The Complexities of Nonpoint Source Pollution
CULTIVATING COLLABORATIVE PARTNERSHIPS IN
NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BIG DARBY
A thesis presented to the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Master of Science
Tamara Lim Melton
June 2003 This thesis entitled
Cultivating Collaborative Partnerships in Natural Resource Conservation:
Lessons Learned from the Big Darby
By
Tamara Lim Melton
has been approved for
the Program of Environmental Studies
and the College of Arts and Sciences by
Geoffrey L. Buckley
Assistant Professor of Geography
Leslie A. Flemming
Dean, College of Arts & Sciences MELTON, TAMARA L. MS. June 2003. Program of Environmental Studies
Cultivating Collaborative Partnerships in Natural Resource Conservation: Lessons Learned from the Big Darby (129pp.)
Director of Thesis: Geoffrey Buckley
Governmental policy addressing nonpoint source pollution has been significantly transformed over the past 30 years; however actual water quality improvements have been meager. Experts purport that alternative, non-regulatory methods to approaching water quality reform should be considered. The collaborative approach, which emphasizes involvement of all relevant stakeholders during project planning and implementation, is one method that has shown potential to bring about long-term ecological improvements.
The primary research questions driving this study are as follows: What factors enable collaboration to be successful? What constitutes “success”? What are the barriers to collaboration, particularly in agricultural watersheds? And how can these barriers be overcome?
Relying on interviews with key stakeholders and other qualitative data, I relate an account of a conflict faced by two conservation collaboratives in the Big Darby Watershed in Ohio and discuss the lessons learned by each party. These findings provide suggestions for the future success of collaborative partnerships in this watershed and beyond.
Approved:
Geoffrey L. Buckley
Professor of Geography
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude first to the farmers, governmental and non- governmental personnel, and other experts who willingly participated in and contributed to my research.
I am grateful to my advisor, Geoff Buckley, for his sound advice, encouragement, and good nature. The freedom he allowed me as my research developed, combined with his constructive feedback, made this process a very positive learning experience. I sincerely thank my committee members Mary Stoertz, Rich Greenlee, and Brad Jokisch for their wise and thoughtful contributions at my defense. I also thank Gene Mapes, director of the MSES program, who helped make my experience at Ohio University a rewarding one.
This research was also significantly supported by generous funding by the Ohio
University Council of Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activity and the John Houk
Memorial Research Grant, to whom I am grateful.
I especially thank my good family, Sam and Rene Sakorafis, Larry Lim, Kelli and
Nikki Lim, and Howard and Jacque Melton, who have strengthened me by their constant encouragement and faith.
And finally, I express my heartfelt thanks to Jim, my “in-house” editor, whose support and love made this a reality.
5
Table of Contents Page Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………….3
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………….4
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………6
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………....6
Chapter 1. Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution: Examining the Problem and Finding a Solution Through Collaboration...………………………………………………..7 Scope and Consequences of Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution………………8 Challenges in Addressing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution………………...10 Regulatory Efforts to Abate Nonpoint Source Pollution…………………………..12 Non-regulatory Efforts to Abate Nonpoint Source Pollution: Collaboration as a Solution………………………………………………………..18 The Big Darby Watershed: A Collaborative Effort………………………………...21 Research Questions and Methodology…………………………………………….22 Significance of Research…………………………………………………………..23 Outline of Upcoming Chapters…………………………………………………....24
Chapter 2. Literature Review……………………………………………………………...26 Historical Background: The Emergence of Collaborative Partnerships……………26 Collaborative Partnerships Defined……………………………………………….29 The Value of Collaborative Partnerships…………………………………………..30 Key Elements of Successful Collaborative Partnerships…………………………...33 Barriers to Collaboration………………………………………………………….36 Collaborative Partnerships in the Big Darby Creek Watershed……………………45
Chapter 3. Methods………………………………………………………………………50 Why Qualitative Research?...... 50 Qualitative Research Design………………………………………………………52
Chapter 4. Findings………………………………………………………………………66 Researcher’s Background Sketch…………………………………………………..66 General Findings………………………………………………………………….68 Narrative: Collaborative Partnerships in the Darby and the Wildlife Refuge Controversy…………………………………………………..69 Follow-up Responses from Interviewees………………………………………....101 Narrative Analysis………………………………………………………………..104
Chapter 5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..112 What is “Success”?...... 112 What Factors Enable Collaboration to be Successful?...... 113 Topics for Further Study………………………………………………………....121
References……………………………………………………………………………….123 6
List of Tables
Table
1. Sources of Nonpoint Source Pollution in the United States……………………………10
List of Figures
Figure
1. Big Darby Watershed (OEPA 2002)…………………………………………………...22
7
CHAPTER ONE
AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION: EXAMINING THE PROBLEM AND FINDING A SOLUTION THROUGH COLLABORATION
Agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is a problem of national and international scope. Nutrient-rich runoff from the Mississippi River watershed has depleted oxygen in the Gulf of Mexico, damaging the Gulf ecosystem. Recognizing the potential economic and ecological impacts of nonpoint source pollution, the U.S. has responded with regulations, the most significant of which are the Clean Water Act, namely sections 319
(nonpoint source control) and 303d (Total Maximum Daily Loads). Though these regulations have resulted in considerable reforms, nonpoint source pollution has remained problematic. Through examining the case study of the Big Darby Watershed, this thesis argues that non-regulatory, collaborative approaches that involve stakeholders in the planning of conservation programs are necessary in order to increase participation and ultimately address the problem of NPS pollution.
The primary research questions driving this thesis are: What factors enable collaboration to be successful? What constitutes “success” (i.e. engagement, sustainability, water quality improvements, implementation of best management practices, etc.)? What are the barriers to collaboration, particularly in agricultural watersheds? And how can these barriers be overcome? Relying on interviews with key stakeholders and other qualitative data, I will offer an account of a conflict faced by two collaboratives in the Big Darby and discuss the lessons learned by each party, in hopes to provide suggestions for the future success of collaborative partnerships in the Big Darby and beyond.
8
Scope and Consequences of Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution
The waters of the northern Gulf of Mexico have received a great deal of attention
over the past decade due to an alarming increase in hypoxia, a condition characterized by
dramatic decreases in dissolved oxygen levels. The Gulf hypoxic zone reached its greatest
extent in 1999, stretching across more than 8,000 square miles, an area equivalent to the state
of New Jersey. Data gathered from the Gulf over a 15-year span indicates that the average
area of hypoxia for the period 1993 to 1999 was almost double that for the period 1985 to
1992 (NSTC 2000).
Hypoxia has had a disastrous and widespread effect on both the Gulf ecosystem and
economy. Oxygen-depleted waters have been blamed for declining populations of fish,
shrimp, and zooplankton (Ibid.). Hypoxic conditions have also disturbed food web cycles,
and had negative impacts on the valuable Gulf economy, forcing commercial fisheries to
move away from hypoxic zones and causing shrimping to decline over the past ten years
(Ibid.).
In response to the crisis, the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act
(P.L. 105-383) was passed by Congress in October 1998 and signed into law by President Bill
Clinton on November 13, 1998. The act called for the formation of six teams of experts from the National Science and Technology Council’s (NSTC) Committee on Environment and Natural Resources to review and analyze existing data in order to provide scientific baseline information, which would then be used to develop a plan of action to reduce, mitigate, and control hypoxia in the Gulf.
The lengthy study concluded that the dramatic spread of hypoxia was due to excess amounts of nonpoint source nitrogen entering the Gulf from the Mississippi River Basin
(Ibid.). These excess nutrients stimulated algal growth and oxygen consumption, in a process 9 known as eutrophication. More detailed analysis showed that agricultural lands in Iowa,
Illinois, Indiana, southern Minnesota, and Ohio were the principal sources of excess nitrogen (Ibid.), contributing approximately 65 percent of the total nitrogen yield of the
Mississippi-Atchafalaya River Basin (NSTC 2000).
The current condition of the Gulf of Mexico hardly overstates the problem of nonpoint source pollution in the United States. In the 1998 Federal Clean Water Action
Plan, former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Administrator Carol Browner stated, “Polluted runoff is the greatest source of water quality problems in the United States today.” Ninety percent of all impaired waters on the Clean Water Act Section 303(d) list are affected by polluted runoff (USEPA 2000). With respect to the Gulf, 90 percent of the pollution entering the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River Basin is from nonpoint sources, with 56 percent entering the Mississippi River above the Ohio, and 34 percent entering from the
Ohio basin itself (NSTC 2000, 14).
The 1998 USEPA report to Congress identified agriculture as the number one contributor of NPS pollution as well as the overall leading source of pollutants for surveyed rivers and streams (USEPA 2000). According to the report, agriculture accounted for 59 percent of the reported water quality problems in the United States, and affected about
170,000 river miles (USEPA 2000). (Refer to Table 1) 10
Table 1 Sources of Nonpoint Source Pollution in the United States Rank Rivers & Streams Lakes, Ponds, & Estuaries Reservoirs 1 Agriculture Agriculture Municipal point sources 2 Hydromodification Hydromodification Urban runoff / storm sewers 3 Urban runoff / storm Urban runoff / storm Atmospheric sewers sewers deposition 4 Municipal point Municipal point sources Industrial discharges sources 5 Resource extraction Atmospheric deposition Agriculture Source: USEPA 2000. “The Quality of Our Nation’s Waters.”
Though slightly decreased in 2000, agriculture still clearly remained the leading source of pollution of rivers and streams, affecting 129,000 river miles or 48 percent of all of the impaired river and stream miles assessed (USEPA 2002). Agricultural pollutants typically include sediments, nutrients, pathogens, pesticides, and salts which commonly wash into bodies of water from animal feeding operations or from agricultural lands as a result of plowing, pesticide spraying, irrigation, fertilizing, planting, and harvesting
(http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/facts/point6.htm).
Challenges in Addressing Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution
One reason why agricultural lands contribute so heavily to the hypoxia problem in the Gulf is that this type of pollution is difficult to track and regulate. Unlike point sources of pollution, which are relatively easy to identify, nonpoint sources of pollution, such as runoff from agricultural fields, are far more diffuse. Geographical factors which can influence the level of nonpoint source pollution include the slope of the land, amount of vegetative cover, and soil type, all of which can vary significantly over a small area. Weather 11 also plays a significant, not to mention unpredictable, role in agriculture, causing variables such as runoff flow, type of storm event, and season, to fluctuate (Wagner 2000).
To understand why agriculture is such a large NPS contributor, one has only to be reminded of the sheer amount of land devoted to agricultural production. According to the
1997 Census of Agriculture, 900 million acres, or 41 percent of the continental U.S., was used for agricultural production (U.S. Census of Agriculture 1997). In the state of Ohio alone, 15 million acres, or 57 percent of the state is used for agricultural production (Ohio
Agricultural Statistics Service 2001). Agriculture remains the single largest industry in Ohio today.
It is important, however, to consider other reasons why agriculture has remained
America’s number one water quality challenge. Historically, nonpoint source pollutants such as sediment, nutrients, fertilizers, and pesticides have received less attention from regulators than more “toxic” pollutants emitted by industry. While point source pollution regulations were spelled out in detail and strictly enforced, nonpoint source pollution regulations remained more ambiguous and were largely ignored by farmers and managers. Also, technological improvements over time have drastically reduced levels of pollution contributed by traditionally larger industrial polluters, moving agriculture higher on the list of big polluters (Libby 2001).
The process of managing nonpoint source pollution and enforcing regulations is also complex. At times, it seems arbitrary. After most water quality legislation created by
Congress reaches the narrative stage, authority is turned over to state-level EPAs to translate these criteria into site-specific, numerical values. A tremendous amount of decision-making power is thus left in the hands of the states. In the words of USEPA Administrator
Browner, “How do you determine, when you are looking at a large river basin, what level of 12 a pollutant is acceptable? It’s a very subjective judgment” (Conway 1997, 106). In the end, individual value judgments and partisan politics play a critical role in the establishment of water quality standards.
Regulation is further complicated by the fact that most agricultural lands are privately owned. The NSTC’s 2000 report suggested that changes in agricultural practices such as decreasing the application of nitrogen fertilizers, implementing alternative cropping systems, improving manure management, and developing more wetlands and vegetated riparian buffers showed high potential for success. A model created by the U.S. Mathematical
Programming Model for Agriculture (USMPM) predicted that implementation of these various management practices by farmers could reduce edge-of-field nitrogen losses by 20 percent, or 941,000 metric tons per year. Further, the report indicated that voluntary implementation of management practices “could provide many elements of a solution at least cost to society overall” (NSTC 2000). However, because these problems exist on private sector land, implementation of new management practices depends on each farmer’s willingness to change the way he or she farms, and not all farmers are committed to doing so.
Regulatory Efforts to Abate Nonpoint Source Pollution
The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987
The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972, though a legislative triumph for the regulation of industrial point source pollution, failed to address the issue of nonpoint source pollution.
Congress made its first significant effort to tackle NPS pollution with the enactment of
Section 319 in the 1987 amendments to the CWA. Section 319 added a “national policy” that nonpoint source control “programs” be “developed and implemented in an expeditious 13 manner so as to enable the goals of [the Clean Water Act] to be met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution” (33 U.S.C. 1251(a)(7)). Section 319 required states to submit reports to the EPA which identify waters impaired by NPS pollution; outline “best management practices” for reducing nonpoint source pollution; and identify existing state and local programs for controlling nonpoint source pollution.
Section 319 further required states and/or the EPA to establish management programs for controlling nonpoint source pollution and authorized the EPA to issue grants to states to implement approved management programs (Copeland 2001). Between 1990 and 1995, $370 million was awarded through the Section 319 provision and over 40 percent of the grants awarded were used specifically to control agricultural NPS pollution (Ibid.). In
1991, EPA established the National Monitoring program to evaluate the progress of state
NPS pollution control projects over a 6 to 10 year period. Since 1991, approximately 60 projects have been reviewed, 23 of which have been approved (NCSU Water Quality Group
2000). In Ohio, 319 grants have been used to fund a number of watershed projects, as well as to employ full-time watershed coordinator positions statewide. Used in this way, they have proven effective in addressing nonpoint source related water quality problems.
The 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments also established a program known as the
Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF), which currently stands as one of the most successful environmental infrastructure financing programs in the nation. Although the
CWSRF was originally used to assist wastewater treatment plants, EPA has encouraged states to look to CWSRF for all water improvement projects, including nonpoint source projects. To date, CWSRF has funded over 9,500 projects totaling $30 billion, and provided, on average, $3 billion in low interest loans annually. Upon repayment the money is recycled to fund other water quality projects (USEPA 2001). In Ohio, the State Revolving Fund 14 program has funded 900 projects since 1989, investing more than $650 million in polluted runoff projects (Ibid.).
At the same time, these legislative efforts have inherent weaknesses. Section 319 and
CWSRF provide funding for water pollution projects and coordinators, which is a monumental shift from CWA’s earlier “command-control” approach. However, the heavy- handed reputation of the federal government has caused the public to be very skeptical of new, more innovative federal programs. Further, the fate of federal water pollution programs is uncertain because they depend on the level of Congressional support any given year; thus it is important to note the role of the appropriations process in the implementation of federal water pollution programs. For FY 2001, the House and Senate approved $1.35 billion for CWSRF grants (the same level approved for FY2000), $288 million ($38 million more than requested) for Section 319 nonpoint pollution management grants (Copeland 2001). In FY2002, Congress appropriated $1.35 billion for CWSRF capitalization grants (Dorfman 2002).
The Rebirth of CWA Section 303(d): Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs)
One piece of legislation that has gone largely ignored was recently recognized by experts as “the best prospect now available for coming to grips with the last major, unregulated sources of water pollution in this country” (Houck 1999, 168). Section 303 of the 1972 CWA amendments states that when technology-based requirements were found insufficient to clean up certain rivers, streams or smaller water segments, a “water quality- based approach” is to be implemented, in which states are required to identify impaired waters, establish a priority ranking for these waters, and establish more stringent pollution limits or “Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs)”. TMDL is defined as “the amount of a 15 pollutant that a waterbody can receive and still meet water quality standards”
(www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/intro.html) and has been referred to as a “pollutant budget” for waters (Senior 2001) based on: 1) the amount of pollution originating from point sources, 2) the best estimate of pollution from natural background sources or nonpoint sources), and 3) a “margin of safety” to take into account seasonality and any other lack of knowledge. Thus, a TMDL is the sum of all available loads of any single pollutant from all contributing point and nonpoint sources. It also includes reductions needed to meet water quality standards and allocates those reductions among sources in the watershed.
In terms of the administrative level tasks of implementation and enforcement,
Congress intended TMDLs to be largely carried out by states who have the resources for day-to-day monitoring and enforcement. At the same time, EPA also envisioned it would oversee states’ efforts and promptly correct any mistakes made by states, such as where EPA believes a state has failed to take timely and appropriate action
(www.nwf.org/watersheds/factfiction.html).
The TMDL program was remarkable for its time as it embodied the principles of the new watershed or ecosystem management approach; instead of isolating individual pollutant problems as is the case with the NPDES permitting system, TMDLs considered all pollution sources and their ecosystem level cumulative effects upon a watershed (Conway 1997, 121).
As the phenomenon gained increasing legitimacy, the TMDL process was accepted by a growing body of scientists as federal policy appropriate for water quality restoration.
Although there was not yet consensus in terms of what a watershed approach should entail, the majority of managers admitted that a more holistic approach to management was long overdue. Thus, a water-quality approach was incorporated in the language of the 1972 act. 16
However due to factors of time and cost, TMDLs remained largely dormant, and the CWA adopted a predominantly technology-based approach.
The Clean Water Act Section 505(a): Litigation
During the 1990s, citizens attempted to change this pattern through the use of a long ignored secret weapon - Section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act – which authorizes citizens to bring suit in federal court against the EPA “where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the
Administrator” (33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2)). Though the courts historically deferred to the agency in most federal cases, during this period the courts found the EPA, on numerous occasions, acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The success of these cases prompted over 45 legal actions related to TMDLs to be filed since 1992
(www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/).
The media publicity and pressure brought on by both the litigation forced the EPA to take action. The EPA created an advisory committee in 1996, whose recommendations were used to shape the proposed TMDL Final Rule released in August 1999. The new rule proposed a detailed implementation plan for each TMDL produced, which was to be initiated by states, in order to give the states more flexibility in tailoring their management efforts (www.epa.gov/water). The TMDL not only tightened enforcement for point source pollution, but outlined what best management practices (BMPs) needed to be in place for nonpoint sources for a waterbody to meet water quality standards. Further revisions included mandatory intervention by USEPA if the state failed to make progress, time lines for implementation of TMDLs, and the establishment of methodologies for assessing the health of waters. 17
The proposal was hailed by most in the environmental community as a landmark achievement. USEPA referred to TMDLs as the “first step” in the development of watershed restoration action strategies and “crucial to success” in achieving water quality goals “because it [brought] rigor, accountability, and statutory authority to the process
(Wenig 1998, 13).
The 1999 proposal did not receive universal support, however. Thirteen congressional hearings were held during the 106th Congress to debate the matter, each of which were characterized by a vocal agriculture, livestock, and forestry opposition. During the public comment period, over 34,000 comments were submitted by agribusiness, industry, environmental groups, and numerous other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) expressing concern regarding the proposed rule. Despite the intense resistance by opposing groups, the proposal remained largely intact and was signed by the Clinton Administration on 13 July 2000. Congress, in opposition, responded by enacting an amendment to a larger appropriations bill which prohibited the EPA from using any funds designated for the 2000 or 2001FY to implement the new TMDL rule. Later that same year, Congress placed an 18- month delay on the TMDL rule (until April 30, 2003) to examine its scientific basis and to produce a document outlining estimate costs of design and implementation to all stakeholders (Ibid.). In February 2003, the Final Rule was formally withdrawn.
Regardless of the political discord it initiated, the TMDL program has proven
valuable, particularly in Ohio. For example, TMDLs that were conducted in the Big Darby
and Sugar Creek identified both watersheds as biologically valuable and critically threatened
resources. The national and local attention they received as a result of the TMDLs
stimulated a high level of interest and monetary support from the EPA, USDA, NRCS, and 18 numerous public universities. The state of Ohio has shown a consistent pattern of awarding
319 monies to TMDL-targeted and impaired watersheds.
At the same time, TMDLs are also problematic. Large governmental programs, such as the TMDL program, have earned the reputation for being costly and time-consuming.
USEPA estimated the TMDL program to cost states $63-69 million per year to develop and
$17 million per year to monitor (USEPA “The National Costs of the TMDL Program: Draft
Report,” 2001). This amount is in addition to the estimated $500 million state governments spend per year on water resource protection (USEPA “The Quality of Our Nation’s
Waters,” 2000). Budgetary constraints have also impacted restoration efforts. Of the 20
TMDLs underway in Ohio in 2002, almost all of them have been slowed as a result of budget cuts (Mount 2002). TMDLs are required to incorporate public review periods and hold public hearings, potentially adding months to the already lengthy process.
The technical demands of the program not only drain the EPA of valuable resources; they also give the false impression that water quality issues can be solved by purely technical means. Although technical water quality data can assess the general health of a given river or stream, the data do not contain the information necessary to assign limits to the amount of pollution that can be tolerated. According to Wagner, “Because we know so little about aquatic ecology and the effects of the hundreds of manmade pollutants on our rivers and streams, setting water quality standards involves making unverifiable approximations” (2000,
6).
Non-regulatory Efforts to Abate Nonpoint Source Pollution: Collaboration as a Solution
Despite the progress made by changes in federal policy, the hypoxic conditions in the Gulf of Mexico are a clear indication that regulatory efforts to abate NPS pollution have 19 been short-sighted. In fact, 40 percent of the nation’s waters still do not meet swimmable and fishable standards, as established by the CWA (USEPA “The Quality of Our Nation’s
Waters” 2002). Wendy Wagner, Professor of Law at the University of Texas, notes that the problem
… simply put, is that watershed management and the associated requirements for clean waters have been misframed as technical issues, when in fact public discourse is required for significant progress to be made in restoring degraded waters … without the support or involvement of the public, particularly at the state level where much of the regulatory authority rests, water protection programs are bound to drift aimlessly and ultimately fail. (Wagner 2000, 3)
For that very reason, policy makers have become more and more focused on working with agricultural producers (using incentives) instead of against them (using regulations). Early efforts along these lines were made with the establishment of the Rural
Clean Water Program (RCWP) by the USDA, which sponsored 21 projects between 1981 and 1995 and spent a total of $64 million (Osmond & Gale 1995). The RCWP, which was geared toward reducing NPS pollution through education outreach and cost-share assistance, was considered a success by many as it established a target voluntary producer participation rate of 75% and significantly reduced nutrient runoff in a number of projects (Gale et al
1993). For example, in Delaware, implementation of conservation tillage and animal waste management BMPs resulted in a 60% decrease in phosphorus and a 90% decrease in sediment to the impaired Appoquinimink River (Ibid.).
More recent efforts have also recognized the value of public support in conservation efforts. In his 1998 State of the Union address, President Clinton released the Clean Water
Action Plan (CWAP), in which the federal government intended to speed the restoration of the nation’s waters on a “watershed basis” through 1) “support[ing] locally led partnerships that include a broad array of federal agencies, states, tribes, communities, businesses, and 20 citizens to meet clean water and public health goals;” and 2) “increas[ing] financial and technical assistance to states, tribes, local governments, farmers, and others.” President
Clinton proposed $568 million in new resources in his FY 1999 budget to carry it out, bringing the total request to $2.5 billion. Congress appropriated $2 billion in FY1999 and
$2.2 billion in FY2000. For FY 2001, a 27% increase was requested totaling $2.8 billion
(Copeland 2000, 12).
There are a number of other government-funded programs which are currently working to achieve the goals of CWAP. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was initiated by the Food Security Act of 1985, which has as its objective to preserve sensitive croplands by converting them to permanent vegetative cover, in the form of riparian buffers, filter strips, and grassed waterways. Farmers willing to make this commitment for 10 to 15 years receive in exchange annual rental payments of up to $50,000 from the USDA, half the cost of establishing vegetative cover on the land, and technical assistance from their local
Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD). According to a 1994 report on the Big
Darby Watershed in Ohio, 16,706 acres or 19% of all eligible lands within the watershed, were enrolled in CRP, and the 1991 enrollment showed a 3.9% sediment reduction from
1988 levels (Gordon 1994).
Another initiative sponsored by the USDA is the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP), which is administered by the USDA through the 1996 Farm Bill. It provides educational, technical, and financial assistance (in the form of cost-sharing toward the implementation of BMPs) to farmers who agree to implement environmentally sound farm practices on their fields. Approximately $130 million was available in 1997 for the federal EQIP program, $3 million of which was awarded the state of Ohio toward water resource, livestock waste, and nutrient management (Rausch et al. 1997). EQIP funding was 21 increased in 2002 to $200 million annually. EQIP’s cost-sharing benefits are manifested in
Ohio’s North Fork subwatershed of Sugar Creek watershed, where farmers are eligible for cost share rates of 75% due to the creek’s priority designation as a critically-impaired resource (USDA 1997).
Government-facilitated initiatives, successful as they may be, still lack a critical component: public participation. Though farmers can participate in such programs, they are not involved in program design. For example, many farmers are interested in implementing
CRPs, but do not in the end, enroll acreage because of the term length of the easement.
Collaborative partnerships in conservation efforts may potentially alleviate these kinds of problems by involving all stakeholders in the entire process, including the planning stages of a program. Defined as joint initiatives made up of diverse stakeholder interests in a particular resource, collaborative partnerships have brought farmers, resource managers, scientists, and policy-makers together to discuss and understand their diverse interests, and compromise in order to find solutions that benefit all parties.
The Big Darby Watershed: A Collaborative Effort
The 82 mile-long Big Darby Creek in central Ohio is the most diverse aquatic system
of its size in the Midwest and has been designated as a USDA Hydrologic Unit Area (1991),
a “Last Great Place” by the Nature Conservancy (1991), and as a National Scenic River
(1994). The waters of the Big Darby are home to 103 species of fish and 38 freshwater mollusks (USFWS letter, 11 Feb 1999). Of that total, 14 species were classified as endangered and 28 species were classified as threatened or potentially threatened (Ibid.).
Beyond its stream banks, remnant prairie species such as the purple coneflower (Echinacea
purpurea), the threatened prairie false indigo (Baptisia lactea), and Indian paintbrush (Castilleja 22 coccinea) can also be found (www.dnr.state.oh.us/dnap/sr/bdarby.html). This watershed, which spans 557 square miles is not only heavily impacted by agriculture, but also by pressures from urban growth. Since 1991, farmers and other community leaders - with funding from USDA, OEPA, ODNR and numerous other agencies and grant foundations - have been collaborating to reduce sediment deposition into the Darby Creek. Through livestock exclusion, conservation tillage practices, and the creation of filter strips and wetlands, sediment deposition has been reduced by 35,000 tons / year. The Darby
Hydrological Unit Area program, Operation Future, and the Darby Creek Land Conservancy are just a few examples of collaborative partnerships which have set Big Darby watershed apart as a model for many other watersheds in Ohio as well as across the country.
Figure 1. Big Darby Watershed (OEPA 2002)
Research Questions and Methodology
The primary research questions driving this thesis are: What factors enable
collaboration to be successful? What constitutes “success” (i.e. engagement, sustainability,
water quality improvements, implementation of best management practices, etc.)? What are 23 the barriers to collaboration, particularly in agricultural watersheds? And how can these barriers be overcome?
Relying on informal interviews with key stakeholders (resource managers, administrators, government officials, and local farmers), newspaper and journal articles, public opinion surveys, and government documents, this thesis documents the conception and evolution of two collaborative partnerships in Ohio’s Big Darby Watershed. It identifies key successes and failures, as well as the major barriers that have stood in the way of success.
Ultimately, the goal of this research is to identify those factors that are most critical to effective partnering for resource conservation. Finally, the thesis suggests potential pathways for future study.
Significance of Research
Public support is essential to long-term success in natural resource management, and
promoting collaboration between managers and local citizens is one way this can take place.
John Sawhill, former president of The Nature Conservancy, emphasized this point when he
stated, “…we will not succeed in our work without the active support and cooperation of
the people who live in and around important natural areas – without drawing on their love
for the land” (Sawhill 2000, 5). This research adds to the body of existing literature on
collaboration, in hopes that it will ultimately increase the effectiveness and sustainability of
natural resource management efforts nationwide.
On a smaller scale, the findings of this research should prove valuable to citizens and
agencies who are confronted by similar agricultural nonpoint source pollution problems.
This research is particularly applicable to Ohio (as well as much of the Midwest), where
agriculture maintains a strong presence and where these case studies hit close to home. 24
Extensive literature exists on the successes of collaborative partnerships in the Darby watershed. However, a proposal in 1998 to establish a wildlife refuge in the Darby altered that course of progress. Because of the public’s keen interest in the Darby, the events surrounding the refuge proposal were well-documented by the media. However, limited attention has been devoted to analysis of how the conflict influenced community relationships and contributed to the eventual collapse of one of those partnerships. This thesis will attempt to explore this less-studied area.
Much of the available literature on collaboration in natural resource management has been written from the perspective of government agencies or non-profit environmental groups. Very little has taken other perspectives into account. In order to truly understand these relationships in the Darby and their dynamics, this thesis approaches the issue largely from the perspective of the farmers in the Darby Watershed. Knowing their perspective is critical to the success of any government-sponsored program.
Outline of Upcoming Chapters
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One makes the case that regulatory approaches to addressing NPS pollution have been ineffective and that collaborative approaches toward conservation should be examined. The chapter briefly introduces the Big
Darby Watershed as a case worth studying.
Chapter Two, a literature review, provides background on the emergence of conservation-based collaborative partnerships in the United States. It identifies the value of collaboration in sustainable natural resource management, the key factors that are necessary to ensure success, and the barriers that have sometimes impeded progress. The chapter 25 reviews previous research on the collaborative partnerships of the Big Darby Creek basin and similar agricultural watersheds, thereby placing the present research in context.
Chapter Three focuses on methodology. It provides background on the qualitative approach that was adopted and the rationalization for its use in this research. The chapter also details the types of data that were used and how this data was collected.
Chapter Four begins with a background sketch on myself, the researcher, and then presents the findings of the research, using a variety of data to track the creation and success of two collaborative partnerships, Operation FUTURE and the Darby Partnership.
Highlighted in this chapter is a discussion of the events surrounding the Little Darby
Wildlife Refuge proposal controversy, which led to the demise of collaboration between farmers and environmentalists in the watershed. Two different perspectives – those belonging to the farmers and the agency / TNC personnel – are incorporated into the discussion.
Chapter Five summarizes the key findings of this research and provides recommendations for action toward creating and/or maintaining successful collaborative partnerships. The chapter also discusses modifications and additions that were made to the initial theoretical framework of the study and explains why they were made. Topics for further study are also suggested. 26
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides background information on collaborative partnerships, including a historical summary of their emergence at the national level and an assessment of their value to conservation. A review of the literature from natural resource management, conflict resolution, sociology, and public policy is used to discuss the key elements needed to ensure the success of collaborative partnerships. Finally, a more narrow literature review details the most relevant scholarly work that has been done on the topic of collaboration in the Big
Darby Creek watershed.
Historical Background: The Emergence of Collaborative Partnerships
The modern environmental movement in the U.S. was fueled by environmental
disasters and borne out of conflict. In 1969, a fire on the oil-slicked Cuyahoga River, a
devastating oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, and the pronouncement that Lake Erie
was “dead,” made front page headlines. An alarmed American public propelled
environmental issues – especially those associated with water pollution – to the forefront of
the national agenda (Cortner and Moote 1999). The Nixon administration responded to the
crisis in 1972 by passing “The Clean Water Act (CWA).” The CWA established strict limits
on the discharge of toxic effluents into national waters. Violators were assessed hefty fines.
Though dramatically effective in reducing industrial point source pollution, the government’s
“command and control” approach provided no encouragement for businesses to exceed the
established standards and therefore locked industry into a compliance mindset. This top- 27 down approach not only hindered environmental innovation, it also produced an adversarial relationship between government and industry (Hoffman et al. 2002).
Tensions mounted as environmental groups used the courts to enforce compliance.
Concerted efforts by the Natural Resource Defense Council and the Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund, to name just two, resulted in an unprecedented increase in environmental litigation and court costs. While the strategy was successful in bringing environmental issues to the attention of the public, the extreme amounts of time and money spent by all parties compelled individuals to begin seeking innovative approaches to resolving environmental disputes.
As a result, the emerging field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) began to be promoted in the early 1980s by environmental organizations, grant-making foundations, and private planning firms alike. Founded on the necessity of stakeholder negotiation in environmental conflict resolution, ADR was promoted by its supporters as a more feasible alternative: resolving disputes yet avoiding the time and costs associated with litigation
(Coughlin et al. 1999). Legislative support for ADR was recognized in 1990 by passage of the ADR Act and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act. Although public participation was encouraged through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970, as well as other pieces of legislation, there was no language prior to the ADR Act and the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act that allowed for public involvement at the planning stages of a project.
At the same time, a new paradigm was gaining acceptance in the field of natural
resource management, challenging the long-standing progressivist ideals of “multiple-use.”
Ecosystem management, also referred to as watershed management, was a new approach
founded on the concept that everything in nature is connected and must be understood and
managed accordingly. Because these interconnected ecosystems crossed both political and 28 ownership boundaries, one of the fundamental tenets of ecosystem management was that parties with jurisdiction over a particular resource must collaborate (Cortner and Moote
1999, 40). The ultimate goal of ecosystem management was to promote sustainable use of resources (Ibid.).
By the 1990s, the concept of collaborative partnerships had gained widespread acceptance. In 1992, President Clinton proposed a restructuring of NEPA based on the principles of collaboration, information sharing, and flexibility, as the key to effective and responsible government (Osbourne and Gaebler 1992). Collaboration between the government and timber industry reached a new level with the 1994 Spotted Owl Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP). Though many environmentalists were skeptical of HCPs
(Coughlin et al. 1999), the Clinton administration saw them as an effective means by which to resolve environmental disputes, providing a compromise that would address the concerns of both environmental and property rights advocates. In 1998, President Clinton unveiled the Clean Water Action Plan (CWAP) which not only embraced the ecosystem approach to water-quality management, but set out to accomplish its mission through the support of watershed partnerships. The EPA continued to promote these concepts in 1999 with the release of a framework for “Community-Based Environmental Protection (CBEP)” designed to promote “collaborative, holistic environmental decision-making tailored to the needs of specific communities in their efforts to address the remaining environmental challenges”
(EPA 1999, 3). CBEP attempts to integrate environmental, economic, and social objectives in order to achieve EPA’s defined goal of “sustainable development”: a cleaner, healthier environment; an improved quality of life for humans; and a stable, more efficient economy
(Ibid.). In December 2002, EPA Assistant Administrator G. Tracy Mehan III released a memo re-emphasizing the agency’s commitment to the watershed approach through 29
“working together with a diverse array of partners” to achieve water quality goals (EPA memo 2002). Once again, local watershed partnerships were viewed as opportunities
“where communities, neighbor to neighbor, can engage, educate and persuade one another in a mutual quest for shared goals” (Ibid.)
Collaboration has also proven valuable when it comes to achieving progress toward
environmental restoration. A comprehensive study analyzing 105 different ecosystem
management projects nationwide found that collaboration, more than any other variable, was
cited by respondents as critical to their projects’ progress and ultimate success (Yaffee et al.
1996). Julia Wondolleck, professor of environmental dispute resolution at the University of
Michigan states, “We do not embrace collaboration as an end in itself. Our objective is that
progress be made on environmental problems, not that people ‘feel good’” (2000, xvi).
Collaborative Partnerships Defined
Although the term “public participation” has become the new “buzz word” in
natural resource management today, experts caution that public participation alone brings
only limited success (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Rather, it is the “collaboration” of all
representative stakeholders – including managers, scientists, policy makers, and the public –
which mobilizes expertise, funds, political power, and local support and allows for
sustainable environmental changes to take place.
Organizational management literature defines collaboration as “the pooling of
appreciations and/or tangible resources (e.g. information, money, labor, etc.) by two or more
stakeholders to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually” (Gray 1985,
912). Selin and Chavez (1995) state that “collaboration implies a joint decision-making 30 approach to problem resolution where power is shared, and stakeholders take collective responsibility for their actions and subsequent outcomes from those actions” (190).
Coughlin et al. (1999) have developed five broad classifications for resource management efforts that rely on the concept of collaboration:
• Sustainable Community Initiatives – Sustainable community initiatives are both small and large scale, and focus primarily on the economic, social, and environmental well- being of a community. Little Cities of Black Diamonds, a group comprised of residents of the old mining towns of the Hocking Valley Coalfield in southeast Ohio, is an example of such an initiative.
• Ecosystem Management (EM) – Ecosystem Management involves generally large-scale, long-term, agency-driven projects that focus on the sustainability of an ecosystem. EM emphasizes the role of humans in the ecosystem, and involves the public at all stages of management. In 1996, there were over 500 EM project nationwide (Yaffee et al. 1996).
• Coordinated Resource Management (CRM) – Coordinated Resource Management has similar objectives to Ecosystem Management. However CRM is usually initiated at the local level by a request from a person, group, organization, or agency (such as a Soil and Water Conservation District) that perceives the need for a group-action approach in order to resolve a local resource problem. There are hundreds of CRM initiatives in the U.S. today (Coughlin et al. 1999).
• Habitat Conservation Planning (HCP) – Habitat Conservation Plans usually result from negotiations between private landowners and the Fish and Wildlife Service. HCPs originated from the amendments made to the Endangered Species Act, which allow for incidental takings of an endangered species given the approval of a conservation plan. In 1998, there were 225 HCPs nationwide (Coughlin et al. 1999).
• Watershed Initiatives – Most collaborative conservation efforts today organize around watershed boundaries. Similar to the objectives of Ecosystem Management, watershed initiatives are smaller in scope and are often driven by the public. In 2001, there were more than 3,000 local watershed groups functioning nationwide (Fisher 2001).
The Value of Collaborative Partnerships
Government agencies collaborated for many years simply “because the law required
it” (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Similarly, businesses and private landowners have come 31 to the table due to the threat of government action or lawsuits. However, more recently people are voluntarily coming together more and more frequently. Why is this happening?
Steven Yaffee of the University of Michigan states that most cooperative efforts develop because of strong, self-interested motives that can be achieved only through collaboration; rarely do individuals choose to collaborate for altruistic reasons (1996, 302). Simply put, people support each other because they know they will receive something in return.
People collaborate because it accomplishes more, while saving money. For example, in the summer of 2001, the Monday Creek Restoration Project (MCRP), the Ohio EPA, the
Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and the Army Corps of Engineers collaborated to accomplish several projects simultaneously in the Monday Creek watershed. In a feasibility study meeting hosted by the Army Corps and attended by numerous agencies and experts, it was learned that the OEPA had scheduled a Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL) survey in the same watershed in 2008. After determining that both surveys required the same field data, the EPA agreed to bump up the TMDL for Monday Creek from 2008 to 2001, and other groups readily offered assistance in the effort. Using the water quality and biological data gathered by the OEPA staff, water flow measurements taken by MCRP, and funds allocated by the Army Corps and ODNR, the agencies pooled resources to provide an updated watershed assessment for MCRP, a Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL) report for the OEPA, and an Army Corps Feasibility Study for Monday Creek, thus speeding up the process of restoration for the AMD-impacted stream (Steinmaus 2002).
Collaboration often allows for better decision-making and increases the pool of resources available. Because of their diverse stakeholder pools, partnerships can combine management strategies in new ways or imagine new ways to solve problems. Furthermore, 32 an increased number of participants and organizations can increase the network of funding channels and technical assistance options.
The involvement of local citizens in collaborative processes promotes a sense of empowerment and pride that is vital to both community and ecosystem sustainability. One participant stated, “Community success and pride will protect more habitat than any law we could write” (quoted in Coughlin et. al. 1999, 3-3). In explaining the initial impetus behind the formation of the Western North Carolina Alliance (WNCA), Mary Kelly commented on why their locally-grown partnership has lasted: “It wasn’t some outside agenda that came in and created the Alliance. It really was the brainchild of the people of the region. It was created by and for the people of western North Carolina for the purposes that they saw fit”
(Newfont 1999, 112). Community pride motivated the WNCA to gain membership and follow through with projects, resulting in a number of significant accomplishments.
Supporters of collaboration testify that the sense of empowerment gained through their personal involvement encourages them to focus on their personal role in the management of a resource and to search for solutions, rather than pointing fingers.
Although some question the impact of collaborative watershed groups on actual land management practices (Curtis and DeLacy 1995; Napier and Johnson 1998), the current literature suggests that collaboration aids in community and relationship building, an often overlooked factor that is critical to ecosystem restoration. A good example is the Albemarle-
Pamlico Estuarine Study (APES), a 9-year project which involved the management of a
30,000 square mile estuarine system in North Carolina and Virginia. Though Korfmacher
(1998) concluded that the project failed to meet the objectives for ecosystem management, the APES actually had a positive impact on the community. The project educated those who were involved and built relationships between and capacities among the parties, leaving 33 a lasting impression on the individuals regardless of whether the study recommendations were implemented (Ibid.).
Key Elements of Successful Collaborative Partnerships
Collaboration, often referred to as cooperation (Yaffee et al. 1996), starts from the
premise that conflicting interests with dissimilar goals and motivations can come together to
reach a consensus. Thus, collaborative partnerships are, by definition, extremely difficult to achieve. Yet studies indicate that collaborative partnerships are attainable and can be the means by which understanding, support, and capacity for resource management are achieved
(Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). The current literature identifies a number of key elements that make a collaborative partnership successful.
A collaborative partnership requires that all concerned interests are represented.
These interests could include conservation groups, local elected officials, local residents,
chambers of commerce, environmental education organizations, local military bases, farm
groups, students, senior citizen and religious organizations, financial groups, credit unions,
land developers, etc. As these interests contribute relevant information, a more holistic
perspective of the resource and its interrelated factors is developed, thus enhancing the
quality of decision making. Experience has shown that environmental management must
involve stakeholders in the planning as well as the decision-making processes (National
Research Council 1999). Taking those factors into consideration early on contributes to a more sustainable management plan and also reduces the likelihood that opposition will surface during the implementation stages of a project.
Finding common ground is essential to building an effective collaborative, no matter
how difficult it may be to achieve. Only a common, shared vision will enable different 34 stakeholders with different perspectives to find reason to work together. Wondolleck suggests drawing on a sense of place or community, highlighting shared goals or fears, and capitalizing on compatible interests as ways to bridge differences and find commonalities
(2000, 73). For example, in 1992 the Oak Openings Working Group located in northwestern Ohio succeeded in getting support from private landowners and local governments once they were made aware of the threat that development posed to an ecologically-sensitive oak savannah community.
It should also be noted that since stakeholders rarely hold equal political and economic power, partnerships must make a sincere effort to reach a solution that respects less powerful interests. The National Research Council suggested that not only must a planning process “get the right participation,” it must also “get the participation right,” meaning that the process must “…satisfy the decisionmakers and interested and affected parties – that it is responsive to their needs – that their information, viewpoints, and concerns have been adequately represented and taken into account; that they have been adequately consulted; and that their participation has been able to affect the way risk problems are defined and understood” (NRC 1999, 240). Truly participatory, collaborative approaches to environmental management must fully respect the values, knowledge, and experiences of the participants involved (Rhoades 1999). Ultimately these kinds of efforts promote power sharing that is necessary at all stages of the process, particularly when less- powerful stakeholders are involved.
William Ruckleshaus, former EPA administrator stated, “For cooperative regulatory programs to build creative partnerships, trust emerges as a critical component of the collaborative process” (Ruckleshaus 1996, 2). Because watershed management is a process that is “fundamentally social in nature,” relationships based on understanding, respect, and 35 trust must be formed in order for effective communication and change to take place
(Rhoades 1999). Jack Shipley, a participant in the Applegate Partnership – one of the best known watershed groups in the Pacific Northwest – stated, “It was desperation and gridlock that brought us together, but it is trust and respect that keep us going” (quoted in
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, 9). Another project participant suggested, “People will take the time to understand and work through partnership differences to the extent that they feel valued and respected for what they bring to the relationship…Respect that builds trust begins with an assumption of equality: All parties bring something valuable to the relationship and deserve to be heard” (Ibid., 13). However, environmentalist Brent Cairns notes that a relationship of trust is not easily achieved when the parties in question possess very different viewpoints:
Trust was certainly the objective from the beginning, but you can’t magically create it. The only way you can build it is by sitting together – a lot – and by going through all kinds of issues. And by seeing each other in our sort of worst moods and behaviors, and almost giving up and not. And witnessing another person’s real deep pain and fear and not turning away (Ibid., 164).
A study of a successful watershed partnership in an agricultural watershed in the
Midwest found that one of the ways genuine social interaction can be fostered and trust reinforced is if scientists are sensitive to the needs of non-scientists (Rhoads 1999). Rhoads explains that scientists must bear this responsibility because they are often in the minority when it comes to community-based decision making. In order for them to make a persuasive argument that the community can support, scientists must put their knowledge into an appropriate socio-cultural context which the non-scientist can relate to and value.
Finally, collaborative relationships require patience. George Grier, a member of the
MacKenzie Watershed Council in the Northwest Territories, Canada, explained: 36
You need to have an incredibly long-term view of things if you’re going to gauge success by collaborative processes. This is kind of like the analogy of filling the pipe line: You know you don’t get anything out the other end until the pipeline’s completely full, and in this case filling the pipeline takes a really long time because it’s relationship building, and it’s building a knowledge base, and it’s networking and there’s a lot of complicated stuff that goes on that has to do with human dynamics and has absolutely nothing to do with national resources. So if you judge how well you’re doing by looking at projects completed it’s going to be tough to evaluate a collaborative process as being a functional one in a short period of time. The test really will be to see what it looks like in 10 years after the relationships have been maintained. There’s a lot of symbiosis that goes on and you got to give that time to get itself established (Coughlin et al. 1999, 21-6).
The process of developing relationships becomes even more drawn out when it involves people from different cultures with different viewpoints. Because these relationships take time, observable outcomes may be slow to develop and funding agencies and stakeholders alike may grow impatient. However, the investments of time and commitment involved in nurturing partnerships often prove worthwhile as collaborative partnering leads to wider acceptance and faster implementation of projects.
Barriers to Collaboration
Unfortunately, there are just as many reasons not to collaborate. Attitudes of mistrust, poor economic status and lack of financial incentives, inadequate education and/or awareness, and cultural and cognitive differences are all barriers that can easily prevent willingness to collaborate. Though governmental agencies and environmental groups usually have numerous incentives to collaborate in environmental projects, there are usually fewer incentives for farmers, as participation in environmental management often entails some significant change or financial contribution on the part of the land owner. Given the focus of this research, this section will highlight the position of farmers, and the unique factors that influence their willingness to participate in conservation-based programs. 37
Anti-government sentiment has long stood in the way of collaboration, especially in rural communities. Bob Bargar, a retired professor of Education at Ohio State University, stated,
It is important to remember that farmers are very independent people. They live in a culture in which interpersonal relationships are very important. These relationships are the means through which all business is done. Agreements are very often verbal and concluded by a handshake. In that context, a man’s word is his sacred trust; nothing is more important than a man’s honesty and his ability to keep his word. The first thing that many farm folks look for in a new relationship is whether or not they feel they can trust the new individual. The perceived breaking of trust, once established, is a matter of great concern, whether the person violating that trust is a neighbor down the road or someone from outside the community. If you can’t trust someone, then you take steps to protect yourself and your own. (Bargar 1999, 10)
It can be difficult to convince the public that agencies are not involved in conservation projects for regulatory purposes. As one editorialist quipped, “Does anyone truly believe that any government bureaucracy – especially one so deeply suspicious of the regulated community, an agency that measures its worth by its annual tally of convictions of environmental miscreants – would actually be willing to bargain away its birthright?” (Harris
1996, 4). An individual from a collaborative project in Colorado stated, “[There is a] fear that the feds have an ulterior motive…to discover threatened and endangered species to shut down operations…People outside the project (area landowners, local commissioners, etc.) still are wary that ecosystem management is an attempt by government agencies to control private lands” (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, 58).
Distrust of the government by rural farmers has significantly impeded resource management. A survey taken in the U.S. cornbelt region found that the more negatively farmers felt about governmental involvement, the less likely they were to want to participate 38 in the WQIP, the USDA’s key nonpoint source pollution program (Kraft et al. 1996). This kind of effect, however, not only applies to the government; negative or exaggerated perceptions of individuals of any party can create a stereotypical “us-them” polarization which can lead to conflict (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, 58).
Poor economic status is another significant barrier to collaboration. For example, if a farmer is struggling financially, one can reasonably assume he is less likely to participate in outside activities that would take him away from his immediate work on the farm.
Economic status also influences the likelihood that a farmer will implement best management practices (BMPs). In a 1993 evaluation of the Rural Clean Water Program
(RCWP), researchers found a lower rate of participation among farmers who had relatively lower economic indicators (Gale et al. 1993). Also during the early 1980s, many farmers in
Oregon were unable to participate in the Tillamook Bay RCWP project because high interest rates limited cash flow, making it difficult for farmers to pay their portion of the cost of installing those technologies (Osmond 1995).
Lack of financial incentives is one of the most critical factors influencing a farmer’s decision not to collaborate with agencies in implementing BMPs. There are a number of sizable federal initiatives aimed at reducing agricultural nonpoint source pollution. One is the Rural Clean Water Project (RCWP), in which farmers can be reimbursed up to 75% of the cost of each recommended BMP implemented. When implemented in Alabama, few farmers chose to participate until the cost-share rate was raised from the initial 60% to 75%, after which the critical area of concern gained 100% participation by farmers (Osmond
1995). Evaluative research on the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), a 30-year easement program that pays farmers to leave their lands fallow in order to preserve water quality and soil fertility, indicated that 77% of the survey respondents who chose not to enroll in the 39 program did so based on financial decisions (Lant et al. 1995). These studies underscore the important role that financial resources play in influencing a farmer’s decision to participate in a conservation program.
Education and water quality awareness also play a significant role in determining a farmer’s likelihood to participate in BMPs. Producers who are more aware of water pollution in general and on their farms are more likely to participate in conservation programs than farmers who are less well informed (Osmond 1995). In addition, producers who receive water quality and conservation information from government agencies and farm magazines are more likely to change agricultural practices that affect water quality than those producers who do not receive such information (Ibid.). Besides access to relevant literature, actual one-to-one contact between project personnel and farmers is one of the most effective ways to build relationships between parties and ultimately increase participation in conservation programs (Ibid.). A study of Wisconsin farmers (of whom 50 percent did not have a computer and only 19 percent used the internet to access information regarding farming) showed that the level of personal contact with county extension agents was the primary factor determining farmers’ satisfaction with Extension services (Ostrom 2001).
The data further indicated that the more contact farmers had with a county Extension agent, the more they took advantage of other services provided by Extension (Ibid.)
Cultural values shape an individual’s perception of conservation and of their
willingness to participate in environmental management projects. One study compared the
attitudes of two rural ethnic communities in south central Illinois, one Yankee (native New
Englander) and the other German-Catholic (Yeoman). Salamon concluded that Yeoman
farmers were more receptive to adopting soil conservation measures because they have a
stronger commitment to passing on farm lands to future generations and had more modest 40 financial goals than Yankee farmers (Salamon 1985). However, as the values of each ethnic community vary, so will their willingness to apply conservation practices on their farms.
Regardless, it is clear that decisions based on scientific data alone often fail if they conflict with a community’s socio-economic values.
Cultural values associated with rural and agricultural life also affect the way farmers react to perceived threats, which could range from environmental regulation to losing their farm altogether. Journalist Joel Dyer, who has studied and written extensively on rural culture, explained farmers’ reactions to threats to their way of life. He stated:
[Rural America is angry] because the people there look around at their way of life, their unique culture, and they see that it’s changing…They don’t want to change their way of life…They’re a very nostalgic population that wants to keep things the way they’ve always been…They want to farm. They want to be left alone. They don’t want to have to mess with eight thousand different laws. [Their culture is] dying out. And the reasons for that change are beyond their control. I think all of us tend to get angry when our lives are harmed by forces outside our control. (Jensen 1999, 4-5)
It’s not just the loss of a job – it’s the loss of an entire way of life. Rural America is a different culture. Farmers don’t just say, “Damn, these corporations sure are making it hard for me to get by. I guess I’ll take that factory job in the city.” They don’t want to go to the city; they want to hold on to the life they have.” (Ibid., 7)
Dyer explained that cultural differences between urban and rural life are real and cannot be underestimated.
As much time as I’ve spent with farmers going through foreclosures over the last decade, I don’t even pretend to understand the anxiety they suffer. That’s part of the problem of urban-rural relationships: we urbanites can see the despair, but we can’t feel it. We can’t fully grasp the feeling of “My great-granddad homesteaded this piece of land and fought to keep it. My granddad took it over from him and made it bigger and better. My dad took it over from him and did the same. And now he’s given it to me, and I’m going to lose it.” (Jensen 1999, 8)
41
An example of an innovative program that is focusing on social and cultural factors in conservation management efforts is the Agroecosystems Management Program (AMP) at
Ohio State University’s Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center (OARDC) based in Wooster, Ohio. This 30-member team, made up of farmers, ecologists, biologists, social and political scientists, and agricultural experts has been working with the local agricultural community of Sugar Creek Watershed in creating solutions to improve water quality which are tailored to their specific land and needs.
Richard Moore, an OSU professor of Anthropology and coordinator of the Sugar
Creek project, combined both anthropological and ecological approaches to formulate what has become known as “the Sugar Creek Method.” This method promotes sensitivity to unique socio-cultural elements through surveying local communities to understand their values, concerns, and aspirations; and creating local-level participatory-learning communities that seek their own vision for their watershed (Moore 2002). These objectives are based on the underlying assumption that local solutions need to be included when dealing with local problems.
Over the past two years, AMP has found unprecedented success. The farmer group involved in the project has gained high visibility and has attracted positive attention within the community and throughout Ohio. In terms of BMP implementation, participating farmers have established three miles of contiguous buffer along the Sugar Creek. Funding has been substantial as well. In 2002, AMP was granted $475,000 by the Ohio EPA and
$49,000 from USDA Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education (SARE) Program toward the further development of improving water quality in the Sugar Creek watershed through participatory farmer efforts. 42
Interwoven into the fibers of culture are fundamental cognitive traits that structure how an individual collects information and uses it to form opinions and make decisions.
Cognitive differences between parties can serve as yet another barrier to collaboration. Bob
Bargar, an Ohio State University professor who was deeply involved in the Darby conflict, stated,
Laced all through and undergirding the conflicts over the Darby, are factors that go beyond the outer issues, as vital as these are. Human beings differ greatly in how their minds process information and make decisions. Often referred to as differences in cognitive styles, these processes have a significant influence on how issues are perceived, what information about the issues is perceived as important, how conclusions are reached, and so on. These cognitive style differences impact perspective, attitude, and most importantly, how we learn about the things that affect our lives (Bargar 1999, 7).
Looking specifically at the parties in the Darby Watershed, Bargar recognized that
“most members of the farming community and most members of the conservation community are very different in this regard” (Bargar 1999, 7). Research using the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a self-reported personality inventory based on Swiss psychologist Carl Jung’s theory of human personality, identified the cognitive preferences of these parties (Barrett and Horner 1989). Findings indicate that farmers and environmentalists prefer very different modes of perception. Many members of the farming community have what Jung termed a preference for “sensation” as a mode of perception, while environmentalists tend to prefer a more “intuitive” mode of perception. Bargar explained,
…folks with a preference for a sensation view tend to have a realistic, practical, hands-on approach, they pay great attention to the facts and specifics of a situation, they want to know what will work, and they are skeptical of new ideas until they can see the nuts and bolts of how the idea will actually work in their operation. They want evidence that something will work before they try it. They are not prone to taking risks on new ideas.
43
Many environmentalists, on the other hand, have…an intuitive preference for perception…Folks with a preference for an intuitive view, tend to look for the “big picture,” they respond to the possibilities in a situation, they naturally respond to new ideas and they are risk takers. But in following an idea, they sometimes overlook the “devil in the details” that must be accounted for if something will work. (Bargar 1999, 7)
Bargar then addressed the potential conflict that can arise when these two differing cognitions collide:
Folks who have a preference for the sensation view are wary when they do not see the details of how something will work and can be cautious or suspicious about what they may see as an idea that doesn’t make sense to them. Folks with an intuitive view may have the idea that a current practice will not work in the future. They try to convince other folks of the need for change, but sometimes leave a credibility gap. When confronted with conflict, each tends to persist in their own preferred “view,” whole natural limitations are already a part of the problem. And so it goes. Not being conscious that the differences are due in part to the cognitive processes involved and not just embodied in the issues, we tend to project difficulties in communication onto the other person, that is, we cannot understand why they “cannot see it our way.” Further, we tend unconsciously to devalue those cognitive processes in which we are less skilled, but in which the other person is stronger, and tend to project that devaluation onto the position of the other individual. And we don’t know this is happening. So the disagreements have several layers of complexity…To quote Pogo, “We have met the enemy – and he is us” (Bargar 1999, 7-8).
Sociologist Max Bazerman (1999), in an article entitled “The Human Mind as a
Barrier to Wiser Environmental Agreements,” introduced six other cognitive barriers particularly relevant to environmental disputes and conflict resolution: “mythical fixed pie,”
“pseudo-sacredness,” “endowment effects,” overconfidence, positive illusions, and egocentrism. Because some of these concepts are interrelated, some of them will be discussed together.
Rooted in the social norm which interprets most competitive situations as “win- lose,” the “mythical fixed pie” ideology assumes that one party’s interests directly oppose the 44 other party’s interests (Bazerman 1999). The assumption that “what is good for one party is bad for the other” (Ibid.) inevitably prevents collaboration by reason of either party’s fear that any sort of compromise would negatively affect their own position. More specific to this research, a very similar concept is the perceived incompatibility of economic and environmental goals. The prevailing belief is that environmental protection must, by its very nature, reduce economic competitiveness (Palmer, Oates, Portney 1995). If an individual assumes that firms in a static system have made cost minimizing choices, then regulation clearly raises costs and is detrimental to that party.
Pseudo-sacredness and endowment effects can hinder collaboration by influencing an
individual’s perceived value of a particular good. According to Bazerman, an example of a
“pseudo-sacred” issue is one where there is a willing exchange of something originally
deemed “sacred” (or which would originally have never been traded under any condition)
for some other valued outcome (Bazerman 1999). For example, many Darby farmers
regarded their land as “sacred,” or not for sale under any condition. However, farmers were
also upset at the USFWS offer to purchase their land at only fair market value. If perhaps
the offer had been higher and farmers who were originally against the idea decided to sell,
their land would then fall into the category of “pseudo-sacred.” The endowment effect is
explained by the idea that ownership of an item actually increases its perceived value by the
owner because once a personal attachment is formed, the cost of breaking that attachment is
greater (Ibid.). The endowment effect is related to pseudo-sacredness in that the magnitude
of the endowment effect is directly correlated to its perceived sacredness and both distort
the way in which a party values the subject under debate.
Overconfidence, positive illusions, and egocentrism are three related cognitive factors that
hinder collaboration. Overconfidence is an individual’s tendency to overestimate the 45 accuracy of their judgments. Similarly, positive illusions refer to an individual’s tendency to view their party in an overly positive light; that they are more likely to succeed, are of higher character, or tried harder to reach an agreement than the other group. Egocentrism, on the other hand, refers to an individual’s tendency to be biased in perspective regarding what is fair. Egocentrism is particularly pronounced in situations where the opposing parties are of unequal power. Overconfidence, positive illusions, and egocentrism can all lead to an overestimation of a party’s likelihood of success and can also be the basis for a party’s justification of environmentally degrading behaviors (Bazerman 1999).
Regardless of the apparent barriers, however, the significance of collaborative partnerships in resource management, particularly in agriculture-related water quality issues, should not be ignored. Experts concur that collaboration is the most powerful tool in the management of private lands (Coughlin et al. 1999), and is thus fundamental to agricultural nonpoint source control and abatement. Numerous case studies (Reilly 1998; Korfmacher
1998; Rhoads 1999; Yaffee et. al. 1996) have proven collaborative partnerships’ success in bringing together farmer landowners, managers, scientists, policy-makers, and the public, to find solutions that benefit both the producer and the ecosystem.
Collaborative Partnerships in the Big Darby Creek Watershed
This section discusses the research that has previously been conducted in the Big
Darby Creek Watershed relating to collaborative partnerships, the strengths and weaknesses of those findings, and how this thesis proposes to fill those research gaps.
Korfmacher makes a strong argument for the value of the Darby Partnership, a decade-old collaborative in the watershed. Even though the Darby Partnership lacked both independent funding and authority, the author forcefully argues that the partnership was still 46 a useful and viable organization as “…the past decade of trust- and relationship-building experience may have provided a strong enough foundation for these actors to take the next step toward joint decision making for ecosystem management” (Korfmacher 2000, 14). She further states that even some of the partnership’s weaknesses may actually have been strengths. For example, the lack of central authority may have allowed the partnership to be more inclusive because they did not try to take a stance on topics.
Korfmacher’s survey, however, may be slightly biased due to the uniformity of her pool of interviews. Because of the disproportionate ratio of government and local participants in the Darby Partnership, many of those individuals surveyed were state and federal government representatives who tend to support collaboration. They may have overestimated the success of the partnership because of their own direct involvement in the group. To remedy this, this researcher interviewed a more diverse group, over half of which included local farmers who had been involved in collaboratives in the Darby.
Although the partnerships in the Darby gained national attention as a huge success story, a series of events took place near the end of Korfmacher’s research which dramatically slowed conservation efforts and brought most of the partnering in the Darby to a complete halt. The events surrounding the 1998 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service proposal for the establishment of a wildlife refuge in the Darby watershed damaged the relationship between farmers and the government and resulted in the disintegration of a critical partnership which involved numerous local farmers. Though many publications have emphasized the successes of the Darby partnerships, none have mentioned its failures. This research will offer new insights as it will examine the events surrounding the proposal for the establishment of the
Little Darby Wildlife Refuge, the ensuing conflict and eventual fall of the proposal, and the repercussions of those events. 47
An article by Soule (2002) entitled “Conservation and Agriculture as Neighbors” makes brief mention of some of the factors leading to the collapse of partnering in the
Darby. One of those factors involved the communication failure between the farmers and conservationists. She stated that “neither party has learned to speak or fully listen to the other’s language” largely due to significant cognitive and communication differences existing between the two (Soule, 186). This communication failure manifested itself in 1998, when
“…despite the emphasis on talking and communication…The Nature Conservancy was taken by surprise when the farmers rejected farmland preservation” (Ibid.). After these events, employees of The Nature Conservancy of Ohio were “doubtful that the farming community has made a long-term commitment to conservation” based on their adamant opposition to the wildlife refuge proposal, even despite a “willing seller only clause and a provision for over 20,000 acres in farmland preservation” (Soule, 173).
Soule, however, fails to explain the context within which those events took place.
Soule failed to mention the relevance of cultural differences in the debate, such as the
farmers’ traditional anti-government sentiment which had existed long before the
partnership was established. It is a critical fact that the farmers’ initial participation in the
Darby Partnership was largely intended to show that they were willing to work with
environmentalists, and that government intervention was unnecessary. They, therefore, did not look
at the wildlife refuge proposal as a preservation of farmland, but as a threat to their property
rights and a breaking of the trust they had formed with The Nature Conservancy, and
retaliated in full-blown opposition.
This thesis will fill the gaps in Soule’s research by addressing the cultural and cognitive differences between farmers and environmentalists, in order to explain how the communication failure took place and how it could have been avoided. Although Soule’s 48 article is informative, it focuses primarily on The Nature Conservancy (interesting to note, she is a former employee) and fails to include the perspectives of others. This thesis will provide a more balanced perspective as it will represent both the agency and farmers’ viewpoints on the events surrounding the Darby Wildlife Refuge proposal.
Critics have also questioned the value of collaborative partnerships in the Darby. A study conducted in the Darby Creek Watershed between 1991 and 1994 questioned the value of collaborative partnerships due to their failure to increase the implementation of BMPs by farmers. Because Napier and Johnson assume that “the ultimate test of conservation program effectiveness should be whether or not production practices are actually implemented on the land and whether or not the practices adopted actually improve environmental quality,” the data conclude that “efforts by conservation agencies within the study region have had little impact on conservation behaviors of study participants” (Napier
1998, 83). Using only quantifiable numbers such as adoption of BMPs as the single measure of success in the Darby, one can easily label the hefty investments in the Darby a failure
(Napier 1998). However, proponents of collaboration emphasize that the numbers of acres converted to filter strips are not the only measure of success.
Rather than voluntary incentives which have been encouraged by collaboratives,
Napier suggests “control-and-command” measures as one of the ways to coerce farmers to comply with environmental standards. This top-down regulatory approach which has been in force since the 1970s is viewed by many experts as incapable of bringing long-lasting change and improvement (Hoffman 2002; Rhoads 1999). Further, though regulation may result in a higher rate of adoption of BMPs, this strategy places no value on the personal reasons why an individual adopts BMPs. Experts have explained that an actual change in attitude will have the longest lasting impact on actual behavior (Rhoads 1999). Napier did 49 recognize that sociological factors were a significant barrier to participation and that more attention should be focused on finding solutions to these obstacles rather than finding technical solutions (Napier 1998); however he does not go into any detail about how that should be accomplished.
This thesis attempts to reconcile these contradictions by examining the 12-year history of collaborative involvement in the Big Darby watershed. In this research, I intend to develop a greater understanding the background behind the parties involved, the events which ultimately halted the progress of conservation in the region, and the lessons learned from the stakeholders regarding collaboration in conservation efforts. I argue that the engagement of individuals in conservation programs is a critical step necessary to the adoption of BMPs and the ultimate goal of an improved environment. I will also discuss particular socio-cultural factors that have prevented Darby farmers from participating in collaboratives and how these barriers can be overcome. 50
CHAPTER THREE
METHODS
In order to answer the research questions, the researcher must first determine what data are most needed and useful to the study, and what design would be most effective in attaining that information. This chapter will explain the fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative research methods, why I have chosen to implement the qualitative approach, what the qualitative method entails, and specifically how the research data will be collected.
Why Qualitative Research?
Research methodologies and data are usually classified into two broad categories: quantitative and qualitative. A quantitative methodology asks questions such as, “How satisfied were you with the program? Very, somewhat, little, not at all.” This approach would not be appropriate for this research because the objective of this study is to gather information-rich data in order to understand why individuals feel a certain way, not how strongly they feel about a particular issue or program. Quantitative methods have the further tendency to manipulate data into predetermined response categories which can skew the data due to investigator bias (Patton 1990, 40).
Despite its shortcomings, quantitative data can be relevant and applicable to this research in some instances. For example, quantitative social surveys performed in my study area help explain the attitudes of a larger population and provide further insight into the empirical data collected through the course of the study.
This study focuses primarily on qualitative methodologies because the qualitative approach provides the participant with the freedom and flexibility of response that are needed to answer the questions at hand. The qualitative approach, which asks questions 51 such as, “Tell me about your experience in the program,” leaves the topics of discussion, as well as the overall direction of the interview, up to the participant. This approach acknowledges the interview text as data which can be used to discover human perspectives, understand social constructions, compare to other texts, and substantiate theories. Relying on the text in this manner, as dictated by the participant, can significantly reduce investigator bias.
Qualitative methods support this research best because they value the social and cultural contexts within which actions are played out (Patton 2002, 62). Philosopher and social scientist Alfred Schutz makes clear that socio-cultural connections are essential to qualitative research when he states, “the exploration of the general principles according to which man in daily life organizes his experiences, and especially those of the social world, is the first task of the methodology of the social sciences” (1962, 59). The same concept is emphasized in Max Weber’s phenomenological doctrine of Verstehen, which remains one of the theoretical foundations of qualitative inquiry (Patton 2002, 52). Translated as
“understanding,” experts have explained Verstehen as “an attempt to ‘crack the code’ of the culture, that is, detect the categories into which a culture codes actions and thoughts” through attempting to understand both the intention and context of human action (Meyers
1981, 180). In contrast to the quantitative approach, which fails to consider factors of context, the qualitative approach relies upon the subject’s social constructions of reality as the fundamental basis in interpreting data (Flick 2002, 32). Through an understanding of the subject’s social constructions of reality, the researcher can then begin to answer the question
“why”: why do individuals feel the way they do? Understanding the paradigms and experiences that have shaped individuals’ perceptions are essential to the evaluation of a program (such as a collaborative watershed partnership). Indeed, they can be of great value 52 when it comes to creating, adapting, and improving programs to better address the underlying needs of the various parties involved.
Qualitative Research Design
In considering factors of design, qualitative researcher and widely-acclaimed author
Michael Patton suggests that rather than create a specific methodological blueprint (which the term “design” often implies), qualitative research design should be built on the foundation of a “paradigm of choices rather than become the handmaiden of any single, narrow disciplinary or methodological paradigm” (Patton 1990, 198). Further, research design should remain flexible and open to data as they emerge (p. 196). To this end, Patton recommends that the research design provide a range of methodological options to meet the needs/constraints of the study in question. This strategy may be more demanding as it may:
1) rely on multiple methods (instead of a single method) to answer a single question, and 2) compel a researcher to adopt methods he or she is less familiar with. However, the benefits of this strategy outweigh its drawbacks because the design is customized to meet the needs of the research and data.
Patton’s design recommendations are driven by several questions. They include
(Patton 1990, 197):
1) What is the primary purpose of the study? 2) What is the focus of the study? What are the units of analysis? 3) What will be the sampling strategies? 4) What types of data will be collected? 5) How and in what format will data be collected? 6) What analytical approaches will be used? 7) How will validity of and confidence in the findings be addressed? 8) When will the study occur? 9) How will logistics and practicalities be handled? 10) How will ethical issues and matters of confidentiality be handled? 11) What resources will be available? What will the study cost?
53
The remainder of this chapter addresses each of Patton’s question sequentially, providing literature-supported rationale as to why those particular methods were adopted.
What is the primary purpose of the study? The primary purpose of this study is to understand the factors that make watershed partnerships successful in order to improve similar organizations and relationships. Formative evaluation is a type of research which suits this study best because it focuses on ways to improve the effectiveness of a program or organization through observing its strengths, as well as weaknesses, and providing recommendations for improvement (Patton 1990, 157). This specific research will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of collaborative partnerships established in Ohio’s Big Darby
Watershed. It is hoped that the results will prove useful to collaboratives nationwide, making partnerships (and the relationships within those partnerships) more effective at abating agricultural nonpoint source pollution.
What is the focus of the study? What are the units of analysis? By looking at one isolated watershed and the events that took place there, this study will emphasize depth over breadth. By concentrating specifically on the efforts made in Ohio’s Big Darby
Watershed, we hope to gain an in-depth understanding of the many perspectives and circumstances surrounding this one watershed. Although this study will by no means have universal application, watershed groups (in the Midwest and beyond) that share similar situations and difficulties may find some of these conclusions transferable. With respect to units of analysis, the focus will be on organizations (e.g. Operation Future, The Fish &
Wildlife Service, The Nature Conservancy, Citizens Against the Refuge Proposal (CARP)), and the smaller components within those organizations, such as communities (e.g. farmers) and individuals. Another important component under scrutiny is the critical incident, in particular the chain of events surrounding the Little Darby Wildlife Refuge proposal. 54
What will be the sampling strategies? Purposeful sampling is a strategy which focuses on selected cases that are considered “information rich” in that they provide insights
about the phenomenon under examination (Patton 2002, 46, 242). One of the fundamental
factors in determining which cases are “information-rich” has to do with the reliability of the
informant (Flick 2002, 69). A good informant has the necessary knowledge and experience
relevant to the question under examination, has the ability to reflect and articulate their
feelings, and should be willing and have the time to participate in the study (Morse 1998, 73).
As time and resources are limited in most research, purposeful sampling is an effective
method for gathering the greatest amount of relevant data in a given time.
Participants were absorbed into this study largely through a “snowball” process. I
initially contacted a number of agency staff and NGO representatives by phone or email,
assessing their level of involvement in collaborative partnerships in the Big Darby, as well as
their willingness to participate. Those individuals responded with a number of other
references including Extension personnel and university professors. Extension also
recommended several names of local farmers in the Darby basin who were heavily involved
in collaboratives and who would likely be willing to participate. (It is critical to note that my
reference to her association with Extension representatives was an apparent determining
factor in their willingness to be interviewed.) Due to the limits of time and resources, a
priority list was created based on the “good informant” criteria in order to determine the
order in which those interviews should be conducted.
What types of data will be collected? The qualitative data used in this research
were drawn from sixteen personal interviews with key stakeholders involved in collaborative
partnerships in the Big Darby Watershed. These diverse stakeholders included local farmers,
university professors, personnel from federal and state agencies, and representatives from 55 non-governmental organizations. It is important to note that interviews are well suited for qualitative research methodologies. Flick supports this statement by explaining that interviews transform preconceived methods into texts, whether it be in the form of notes or transcriptions of recordings. During analysis, the researcher establishes the text as the basis of interpretation and constantly refers to the text in order to sufficiently ground themes and broader theories (Ibid.). Those theories become interpretations of texts, which are then retranslated into text. Thus, Flick explains the process of qualitative research as “a path from theory to text and another from text back to theory” (Flick 2002, 11).
The interview questions were mainly opinion and values-oriented. They were aimed at understanding the cognitive and interpretive processes of participants. Examples of questions asked in the interview include, “What would you consider the greatest achievement of [this partnership]?”, “What actors enable collaborations to be successful?”, “What are the barriers to collaboration in these watersheds?” and “What do you consider “success”?”
In addition to personal interviews, secondary data were utilized including:
• Newspaper articles and press releases. The heavy and extensive media coverage of the events surrounding the Little Darby Watershed is a critical component to this research. From a collection of almost 200 articles written over an almost 10-year span, 38 articles (largely from the Columbus Dispatch) were selected for careful analysis. Press releases produced by all parties involved, were also examined. Articles and press releases were not only analyzed for content, but also for the way in which the media influenced the partnerships in the Darby.
• Documents, journal publications, and letters. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Little Darby Wildlife Refuge, a USEPA case study on the Darby Watershed, and the Citizens Against the Refuge Proposal (CARP) Opposition Report, are a few examples of data which were relied upon to outline the chain of events. I also gained permission from an OFA member to review various letters and FOIA documents which were awarded to OFA from the USFWS. A number of other published journal articles and conference preceedings related to collaboration and the Big Darby Watershed were also referenced. 56
• Social Surveys. Two public opinion surveys, commissioned by The Nature Conservancy, provide quantitative data regarding voter attitudes towards conservation and preservation in the Darby. Surveys conducted by Ohio State University, USFWS, and the Citizens Against the Refuge Proposal (CARP) are also referred to.
How and in what format will data be collected? In terms of research design
format, interviews were conducted using both the standard open-ended interview format and
informal conversational interview format. A standard open-ended interview format is characterized by
open-ended questions, in which their exact wording and sequence are determined prior to
the interview (Patton 2002, 349). In terms of strengths, in an open-ended format, responses
are more comparable and thus more easily organized and analyzed because respondents
answer the same pre-determined questions. However, little flexibility exists for adapting the interview to particular individuals and circumstances. Further, standardized questions may constrain and limit the naturalness and relevance of questions and answers.
For these reasons, the informal conversational interview format was also adopted. In
contrast to the standardized open-ended format, an informal conversational interview
format allows for questions to emerge during the course of the interview. The strengths of
the conversational format are several. First, naturalistic questioning increases the salience
and relevance of questions. Second, interviews are built on and emerge from the context of
personal observations made by the interviewer. And third, the interview can be adapted to
individuals and circumstances. At the same time, because different people are asked
different questions in an informal interview, the organization and analysis of data can be
quite difficult. This format can also be less comprehensive if certain questions do not arise
naturally, or if the interviewer misleads the conversation and fails to address the primary
questions of interest (Ibid.). 57
Naturalistic inquiry is an essential theme and natural control of qualitative research.
Naturalistic inquiry involves formulating a method that is non-biased, non-manipulative, and is open to new findings as they emerge (Patton 1990, 40). (It is important to note, however, that there are a number of “unnatural” elements inherent in the interview setting. In fact,
Patton mentions that “the very presence of the researcher, asking questions…can be an intervention that reduces the natural unfolding of events” (Patton 1990, 42). In this specific research, for example, the fact that I was taking notes and recording the interviewees, and that they knew they might be quoted, could have prevented participants from saying things that they might otherwise have shared in another setting.)
A researcher’s personal experience and engagement with participants directly affects the data collection process. Not only does understanding the background of individuals and events help to explain the reasons behind individuals’ opinions and the non-verbal context of their opinions, but personal interaction with participants directly influences the level of trust a participant holds for a researcher, thus affecting the quality of information received in an interview. This was particularly the case with interviews conducted with farmers. Prior to the interview, I introduced herself, explained her intentions, and asked the participant a number of more personal, unrelated questions. Though I did not know any of the farmers prior to the interviews, personal experience and engagement with them established trust, confidence, and a good rapport for honest, quality dialogue.
Empathic neutrality on the part of the researcher is essential for gathering high quality data. At first the phrase “empathic neutrality” may seem to be a contradiction in itself:
Empathy communicates understanding, interest, and caring, while neutrality suggests a certain emotional distance from their thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. However both are necessary in the interview process. By forcing the researcher to be nonjudgmental both in 58 the wording of questions and the attitude in which the researcher responds to comments, the interviewee feels he or she can tell the researcher anything without engendering their favor or disfavor with regard to the content of their response. In this sense, neutrality can actually facilitate rapport and help build a relationship that supports empathy (Patton 2002,
365).
Emergent design flexibility is another strategy that affords the investigator the freedom to adapt their research methods as their understanding or situation changes, and to pursue new paths of inquiry (Patton 2002, 44). The concept of shifting methods of design and analysis as the data emerge is a distinct characteristic and fundamental theme of qualitative inquiry.
The questions used in the generic semi-structured interview were as follows:
1) What was your role in [the partnership]? What were your duties? How did you become involved? 2) What was the trigger to formation of the organization (individual concern over the degradation of a resource, federal mandate, impasse, etc.)? Who initiated the process? 3) What were the objectives of the partnership (e.g. information exchange, education, monitoring, assessment and planning, action)? 4) How important was collaboration with other agencies and private organizations in [the partnership] goals and activities? Can you think of an example? 5) What would you consider the greatest achievement of [the partnership]? 6) What factors enabled the partnership to be successful? 7) In these scenarios, what was “success” (e.g. engagement, sustainability, water quality improvements, implementation of best management practices, etc.)? Who determined whether it was successful? 8) What do you consider the greatest challenge the partnership has faced? 9) What were the barriers to collaboration? And how could these barriers have been overcome? 10) In your opinion, what are the key lessons you have learned from these experiences?
Some questions were omitted after early interviews were conducted. Because I found the latter five questions the most productive, on several occasions where time restraints existed, only the last five questions were discussed. Some questions were also 59 changed to adapt to the needs of both the participant and researcher, and the direction of the conversation. For example, a few interviewees were more interested in “telling their story” than answering questions, so I focused more on guiding the discussion than asking particular questions. On other occasions where I was interested in understanding certain interviewee’s perspectives on certain events, I asked specific questions regarding their interpretation of what was taking place in the Darby at a certain place and time. Consistent effort was made to display empathic neutrality throughout the interview process.
What analytical approaches will be used? Understanding the theoretical weaknesses of deductive analysis explain why inductive analysis is the best approach for this thesis. Research in the physical and biological sciences has typically employed a deductive approach, in which research questions and hypotheses are first derived from theoretical models and then tested against empirical evidence (Flick 2002, 2). In the social sciences, however, dynamic social contexts and perspectives have made it increasingly difficult to formulate theories prior to the collection and evaluation of data. For this reason, social scientists have looked to the more flexible nature of the inductive approach, in which theories emerge from the empirical data, rather than the other way around. For example, collaboration is not a single isolated event, but rather a dynamic and ever-changing process, with productivity and attitudes being altered by new interactions, situational variables, and program developments (Patton 2002, 42). In contrast to more traditional deductive methods, the inductive qualitative approach allows for flexibility in terms of theory formulation and evaluation, regardless of when new and relevant variables enter the process.
Grounded theory is a type of inductive, qualitative research that has had significant application to the social and behavioral sciences, and has recently gained the attention of other occupational fields such as business and health care 60
(www.groundedtheory.com/vidseries1.html). Developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, grounded theory takes an inductive approach which “gives preference to the data and the field under study as against theoretical assumptions” (Flick 2002, 41). Strauss and Corbin
(1990, 23) explain:
A grounded theory is one that is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection, analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with each other. One does not begin with a theory, then prove it. Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge.
Grounded theory research begins by focusing on an area of study and then gathers data from a variety of sources, including interviews and field observations. In this study, the central focus was on agricultural and conservation-based collaborative partnerships in the
Big Darby Watershed. Data such as interviews (as well as personal observations made during those interviews), newspaper articles, journal publications, and other surveys conducted within the watershed’s boundaries were collected.
The data were then analyzed using two different processes of analysis. The first analytical approach utilized in this study is narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is a more sequential approach to looking at information, and uses collected narrative data to reconstruct events as well as life constructions (Flick 2002, 202). In this research, newspaper articles, government documentation, and journal publications are used to reconstruct the chain of events that unfolded in the watershed. Stakeholder interviews also contain narrative data that tell the story and help to explain the subjective social constructions through which interpretations are filtered. Understanding the context of these events is a critical element in this study. 61
The second method of data analysis utilized in this research is known as thematic coding, which can be applied to interviews, newspaper articles, or any other form of text- based data. Heavily embedded in the analytical theory of Strauss and Glaser, thematic coding is an offshoot of the more traditional method as it addresses the specific issue of the social distributions of perspectives on a phenomenon or a process (Flick 2002, 185). It accomplishes this end by 1) defining a few themes in advance [which themes emerge from careful analysis of the historical data that are reviewed prior to the collection of empirical data], 2) using the semi-structured interview format to focus on those particular themes which make data comparable yet open to the views of the interviewee, and 3) relying on purposeful sampling of information-rich sources that can best represent the diverse perspectives in existence.
The first stage of thematic coding is open coding, in which the entire text is reviewed by asking the questions, “What is this about? What is being referenced here?” Repeated nouns and verbs create categories, and their related adjectives and adverbs create properties of those categories, which assist in identifying, naming, categorizing, and describing phenomena found in the text. Selective coding is the second stage of thematic coding. In selective coding, the researcher reviews the emergent codes from the previous stage and attempts to generate broader thematic domains and categories for that single text. The themes which emerge from the text are then cross-checked with the themes inducted from other independent interview texts.
How will validity of and confidence in the findings be addressed? Aside from
enforcing systematic data collection procedures (e.g. asking consistently non-biased
questions, using semi-structured interviews, maintaining empathic neutrality, etc.), strategies
such as triangulation, context sensitivity, reflexivity, and holistic perspective are necessary to produce 62 high-quality qualitative data that are credible, trustworthy, authentic, balanced, and fair to the people studied (Patton 2002, 51).
The concept of triangulation is best explained in relation to land surveying, in which angles are measured from two known points in order to locate the unknown position of the third. As opposed to using a single landmark which can only identify the variable in question somewhere along a straight line, two landmarks can locate a precise point in space by taking bearings in two directions and locating the third at their intersection (Patton 2002,
187). In evaluation, triangulation refers to scrutinizing the collected data using a number of various “landmarks,” or analytical strategies, in order to strengthen the design integrity and to validate the results of empirical data (Flick 2002, 227). Denzin emphasizes the necessity of triangulation in saying that “no single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival causal factors…Because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality, multiple methods of observation must be employed” (Denzin 1978, 28).
The four types of triangulation most commonly referred to include multiple data sources, multiple investigators, multiple perspectives, and multiple methods. These strategies were employed by: 1) evaluating multiple sources of data (interviews, articles, and surveys), 2) looking through the lens of various perspectives (agency staff, university professors, and farmers) in order to interpret the data, and 3) using multiple methods (thematic coding and narrative analyses) to study the same body of data.
Being sensitive to the context of collected data is crucial to the final evaluation process. Context sensitivity is demonstrated through placing all findings in their social, historical, and temporal context. For example, findings regarding the concept of “trust” will differ across the board due to cultural and cognitive differences among stakeholders, and should therefore not be discussed without considering the background of those individuals 63 in mind. Patton makes clear that “the investigator’s commitment is to understand the world as it unfolds, be true to complexities and multiple perspectives as they emerge, and be balanced in reporting both confirmatory and disconfirming evidence with regard to any conclusions offered” (Patton 2002, 51).
However, it is highly unlikely that a researcher can be entirely informed as to the context of the data collected (e.g. the researcher may have little familiarity with the group under study or may lack an extensive knowledge of psychological concepts to thoroughly explain cognitive characteristics and differences). Qualitative analysis recognizes these weaknesses through the utilization of the strategy of reflexivity. This strategy emphasizes the researcher’s presence and personal influence in the study. Because the human being is the instrument of data collection, the subjectivities of the researcher must be acknowledged accordingly as an integral part of the research process. Flick states that “the researchers’ reflections on their action and observations in the field, their impressions, irritations, feelings, and so on, become data in their own right, forming part of the interpretation,” and must be documented accordingly (Flick 2002, 6).
Patton emphasizes the danger of isolating particular variables in the evaluation process without examining the “big picture.” The holistic perspective strategy views the entire phenomenon under study as “a complex system that is more than the sum of its parts”
(Patton 2002, 41). To maintain a holistic perspective, the researcher must continually focus on the interdependencies and dynamics between variables, and refer those findings to the
“big picture,” with the goal of gaining a greater understanding of the larger phenomenon in question. 64
In addition to using these qualitative research methods, I will verify the validity of the data with the interviewees themselves. Once the data are analyzed in their entirety, I will give them the opportunity to review her findings and provide feedback on its accuracy.
When will the study occur? The study consisted of extensive field interviews conducted between February and July 2002.
How will logistics and practicalities be handled? Access to either private property or public office buildings was granted by all willing participants. My personal car was used to travel to various sites in Ohio. When I was unable to meet personally with the participant, either due to scheduling conflicts or geographic constraints, interviews were conducted over the telephone. No special permission needed to be granted to records or contracts as no confidential documents were required for this study.
How will ethical issues and matters of confidentiality be handled? Appropriate paperwork was submitted and approved by the Ohio University Institutional Review Board
(IRB). As none of the questions asked of the participants revealed any sort of private or confidential information, and did not place participants at any physical or legal risk, a waiver from informed consent was requested and granted by the IRB. However, I was still required to obtain verbal permission from the participant after reviewing the following points prior to the interview:
• These data are being collected for research purposes at Ohio University. • Participation is voluntary. • The interview will take approximately 1 hour. • Participants must be 18 years of age or older. • By completing the interview and answering the questions, this implies their permission to use the data for research purposes. • Confidentiality will be maintained as the notes and audio cassettes will be held personally by the investigator and information will only be shared with other individuals pending personal request and permission. • May I record our interview on audiotape? • Please let me know at any time if you feel uncomfortable answering any of my questions or you would like to keep any of our conversation off the record and 65
confidential. • Do you have any concerns regarding any of the stipulations mentioned?
At the end of the interview, I was required to ask: “Was there was any information shared by the participant which s/he would like to remain confidential and unpublished?”
What resources will be available? I was awarded generous funding by the Ohio
University Masters of Science in Environmental Studies Program ($125), the John Houk
Memorial Research Grant ($400), and the Student Enhancement Award through the Ohio
University Council of Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activity ($790). This money helped to cover costs for research supplies (e.g. cassette tapes, photocopies), phone interviews, and travel to various sites throughout Ohio for personal interviews. 66
CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS
Chapter Four provides a background sketch of myself and then presents the findings of the research in a narrative style, using the data to document the creation and success of two collaboratives, the Darby Partnership and Operation FUTURE Association. It then discusses the chain of events surrounding the Little Darby Wildlife Refuge proposal controversy, which led to the demise of collaboration between farmers and environmentalists in the watershed. I include two different perspectives – that of the farmers and that of the agency / TNC personnel. The general themes which emerge from these two perspectives are summarized.
Researcher’s Background Sketch
I am a 27-year old female of Asian American descent. I was raised in an urban area.
I received a B.S. in Conservation Biology and am currently working toward an M.S. in
Environmental Studies. Due to my interest in natural resources, I have been a long-time
supporter of efforts to protect the environment. I have lived and studied in various states
and abroad.
I consider myself largely unfamiliar with rural farming life and culture. Recently,
however, I had the opportunity to assist in the development of natural resource management
plans and other rural development projects in southeast Ohio for the Institute for Local
Government Administration and Rural Development (ILGARD). This experience caused
me to develop a deep respect for rural people, and a deeper appreciation for the rural way of
life. In addition, and upon recommendation by a member of my committee knowledgeable
in rural sociological issues, I watched the 1984 movie, Country, which depicted both the 67 economic and cultural stresses imposed on a small agricultural community in Iowa who learn they have 30 days to pay off a government loan. The video helped me to understand the economic and socio-cultural pressures that farmers face today.
Let me now provide some background information on my interviewees. Of the sixteen individuals I interviewed, all were white and all but two were male. Five of them were academics, two were TNC representatives, and four worked for government agencies.
Five were farmers. Of all the individuals I contacted initially by phone or email, only one individual – a former TNC employee – declined to be interviewed. I made a concerted effort to meet with as many farmers as possible because I felt their perspective had been overlooked.
I am the first to acknowledge that my background had the potential to impact this study. I knew that our differences in terms of gender and race could influence the information gathering process. Since I have had numerous, positive interactions in the past with professors, agency personnel, and environmentalists – many of them white males – I was confident that our differences would not pose a problem. I was, however, very concerned about how I would be received by the farmers, not only because I was a female and a minority, but also a “city girl” and, in their eyes, an “environmental activist.”
As predicted, interviews with the academics, TNC staff, or agency personnel went smoothly. I was quite surprised, however, that the interviews with the farmers went just as well. Though I think many of the farmers were surprised at first that I was Asian and were curious as to why a “city girl” would care about farmers, after a brief “get to know you” we were having a very open and honest dialogue. I sensed that the farmers were comfortable talking with me – there were no indications they felt inhibited because of my academic or personal background. The farmers I interviewed were very articulate and held many 68 leadership positions in the community. It is important to note, however, that these farmers may not serve as an accurate sample of the Darby farming community as a whole. The farmers contacted for interview were selected for this project specifically because of their involvement in partnerships in the Darby and their reputation as opinion leaders in the farming community.
After hearing their perspective and getting to know them personally, I found myself becoming very sympathetic to their viewpoint. Perhaps this was because the farmers were generally more emotional. It also may have been due to the fact that I was previously unaware of many of the farmers’ viewpoints, and the feelings they shared brought new perspectives that I had not previously considered. I was, however, very aware of these feelings throughout the course of the data gathering process and made a consistent effort to maintain empathic neutrality in interviews.
General Findings
I organized my findings by placing them in two categories: 1) farmers and 2) agency personnel / environmentalists. Through this process of rough grouping, I was able to compare and contrast the large quantity of data and understand them in socio-cultural context. It is critical to note, however, that not all individuals interviewed fit neatly into these two categories. For example, there were agency personnel who were extremely sympathetic to the farmers and farmers who were likewise very sympathetic towards TNC.
Major themes that emerged from conversation with the farmers revolved around issues of power sharing and trust. While it was more difficult to identify consistent themes from the interviews with agency staff and environmentalists, two points that did come up 69 repeatedly were 1) the unwillingness of the farmers to compromise and 2) the role the media played throughout the process.
A few themes emerged that were relevant to both parties. The first was related to common objectives. For example, it was a common objective – preservation of the unique quality of the Darby Creek – which unified farmers and environmentalists early on during the productive years of OFA. Likewise, it was the lack of a common objective that split the two interests during the refuge debate. Indeed, at the same time agency staff and environmentalists were spending more and more time promoting a wildlife refuge, farmers were expressing less and less interest in setting aside land for endangered species. The second overarching theme apparent throughout the narrative is that of fundamental cognitive differences, which the reader should be mindful of throughout the narrative.
Narrative: Collaborative Partnerships in the Darby and the Wildlife Refuge Controversy
In the late 1980s, the Darby’s aquatic biodiversity and unique habitat captured the attention of the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS). In time, USDA funds were granted towards conservation efforts throughout the watershed. The project, which involved helping farmers plan and implement conservation practices, was well received, and stimulated more interest and participation from other state-level environmental and farm agencies (Darby Book 1996, 6). Together, these cooperating organizations developed a management plan for the Darby Creek Watershed and immediately applied for funding.
One application was granted in 1991 by the USDA in the form of a Hydrologic Unit Area
(HUA) designation. The designation of the Darby as an HUA resulted in generous funding between 1991 and 1995. NRCS personnel were hired to provide technical assistance and 70
$600,000 in cost-shares was allocated to farmers for the implementation of BMPs (USEPA
2000, 11).
As one of only 70 HUAs in the nation, the Darby received widespread attention from the media, agencies, and private environmental groups in the 1990s. The same year the
Darby was designated, The Nature Conservancy named it one of its “Last Great Places.” In
1994, Big Darby Creek was recognized by the National Park Service as a national scenic river. Water quality and other biological studies conducted by the Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency similarly confirmed that the Darby maintained “Exceptional Warmwater
Quality.”
Creation of the Darby Partnership
The high level of activity going on in the Darby signaled a growing need for communication and coordination within the watershed. In 1991, The Nature Conservancy agreed to facilitate a partnership of federal, state and local agencies, private organizations, and citizens to serve as a “think tank” for all conservation efforts in the Darby. The goal of the partnership was to be a resource for citizens of the watershed who wanted to protect the
Darby (Darby Book 1996, 7). The group became known as the Darby Partners (later renamed the Darby Partnership), and consisted of 40 different organizations and agencies which met quarterly to share information and resources.
The Darby Partnership intended from its inception to serve as an information exchange for all conservation efforts in the Darby. It deliberately chose not to set a common vision for the partnership and refrained from taking positions on issues
(Korfmacher 2000). Quarterly meetings were used to address current issues relating to the protection of the Darby; and topics for discussion were set by individuals requesting time, 71 while a TNC staff member was responsible for facilitating relevant discussion. The value of this neutral, impartial facilitator was made apparent when members of the partnership expressed their confidence in Teri Devlin, a former TNC employee and one of the main coordinators of the Darby Partnership. One individual stated,
There is a facilitation challenge keeping all the interests at the table and making sure they feel comfortable there. We have from my perspective one of the great facilitators in Teri Devlin. Someone who just knows how to make people feel welcome and comfortable and honored in their perspective. I think if someone has a strong self interest to be gained by the partnership they run the risk of really threatening its integrity. I think Teri has been the right degree of friendship and has been a great facilitator in honoring all points of view. (Manskopf 1999, 8-13)
Due to the HUA funding, the partnership initially focused on agriculture-related issues; however, the Darby Partnership has addressed issues from sprawling development, to stormwater controls and floodplain regulations, to the proposal of the establishment of a wildlife refuge in the Darby (Korfmacher 2000).
Though attendance was dramatically reduced between 1998 and 2000 due to the wildlife refuge debate (which will be described in detail later in the chapter), the Darby
Partnership has slowly recovered and continues to meet quarterly, averaging about 40-60 in attendance (Sasson 2003). The group has maintained strong representation from state and federal governmental agencies. Local government and citizens have had a relatively smaller presence in the partnership, potentially due to the fact that meetings are held during the day.
However, the group averages a relatively high attendance compared to other similar forums
(Ibid.).
72
Accomplishments of the Darby Partnership
The Darby Partnership lacked elements considered by many experts to be critical for successful collaboration (strong central source of funding, authority, and common vision), yet proved productive and useful in many ways (Korfmacher 2000). Though the group itself lacked independent funding, the legitimacy of the partnership helped to attain vast resources.
For example, due to the Partnership’s reputation and its efforts to work with local farmers,
TNC was able to obtain a $250,000 Kellogg grant for the support of the Operation
FUTURE Association (Korfmacher 2000), a farmer group in the Darby (which will be discussed in the following section). Further, the fact that the partnership lacked a common vision and avoided taking positions created a neutral forum for discussion which allowed for open dialogue and information exchange.
In a survey conducted by Korfmacher (2000), members of the Darby Partnership stated that two of the most fully achieved objectives were educating the partners and the public about management issues and sharing scientific information. Interviewees confirmed these findings (Beery 2002). One specific accomplishment that focused on education was the creation, publication, and distribution of “The Darby Book” in 1996, which explained various threats to the Darby Creek (i.e. septic tanks, livestock grazing, wetland loss, etc.) and provided suggestions and resources for remediation.
Another one of the most valuable accomplishments of the Darby Partnership was the relationship-building and trust that was developed among members of the partnership, which has encouraged collaboration and joint decision making between participants
(Korfmacher 2000).
73
Criticisms of the Darby Partnership
One of the main criticisms of the Darby Partnership was that local citizen participation was poor. Another criticism was the high turnover of agency staff involved
(Manskopf 1999). Critics of the partnership claim that the rate of implementation of best management practices has been less than desirable. Napier and Johnson’s research (1998), which was discussed earlier, indicates that voluntary incentive conservation programs in the
Darby have not significantly increased the rate of adoption of best management practices in the watershed. Critics also point to the fact that the biodiversity of the streams has changed little. The Nature Conservancy, which initially measured the success of the Darby
Partnership by the number of acres preserved and dollars spent, now places a greater emphasis on ecosystem biodiversity, and for that reason calls the efforts of the Darby
Partnership only a “qualified success” (Sasson 2002).
The Emergence of Operation FUTURE
Though the activity in the watershed in the early ‘90s caused excitement in the environmental community, it also caused a growing concern for farmers in the Darby, whose agricultural lands comprised 80 percent of the watershed. “The increased attention that Big
Darby Creek was getting for its scenic and ecological attributes was troublesome and threatening to many farmers in this community. Rumors about what these designations mean and about the unfamiliar outside interests were widely discussed and believed” (Hall
1995, 2). Many farmers were particularly afraid that the media attention might fuel further criticism related to agricultural nonpoint source pollution, and eventually lead to the regulation of agriculture (USEPA 2000, 12). 74
The Darby Partnership responded to the farmers’ concerns with the idea to create a task force of farmers and environmentalists to discover and collaboratively address the issues relevant to the Darby. HUA funding provided $90,000 a year to cover Ohio State University
Extension (OSUE) staff salaries, which agents used to organize and facilitate task force meetings. OSUE selected 20-30 farmers who were regarded as opinion leaders (not necessarily those who were aware of environmental issues) in the community to attend the first meeting which was held 1 February 1991 (Hall 1995, 2).
From this core group of farmers emerged a group known as “Operation FUTURE”
(the acronym stands for “Finding Understanding in Tomorrow’s Uncertain Rural
Economy”). Operation FUTURE was created as a partnership between OSU Extension, farmers, and TNC, with the mission “to link economic with environmental soundness to improve the quality of life in the agricultural community of the Big Darby Creek watershed” (Hall
2002, italics mine). Though the group was maintained by a paid OSUE agent, the organization was largely farmer-driven; the farmers themselves were selected as officers and were highly involved in the recruiting of other members and in the planning of meetings and events. The sponsors were hopeful that a collaboration founded on a bottom-up leadership approach would promote information exchange and increase the awareness of farmers on environmental and agricultural issues, with the ultimate purpose of preserving the biodiversity of the Big Darby.
By 1993, Operation FUTURE evolved from a small task force to a member-driven
association known as the Operation FUTURE Association (OFA), with non-profit
organization status. A $200,000 Kellogg grant awarded that year provided additional funds
to further support programs and staff. In 1994, the farmers, who were too busy to take on
the responsibility themselves (B. Boerger 2002), hired OSUE agent and farmer Denny Hall 75 to serve as OFA Executive Director. Hall spent a significant amount of time conducting leadership training and teaching facilitating skills in order to encourage the long-term sustainability and self-sufficiency of the group. It is important to note that all five of the farmers interviewed made particular mention of the positive relationship the OFA farmers had with Hall and his key role in the success of OFA. Hall similarly expressed his respect for the farmers he associated with in Operation Future.
Accomplishments of Operation FUTURE
Because the funding for Operation FUTURE was made possible largely through the efforts of the Darby Partnership, it is difficult to discuss their accomplishments independent of one another. Funding aside, we can say that Operation FUTURE was believed to have created an effective bridge between the agricultural and environmental communities (Hall
1995). One example of an OFA activity that made this connection apparent was the fifteen canoe trips through the Darby Watershed, in which over 500 people participated between
1992 and 1998. On those canoe trips, farmers, agency personnel, local residents, and experts alike were purposely paired together to interact with one another and to learn from each other about the watershed. In a Columbus Dispatch article dated 23 June 1999, both farmers and environmentalists expressed a realization that they did have similar interests in protecting the watershed and they could learn a lot from each other. Environmentalists and agency staff began to see an environmental concern and awareness in the farming community they had not realized previously. Stated Hall, “Once regarded as the ‘bad guys,’ farmers today are recognized for their positive role in remediating the adverse effects of land use changes and nonpoint source pollution” (Hall 1995). Hall similarly observed a change of heart in many of the farmers as well: 76
The notion that biological diversity had persisted in this agricultural watershed while not in others was recognized as testimony to the farmers’ stewardship. A new sense of pride and ownership of the creek’s biological diversity began to emerge in the farming community. A fundamental shift occurred, with the farmers beginning to see their role as making a great place even better. This contrasted with the feeling that they were going to be lambasted for water quality problems. (Hall 1995)
Considering the disparity of opinions between the two parties, many view the understanding gained by participants on these canoe trips as the biggest success of OFA (USEPA 2000;
Hall 1995).
The level of engagement in OFA by farmers is another indicator of success. Annual meetings attracted up to 400 people (Hall 2002), all gathered “under the idea of being largely environmental” (B. Boerger 2002). Approximately 60-80 farmers paid their own way to participate in OFA-organized tours to various locations throughout the U.S. (Washington
D.C., Chesapeake Bay, Illinois, and Missouri) and abroad (Brazil). These trips were planned with three goals in mind: 1) to better understand the political interests influencing agricultural-related policy; 2) to become familiar with other watershed management programs; and 3) to interact with other farmers facing similar environmental challenges.
Another significant accomplishment of OFA was an increased environmental awareness among members of the farming community. Barry Boerger, a Darby farmer and former OFA president, noticed that farmers were talking about conservation, not just at
OFA meetings, but in the halls after meetings and over meals together. “I hear farmers talking about conservation programs today. The education programs, like the canoe trips, opened peoples’ eyes. They knew there was good fishing in the Darby, but they had no idea what high regard it had nationwide” (B. Boerger 2002). Although there were differing opinions (Shannon 2002), many farmers realized there were economic incentives behind the implementation of BMPs, such as cost-sharing for filter strips and CRPs. Boerger stated, 77
“Farming is a business and anything that makes economic sense is going to get a farmer’s attention” (2002). Hall asserted that OFA’s efforts persuaded farmers of the legitimacy of
BMPs and thus made conservation practices socially acceptable among farmers, which will lead to increased, long-term participation over time (Hall 1995).
The work of OFA also contributed to the progress made in terms of conservation in the Darby watershed. Education and adoption of no-till practices in the Darby resulted in a
30% reduction in sediment entering the stream (Hall 2002). It is important to note, however, that the introduction of the John Deere no-till drill, which occurred over this same time period, greatly influenced the farmers’ switch to no-till practices (Ibid.).
Operation FUTURE’s accomplishments attracted not only local media attention, but attention nationwide. By 1995, OFA officers had made presentations at numerous conferences and meetings throughout the U.S, and their organization’s accomplishments had been featured in national publications such as Farm Journal, Progressive Farmer, and The Nature
Conservancy (Hall 1995).
Criticisms of Operation FUTURE
There are critics that have questioned the success of OFA and the overall value of costly voluntary conservation programs. A study conducted between 1991 and 1994 by
Napier and Johnson (1998) indicated that Darby farmers’ contact with OFA and their access to resources through OFA were much less than what they publicly claimed to be.
Regression analyses found that the parameters of education, use of information sources, access to technical assistance, and access to economic subsidies were not statistically significant predictors in determining adoption of conservation practices in the Darby
(Napier and Johnson 1998). Moreover, Napier and Johnson also concluded that although 78 significant changes in production practices did occur in the watershed between 1991 and
1994, “many of the observed changes [were] not desirable from a perspective of soil and water conservation” (Ibid., 80). A few interviewees similarly revealed that the Darby’s sizable funding “didn’t achieve much because there were very few participants” and that “nothing much changed in terms of [implementation of BMPs]” (Hegge 2002). OFA did recognize that they had “not been diligent about quantifying specific accomplishments” (Hall 1995).
One agency staff member expressed that OFA was not successful in “making the jump to environmental stewardship” because farmers were too production driven (Beery
2002). Another agency staff member explained his definition of “partnership” as a situation
“when groups give up something to achieve some interest,” and that in the case of OFA, farmers had their own predetermined objectives and were so compelled by them that they were “unwilling to give up anything” (Hegge 2002).
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Proposal for the Little Darby National Wildlife Refuge
Concerned that progress was not being made rapidly enough, several agencies began exploring other options to protect the Darby. In March 1997, at the request of TNC, a meeting was attended by the USFWS, TNC, Metroparks, and NRCS to discuss options for protecting the Darby watershed (FOIA documents from USFWS). This group became known as the Darby Ecosystem Protection and Restoration Project (and will be referred to from this point on as the Darby Project). From the bi-monthly meetings of this coalition grew the concept of designating a portion of the Darby Watershed as a national wildlife refuge. The group also came to a consensus early in the planning process that the acquisition of land should be on a strictly voluntary basis, and therefore eminent domain should not be exercised in land acquisition. 79
The agencies involved felt the idea would be favorable for wildlife and habitat protection, and also for farmers in the watershed who were interested in selling their land but didn’t want to turn it over to a developer (Columbus Dispatch, 23 November 1997).
However, TNC still sought public opinion and hired the Kitchens Group to conduct a poll on the matter. The results of the poll indicated that a large percentage of Ohio voters wanted to see the Darby Watershed protected (Columbus Dispatch, 17 November 1997).
However, farmers interpreted the poll differently. After a review of the survey results, a group of farmers later explained:
When the Kitchens Group survey asked what is the best way to protect Little Darby Creek, the most popular response provided was local zoning, not purchase of land by the government…Those conclusions [listed in the DEIS] merely demonstrate general public conservation sentiment in 1997. The conclusions do not justify the refuge. They are equally supportive of other non-refuge conservation alternatives. (CARP comments to DEIS 1999, 36, italics mine)
Over the next seven months, the Darby Project presented the refuge idea to
congressional representatives and important state-level officials, OSU Extension agents, and
local SWCD boards. Though each expressed different levels of support for the idea, most
agreed that grassroots support would be essential in the undertaking (USFWS Chronology of
Events 1999).
On 9 September 1997, the Darby Project presented their ideas to seven Darby
farmers, who were also active members of OFA, in hopes of gaining their support. The
USFWS summarized the farmers’ reaction to the presentation: “The group indicated their
general support for the concept so long as it was presented as an option among all other
conservation alternatives. It did not frighten them” (USFWS Chronology of Events 1999,
2). Though the seven farmers were largely in favor of protection, there was doubt among
the group that the project would be accepted by the agricultural community at large (B. 80
Boerger 2002). Realizing the sensitive nature of the issue, the seven farmers collectively decided that OFA could not take a position on the matter; USFWS would instead have to sell the idea to the farming community on their own. The Project chose to move ahead on their own, with what they deemed a substantial level of support according to the Kitchens
Group poll. Shortly thereafter, TNC sent out letters to all major landowners within the tentative boundaries, notifying them of the project and requesting public comment.
Only a few days later, on 23 November 1997, the first newspaper article appeared in the Columbus Dispatch announcing a potential 50,000 acre wildlife refuge for the Darby
Watershed and voluntary opportunities for land purchase within its boundaries. The announcement was considered a triumph for the conservation community; however, many were concerned that the timing of the article was premature (the article was not instigated by the Darby Project, but was a result of numerous inquiries made by the print media which the group finally decided to address). A number of Darby Project participants expressed their opinion that had TNC had more time to get information out to the farmers prior to the article, they may have been more receptive to the refuge concept (Hall 2002; Shelton 2002).
Though the agency made clear that the ideas were preliminary, that the scoping process was required, and that no decisions were final, many farmers were skeptical of the refuge plan. In a Dispatch article, Barry Boerger stated, “I’m hearing skepticism from the community. No one quite knows what the thing is going to look like [and] there has been very little opportunity for local input” (Columbus Dispatch, 8 January 1998). OFA president,
Fred Yoder, explained the concern of the majority of Darby farmers at the time: “When we read the article in the November 20 Columbus Dispatch we were concerned that U.S. Fish &
Wildlife listen to farmers from the affected area so we immediately helped create a task force 81 of farmers. This task force then met on many occasions to evaluate the effects of the U.S.
Fish & Wildlife proposal on the agricultural community” (OFA letter, 28 January 1999).
Only one month later, on 30 December 1997, and before serious discussions could be held between the farmers and the Darby Project, the Dispatch’s headline read “DeWine backs Darby.” On the front page, U.S. Senator Mike Dewine stated, “I intend to be very supportive of this project publicly and work behind the scenes to provide assistance…This is going to be my No. 1 conservation priority and one of my top priorities for Ohio” (Columbus
Dispatch, 30 December 1997). Again, the media notified farmers of these events before TNC had the time to consult with the farmers personally, and this caused an immediate stir among those in the agricultural community.
Darby farmers were shocked by the announcement, and particularly by the pace at which the project was moving. The farmers felt betrayed, particularly by TNC, whom the farmers felt was plotting the refuge idea behind their backs. They also felt betrayed in the sense that TNC no longer trusted them to take care of the Darby. Barry Boerger explained,
“It seemed to me that there was an implication that the farmers were being told that they were most likely not capable of protecting the ecosystem in the future so the best alternative was to take control of the land and give it to someone else who could” (2002). Another group of farmers similarly expressed disapproval of government intervention because they considered the agricultural community of the Darby largely responsible for preserving the integrity of the stream:
The people of the Little Darby watershed have taken pride in their region and have been active in conserving the resources of the watershed. The water quality and ecological habitat of Little Darby Creek are exceptional, due in large part to the care of local farmers and other community members and organizations who have labored to conserve the creek and its resources. Yet the Fish & Wildlife Service now is proposing to displace the very people who have so carefully maintained the Little Darby watershed. (OFA letter, 28 January 1999, italics mine) 82
OFA officers, who originally chose to remain neutral on the issue, slowly began to realize that by not making a public statement regarding the refuge, OFA was no longer representing their constituents, the majority of which were opposed to the plan (B. Boerger
2002). Therefore, on 27 January 1998, the task force decided to issue a public statement of opposition, and on 28 January 1998, a formal press release by OFA was made public. In the press release, OFA stated, “It is not that we are against wildlife, it is that we are concerned about the very significant loss of some of our State’s best farmland” (1998, 2). A more detailed letter written the same day by OFA, but directed to Darby farmers, explained,
Specifically, we are opposed to the potential loss of farmland that would occur if U.S. Fish & Wildlife established a large tall-grass prairie. Not only would land be lost to production agriculture directly through Fish & Wildlife acquisition, but also, we fear a refuge would further attract residential development pressure.
Ultimately, the problem is that the mission of the U.S. Fish & Wildlife is just too narrow to serve the interests of our agricultural community. This difference is evident by U.S. Fish & Wildlife’s insistence on planning a large, tall grass prairie in the heart of prime farmland…Finally, we believe it is a potentially devastating development for conservation across the country if voices like the Operation Future Association and conservation-minded farmers like those in the Darby watershed are run over by a government agency like the U.S. Fish & Wildlife. When farmers like our OFA members [who] have done so much to promote conservation are ignored it becomes a disincentive for farmers elsewhere to participate in the first place. (OFA letter, 28 January 1999, italics mine)
It is important to emphasize here that one interviewee closely involved in OFA at the time expressed regret in retrospect that the press release was sent before TNC had an opportunity to meet with the farmers to address their concerns (Hall 2002). This is one example of how the media served as the go-between for the two organizations, preventing opportunity for them to discuss and resolve their differences face to face. Over 200 newspaper articles appeared locally and nationally in relation to the Darby between 1991 and
2002, many of which were press releases to the media. A number of interviewees opined 83 that this behavior did not allow disputing parties to meet and discuss their differences face to face, before lines were drawn, which ultimately led to premature disputes and tension.
The press release shocked the Darby Project, and particularly TNC. The polls had given them every indication that the farmers were in support of such a project, yet the farmers felt otherwise toward the refuge, even despite farmland preservation efforts and the exclusion of eminent domain (Soule 2002). A TNC employee and member of the Darby
Project pointed out one reason why the farmers were so opposed to the project. In retrospect the staff member stated, “With this wildlife refuge I think I may have been a little ignorant and our organization may have been a little ignorant of the level of distrust in the community for the federal government” (Manskopf 1999, 8-13). It was also evident that the two parties suffered a major communication failure at that point in time: they did not know each other’s “bottom line.” In other words, the very thing that USFWS was doing to “help” the farmers (creating a farmland protection area within the watershed) was the very thing the farmers were fearing most (government intervention).
The Darby Project continued to move forward, while the farmers grew increasingly skeptical. Farmers were concerned about the agricultural/economic impact a refuge would have on the watershed. Many tenant farmers renting land in the area were worried their landowners would decide to sell, leaving them without land and means for making a living.
Hall stated in the Dispatch, “Farmers in the area seem willing to support corridor protection.
Many of them have enrolled land beside the streams in federal conservation programs, but they may not support a large refuge surrounding the creeks…Farmers would not like to see any large area of land lost to a refuge” (Columbus Dispatch, 31 Jan 1998, italics mine). Resident farmer
Gary Shannon stated, “Refuge proponents have said the land will be purchased only from 84 willing sellers, but farmers worry about quality farmland being taken out of production”
(Columbus Dispatch, 5 Feb 1998).
Though agency and TNC staff believed the agricultural community had a legitimate concern, they felt the farmers were focusing solely on the loss of farmland for conservation purposes, without acknowledging the more ominous threat of the conversion of farmland for residential and commercial development in the watershed (Shelton 2003). Agency staff also felt that the farmers were overreacting to the rate at which farmland would be converted. USFWS expressed early on that the conversion would be a very gradual process occurring over a 20-year span, with an estimated average of 1,250 acres of farmland being converted to conservation per year, which translated to only 0.4% of the land base of
Madison County and only 0.2% in the combined land base of Madison & Union Counties
(Ibid.).
Farmers were also concerned about how the proposed refuge would affect the value of their land. Many felt that the presence of the Service in the watershed would act as a land value depressant, discouraging others to buy within the Service’s refuge boundaries, for fear that the Service would somehow take the land for nothing one day. At the same time, refuge opponents also felt the refuge would act as a land value enhancement that would bring more housing developers to the region and price farmers out of the land purchasing market. TNC staff felt it was an argument “that the Service could never win, since they were viewed as causing the two problems simultaneously” (Shelton 2003).
The agricultural community was also apprehensive as to whether they would receive
“fair” compensation for their property, if they did decide to sell it to USFWS. The crux of the problem, however, boils down to the definition of “fair.” The Service explained that because they were spending taxpayer money they could only pay “fair-market value” for the 85 land, which was often significantly less than what developers were paying. Madison and
Union County farmers, many of whom had received generous offers from developers, felt that “fair” was the highest value the property could be sold at. In fact, many refuge opponents privately stated that opposition to the refuge would have faded away if the
Service would have met the farmers’ determination of “fair” by agreeing to pay developer prices (Shelton 2003). Unfortunately, this dilemma was never resolved.
The farmers also felt they were ignored by USFWS and TNC throughout the planning process. A group of farmers stated, “The Service claims to have involved local landowners in the refuge planning process, but that ‘involvement’ amounted to little more than notice to landowners of what the Service, The Nature Conservancy, and other entities intend to do in their area” (CARP comments on DEIS, 22 September 2000, 21). Records indicated that members of the Darby Project were also aware of the lack of public involvement in the process. Tom Larson of USFWS Region 3, in an internal memo to
USFWS staff, noted:
I would caution you against relying too heavily on TNC for advice that is translated directly to a FWS position. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 was passed to prevent government agencies from working behind closed doors with special interests (lobbyists, etc.). I do not know a lot about FACA but we were informed about it at training I had within the past year. Under the act, we cannot have closed meetings with selected segments of the public and ask for their advice. We can get technical information from specific people or groups. (Larson, internal memo to USFWS staff, acquired by CARP through FOIA, italics mine)
In order to be more inclusive of all parties, in the summer of 1998 the USFWS established a
Darby technical work panel. A USFWS press release stated,
The Service instituted a 30 member Technical (advisory) Work Panel…to share facts, and enlist views and suggestions from community and professional representatives throughout the planning process. County officials and farm organization representatives have 86
been an active and important part of this panel. (USFWS press release, 11 February 1999, 3)
However, even in this effort, the farmers felt the public was not adequately represented. They stated that of the 30-member panel, only one member lived within the target area (CARP Opposition Report 1999). They also questioned the overall productivity of the panel. Some felt the Service was actively attempting to suppress opposing views existing on the work panel (CARP comments on DEIS, 22 September 2000). One interviewee stated that the evasiveness of the federal government in those meetings contributed, in part, to the mistrust which pervaded the refuge conflict.
FWS was evasive in their answers to farmers’ questions. They would always answer with, “we have a process,” and when the farmers asked how long it would take, they would have the same answer. At the end of meetings, farmers didn’t know what to make of the Fish & Wildlife presentations, so they thought the worst. (B. Boerger 2002)
Another farmer interviewee expressed frustration with the inflexibility of agency goals and procedures:
Instead of spending millions of taxpayer dollars and displacing hundreds of taxpayers in your target area, you…should work with state and local people to put more bite into local zoning and planning policies so federal intervention is not necessary. But, unfortunately, you won’t because that is not your job. Your job is setting up federal wildlife refuges…Unfortunately, when…the Fish & Wildlife Service leaves our community, it will only be to go to someone else’s community to try to do the same to them. After all, it’s their irreversible solution and it’s just their job!” (CARP Opposition Report 1999, 2, italics mine).
A Preliminary Project Proposal (PPP) for what was then called the “Darby Prairie
National Wildlife Refuge” was submitted to the USFWS and was approved by Director Bill
Hartwig in April 1998. The nine-page PPP described a 50,000 acre area privately owned by
470 landowners within Madison, Champaign, and Union County lines that could potentially be acquired through “willing-seller-only agreements” by the federal government toward the protection of endangered species and migratory waterfowl, and the restoration of their 87 habitat. The proposal also outlined the ecological diversity of the Darby, threats to biodiversity, goals for protection, funding sources, as well as the public attitude on the refuge and opportunities for public involvement. In the letter, however, Hartwig also pointed out that this approval was by no means the final decision.
I want to emphasize that this action does not establish the refuge. This action does enable the Service to initiate planning for the refuge in concert with all interested organizations and individuals and to seek a protection strategy for the Darby Creek watershed that may include the establishment of a refuge or other conservation options. A refuge may only become a reality if approved by the Service Regional Director after public input and a careful analysis of the facts and impacts, after funds are appropriated by Congress and finally, after land, or a right therein, is acquired. (Letter to Gov. George Voinovich from USFWS, 3 June 1998, italics mine)
Regardless of Hartwig’s comments, much of the agricultural community felt threatened by the speed of the effort and decided to pursue a more active role. A small group of farmers staunchly opposed to the refuge, many of whom were also OFA members, created another entity called “Citizens Against Refuge Proposal” (CARP) in January 1999.
With non-profit status and seven elected trustees, the group established as its purposes: to obtain information concerning the proposed refuge; disseminate that information to members of OFA; evaluate how the proposals would affect agriculture within the boundaries; dispense that information to local, state, and federal governments; and express and publish for the general public, government-elected officials, and other agencies, CARP’s opposition to the proposed refuge (CARP Opposition Report 1999).
CARP raised the funds within a few months to hire lawyer Christopher A. Walker who actively lobbied their congressmen and helped them to file suit under the Freedom of
Information Act (and again in March 2000) for documents from the USFWS to further investigate the refuge proposal plans. CARP also released an Opposition Report in February
1999, which stated their opposition to the refuge based on 1) the loss of prime farmland; 2) 88 the loss of tax revenue; 3) eventual or immediate drainage problems; 4) increased damage to row crops and livestock from the reintroduction of many species of wildlife; and 5) possible loss of school funding. Over 1,000 signatures and petitions were included in the document, all expressing similar sentiment toward the refuge proposal. The CARP report further explained that the intrusive behavior of USFWS and TNC had caused the agricultural community to lose their trust in them:
The Fish and Wildlife Service and supporting groups have alienated local residents and local governments. By forcing the Darby Refuge proposal against the united opposition of local residents and local government, and by disparaging the ability of local communities to protect and preserve the resources in their care, the Fish and Wildlife Service and supporting groups (such as The Nature Conservancy) have lost credibility, influence, and good will in the Little Darby region. Yet both the Service and The Nature Conservancy recognize that any effective conservation effort in the Little Darby watershed must have local support in order to succeed. Imposing the Darby Refuge on unwilling local residents will ultimately be counterproductive to effective preservation of the Little Darby watershed. (“Little Darby National Wildlife Refuge: Bad for Farming, Bad for Local Communities, Bad for Little Darby Creek 1999, 2, italics mine)
By the spring of 1999, CARP secured commitments not to sell land for refuge purposes from over 99% of the landowners within the refuge study area.
Though it was true that CARP gained support from the majority of farmers in the
Darby, interviewees made reference to the fact that CARP was perhaps not truly representative of the farmers at large. Some noted that social pressure by protestors may have caused farmers originally in support of the refuge to not speak up, and yet others to join CARP (Hegge 2002).
The USFWS made conscientious efforts to address a number of claims that had been made up by CARP and the general public. In a USFWS release dated 11 February 1999,
William Hegge, Darby project manager, addressed a number of those statements, one of 89 which was that the public [would] have no say in the final refuge plan. Hegge stated that involvement by the public was required by law:
After the scientific, economic, and opinion analysis has been completed and a plan prepared, the Service will formally meet with the public to accept comments. Public comment and review of the plan is required by law before the Service can consider it for approval. (USFWS press release, 11 February 1999, 2, italics mine)
The USFWS clarified misinformation that farmland would be lost because of the refuge.
Hegge stated,
Farmland is not lost, it is sold by owners who have the right to sell their land to anyone they choose. The Service is acutely aware of the importance placed on farmland protection by the local communities and the State of Ohio...The Service has made a commitment within its goals for the proposed project to preserve agricultural land as a desirable alternative to urban sprawl and its associated development adjacent to native habitats that have been preserved or restored. Since there is no true plan as yet that has been proposed by the Service, those suggesting that plan will result in the loss of farmland are making an assumption. It is in the Service’s’ best interest to have as much land stay in agriculture as possible if any refuge plan is to be [a] viable part of the community…(USFWS press release, 11 February 1999, 2)
Hegge particularly stressed that the service would not take land by eminent domain. He explained,
All levels of government have the authority to use eminent domain, including the federal government. However, the USFWS does NOT use it as a matter of policy. It would be counterproductive. Our record has been consistent. In the past 10 years the Service has engaged in almost 6000 transactions across the country involving nearly 2 million acres. Eminent domain was used in one instance and that was to clear title. The U.S. Congress has specifically mandated us not to use it in the planning legislation. Land will be purchased from willing sellers only. (USFWS press release, 11 February 1999, 1)
Senator Dewine also released a very similar statement on 10 February 2000 prohibiting eminent domain and stating that drainage systems would be respected. These facts were repeated numerous times in public meetings and in the print media, but continually questioned by Darby farmers throughout the debate. 90
Though there was resistance by the agricultural community, there were positive responses voiced by the larger public. In the fall of 1999, another poll commissioned by
TNC and conducted by the Tarrance Group suggested that 7 out of 10 voters in the state of
Ohio supported an initiative like the Darby. Support was even higher within the counties that fell in the watershed boundaries, where 74 percent of voters supported the proposed refuge. One of the survey questions read,
As you may be aware, there is a proposal to create a national wildlife refuge on the Little Darby Creek in the area west of Columbus. The plan would create a 20,000 acre wildlife refuge and protect another 20,000 acres of farmland from development. Based upon this description, would you favor or oppose the Little Darby National Wildlife Refuge?
To the question, 71% of voters statewide were in support, an even higher 74% were in support within the six Darby Watershed counties, and 42% were strongly in favor of the refuge (Tarrance Group 1999).
CARP, however, questioned the validity of the Tarrance Group poll. A number of farmers maintained that the survey questions were biased (Shannon 2002; B. Boerger 2002;
M. Boerger 2002; Scott 2002). For example, one of a series of survey questions read,
“Would you favor or oppose the Little Darby National Wildlife Refuge proposal if you knew that it supported a large number of rare and endangered species?” CARP felt that those issues such as “creating habitat for rare species” were benign, and were emphasized (rather than more complex social issues) in order to demonstrate general public support for the refuge (CARP comments to DEIS 2000, 19-20). Farmers also felt many of the survey questions failed to address the rationale behind their position, making them look like the
“bad guys” (Shannon 2002).
CARP also cited other opinion surveys which showed different public sentiment, and which were only briefly discussed in the Draft EIS. 91
In 1999 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service conducted its own opinion survey on the proposed refuge which indicated that 73% of the respondents indicated that they did not believe a wildlife refuge was the best way to protect and restore the natural resources of the Darby Creek watershed. Only 28% believed that migratory bird habitat restoration should be one of the main issues to be addressed by the project (“Farmland or watershed protection” was the most popular answer to that question.). The 1999 FWS survey is not mentioned in any meaningful detail in the DEIS, other than to note that it had “mixed results.” (CARP Draft comments to DEIS 2000, 19-20, italics mine)
CARP also referred to a survey they conducted themselves in June 1999 which involved 119 residents in the Little Darby Creek Watershed. The survey reported that 98 percent of respondents were not interested in selling their farms for the establishment of a wildlife refuge (CARP comments to DEIS 2000).
In response to the strong opposition, in August 1999 the Service scaled back its proposal from 50,000 acres to 23,000 acres of wildlife refuge, surrounded by a “farmland preservation area” nearly the same size as the refuge that would protect the designated area strictly for agricultural use. A lengthy Environmental Assessment (EA) on the revised project, renamed the “Little Darby National Wildlife Refuge,” was released in November
1999 and underscored the positive impacts a refuge would have on the physical, economic, and social landscape of the Darby.
Regardless, most of the agricultural community was not persuaded by the report.
Within the 60-day public comment period that followed, over 800 comments were received
(USFWS 2003) and approximately 650 people attended three public open houses held by
USFWS. Due to the high volume of comments, the persistent opposition from farm groups and local landowners, and the additional pressure from Congressional representatives to place a two year moratorium on the proposal, the FWS Regional Director in May 2000 decided to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (Columbus Dispatch, 28 May
2000). 92
The Ohio State University’s Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and
Development Economics released the results of an 8-month impact study on the Darby two months later, in July 2000, predicting that the economic impact of a refuge in the watershed would be minimal (Kraybill and Irwin 2000). The study confirmed the findings of the previous economic assessment prepared by the USFWS for the earlier EA, and again brought strong opposition by the agricultural community (Ohio Country Journal, January 2000).
Only six weeks after the EA public comment period ended, the new Draft EIS
(DEIS) was released by USFWS. Members of CARP were angered because they claimed the DEIS was “practically indistinguishable from the previous EA” (CARP comments on
DEIS, 22 September 2000, 21). Another 60-day public comment period was held to review the DEIS, in which 1,400 comments were received, and scoping meetings were arranged.
In those meetings, CARP claimed that USFWS did not address each issue as they were identified by the farming community, whereto USFWS explained that “the purpose of scoping was to gather information, not necessarily respond to that input immediately”
(USFWS DEIS for Little Darby National Wildlife Refuge 2000, 19).
CARP also suggested alternatives to a wildlife refuge (such as a counterproposal similar in acreage to the wildlife reserve but based on a widened corridor along Darby
Creek [Moore 2003]), which they felt were “dismissed those suggestions out-of-hand” by the Service (Ibid., 21). USFWS again defended their position by explaining that many of the
CARP recommendations had problems. For example, the suggestion to utilize the
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) was problematic due to scarcity of funding (which was already evident in the other projects throughout the state) and the fact that best management practices such as riparian corridor tree plantings and windbreaks put into place by CREP were not permanent in nature (CREPs were 15-20 year contracts that 93 did not have to be renewed and which land could be converted back to agriculture or development) (Shelton 2003). Though CREP has found success in many states, in comparison to the permanent protection the refuge would create, USFWS felt CREP was not a reasonable option for the Darby because it put taxpayers’ money into an expensive program that did not ensure lasting protection (Ibid.). USFWS also felt that given the lukewarm participation in voluntary conservation programs in the past, a non-refuge alternative would not be viable in the long-term (USFWS DEIS 2000).
Throughout the public comment process for both the EA and DEIS, farmers remarked that USFWS was “unwilling to compromise or consider farmer input” (Buckeye
Farm News, March 2000). USFWS felt they had made a monumental effort to consider public opinion by including a farmland preservation component in one of their refuge concepts, the first time it had ever been done in the nation.
Since the mission of the FWS is for rare and endangered species habitat protection, not farmland preservation which is part of the Dept. of Agriculture’s duties, this should have been viewed as bending over backward to accommodate the local sentiment. But it was not, due to a general mistrust of the Service that had at that point built up, and because the farmland easements would be permanent in nature (which was viewed negatively because it would prevent sale for high profit in the future). (Shelton 2003)
CARP also objected to the format of the meetings “inasmuch as they directed public focus away from reasonable non-refuge alternatives and toward exclusive analysis and discussion of the Service’s proposal” (CARP comments to DEIS, 22 Sept 2000, 36).
Interviewees expressed that the protocol of federal agencies can be problematic in collaborative work as it does not promote private relationships (Shelton 2002). USFWS staff, on the other hand, explained that the Service’s protocol is, of necessity, uniform nationwide for organizational purposes. Bill Hegge stated, “The substantive comments we’ve heard and I think we’ve listened to, but emotional comments don’t provide any detail 94 to us. Our mission is a nationwide mission. We try to be sensitive to the local community but we also have a nationwide interest” (Dunham 2000, 23).
Here it is important to identify what the USFWS staff member labels as
“emotional” comments. Hegge, in the above statement, used the terms “substantive comments” to define remarks that were helpful in evaluation of the EIS, while “emotional comments” referred to feedback that altogether did not address the EIS. For example, in public meetings many angry farmers expressed their complete opposition to the refuge.
The Service, however, which was seeking comments on the project itself and not on whether the it should exist altogether, felt that such opinions were of little use to them.
Others defined the emotional comments expressed by a vocal minority during public hearings as unproductive feedback that stirred up the emotions of the rest of the farmers, preventing discussion from taking place with agency personnel. One interviewee explained:
Instead of approaching an issue such as mosquito control under the auspices of how could the mosquito population not pose a threat if the refuge was created, some refuge opponents came to meetings armed with rhetorical questions that no “right” answer could ever be given for, in order to “prove” a political point. Questions like “why are you trying to kill our children and livestock with malaria” would surface. Once items like that would start to appear, and gain wild cheers from the anti-refuge crowd, the communication process would entirely break down. Like clockwork at these meetings, a landowner whose farm had been in their family for over 200 years would get up, give an impassioned speech about why the loved their land, start crying, and ask why the Service was trying to kick them off their family property? This would be followed up by the Service’s tired explanation that they were not going to kick anyone off their land, that eminent domain was not going to be used, that this was only another option for landowners to have if they were to ever consider divesting their property, that anyone who wanted to could farm until eternity or sell to developers or do whatever it was they wanted to with their property – which of course would not be believed by the refuge opponents. I think many refuge opponents and refuge neutral landowners came to the meetings looking for legitimate answers to their questions…However, once a few of the 95
“crazies” got into the mix with their questions about United Nations take-over and the like, they tended to dominate the discussion to nobody’s benefit, and nobody would go home feeling satisfied with the answers that were given. (Shelton 2003)
CARP also responded to the DEIS with a number of other arguments. They first pointed out the fact that there was no mention anywhere in the document of CARP’s success in rallying over 100 watershed residents to place restrictive covenants on 18,000 acres within the planning boundaries. Those restrictive covenants, which by definition are enforceable property restrictions that apply to current and successor owners of participating properties for a term of 30 years, were established by CARP specifically to
“prohibit the use of participating properties for a wildlife refuge or similar uses” (CARP comments to
DEIS, 22 Sept 2000, 20, italics mine). CARP intended this to be a strong statement to
USFWS that its land acquisition plans were unrealistic:
With more than half of the Voluntary Purchase Area under the protective covenants, the Service cannot expect to acquire sufficient property from “willing sellers” to form a viable, cohesive refuge. The Service has blithely ignored previous petitions and statements indicating that 99% of local landowners have no intention of selling for the refuge. The covenants, on the other hand, are legally binding and therefore represent more than idle assertions. (CARP comments to Draft EIS, 22 Sept 2000, 20-21, italics mine)
However, USFWS and TNC staff felt that the measures CARP had taken were too
reactionary and felt that public opinion might change with time, just as it has so many
times in the past. One example among many was the establishment of the Cuyahoga
Valley National Park in northeastern Ohio. Though it was initially broadcast through
national media as the federal government trampling local interests, once the park was
established the government was flooded with individuals interested in selling their
property. In many other similar cases, even the fiercest opponents were known to sell
their property “because they saw the agency acting like a good neighbor in the 96
community and doing the things it said they would” (Shelton 2003). Cuyahoga Valley
National Park is now one of the most visited National Parks in the nation and is a
tremendous asset to the Northeast Ohio community. One interviewee expressed that
the same phenomenon could have likely taken place in the Darby:
The bottom line here is that over time (and when money for purchase is made available) people change, attitudes change, financial positions change, and those who signed these deed restrictions were unwilling to consider that any of these things would change to pose the refuge in a different light. (Shelton 2003)
But CARP maintained that it would be unlikely for them to change their minds
regarding their support of the refuge. The group made it clear that the reason they
were against the refuge, to the extent of signing protective covenants, was due to their
lack of trust for the Service:
To be candid, the Fish and Wildlife Service simply does not have the trust of the local communities, nor is it likely to build a relationship of trust in the near future. This lack of trust is the result of the bitter experience of CARP and the local communities in dealing with the Service throughout the development of the refuge proposal…The Service has squandered its opportunities to build trust and cooperation in the affected communities. It is naïve for the Service to assume that these communities will now seek to cooperate in a wildlife refuge scheme that has been imposed upon them against their will. (CARP comments to Draft EIS, 22 Sept 2000, 21, italics mine)
CARP also expressed its distrust and loss of respect for TNC:
We in CARP think that TNC made a serious mistake when it began to lobby for the Darby Refuge. TNC seems to have forgotten that its key to success in this area is the good will and cooperation of local residents. TNC’s role in this area changed very quickly from working with our communities in the early ‘90s to working against us concerning the Darby Refuge. They tried to play a dominant role in this area without maintaining local support, and there’s a lot of resentment out here because of that…TNC has used up its good will and credibility in this area. It may take years for them to recover from their mistakes. Said [Mike] Boerger, “If TNC is serious about repairing its reputation in Madison and Union Counties, we suggest that it drop its support for the Darby Refuge and work with us to create conservation alternatives that will really succeed.” (CARP press release, 12 December 2000, 1, italics mine)
97
OSU retired education professor, Bob Bargar, who was familiar with the Darby farmers and events surrounding the refuge debate, similarly explained the farmers’ resentment toward
TNC at the time:
As it now stands there are farmers in the valley that are so angered by the refuge proposal and how it was handled, that it could set cooperation on best management practices back years. I heard an interview over the WRFD noon farm program last week, in which the president of the major opposition group, CARP, said point blank that his members no longer trusted the Nature Conservancy and would no longer cooperate with TNC in any way. In other words, it would appear that TNC proposals may be dead on arrival for his group. Given what I know about the cognitive styles of farmers, I would not expect that to change easily or soon. There are currently over 470 members in this group. That’s a lot of farms and acres. (Bargar 1999, 4)
In the same spirit of dissent, another opposition group known as “Stewards of the
Darby” (SOD) held a protest rally on 2 September 2000 expressing similar discontent.
Keynote speaker at the demonstration, U.S. Representative Helen Chenoweth-Hage (R-ID), stated:
[The USFWS wants to] return [the Darby plains] to…mosquito infested wetlands. It makes absolutely no sense at all…It doesn’t meet the test of common sense, does it, that we would want to take good farmland out of production and give it to the mosquitoes. But the fact is that America will become much weaker. America’s national security is at peril unless we’re able to feed and sustain ourselves. As we know all wealth comes from the land. And we either must mine, mill, or harvest from this land, or we will become a poor and third world nation…
…as God said in the Old Testament many times to the Israelites, you gotta retake the land. Well, the command is here again: we gotta retake our land. We cannot lose the land in the Darby Plains and we must retake the land that the government is already beginning to take over. Don’t be fooled by the fact that the Nature Conservancy is in here working with people on a “willing buyer, willing seller” basis. The Nature Conservancy is nothing more than the Federal Government’s real estate broker. And don’t you forget it. (www.stopfedlandgrab.org/HAGE.html)
98
It should be noted that Chenoweth-Hage’s opinions may not have been a true reflection of the larger Darby community. Many of the officers of Stewards of the Darby and CARP were staunch property rights advocates who enlisted the assistance of right-wing conservatives such as Chenoweth-Hage to fiercely encourage rebellion against the government proposal. Though these opinions certainly existed among members of the agricultural community, they cannot be generalized as the position of the entire community as a whole. Also TNC asserts that though relationships have been difficult to restore between TNC and the agricultural community, at present they continue to work with individuals in the watershed who are willing and interested in protecting the natural resources found in the Darby creeks (Shelton 2003).
The vocal opposition and extensive lobbying efforts of CARP and other resistance groups reached Washington D.C. that month, when four Ohio representatives, Dave
Hobson (R-Springfield), Deborah Pryce (R-Columbus), John Boehner (R-West Chester), and
Ralph Regula (R-Navarre), blocked Senator Dewine’s attempt in Senate appropriations to get
$1 million for land purchases in the Darby Watershed (Columbus Dispatch, 10 January 2001).
Again, a month later, the Ohio congressional delegation asked USFWS to delay the final decision to allow more time to explore alternatives to the refuge. The Service agreed and the work on the EIS stopped.
The year 2001 brought more delays for the refuge plan. The first was a postponement of the final report due to the inauguration of President Bush. Shortly after, the Service officially put the refuge proposal on hold while Senator Dewine negotiated with
Ohio members of Congress who were opposed to the project. Representatives Hobson and
Pryce remained especially firm on their position and wrote a letter to Secretary of the
Interior Gale Norton requesting that the Department withdraw its proposal for the refuge. 99
The project remained at a standstill until the following year, 12 March 2002, when the Department of the Interior responded to the letter. Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks stated in a written release, “We agree with you that it is best that the refuge proposal be formally withdrawn, and that all interested parties proceed with other alternatives for the conservation of the Darby watershed” (italics mine). Representative
Hobson, one of the politicians key to the lobbying efforts, responded favorably to the news:
I am pleased that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has chosen this course and plans to formally withdraw the proposal to create a National Wildlife Refuge along the Little Darby Creek and in Madison and Union Counties. This demonstrates that the best way to conserve our environment is through grass-roots, local efforts initiated by the community. (Press release from Congressman Dave Hobson, 12 March 2002)
With this information, the media declared the refuge proposal dead the following day and farmers were elated with the news. Mike Boerger of CARP stated, “Our children witnessed the power of concerned citizens who joined together. Now our community has regained role as primary stewards. And we’ll continue to do a good job” (Columbus Dispatch,
13 March 2002).
USFWS made efforts in the ensuing months to gain public opinion regarding the
Service’s withdrawal of the refuge proposal. There were mixed reviews by the farming
community as to the effectiveness and overall intent of these efforts. For example, one
informal open house in July 2002 attracted a large turn out, however despite requests for
input almost no opinions were put forth by the attendants (Plain City Advocate, 23 July 2002).
Tom Larson of USFWS interpreted the lack of comments in a positive light: “With as active
as this community has been in the past, I really take this as a good sign. I think at worst,
people are taking a wait-and-see attitude. At best, I think maybe some people believe us and
accept that we are not going to have a wildlife refuge.” However, Dale Rapp, farmer in the 100
Darby Watershed, explained differently: “We are all just very leery to put our suggestions on the board because we are all leery of the federal government. I don’t think they are really going to shelve the project. I think they are going to try to come in here another way”
(Ibid.).
In September 2002, the USFWS made clear to the farmers their intent to withdraw through the release of the “Little Darby Creek Conservation Through Local Initiatives Final
Report.” Written in lieu of a longer and more costly Final Environmental Impact Statement, the final report was “part of the Service’s efforts to support local conservation efforts to preserve the agricultural and natural resources of the Little Darby Creek Watershed”
(USFWS Final Report 2002, 1). Besides a record of the Service’s involvement in the Darby
Watershed and an extensive list of programs and other resources for assistance in conservation efforts, the final report also included the results of a survey conducted in the summer of 2002 to assess the community’s view of important elements of local conservation action in the Darby. For practical purposes, I chose to narrow in on the 41 responses from within the Darby Watershed boundaries, and to further focus on those responses most representative of the Darby agricultural community, as revealed through the textual data provided in this chapter.
In response to the question, “How would you define a fair and sensible approach to addressing the issues [of preservation of agriculture, rural life, and natural resources]?”, some suggested that local landowners must be listened to; that local people should be involved in planning; flexibility should exist in listening to different approaches; and “local input should be incorporated into any solution” (USFWS Final Report 2003, 30). Concerns were expressed regarding the threat of “big government” and the need to maintain local control. 101
Answering the question, “How would you know if those responsible for resolving the issues had listened to you and valued your input?”, some replied that they would know they were heard if their input were valued at public meetings, if written communication occurred, and if open meetings were held. Other than communication, respondents in the
Darby valued actions as proof that they had been heard and valued. Some actions included the changing of laws and leaving landowners alone when their stewardship was acceptable
(Ibid.). The responses gathered in this USFWS survey largely corresponded with the responses I gathered in personal interviews and through print media, CARP statements, and letters.
The final announcement of withdrawal was published in the Federal Register on 3
October 2002. USFWS qualified their withdrawal by again acknowledging the responsibility
of the local community in promoting conservation in the Darby, “In withdrawing the
proposal to establish a refuge, the Service is supporting interests in locally-driven
conservation efforts” (Federal Register, 3 October 2002). However, much to the dismay of
USFWS, involvement by the agricultural community in the Darby has significantly lessened
since the refuge conflict. The Darby Partnership continues to function under the auspices of
TNC, and other collaborative efforts are slowly being made in the Darby (e.g. the Darby
Vision partnership), but the work of Operation FUTURE has come to a complete standstill.
Follow-up Responses from Interviewees
After I completed the above narrative, I gave opportunity to each interviewee to
review the accuracy in which I represented them in my work and provide other comments
and suggestions. The majority of my responses were received from agency personnel and
academics; only one response came back from a farmer. I largely expected this response: 102 that agency personnel and environmentalists would be more interested in the final outcome of the report, while farmers would be more preoccupied with their fields (particularly because it was the planting season). However, of the comments gathered, most felt that I had accurately represented the events of the conflict and the viewpoints of each respective party. Below is a short summation of their responses:
“Let me say up front that given my knowledge of the Darby events, you have articulated accurately the series of events. The various quotations are on target and illustrate each particular concept or event well. Your narrative even filled in some facts and events that I was less familiar with, so I now have a more complete picture. It was interesting for me to see that some of the major points that I had made in my paper late in 1999 were also touched on by Operation Future in its report earlier that year. I had not seen their report until later, and so the parallel nature of the content does provide some validation for what I said as well as for your narrative. I checked over the quotations from my paper, and they are all accurate and used appropriately.” (Bob Bargar, retired OSU professor, 24 March 2003)
“Overall, I thought your paper was well done and will serve us all as we think about projects like this in the future.” (Denny Hall, OSU Extension agent and former OFA director, 02 April 2003)
“I believe that you have represented the views of the various players very well. Speaking from my prospective, I would say that your research and comments have noted the events that I was involved with quite accurately.” (B. Boerger, Darby farmer and former OFA officer, 20 March 2003)
“This is a great work!” (Richard Moore, OSU professor and Agroecosystems Associate, 19 March 2003)
“I think you did a fine job in your research, and your writing clearly presents what you found. I know that there were volumes of information, and numerous contacts/interviews to sort through this process. You did well in presenting all this in a concise, organized, and understandable manner.… I tried to be as candid as possible to explain some of the background coloring of a couple issues, which I hope adds to your general understanding of these items. With those caveats in mind, I support your conclusions in Ch. 5.
Also, for the most part, I believe that the presentation strives to be value-neutral (not an easy job, I realize). However, I am glad that you have the intro disclaimer about sympathizing with the farmers 103
you interviewed, as the chapter does seem somewhat weighted upon presenting the opposition's perspective of the refuge proposal.” (Mike Shelton, TNC employee, 20 March 2003)
A few agency representatives felt that the document was biased. Two individuals from different governmental agencies were more critical of the report:
“My quotes are correct…Your documentation of events are correct…Is this a very, very, very, biased document…Definately by your own writing…Its a ‘80% there’ look at dysfunctional organizations. It saddens me because it shows how uncaring people are towards the river. But you still get an A.” (Wes Beery, NRCS employee, 24 March 2003)
“Please note that there is a major element missing. Note that few are actually discussing the aquatic ecological health, and the long term survival, of the species in the streams that make the Darby what they have been. There is not enough familiarity among the general public with what causes stream quality declines. Because of a combination of stresses from agriculture, development and other sources, there is no guarantee that they will continue to exist as outstanding streams. I feel many are not familiar with long-term trends; we have to ask whether the Darby's survival will last. If they do, these changes will happen slowly, and few will notice.” (Anthony Sasson, TNC employee, 19 March 2003)
The responses were largely predictable. I expected that those sympathetic to the farmers would be more praiseworthy of my work. Similarly, I expected agency and TNC representatives to be more critical of my research because I am generally more critical of agency personnel throughout the report. I agree with Beery that this report seemed biased towards the farming community. However, because I felt the perspective of the agricultural community was least understood, I placed special emphasis in the data collection process on understanding the farmers’ point of view on the conflict. Because of this intent, I may not have given both perspectives equal attention. It is also possible that there were angles of the conflict that were not discussed; also if I had interviewed different people and read different material, it is possible that I could have had drawn very different conclusions to 104 this research. However, the findings in this chapter were uncovered by my own empirical research according to the individuals I interviewed, the texts I reviewed, and my interpretations of them. It is important to note that these findings were also triangulated, relying upon interviewee responses, interview material with the same individuals conducted by different researchers, newspaper articles, letters, and government documents.
Narrative Analysis
To reiterate, the major reoccurring themes for the farmers were power sharing and
trust. Repeated themes from agency staff and environmentalists included the role of the
media and unwillingness of the farmers to compromise. Themes relevant to both parties
included common objectives (or lack thereof), an effective facilitator, and psychological /
cognitive differences between conflicting parties. This analysis will use the narrative data to
support each of these seven themes.
One of the first themes that emerged from the narrative was that of power sharing.
To the farmers, power sharing meant being involved in planning and decision making
regarding the proposed refuge. The procedures of USFWS, and more specifically the
meeting formats and the protocol for writing and receiving feedback on environmental
impact assessments, did not allow for full participation by the public. Hall expressed
frustration regarding the USFWS processes:
I am really frustrated with the Fish and Wildlife Service in that they claim to be collaborative, but not feeling anything like that. They maintain all the information…they think up what they need to and then present that to the public and you have a chance to like it or not…Their process is not open and collaborative. In the end that has resulted in a lot of mistrust from the local people… (Manskopf 1999, 8-13,14)
105
This failure to share power, through direct involvement in planning and decision making, violated basic principles held by the farming community (Bargar 1999). Further, the farmers’ perception that their suggestions were not respected or valued was another critical element of power sharing that was violated. These violations had serious and negative implications for the Darby. Teri Devlin explained:
I think the Darby can act as a model of what not to do on a watershed. That is, we were so lucky to have such great agency and organization buy-in and real good funding that what we got lost was the community of people. The landowners kind of got put over on the side because we were just steam rolling our way to getting things done…What I think the benefit of the Darby can provide is to show that if you don’t start with citizen-based and real citizen involvement…down the road you may end up with nothing. (Manskopf 1999, 8-10)
A number of individuals were of the opinion that had issues of power sharing been appropriately addressed and handled early in the conflict, the end result of the debate might have been very different. Denny Hall stated:
For me [and the farmers] it was an issue of who is providing the leadership. Is it internal, coming from the community, or is it coming from outside the community? If the farmers had developed a plan that said that “we think that the best thing that could happen here is to partner with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife on this corridor plan,” you know that would have been a completely different dynamic than Senator Dewine’s picture saying one of his highest priorities is the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. (Hall 2002).
Bob Bargar also felt much the same:
In the Darby, I think a major chance has been missed to develop and test a model of participatory democracy devoted to saving the environment of a watershed and the biological, social and economic future of that watershed and its residents. I do not think that this would have meant no refuge; I think that it might in fact have eventually meant a fairly sizable refuge, but based on a strategy that believed firmly in communication among all participants as equals, hammering away at the devil in the details until a path was seen to accomplish multiple but equally desirable goals to the benefit of all… I have to think that ways could be worked out, beneficial to all, to gradually transfer pieces of land into a reserve without adversely affecting the 106
local farm economy, and that the local people could have been proud of, being in part a creation of their own hands and hearts and minds. And over time, this could have amounted to a relatively large area. It probably would have involved a diversity of ownership strategies, including private as well as nonprofit land trusts and governmental agencies like Fish & Wildlife. But, being a product of a willing community, it would have been cared for and protected and added to as a sense of community responsibility to the community’s own quality of life as well as to the larger environment… (Bargar 1999, 3, italics mine)
Bargar emphasized in the above quote that power sharing gives farmers a sense of empowerment, as they know that an idea or decision was a “creation of their own hands and hearts and minds.” The truth of this statement was clearly manifested in the early successes of Operation FUTURE. TNC provided the farming community a substantial amount of funding and flexibility to maintain their own organization, and under those conditions farmers quickly responded by the hundreds. The high level of engagement of the agricultural community in OFA between 1991 and 1997 was evidence that conservation was a relevant issue and that farmers were willing to talk, given the understanding that decisions were ultimately up to them.
Trust was another farmer theme that emerged. The expressions of mistrust towards the federal government and TNC found in the farmers’ rhetoric clearly acknowledged their valuation of trust in business and personal relationships. Farmers and sociology experts regarded the breaking of the farmers’ trust by USFWS and TNC as the most serious violation amidst all the events that took place surrounding the refuge conflict, and also the factor most difficult to repair. For example, though the USFWS felt the farmers should have felt the
USFWS was “bending over backwards” for the farmers, the farmers felt otherwise because of their built-up mistrust of the Service.
Themes for agency and NGO personnel were more diverse; this was due to the diversity of agencies in which the interviewees originated and also their roles in those 107 organizations. For example, state extension programs work directly with farmers, often providing technical assistance regarding production, while USFWS and TNC focus specifically on conservation. Because of the specific and unique goals of each organization, a much wider spectrum of perspectives was apparent. However, many plainly expressed that the media substantially hindered effective communication and collaboration. TNC staff members and an OSU Extension agent agreed that an excessive amount of communication took place through the media, communication which could have been conducted more effectively face-to-face. For example, the same individuals felt that farmers would not have been so adversarial in their response to the refuge if TNC had provided more information about the refuge prior to the appearance of the first Columbus Dispatch article. Also, if parties had met and discussed concerns instead of using press releases to communicate, interviewees felt farmers would have been better informed and possibly less resistant to the information.
Two agency staff interviewees, one from USFWS and the other NRCS, intimated that farmers’ unwillingness to compromise was a major barrier to collaboration. This unwillingness to compromise was apparent in the heated public hearings held by USFWS, in some of the farmers’ language detailed in the CARP Opposition Report, and also in the farmers’ decision to place deed restrictions on almost the entire acreage within the proposal boundaries. On the other hand, one interviewee representing USDA strongly disagreed and felt that farmers had gone to great lengths to try to find a win-win situation and were left no other choice but to take measures they felt would protect themselves best. In considering these differences of opinion, it should be noted that these opposing viewpoints represent the different missions and perspectives of very different governmental agencies.
A theme relevant to both parties was related to common objectives. In the early days of OFA, canoe trips on the Darby were well attended and were bringing farmers and 108 environmentalists together under the common vision of protecting the Darby. Over time however, Denny Hall explained a complete change in atmosphere as the two parties began to diverge in the midst of the refuge debate:
[The Operation Future task force] would propose, at the task force meeting, a couple ideas or two. [And the Fish & Wildlife’s response was], “Well that’s not compatible with the mission of the Fish & Wildlife Service.” You know to the point that [the farmers were feeling], “I don’t think the mission of the Fish & Wildlife service is compatible with the interest of the local community. (Hall 2002)
Bargar stated that this divergence could have been avoided because the two parties’ objectives were really not conflicting at all. He explained, “This Darby business is not an easy deal, [but] the tragedy is that the long-term goals are parallel: saving the land, saving the watersheds and saving the ecosystems for the future of humanity, and these are things that many farmers believe in” (Bargar 1999, 3).
The second overarching theme mentioned by both parties was effective facilitation.
In both the Darby Partnership and Operation FUTURE, facilitators like Teri Devlin and
Denny Hall performed the basic organizational and logistical tasks, and assumed the responsibility to have as many viewpoints represented, keep discussions neutral, and demonstrate respect for all perspectives. They were both individuals well respected by their peers, who maintained a positive relationship with the members of their respective partnerships. Members of both the Darby Partnership and OFA commented that the presence of Devlin and Hall increased people’s willingness to participate and take risks in those partnerships. It must be noted, however, that in order to have a facilitator there must be available time and/or resources. In the Darby Partnership, TNC volunteered to facilitate and had the manpower necessary to do so. As for OFA, the coordinator was paid through generous funding received by the Kellogg Foundation. Thus, funding resources, not only for the implementation of programs themselves but also for the administrative management 109 of the organizations carrying out these programs, are essential to the long-term viability of collaborative partnerships.
Both parties expressed frustration at some point that the other party was unwilling to compromise, that they could not understand why the opposing party could not “see it their way.” This disparity can be better understood by looking at the conflict under the contextual lens of cognitive difference. These fundamental cognitive differences between farmers and environmentalists emerged as the third theme of the narrative. A farmer’s sensory preference for perception causes him to be “skeptical of new ideas until they can see the nuts and bolts of how an idea will actually work in their operation” (Bargar 1999, 7).
Environmentalists, on the other hand, are generally intuitive-minded and more risk-taking than farmers (Ibid.). These differences surfaced numerous times throughout the refuge conflict. For example, even though two different studies indicated the refuge would have minimal economic impact on the region, Darby farmers were not persuaded because they struggled to perceive how a figurative study could translate to real life. In another instance,
CARP proposed a more aggressive implementation of CREP as a potential refuge alternative; the group felt CREP was a more “reasonable” option because they were familiar with the program and didn’t feel threatened by the permanency of commitment demanded by a refuge. Environmentalists, on the other hand, who were more “big picture” minded than the farmers, were aiming for the goal of preservation of the Darby and thus quickly eliminated CREP as a “reasonable” alternative because it did not guarantee permanent protection. Both parties had different ideas of how the term “reasonable” was defined. (For further discussion on cognitive differences between farmers and environmentalists, refer to
Chapter Two.) 110
Another reason why farmers tend to be more skeptical of changing their farm practices or of adopting new conservation ideas (like a refuge) is because farmers generally have more at stake than do agency personnel. For agency staff, if a refuge didn’t materialize as projected there would be no serious or direct threat to them. Because agency staff and environmentalists have less at stake, farmers often perceive them as being insensitive. As previously cited in this chapter, one farmer emphatically stated:
Instead of spending millions of taxpayer dollars and displacing hundreds of taxpayers in your target area, you…should work with state and local people to put more bite into local zoning and planning policies so federal intervention is not necessary. But, unfortunately, you won’t because that is not your job. Your job is setting up federal wildlife refuges…Unfortunately, when…the Fish & Wildlife Service leaves our community, it will only be to go to someone else’s community to try to do the same to them. After all, it’s their irreversible solution and it’s just their job!” (CARP Opposition Report 1999, 2, italics mine).
Though this remark may be exaggerated, it expressed the sentiment of the majority of Darby farmers that they had much more at risk than agency staff. For farmers, if a refuge didn’t materialize as projected, their property, livelihood, and way of life would be at stake.
A farmer would similarly be more skeptical of implementing new farming practices because it would directly influence his/her crop production and income. An academic or extension agent, on the other hand, would not have a livelihood to lose if their advice was poor.
The narrative account of the events surrounding the Darby refuge conflict demonstrate repeated themes. For the farmers, the themes were power sharing and trust.
For agency staff and environmentalists, they were the role of the media and unwillingness of the farmers to compromise. Themes that emerged from both sides included common objectives (or lack thereof), an effective facilitator, and psychological / cognitive differences between conflicting parties. Each of these themes are necessary factors to successful collaboration, because as the Darby account provided, without them collaboration ceased. 111
Now that these factors have been identified, the conclusion will address how they can best be achieved. 112
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Chapter Five discusses how the findings of Chapter Four answer the research questions of
this thesis: What factors enable collaboration to be successful? What is success? What are
barriers to successful collaboration and how can they be overcome? I summarize the main
themes that emerged from this study, provides recommendations as to how to overcome
particular barriers of collaboration, and then proposes some topics for further study.
What is “Success”?
The term “success” can be defined in a variety of ways. Because I did not ask the question, “What is success?” with respect to collaboration, individuals defined the term in numerous ways and according to their professional and/or social roles. The majority of agency and TNC personnel measured success in the form of implementation of BMPs, the status of biodiversity in the stream, and preservation of habitat. These organizations, whose business it is to achieve certain conservation goals, looked at collaboration more as a means to an end.
Extension staff and farmers, on the other hand, recognized engagement by the farmers in collaborative partnerships as a significant indicator of success. Extension personnel, who are responsible for interacting and educating the public, place a high value on maintaining one-on-one relationships, and therefore viewed engagement as one of the chief elements of success. Leader farmers in the Darby similarly defined success as engagement by the agricultural community in Operation FUTURE.
This research indicates that engagement in partnerships is in and of itself a fundamental indicator of success in collaboration. In the Darby watershed, it became 113 apparent that conservation projects like the Little Darby National Wildlife Refuge Proposal do not survive without broad public support. Bob Bargar stressed the necessity of having the support of the public:
Unless the local community is with you, the future of the watershed is by no means assured even with the Refuge. You might be better off to have a community cooperating fully with the installation of best management practices without a Refuge, than to try to develop the Refuge with an angry community that still controls the land. (Bargar 1999, 4)
For this reason, it is critical to consider engagement by the public in partnerships as an important defining aspect of success in collaboration. Conservation project planners must strive for engagement by the public independently and regardless of actual ecological progress made.
Certainly, Napier and Johnson’s conclusion is true that the implementation of BMPs are critical to conservation. However, their statement that engagement is not a significant factor in conservation is discredited by the findings of this research. It became evident through the analysis of the interviews and other data gathered that one of the most effective ways to make farmers aware of conservation issues was through involving them in conservation programs like Operation FUTURE. Similarly, one of the fastest ways to lose support for conservation is to not involve local citizens in conservation programs (in this case, it was a matter of not involving farmers in the planning process of the Darby wildlife refuge). Engagement thus educates and empowers participants, prevents hang-ups in implementation, and helps to promote long-term environmental progress.
What Factors Enable Collaboration to be Successful?
Factors that enable collaboration to be successful include power sharing, common
objectives, a neutral facilitator, trust, and recognition of social, cultural, and cognitive 114 differences. A lack of any of these factors is a potential barrier to collaboration.
Recommendations that can promote these factors in collaboration are also suggested.
Although these recommendations apply to all stakeholder parties involved, because agency /
NGO staff and environmentalists are often in the minority and bear the responsibility of persuading the larger public, they should take special heed to these recommendations.
Power Sharing
One of the most critical elements of collaboration is power sharing. Though
USFWS and TNC felt they had made sincere efforts to share power, farmers either denied it or did not feel it was genuine. The lack of power of sharing was one of the most significant factors leading to the farmers’ opposition to the refuge proposal. In fact, Darby farmer
Barry Boerger stated that had power sharing occurred, the farmers’ reaction as well as the overall outcome of the conflict might have been different:
If the three main partners, Operation FUTURE, The Nature Conservancy, and the USFWS had tried to devise a plan together to keep the established landowners (caretakers) in control instead of a plan that was perceived as eliminating one partner, today's picture may have been different (B. Boerger 2002).
Recommendation #1: Involve the community in planning and decision making, and keep them involved. Bob Bargar stated that true involvement by the farm community should include “a full participatory voice in planning, as well as in executing how it gets done” (Bargar 1999, 3). All relevant stakeholders, and particularly the opposing parties, should be involved throughout all stages of a project so that the diverse parties are equally informed and are able to contribute in decision-making processes. To achieve this, local citizens should be invited to participate early in the planning process. Meetings should be held at a time which allows the greatest number of people to participate. Agency / NGO 115 staff should flex to this schedule, particularly if evening meetings are most convenient for the general public.
A mere physical representation by the community, however, is not enough; opinions of those in attendance should be sought after, acknowledged, and discussed. For example, even though USFWS claimed to have involved the farmers in the planning of the refuge, the majority of the farmers were not persuaded that their input on the USFWS technical work panel made any impact on decision-making. Government agencies, such as USFWS, therefore, must provide not only a forum for public input, but must establish a process that genuinely recognizes less powerful stakeholder interests. The ultimate test is whether the weaker party feels that power is being shared.
Recommendation #2: Maintain open and honest communication. An important part of sharing power is for each party to understand the other’s “bottom line” and to maintain that level of communication. Looking in retrospect at the events surrounding the Darby conflict, much of the shock was initiated by either miscommunication or a lack of communication. For example, positive indications of a public opinion poll caused TNC to mistakenly believe that the agricultural community was in favor of the refuge, and press releases made by each group (along with premature interference initiated by the print media in many instances) did not allow for face-to-face dialogue and thus intensified the tension between parties. Therefore, in order to encourage collaboration minimize potential conflict, parties in conflict should meet together to discuss differences before the media is contacted.
Wes Beery, the former agricultural coordinator for NRCS during the Darby conflict, emphasized the importance of being honest as to what each party can and can’t provide, and also expressing what they each ultimately want (Beery 2002). If this communication occurs in the early stages of project planning, opposing parties are better able to predict one 116 another’s intentions and are less likely to be surprised by the other parties’ reactions, thus reducing the likelihood of misunderstanding and potential conflict.
In order for effective communication to take place, parties must be aware of their audience and communicate at the audience’s level of understanding. For example, agency personnel and technical experts involved in the Darby Partnership opined that much of the scientific data and jargon used in meetings may have been confusing to the farmers and other citizens in attendance. For this reason, Marc Smith of OEPA stated, “Figure out ways of presenting material that is understandable to the average person” (Manskopf 1999, 8-17).
Common Objectives
Successful collaborations are based on common objectives. Through canoe trips down the Darby, farmers and environmentalists initially found common ground in their interest in and concern for the creek. Conflicts began to arise, however, when (according to farmers) USFWS and TNC began to place more emphasis on the wildlife refuge concept than on the creek itself. Farmers articulated numerous times throughout the debate that they were much less interested in creating habitat for birds than they were in protecting the quality of the stream. Although both parties were sincerely interested in protecting Darby
Creek, the farmers’ perception of USFWS and TNC’s preoccupation with the refuge idea caused them to doubt whether they had anything in common at all.
Recommendation #3: Discover your commonalities and focus on them.
Partnerships in the Darby that rely on the support of the agricultural community should focus on the river instead of the land. In the case of the Darby Partnership, where the purpose of the group was strictly to share information, a common goal proved unnecessary and might have even been a hindrance to the involvement of all stakeholders. However, any 117 collaborative partnership that has implementation in mind should spend considerable time discovering commonalities and establishing objectives that focus on achieving those common goals. Also, when conflict arises, parties should go back to the table to reestablish those common objectives and the steps necessary to achieve them.
Trust
Successful collaborative partnerships are founded upon trust. Former EPA administrator, William Ruckleshaus, emphasized this theme: “For cooperative regulatory programs to build creative partnerships, trust emerges as a critical component of the collaborative process” (Ruckleshaus 1996, 10, italics mine). Bob Bargar explained that the early relationship that existed between Darby farmers and environmentalists was founded upon trust, and then destroyed by a perceived breaking of trust.
The early history of the Darby was one of successful establishment of trust between the environmental community and the farm community. [But the unwillingness to involve the public, combined with] the proposal to remove so much land from production was seen as a serious threat to the farm economy and to the farm community, and a violation of the very deep connection to the land held by most in that community. Both of these actions were seen as a serious violation of the trust that had been established earlier. (Bargar 1999, 10)
Recommendation #4: Earn trust by sharing power, particularly with weaker parties.
Involving the public in planning and decision making, as well as establishing and maintaining open lines of communication are two elements which demonstrate to an opposing party that the other is committed to the relationship to the extent they are willing to take personal risks for the partnership. (Also refer to the previous section entitled “Power Sharing.”)
Recommendation #5: Earn trust by building relationships. Relationship building, no matter how insignificant it may appear compared to more technical aspects of natural 118 resource management, is one of the most critical and most overlooked elements of successful partnerships. Skills that can help build relationships include listening, showing concern, expressing appreciation, asking for honest feedback, responding in a non- confrontational manner, and respecting others’ opinions regardless of their level of knowledge, power, or skills. Other suggestions made by members of the Darby Partnership include, “Try to get over turf battles and give credit where credit is due…Give other people credit” and “Acknowledge that you can not do everything. If the partnership is humble and does only what they can do well, it has a better chance at surviving” (Manskopf 1999, 8-15).
An Effective Facilitator
Successful collaborative partnerships have an effective facilitator. Facilitators not only provide the manpower necessary to run a successful partnership, but also create a climate in which all stakeholders feel free to share opinions, and even potentially controversial issues are addressed in a non-threatening manner. Many of the interviews conducted revealed that the facilitators of both the Darby Partnership and Operation
FUTURE were central to the overall success of the group.
Recommendation #6: When searching for a facilitator, carefully consider your available resources and, if necessary, search for other potential resources outside the partnership. In terms of facilitation in the Darby Partnership, TNC, which was already participating at the time, volunteered to coordinate the group and had available resources on hand. Operation FUTURE, with the help of generous funding, hired an individual they had already been working with, and who they knew and trusted. These examples demonstrate that looking at and utilizing the resources already available can save time, money, and also energy in terms of relationship-building. 119
Recommendation #7: When selecting a facilitator, look for an individual who can maintain a neutral position. This can be achieved by selecting a facilitator who already represents a neutral party. Even before the refuge conflict arose, some stakeholders did not perceive TNC as a neutral party, which led some farmers to be skeptical of the intent of the partnership and whether they should participate or not. Since the refuge debate, farmers have gotten involved in other partnerships, however there has been very little participation by the agricultural community in the Darby Partnership. This resistance by farmers is believed to be largely due to the fact that the group is still facilitated by TNC. Therefore, to avoid such skepticism prior to partnering, select a facilitator that already represents a neutral party.
Sensitivity to Social, Cultural, Psychological, and Cognitive Differences
Social and cognitive differences between farmers and environmentalists in the Darby were evident barriers to collaboration. To overcome these barriers, collaborations must be sensitive to social, cultural, and psychological / cognitive differences between parties.
Recommendation #8: Learn about each other. Journalist Joel Dyer stated that the first way agencies can help rural communities is to make an effort to understand them. He stated:
I think one of the most important things urban people can do is educate themselves about rural America. So many activists have never held a farm or factory job in a working-class community, so they don’t really know what they’re talking about when they talk of unions or agricultural issues. They don’t know anything about these people’s lives. And if you don’t know anything about them, it’s much harder for you to help them (Jensen 1999, 12).
An excellent example of an activity which helped opposing parties to learn about each other was the canoe trips in the Darby sponsored by Operation FUTURE. Most of the 120 individuals who participated in the canoe trips reported to have had positive experiences which caused them to reconsider their preconceived opinions of the other party. However, the canoe trips were single, isolated events which did not allow for a significant level of trust to be established between parties enough to have a lasting impact. For this reason, a successful collaboration should allow numerous opportunities for opposing parties to interact with each other.
Marc Smith of Ohio EPA stated that another way to demonstrate sensitivity to socio-cultural differences is to promote respect for the other’s viewpoints:
Try to promote respect for the other viewpoints. A lot of time you come to the table quite suspicious of other peoples’ motives. You have to figure out how to get around that. There are reasons why people have their ideas, try to understand the other person’s point of view. Also [educate, explain] to other people why you have a certain viewpoint. (Manskopf 1999, 8-15)
Bob Bargar further recommended the implementation of formal and informal training for all collaborating stakeholders in order to better achieve understanding between parties.
In our efforts to build successful communications between the communities, we need programs, seminars, retreats, and so on that allow us to come together to reflect in common fellowship on the underlying processes of the mind so that we understand how those processes function in each of us. With this understanding we can recognize that all processes are important, as Jung said, “to the total psychic economy.” We can recognize the value of our differences and how these allow each of us to contribute in ways that are personally meaningful to successful collective action. (Bargar 1999, 8)
Recommendation #9: Try to look at each other in a new light and try to extend your own vision. No matter how difficult this may seem, looking beyond long-standing party stereotypes is critical to collaboration. Hoffman explained that this paradigm shift is necessary at every level. 121
At the individual level, we have to change the way we think about problems to recognize potential blind spots in our own perspectives and to realize the potential for more efficient solutions. At the organizational level, roles of actors in the policy arena need to be redefined from being regulators to “trusting collaborators.” (2002, 840)
Though it is natural to take the defensive in the face of conflict, one way that opposing parties can extend their own vision is to be slow to rule out the possibility of trading issues they believe to be “sacred” (Bazerman and Moore 1999). Instead, opposing parties should try to quantify the value and importance of that issue, or the price at which they would be willing to make a trade for some other possible gain and look for ways to create win-win situations for all parties involved.
Recommendation #10: Acknowledge cognitive differences in federal policy and protocol. Even though agencies have made efforts to restructure their organizations
(reducing size of management control positions, increasing span of control, promoting interagency collaboration, and creating self-managing work teams), there are still problems with their implementation. The U.S. GAO called attention to this organizational inertia, pointing out that the current regulatory system has “led to, and tends to reinforce, many of the existing practices and behaviors that EPA is seeking to change…The agency faces several challenges, including helping its rank-and-file employees to understand and support changes to the current regulatory system and obtaining consensus among the agency’s varied stakeholders on what these changes should be” (USGAO 1997, 27).
Topics for Further Study
This study has uncovered numerous topics for further study. First, further in-depth
research on successful collaboratives like the Sugar Creek project should be conducted in
order to understand what makes them successful. Those factors should then be considered 122 as to how they can be appropriately applied to the Darby Watershed or other agricultural watersheds suffering similar difficulties. Second, an evaluation should be conducted regarding how public opinion polls, surveys, and government public comment periods can more accurately reflect public opinion. Third, further research should be conducted on the current effectiveness of how public participation procedures detailed in the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, and the EPA’s Community-
Based Environmental Protection strategy is translated into specific environmental policy.
Fourth, existing federal and state policy should be carefully evaluated to determine whether it fairly takes into consideration social and cognitive differences. Fifth, resources should be invested toward the development of training or a handbook for agency personnel on how to effectively collaborate with the public.
This thesis has revealed that there is still much more work to be done in the field of collaboration in natural resource management. Analyzing both successes and disappointments from isolated case studies such as the Darby watershed can teach important lessons in how to establish and cultivate collaborative partnerships between stakeholders.
Collaboration is essential to natural resource management. Government and non-
governmental agencies should consider and implement the recommendations provided in
this research in order to create effective collaborative partnerships and overcome existing
barriers that currently impede effective natural resource management. 123
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