THE SLAVIC KALABALIK: THE PRUTH CAMPAIGN, CHARLES XII’S SWEDISH CAMP AT BENDER AND THE RISE OF PAN-SLAVISM (A Theory on Peter I’s campaign in Wallachia, Moldova and its Legacy) Jackson Little The Great Northern War (1700-1721) rent the Moldova, enjoyed the protection and favor of the geopolitical fabric of Eastern and Central Europe. Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III. Ahmed’s hospital- Twenty-one years of war saw the ruin of the Swed- ity extended in the Ottoman geo-political sphere ish Empire, the prostration of Poland and the rise when he refused to honor Russian requests for of the Russian Empire under its fi rst Emperor, the extradition of the Swedish King. Charles XII Peter the Great. Although Russia was ultimately was similarly frustrated when Ahmed III refused victorious, there was one defi nitive chapter where to break the long-standing Ottoman truce with all of Russia’s nascent imperial gains and the life Russia signed shortly before the opening of the of its fi rst emperor were threatened by Peter’s di- Great Northern War. Charles’ persistent lobby- sastrous campaign on the Pruth River in the Ot- ing eventually convinced the Ottomans to declare toman Balkan provinces. Although provoked into war against Russia in 1710 (Frost 2000, 294). Pe- war by the Ottomans, Peter’s cultural attempts ter’s subsequent military response attempted to to rally support in Wallachia and Moldova were enlist the aid of Christian forces in Wallachia and clear antecedents for the later cultural theory of Moldavia. Although Moldavian ruler Dmitri Can- Pan-Slavism. I aver that Russian Pan-Slavism temir lent his support, Russian forces were be- was the product of a diplomatic and military ef- trayed, outnumbered and ultimately surrounded fort to oust the exiled King Charles XII from Ot- by Ottoman forces on the Pruth River. Despite his toman Moldova and affect an expedient ending vulnerable position, Peter was able to negotiate to the Great Northern War on favorable terms to safe passage back to Russia, only sacrifi cing his Russia. My theory is meant to provoke a reexami- gains in the Sea of Azov. Dissatisfi ed with the Ot- nation of the diplomatic signifi cance of Peter’s toman response, Charles XII continued pushing military ventures as well as a discussion on the for war until the dire situation in Sweden and in- role of Eastern European polities in the birth of creasing Ottoman animosity forced him to leave Pan-Slavism. Historians such as Hans Kohn con- in 1714 for Sweden (Hughes 1998, 45-46). sider Pan-Slavism a product of nineteenth cen- The Eastern European studies academic commu- tury Central Europe but Peter’s Pruth Campaign nity continues to devote considerable attention clearly developed the evolutionary basis for the to the theory of Pan-Slavism but the majority of Russian form of Pan-Slavism that would arise in contemporary scholarship focuses on specifi c na- the nineteenth century and early twentieth cen- tions’ interaction with Pan-Slavic theories. Olga tury. Maiorova’s 2010 publication From the Shadow In 1709 the Battle of Poltava marked the turn- of Empire: Defi ning the Russian Nation through ing point of the Great Northern War in Russia’s Cultural Mythology, 1855-1870, is a recent ex- favor and the end of Charles XII’s 1708 invasion ample of this exclusive focus. Hans Kohn’s older of Russia. The defeat of the Swedish army forced work Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology fo- Charles XII to fl ee into the outlying reaches of the cuses exclusively on the movement’s history but Ottoman Empire where he ensconced himself in very little modern scholarship furthers his inqui- a small military camp a paltry number of Swed- ries into the movement’s origins. Despite Russia’s ish soldiers and staff who traveled with him while extensive redevelopment of Pan-Slavism in con- the rest of the army surrendered at Perevoloch- junction with Slavophilism, Pan-Slavism’s roots na. This minute Swedish enclave, in present-day are fi rmly entrenched in the Slavic communities Tyragetia, s.n., vol. VII [XXII], nr. 2, 2013, 111-114. 111 II. Materiale şi cercetări of Central Europe where they were exposed to the when Peter expanded Russia’s political and mili- German Romantic movement of the 1820’s and tary sphere of infl uence. I am not refuting the role 30’s. Central European Pan-Slavism developed of Central Europe in Pan-Slavism’s origin but I as an early form of Central European cultural believe that new investigations are required to nationalism that gripped the German principali- determine the agency of the Eastern European ties as well as the Czech and Slovak communities politico-cultural communities in the movement’s of Central Europe (Kohn 1953, 11). The theory early development prior to the nineteenth cen- of Pan-Slavism was an attempt to development tury. Contemporary scholarship avoids drawing a sense of ethnic kinship amongst the disparate connections between Pan-Slavic theory and other Slavic communities in Central and Eastern Eu- intellectual movements prior to the French Revo- rope along the lines of linguistic congruity. The lution. Although the Pruth Campaign cannot be emphasis on Slavic linguistic kinship was aug- considered an intellectual movement, it is just mented by the theory of “Slavic Volksgeist”; both one example of a pre nineteenth century event in- of which developed into proto-nationalist move- spiring the development of a nineteenth century ments throughout the major and minor Slavic cultural theory. communities scattered in the Austrian, Russian Although Russia was provoked into war by and Ottoman Empires. Despite the push for Charles XII’s machinations at the Ottoman court, Slavic hegemony, Pan-Slavism was riddled with I believe that Peter’s risky decision to invade the numerous fractious interpretations. Pan-Slavic Ottoman vassal states of Moldavia and Wallachia theorists in Ukraine and Bohemia approached was borne largely out of a sense of political fore- applied the theory of kinship in relation to their sight. If he wished, Peter could have prepared liberation from foreign hierarchs, in this case the defenses in Russia’s southern frontier and sim- Austrian and Russian Empires (Hunczak 1974, ply waited for the Ottomans to arrive. Having re- 82-83). Russian Pan-Slavism was markedly dif- cently witnessed the destruction of Charles XII’s ferent than that espoused by its Central Euro- previously invincible Swedish army, it is unlikely pean adherents. In Russia’s case, Russian Impe- that the Ottomans would have been willing to rial Pan-Slavism grew into an increasingly potent undertake a major invasion of Russia. If Peter force during the Westernizer-Slavophile debates could stimulate a friendly revolt in both regions of the nineteenth century. and with the aid of his army, fresh from its victory Slavophilism was directly supported by Pan- over Charles at Poltava, then he could limit Ot- Slavism due to the latter’s encouragement of toman power in the region, secure further gains unity between other Slavic communities and the in the Black Sea and possibly capture Charles XII recovery of a grand, ancient cultural heritage in who was sequestered only a few miles away on the the face of Western corruption and subjugation Dniester River at Bender. The potential rewards (Hunczak 1974, 84-85). While Russian Slavophil- from capturing the fugitive Swedish king and po- ism and Pan-Slavism emphasized the exclusivity tentially ending the Great Northern War much and purity of Russia’s cultural heritage, the lat- earlier would have been suffi ciently attractive to ter theory was increasingly coopted into Russia’s convince the previously cautious military leader imperial ambitions and developed as a means of to embark on a long campaign, deep behind en- legitimizing Russia’s dominion over other Slavic emy lines. In order for the plan to succeed Peter realms such as Ukraine. Thus Russian Pan-Slav- needed to ensure the loyalty and support of the ism rapidly moved away from a theory of univer- Wallachians and Moldavians upon whom he re- sal unity on equilateral terms towards an image of lied for reinforcements, supplies and intelligence. hegemonic Slavic community dominated by the To garner support from his Balkan allies Peter larger community constituted within the Russian cast himself as the “liberator of the Balkan Chris- Empire. Effectively the smaller Slavic communi- tians” (Huges 1998, 46). In addition, Peter issued ties were to be drawn into the Russian Empire’s a declaration to Christian’s residing within the Ot- politico-cultural orbit, with Russia serving as the toman Balkan territories: “I am taking upon my- sun (Hunczak 1974, 87). This sense of Imperial self a heavy burden for the sake of the love of God, Russian politico-cultural centralism developed for which reason I have entered into war with the during the nascent period of the empire’s growth Turkish realm… because the Turks have trampled 112 J. Little, The slavic kalabalik: the Pruth campaign, Charles XII’s swedish camp at Bender and the rise of pan-slavism on our faith, taken our churches and lands by cun- south towards the Black Sea and limiting the Ot- ning, pillaged and destroyed many of our church- toman Empire’s authority was a failure due to a es and monasteries” (Hughes 2002, 96). Peter’s number of military and diplomatic factors. His adoption of a religious motive for his invasion of losses were comparatively light considering the the Ottoman Balkan provinces masked Russia’s possibility that Charles XII’s intrigues at the Ot- developing imperial ambitions for the Black Sea toman court could have brought the recently vic- region and Russia’s border regions with the Otto- torious Russia to its knees once again.