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Managing the Rise of Southeast Asia's Coast Guards Managing the Rise of Southeast Asia’s Coast Guards February 2019 Prashanth Parameswaran INTRODUCTION Over the past few years, Southeast Asian states have begun either significantly increasing their investments in coast guards and other maritime law enforcement agencies (MLEAs) or have considered standing up new agencies.1 As this has occurred, there has been a rising conversation about the significance not only for these countries themselves, but for wider regional stability and for external partners such as the United States. While recognizing the growing attention that Southeast Asian states are paying to coast guards and MLEAs more generally is a useful starting point, this is only a first step. In order to fully contend with the implications of Southeast Asia’s coast guards and to integrate them into wider regional maritime security, policymakers in the Asia-Pacific must be mindful of both the opportunities and challenges inherent in this trend as well as follow through on a series of initiatives at the national, bilateral, regional, and global levels in the coming years. Photo: Igor Grochev/Shutterstock.com The Rise of Southeast Asia’s Coast Guards UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF in turn increased the pressure on countries SOUTHEAST ASIA’S COAST GUARDS – particularly littoral states such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore – to invest more The idea of maritime law enforcement in authorities who can manage this activity entities in general and coast guard-like and its potential consequences, be it bodies in particular is not entirely new in ensuring the navigational or safeguarding Southeast Asia. Given that the region is against maritime pollution. home to important waterways such as A second and related driver is the the South China Sea and the Malacca proliferation of maritime security challenges. Straits, Southeast Asian states have long As more state and non-state actors develop been attuned to the opportunities and the willingness and capability to utilize the challenges in the maritime domain, and maritime realm, this only increases the correspondingly have recognized the potential challenges that could arise from its need for entities to manage non-military usage – be it illegal fishing, piracy, terrorism, challenges in the maritime domain, even if or trafficking – and that wide spectrum of they are not necessarily labeled a single, maritime-related challenges has in turn centralized, ‘coast guard.’ Indeed, one can exposed the gaps in capabilities to deal trace these institutions back even to pre- with maritime law enforcement issues.4 independence days in some cases. For In Southeast Asia, the period following instance, Singapore, historically a port city, the September 11 attacks in particular traces its current Police Coast Guard (PCG) increased the attention of regional states back to the Marine Branch formed back in to threats such as maritime terrorism and 1866, while the idea of a coast guard in the piracy, which in turn catalyzed a focus on Philippines technically dates back over a strengthening maritime law enforcement. century beginning with the Bureau of Coast For instance, the development of Malaysia’s Guard and Transportation, though this has coast guard-equivalent body, the Malaysian 2 shifted over time subsequently. Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), A few key drivers and trends over the which is today formally identified as the past few years have gradually led to more Malaysia Coast Guard on an international countries in Southeast Asia either to either basis, dates its existence back to 2005 significantly boost their existing coast guard following rising concerns about maritime capabilities or considering standing up new terrorism and piracy in a post-9/11 context, maritime law enforcement entities. The first which also saw the birth of new regional is the sheer increase in maritime-related organizations including the Regional activity in the region. The rise of East Asian Cooperation Agreement on Combating economies, the increase in global trade, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in and the resulting boost in shipping demand, Asia (ReCAAP).5 has led to a surge in maritime commerce A third driver is the ongoing disputes and in the region. By one count, traffic in the rivalries between states. Southeast Asian narrow, strategically significant Malacca states still have a number of lingering Straits alone, which already accounts for disputes that remain between them, and over a third of traffic, has doubled in the particular periods have led to increases in past decade, and is set to increase a further attention to shoring up national positions 3 50 percent out to the next decade. That has on the water, at times generating ripple 2 PRASHANTH PARAMESWARAN The Rise of Southeast Asia’s Coast Guards effects as well in terms of how maritime with more capable coast guards or assets are developed and utilized. In recent MLEAs, they have become increasingly years, concerns about the South China Sea more sophisticated in the investments have also played into this mix, with China’s that they make, looking beyond just use of maritime law enforcement vessels naval capabilities and developing a fuller in related activities leading Southeast spectrum of maritime capabilities that Asian states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, provide them more options to engage both the Philippines, and Vietnam to consider domestically and internationally. While the developing their own capabilities to respond mix of partners tends to vary by country, to this as well. The effect has been the Japan has been particularly influential in its increasing use of coast-guard type forces or effects on the development of the maritime so-called ‘white hulls’ in efforts to protect or capabilities of Southeast Asian States. safeguard country claims.6 The effects include not just increases in equipment or training, but also changes A fourth driver is interactions with foreign in structure of MLEAs and the nature of partners. As Southeast Asian states have thinking about coordination between various interacted more with maritime partners bodies.7 Table 1: State of Coast Guards/Equivalent Functions in Southeast Asian States Country Coast Guard/Equivalent Date Founded Host Organization Brunei Marine Police 1921 (RBPF Founding) Royal Brunei Police Force Cambodia N/A, managed by Royal N/A N/A Cambodian Navy (RCN) Indonesia BAKAMLA 2015 Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Malaysia Malaysian Maritime 2005 Ministry of Home Affairs Enforcement Agency (MMEA) Laos N/A, no navy N/A N/A Myanmar N/A, managed by Myanmar N/A N/A Navy Philippines Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) 1967 Department of Transportation Singapore Police Coast Guard 1993 Singapore Police Force Thailand N/A, Coast Guard Squadron N/A, 1992 N/A, Royal Thai Navy operates under Royal Thai Navy (RTN) Timor-Leste N/A, managed by naval N/A N/A component of Falintil-FDTL (F-FDTL) Vietnam Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) 2013 (previously Ministry of National Defense Vietnam Marine Police, 1993) Source: Author’s analysis based on open-source information 3 PRASHANTH PARAMESWARAN The Rise of Southeast Asia’s Coast Guards These drivers have all contributed to a well. Countries with coast guards or coast greater attention by several key Southeast guard-like entities are at varying stages Asian states to the development of coast of progress and tend to organize and guard-like bodies and other MLEAs. The host that function differently – whether most visible demonstrations of these are it be in their police forces or government among the more capable Southeast Asian departments and ministries – while those states that already have identifiable coast that do not have coast guards also still guards. Among these, Malaysia and the display variances, whether it be Thailand Philippines have added to their existing which does have a designated Coast Guard capabilities, while Vietnam and Indonesia Squadron all the way to the exception set up new, dedicated coast guard entities in landlocked Laos which still does not in 2013 and 2015 respectively after years of possess a navy. deliberation and shifts in their policies.8 Beyond the current state of coast guards But beyond this, there are also other and MLEAs in Southeast Asia more Southeast Asian countries which do not generally, there has also been a noticeable have separate, designated coast guards that uptick in both the investments made by have nonetheless been either eying setting these countries as well as the size of the up such an agency or changing aspects of vessels that they are investing in during their maritime security governance more recent years. In terms of investments, generally. In mainland Southeast Asia, for a notable case is the Philippines, as instance, Cambodia and Myanmar have evidenced by the 2018 defense budget previously expressed interest to varying where 6.7 billion pesos were allocated to degrees in setting up designated coast the PCG under the Duterte administration.10 guards with some degree of separation Malaysia has also been stepping up its from their navies. Meanwhile, Thailand, coast guard investments as well despite which has a designated Coast Guard overall defense cuts that have been Squadron within the Royal Thai Navy, has witnessed under the new government also been considering ways to reconfigure which took power in May, as well as some and better centralize maritime security in shifts in the role of the MMEA more recent years, including upgrading the role generally.11 of the Thailand Maritime Enforcement In terms of acquisitions, Vietnam has Coordinating Center (Thai-MECC) as a been the standout case by far, with the coordinating agency.9 combination of local shipbuilders and Table 1 summarizes the current state of assistance from a mix of countries such coast guard and maritime law enforcement as the United States, Japan, and European bodies in Southeast Asia, noting the countries, resulting in the building of agencies involved, their evolution, and larger ships, including four 4,300 ton where they are hosted.
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