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Afghanistan: the Prospects for a Real Peace Afghanistan: The Prospects for a Real Peace By Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Grace Hwang Working Draft: MAJOR REVISION: June 3, 2020 Please provide comments to [email protected] Photo: BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP via Getty Images Cordesman: Afghan Prospects for Peace 06/03/2020 2 Afghanistan: The Prospects for a Real Peace Anthony H. Cordesman Afghanistan is sometimes referred to as the “graveyard of empires.” In practice, it has been the “graveyard of Afghans” – a nation where outside powers have always found it more costly to remain in Afghanistan than their presence there was worth. Russia – like so many of Afghanistan’s past conquerors – has survived and has prospered from leaving. Today, the United States does not have a critical strategic interest in Afghanistan, and the country does not currently pose a more critical threat in terms of international terrorism than do the situations in many other states pose. The U.S. too now has the option of leaving – regardless of the success or failure of its efforts to leave as part of a fully negotiated peace. It is the Afghan people that face the risks and costs of failure, just as they have in the past. Afghanistan has had long periods of peace – and even had its own empires – but time after time the nation has divided, become a regional backwater, or succumbed to civil war. Today, Afghanistan’s leaders and factions have divided the nation, served their own interests at the expense of their peoples, and plunged the country into civil war. The end result has undermined Afghanistan’s development and capability to defend its own national interests and has converted the country into a power vacuum that other states or non-state actors attempt to fill. History repeats itself, whether it is forgotten or not, and the current search for peace in Afghanistan bears a grim resemblance to what happened in Vietnam. As this analysis shows, the current peace effort seems to be as much the result of a U.S. effort to leave the country, as it is to find a real peace. More broadly, it shows that there are many other barriers to a successful peace than the fighting with the Taliban, and many are the result of the Afghan central government’s divisive politics, and its failures in governance, economics, and ability to create effective security forces. Unless both the key issues in negotiating with the Taliban and the failures of the central government can be addressed, even a successful peace agreement is likely to fail, and the U.S. must consider a full withdrawal. Like all forms of triage, strategic triage will be painful, but it may also become all too necessary. A Taliban and Central Government that Fail the Afghan People The Afghan people do want peace. Public opinion polls by the Asia Foundation demonstrate how the Afghan people want peace, progress, reform, and an honest government. In its summary of its 2019 poll of the Afghan people, the Asia Foundation states that, “A key indicator for the Survey over time has been whether Afghans are optimistic or pessimistic about the country’s direction. Findings reveal the impact that peace talks have had on optimism in the country. While optimism in 2018, at 32.8%, was effectively unchanged from 2017, Afghans this year report a slightly higher level of optimism, with 36.1% of respondents saying the country is going in the right direction, and in explaining reasons for their optimism, those who say “peace / end of war” has increased notably from 16.4% to 26.3% this year.”1 The poll explored Afghan attitudes towards peace in depth, and the results indicate how much the Afghan people want a peace that could move Afghanistan forward. It found that, 2 Some 64.0% of those surveyed say reconciliation with the Taliban is possible, a 10 percentage point increase over 2018 (53.5%). Males (69.6%) are more optimistic than females (58.5%) by more than 10 points. Increased media coverage of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks have raised public awareness of the talks, as reflected in a new question this year that shows 77.4% of respondents overall are aware of efforts to negotiate Cordesman: Afghan Prospects for Peace 06/03/2020 3 with the Taliban. A new question in 2019 gauges Afghan support for efforts to negotiate peace with the Taliban. This year, the proportion of people who strongly or somewhat support these efforts stands at 88.7%. The number of Afghans who say that a group poses a threat to the security of their local area (36.4%) is almost identical to 2018 (35.8%). In an open-ended follow-up asking which group poses a threat, the Taliban continue to be the top response, at 68.9%. The Taliban are seen as more of a threat in rural areas (75.9%) than urban (37.2%) …The number of respondents who cite Daesh/ISIS as a local security threat has decreased by 4 percentage points, to 12.4%, which reflects the diminished capabilities of that group. It also found that Afghans did not want peace at any price. The Survey found that,3 The majority of Afghans say they would not vote for a president who accepted a peace agreement with the Taliban, which jeopardize women’s education (65.6%), women’s ability to work outside the home (65.0%), or if the central government lost territory (65.8%). Much of the world, and certainly most Americans, want that peace for Afghanistan as well. That does not, however, mean that those who want peace are going to get it. It is one thing to dream of the peace you want, and quite another to have to live with the reality you can actually obtain. Key Challenges to Peace This analysis examines the political, governance, security, and economic factors that shape the prospects for such a real peace. It finds some reasons for hope, but more problems than solutions. It also finds that there is a serious risk that the U.S. may leave without having created a peace that can offer lasting stability and security. The peace agreements to date do more to expedite a U.S. and Allied withdrawal than they do to create the conditions that can lead to a lasting and secure peace. It finds that the Taliban remains committed to its ideology. And, that the Taliban has good reasons to negotiate, but those reasons are more for achieving their ulterior motives through negotiations, rather than seeking a real peace. Its ongoing military progress, its rising hopes for a U.S. withdrawal, and its commitment to its ideology are all key indicators. A wide range of sources – including two major sources of official U.S. reporting on Afghanistan – indicate that the leaders of the Afghan central government, President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, are both a major threat to the ability to create a lasting peace and a state than can meet the needs and hopes of the Afghan people. More broadly, sources like the World Bank, IMF, and different reports from two U.S. inspector generals provide data that indicate that the portions of Afghanistan under the central government’s control are a “failed state” by any standard. Security remains a critical issue, and one that seriously threatens the ability to negotiate and enforce a real peace. There are substantial official sources that show that Afghanistan was not winning against the Taliban before the peace agreements, even with the massive U.S. combat air and intelligence support alongside the extensive support from Allied forces and cadres of U.S. special forces, elite units, train and assist forces, and intelligence operators. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are making progress, but reporting by the two U.S. inspector generals – the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the Lead Inspector General (LIG) – show that the ground forces are years away from being able to stand on their own with any confidence and also that there are no current plans to create an Afghan Air Force (AAF) that could provide the level of combat capability the U.S. and its Allies have provided since 2013. Cordesman: Afghan Prospects for Peace 06/03/2020 4 The civil development of the country poses equally pressing challenges to any effort to create a secure and stable peace. Afghanistan has steadily fallen behind the pace of development compared to other poor regional states. It has regressed in many ways since the Afghan monarchy began to collapse in a mix of internal power struggles in the 1970s. It continued to do so during the periods from 1972 to 1989, in spite of a massive Soviet effort; under the Taliban before 2001; and after a massive U.S. and international aid effort since 2001. Afghan elections have not produced either a working political system or effective governance in the areas controlled by the central government. Afghanistan has also not moved towards effective economic development, and the current economy does not adequately meet the basic needs of its people. Rather, the Afghan economy can only function if it is supported indefinitely by massive outside aid, and it still remains heavily dependent on the country being the world’s major source of opiates. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the current peace efforts in Afghanistan are uncertain at best. So far, the peace agreements simply layout a possible schedule for negotiations and U.S. withdrawals, rather than define a real peace. It is far from clear that the Afghan central government and the Taliban can reach a stable, workable peace agreement.
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