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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs January 20, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary As of January 1, 2015, the United States and its partner countries have completed a transition to a smaller post-2014 mission consisting mostly of training the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), which lead security operations throughout the country. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to just over 10,000, of which most are trainers and advisers as part of a 13,000 NATO-led “Resolute Support Mission.” About 1,000 of the U.S. contingent are counter-terrorism forces that also operating under a new U.S. “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” that replaces the post-September 11 “Operation Enduring Freedom.” President Obama directed in May 2014 that the U.S. force will shrink during 2015 to about 5,000 by the end of this year, and their presence after 2015 will be exclusively in Kabul and at Bagram Airfield. The post-2016 U.S. force is to be several hundred military personnel, under U.S. Embassy authority. However, doubts about the ability of the ANSF to operate without substantial international backing have led to recent U.S. alterations of the post- 2014 U.S. rules of engagement and debate over the size of the post-2016 force. Deploying a post-2014 international force was contingent on Afghanistan’s signing a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States and a similar document with NATO. These accords were delayed by a dispute over alleged fraud in the 2014 presidential election, which was settled in September 2014 by a U.S.-brokered solution under which Ashraf Ghani became President and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah was appointed to a new position of Chief Executive Officer of the government. Even though the election dispute was resolved, at least for now, experts remain concerned that Afghan stability is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance. Ghani and Abdullah’s disagreements over new Cabinet selections delayed the appointment of a new cabinet until early January 2015. Aside from the tensions between Ghani and Abdullah, governance is widely assessed to suffer from widespread official corruption. Since taking office, Ghani has signaled he will prioritize anti-corruption issues. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Some negotiations have taken place periodically, and in May 2014 indirect U.S. – Taliban talks produced an exchange of prisoners that included the return of U.S. prisoner of war Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. Ghani’s trips to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China since taking office have been intended, at least in part, to invigorate negotiations. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan, to support the reconciliation process has shown some modest success, although Afghan insurgent groups continue to operate from Pakistani territory. Yet, Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights. As part of a longer term economic strategy for Afghanistan, U.S. officials seek greater Afghan integration into regional trade and investment patterns as part of a “New Silk Road,” and say that Afghanistan might be able to exploit vast mineral resources. Still, Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid for many years. Through the end of FY2013, the United States provided nearly $93 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which more than $56 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. The appropriated U.S. aid for FY2014 is over $6.1 billion, including $4.7 billion to train and equip the ANSF, and the FY2015 request is about $5.7 billion. These figures do not include funds for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Administration officials have pledged to Afghanistan that economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue roughly at recent levels (about $1.5 billion per year) through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 th From Early History to the 19 Century ..................................................................................... 1 th Early 20 Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1 Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period ..................................................................................... 2 The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities ............................................... 3 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ........................................................................ 3 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ................................................................ 4 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................... 5 U.S. Policy Towards the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence .............................. 5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6 Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before September 11 ................................................ 7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom.......................................................... 7 U.N. and Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) ....................... 7 Major Combat Operations: 2001-2003................................................................................ 8 Post-Taliban Governance Established ................................................................................. 8 U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ............................................................... 11 Security Policy: Transition, and Beyond ....................................................................................... 12 Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others ............................................ 13 The Taliban ........................................................................................................................ 13 Al Qaeda and Associated Groups ...................................................................................... 14 Hikmatyar Faction (HIG) .................................................................................................. 15 Haqqani Network .............................................................................................................. 16 Insurgent Tactics ................................................................................................................ 17 Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ....................................... 18 The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2003-2008 ............................................................................... 18 Obama Administration Policy: “Surge,” Transition, and Drawdown ...................................... 19 McChrystal Assessment and December 1, 2009, Surge Announcement ........................... 19 Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead ............................................................... 21 Resolute Support Mission and 2017 Planned Exit .................................................................. 22 Implementation of the Mission Transition ........................................................................ 23 Debate Over Post-2014 Security Outcomes Produces Mission Alterations ...................... 24 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) ................................................................................. 25 Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ............................................................................ 26 Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .......................................................... 27 Current and Post-2014 Size of the ANSF .......................................................................... 28 ANSF Top Leadership and Ethnic Issues .......................................................................... 28 ANSF Funding .................................................................................................................. 29 The Afghan National Army (ANA) ................................................................................... 30 Afghan Air Force ............................................................................................................... 31 Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 31 Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 34 Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 34 Cooperation With Allies .......................................................................................................... 35 Reintegration and Potential Reconciliation
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