^^ 0% PETER THE GREAT BY THE SAME AUTHOR. In one volume, large Crown Svo, cloth, 6.v. ea< II IK ROMANCE OF AN EMPRESS (Catherine n. OF Russia). With a Portrait. The Times, — 'This book is based on the confessions of the I it ol mpress herself ; gives striking pictures the condition of the contemporary Russia which she did so much to mould as well as to expand. Few stories in history are more romantic than that of Catherine u. of Russia, with its mysterious incidents ami curious thrilling episodes ; few characters present more problems.' THE STORY OF A THRONE (Catherine ii. ov Russia). Willi a Portrait. The World. — ' No novel that ever was written could compete withthishistoiir.il monograph in absorbing interest.' London: WILLIAM HEINEMANN, 21 Bedford Stree 1 , \\ .C. D ETER THE GREAT BY K WALISZEWSKI AUTHOR OF ' THE ROMANCE OJ AN EMPRESS ' ' 'THE STOKY Or A THRONE, El I . Translatedfrom the French By LAD V MA RY LO YD Ulith a portrait IX TWO VOLUMES VOL. II. LONDON WILLIAM HE I N EM ANN 1897 All rights it se> ved '31 WI7 WOR57r-Vyi »^6.5^. • CONTENTS PART III—HIS WORK BOOK I —EXTERNAL STRUGGLE—WAR AND DIPLOMACY i ~~*>/\ 1 PAGE I T £,">-/ I. FROM NARVA TO P0LT7 "\, 1 700-1 709, . 3 II. FROM THE BALTIC TO THE CASPIAN, 39 — III. THE APOGEE FRANCE, 70 "V BOOK II —THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE—THE REFORMS — END OF :'HE STRELTSY- ^RYl'HE NEW REGIME THE ST. PETERSBURG, .... 104 II. MORALS—HABITS AND CUSTOMS, '25 V III. THE ECCLESIASTICAL REFORMS AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PATRIARCHATE, ^Vy/XVJV^ - • 153 >/7v> THE SOCIAL REFORM—THE TABLE OF RANKS, . 164 Vy. peter's economic work, 174 VI. THE POLITICAL WORK OF PETER THE GREAT, 190, . "/vil. THE ARMY AND THE NAVY, VIII. THE OPPOSITION—THE TSAREV1TCH ALEXIS, 220 -((/j [X. PETER THE GREAT'S LAST WILL—CONCLUSION, 256 VOL. II. 1 PART Til HIS WORK VOL. II. BOOK I—EXTERNAL STRUGGLE—WAR AND DIPLOMACY CHAPTER I FROM NARVA TO POLTAVA, 170O-I709 1. Traditional Policy, internal and external — Peter begins with the outside — Russian ambition and enterprise oscillated between the North and the South — The Emperor's refusal drives Peter to choose the North — The interview at Rawa — Intercourse with Augustus — The quadruple alliance — Patkul — Peter resolves to make common cause with Saxony and —Denmark against Sweden, but awaits— the signature of peace with— Turkey The Treaty of Preobrajenskoie News— from Constantinople— On the march to Narva—Arrival of Charles XII. Peter's flight The catastrophe. II. The Tsar's pusillanimity and distress—Charles' advance on Poland gives him time to collect himself, and drives him into closer alliance with Augustus —More war preparations —The interview at Birze —Fresh reverses and earliest successes— Peter at the mouth of the Neva-— ' The Rey of the Sea'— St. Petersburg— Peter takes possession of Ingria and Livonia, and Augustus loses Poland— Preparations for the decisive struggle. in. A Diplomatic Campaign — Search for a Mediator — Prince Galitzin at Vienna — Matvieief at the Hague and in Paris — Prince Dimitri Galitzin at Constantinople—An alliance negotiated at Berlin — Patkul's career and — death — The Swede triumphs over the Livonian — Arved Horn Altranstadt — The defection of Augustus — Diplomatic duplicity — The battle of Kalis/. —The two Sovereigns attempt to obtain a separate peace — Aurora von Koenigsmarck in the camp of Charles XII.— Peter's Envoys and Emissaries to European Courts—A negative result — Peter is left alone to face — He resolves to on his own Charles —fight ground. lv. Charles XII. 's Plan of Campaign— Mazeppa The first obstacle —The Ilet- man hesitates — Loewenhaupt's march delayed —The summer goes by— Prospect of a winter Campaign.— v. Charles marches southward Victory at Holovtchin — Loewenhaupt's disaster at Liesna— Famine —Mazeppa makes up his mind—Too late ' He loses the Ukraine—The Siege of Poltava -Victory or death — Demoralisation of the Swedish army— Charles wounded Peter increases his of — ol — chances — victory The encounler -Defeat the Swedes Its consequences The ruins of the past, and the Russia of the future. PETER THE GREAT was the heir and the follower of predecessors whose merit has been too easily forgotten. He 4 PETER THE GREAT was certainly, and incomparably, their superior, although, in certain respects, he lacked completeness. From these predecessors he inherited a double programme of internal reform, and external expansion. He first turned his attention to the latter. My readers will readily understand that I have not allowed myself to be wholly swayed, in the arrangement of this book, by a desire for chronological exactness. The greater number of the reforms which changed the whole face of eighteenth century Russia, politically, economically, and socially, belonged to the last years of Peter's reign. This does not alter the fact that their importance, from the historic point of view, far outweighs that of the victory of Poltava and the Conquest of the Baltic. The foremost place in this work is not occupied by the general minutiae of dates. Quite a different consideration has inspired me. I do not at all believe that the long succession of battles and negotia- tions, which, until 1721, almost entirely absorbed the Re- former's activity, were the preliminary condition which must necessarily have preceded his reforms. I am, on the contrary, convinced, and I will endeavour to prove it, that they were the indirect, but inevitable, or, as some may prefer to say, the providential, outcome of that struggle. In other words, the existence of the reforms did not depend on the war. But without them, the war could not have been carried on. Thus, all I have done is to put the plough behind the oxen. From the year 1693, to 1698, Peter, whether in Holland or in England, at Voroneje or Archangel, had turned his first endeavours to becoming a first-rate seaman, a thorough pilot, carpenter, and artillery man. And why ? First and foremost because it amused him. This is clear. He played at being a soldier and a sailor, but, by degrees, a more serious idea,—the consciousness of his ancestral traditions and the duties they imposed upon him—was combined with mere amusement, and, in the end, reality won the day. But this reality was actual war. From 1700 to 1709, his one object,—and he had no time to think of any other,—was to vanquish "Charles "XTITTJr-die-^ghting him. Prom 1709 to i72+r4MsTife was one ceaseless struggle, as much to obtain an advantageous peace, as to extricate himself from the fresh difficulties and dangers into which his own presump- FROM NARVA TO POLTAVA, 1700- 1709 5 tuousness, and over-confidence, had thrown him. And here we see the result. The Tsar, in the pursuance of the course on which he had so thoughtlessly entered, was driven to call upon his country for an amount of assistance far beyond anything that Russian resources, in their then condition, political, economic, or social, were capable of furnishing. The ancient foundations of the Muscovite edifice snapped and crumbled, weighed down on one side, and undermined on the other, by the huge weight cast on them, and the enormous effort demanded. Thus an abyss opened which had to be instantly filled, no matter how,—for war brooks no delay. So it came about, that, wellnigh uncon- sciously, and in spite of himself, the warrior grew into an organiser and reformer. His reforms were the makeshift ammunition with which he loaded his cannon, when the contents of his artillery waggons were exhausted. I shall later dwell more fully on this point of view—an all-important one for the due understanding of the great Tsar's work. I possess no knowledge of the art of war, and shall not attempt to bring ridicule on myself, by pretending to give a complete picture, or a reasoned criticism, of those campaigns which, between 1700 and 172 1, robbed Sweden of her position in Europe, and gave Russia hers. And the intended scope of this work would not, indeed, permit it. My sole endeavour will be to point out the historical bearings of the well-known events which mark this epoch, and so to cast a clearer light on the object of this special study of mine — I mean the personal features of the great man, as I have sketched them in the preceding pages, and those of his reign, which 1 shall now proceed to consider. It would appear that it was not till Peter's visit to Vienna, in 1698, that he conceived the idea of attacking Sweden. Up till that time, his warlike impulse had rather been directed southwards, and the Turk had been tin- sole object of his enmity. But^at Vienna, he- perceived that thcKmperor, whosgjielp he h ad counted on, had fail ed him, and forthwith the mobile mind of the young Tsar turned to the right-about. A war he must have of some kind, it little mattered where, to giye_work to his young army. The warlike instincts and the greed of his predecessors, tempted sometimes by the Black Sea, sometimes by the Baltic, and the border provinces of 6 PETER THE GREAT Poland, had, indeed, always swung and turned back and forward, between the south and the north. These alternate impulses, natural enough in a nation so full of youth and strength, have, since those days, been most unnecessarily idealised, erected into a doctrine, and dignified as a work of unification. It must be acknowledged that every nation has, at one time or the other, thus claimed the right to resume the national patrimony, at the expense of neighbouring peoples, and Peter, by some lucky fate, remained, in this within certain respect, bounds of justice, of logic, and of truth.