War As Nothing but a Duel: War As an Institution and the Construction of the Western Military Profession

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War As Nothing but a Duel: War As an Institution and the Construction of the Western Military Profession J. Military Stud. 2018; X(X): 1–13 Research Article Open Access Ilmari Käihkö* War as nothing but a duel: war as an institution and the construction of the Western military profession DOI 10.2478/jms-2018-0003 armed forces, which provided enemies with vulnerabili- Received December 18, 2017; accepted June 20, 2018 ties ripe to be exploited (1995: 60). This was a problem that Hew Strachan returned to when he argued that the end of Abstract: Like all repetitive human interaction, even war has the Cold War made the past decades’ strategic vocabulary been institutionalized and fought according to conventions obsolete (2013: 41). Arguably, the polarization between the and norms. Historically, this institutionalization is apparent two superpowers and the mutual possession of nuclear from the way war has been compared to the duel, first in weapons meant that war had lost its rationality: no jus- the 14th century and most famously by Carl von Clausewitz tification could warrant the resulting degree of death and 5 centuries later. This article continues this train of thought destruction of nuclear war. As a result, all other strategic and argues that the observed limits of Western “professional thinking paled in comparison to deterrence and avoiding – orthodoxy” and “strategic vocabulary” can be traced to how not fighting – war. Yet, when the threat of Armageddon war has been institutionalized by the military profession. passed, threats that had previously been deemed insignif- This offers an alternative explanation to the prevailing views icant gained in importance. This was especially the case of why the West has struggled in contemporary wars: it is the with nonstate actors. fundamental mismatch between these professional norms in While these actors were not new, it was only the terror the West and those held by their opponents that forms the attacks in September 2001 and the following declaration biggest asymmetry in contemporary war. As this asymmetry of a global war against terror that brought them to the is unlikely to disappear, these professional norms need to be center of the attention of international security. Yet, as reconsidered: just like the aristocracy with the duel by the has since become clear, despite the discovery of numer- late 19th century, the Western military profession appears ous prefixes to war, no new strategic vocabulary has been stuck in an institution that is increasingly becoming obsolete. devised to help in dealing with these actors. As Jan Willem Without such reconsideration, the attainment of decision – Honig (2016: 275–276) has argued, the militaries of devel- the central strategic objective in war – and hence victory in oped states continue to “labour under the tyranny of out- future wars will remain uncertain. moded ideas of how war and strategy work” to the point Keywords: Clausewitz, cultural sociology, duel, institu- that mere adaptation “without thinking about war and tions, military culture, strategy, war strategy in novel ways” has resulted in limited success in recent wars in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.1 What is at stake here is nothing less than victory and Introduction: why does the West defeat in future wars. Yet, while Bacevich (1995: 60) saw not win? 1 Shifting focus from developments in Afghanistan to the primacy In his 1995 essay, A. J. Bacevich wrote about the “persis- of standing together with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tent limitations of professional orthodoxy” within the US allies or highlighting the lessons useful in national defence (as the Norwegian and Swedish official inquiries, respectively, attempted to do) is beside the point here: no later reprioritization will change the *Corresponding author: Ilmari Käihkö, Department of Security, fact that the NATO-led coalition struggled against the deteriorating Strategy and Leadership, Swedish Defence University, Östermalm, situation (Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon 2016; Stockholm, Sweden; Department of Sociology, Uppsala University, Regeringen 2017), and that the European responses largely followed Uppsala, Sweden, E-mail: [email protected] the same patterns (Honig and Käihkö 2014). Open Access. © 2018 Käihkö, published by Sciendo. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. Unauthenticated Download Date | 11/28/18 8:35 AM 2 Käihkö, War as nothing but a duel that these professional limitations were not new, he pessi- that it possesses its own norms, based on an understand- mistically saw that “most of it is unavoidable”. This article ing of war comparable to another institution, that of the takes a slightly more positive take on the issue. None of duel. This is, however, not to say that war in practice this may be new, but it is not impossible to reinvent this equals to a duel, a notion questioned by the realities of professional vocabulary. The aim of this paper is thus to contemporary war. Nevertheless, and as motivated by Carl contribute to this debate through the investigation of the von Clausewitz’s (2004: 1) famous maxim that “war is most central institution of the military profession – war. nothing but a duel on an extensive scale”, it appears that In more concrete terms, this paper follows the observation the military profession is increasingly stuck in a similar made by Philip Smith (2005: 4), who argued that “war is situation with contemporary war as the aristocracy was not just about culture, but it is all about culture”. While with the duel by the late 19th century – clinging to an admittedly taking a very extreme view, as he disregarded institution that is increasingly becoming obsolete. the material realities of war, Smith’s observation never- This case of cultural specificity is suggested not only theless nicely summed up an emerging trend within the by the struggles against irregular opponents who adhere sociological study of war, which emphasizes normative to different conventions (hence the notion of “uncon- dimensions and which clearly draws from the study of ventional” war), but even by the recent conceptual con- culture (Keegan 1994; Legro 1995; Farrell 2005; Kramer fusion apparent in prefixes to war, such as hybrid. While 2008; Van Creveld 2009). While Smith’s focus was public the concept clearly illustrates the crisis of the deeply held discourse, he rightfully saw that cultural explanations understanding of war as something that can be executed have been lacking even when it comes to conduct of war in an apolitical and linear manner, it has resulted in and military life alike. As a result, he argued that, “military limited reevaluation of the concept of war or the respon- action is taken as a paradigm exemplar of what efficient, sibilities of the military profession. The contribution of goal directed but ultimately meaningless collective social drawing parallels between duel and war as comparable action looks like” (Smith 2005: 5–6). Yet, as suggested by institutions suggests that the obsolete professional vocab- his idea of cultural systems (Smith 2005: 11), orthodox pro- ulary too can be rethought to better match the demands fessional norms that limit available courses of action have of contemporary warfare, by which I simply mean armed become a core problem in recent wars. After all – and as conflict. In fact, this may well be necessary in order to win several contemporary wars well illustrate – it is not only in future wars. tactical battlefield proficiency that delivers victory. Just This article proceeds in six steps. The following like Thomas Schelling (1980) attributed the nonuse of section discusses war as an institution, as well as the nec- nuclear weapons during the Cold War to shared conven- essary caveats of the argument carried here. The compar- tions, this article argues that short of complete annihi- ison between duel and war can be historically traced to lation, a shared understanding of war is required before 14th-century thinkers, who were looking for a stable foun- violence can lead to conflict resolution and durable peace. dation that enabled the institutionalization of war. Yet, Recent experiences in armed conflicts highlight the it is far from certain that war is understood in the same fundamental discrepancy between the understandings of manner everywhere and by everyone: it should hence war held by the Western military profession2 on the one not be investigated primarily as a Eurocentric legal insti- hand and those of its enemies and allies on the other. tution. The third section continues this train of thought Previous research has illustrated the importance of these and departs from the classic comparison of war as nothing kinds of collective military professional conventions. For but a duel, or an institution. Similar institutionalization of instance, Jeffrey Legro (1995) has argued that ideas of war war is evident in increasingly uniform vocabulary, norms, and organizational culture within military bureaucracies and organization of Western militaries to the extent that trumped the preferences of national leaders on the use of by the end of the First World War, it became possible to force during the Second World War. This article extends speak of a Western military profession, united by a shared this finding to the Western military profession and argues understanding of war. The fourth section focuses on com- paring the duel-like understanding of war that both gives 2 These commonalities echo James Gow’s (2005: 7) observation a positive narrative and internal cohesion to the military about the West as a construction “created by factors such as geog- profession and makes war an effective institution of con- raphy, history, culture, politics, religion, philosophy, and identity” flict resolution. The fifth section argues that this view of fundamentally based on exclusivity. Hence, the West refers to the war risks becoming obsolete. This is illustrated by a lack developed states that have organized themselves (including their militaries) according to these shared conventions and that perceive of mutual understanding and recognition between oppo- others who have not done so as distinct.
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