US-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS ENGAGEMENT IN ABSENTIA? ASEAN WORRIES OVER LACK OF US ATTENTION CATHARIN DALPINO , GEORGETOWN UNIVERSIT Y Stung by a US delegation to the East Asia Summit of lower rank than previous years, ASEAN leaders retaliated by presenting National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien with a partial boycott of the adjacent US-ASEAN Summit. The Trump administration brushed off the incident with a State Department fact sheet that began, “US engagement with the ten member states of ASEAN has never been stronger.” This article is extracted from Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific, Vol. 21, No. 3, January 2020. Preferred citation: Catharin Dalpino, “US-Southeast Asia Relations: Engagement in Absentia? ASEAN Worries over Lack of US Attention,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp 49-58. US-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS | JANUARY 2020 49 Although ASEAN’s disappointment was real, the figure raised questions about the strength of record suggests that Washington had stepped Thailand’s newly revived democracy. up momentum in relations with Southeast Asia in the final months of 2019. Secretary of Diplomatic Spat Defense Mark Esper made his Southeast Asia debut in his new capacity at the ASEAN Defense Thailand had hoped to cap its year as ASEAN Ministers Meeting-Plus in November. Assistant chair with a high-profile East Asia Summit Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific (EAS) that brought US President Donald Trump Affairs David Stilwell and Commander of the US to Bangkok for the first time in his presidency. Pacific Fleet Adm. John Aquilino also visited From the start, however, the chances of Trump Southeast Asian countries in their new roles. attending were slim, since he was more focused Institutionally, the US and ASEAN crossed new on the APEC meeting that had been expected to thresholds: an agreement to begin formal take place in Chile, and the anticipated negotiations on linking the ASEAN Common announcement—with Chinese President Xi Window to US electronic customs; inauguration Jinping—of the conclusion of the first phase of of the US-ASEAN Maritime Exercises; and the a new trade agreement. When Chilean President first US-ASEAN Dialogue on Cybersecurity. Sebastián Piñera cancelled the APEC meeting (and a major climate change conference), This period was not without divergence, even Bangkok renewed hope that Trump would disagreement, between the United States and attend the EAS. ASEAN countries. Washington continued to press Southeast Asian leaders to choose a At the last minute, the White House decided to Western hardware provider for fifth-generation send National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien (5G) technology over Chinese companies, in Trump’s place. Commerce Secretary Wilbur particularly Huawei. And although neither Ross was also in the delegation, but not a ASEAN nor Myanmar’s neighbors support participant; his role in Bangkok was as co-chair repression of the Muslim Rohingya by the of a business forum that brought a number of Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), ASEAN’s high-profile US companies to Southeast Asia. consensus-based process makes direct action The US delegation was the lowest-ranking ever difficult. since the United States entered the EAS in 2011. The summit also lacked Xi, who, like Trump, But the strongest dynamic in US relations with had opted for Chile over Bangkok, but Premier Southeast Asia in late 2019 remained the impact Li Keqiang attended in his place. Russian of US-China trade tensions. Some Southeast President Vladimir Putin was also absent, but he Asian countries, particularly Vietnam, benefit customarily does not attend the EAS. As with from diversion of trade and investment, but that the Shangri-La Dialogue in June, China advantage is offset by a pervasive climate of overshadowed the United States at the EAS by trade uncertainty and continued pressure from virtue of its higher representation. Washington when trade surpluses with the United States increase. In mid-December, the Responding to the perceived snub from announcement that China and the United States Washington, only three heads of government— had reached agreement on the first phase of a from Thailand (then 2019 ASEAN chair); trade agreement was met with some relief in Vietnam (the 2020 ASEAN chair); and Laos (the Southeast Asia, but this was not viewed as a current ASEAN Coordinator for relations with resolution to US-China trade friction. the United States)—attended the US-ASEAN Summit on the margins of the EAS. The other The latter months of 2019 also saw internal seven ASEAN states sent foreign ministers. The political adjustments and issues in Southeast Trump administration likely anticipated a Asia. Inaugurated for a second term as negative response: O’Brien, co-chair of the US- president, Indonesia’s Joko Widodo announced ASEAN Summit, came armed with an invitation his cabinet picks, intended to invigorate from Trump for a special US-ASEAN Summit in economic reform. However, the appointment of the United States in early 2020. No agreement his political rival, Prabowo Subianto, as defense on a time or place for the meeting was reached minister adds a wrinkle to US-Indonesia in Bangkok, and ASEAN leaders are of mixed security relations. In Thailand, judicial feelings about its utility under difficult political proceedings against a prominent opposition circumstances in the United States. 50 JANUARY 2020 | US-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS Raising the US Defense Profile Different circumstances may apply in the current security environment in Southeast Asia. Another ASEAN meeting, the ASEAN Defense The return of Islamic State fighters to Southeast Ministers Meeting-Plus in Bangkok Nov. 16-17, Asia from the Middle East; rising religious was the occasion for Mark Esper, the new US tensions in the region; and increasing Chinese secretary of defense, to initiate relations with assertiveness in regional waters have his Southeast Asian counterparts. Esper intensified US-Indonesian security relations. As followed the ADMM-Plus with visits to the a result, since February 2018 the Pentagon has Philippines and Vietnam. Throughout his trip, quietly attempted to resume ties with Kopassus, Esper followed the hard line on China that has leaving open the question of whether it should been the hallmark of the Trump administration also be free to work with former Kopassus at regional and security meetings over the past leaders. year. This extends to new US criticism of the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct on the South Prabowo’s selection as defense minister pushes China Sea negotiation process, to the extent that this question into new territory. Washington Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen and Jakarta agreed (through public press publicly pushed back at the ADMM-Plus, a sign releases) that the meeting between Esper and of growing ASEAN concern over US-China Prabowo was cordial, even productive. The two tensions. defense officials agreed that a greater number of Indonesian military officers would receive US While in Manila, Esper encouraged Philippine training, a traditional signal of increased Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana to be more momentum in US relations with a security vocal publicly about Chinese incursions into the partner. Esper was invited to visit Indonesia and Philippine EEZ. As Secretary of State Pompeo said that he looks forward to doing so in the did when he visited the Philippines in March, near future. Esper reaffirmed that the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) covered attacks on Philippine naval vessels in the South China Sea. Although no assurances were made, Esper did not actively oppose Lorenzana’s request to review the MDT; Manila is expected to make a formal request to do so at the next meeting of the US- Philippines Mutual Defense Board in 2020. In Hanoi, Esper announced that the Pentagon would give a second Coast Guard cutter to Vietnam. The Prabowo Dilemma Figure 1 US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Indonesian Arguably the most significant moment of Prime Minister Prabowo Subianto meet on the margins of Esper’s Southeast Asia trip was his bilateral the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus in Bangkok on meeting with new Indonesian Defense Minister November 17, 2019. Photo: jakartaglobe.id Prabowo Subianto on the margins of the ADMM-Plus. During the regional meeting, Trade: Waiting the Wings Prabowo was conspicuously courted by his counterparts from China and Russia, signalling With the first phase of a US-China trade a new competition for security ties with agreement scheduled for signing on Jan. 15, Indonesia. In the 1990s US-Indonesia security Southeast Asian leaders are relieved that Beijing relations were strained by the human rights and Washington have come to terms on aspects abuses of Kopassus, the Indonesian military’s of their trade dispute. However, enforcement special forces unit, in East Timor and against mechanisms for reported aspects of the first student protestors. US military assistance to phase, such as China’s agreement to cease Indonesia was removed under sanctions heavily pressuring US companies for technology endorsed by the US Congress. Since then, transfer, are unclear. This is in keeping with a Prabowo has been denied entry into the United growing perception in Southeast Asia that the States, most recently in 2012. first phase was a victory for China: Beijing was able to dodge significant structural changes, US-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS | JANUARY 2020 51 particularly on government subsidies and the term. If anything, the momentum seems to be use of state-owned enterprises. Such issues are in the opposite direction: Washington has reserved for the second phase, the timing and suspended trade preferences for Thailand and outcome of which are uncertain. Indonesia under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); Bangkok and Jakarta are now More fundamentally, the past year in US-China focused on attempting to negotiate their partial trade relations and its impact on Southeast Asia, or full restoration.