretary or the Chairman. A chance to be published in DOD’s premier journal Joint Force PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity Quarterly, with its 15,000 print readers and more than 3,000 per month on-line readers. A increases in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, chance to gain peer and faculty recognition. Monetary prizes courtesy of NDU Foundation. and irregular warfare. Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM CENTER FOR welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially civil-military COMPLEX OPERATIONS DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT integration. Manuscript submissions should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email For further information, contact your college’s essay coordinator, or go to: to [email protected]. ISSUE SIXTY-TWO, 3 http:///www.ndu.edu/press/essayCompetitions.html

These essay competitions are conducted by NDU Press with the generous financial support D of the NDU Foundation. The NDU Foundation is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization established QUARTER 2011 to support the mission and goals of the National Defense University, America’s preeminent North Atlantic Ocean JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY N o rth Pacific institution for national security, strategy, and defense education. Ocean Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press North Pacific National Defense University, Washington, DC Ocean USCENTCOM

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USSOUTHCOM NEW from NDU Press Understanding War in Afghanistan by Joseph J. Collins JFQ

The author describes this concise book as an “intellectual primer on war in Afghanistan.” Joseph J. Collins is one of few people qualified to make such a claim. His career as a Soldier, policymaker, and academic has kept him involved for more than 30 years with the various wars in this central Asian country, from the Soviet occupation through current U.S. operations. The book attempts to provide military leaders, civil servants, diplomats, and students with the intellectual basis to prepare for further study of or assignment in Afghanistan. After examining the land, people, and culture, the book covers the history of the country, including the Soviet-Afghan War, the civil war, the advent of the Taliban, the war against the Taliban, and the U.S. effort from 2001 to the present. It also includes a chapter on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, which Collins describes as essential to understanding the nature of the current conflict. He concludes with the potential choices and issues facing national leaders for the future, notably the necessity for the United States to redouble its efforts in building Afghan capacity so that the country can stand on its own two feet.

PRISM JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations PRISM 2, no. 3 (June 2011) takes on a variety of topics on complex operations, although several offerings focus on aspects of criminal activities. The Features section opens with Lieutenant General Robert Caslen and Major Bradley Loudon writing on forging a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency. The next three articles deal with aspects of the criminal challenge for counterinsurgency and complex operations, and include Douglas Farah on terrorist-criminal pipelines and criminalized states, Colonel Robert Killebrew on criminal insurgency in the Americas, and Professor Bruce Baker on building law-enforcement capacity in Africa. The remaining Feature articles present Professor Stephen Krasner on state-building, the Honorable Franklin Kramer on irregular conflict, Dr. Max Manwaring on three cases of transnational

criminal organizations, and Dr. James Carafano on interagency reform. Next, From the Field articles include, from Germany, Dr. James Derleth and Jason Alexander on stability operations; from Haiti, David Becker on gangs and “community counterinsurgency”; and from the Pacific, Dr. Andrew Leith on regional assistance to the Solomon Islands. The Lessons Learned article, by Dr. Stephen Mains and Dr. Gil Ad Ariely, discusses the management of operational knowledge. Finally, the issue concludes with an interview of General David Petraeus.

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM CENTER FOR welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially civil-military COMPLEX OPERATIONS DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT integration. Manuscript submissions should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to [email protected]. ISSUE SIXTY-TWO, 3 D QUARTER 2011

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC