CSCAP

REGIONAL SECURITY

OUTLOOK 2015 EDITOR

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Ron Huisken Pacific (CSCAP) is the region’s leading Track Two Adjunct Associate Professor, (non-official) organisation for promoting cooperation Strategic and Defence Studies and dialogue on regional security issues. CSCAP was Centre, Australian National established in 1993 and now has 20 national Member University Committees and one Observer. EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Olivia Cable School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, Australian National University EDITORIAL PANEL Desmond Ball CSCAP Australia Anthony Milner CSCAP Australia Rizal Sukma CSCAP Indonesia Yusuf Wanandi CSCAP Indonesia

LETTER FROM THE CO-EDITORS On behalf of the Council for Front cover image Security Cooperation in the Asia Vietnam protested China's deployment of an oil rig in Pacific (CSCAP), we are pleased disputed waters in the South China Sea in May 2014 to present the CSCAP Regional resulting in confrontations between vessels of the the Security Outlook 2015 (CRSO two countries. Credit: Vietnam Coast Guard. 2015). Inaugurated in 2007, this is the eighth annual CRSO Back cover image volume. View of the Mekong River looking toward Thailand, The CRSO brings expert analysis from Vientiane, Laos. Photo credit: Jan Huisken. to bear on critical security issues facing the region and point to policy-relevant alternatives for Track One (official) and Track Two (non-official) to advance multilateral regional security cooperation. CSCAP thanks the Australian National University for support of this publication The views in the CRSO 2015 do not represent those of Designed and printed by Paragon Printers any Member committee or Australasia, Canberra, Australia. other institution and are the responsibility of the individual authors and the Editor. Charts and images in the CRSO 2015 do ISBN: 978-0-9942248-0-4 not necessarily reflect the views of the chapter authors. Copyright © 2014 by CSCAP Access to the CRSO is available at www.cscap.org Ron Huisken Olivia Cable CONTENTS

3 Security in the Asia Pacific: growing turbulence or a gathering storm? Ron Huisken

7 America: uneasy engagement Patrick M. Cronin and Alexander Sullivan

11 The Sino-American security dilemma in Asia: a Chinese perspective Lanxin Xiang

15 Japan and the future of the East Asian regional order Hitoshi Tanaka

19 Japan: stepping forward but not stepping out Gerald Curtis

23 Modi’s India: towards a bolder international engagement C. Raja Mohan

27 Great power politics in Asia and Korea’s response Kim Sung-han

31 Northeast Asia’s security dilemma: Korea at the centre Leonid Petrov

35 Indonesia’s strategic thinking: breaking out of its shell? Evan Laksmana

39 Indonesia’s security focus: from inside to out Donald Greenlees

43 America or China? Australia should choose both Hugh White

46 Thailand: The Coup and its consequences Thitinan Ponsudhirak

1

The security outlook in Asia and the Pacific — growing turbulence or a gathering storm?

Ron Huisken

Confidence in the capacity of the Asia Pacific region Military expenditure trends 1990-2011 to preserve a flexible but fundamentally robust US$billion 2010 prices and exchange rates* order weakened noticeably over the past year. Last year, this publication concluded that the outlook for US China Japan India ROK ASEAN regional security was one of ‘qualified pessimism’ 1990 512.4 18.7 49.8 22.0 13.4 14.0 and that, collectively, the region was not winning the 1991 450.1 19.8 50.5 20.6 14.4 14.7 struggle to preserve confident expectations of peaceful change amid a transformation of the region’s strategic 1992 475.2 24.0 51.8 19.7 15.0 15.9 parameters. Despite being clearly anticipated and 1993 450.1 22.1 52.7 22.3 15.0 16.9 exhaustively studied for some twenty-five years, 1994 424.9 21.2 52.7 22.3 15.7 17.8 the management of the Asia Pacific’s strategic 1995 400.0 21.7 53.2 23.2 16.6 19.5 transformation is currently headed toward outcomes at the worst case end of the spectrum. 1996 378.3 23.9 54.3 23.7 17.9 20.4 1997 376.4 24.3 54.3 21.7 18.5 20.4 A security order is a complex tapestry of norms, laws, 1998 367.7 27.9 54.3 21.9 17.9 19.1 conventions, deterrents, opportunities, mechanisms for conflict avoidance and resolution and so on. A growing 1999 367.8 31.4 54.3 24.5 17.3 19.1 number of reputable observers are concluding that 2000 382.0 34.6 54.7 25.4 18.5 19.1 this tapestry has been unravelling for some years and 2001 385.0 40.8 55.2 26.6 18.9 19.9 that the rate of deterioration may be accelerating. 2002 432.4 47.8 55.9 26.6 19.5 20.9 Serious observers have even warned of a new Cold 2003 492.2 52.0 56.0 27.2 20.1 23.1 War, or argued that 2014 was beginning to look like an ominous echo of 1914. While these contentions have, 2004 536.4 57.5 55.5 31.6 21.1 22.7 on the whole, been disputed as analytically unsound 2005 562.0 64.7 55.3 33.7 22.8 23.1 and unduly alarmist, the President of the United 2006 570.8 76.1 54.6 33.9 23.6 23.6 States has signalled graphically that serious concern 2007 585.7 87.7 53.9 34.3 24.7 26.9 is no longer misplaced. Addressing the UN Security Council in September 2014, President Obama spoke of 2008 629.1 96.7 53.1 39.0 26.3 27.5 a ‘pervasive sense of unease’ across the globe and of a 2009 629.6 116.7 54.3 45.9 27.7 28.8 world ‘at a crossroads between war and peace; between 2010 698.2 121.1 54.5 46.1 27.5 29.2 disorder and integration; between fear and hope’. 2011 689.6 129.3 54.5 44.3 28.3 30.6 Obama’s perspective was global in scope. It included Source: Adapted from SIPRI yearbooks; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms but was not confined to the Asia Pacific, which is the Transfers; IISS Military Balance. particular concern of this assessment. In our region * More confidence attaches to trends and relative magnitudes than we have witnessed perceptions taking shape and to absolute values. judgements being made that the strategic aspirations of others could not be reconciled with ‘our’ vital military and even public mindsets are slipping into interests. The policy settings that have flowed from antagonistic settings and that meaningful dialogue these perceptions and judgements have placed the and communication has withered correspondingly. foundations of the prevailing order under severe strain. It is not just the instances of provocation and East Asia today could be characterised as anticipating brinkmanship, particularly on and over the high and trying to prepare for a prolonged phase of seas, that are of concern. It is also the mounting contestation. The core axis is that between the two evidence that, within some key relationships, political, mega-states, US and China, although the China-

3 Japan relationship is also critical (a vast space extending from South ‘window of strategic opportunity’ and has experienced the sharpest of Japan, through Australia and that figured so prominently in deterioration in recent times. out into the Bay of Bengal) as a its strategic assessments since Hopes that China’s re-emergence new geographic strategic focus; the days of Deng Xiao Ping, as an energetic great power resolved to gradually reverse the subsequent events transformed the would be paralleled by a partly Cold War 60:40 split in favour of landscape utterly for both capitals. natural, partly orchestrated the Atlantic over the Pacific for key gravitation toward a new and military assets (strategic ballistic resilient geo-political order have missile submarines, nuclear …the endeavours in faded in favour of a search for submarines, aircraft carriers); and “ new and stronger alignments as signalled that it would seek far- Washington and Beijing to states seek to insulate themselves reaching supportive changes in the gauge the political mood from intensifying geo-political nature of its alliance relationships turbulence. with Japan and the South Korea, and strategic intent of the especially to minimise the static Possible strategies for corrective deployment of US forces in and other have yielded more action depend rather crucially on around these states. an accurate diagnosis of what has surprise, disappointment been going wrong. Unfortunately, Although 9/11 erased a critical that sort of wisdom typically comes dimension of this pivot—closer and growing mistrust than in hindsight when a measure of political attention to East Asian historical perspective provides affairs—much of the rest of it reassurance. more reliable information and played out behind the scenes of ” when it is easier to distinguish the the war on terror. Later, the Bush Timing can often be as important important from the trivial. administration embraced the as substance in these matters. challenge of etching a position for By the turn of the century, In respect of the US and China, India in the global hierarchy that Beijing had high confidence in hindsight might suggest that discounted the facts that it had the reliability of its economic where we find ourselves today is not been eligible for a permanent revival, was already enjoying the largely the result of the United seat on the UN Security Council surge in respect and influence States, a mature and accomplished in 1945, remained determinedly associated with becoming, in fact superpower, undergoing a period of non-aligned during the Cold War, and prospectively, everyone’s such spectacular turbulence that remained outside the nuclear prime economic partner. Moreover, it lost its poise and judgement and non-proliferation regime even despite an energetic military presented a confusing picture for though it resisted acquiring a build-up, Beijing had substantially third parties seeking to forecast nuclear arsenal until 1998 and, reassured the region with its America’s trajectory as a key until about a decade ago, had an insistent message that economic building block for their own policy- economic record best described as development and avoidance of the making processes. This diagnosis unremarkable. stresses that the rise of Germany might also acknowledge that the and Japan had in the past placed more emphatic American pivot Beijing almost certainly saw on the fabric of international order to Asia was probably not Barack this American posture as a pre- was an absolute priority. Beijing Obama in 2011 but George Bush emptive signal to China not to then witnessed the impact the in 2001. The Bush administration consider contesting US primacy, devastating trilogy of 9/11, regime was broadly informed by the neo- especially as it came on top of US change in Iraq and the global conservative view that the US ‘assertiveness’ on Taiwan in 1996, financial crisis had on America’s should embrace unipolarity, impose and in 1999 when Washington credentials for unipolarity. An it as the core of the international by-passed Chinese and Russian America that, for the first time, system because it was better than vetoes in the UN Security declared itself to be, and acted any balance of power arrangement, Council to bomb Belgrade over overtly as, the world’s pre-eminent and commit to preserving it ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and state proved to be an exceedingly indefinitely. It reversed the priority inadvertently struck the Chinese costly change in persona. The all order that had guided US policy for embassy in the process. Whatever but universal coalition that had decades (from Europe/Middle East/ Beijing initially made of this gathered spontaneously around Asia to Asia/Middle East/Europe); strategic shift in Washington and Washington in the aftermath conceived of the East Asia Littoral its possible implications for the of 9/11 was shaken and then

4 squandered by the scale of the were, of course, fuelled by the Fortunately, our present political, military and intelligence strengthening realisation that circumstances are not as stark as misjudgements that played out America could never regain its this cryptic diagnosis of how we over the question of Iraq. By the former pre-eminence, especially got to where we are might seem time the Global Financial Crisis in terms of relative economic to suggest. The driving policy struck as the Bush Administration power. In short, there was not imperative is not yet the avoidance was about to leave office in much here to lead strategists of war. Rather, it is staving off 2008, America’s standing in the in Beijing to fundamentally acceptance of predominantly world was lower than it had ever reconsider their assessment. As adversarial strategic relationships. been, especially in those crucial China responded to this reading Most particularly the US, though subjective dimensions of respect, of history—an America that had relatively diminished, remains admiration, confidence and trust. revealed (or, for many in China, the most formidable state in the confirmed) its determination world and is gradually regaining Did China’s leadership persuade to manage and contain China’s its internal poise and coherence. itself that this was not simply aspirations but which, less than America retains a portfolio of hard a setback but more of a historic a decade later, appeared to have and soft assets that is uniquely strategic reversal heralding the sharply diminished capacities comprehensive and it remains early end of unipolarity and to achieve that outcome—it the partner of choice, not least suggesting that the nature of the confirmed for Washington that for most states in the wider Asian future regional and global order China’s aspirations and the means region. China, similarly, has not was far more open than it had it was prepared to use to advance lost perspective. It has too much previously imagined? It would them were incompatible with core invested in its spectacular success hardly be surprising if it did so, US interests. In contrast to the to date to be attracted to impatient, and the evidence of a markedly Bush administration’s strategic high-risk ventures. In addition, if more assertive international signal to China in 2001, the more tentatively, Beijing’s sense of posture since 2009/10 suggests that Obama administration’s pivot responsibility for outcomes in the this was indeed the case. (or ‘re-balance’) toward Asia in Asia Pacific is growing. Twenty- 2011 stemmed from Washington’s five years ago, if the region was The challenges confronting the assessment that China (in the deemed to be not working well, it Obama administration were sense of opportunity) as well as made sense to look primarily to monumental: restore international America’s allies and friends (in the Washington, Tokyo and perhaps confidence in America’s purpose sense of concern about US staying Moscow for explanations. Beijing and resolve; address the American power) were over-interpreting was still essentially a consumer of public’s war-weariness; engineer the events of the previous decade. the economic, political and security an economic recovery while The re-balance was an urgent climate created by others. This is dealing with staggering fiscal and reminder that America remained no longer the case. If the region budgetary imbalances. The Obama fully committed to protecting is not functioning well, essential administration pointedly stepped and meeting its vital interests, parts of the explanation are as away from the neo-conservative obligations and responsibilities in likely to be found in Beijing as prescription of perpetuating Asia, but it did not aspire to project anywhere else. unipolarity, remained committed to a new grand strategy or endorse the earliest practicable termination the one advanced by the Bush The net result, however, remains of its large military commitments Administration. worrisome. If it has come more in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has clearly into view that China’s been steadfast in dealing with It can therefore plausibly be prevailing vision for East Asia crises by leading from within argued that, over and above cannot be achieved if the US coalitions of the willing rather than increasingly interactive military presence in the region retains resolving to intervene unilaterally programs, frictions on and over the its current depth and breadth, it and then welcoming coalition high seas, and a largely invisible is equally clear that the United partners. These policy strands, but relentless contest in the States will not accept being driven although they delivered crucial cyber arena, the endeavours in away and is resolved to meet the gains, also inescapably raised Washington and Beijing to gauge evident preference in Asia to see it questions in many states about the political mood and strategic continue to play a decisive role. what it all said about America’s intent of the other have yielded capacity and resolve to play its more surprise, disappointment and Asia appears to be pivoting traditional role. Such doubts growing mistrust than reassurance. away from hope, that a massive

5 geopolitical re-ordering could be meetings themselves. Leaders East Asia Summit to help boost managed peacefully, to resignation, meetings, in particular, are high- its authority, responsibility that it will, in fact, involve an profile events with inescapable and accountability.1 The group indefinite and dangerous phase of exposure to the international prefaced its recommendations great power competition to shape media. The cluster of summits in with the observation that, given the character of the region and November 2014—APEC, EAS and the intensifying challenge to how it works as a community of the G20—clearly put pressure on order and stability in the region, interdependent states. It is widely states to be seen as reasonable the managers of the existing appreciated that this could be a and constructive. A number of multilateral forums needed to difficult and risky contest, possibly hopeful developments ensued— approach the aspiration to give demanding more sustained notably those involving the US, them greater weight and gravitas political and diplomatic skill than China and Japan and Xi Jinping’s with more determination and can reasonably be expected. It pointedly reassuring address to the a greater sense of urgency. The could equally be observed that Australian Parliament—that may, recommendations focused on most of the players seem currently individually or collectively, develop deepening the institutionalisation to be confident that they can stay into promising changes in attitude of the East Asia Summit (EAS): well away from the threshold and approach. Second, they provide define a more collegiate process of declared enmity and military a direct and efficient means for any to set the agenda; consider joint conflict. This confidence may be leader to validate or critique the chairmanship with non-ASEAN misplaced, or it may develop into a guidance and assessments offered members; more clearly define roles fateful complacency. by their bureaucracies on how and competencies and improve policy settings are being evaluated connectivity and coordination It would be prudent for the region’s by regional states. Third, a between the EAS and related fora political leaders to consciously take multilateral setting helpfully blurs like the ASEAN Regional Forum steps to ensure that events stay the often crucial question of who and the ASEAN Defence Ministers on the safe side of this equation goes first in opening or re-opening Meeting-Plus; establish a dedicated and that key relationships do not a dialogue. EAS secretariat; and consider settle into an adversarial rut. extending the duration of the EAS . Instead of simply bracing for an The managers of these multilateral indefinite trial of strength led by processes have the responsibility The papers assembled in this the US and China, leaders could to ensure that their modalities volume validate the thrust of press for evolutionary geo-political are conducive to constructive these observations, but also probe change that emerged as a natural outcomes. In this regard, a and develop the major themes in consequence of positive strategic recent CSCAP Working Group revealing and insightful ways. We developments within the region. unanimously recommended are confident the reader will find This would put the focus back on changes to the modalities of the them informative and stimulating, such things as finding ways to but we also hope that they will put the Korean peninsula on a contribute to the larger objective positive trajectory, and on pressing Instead of simply bracing of diverting our region from its the leaders of China and Japan to “ present trajectory. commit to following the example for an indefinite trial of set by France and Germany sixty- Ron Huisken“Adjunct Associate five years ago. strength led by the US Professor, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian A stronger investment in the and China, leaders could National University available multilateral processes is likely to be a crucial element press for evolutionary in this endeavour. Our region geo-political change that ENDNOTES urgently needs to make summitry 1 Council for Security Cooperation in a more frequent routine focussed emerged as a natural the Asia Pacific, Towards an Effective on dislodging the present Regional Security Architecture for the dynamic and finding a new path. Asia Pacific, CSCAP Memorandum consequence of positive No.26, June 2014 [available at Multilateral processes are not www.cscap.org]. magic wands but they do have strategic developments several characteristics of particular within the region. value. First is the fact of the ” 6 America: uneasy engagement

Patrick M. Cronin & Alexander Sullivan

The security environment in the Asia Pacific remains in flux. Some of the negative developments of the past year should leave the United States both more vigilant and determined to continue its regional policies which strengthen America’s comprehensive engagement with the region.

To reprise recent developments we need to begin with the volatile final quarter of 2013. Events in Asia were giving decidedly mixed signals as to the state of regional security. On the one hand, US Vice President Joe Biden completed a largely successful December 2013 trip to Japan, China and South Korea. China’s RIMPAC 2014: Ships and submarines from 15 of 22 participating nations, including China President Xi Jinping announced for the first time, steam in formation. Credit: US Navy. a raft of long-overdue reforms during the Third Plenum and also hosted a conference on robust US leadership role—the China’s long-term investments ‘peripheral diplomacy’ to focus on demand for which drove much of in coast guard capabilities and improving relations with China’s the original pivot policy—has faced military modernisation, as well as neighbours. On the other hand, headwinds, from fractious politics commercial maritime assets, have Asian countries were dismayed by at home to consuming crises given it far more capacity to wield events such as China’s perfunctory elsewhere in Washington’s global influence in its near seas. China’s announcement of its East China portfolio of responsibilities. navy has come a long way since Sea Air Defence Identification Zone Admiral Liu Huaqing put forward The signal development of (ADIZ), which overlapped pointedly a ‘green water’ strategy to control the past year has been that with those of South Korea and the maritime space within the first a pattern of rising Chinese Japan, as well as a brutal purge by island chain. assertiveness. Some see in China’s the young ruler of the Democratic maritime behaviour, at least in At a minimum, China’s recent People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). the South China Sea, continuity activity in maritime Asia Fast-forwarding one year to the between recent assertiveness and represents a continuation of a waning days of 2014, how are its aggressive actions in 1974, trend discernible since at least we to assess the present peace 1988 and 1995 in the Paracels, 2009 in the aftermath of Beijing’s and stability of the world’s most Johnson Reef and Mischief Reef, triumphal Olympics and the global dynamic region? While there is respectively. In all those armed financial crisis. The year 2009 much to be hopeful about, over the incidents, as today, China appears was also the point at which China past year the security environment to be looking for opportunities to submitted its expansive nine (now has deteriorated markedly. A more expand its regional influence. The ten) dashed line claim in the South primary difference is that today, China Sea as part of its official

7 submission to the United Nations (PLAN) vessels—around the oil have not been high-profile issues, Commission on the Limits of the rig, members of which allegedly including India, Indonesia and Continental Shelf. This past year rammed Vietnamese vessels. The Malaysia. has seen that activity become oil rig was withdrawn in early more pronounced and directed July, but by September Beijing All of this growth in Chinese at new targets. China’s use of had dispatched a separate drilling assertiveness is taking place diverse levers of state power to platform to the East China Sea, against the background of Beijing’s implement a strategy of tailored and the South China Sea is sure to rapid accumulation of economic coercion, or ‘salami-slicing’ tactics, see return visits by Chinese rigs. might and military capabilities. against those it perceives to be Especially destabilising is China’s impeding its interests has been pursuit of cyber weapons and well documented. conduct of cyber espionage. The United States has sharply While actions in 2012 and 2013 China’s use of diverse criticised alleged theft of US had already drawn the region’s “ private intellectual property by attention, in the last year levers of state power to groups linked to the Chinese China under Xi Jinping—newly security apparatus. The US Justice empowered with consolidated, implement a strategy of Department’s indictment of five centralized institutions for Chinese military officials in May coordinating foreign and security tailored coercion, or salami- 2014 prompted China to suspend policy—has been even more slicing tactics, against those the bilateral working group on forward-leaning and assertive cyber issues. in pressing its various claims it perceives to be impeding in Asia. Previous gambits at Still, neither the near seas nor Scarborough Shoal and around the its interests has been well cyberspace is likely even Asia’s Senkaku Islands were preceded most dangerous flashpoint. The by at least a pretext of initial documented. past year has seen disturbing offense by the Philippines and ” indications of instability in North Japan, to which China responded Korea. The jejune Kim Jong-un with overwhelming paramilitary, More recently, land reclamation executed his regent-uncle Jang diplomatic and economic at disputed South China Sea Sung-taek in a bloody purge in pressure—so-called ‘reactive formations such as Johnson South December 2013, severing a critical assertiveness’. Reef is intended to bolster China’s link to his patrons in Beijing. claims to the contiguous waters, Reports of more official executions Recent Chinese assertiveness has perhaps in view of the Philippines’ during Kim’s six-week absence instead been more self-initiated. arbitration case pending before from public view in late 2014 The ADIZ declaration in November the International Tribunal on may indicate elite-level disarray 2013 had no clear antecedent, the Law of the Sea. But the within the DPRK. North Korea has but rather represented Beijing’s land reclamation activities also conducted various provocations desire to extend its dispute with have a clear military purpose: including exchanging fire with Japan to the air. In January 2014, in September 2014, the chief of South Korean forces, and another Hainan province issued fishing the PLAN, Admiral Wu Shengli, nuclear test is a matter of when rules claiming regulatory authority conducted a week-long inspection not it. The likely fruition of North over more than eighty per cent tour of several of the projects. Korea’s long-sought nuclear- of the South China Sea, and has Should the land reclamation tipped ballistic missile capability backed those up through patrols activities advance to include in the near future, combined with and harassment of non-Chinese runways, they could support a volatile peace across the DMZ fishermen. attempts to declare and enforce a and the uncertain role of China South China Sea ADIZ in air space mean that deterrence could fail In May 2014, China dispatched regarded by the United States as and escalation could happen. At a brand-new deep water oil rig to the global commons. In addition to this stage, the Korean Peninsula explore for energy resources in doubling down on ongoing disputes remains the only plausible disputed waters offshore Vietnam, in maritime Asia, China has tinderbox that could set off a and set up an eighty-plus-ship undertaken activities that have dreaded major power war in the cordon— including, reportedly, raised the hackles if not drawn Asia-Pacific. People’s Liberation Army Navy the ire of countries for whom these

8 Effective responses to these unforeseen a year ago, chiefly With South Korea, the United destabilising trends from regional Russia’s resurgent belligerency States is continuing the tight groupings or institutions have in Ukraine and the rise of the joint command and bolstering been few and far between in the so-called Islamic State. The alliance capabilities while seeking past year. Tokyo and Seoul have Obama administration has had to conditions for future reversion seen a dramatic worsening of respond to all these crises while of wartime operational control. the bilateral relationship under still managing Russia, China, Australia and the United States two leaders, Shinzo Abe and major Middle Eastern partners are doing more together on Park Geun-hye, who have years and potential domestic spoilers to amphibious and other capabilities, remaining in their terms and conclude a successful deal on Iran’s while Australia is developing a seem politically unable to pursue nuclear program. These myriad new strategic relationship with coordination on shared concerns. challenges have distracted from Japan. President Obama signed China-Japan relations are at a long-term efforts in, at least for an Enhanced Defence Cooperation historic low in the post-Mao period. now, a less crisis-prone Asia. Agreement with the Philippines The Association of Southeast Asian that opens the door to rotational Nations, meanwhile, has not found Nevertheless, despite myriad US presence there. US security a voice to stand up to China on its challenges, US rebalancing cooperation with various Southeast destabilising actions in the South efforts are quietly proceeding, Asian partners is making slow China Sea. and prospects are looking up. but steady progress—exemplified President Obama will have by the partial lifting of a ban on All these trends, coupled with the visited the region twice in 2014 certain lethal maritime weapons need to seize the great economic in addition to frequent visits sales to Vietnam in October promise of the Asian century, by cabinet officials and senior 2014—and efforts at multilateral lend greater urgency to the military commanders. In the past information-sharing through United States’ policy of strategic year, the United States has made ASEAN have met with regional rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific, and significant breakthroughs with a support. Key, too, is improved indeed it remains committed to the number of allies and partners in U.S. force posture infrastructure shift. But internal and external the region, including China. China across Asia, including at Guam, dynamics have made sustained participated in the 2014 Rim of the which will open up new vistas for focus and splashy deliverables Pacific exercises for the first time, U.S. joint training with various hard to come by for Washington. and US military leaders regularly partners. Political dysfunction over the tout their frequent interaction with last several years has made the PLA counterparts. With Japan, Meanwhile, electoral victories United States government look the United States has reached a by the Republican Party in the weak and haphazard, lessening its critical milestone on sustainable November 2014 midterms may standing worldwide including in basing of US forces in Okinawa bolster support for TPP or provide Asia. Partisan infighting resulting and is reviewing the bilateral some relief from sequestration. in a September 2013 government defence cooperation guidelines, Even without raising the shutdown forced the cancellation with Japan’s new limited exercise top-line budget, the Defense of President Barack Obama’s 2014 of collective self-defence promising Department believes it is on track trip to Asia for the Asia-Pacific enhanced alliance coordination. to hit promised force structure Economic Cooperation and East allocations to Asia, and will be Asia Summit meetings. Gridlock rolling out its best new capabilities, among lawmakers and special some of them shared with allies interests has also frustrated and partners, in the region in the efforts to conclude a framework …despite myriad next five years. agreement for the Trans-Pacific “ Partnership and to provide relief challenges, US rebalancing Finally, in 2014 the United States from sequestration, which severely continued to improve upon a constricts the Pentagon’s attempts efforts are quietly strong element of engagement to effectively manage short- and proceeding, and prospects with China, without which no long-term defence priorities. US Asia policy can be successful. are looking up. Despite elements of competition Moreover, the United States’ ” at the strategic level or on issues strategic focus has been drawn like cyber, the institutional US- to new (or perhaps old) hotspots China relationship, manifested in

9 high-level dialogues and practical other policymakers will have to cooperation, has never been contend with the world as they stronger than under the Obama find it. As stated at the outset of Administration. Presidents Xi this review, the region will demand and Obama’s second informal vigilant engagement across ‘shirtsleeves’ summit in November economic, political and military 2014 will be the second in as many realms of policy. years, and the conversations are likely to include both exchanges of concerns as well as plans for cooperation on a range of global Patrick M. Cronin issues. Senior Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New The end of 2014 is the prelude American Security, US to 2015, which marks the 70th anniversary since the end of the Alexander Sullivan, Second World War and the 50th Research Associate, Asia-Pacific anniversary of Japan-Korea Security Program, Center for a New normalisation. One would have American Security, US hoped for less volatility in the regional security environment heading into a year with such historic overtones, but US and

China's President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama meet at APEC, Beijing, November 2014. Credit: The Epoch Times.

10 The Sino-American security dilemma in Asia: a Chinese perspective

Lanxin Xiang

The US pivot to Asia appears to have triggered a Sino-American security dilemma. With US support for Japan and some Southeast Asian countries in their territorial disputes with China, Sino-US relations has deteriorated markedly. In 2013-14 the Obama Administration was walking a tightrope with its much publicised Asian ‘Pivot’. Although formally launched in November 2011, the idea of America’s military and diplomatic ‘pivot,’ or ‘rebalance’ toward Asia was set out most comprehensively in a 2013 essay in Foreign Policy by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.1 The ‘pivot’ China's first aircraft carrier on sea trials. Credit: Pinstake. strategy, according to Clinton, comprised six courses of action: strengthening bilateral security with the US and its alliances legitimacy crises at home and are alliances; deepening America’s and seek avenues of cooperation. beyond the reach of the pivot.2 relationships with rising powers, But this appears to be a colossal including China; engaging with miscalculation. Foreign supporters of the pivot, regional multilateral institutions; however, believe that the US expanding trade and investment; Chinese critics argue that the strategy toward China has coupled forging a broad-based military pivot toward China is creating engagement with balancing. presence; and advancing a self-fulfilling prophecy, for The engagement half of this democracy and human rights. it enhanced Beijing’s sense of strategy has been geared toward insecurity and could only stimulate enmeshing China in global trade It is commonly held in Washington China’s reactive assertiveness, and international institutions, that, if the United States is undermining regional stability, discouraging it from challenging fully committed to Asia, then and diminishing the possibility the status quo, and giving it Washington and Beijing will be of cooperation between Beijing incentives to become what the able to create long-term cooperative and Washington. Through George W. Bush administration strategies that accommodate exaggerating the threat posed by termed a “responsible stakeholder” each other’s interests. Doing Chinese power, the United States in the existing international this would significantly reduce damages its long-term diplomatic system. The other half attempts miscalculation and the likelihood engagement with Beijing. This is to maintain the balance of power, of conflict. Beijing may not like a clear deviation from the basic deter aggression and mitigate any the pivot, but the US government policy setting of all US presidents attempts at coercion.3 believes that China’s leaders— since Richard Nixon. It also while disturbed by the long term neglects the fact that China’s China has reacted strongly to the strategic dimensions of the pivot— inherent weaknesses are primarily logic and actions brought about by will eventually come to terms endogenous problems caused by a the pivot. On the one hand, China

11 believes that US policy harks relations”, while President Barack aggressive agenda for territorial back to a Cold War mentality of Obama insists on a “new model” gains. Obama’s original reference military containment. On the of relations. The difference may point was the status quo before the other hand, the Chinese military appear minor but the leaders eruption of the territorial disputes has invested heavily in countering in fact have starkly divergent over islands in the East and South US strengths and cited the pivot perspectives. China seas, when Washington had as a good excuse for their own a pliable ally in Tokyo, willing to continued buildup. China has also In his opening speech at the turn over the responsibility for used historical American examples Strategic and Economic Dialogue national defense to the US-led to blunt criticism of other actions, held in Beijing in October 2014, alliance arrangement. such as the establishment of Xi emphasised that the Sino- their Air Defense Identification American relationship has no But after Japan suddenly Zone in the East China Sea. historical precedent or ready- changed the status quo in 2012 During the six-and-a-half-years made model as guidance. Obama’s by ‘nationalising’ the Diaoyus/ of the Obama Administration, opening statement at the dialogue Senkaku islands, the Obama bilateral relations have sunk to implied, however, that his ‘model’ administration began to see this their lowest point since the Nixon- is based on the idea that he as a new strategic advantage Kissinger period of the 1970s. would never compromise on the for the US in the Asia-Pacific. Leaders in Beijing and Washington question of democratic legitimacy, The US decided to abandon a have not only disagreed about but is willing to build a working neutral position and started to how to solve major problems in relationship with China contingent ‘re-normalise’ its reference point the international trading system, upon what the US considers through open support of the global governance and regional proper Chinese behaviour. China’s Japanese move in the name of security, but they have also behaviour will be judged according alliance solidarity. Therefore, it is consistently been talking past each to what the US holds as universal not surprising that Beijing sees other on the key issue of how to standards. Thus, Obama-the- this American attitude as a major define their relationship. This is Lawyer deliberately stresses the policy reversal. the result, ultimately, of failing term ‘model’, which implies an to overcome their fundamental example to follow or imitate. differences about what constitutes China has reacted legitimacy for a nation state. For Why do Beijing and Washington “ Washington, legitimacy has only keep talking past each other? strongly to the logic and one element—the democratic Perhaps it is because people are procedure, which it considers willing to take greater risks to actions brought about by a universal model applicable avoid losses than they are to everywhere. For Beijing, no achieve gains. Instead of making the pivot. On the one hand, political system is universally decisions that maximise their valid, and the claim that decision- overall expected gains, people tend China believes that US making procedures alone to focus on a particular reference determine political legitimacy is point and give more weight to policy harks back to a Cold a myth. On this issue, at least, losses than comparable gains. That Washington seems to have occupied is to say, leaders usually exhibit War mentality of military the moral high ground. a status-quo bias. For example, a superpower in relative decline containment. On the other Similarly, whereas the US claims often considers preventive war a hand, the Chinese military its intense military and diplomatic good instrument to forestall the alliance-building activities in the loss of its status and prestige, has invested heavily in Asia-Pacific are ‘rebalancing’ for and is willing to double its effort the sake of regional stability, China in existing conflicts rather than countering US strengths clearly sees it as a containment withdraw from them. Thus, strategy. But more worrisome is Washington considers that and cited the pivot as a the fact that the two leaders use Beijing is willing to gamble quite different reference points either to enhance its influence good excuse for their own to describe their bilateral ties: at the expense of US interests continued buildup. President Xi Jinping speaks in diplomatic negotiations, or to ” of a “new type of major power offset American influence with an

12 At the same time, China also out that, so far, American leaders seems to have changed its posture have ‘renormalised’ their reference They can hardly engage of ‘peaceful rise’ and is willing to point much faster than their “ take more risks to compensate Chinese counterparts; the latter on China seriously—or for losses in diplomacy in its the defensive and ill-prepared to immediate neighbourhood, despite conduct an effective regional policy. encourage it to remain the fact that its crowning foreign- In contrast, the US pivot to Asia is policy objective is to maintain a well designed for re-establishing psychologically secure peaceful international environment American influence in the region. as long as possible. The proposal Furthermore, for Chinese leaders and peaceful as it travels to establish a new type of major the reference point continues to power relationship with the US be the pre-Pivot status quo, as the road of ‘national is aimed at avoiding a downward they seek to recover their lost spiral of strategic relations and influence. As a result, the US is restoration’—if the starting preventing a contemporary focusing on rolling back Chinese point is to question the version of what Henry Kissinger ‘aggressiveness’ in the western called “Anglo-German alienation” Pacific, while China believes legitimacy of the Chinese before World War I. Here, we can assertiveness to be the most go further in explaining China’s effective deterrent against the US state. reactive assertiveness, which, available to it. ” although alarming its neighbours, is rooted in a mentality, very much The security dilemma in East develop compelling interests in like that of Washington, that may Asia has two dimensions. On maintaining the liberal order from not be focused on maximising gains the one hand, regional actors which it has benefited a great deal. but cutting losses. are encouraged to pursue their This is the thinking that appears own agenda. On the other, to have underpinned Washington’s Thus, we are witnessing a classic competing global influences ‘responsible stakeholder’ proposal security dilemma which has the between China and the United in 2005. potential to become a permanent States will intensify. This is not state of confrontation. Taking a formula for sustained regional At the other end of the spectrum, current US-China relations stability and prosperity. From the there has been the theory of the as a normal state of affairs is Chinese perspective, most current inevitability of China posing completely self-deluding. To discussions in the West about the destructive challenges to the understand the present crisis, the threat posed by the ‘rise of China’ existing international order. This US-China relationship must be seem flawed, for they tend to theory, often articulated by a recognised as entering a phase focus on how much China would neo-conservative group, assumes of ‘New Normal’. Call it a new- be willing to ‘accommodate’ to China will behave like all leading Cold War, New Normal is a term the existing international order. destructive powers in history invented in the West which refers The underlying assumption is and inevitably attempt a global to economic conditions following that the undemocratic Chinese power grab through altering the financial crisis of 2007-2008. regime lacks legitimacy, and the the rules governing the existing The term has since been used liberal international order can help international order to enhance its in a variety of other contexts change the nature of the regime political legitimacy. to imply that something which and save its repressed people. was previously abnormal has Two theories are in vogue, each It is highly likely that China will become commonplace. President with inevitable yet contradictory decline to go down either of these Xi personally used “new normal” outcomes. At one end of the roads. It has no fundamental several times in different contexts. spectrum is the theory of the reasons to destroy the current inevitability of China’s integration international order, but would Populism disguised by cultural into the liberal world order, which certainly be attracted to altering traditionalism has been the new assumes that China will eventually some rules of the game according normal for today’s China. This type be brought into this order through to Chinese tradition, culture and of New Normal in foreign relations the process of globalisation. national interest. In this context, will not provide much flexibility Democratisation is considered China is prepared for an ideological in solving territorial disputes with a global and unstoppable trend, battle with the West. However, other nations. It must be pointed while economically China will unlike the Cold War, it will not be

13 launched as a battle of good versus They can hardly engage China ENDNOTES evil, but as a serious cultural seriously—or encourage it to debate over genuine alternatives. remain psychologically secure 1 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October Ironically, the chance of conflict and peaceful as it travels the road 2011. with the West could become higher of ‘national restoration’—if the 2 Lanxin Xiang, “China and the if China’s traditional outlook starting point is to question the International Liberal (Western) Order”, were to be fully ‘Westernised’. legitimacy of the Chinese state. in Liberal Order in a Post-Western Democracy never prevented the It would be a miscalculation for World, Transatlantic Academy at the territorial expansion of states the West to remain obsessed with German Marshall Fund, May, 2014, (the young American republic is a nightmare scenarios based on a Chapter 9, pp.107-121. typical example). A Westernised parochial vision of the ‘rise and 3 Aaron Friedberg, ‘Bucking Beijing: An Alternative US China Policy’, Foreign China with an active territorial fall’ of great powers. It is totally Affairs, vol. 91, no. 5, September-October agenda would surely come into unrealistic to expect China to 2012, pp. 48–58. conflict with the United States remain at the receiving end of a for geopolitical reasons, just as it West-dominated international would be unlikely to clash with the order and not aspire to making its EU for such reasons. own contributions to improve the rules of the game. The policy implication is that, instead of encouraging and forging conditions to Westernise China, the West should seek ways to Lanxin Xiang accommodate key dimensions Professor of International History of China’s traditional, non- and Politics, Graduate Institute expansionist political culture. of International and Development Studies, Geneva.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy Jiangkai-class frigate Linyi (FFG 547) moors alongside the Luhu-class destroyer Qingdao (DDG 113) following the ships' arrival at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, 6 September 2013. Photo credit: Daniel Barker, US Department of Defense.

14 Japan and the future of the East Asian regional order

Hitoshi Tanaka

The future of the East Asian regional order poses a number of vexing questions. China’s assertive foreign policy posture in recent years, including its aggressive maritime activities in the East and South China Seas and its launch of the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank, has generated considerable concern regarding the country’s future intentions. But does China aspire to replace the existing international and regional systems with more China- centred systems? And to what end will China exercise its growing economic and military strength? With regard to the United States, there are concerns about how committed the US will remain to the region over the long-term. And President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe meet for the first time as the leaders of looking at Japan, what must it do China and Japan, APEC, Beijing, November 2014. Credit: Kyodo/Landov. to regain its economic vigour? From a Japanese perspective, key A history of East Asia’s shifting and political institutions. Japan’s objectives for the future evolution victory in the Sino-Japanese of the regional order include: balance of power War of 1894-95 proved to be a maintaining and strengthening turning point marking its rise. To put the future challenges the shared stability and prosperity Subsequently, Japan went down associated with managing a East Asia has come to enjoy an aggressive path including going stable and prosperous East Asian in the post-war era, fostering to war with the United States. regional order into perspective a region where Japan is free Throughout the Pacific War the it is necessary to reflect on the from significant threats and United States and China were historical changes in the balance promoting confidence in Japan allies and Japan a shared enemy. of power, which have brought so that it may actively contribute Finally, Japan’s expansionism was the situation to the present. to enhancing shared regional halted through intervention by the For centuries China was the economic and security goals. United States. Three key challenges stand out dominant power in Asia. But, as requiring the region’s urgent come the mid-19th century, the The post-war period saw an attention: maintaining stability Qing Dynasty was in decline as astonishing reversal of roles. After as the balance of regional power the European powers imposed the Chinese Communist Party shifts, managing economic unequal treaties and raced to carve took control over the Chinese interdependence and aligning it up. Meanwhile, Japan started mainland in 1949, and as the Cold domestic politics with regional its Meiji Restoration in 1868, War intensified with the outbreak goals. rapidly modernising its technology of the Korean War in 1950, China

15 became a new foe of the United Japan in 2010 claiming the title The domestic politics-foreign States, and its economy stagnated of Asia’s biggest economy and the under the leadership of Mao second biggest in the world. policy nexus: aligning Zedong. US plans to chastise Japan domestic and regional goals for its wartime transgressions Thus the future East Asia regional gave way to the emergence of order must accommodate for the Another challenge to shared East the US-Japan alliance and new first time in history, both a strong Asian stability and prosperity is policies designed to nurture Japan Japan and China alongside the the intensification of domestic as a member of the West in the United States. Making room political trends at odds with fight against communism. The for and fostering cooperation regional cooperation. Domestic US-Japan Security Treaty was between these three powers in an politics in countries around the established in 1960 and Japan era of unprecedented economic region has become increasingly would rely on the United States for interdependence is an unparalleled susceptible to the whims of its military security and provide challenge that will require new partisan agendas, short-term the US military with bases in modes of thinking. thinking and nationalism. In Japan for the forward deployment the United States the hyper- of US forces in East Asia. Japan Managing economic partisan and divisive political was freed to focus on its economic environment has resulted in recovery and spectacularly rebuilt interdependence a political deadlock on many from the ashes of defeat to become The post-Cold War world has born important issues including foreign the second largest economy in the witness to an increasing volume of policy. The Chinese Communist world in just a quarter of a century. interactions between governments Party, facing an array of domestic of a diverse range of political types. political, economic and social In Asia, a number of communist challenges—such as income Three key challenges countries, such as China and inequality, corruption, food safety “ Vietnam have not only embraced issues, air pollution, de-regulating stand out: maintaining market economy reforms, but the financial sector, and structural stability as the balance become key links in the ever reform to shift to sustainable more deeply integrated regional growth—risks being tempted of regional power shifts, production networks. Thanks in no to utilise a tough foreign policy small part to such reform efforts posture vis-à-vis the US and Japan managing economic and the leading role of regional to divert attention from governance production networks in fostering shortcomings. interdependence and integration, East Asia is shifting to In Japan, the so-called lost two become the world’s economic centre decades of economic stagnation has aligning domestic politics of gravity. left deep frustrations across the with regional goals. But despite the increased economic country and historical revisionism ” interdependence, regional tensions has been exploited for short-term continue to dangerously flare, such political gains at the expense of In the years since, however, China as between Japan and China in repairing relations with China reinvented itself, achieving rapid the East China Sea, and China and South Korea. Reconciling economic growth and increasing and ASEAN countries in the South such domestic political trends its defence spending to improve its China Sea. Thus it is clear that with regional cooperation requires military capabilities. Beginning while economic interdependence political leaders and policymakers with détente and the normalisation raises the costs of violent conflict to be more conscious of the medium of China’s diplomatic relations with and acts as a deterrent to war, it to long-term evolution of regional the United States and Japan in alone is not a sufficient condition order and publicly acknowledge the the 1970s, the opening of China’s to keep the peace. As such, the benefits of bilateral and regional economy and market reforms under future regional order demands cooperative initiatives. In doing so, the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in careful and dedicated attention to Japanese political leaders must not the 1980s, and China’s integration the management of good relations forget the sensitivities of the past into regional production networks between governments of diverse when Japan inflicted great pain on fostered by its membership of political types and at different the peoples of the Asia-Pacific. APEC since 1991 and accession to stages of economic development. the WTO in 2001, China overtook

16 Six elements of Japan’s Japanese Constitution to allow the Japanese public and the for collective self-defence, in order international community. regional vision to credibly deter threats. At the same time, the strengthening of In order to address the three Cooperation with democracies Japan’s security policy must be key challenges noted above and conducted within the framework Japan will also seek to strengthen realise its objective of a stable and of an exclusively defence oriented cooperation with other democracies prosperous East Asia in which security posture so as not to such as Australia, India, Japan is free of threats and able exacerbate the security dilemma. Indonesia and South Korea. to actively contribute to shared Japan and Australia, for instance, regional economic and security established regular defence and goals, Japan is likely to prioritise A robust US-Japan alliance foreign minister (2+2) meetings six elements: a revitalised The US-Japan alliance has and signed a defence technology Japan; a robust US-Japan underpinned the post-war stability transfer agreement. Indian Prime alliance; cooperation with other of East Asia. But looking to the Minister Narendra Modi made democracies; China-US-Japan future, the US faces new budget Japan his first major foreign trilateral confidence building; pressures including on its defence visit and the two countries are regional rulemaking; and energy spending in the wake of costly wars negotiating a civil nuclear deal and cooperation. in Afghanistan and Iraq and the US-2 amphibious aircraft sales. global financial crisis. Moreover, Indonesia has recently elected a A revitalised Japan US President Obama has new President, Joko Widodo, which emphasised a foreign and security presents a fresh opportunity to Japan is focusing on revitalising policy framework underpinned expand cooperation with this key its national strength on two by multilateral cooperation. In ASEAN country. Japan’s relations key fronts. On the economic order to help alleviate US budget with South Korea have flared front Japan must reconcile pressures and contribute to recently over the Takeshima Islets its mounting debt, which has multilateral security cooperation, dispute and the comfort women resulted in a debt-to-GDP ratio Japan will need to expand its roles issue. The two countries were close of more than 200 per cent, with within the alliance. This was a key to concluding an Acquisition and its ageing society’s growing rationale behind the Abe cabinet’s Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) demand for social welfare. To this constitutional reinterpretation to and a General Security of Military end Japan must focus greater allow limited forms of collective Information Agreement (GSOMIA) efforts to deregulate, nurture self-defence. The revising of the in 2012. Domestic politics in both new industries, and reform and US-Japan defence cooperation countries, however, conspired to liberalise uncompetitive sectors guidelines will also help bilateral scupper the deals and renewed including sensitive protected defence cooperation and bolster efforts are now needed by both sectors such as agriculture. On regional contingency planning. sides to repair relations. the security front, tensions with But the Diet will need to amend a China, most prominently over number of relevant laws, such as the Senkaku Islands, as well as Confidence building the Self Defence Forces (SDF) Law, North Korea’s nuclear weapons as well as pass new legislation in mechanisms between China- program, have become grave order to implement these changes. concerns to Japan’s security. As Japan-US This will require delicate political such Japan needs to strengthen negotiations as well as clear and China has adopted an increasingly its security policy, as it has done concrete explanations to justify assertive posture in recent through the reinterpretation of new SDF operational roles to years, especially in relation to the Article 9 peace clause of the the East and South China Sea territorial disputes. Given the unpredictability of its future role, A trilateral confidence building mechanism with a special many nations around the region “ feel a strong motivation to align focus on military-military dialogue should be urgently themselves with the United States. established between the US, Japan and China and then But while it is natural to hedge against the possibility of future expanded through the East Asia Summit.” unpredictable behaviour and

17 regional instability, it is in the other countries’ entry must be kept Success in all six areas of Japan’s interest of the region as a whole open for the future. To this end, the vision for the future regional order to seek stronger engagement with Regional Comprehensive Economic poses a tremendous challenge. China as the country has become Partnership (RCEP) must also At the same time, the payoff of a a critical trading partner to the be completed as soon as possible stable and prosperous East Asia, US, Japan and ASEAN. To this and the amalgamation of RCEP not just for Japan but for the end a trilateral confidence building and TPP retained as a future entire region, is a worthy objective mechanism with a special focus aspiration. reconcilable with the interests on military-military dialogue of all regional actors. Failure in should be urgently established Energy cooperation these areas is likely to entrench between the US, Japan and China confrontational postures and to ensure a stable and prosperous A final pressing concern is the need yield a more dangerous region for regional order which reconciles for energy cooperation. Growing all. With the bigger picture and the interests of all three countries. populations and economic growth a strong sustainable pathway in Once successfully established, means the future energy demands mind, shared regional stability it should be expanded to a more of the region will only rise. The and prosperity in the future can inclusive format through the East urgent need to secure energy surely be transformed from today’s Asia Summit which offers the best resources as energy competition challenge into tomorrow’s reality. venue given its membership and intensifies also at times potential to be region’s pre-eminent exacerbates territorial issues. As strategic institution. such the East Asia Summit should Hitoshi Tanaka establish a dedicated energy Chairman, Institute for Deepening of regional cooperation-working group to International Strategy, Japan address energy issues across the Research Institute, Japan rulemaking board including: energy security, Economic interdependence and joint exploration and development, globalisation affords exciting new environmental protection, nuclear potential for increasing shared safety, and transport issues such as regional prosperity. But at the securing the sea lanes. same time, it demands increased international interactions across a broad and expanding range of areas such as trade, investment, social policies, and environmental management and climate change. In order to foster predictability and ease of international interactions it is crucial to deepen regional rulemaking. To this end, concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is important not just as an economic agreement but also as a strategic arrangement to bind the United States into the East Asian rulemaking process. The TPP at this juncture does not include all relevant Asian countries, most prominently China. While Chinese President Xi Jinping is moving to reform China’s state-owned-enterprises, state intervention in the Chinese economy is still too heavy to allow China to join the TPP at present. However, the door for Chinese and Prime Minister Abe meets Prime Minister Modi in Tokyo, October 2014. Credit: Bloomberg.

18 Japan: stepping forward but not stepping out

Gerald Curtis

For decades analysts have been predicting that big changes in Japanese security policy were just around the corner. In the early 1970s Herman Kahn forecasted that Japan would become the 21st century’s ‘super-state’; in 1987, after Prime Minister Nakasone lifted the one per cent of GDP limit on defence spending, Henry Kissinger penned a Washington Post opinion piece that declared the inevitability of Japan’s emergence as a major military power; and in 2000 Kenneth Waltz wrote that Japan was gearing up to bolster its conventional forces and build nuclear weapons. None of these predictions panned out, but today it is popular once again Prime Minister Abe hosts President Obama in Japan, April 2014.Photo credit: mtviewmirror. to speculate about Japan being on the brink of major changes in its security policy. Could we now be at worry that there may be a link collective defence, and declared an inflection point where the views between Abe’s revisionist views of his intention to beef up the ability of the realists are finally becoming the past and his vision of Japan’s of Japan’s naval and air forces to realistic? future. defend islands at the far reaches of There is no doubt that Prime Japan’s territorial waters. Prime Minister Abe has been Minister Abe would like to see outspoken about his desire to Abe has established a record for Japan have a more robust and see Japan become more of a being Japan’s most peripatetic muscular foreign policy. There is normal country, free of some of prime minister ever—his visit to no question that Chinese worry the constraints on the use of Beijing for the November APEC that Japan will become a more military power that have resulted summit being the fiftieth country formidable factor in the regional in Japan punching far below its he had visited in less than two balance of power. And there economic weight in regional and years, with repeat visits to several is good reason to believe that global affairs. Since becoming of them, reflects this. He has paid Americans are ambivalent about prime minister in December 2012 special attention to ASEAN— what they see going on in Tokyo. he has established a national Vietnam and the Philippines in The Pentagon has welcomed Abe’s security council, eased the ban particular—as well as Australia decision to reinterpret Article on the export of weapons and and India, the significance of which Nine of the Constitution to permit weapons technology, got the Diet has not been lost on the Chinese. collective defence and have Japan to pass a controversial classified make a larger contribution to secrets law, had his cabinet adopt This is an impressive list of the alliance. Others in the US a reinterpretation of Article Nine accomplishments but do they government and in the media of the Constitution to permit amount to a change in Japan’s

19 did so. Prime Minister Noda threat to American national The entanglement/ was constrained from increasing interests. “ the defence budget because of a abandonment dynamic of sluggish economy. Abe did increase In addition to these structural it, for the first time in eleven changes in Japan’s external alliance management is years. But the increase hardly environment, there has been represented a dramatic break a weakening of domestic anti- fundamentally different now with previous policy: in 2013 it military sentiment that has long increased by 0.8 per cent and in the inhibited foreign policy change. from what it was during 2014 budget increased 2.7 percent. The ‘Pacifism’ in post-war Japan For the five fiscal years from 2014- was of a special kind. It did not the Cold War and it leaves 2018, annual increases of less than mean that Japan denied the 3 per cent are projected importance of the military force Japanese feeling more to insure the nation’s security. insecure. Japan’s external environment What it meant was that a large ” majority of Japanese rejected the Since Abe has been prime minister, use of Japanese military power to relations with both China and do so. Fearful of a resurgence of national security strategy? If the Korea have been badly strained. the military’s political influence Democratic Party of Japan’s Prime To be fair though, they were not and lacking confidence in the Minister Yoshihiko Noda had had much better when the DPJ was government’s ability to use military a secure majority in both houses in power—former Prime Minister power prudently, the majority of of the Diet as Prime Minister Noda and South Korean President the Japanese public preferred to Abe does now would his security Lee Myung-bak argued over have the government sign on to policies have been very different comfort women and Takeshima/ a grand bargain with the United from the strategy Abe is pursuing? Dokdo. Relations between Japan States that gave the US access to If Abe were to vacate the prime and China reached a nadir with bases in Japan from which it could minister’s office tomorrow, would Prime Minister Noda’s decision to project its power into the rest of anyone whom one could reasonably nationalise three of the Senkaku/ Asia and beyond in return for a imagine succeeding him push Diaoyu Islands that China claims guarantee of Japan’s territorial policy in a fundamentally different as its own. security. Domestic anti-militarism direction? The answer to all these continues to act as a brake on the questions is no. To be clear: structural factors build-up of Japan’s military power are far more important than the but far less so than before. When the DPJ’s ‘dovish’ Naoto personality of Japan’s current Kan was prime minister the prime minister in driving change The end of bipolarity—and the government adopted new national in Japan’s foreign policy. These end of the decade or so of US defence program guidelines that factors include: the collapse of a unipolarity that followed—has called for establishment of a bipolar international order that left Japan facing an unstable ‘dynamic defence force’. Under gave Japan confidence that threats and dangerous international the hawkish Shinzo Abe, the to its security would be perceived environment. During the Cold government’s new defence program by the US as threats to its own; War, the Japanese worried that guidelines called for a ‘dynamic China’s emergence as a great an alliance with the US might 1 joint defence force’. The DPJ power and its aggressive actions entangle their country in conflicts advocated the establishment of in the East and South China Seas; of which they wanted no part. a National Security Council, as and by North Korea’s acquisition While confident that a Soviet had previous LDP Governments, of nuclear weapons. It is also being threat against Japan would and the Abe Administration driven by a perception of relative be viewed in Washington as a implemented this longstanding American decline, evidenced by direct challenge to the US, they recommendation. In July 2012 declining defence budgets, political had little reason to doubt the Prime Minister Noda said in paralysis in Washington and a credibility of the US commitment the Diet that he might consider public opinion leery of having their to protect Japan. Today the tables reinterpreting Article Nine to country becoming entangled in are turning. It is the US that has permit collective self defence; In further military conflicts where concerns about getting entangled July 2014 Prime Minister Abe there is no clearly discernible in a Japanese dispute with China about sovereignty over a group of

20 uninhabited islands in the East to strengthen the alliance by The Abe government’s foreign China Sea. Japanese for their increasing Japan’s contribution to policy has been cautious and part wonder whether they can it. incremental—building on have full confidence in America’s rather than radically changing commitment to take Japan’s side The US and Japan are in the final policies of the governments that in the event of a confrontation stages of revising the guidelines preceded it. As Abe continues with China. The entanglement/ for defence cooperation, the first to comment on the history of abandonment dynamic of alliance revision since 1997 and one that Japanese colonialism, militarism management is fundamentally is premised on further integrating and his expressed desire to ‘free different now from what it was the military forces of the two Japan from its postwar regime’, during the Cold War and it leaves countries and increasing the suspicions about his longer term Japanese feeling more insecure. sphere of Japanese responsibilities. policy goals and intentions will Japan has reinterpreted Article impact his foreign policies. Knowledgeable Japanese Nine repeatedly over the years understand that the United States to expand the definition of what Prime Minister Abe is not about will remain for years to come the is permissible in the name of self to change his ideological stripes, most powerful nation in Asia and defence and it has engaged in but he is a realist who appears globally and that alliance with it collective defence arrangements to have gotten the message that must form the bedrock of Japanese without calling them such at his comments about history— security policy. This is a consensus least since the early 1990s. But it including his symbolic visit to view in Japan, rejected only at the has had to go through ‘Houdini- Tokyo’s Yasukumi Shrine—do not margins by small minorities on the like’ contortions to do so. The serve Japan’s national interests. left and right. But it is true as well formal recognition of the right to His recent statements and actions that no matter how much emphasis engage in collective self defence indicate he is well aware that the US gives to a rebalancing to agreements makes it possible for Japan does not have the ability to Asia, it cannot regain the position Japan to consider military options ‘contain’ China, but that Japan’s of unchallenged primacy that it and engage in joint planning with own future well-being depends enjoyed for so many decades. China the United States in ways that on further deepening economic does not have to match America’s were not possible before. ties with China and the rest of military power to pose a formidable Asia. Abe is a cautious ‘hawk’ who challenge to US dominance. Its Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan will strive to strengthen Japan’s thrust for regional power and its also has sought to develop security alliance with the US and to search economically dominant position linkages as well as strengthen for a global role that will bring in East Asia will continue to gain economic ties with Australia and Japan prestige and respect. Abe strength over time. This is the new India and countries in Southeast appears to be torn between the pull reality that Japanese foreign policy Asia. The operational consequences of his heartstrings—emotional and makers are trying to cope with. so far are minimal but there is no ideological—and the dictates of his question that Japan is seeking head—pragmatic and strategic. The Japanese are nothing if not to lay the groundwork for closer Since he has a good chance to be realists about international power, security cooperation with other prime minister for several years and the realities Japan is facing countries that are as concerned the question of which he follows is pushing forward policy change about maintaining a regional is of obvious importance. But in in interesting ways. First and balance of power as Japan is. considering the future course of somewhat counter intuitively, it has weakened the voices of those who have long called for a foreign policy more independent of the China’s rise and its anti-Japanese rhetoric and United States. China’s rise and “ its anti-Japanese rhetoric and actions have made Japan more intensely aware actions have made Japan more intensely aware than ever of the than ever of the critical importance of its alliance critical importance of its alliance with the US, even if the credibility with the US. of America’s commitments under ” that alliance come into question. The result has been an effort

21 Japanese policy it is important to recognise that Prime Minister Abe governs in a democracy where deeply entrenched interests groups; a powerful bureaucracy; a competitive political party system; a free press; and a public that is strongly risk averse combine to act as a profound check on prime ministerial power. Japan will become more of a factor in the regional balance of power in coming years. But forecasts of dramatic and discontinuous change in Japanese foreign policy are no more likely to be right this time than they were in years past.

Gerald Curtis Burgess Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.

ENDNOTES 1 Other than adding the word ‘joint’ to emphasise the importance of cooperation between the Ground, Maritime and Air self-defence forces, there is no difference between them.

Chinese Navy drills, South China Sea, 27 March 2013. Photo credit: Times Asi, flickr.

22 Modi’s India: towards a bolder international engagement

C. Raja Mohan

Foreign policies of large countries like India do not change with the turnover of governments. They are rooted in the nation’s geography, history and strategic culture. Significant changes in the external environment or in the nature of the regime at home, however, do result in major foreign policy adaptations. That moment presented itself for India at the turn of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War fundamentally altered the international context of India’s foreign policy. At the same time, the collapse of India’s old economic order made liberalisation and globalisation unavoidable imperatives in the early 1990s. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a banquet hosted by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, at Akasaka Palace, Tokyo, Japan, 1 September 2014. Photo credit: Narendra Modi, The responsibility to engineer the flickr. change in economic and foreign policy domains fell upon a series of weak coalition governments international prospects. That the Prime Minister, Modi has surprised that were in charge of the ruling party has a majority in the the nation and international nation from 1989. Although the Lower House, the Lok Sabha, for community with an enthusiasm change in India’s economic and the first time in three decades toward diplomacy and a capacity strategic orientation over the has decisively altered the political for bold decisions on the foreign last quarter of a century has environment in India. policy front. been palpable, it has also been incremental and been clouded While there was widespread Since assuming office in May 2014, by self-doubt. The depressing expectation that Modi would Modi has made several moves on drift of the United Progressive rejuvenate the Indian economy, the foreign policy front. Although Alliance (UPA) government, few expected he would make a Modi has not changed the especially during its second term difference to India’s foreign policy. fundamentals of India’s post-Cold (2009 to 2014) revealed once Neither Modi nor the BJP chose to War foreign policy, he has brought again the persistent gap between spell out much about the foreign new vigour and purpose to India’s India’s strategic promise and policy agenda in the prolonged engagement with neighbours and performance. The election and election campaign. Between 2004 major powers. Developments in the appointment of Narendra Modi and 2014, Modi—as a provincial second half of 2014 offer insight into as prime minister in the summer leader with little experience Modi’s worldview and the future of 2014 with a surprisingly large at the national level—seemed of India’s foreign policy, and can mandate has helped dispel some unprepared for major foreign be understood in eight broad areas of the pessimism about India’s political initiatives. Yet now as which his foreign policy emphases.

23 The new emphases reflect India as now being open for rights; cautioning Maldives not business. Indeed, few of the Prime to play the China card beyond a First is the clear new focus on Minister’s predecessors have spent point; and developing a sustainable reviving India’s economic growth. as much time engaging the leaders strategy for Afghanistan amidst Whether it is dealing with the of international business at home the withdrawal of international neighbours or major powers, and abroad. forces. Narendra Modi has understood that diplomacy is about serving Second, Modi appears bolder than India’s economic interests. The his predecessors in making the Although the change notion of economic diplomacy for political case at home for economic “ India is certainly not new—it was globalisation. Modi has found in India’s economic and at the heart of India’s foreign policy an interesting way of combining strategy of non-alignment when a strong nationalist orientation strategic orientation over the Nehru reached out to Moscow with a greater economic openness last quarter of a century has and the socialist world to boost to foreign participation. This its heavy industrial capabilities. approach has resonated with the been palpable, it has also India’s economic diplomacy newly aspiring Indian middle acquired a new orientation in the classes and enthused domestic been incremental and been and foreign businesses. Modi age of economic reforms. Ironically clouded by self-doubt. India’s growth slowed in the second has also begun to discard the ” term of the UPA government led by Congress party’s defensiveness Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh, on controversial issues such the architect of India’s reforms as intellectual property, trade, Fourth, on India’s two most from 1991 to 1996. Worse still, the and climate change. The Modi difficult relationships in the Congress leadership led by Sonia government’s refusal to sign the neighbourhood, Modi has unveiled Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi restored World Trade Organisation’s trade a new combination of flexibility economic populism of the 1970s at facilitation agreement by citing on economic engagement and home and resurrected the Third- food security concerns seemed to firmness on confronting security Worldism of the past. As a result, invoke past attitudes, but it has challenges. If Modi’s positive India under the Congress party since signalled some flexibility and start with Pakistan’s Nawaz seemed hostile to business at home appears ready to find practical Sharif surprised observers, the and abroad. solutions. Modi’s decision to suspend talks with Islamabad a few months Modi was determined to reverse Third, Modi has recognised the later has drawn much criticism this. He put domestic economic urgency of revitalising India’s at home. Modi’s message is that development at the top of India’s relations with its sub-continental India is open for an expansion foreign policy goals. For Modi neighbours. Whether it was of mutually beneficial economic diplomacy is an integral part of a the invitation to the leaders of cooperation, at the exclusion of strategy to restore international the South Asian Association for any Pakistani transgressions on confidence in India’s economic Cooperation (SAARC) nations the security front. A similar theme prospects and mobilise external to join his inauguration or the has dominated Modi’s approach resources for the modernisation choice of Bhutan and Nepal as to China. He has ended India’s and expansion of the two his first foreign destinations, the previous reluctance to welcome critical sectors in the Indian new emphasis on these states Chinese investments, as well economy—manufacturing and was unmistakable. In Nepal, as defend its approach to the infrastructure. Modi’s economic Modi demonstrated an ability to boundary dispute with China. diplomacy has led to promises of understand Nepali grievances, While extending personal warmth significant foreign investments. connect with its political classes to China’s President Xi Jinping For example, more than US$35 and masses, and signal the will to and opening the door for Chinese billion from Japan, US$20 billion redefine India’s regional strategy. industrial parks, Modi has made from China and US$40 billion by If Modi’s instincts on Nepal turned it publicly clear that China’s the US companies. While these out to be right, he has a much incursions into Indian territory figures must be taken with a pinch bigger challenge in implementing would undermine prospects for a of salt, there is no denying the the agreements already signed genuine partnership between the impressive effort led by Modi to with Bangladesh; persuading Sri two countries. Lanka to deliver on Tamil minority

24 Fifth, in the extended At the same time, the diaspora neighbourhood, Modi’s emergence Yet now as Prime can actively contribute to India’s has been widely welcomed “ economic development. Modi’s in East Asia. Given the deep Minister, Modi has outreach to the diaspora was institutionalisation of India’s reflected on two occasions: in New relations with East Asia, new surprised the nation and York’s Madison Square Garden in regional engagement it is not international community late September, and Australia in difficult. Indeed, Modi has a special November. advantage. As Chief Minister for with an enthusiasm toward Gujarat, Modi traveled to China, Eighth, culture and soft power Japan, Singapore and Australia diplomacy and a capacity for have always been an important to seek investments for the state. bold decisions on the foreign part of independent India’s His pro-business approach and engagement with the world. focus on economic growth has policy front. Whether it was a periodic explosion generated a renewed interest ” of global interest in Indian across Asia in India’s commercial mysticism or spiritual traditions partnerships. At the same time, or the growing influence of Indian Modi has been less inhibited than government, which held back its cinema, India has had a unique his predecessors in addressing ties with the US and Japan by place in the global cultural sphere. regional concerns about the rise citing the dangers of provoking Indeed, culture was very much part of China. This was reflected in his China. Modi has been bold in of Nehru’s imagination of India’s visit to Japan, where Modi did not affirming India’s pursuit to foreign policy and was pursued by hesitate in indirectly criticising improve its relations with all the his successors in different ways. China’s ‘expansionism’. major powers, each on its own Modi is lending new weight to it. merit. If the Congress party, in its Unlike his secular predecessors or In the West, Israel was among the manifesto for the 2014 elections even the BJP’s Vajpayee, Modi is few countries that Modi traveled harked back to non-alignment, uninhibited in wearing his religion to. Given the BJP’s ideological the BJP made no reference to and culture on his sleeve. Witness critique of Congress government’s this traditional posture at all. his visit to Nepal’s Pashupatinath Israel policy over the decades, Modi Furthermore, the BJP even temple in Kathmandu and is far more open about building underscored the importance of praying in the Kyoto Buddhist strong ties with Israel. This did building a ‘web of alliances’ in temple. Thus, Modi has placed not, however, suggest India neglect order to secure India’s national special emphasis on celebrating its ties with the Arab Middle East. interests. For Modi, the question Indian culture and its links to the While the Middle East did not is how India can expand its own international community, not least figure in Modi’s travels during comprehensive national power in as a spur to tourism. 2014, his Minister for External practical collaboration with all Modi has dismissed critics who Affairs Sushma Swaraj devoted the major powers and leverage demand a grand vision for India’s attention to engaging the region. its growing weight to shape the economic and foreign policies. With India’s huge economic stakes regional and global balance of Rather, Modi insists that small in the Middle East, set alongside power. His efforts to engage with steps can make a big difference regional instabilities, it is likely major powers has been reflected in both arenas. He has probably the Middle East will figure in his visits to Japan and the US, recognised that Delhi has had prominently in Modi’s economic and hosting of the Chinese and too much theory regarding and foreign policies. For the Modi Russian Presidents in Delhi. Yet international engagement and too government, the relationship with what Modi has missed is a similar little pragmatic action. Iran has a special bearing as it level of engagement with European contemplates India’s approach to powers. Afghanistan, especially with the Modi has begun to correct that by replacing the anarchy in the significant reduction of US military Seventh, even more so than earlier Delhi Durbar with discipline and presence. governments, Modi sees the Indian comprehensive assertion of his diaspora as a key strand in India’s prerogative to set goals, domestic Sixth, Modi has understood the international relations. Modi and foreign, and compel compliance importance of engaging all major believes that India’s diaspora needs from the bureaucracy. This has powers without inhibition. This the support of the Indian state. is in sharp contrast to the UPA begun to enhance India’s credibility

25 as an interlocutor in the global domain. But good governance and political will cannot obviate the need for comprehensive reform of India’s foreign policy institutions and expanding the state’s capacity to effectively engage with the world. For the moment, Modi is riding high. Notwithstanding his claims to modesty, his world view might be summed up as a purposeful quest to accelerate India’s rise through pragmatic and realist policies.

C. Raja Mohan Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, India

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi with US President Barack Obama, Washington DC, October 2014. Credit: Indiatimes.

26 Great power politics in Asia and Korea’s response

Kim Sung-han

Since the United States declared its ‘Pivot to Asia’ in 2011, great power politics has intensified throughout the region. This intensification is no more evident than in Northeast Asia. The great powers—the US, China, Japan, Russia, and India—are trying to protect their own interests, not through cooperation, but rather by threatening one another through military, economic or political means. China’s foreign and security policies are proving to be pivotal in determining the relationship among great powers in East Asia. President Xi Jinping reaffirmed ‘sovereignty, security, and development’ as China’s core interests at the 3rd meeting of the Party’s Political Bureau on South Korean and US Ampibious Warfare Ships during bi-lateral exercise Ssang Song, April January 2013. While it is unclear 2014. Credit: US Navy. whether the geographical scope of China’s core interests includes South China Sea, East China Sea Great power politics in Asia for maritime supremacy. China and the Korean Peninsula, few is gearing up to challenge the pundits doubt that this is a de The US-China relationship is hegemonic status of the US in facto reality. among the most important in the Western Pacific. The geo- East Asia. The New York Times strategist Nicholas Spykman used Given that prevailing columnist, Thomas Friedman, to call the South China Sea Asia’s circumstances do not allow a captured the central dilemma Mediterranean. Now, some are China-centered East Asian order, when he characterised China as calling it China’s Caribbean. China appears to be focused on ‘a threat, client and opportunity’ maintaining a stable relationship for the United States. It is hard The China-Japan relationship with the United States with a for the United States to trade the is even more worrisome. China view to continuing its economic economic benefits of cooperation believes it has overtaken Japan growth. However, China is actively for the strategic benefits of in terms of national power since promoting regional cooperation containing China. When China 2010 when the Chinese GDP by respecting ASEAN centrality tried to redefine relations with surpassed the Japanese, but and its leadership of the Regional the US under the label of ‘new Japan is reluctant to accept it. Comprehensive Economic type of great power relationship’, At the World Economic Forum in Partnership (RCEP) as a counter the United States was reluctant January 2014, Japanese Prime to the US-led Trans-Pacific to accept the implicit concept of Minister Shinzo Abe compared the Partnership (TPP). G2. These two great powers are Japan-China relationship with the being driven into a competition UK-Germany relationship before

27 World War I. In fact, the Japan- international order to be based on attempting to preserve a balance China relationship is more akin to national sovereignty rather than between alliances and regionalism, the France-Germany relationship liberal values. China is interested rather than giving sole priority to at the end of the 19th century, in aligning with Russia to explore alliances. when France was preoccupied with changes in the US-centered Asian isolating and taking revenge on order although whether China will While the United States Germany for its defeat by Prussia long share leadership with Russia traditionally prefers the hub-and- in 1870. If France had not aligned is uncertain. spokes approach, it joined the East with the UK but elected to work to Asian Summit (EAS) in 2011, the defuse UK-German tensions, the The China-India relationship is first time the United States joined course of history might have been also gaining attention from the a multilateral framework that it very different. At this juncture, United States and its allies. India did not initiate. Indeed, the Obama Japan is being seen to be involved is in the advantageous position of Administration considered that in ‘encircling’ China. Japan seeks being courted both by the United East Asian regionalism should to deal with the rise of China States (to counter-balance China) not be centered on ASEAN Plus through ‘external balancing’— and by China (to preclude any deep Three, but should be broadened to strengthening its security alignment with the US). India Asia-Pacific regionalism, whereby needs to strengthen its nuclear and including the Australia, New conventional deterrent capabilities Zealand, India, New Zealand, to prevent the gap with China from Russia and the US. In this light, While it is unclear growing wider. India also sees the the EAS is now more than simply “ need to regard China as a strategic an extension of ASEAN Plus whether the geographical partner through the transition Three. Rather, it is an upgrade to from a unipolar to multipolar a global framework for political scope of China’s core international system. and security discussions in which four of the world’s great powers— interests includes South America’s leadership role and China, Japan, the US and Russia— participate. China Sea, East China Sea the Northeast Asian paradox While the United States and the Korean Peninsula, While Asia’s evolving strategic has renewed its attention to landscape has strong parallels Southeast Asia and regional few pundits doubt that this with European geopolitics of the cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, late 19th century, the US retains this may be at a cost to Northeast is a de facto reality. its clear leadership in military ” Asia where the China, Japan, technology and capability. The the US, Russia and the two leadership role of the United Koreas are located. Northeast States is thus important. The Asia has featured a distinct relationship with US, Australia, core of America’s Asia-Pacific India, and South Korea—and paradox: economic integration strategy includes: deepening has intensified while political ‘internal balancing’—increasing its alliances; responding to China’s defence expenditure. cooperation remained stagnant resurgence; strengthening for over three decades. Since cooperation with ASEAN; and a The China-Russia relationship Northeast Asia has traditionally growing interest in Asia-Pacific is also distinctive in the sense lacked formal, multilateral and regionalism. With respect to that their strategic partnership is regionally exclusive institutions alliance policy, Washington is strengthened by a shared suspicion for political cooperation, the region fostering comprehensive and of the US. In the 2011, the Levada has pronounced an ‘organisation strategic alliances geographically Center polled 29 per cent of gap’ compared with Europe, the and substantially in response to Russians perceiving the US as an Americas, Africa, and even the contemporary security challenges. enemy, while only 9 per cent had Gulf. Furthermore, the United States is the same view of China. In 2012, maintaining a policy of cooperation these views strengthened: 35 per The pre-condition for formal mixed with competition toward cent of Russians perceived the US institutionalisation of regional China. Regarding its policy on as an enemy, while just 4 per cent relationships is a ‘great power troop stationing and cooperation perceived China as an enemy state. balance’. Such a balance has in East Asia, the United States is Both Russia and China prefer the never been enduringly present

28 in Northeast Asia. The existence Europe and East Asia in the Obama emphasised: ‘We pledge to of a credible external balancer – 21st century. The second school continue to build a better and more and the US is the sole candidate looks to a US-led Asian order. secure future for all Korean people, -provides an alternative foundation Its proponents believe that a working on the basis of the Joint for the emergence and endurance multipolar system in inherently Vision to foster enduring peace and of regional organisations. This unstable. The US has been stability on the Korean Peninsula means that the ‘US factor’ needs playing a stabiliser role through and its peaceful reunification to be given careful consideration to its military presence in Asia. A based on the principles of ensure that the search for viable withdrawal of US forces from denuclearization, democracy peace and security mechanisms in Asia would lead to an unstable and a free market economy’. Of Northeast Asia is seen positively in multipolar system whereby particular note was that this Washington. major powers will be involved in Park-Obama summit reconfirmed an unlimited power competition America’s commitment to Korean The polarisation between China without converging on a stable reunification, rather than looking and Russia on the one hand, and order. at North Korea from the narrow Japan and the US on the other perspective of non-proliferation. will be destabilising, particularly South Korea’s Park Geun-hye since China is regarded as the only Government stands closer to the Presidents Park and Obama potential power with an ability to US-led Asian order school while agreed to move from a threaten the hegemonic status of exploring the possibility of a comprehensive strategic alliance the United States. To those who concert of Asia in a complementary to a global partnership in which worry about upholding the balance way. The Park Government gives ROK and the United States expand of power in Northeast Asia, the US highest priority to the ROK-US cooperation on climate change, stands out more sharply than ever alliance which it regards as the clean energy, energy security, as the only truly indispensable linchpin of peace and stability human rights, humanitarian balancer. A further condition for in the Asia Pacific region. In the assistance, development assistance moving beyond the Northeast 2013 US-ROK Joint Declaration, cooperation, counter-terrorism, Asian paradox is the historical President Park and President peaceful uses of nuclear energy, institutionalism that focuses on the nuclear safety, non-proliferation, role and potential of preexisting cyber security, and counter-piracy. organisational structures. For The Park Government also strives example, the setting of Six Party Abe compared the for a better relationship with Talks may become the foundation “ China on the premise that, while of a Northeast Asian peace and Japan-China relationship the central axis of Korea’s foreign security mechanism. A continuing with the UK-Germany and security policies is the ROK- leitmotif of the Six Party Talks is US alliance, strong China-ROK the prospect that a resolution of relationship before World relations are fully compatible with the nuclear problem could set the this fact. stage for more institutionalized War I. In fact, the Japan- and enduring multilateral In addition, the Park government cooperation in Northeast Asia. China relationship is more is pursuing multilateral security cooperation mechanisms for Korea’s strategic response akin to the France-Germany Northeast Asia rather than relationship at the end limiting itself to the US-China There are two main schools of bilateral structure. At the joint thought on how the ROK should of the 19th century, when session of US Congress in May respond to great power politics in 2014, President Park proposed East Asia, as well as the Northeast France was preoccupied with the Northeast Asian Peace and Asian Paradox. One school leans Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). toward a ‘concert of Asia’, taking isolating and taking revenge Park stated that ‘the US and inspiration from the century of other Northeast Asian partners peace in Europe following the on Germany for its defeat by could start with softer issues. These include environmental Vienna Convention of 1815 and Prussia in 1870. highlighting the parallels between ” issues and disaster relief. They the geopolitics of 19th century include nuclear safety and counter- terrorism. Trust will be built

29 through this process… But it will to ensure the stability of Northeast be firmly rooted in the Korea-US Asia. For South and North alliance.’ Korea, participation in such a multilateral security mechanism Since President Park’s Trustpolitik could contribute to establishing a with North Korea is aiming at solid peace regime on the Korean a North-South dialogue and Peninsula. Trustpolitik and NAPCI denuclearisation, the NAPCI— share conceptual similarities with which would include North the US rebalancing strategy since Korea—is not supposed to they are anchored in the ROK-US precede Trustpolitik. Rather, a alliance and aimed at promoting Northeast Asian peace and security cooperation with other countries. mechanism should be pursued in In this sense, it can be said that a way which is consistent with South Korea is exploring the scope and conducive to progress on the for synergistic effects among these North Korean nuclear problem, three elements while not losing and avoid becoming a vehicle for sight of the difficulties involved. North Korea to try to legitimise its nuclear power status. As long as inter-Korean relations remain unstable, real peace and stability Kim Sung-han in the region will remain a remote Professor of International prospect. Tangible progress in Relations, Korea University inter-Korean relations should be the precondition for arrangements

30 Northeast Asia’s security dilemma: Korea at the centre

Leonid Petrov

More than sixty years after the signing of Armistice Agreement in Korea, Northeast Asia remains as divided and paranoid as in the old days of Cold War. Mutual distrust and inability to recognise each other’s security concerns lead the two Koreas and their regional neighbours to live in constant fear of resumed hostilities, now with the potential to go nuclear. This piece will analyse the logic that underlies the security concerns of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) vis-à-vis that of China, Russia, Japan and the US. Inter-Korean conflict Soldiers from the Korean People’s Army look south while on duty in the Joint Security Stable peace and security in Area. Photo credit: US Army official, Korean Demiliarised Zone image archive, Wikimedia Northeast Asia cannot be achieved Commons. without ending the Korean War. How can it be achieved? And what is the role of regional neighbours in openness might be used by the new conventional weapons are the process? The overview of DPRK other side as a window for attack costly and still cannot guarantee and ROK’s security concerns vis- and forced unification remain alive immunity from foreign invasion, à-vis each other and their regional and justified. Substantial resources North Korea continues to develop neighbours may be helpful in continue to be allocated by the its nuclear program—which is answering these questions. DPRK and ROK to keep their more symbolic that functional—as armies larger, better trained, and insurance against a possible pre- From the first days of their equipped with more sophisticated emptive strike. separation after World War II, weapons. both North and South Korea have The ballistic missile program that lived in a constant fear of invasion North Korea, with its tiny economy, North Korea stubbornly continues mixed with the constant desire to spends no less than fifteen per is also multifunctional and pre-empt this invasion by attacking cent of GDP on defence. Its contains both military and civilian first and unifying the country. The active military force is the fourth applications—communications, unfinished nature of the Korean largest in the world (1.2 million meteorology and agriculture. The War left both Pyongyang and Seoul people) and has several domestic military function of this dual-usage frustrated and paranoid about functions, including economic— technology is still being perfected each others’ intentions, effectively cheap and disciplined labour by the North and needs more precluding any improvement in for construction projects—and tests, which have been banned by bilateral relations to the present ideological—mass indoctrination UNSC Resolutions 1718, 1874, and day. Suspicions that détente and of conscripts. Understanding that 2094. Considering the miniature

31 scale of the Korean peninsula the deter North Korea but inevitably realised that even if the goal is DPRK’s long and medium range alert Chinese and Russian defence achieved and Pyongyang gives up missile programs have no use in systems and lead to new spirals of its nuclear ambitions and freezes potential inter-Korean conflict and arms race in the region. the WMD programs it would be are predominantly designed for impossible to verify or enforce psychological deterrence against For instance, the US is urging such an agreement. The parties nuclear blackmail by a third party. South Korea to purchase an created preconditions that made expensive missile defence program, further negotiation impossible Imperfect alliances called Terminal High-Altitude Area and, blaming each other for Defence (THAAD), which might insincerity, abandoned the Six- Both Koreas still feel vulnerable enable Seoul to intercept North’s Party-Talks. Since there is no other to a potential attack from the medium and short range Rodong regional security forum to bring other side and continue to rely on and Scud missiles more effectively. the conflicting security blocks in logistical help and guidance from Not everyone in Seoul is convinced Northeast Asia together, North and their traditional allies. China that this program is as effective South Korea have not sustained a periodically provides North Korea as advertised. South Korea is dialogue since 2009. with fuel, equipment and dual already committed to the gradual usage technologies that indirectly development of the Korea Air help Pyongyang’s nuclear and Missile Defence (KAMD) system ballistic missile programs. For and recently agreed to purchase example, in 2011 the Chinese- 136 Patriot Advanced Capability The unfinished nature made heavy transport vehicles (PAC-3) interceptors from the US “ were modified by North Koreans to for $1.4 billion. of the Korean War left serve as mobile missile launchers and even proudly paraded them US assurances that these both Pyongyang and Seoul systems respond to DPRK missile in Pyongyang. China denied frustrated and paranoid responsibility and claimed developments and will not alter that this export did not violate the basic military balance in the about each others’ sanctions regime. Whether China region still leave the neighbours will continue to turn a blind eye to with a tense feeling that a new intentions, effectively such violations is not clear because heightened confrontation in the cross-border trade with Korea is entirely possible. China precluding any improvement North Korea is not subject to any and Russia’s concerns about the international inspections. stationing of US-designed Ballistic in bilateral relations to the Missile Defence equipment in Despite China’s irritation with South Korea have led to new present day. North Korea’s defiance of the tensions and contributed to the ” international non-proliferation collapse of their joint economic regime, China is much more projects with the ROK. Similarly, concerned with the continuing measures to strengthen DPRK- Uncertainty also permeates the US presence in the region and PRC military cooperation alert internal relationships within each its regular large-scale military Tokyo and Washington as much as of the regional security blocks. exercises on and around the Seoul and these suspicions badly The military personnel and assets, Korean peninsula. The combined affect the regional dynamics. Fears which the US Government has field training exercises, ‘Foal that members of the opposing stationed in South Korea since Eagle’ and ‘Key Resolve’, are security blocks would start talking the Korean War, are assigned designed to support the defence directly to each other kill any the role of augmenting the ROK of South Korea from a possible potential for the resumption of a Army, Navy and Air Force in case North Korean attack. ‘Ulchi- meaningful dialogue. of sudden attack from the North. Freedom Guardian’ is the world’s The truth is that neither Seoul nor largest computerised command The collapse of the Six-Party- Washington believes that South and control implementation drill Talks has been one such example. Korea’s 655,000 troops, armed jointly conducted by the US and Designed to address the North with billions of dollars worth of ROK militaries. Staged annually, Korean nuclear proliferation advanced military equipment, can they are ostensibly designed to problem, this forum lost be confident of facing the North momentum when the parties Korea’s 1.2 million troops armed

32 with antiquated Soviet era tanks, and the US conduct joint military ships and airplanes. drills in the region. As long as The Korean peninsula regional leaders stick to a Cold “ With this uncertainly in mind, War mentality and see the world must assume a neutral (non- the US and ROK have recently through zero-sum lenses, this agreed to further delay the situation is going to persist. allied) status, which would transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) over allied forces The same paradigm is relevant tolerate no foreign troops stationed on the peninsula to the to Russo-North Korean relations, government in Seoul. The transfer particularly since Russia attracted or their weapons on Korean had been planned for 2015 but international sanctions for its has now been deferred to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. soil. mid-2020s. The reason provided Economic and military cooperation ” by US Defence Secretary Chuck between Moscow and Pyongyang is Hagel and ROK Defence Minister currently based on the resurgent Han Min-koo was unequivocally themes of anti-American—and mechanism could then become simple: the ‘intensifying missile occasionally anti-Chinese— the backbone of a new regional and nuclear threat posed by North solidarity. Even economic decisions security structure for Northeast Korea. Seoul is not yet confident are often motivated by ideological Asia. It would also lead to it can resist an attack and the or military considerations but mutual recognition of the DPRK Pentagon still believes that South are still devoid of complete trust and ROK, as well as diplomatic Korea is not yet ready to coordinate between the parties involved. This cross-recognition of the DPRK joint military operations. imperfect alliance of uncertain by the US and Japan. If security partners has prevailed for the last assurances are offered to North China’s security cooperation six decades since the Korean War and South Korea by their long- with North Korea has been and is likely to endure for as long standing allies and foes, the undermined by the continuing as the Cold War structures persist source of confrontation would be nuclear and missile tests conducted in the region. extinguished and the opportunities by Pyongyang in 2006, 2009, to start regional cooperation would and 2013. These days Beijing is Ending the Korean War be wide open. seriously reviewing its approach to how best protect its national It is difficult to dispute the This proposal can be feasible interests in the region without assessment that decades of only under one condition. The letting down North Korea but mistrust and arms racing have Korean peninsula must assume a with minimal engagement in its created an environment in which neutral (non-allied) status, which dangerous course. As a result, regional policymakers and military would tolerate no foreign troops China joined the UNSC sanctions, experts dedicated their time to or their weapons on Korean soil. declined a summit with North thinking about how to create Moreover, Korea must become a Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un, and tensions and expand military nuclear-free zone that threatens encouraged the inter-Korean budgets rather than reducing the nobody around it. The 1991 North- dialogue. On the whole, however, risk of new military conflict. This South Joint Declaration on the Sino-North Korean relations are paradox will remain unchallenged Denuclearisation of the Korean not worse than they were decades as long as the source of regional Peninsula could provide the basis ago. confrontation remains obfuscated: for such a possibility. The idea of the ceasefire regime in Korea, zero-nuclear world was one of the Pyongyang’s China strategy is which was temporarily introduced pre-election promises of President based on balancing between in 1953, needs to be replaced by a Barak Obama and could start keeping Beijing content and alert. permanent peace agreement. materialising in Northeast Asia Without North Korea the north- with its centre in Korea. eastern provinces of China are Such a peace treaty, for which not sufficiently protected from Pyongyang has been lobbying With eight Nuclear-Weapons-Free the forward-deployed ROK-US since 1975, could include a Zones established around the military. North Korea plays the provision on creating a regional globe, such as the Antarctic Treaty role of China’s watchdog that barks mechanism to ensure compliance (1959) and the Southeast Asia to alert its owners of an intruder’s with many issues of concern for NWFZ (1995), it would be more presence every time South Korea regional powers. This multilateral than welcomed in Northeast Asia.

33 Various iterations of a Limited they will continue to suffer periodic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in this escalation of tensions and expect region have been proposed over the worst from this long-standing the years and the issue has been confrontation. The sooner Koreans taken up in the Six Party Talks. It themselves understand the could serve as a start towards the importance of being neutral and eventual elimination of all nuclear conflict-free, the safer and more weapons in the region. Korea prosperous the whole region of would play the role of a regional Northeast Asia is going to become. balancer in economic and political matters but not as a military power that poses any threat to its neighbours. But this role can Leonid Petrov be played effectively only if the Visiting Fellow, School of Culture, balancer itself is neutral, peaceful History and Language, Australian and stable. National University

Whether divided or unified, Korea will remain the pivot of Northeast Asia. Unless North and South Koreas stop playing the role of pawns in the bigger geopolitical game of their powerful neighbours,

An MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter from the Golden Falcons of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 12 prepares to land on the flight deck of the US Navy's forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS George Washington on waters near Guam, 1 October 2014. Photo credit: Seaman Everett Allen, US Department of Defense.

34 Indonesia’s strategic thinking: breaking out of its shell?

Evan A. Laksmana

Indonesia saw monumental changes in 2014 with the election of President Joko Widodo (popularly known as ‘Jokowi’). A furniture businessman turned small-town mayor before he became governor of Jakarta, Jokowi is the first directly elected president without any significant ties to the previous authoritarian establishment.

Perhaps more importantly, he came into office proposing a new strategic doctrine, the ‘global maritime axis’. The axis element of doctrine entails an inward- looking and outward-looking duality—domestically, it focuses on the development of maritime Indonesia’s new President, Joko Widodo, (far right) steps out with other leaders at APEC, infrastructure, inter-connectivity, Beijing, November 2014. Credit: Konbini. and resources, while zeroing in on maritime diplomacy and naval defense internationally. While internal security and domestic The New Order’s pre-occupation many Indonesians believe that stability within Indonesia’s with internal stability did facilitate such maritime-centric doctrine has community of strategic thinkers stepping away from Indonesia’s been a long time coming given the and policymakers was neither confrontational stance toward country’s archipelagic character, surprising nor misplaced.While its immediate neighbours in specialist observers recognize it a series of local rebellions and the 1960s and helped forge the as a departure from Indonesia’s political crises in the late 1940s ASEAN-led regional order over traditional strategic focus on to the 1960s laid the foundation the ensuing three decades. At the internal security and national for such concerns, Suharto’s same time Suharto’s authoritarian development. Is Indonesia finally authoritarian New Order expanded rule both suppressed and fostered breaking out of its strategic shell? and deepened Indonesia’s internal wide ranging discontent across security woes by placing regime different domestic socio-political maintenance at the forefront of groups. Consequently, the abrupt Enemies from within the military’s duties. Indeed, as democratic transition of May 1998 Since its independence in 1945, epitomized by the armed forces’ burst an entrenched security Indonesia has faced an essentially ‘dual function’ doctrine that defined bubble and almost tore the country unbroken series of internal the organization as a socio-political apart as separatist and religious- security threats—ranging from and security-defense force, the ethnic conflicts spread in early terrorism, ethno-religious conflicts, national security establishment 2000s. The author’s ongoing to full-scale insurgencies. As was focused on maintaining collaborative research provides such, an abiding concern for ‘national resilience’ before quantitative confirmation of the everything else. strong preoccupation of Indonesia’s

35 unrest. This removed many, though political autonomy diminished, its Over the 64 years not all, of the internal security organizational and professional “ rationales that sustained the autonomy has grown. For between 1945 and 2009, military’s role during the Suharto instance, the formulation and era. adoption of the Minimum Indonesia experienced 215 Essential Force (MEF) blueprint Second, the police were separated in 2007, primarily a shopping insurgency and terrorist from the armed forces in 1999 list of armaments and equipment and tasked with internal security estimated to cost around 15 attacks that accounted for functions. This separation, along billion dollars over 20 years, was with the scrapping of the dual done relatively free from civilian the bulk (more than 60 function doctrine that enabled intervention and was fully backed the military’s political and by Yudhoyono and the parliament. percent) of the operational economic roles, formally removed Such plans would have been deployments undertaken the internal security role that difficult to justify in the absence had dominated the organization of a widespread appreciation by the country’s armed for decades. Consequently, the that the armed forces were military has abolished almost all taking on a new role at a time of forces. of its billets and offices originally transformational change in the ” designed for internal security and strategic environment. socio-political functions. By one military establishment with account, the military issued 29 Finally, the democratization internal threats. Over the 64 years organizational reform policies to process allowed Indonesia to between 1945 and 2009, Indonesia this effect between 1998 and 2006. begin making the projection of experienced 215 insurgency and democratic values a component terrorist attacks that accounted for Third, as the process of military of its foreign policy strategy. This the bulk (more than 60 percent) reform was essentially designed was done through pre-existing of the operational deployments to ‘de-politicize’ the organization venues, primarily ASEAN, as undertaken by the country’s armed while ‘re-militarizing’ its function well as newly created ones such forces. Given this strategic history, as a tool for national defense, as the Bali Democracy Forum. it is not an exaggeration to argue defense planners began to The Indonesian-proposed ASEAN that internal security and domestic examine the changing regional Political Security Community stability has always been a staple environment more seriously. As project and the ASEAN Charter feature of Indonesia’s national various documents published by that focuses on creating a more security thinking. the Ministry of Defense since 2004 politically inclusive regional order, show, Indonesia’s strategic thought for instance, are indicative of How democracy changed is acknowledging the complexities an outlook in Jakarta no longer surrounding the nexus of non- driven by purely internal security strategic thinking traditional security threats, such concerns. Taken as a whole, as disaster relief, and traditional democracy has allowed Indonesia’s The abrupt transition away challenges, including maritime national security establishment to from authoritarian military rule, border disputes and the changing view the challenges of assessing even though it almost tore the regional balance of power resulting and engaging its changing country apart, also saw a process primarily from China’s rise. regional environment through new of democratic consolidation that lenses. began to transform Indonesia’s Fourth, growing confidence in strategic thinking in several political stability led, in turn, ways. First, various democratic to more stable and amicable Responding to the changing institutions have provided different civil-military relations. For the environment: A middle power socio-political dispute resolution past decade, the Yudhoyono moment? and management mechanisms. administration has given the Regional autonomy that devolved military more leeway to focus on As Indonesia’s strategic perspective political and financial power to its technological modernization transitioned from internal to the regions, for instance, has been programs and organizational external, the broader Indo- credited with helping to manage infrastructure development. Pacific region was undergoing a separatist concerns and social Put differently, as the military’s process of transition of its own.

36 For almost two decades now, Indonesia can exert regional defense industrial development. multiple and conflicting currents leadership. ASEAN, therefore, will In total, between 1999 and 2014, of economic interdependence, remain a cornerstone of Indonesia’s Jakarta signed 86 bilateral defense political nationalism, and the foreign policy. In addition, the and security agreements and revival of historical animosities complexities stemming from the partnerships with 31 countries. All and maritime disputes are intersection of traditional and of this confirms that Indonesia’s challenging the US-forged post- non-traditional security challenges, strategic thinking has moved war regional order. All of these as well as the revival of great away from mainly internal developments have been taking power politics sparked by China’s security concerns to a wider, place under the shadow of an rise, has attracted Jakarta to deeper concern with the changing intensifying competition among defense diplomacy as a new arena regional environment. Although the great powers. The first order in which regional and extra- Jakarta’s focus has shifted, it is of competition centers on China regional powers can strive to still developing the abilities and and the United States. But the coordinate and collaborate better. skills needed to cope with the second and third order rivalries ASEAN and ARF annually held an fluid complexities of the regional involving Japan, Australia, India, average of 15 formal and informal security environment. As with South Korea, and Russia—and how meetings between 2000 and 2009 many states, policy responses have these are tied to the first order— involving defense and security at times been less than coherent. are adding layers of complexity officials at various levels to discuss to the region’s boiling cauldron of a wide range of security issues. Implications and steps ahead uncertainty. The advent of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in The preceding analysis suggests These developments certainly 2006 and the ADMM+8 in 2010 that Indonesia’s strategic thinking engage the minds of Indonesia’s involving the 10 ASEAN states is slowly, but surely, breaking defense planners and strategic along with Australia, China, India, out of its internal security thinkers—as the numerous Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, shell. The process of democratic documents published by the Russia, and the United States is consolidation in particular has Ministry of Defense attest. further testimony to this growing fundamentally altered the way Furthermore, as a ‘middle power’, trend. the country’s national security Indonesia likes to believe it can establishment examines its play a pivotal role in managing Bilaterally, Indonesia conducted strategic environment, both the changing regional order. This 88 defence-diplomatic activities domestically and regionally. While involves very difficult judgments, between 2003 and 2008 alone— the problem of trans-national however, and there is a sense designed mainly for confidence terrorism, disaster relief and of hedging and ambivalence building measures, defense management, and small pockets of in Jakarta’s overall strategic capability enhancement and separatist conflicts in Papua, will response. This is why, in addition continue to occupy security officials to the MEF-driven defense in the short run, it is hard to deny modernization, Jakarta has The process of democratic the increasing focus of defense stepped up its focus on building “ planners and policymakers on bilateral strategic partnerships consolidation in particular Indonesia’s external environment. with key powers, including the Jokowi’s global maritime axis United States, India, China, and has fundamentally doctrine therefore should be seen Russia, even as it continues to give as the next step in the evolution of priority to ensuring that ASEAN altered the way the Indonesia’s strategic thinking that remains in the driver seat in began with Suharto’s downfall in regional architecture building. country’s national security 1998.

As Indonesia’s global profile establishment examines As the focus shifts to the country’s has grown, some observers have changing regional environment, urged Jakarta to move ‘beyond its strategic environment, the global maritime axis doctrine ASEAN’ and engage its regional both domestically and is perhaps Indonesia’s most clearly counterparts directly. Jakarta, articulated grand strategy, a however, clearly continues to regionally. strategy with robust geopolitical regard ASEAN as a valuable ” and geostrategic underpinnings. strategic platform through which

37 Whether the administration can ‘growing pains’ as military officers accomplish the key goals that and security officials come to terms stem from this doctrine—such as with the complexities of regional being a more proactive mediator in diplomacy. the South China Sea—remains to be seen. That being said, Jokowi Regardless, we should expect the and his team will continue to build new administration to continue on the Yudhoyono administration’s working on both ‘internal military and diplomatic legacies. balancing’ mechanisms (primarily ASEAN and regional institutions defense modernization based on will remain a central component improved strategic assessments) in Indonesia’s aspiration to build and ‘external balancing’ ones a more inclusive and balanced (primarily regional institution regional architecture. At the same building and defense diplomacy) as time however, the military’s MEF- a way to respond to the changing driven capability development will regional environment. In this continue alongside the deepening sense, the test for Indonesia’s and widening of Indonesia’s ‘middle power’ moment is tied to bilateral strategic partnerships. its ability to balance these different mechanisms in a coherent and Meanwhile, defense diplomacy is productive manner. still a relatively new institution— especially since ASEAN long Evan A. Laksmana, remained reluctant to give PhD candidate, Maxwell School the grouping an overt security of Citizenship and Public Affairs, dimension. Defence diplomacy Syracuse University. will have to be institutionalized before it can be expected to have any significant strategic impact, and this will take time. There will also be some adjustment time and

US President Barack Obama confers with National Security Adviser Susan Rice (red top), 9th East Asia Summit, Naypyitaw, Myanmar, 13 November 2014. Photo credit: Olivia Cable.

38 Indonesia’s security focus: from inside to out

Donald Greenlees

In the decade just ended something significant happened to the way Indonesia perceives its security. Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who has been greatly maligned for policy lethargy, managed to achieve something that eluded all his predecessors: an end to a historic obsession with internal order. This is not to say that Indonesia does not now or in future face worrying internal security challenges. But it has started to move beyond what former authoritarian president Suharto once described as Indonesia’s ‘inward looking’ concept of security.

From the time Indonesia Indonesian President, Joko Widodo listens to China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang at the 25th declared independence in 1945, ASEAN Summit, Naypyitaw, Myanmar, 13 November 2014. Photo credit: Olivia Cable. ideological fractures and regional disintegration within Indonesia’s Nasional Indonesia, TNI) can in its military and diplomatic borders were seen as the biggest become what might be considered a capability to actively contribute to security threat to the state. ‘normal’ force, focused on providing regional and global security and a Yet with the consolidation of defence against external threats. decline in criticisms over human democratisation, decentralisation Freedom from the constraint of a rights, which have constrained and sustained economic growth, domestic-first security approach relations with the USA and other Indonesia has started to put has enabled Indonesia’s strategic Western countries. While some the bogeys of separatism and planners to focus on external relate to thinking and processes ideological revolution to rest. challenges, including illegal within government, others are While there is some unfinished fishing, uncertainty generated manifest in strategic planning, business on the domestic security from regional power shifts and equipment acquisitions and agenda—notably the conflict over China’s extensive territorial claims operational priorities within TNI the status and rights of Papuans in the South China Sea. itself. If the trend is sustained and the risk of terrorism—neither under the presidency of Joko of these constitute serious armed A number of signs point to Widodo, the benefits to Indonesia threat to the authority of the Indonesia making a transition and implications for its neighbours state. Yudhoyono left office on 20 away from a focus on internal will be immense. October 2014, leaving Jakarta security to confront external more sanguine about the durability security concerns at the strategic Inside Indonesia of the nation building project and operational levels. They than any time it its history. The include greater international Still, there are several consequence for security is that the status for Indonesia as a stable qualifications to the scenario in Indonesian armed forces (Tentara democratic country, an increase which domestic security is left

39 largely to civilian law enforcement resilience’ through reforms to and strategic planners and soldiers ensure the benefits of economic [Indonesia] … has can focus on the international growth are widely shared and state “ environment. Indonesia continues institutions are fit for purpose. started to move beyond to face an active albeit low intensity insurgency in its two The large domestic agenda what former authoritarian Papuan provinces and the risk frequently discourages Indonesians of Islamist terrorism, which from admitting the progress president Suharto once remains relatively high despite already made in securing the the absence of a major attack in country and accepting they described as Indonesia’s five years. It also has a problem are ready to take on a bigger with periodic outbreaks of international role. During the “inward looking” concept of religious and communal violence. presidential election, both Widodo security. Senior officials and TNI officers and his rival retired general ” in Yudhoyono’s administration Prabowo Subianto suggested believed the police alone lacked Indonesians would be taken more over crimes committed during the capacity to deal adequately seriously in international affairs if Indonesia’s departure, the 1999 with these sources of conflict. they built domestic strength first, referendum on East Timor’s status Organised violence conflates with a repeating a comment by Suharto initiated by President BJ Habibie significant human security agenda in 1967. As scholar RE Elson aptly relieved his successors from a in a country marked by disparities put it, Indonesia’s limited success source of internal and external of wealth and vulnerable to and profile in the international destabilisation. Indonesia then environmental shocks. arena was historically a function of seized on the changed social and the ‘direct and total subordination political condition in Aceh after Talk of Indonesia as a new of international relations and the December 2004 tsunami to economic powerhouse, with a international diplomacy to the reach a resolution to the three- rising middle class, masks the always pressing, and often chaotic, decade insurgency waged by the fragility of progress. The World demands of domestic politics.’2 Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Bank estimates 40 per cent of Aceh Merdeka, GAM). The peace Indonesians live on less than 1.5 But the scale of the domestic agreement with GAM was one times the poverty line of US$16.70 challenge that still lies of the great accomplishments of per month.1 There are also ahead should not obscure the Yudhoyono’s presidency, although unresolved cases of state abuses achievement of the current future administrations would of civilians by security forces democratic era. Since the fall be wrong to take the peace for dating back to Suharto’s New of Suharto in the late 1990s, granted. Order, which should be subject Indonesia has witnessed the end of to discovery, reconciliation and its two biggest security dilemmas— Widodo’s challenges justice to address a widespread insurgencies and independence impression that military and movements in East Timor and Widodo needs to match in Papua police personnel are above the law. Aceh. Security sector reform in and West Papua the determination This presents the current Widodo civilian agencies contributed to Yudhoyono administration’s administration with a complex and Indonesia’s successes in combating demonstrated in his first term in multilayered domestic security terrorism and quelling fierce Aceh. Widodo is perhaps fortunate environment. This includes sectarian and ethnic conflicts in in having Jusuf Kalla as vice pushing ahead with liberalisation the eastern archipelago. president, since Kalla was credited in the Papuan provinces to respond with being the driving force in to grievances over injustice in both Although the resolution of East government behind the 2005 Aceh political and economic affairs; Timor’s status was a bitter peace agreement. Given the vast dealing with the new threat posed experience—especially for the agenda Widodo faces as president, by Islamic State sympathisers East Timorese—it did remove a he would be wise to appoint Kalla and returning jihadists from Iraq major impediment to Indonesia as the man to address Indonesia’s and Syria; giving substance to the forging closer security relations Papuan problem. often hollow rhetoric of religious with Western countries and tolerance of the Yudhoyono adopting a higher international Regardless, finding a solution administration; and building what profile. Despite the outstanding to the aspirations of the Papuan Indonesian’s like to call ‘national United Nations indictments people will require courage and

40 imagination. The UN calculates policing solutions are sufficient to our analysis. It might not be an that 36.4 per cent of Papuans manage security, with the military immediate security threat but living below the poverty line— only backing up in emergencies. there are always indicators that three times the national average. Moreover, a significant proportion make us wonder about China’s Yet while Papuan grievances are as of the Papuan elite has a vested intentions in the future.’ The much political as economic, trying interest in remaining with rise of China makes a focus on to fix economic inequality—a Indonesia. the external security agenda strategy of ‘buying the Papuans a high priority for the Widodo off’—will be insufficient. The Indonesia: looking outward administration. In 2012, China ‘autonomy plus’ proposals drawn demonstrated its ability to drive a up by the Papuan and West The solution starts with Jakarta wedge into ASEAN over disputed Papuan administrations for a new recognising that Papuan boundaries in the South China law on regional governance are aspirations represent a political Sea. That year the annual ASEAN a good starting point. Since both problem not a security one. The Ministerial Meeting, chaired by drafts reflect the desire of Papuans historic fears of separatism can Cambodia, failed to issue a joint to be granted certain political pose the risk of eliciting state communiqué for the first time liberties—including limited foreign responses that are self-fulfilling. in forty-five years because of affairs power, to obtain special Nowadays Indonesians might disagreements over whether to economic and land rights and to disagree about the content of the include concerns over territorial engage Jakarta in a process of state, but there are few voices disputes with China. Chinese disclosure over present and past challenging the state itself. From pressure on Cambodia was blamed wrongs—some of this might be a security standpoint, this means for the failure. too much for nationalists to bear, that Indonesia has been able to among them the Minister for begin to rebalance its security While Indonesia is not a claimant Defence, Ryamizard Ryacudu, and priorities and, in foreign policy in state in the South China Sea, perhaps too for the Constitutional general, ‘take a more purposeful ambiguities over China’s territorial Court. and outward looking view of its claims marked by its nine-dash place in the world’.3 Government line—which encroaches on Hardliners in Indonesia’s officials and military officers Indonesia’s Natuna Islands—have administration, parliament might reflexively emphasise the increased anxiety in Jakarta. In an and TNI could resist significant internal dimensions of security. article in the Wall Street Journal concessions to Papuans because But ask them to list the actual in April 2014, TNI Commander of the potential to set a precedent challenges Indonesia faces, the talk Moeldoko stated Indonesia was for other provinces. It would be a is of imminent external threats— ‘dismayed’ to discover the cover mistake for Widodo for cave in. A smuggling, illegal fishing and page of new Chinese passports comprehensive settlement with transnational crime. placed parts of the Natuna Islands Papuans would free Indonesia inside the nine-dash line. Moeldoko from the last major human rights Added to this list are worries warned ‘an assertive China that issue retarding relations with the about the strategic outlook in East rewrites the status quo through West. Nonetheless, it is clear that Asia. As one adviser to Yudhoyono displays of military strength’ would the rebel Free Papua Organisation observed in a confidential unsettle the region.4 The article (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) interview as the president was printed under Moeldoko’s name— has limited and probably declining preparing to leave office: ‘How presumably published with the capability to launch attacks. The China projects itself in the future President’s authority – illustrates region is close to the point where remains a big question mark in greater readiness to take a stand on issues relevant to the regional security environment.

Indonesia has two broad responses The rise of China makes a focus on the external to China’s gambit in the South “ China Sea: first, it is modernizing security agenda a high priority for the Widodo its military and, secondly, it is seeking more diplomatic cohesion Administration. within ASEAN. The military ” dimension entails investment in maritime capabilities, coupled

41 with what Moeldoko promises On one level, military ENDNOTES will be a stronger armed presence modernisation and diplomatic 1 The World Bank, ‘Indonesia Overview’. around the Natuna Islands. The activism can be seen as logical http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ diplomatic dimension is still responses to changes in the indonesia/overview [accessed November evolving. But policymakers in external security environment. 2014] Jakarta are contemplating a But on another level it represents 2 RE Elson, ‘Problems of Identity and move to have ASEAN first settle a deeper change in Indonesia’s Legitimacy for Indonesia’s Place in the maritime border issues among worldview—one that builds on a World’, in Anthony Reid (ed.), Indonesia themselves permitting countries to declining fear of internal conflict. Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, have a clearer negotiating stance 2012, p. 173. with China. 3 Ibid., p.184 Donald Greenlees 4 Moeldoko, ‘Rebuffing Beijing’s Newest The Indonesian approach to the Sea Claims, The Wall Street Journal South China Sea reflects a growing Doctoral candidate, Strategic and Asia, 28 April 2014, p. 11 awareness and self-confidence Defence Studies Centre, Australian when it comes to international National University security. For example, Indonesia is increasing its contribution to UN peacekeeping and soon expects to be able to field 4,500 troops in this role, having established a peacekeeping training centre outside Jakarta—one of Yudhoyono’s pet-projects.

World leaders at the G20 Summit, Brisbane, Australia, 14 November 2014. Photo credit: Government ZA, flickr.

42 America or China? Australia should choose both

Hugh White

Like many of its neighbours, Australia looks at the future of the Asia Pacific region with a mixture of cautious optimism and deepening unease. It is cautiously optimistic about the region’s economic future, and about Australia’s ability to prosper within it. But it is increasingly uneasy about the region’s political and strategic trajectory, as the long era of stability which followed the US opening to China seems to be coming to an end. Long taken for granted and expected to last indefinitely, it now appears that the regional order of the past four decades was in fact the product of a very specific set of circumstances, and those circumstances have President Obama, Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe following a tri-lateral proved to be not at all immutable. summit held in the margins of the G20, Brisbane, November 2014. Credit: Japantimes. On the contrary, strategic circumstances in Asia are being overturned by a radical shift in grown with its power, and it no Asian strategic order, and which the way wealth and power are longer accepts the subordination has remained so stable since distributed between Asia’s major to US primacy to which Mao 1972, is now in flux, and with it powers, a corresponding shift in acquiesced in 1972. Beijing now the security of the entire Asia- the strategic expectations—both seeks a ‘new model of great power Pacific region. Clearly it is no hopes and fears—of those powers, relations’ in which it enjoys at least exaggeration at all to say that the and a consequent transformation equality with America in regional whole future of the Asia-Pacific of the nature of their relationships leadership, and possibly something depends on how this situation with one another. more. develops.

All this constitutes the largest In the past five years, as That is of course as true for revolution in Asian strategic affairs China’s challenge to the status Australia as for every other in a very long time—certainly quo has become more overt, country in the region. Like other since Nixon met Mao in 1972, and America has loudly proclaimed middle and smaller powers, quite possibly since the eclipse of its determination to resist that Australia finds itself facing new China and the emergence of Japan challenge and preserve its and unfamiliar policy challenges as Asian great powers in the 19th leadership as the foundation as it tries to manage and balance Century. China is set to overtake of the Asian order. At the same its relations with the region’s great the US as the world’s largest time, Japan has begun to feel powers as their relations with economy, and it is quickly eroding both more anxious about China’s one another become increasingly America’s capacity to project armed ambitions and less sure about competitive and even adversarial. force by sea in the East Asian America’s support. The US-China- And in some respects Australia’s littoral. China’s ambitions have Japan triangle which defines the policy dilemmas are perhaps

43 even more acute than others’. after 2001 Washington was heavily avoiding recession in the Global At one level this is because both preoccupied in the Middle East. Financial Crisis. For Australia any the US and China are so critical The War on Terror gave Howard hiccup in the economic relationship to Australia; America as its the chance to establish himself with China had become major ally and China as its most as a staunch US ally while at the simply unthinkable. But the important trading partner. More same time studiously avoiding understanding that John Howard fundamentally, it is because any sense of alignment with the had reached with Jiang Zemin had what is at stake in Asia today is US against China. His confident now become incompatible with the future of external ‘western’ assertion that ‘Australia does not America’s expectation of Australia strategic preponderance in the have to choose between America as a close US ally, because America region, on which Australia as and China’ became something of was now quite unambiguously a western outpost in the Asian a policy mantra, but in his time it identifying China as a strategic hemisphere has so long depended was true. rival in Asia, and was pledged to not just for its sense of security but resist China’s ambitions as its for its sense of identity. Howard’s successors have not highest global strategic priority. It been so fortunate. In the years was no longer credible for Australia Moreover like others, Australians after he left office in 2007, China’s to claim that nothing it did as a are finding that the policy precepts challenge to the US-led order in US ally would be directed against and habits of mind that served Asia became increasingly overt, China, because opposing China them so well during the long and so did America’s response. had now become the primary US decades of uncontested US primacy The changing tone of US-China strategic aim in Asia, and support are not much help in navigating relations, and the implications for for that aim had become America’s the new and more dangerous Australia, became unmistakably main expectation of its regional strategic currents of the Asian clear in November 2011 when allies, including Australia. Century. The first Australian President Barack Obama used leader to face these new challenges an address to the Australian The Australian Labor government was John Howard (1996 to 2007), Parliament in Canberra to set out at that time, led by Julia Gillard, who led the conservative parties his Pivot to Asia. The message of responded in public to this very into Government in early 1996. that speech was unmistakable: difficult policy dilemma by simply In his first few months in office America was determined to resist denying it existed. They continued Howard discovered that Australia’s China’s challenge, and would use to repeat John Howard’s ‘We economic opportunities in China all the elements of American power don’t have to choose’ mantra, and would be constrained if its strategic to preserve US leadership as the asserted that Obama’s ‘Pivot’ alignment with the US cut across foundation of the Asian regional had nothing to do with China. core Chinese interests. He was order. Australia’s support for this In private, however, they were determined to ensure this did not robust policy was unambiguously more circumspect. As the Foreign happen, striking an understanding signalled by the simultaneous Minister Bob Carr has revealed with President Jiang Zemin that announcement that a permanent in his published dairies, Canberra while Australia would remain a US Marine presence would be sought in 2012 to downplay the close US ally, nothing Australia established in Darwin. expanded US military presence in did as a US ally would be directed Asia and tried gently to distance against China. This was an By this time China had become themselves from the Pivot. Gillard understanding that Howard Australia’s largest trading partner. was duly rewarded by a very warm found easy to keep over his eleven Its central place in Australia’s visit to Beijing in April 2013, but at years in power. Over those years economic outlook was emphasised the cost of some quiet but distinct Washington did not see Beijing as by the widely-acknowledged fact disappointment in Washington. a rival. China was not yet overtly that export demand from China challenging the US in Asia, and had been central to Australia When Tony Abbott became Prime Minister as leader of the conservative parties in 2013 he In the past five years, as China’s challenge to the status proclaimed his determination to “ manage Australia’s relations with quo has become more overt, America has loudly proclaimed its the US and China the way his determination to resist that challenge and preserve its leadership mentor John Howard had done. But this has proved difficult for as the foundation of the Asian order.” two reasons. First, the US-China 44 relationship today is very different Australia finds itself facing new and unfamiliar policy from the way it was in Howard’s “ day. As a result, like Gillard, challenges as it tries to manage and balance its relations with Abbott finds it much more difficult than Howard ever did to avoid the region’s great powers as their relations with one another making choices which please one become increasingly competitive and even adversarial. side and displease the other. The ” harsh fact for Australian statecraft a close strategic alignment with to build a new model of relations is that both Washington and Japan is really in Australia’s best in Asia will only grow as its Beijing now see their relationship interest over the coming years relative economic and military with Canberra primarily through and decades, but in the present weight in Asia grows. In that the lens of their rivalry with one context what is most striking is case Abbott’s policy will only another, so that their principal Abbott’s willingness to follow what encourage escalating strategic concern about Australia’s position seems to be a primarily ideological rivalry between America, Japan on many issues is what it implies preference for democratic Japan and China, and drive Australia for its alignment with one side over non-democratic China closer to the point where it really or the other of their increasingly regardless of the risk to relations does have to make a once an for all zero-sum contest. This has become with Beijing. choice between its biggest trading so even on such economically- partner and its strongest ally. focused issues as the Asian To be fair, so far Abbott has not Infrastructure Investment Bank. yet paid any major diplomatic or There is an alternative. Escalating In this environment it becomes economic price for his provocative rivalry and eventual conflict increasingly meaningless to keep policy towards Beijing. It will between the US and China is not saying ‘we do not have to choose’. be interesting to see how long inevitable, and there are other this lasts. But more broadly, the ways of avoiding it than forcing Second, Abbott has emerged as a question for Australia, as for so China to back down and accept the less pragmatic, more ideological many other countries in Asia, is status quo, or by US withdrawal foreign-policy practitioner than how well its long-term interest from Asia leaving China to take Howard was. As a result, as the are served by a policy of strong its place as regional hegemon. choices between America and support for America and Japan The obvious alterative is for the China have become tougher, as they resist any significant US and China to seek some kind Abbott has become increasingly accommodation with China and of new accommodation which willing to align Australia with aim instead to preserve the US-led accords China a bigger leadership America and its allies, and status quo in Asia indefinitely into role in Asian regional order, but correspondingly more willing the future. There is no doubt that still preserves a strong, though to align unambiguously against US primacy would remain the best necessarily reduced, US role as China. In the fifteen months outcome for Australia as long as well. In other words, the US and since Abbott won office, this has it could continue to be—as it has China could negotiate a new been most clear in his approach been since 1972—uncontested by relationship in which they agree to Japan. At a time when Japan’s any major power. Abbott’s policy to share power in Asia. Naturally relations with China—and South appears to presuppose that this creating and maintaining such an Korea—have become unusually is possible. He presumably hopes order would entail much risk and tense, and Prime Minister Abe has and expects that when confronted complexity. But for Australia, as proved himself radically revisionist with a strong US-led coalition, well as for the US, China and the both about Japan’s military like-minded countries including rest of Asia, it offers the best and history and its strategic future, Australia, Japan, India and a perhaps only alternative to a much Abbott has taken remarkable steps number of Southeast Asia, China more dangerous and uncertain to deepen Australia’s strategic will simply abandon its ambitions future. alignment with Japan. At one point for a new regional order and go he referred to Japan as a ‘strong back to accepting US primacy. ally’ directly comparable with If so his policy will prove sound. Hugh White Australia’s alliance the US, and But it is hard to be confident that Professor of Strategic Studies, there can be little doubt that he what Abbott hopes and expects Strategic and Defence Studies does indeed see the relationship in will actually happen. It is more Centre, Australian National those terms—as does Abe. There likely that China’s determination University. are many reason to doubt whether

45 Thailand: The Coup and its consequences

Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Thailand has lurched from one crisis to the next over the past decade. Its latest military coup on 22 May 2014—the second in eight years and thirteenth since constitutional rule was introduced in 1932—has dramatically rolled back Thailand’s democratic transition. At one point in the late 1990s, after a Bangkok-based popular overthrow of a disguised military dictatorship in 1992 and consequent broad-based political reforms that culminated with the 1997 constitution, it appeared Thai democratic transition from decades of military-authoritarianism was being consolidated. This is no longer the case. Military- Red Shirts at a rally in Bangkok, 3 April 2014. Photo credit New Mandala, Australian authoritarian rule is back, and it National University. may insist on staying around for longer than one might anticipate. be seen as a crisis being peddled the latter an incumbency putsch to This article probes into the roots by Thaksin’s opponents who are put himself in office—and ushered of Thailand’s long crisis, the unelected and unable to abide by in absolute rule by dictatorship. twin coups in 2006 and 2014, the rules of electoral democracy. Sarit resurrected the monarchy and domestic prospects in the and its role in Thai political life. foreseeable term. To grasp the nature of the Thai Over time, the monarchy and crisis, it is necessary to appreciate military developed a symbiotic The roots of Thailand’s long crisis Thailand’s political order over the relationship. Subsequently, the past century. The country was an monarch surpassed the military Thailand’s long crisis can be absolute monarchy until 1932, and became the apex of Thai portrayed in several different when constitutional rule came society through the monarch’s ways. On one level, it is a crisis into play. From 1932 to roughly substantial hard work with the of a fledgling democracy that has 1958—through the 1930s and masses during the Cold War. As the proceeded in fits and starts from Second World War—the role of the monarch became paramount and 1932 on a topsy-turvy trajectory. monarchy in politics was at its revered in Thai society increasingly On another, it is a crisis of a lowest point. Parliament, political from the 1960s, the monarchy, traditional political order that is parties and politicians were most military and bureaucracy became out of step with the new popular prominent, alongside the budding the core pillars of Thai politics. demands and expectations of the role of the military. After a see- early 21st century. Yet it may also saw rivalry between civilian and The mutually reinforcing trinity be seen as a crisis that revolves military leaders who overthrew among the monarchy, the military around the self-exiled Thaksin absolute monarchy, marked by and the bureaucracy became a kind Shinawatra, the deposed and factionalism and political volatility, of a Cold War fighting machine for divisive leader whose political the army, led by strongman Field Thailand from the 1960s through party has won all of the elections Marshal Sarit Thanarat staged a the 1980s. It became phenomenally since 2001. Conversely, this can coup in 1957 and again in 1958— successful on two fronts. First,

46 it kept communism at bay at a Thailand today. It is as if Thaksin The NCPO forms a nexus, the time when Thailand’s immediate opened Thailand’s ‘can of worms’, heart and inner sanctum of a neighbourhood became communist so to speak, letting the genie out clutch of related bodies. Led by dominoes that fell in succession, of the bottle. The country has been General Prayut Chan-ocha, the including Laos, Cambodia, and transformed from a kingdom of generals in charge even conceded Vietnam. But Thailand defied the traditionally loyal subjects to a that the NCPO functions like a communist domino theory. Second, democracy of increasingly informed “politburo” during the coup period. during this formative Cold War and politically conscious citizens. Thus the NCPO, via Prayut, has period, Thai economic growth was The overlap between subjects and established an interim constitution impressive, registering six per cent citizens is Thailand’s way ahead that effectively provided absolute expansion per year. The monarchy, as the country needs the right power to the NCPO chief. The military and bureaucracy thus kept mix of monarchy and democracy. NCPO handpicked and set up communism away while enabling It is still in a painful search a military-dominated National Thai economic development. for this recalibrated mix that Legislative Assembly (NLA), which requires compromise and mutual in turn selected Prayut as prime This traditional political order then accommodation. Such is Thailand’s minister. He then formed a cabinet, became a victim of its own success, endgame in the late twilight of a heavily drawn from the military. as economic development gave glorious reign when democratic rule In addition, a 250-member rise to new voices and growing appears the only game in town. National Reform Council (NRC) democratisation. The development has been appointed alongside and modernisation from the 1960s Restoration: the twin coups of the 36-member Constitution to 1990s culminated with Thaksin’s Drafting Committee (CDC), which rise and rule by 2001. Thaksin 2006 and 2014 was picked by the NRC, NCPO, was the embodiment of the new Thailand vicious coup cycle is well NLA and cabinet. Such is the elites who benefited from sustained known. A coup sets in motion a concentration of power that is economic development. He was new constitution, elections, and an mutually reinforcing, all reporting a major beneficiary of Thailand’s elected government that inevitably to NCPO with Prayut at the top. economic boom in the decade from becomes corrupt, paving the way Even after he retired from the 1986, and was able to capitalise for another coup and so on. This army on 30 September 2014, on Thailand’s open economy is how the coup-prone system Prayut remains prime minister and global financial integration. perpetuates itself. Thailand is still and NCPO leader. Thaksin’s conglomerate, Shin in the midst of this cycle. The 2006 This astonishing concentration of Corp, skyrocketed after listing on and 2014 putsches are one and the power may be seen more broadly the stock exchange in the early same. The 2006 putsch was seen as a reaction and regression in 1990s. As a former police officer as ‘half-baked’, not having gone the face of 21st century challenges and a graduate of the military far enough to prevent the Thaksin and dynamics associated with preparatory school, he became a regime from reincarnating after electoral democracy that have billionaire telecoms tycoon and elections to engage in the same sort been evident since Thaksin’s rise. a consummate politician with of abuse and graft that deposed it The generals are thus reacting extensive networks in the police, in the first place. Thus the 22 May against what they see as the military, bureaucracy, business and coup in 2014 can be seen as ‘all-in’. politics. The junta—the National Council The chasm between As democratisation made for Peace and Order—stated from “ inexorable headway from the end of the outset that their intention was electoral democracy as a the Cold War, the monarchy-centred to clean up Thai politics and get rid new and undeniable source political order and hierarchy was of corruption. The NCPO has not still intact. The chasm between delegated authority to caretaker of legitimacy and power electoral democracy as a new and technocrats as in past coups. undeniable source of legitimacy This time, the ruling generals caused tensions with the and power caused tensions with are running Thailand more or traditional order that relied the traditional order that relied less directly, with a military- on moral authority, integrity and authoritarian concentration of on moral authority, integrity unelected sources of legitimacy. power that has not been seen since and unelected sources of These tensions have manifested Sarit’s time. in different ways and still beset legitimacy.” 47 abuse and usurpation of the Notwithstanding two leave without adequate safeguards. Thaksin years, from his direct “ Third, they may have vested electoral rule during from 2001 coups in eight years, there interests of their own by that time. to 2006, to proxy leaders and In addition, there is the succession governments that ended which led is no exit from elections and question that hovers over Thailand. to the appointment of his sister democracy in Thailand. The generals may feel that they Yingluck Shinawatra from 2011 ” have to be in power—or at least to 2014. To the Thai military, prevent the Thaksin side from being the Thaksin regime is the most empowers the lower rungs of the in power—while the succession daunting problem, and elected Thai electorate allowing them to takes place. The military sees itself politicians have been the bane of voice aspirations and grievances as the guardian and steward of the Thai democracy. So goes the pro- like never before. Yet there lies Thai kingdom and it may want to coup argument, which explains the a two-pronged problem. First, play the role of midwife during the generals’ view of having to clean Thailand’s electoral winners have succession period. up Thai politics and having to not been allowed to rule. Second, turn back the clock in the process. But the longer the military stays those who ultimately rule cannot Whether the generals get away in power, the more risks Thailand win elections. Since Thailand’s with such efforts is a different will accrue. The generals are main opposition Democrat Party matter. Thailand in 2014 and 2015 likely to make growing mistakes has been morally bankrupt and may be too complex to turn back and missteps. They and/or their utterly unable to win a national but the generals will try at least associates may engage in graft election for more than two to make fundamental adjustments and cronyism. They may overreact decades, the Thaksin camp has by rewriting the rules and tackling to resistance and opposition been the main beneficiary. His corruption without adding their from political activists. After sort of democratic rule can be own graft. The generals are likely all, Thailand is a society that manipulated and monopolised. At to feel in 2015 and 2016 that their has grown up opposing military the same time, the moral authority job is unfinished—since elections rule over the past four decades. that has emanated from unelected are promised by late 2015 or early The NCPO may try to form a sources, such as the military and 2016, they may face retribution, political party or co-opt some the judiciary, appears untenable. and that their vested interests politicians to maintain post- need to be looked after. As a result, This means the military junta election power. Policy reforms may the likelihood that the generals in under General Prayut will be become arbitrary and haphazard. government and in the army will tempted to develop new rules that Opposition to military rule is stay longer than intended and that will somehow keep the Thaksin side likely to grow in the interim. their initially genuine intentions at bay at a minimum—perhaps by These dynamics point to growing may go awry are likely to increase making room in the constitution for tension. Another major round of in the coming months. military rule to be institutionalised confrontation the military and within an electoral framework. It is its opponents of many stripes— An existential search for a new a contentious arrangement that has between pro-coup and anti-coup been dubbed ‘Thai-style’ democracy forces—may well emerge in the moving balance but the electorate will likely coming months. From mid-2015, Notwithstanding two coups oppose it if the rules are distorted the NCPO and Prayut will be in eight years, there is no exit and manipulated too blatantly. A under pressure to stick to the from elections and democracy in recalibrated political order is thus election timetable but will also be Thailand. International norms imperative to return Thailand to tempted to delay the polls unless have changed, reinforced by a a more genuine democratic path the junta can control post-election revolution of transformative without manipulation from the likes outcomes, perhaps in cahoots with information technologies. Thai of Thaksin but also a democratic their preferred politicians. Either people are more politically rule that cannot be derailed at will way, Thailand appears set for a conscious and awakened than ever. by Thaksin’s opponents. It is likely rough ride. The international community, that Prayut and other top brass unlike during the Cold War, no in the NCPO will want to stay Thitinan Pongsudhirak longer condones coups because longer than planned for at least Director, Institute of Security there is no more communist three reasons. First, they may feel and International Studies, expansionism to fight. As the job is unfinished. Second, they Chulalongkorn University globalisation marches forward, it may be afraid of retribution if they

48 COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION CSCAP MEMBER COMMITTEES

IN THE ASIA PACIFIC CSCAP membership includes almost all of the major Established in 1993, the Council for Security countries of the Asia Pacific and also includes the Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is European Union: the premier Track Two organization in the Australia Asia Pacific region and a counterpart to the Brunei Track One, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Cambodia Canada It provides an informal mechanism for China scholars, officials and others in their private European Union capacities to discuss political and security India issues and challenges facing the region. It Indonesia provides policy recommendations to various Japan intergovernmental bodies, convenes regional Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and international meetings and establishes Republic of Korea linkages with institutions and organisations Malaysia in other parts of the world to exchange Mongolia information, insights and experiences New Zealand in the area of regional political-security The Philippines cooperation. Russia Singapore Thailand United States of America Vietnam

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Associate Member)

CSCAP STUDY GROUPS CSCAP PUBLICATIONS

Study Groups are CSCAP’s primary CRSO Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) mechanism to generate analysis and policy The CRSO is an annual publication to highlight regional recommendations for consideration by security issues and to promote and inform policy- governments. These groups serve as fora for relevant outputs as to how Track One (official) and consensus building and problem solving and Track Two (non official) actors can, jointly or separately, to address sensitive issues and problems advance regional multilateral solutions to these issues. ahead of their consideration in official CSCAP Memoranda processes. Study groups under consideration: CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of • Non-proliferation and disarmament Study Groups approved by the Steering Committee and submitted for consideration at the Track One level. • Energy security • Preventive diplomacy CSCAP General Conference Reports • Air and sea search and rescue Since 1997, the biennial CSCAP General Conference, is designed to be an international forum where high Recently concluded study groups: ranking officials and security experts from the Asia Pacific region meet every two years to discuss security • Regional Security Architecture issues of relevance and to seek new ideas in response • Countering the Proliferation of Weapons to evolving developments in Asia Pacific security. of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific The forum is usually attended by approximately 250 • Principle of Good Order at Sea participants; making it one of the largest gatherings of its kind. • Preventive Diplomacy Through its publications, CSCAP’s recommendations have been well received by the ARF.