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Eurasian Geography and Economics

ISSN: 1538-7216 (Print) 1938-2863 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rege20

Russians in : Is the next Crimea?

David J. Trimbach & Shannon O’Lear

To cite this article: David J. Trimbach & Shannon O’Lear (2015): in Estonia: Is Narva the next Crimea?, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2015.1110040

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1110040

Published online: 11 Nov 2015.

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Download by: [University of Kansas Libraries] Date: 11 November 2015, At: 09:04 Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1110040

Russians in Estonia: Is Narva the next Crimea? David J. Trimbach* and Shannon O’Lear

Department of Geography, University of Kansas, 1475 Jayhawk Blvd., 213 Lindley Hall, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA (Received 31 May 2015; accepted 15 October 2015)

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and involvement in Ukrainian border regions pose serious consequences and questions. The precedence of Russian military intervention illustrates the porosity and potential for conflicts in other post-Soviet border regions. The Estonian borderland city of Narva, populated predominantly by Russian-speakers, is one such potential site of tension. Based on preliminary findings and data collected in Narva in 2013, this article provides an overview of citizenship, identity, and geographic affiliation issues among Narva’s Russian-speaking commu- nity in an effort to generate insights as to how any Russian overtures and potential intervention might be received in Narva. Keywords: Narva; Estonia; ; Russian-speakers; identity; citizenship

Introduction On 26 February 2015, in honor of its Independence Day, Estonia hosted a military parade and invited troops from fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to participate in the celebration. Said parade, however, was held in Narva, a town right on Estonia’s border with Russia in which, according to government data, the dominant majority of the populace identifies ethnically or linguistically as “Russian.” No doubt seeing this demonstration as provocative, Russia in response soon held mili- tary drills involving 2000 paratroopers in the region of Russia bordering Estonia and (Freeman et al. 2015). In fact, Estonian–Russian relations wax and wane, ranging from the 2007 riots precipitated by the Estonian government’s plan to move a Soviet-era war memorial, which was seen as an “anti-Russian” move (Shemetov 2014) and which was followed by a cyber attack that was widely suspected to have originated in Russia in retaliation (Kaiser 2015); to the peaceful border resolution between the two countries in 2014; and more recently to the kidnapping of an Estonian Internal Security Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015 Service officer on the Estonian side of the southeastern Estonian–Russian border by the Russian (Borger 2014). Estonia and its Baltic neighbors, Latvia and , have all been members of both the (EU) and NATO since 2004, but Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, still internationally recognized as part of Ukraine, raised concern in states adjoining Russia that Russian expansion may threaten other border areas, includ- ing along Estonia’s northeastern borderland, where the City of Narva is located. Narva shares many paralleled similarities with Crimea and the Donbas region. Crimea, the

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

© 2015 Taylor & Francis 2 D.J. Trimbach

Donbas, and Narva are predominantly Russian-speaking, are proximate to Russian territory, are areas of historic contention (with Russia and ) (Wilson 1995; Thompson 1998; Biersack and O’Lear 2014), and contain(ed) sizeable Russian citizen- ries (State Statistic Committee 2001; Narva Department of Development and Economy 2012). Like the Donbas region, Narva and its surrounding area comprise Estonia’s industrial and natural resource (oil shale) heartland, which has witnessed dramatic eco- nomic shifts and declines since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Holmberg 2008; Bengtsson 2009; Seiffert 2014). Additionally Estonia’s northeast and Ukraine’s east encountered unrest and calls for autonomy and/or secession during the early 1990s (Sneider 1994; Smith 2002). Russia has, in fact, been militarily active in several of its border areas. In late March 2015, the Russian military conducted large-scale “sudden” exercises on several fronts. Air and naval forces in the Barents Sea practiced protecting nuclear missile-armed sub- marines, and the Russian defense minister, Army General Sergei Shoigu announced on 18 March that additional exercises were planned in the Baltic region, the Black Sea, the Far East, and central Russia (Felgenhauer 2015a). Additionally, it is not clear if Russian ballistic missiles (known as the Iskander-M) deployed in Russia’s Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad during exercises in 2014 will remain at that forward location or not (2015a). Iskander-M’s 500 km range poses a serious threat to Kaliningrad’s neighbors and has reinforced the notion of the Baltics as a new military frontline (Isachenkov 2015). Russia has also been upgrading military equipment and capacity in the Stavropol region of the North Caucasus. Stavropol is the headquarters for the 49th army, Russia’s offensive force in the Southern Military District (Goble 2015). According to an article written by Anton Chablin, a political analyst in the North Caucasus, large training exer- cises have been conducted near borders of Georgia and Ukraine, which have both indi- cated interest in joining NATO, and there is concern that possible Russian movement in Georgia could amplify Russia’s established military presence in Armenia (as quoted in Goble 2015). Russia’s actions on its borders have motivated the Lithuanian parliament to reinstate conscription to its military (Felgenhauer 2015a), and , not a member of NATO, is sending troops to the island of Gotland, located in the between Sweden and Russia, despite having demilitarized the area for a decade (Milne 2015). The aforementioned conventional overt military strategies have been complemented by what many military experts call “hybrid warfare,” or the blended usage of conventional, unconventional, overt, and covert military strategies, actions, information, and threats (Van Puyvelde 2015). Russia’s increased militarization has intensified NATO and the US military activities in the Baltics, exacerbating tensions and diplomatic woes. Estonia in particular has seen Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015 an influx of NATO and the US military equipment, defense funds, and even boots on the ground (Kund 2015). Following the US Congress’ approval of $25 million for the modernization of Estonian military bases and the initiation of a two-year contract permitting the USA to use Estonian Defense Force areas, Estonia has seen a boom in military infrastructure improvements and expansions (2015). Russia’s military endeavors on multiple, simultaneous fronts might seem to be a phenomenal feat in light of Russia’s recent economic downturn, but President Vladimir Putin has called for a mas- sive repatriation of capital by wealthy Russians who have deposited multiple billions of dollars of wealth in offshore locations (Felgenhauer 2015b). What might Russia’s military activity mean for Narva, Estonia? How might Russian overtures to this Russian irredenta, if activated as part of what has become known as “hybrid war,” be received by the population there? In the case of Crimea, a 2011 survey Eurasian Geography and Economics 3

of Crimean residents indicated that people there had a stronger sense of attachment to Crimea itself rather than to Russia or to Ukraine. More emphatically, survey respon- dents, comprised of Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and some other groups, strongly preferred Crimean autonomy (Charron 2012). These findings coalesce well with other scholarship that suggests that Ukrainian-Russian-speakers in the south (Crimea) and east (Donbas) are less likely to identify with Ukraine or support Ukrainian territorial integrity, and are more likely to support local autonomy and policies (Moser 2014). Given recent history with Crimea and the presence of ethnic Russian irre- denta in easternmost Estonia, a closer examination of Narva’s population in an attempt to gauge its sense of citizenship, identity, and spatial affiliation is warranted.

Background on Narva, Estonia’s borderland Russian enclave Narva is Estonia’s third most populous city, the country’s industrial center and energy producer, and is home to a predominantly Russian-speaking community located along the Estonian–Russian border (Figure 1). Narva is no stranger to Russian military actions. The “” is a near-ubiquitous phrase in Estonian history and geopolitics referring to two major battles during the (1700, 1704) between the Swedish and Russian empires and major World War II (WWII) battles (1944) between and the Soviet Union (Raun 2001). Narva was also the home of the Estonian Workers’ Commune (1918–1919), which provided a short-lived Bolshevik foothold in Estonia and partial legitimation to Soviet occupation. Narva’s territorial affiliation and population have adjusted with the geopolitical ebb and flow of the larger region (Raun 2001). Narva was used as a fortress and trading town by the Danes, , and (roughly between the thirteenth and Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015

Figure 1. Map of Estonia. Source: Compiled by Xanthippe Wedel. 4 D.J. Trimbach

early eighteenth centuries) along the Narva River in juxtaposition to expanding Russian influences, exemplified by Narva’s Russian twin-town and occasional regional competi- tor of (Jaanilinn, in Estonian; Gerner 2002; Kasekamp 2010). Although the city had long been associated with Estonian territory, Narva was part of the St. Petersburg province between 1802 and 1917, while Estonia was part of the (Raun 2001). Following the Estonian War of Independence (1917–1920) and 1920 Treaty of , Narva and its twin-town of Ivangorod (which had been adminis- tratively merged for centuries) became part of the interwar, independent Republic of Estonia. Under the 1920 Treaty of Tartu, the Estonian-Soviet border was demarcated along the military frontline, with Estonia gaining a 10-kilometer-wide strip of land east of the Narva River (which included Ivangorod) in addition to Setomaa lands in the southeastern Estonian-Soviet borderland region (Berg and Oras 2000; Kaiser and Nikiforova 2006). During Soviet occupation, Narva’s territorial affiliation and its associated border also changed. Following annexation, the Soviet Union re-demarcated the borders between the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) and the Russian Soviet Federated Social- ist Republic with the Narva River as the new northeastern border, placing Ivangorod on the Russian side (Thompson 1998). The Soviet annexation of Estonia in 1940 invali- dated the 1920 Treaty of Tartu’s border and Narva’s administrative relationship with Ivangorod (Aalto and Berg 2002; Joenniemi and Sergunin 2011). Following indepen- dence, Estonia and Russia lacked a mutually agreed-upon border treaty (Thompson 1998). This Estonian–Russian border discrepancy is not unusual, particularly within the context of the former Soviet Union (Megoran 2004); however, unlike other violent terri- torial disputes (Murphy 2013), after decades the discrepancy was peacefully resolved in 2014 (Shemetov 2014), with the Soviet-era border emerging as the agreed-upon de jure border. Although the 2014 border treaty solidified Narva’s territorial affiliation in theory, Narva’s borderland precariousness and population remain problematic mainly owing to the presence of large numbers of ethnic Russians amid rising geopolitical tensions between Russia and NATO. Narva’s population also changed in tandem with broader geopolitical and territorial shifts. During the interwar independence period (roughly 1920–1939), Narva’s (1934) eth- nic composition was 64.8 percent , 29.7 percent Russians, 2.1 percent Germans, and 3.4 percent others (Raun 2001). Narva’s population differed markedly from Estonia’s other urban areas, including , Tartu, and Pärnu, where ethnic Estonians comprised well over 80 percent of the total population and Russians fewer than 10 percent (Raun 2001). During WWII, Narva was devastated and depopulated, allowing for the occupying Soviet regime to rebuild Narva as a model Soviet city for a new Russian-speaking Soviet Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015 citizenry (Smith 2002). Russians and Russian-speakers settled throughout the ESSR and tended to concentrate in newly built ethno-linguistically segregated neighborhoods, like Lasnamäe and Mustamäe in Tallinn, and newly rebuilt industrial cities, like Narva and Sillamäe in the Republic’s northeast (Kasekamp 2010). These settlement trends interspersed a Russian-speaking population throughout the Estonian SSR; however, Narva became the largest Russian-speaking city in Estonia built for and by a Soviet Russian citizenry disconnected to the city’s Estonian past and population. During the late 1980s, the Estonian and other Baltic republics non-violently orga- nized for independence from the Soviet Union. This trans-republic independence move- ment became known as the because it incorporated national singing traditions and practices (Šmidchens 2014). Following the Singing Revolution, Estonia’s Russian-speaking minorities found themselves in a “restored” Estonian state, and they Eurasian Geography and Economics 5

did not fit the nationalist mold of what it meant to be an Estonian citizen in a post-Soviet world (Aalto 2003). A major agenda of the new Estonian government was the restoration of its pre-Soviet citizenship policy that, in brief, declared Soviet citizenship to be illegal, and all pre-Soviet citizens and their descendants (predominantly Estonians) as the sole legitimate citizenry of the state (2003). This policy had the effect of rendering stateless all Soviet era migrants and their descendants, most of whom were ethnic Russians who did not possess pre-Soviet Estonian citizenship. In response, the northeastern communities of Narva and Sillamäe enacted referendums aimed at creating autonomous Russian-speaking municipalities (Smith 2002). These non-violent referendums, although electorally successful, were later declared unconstitutional by the Estonian government and, unlike similar separatist incidences of the early 1990s, the autonomy campaigns were dropped (2002). Narva’s post-Soviet changes reflect and mirror broader socioeconomic shifts impacting other predominantly Russian-speaking communities in Estonia. Narva suffered high unemployment, high rates of HIV/AIDS, drug abuse, and incidents of crime (Lunden and Zalamans 2000). Narva’s lack of manufacturing jobs, once abundant during the Soviet era, spurred heavy outmigration to Tallinn and abroad (Nikolajev and Rikken 2015). Narva’s social and economic problems triggered a nationally held perception of Narva as a regional “other” populated by muulased (semi-derogatory term for non-Estonians) or fifth columnists with pro-Russian leanings (Virkkunen 2002; Aalto 2003; Raud 2004). As Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008) note, “Narva is in many ways on the epistemological ‘frontlines’ of scale … where Narvan-ness, Estonian-ness, Russian-ness, European-ness, Western-ness, and Eastern- ness are made, unmade, rank ordered, and re-hierarchized,” (545). Narva is an illus- trative case study of secessionist and/or irredentist potential in states with multi-ethnic settlement areas deriving their legitimacy via the concept of uti possidetis juris (“as you possess under law;” Saideman and William Ayres 2000; Murphy 2013; Clem 2014). Narva’s ethnolinguistic “Russian-ness” within an ethnic Estonian nationalizing state in juxtaposition to a neighboring nationalizing and militarizing Russian kin state (Saideman and William Ayres 2000;Clem2014) is troubling and calls into question Narva’s future and Estonia’s territorial integrity (Balmforth 2014; Sander 2014; Ottens 2014; The Economist 2015). While the, “Baltic is not the Balkans,” (Clemens 2010), the heightened regional tensions coupled with their ethnicization highlight Narva’s prickly geopolitical position and the necessity to better understand Narva’s Russian- speakers.

Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015 Narvan perceptions and potential reactions to Russian activities Within this dynamic geopolitical and regional context, one of the authors of this piece (Trimbach) conducted fieldwork to examine Narva’s Russian-speaking community to understand the community’s citizenship practices, perceptions, and identities. Much can be gleaned from the project’s preliminary findings to speculate how Narvans might react to Russian military activities and regional overtures. Through Narva College (a branch campus of the ), the lead author surveyed (N = 424) and interviewed (majority face-to-face and three via Estonian-created Skype software) (N = 21) Russian- speakers in Narva (surveyed, N = 207; interviewed, N = 11) and Tallinn. The lead author conducted fieldwork in the autumn of 2013 as part of an ongoing doctoral project, just weeks prior to the onset of the “Euromaidan” uprising in Ukraine. 6 D.J. Trimbach

Narvans and citizenship Although the Estonian state has made recent reforms to its contentious citizenship pol- icy (Parliament Approves Amendments to Simplify Acquisition of Citizenship 2015), Narvans’ formal citizenship statuses and perceptions of such policies remains complex. According to Estonian census data, Narva’s population consists of a mix of Estonian citizens (46 percent), Russian citizens (37 percent), and stateless residents (16 percent) (Eesti Statistika 2011). When it comes to the perceived importance of citizenship, Narvans are as varied as their statuses. Narvans responded that citizenship is “not important” (35 percent), “important” (34 percent), “not very important” (18 percent), “very important” (7 percent), and “difficult to answer” (6 percent). When asked to define how citizenship should be determined in Estonia, a slight majority responded that citizenship should be based on birthplace (54 percent), challenging the primary legal principle of jus sanguinis (“right of blood”) currently used in Estonian policy. When asked to address whether or not an exam should be a citizenship requirement, a majority of Narvans stated that it should be a requirement (61 percent); however, during interviews most Narvans argued that the current language requirements were unrealistic and a major obstacle to naturalization. Such critical responses were consistent among interviewees. A Narva resident stated that,

I am happy to be part of Estonia. I am happy to cheer for our sports people. I am happy to wave the flag. After all, this is my motherland if it comes to those big terms. But my moth- erland has been sometimes sore to me. So, we have this very difficult relationship, which is fine. This is like family. You cannot choose your parents. (Interview, 9/19/2013)

From these data trends, it may appear that Russian-speaking Narvans might be expected to feel antagonism towards the Estonian state, but the coalesced data suggest that there is not a homogeneous Narvan citizenship group or associated identity seeking to sepa- rate from Estonia. Rather, Narvan Russian-speakers comprise a variety of citizenship status groups and citizenship understandings that often challenge Estonian state policy, but do not oppose the Estonian state.

Narvans and politics When it comes to politics in Estonia, Narva’s Russian-speaking community remains politically disengaged and fractured. Based on survey responses, Narvans stated that they are “not very interested” (49 percent) or “not at all interested” (10 percent) in poli- tics. Although some Narvans suggested that they do not participate in politics or civic

Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015 life at all (16 percent), those who do engage do so either passively “watch/read political news” (54 percent) or “vote in local elections” (80 percent). Narvans also tend to be split when it comes to perceptions of political and state accessibility and representation at all political scales in Estonia, Russia, and the EU, with the local being perceived as the most open and reflecting their interests. As one Narva resident noted, “Every politi- cal party tries to protect their own interests. Right now we often see that their interests have nothing to do with those of the people,” (Interview, 10/6/2013). This commonly shared sentiment coalesces well with other scholarship and data that suggest that Narvans are critical of democracy (Rikken 2012), Russian-speakers are marginalized within Estonian national politics (Aalto 2003) and participate less than their Estonian counterparts in electoral politics, which in part reflects the fact that only half of Russian-speakers can vote in national and/or EU elections (Trimbach 2014; Eurasian Geography and Economics 7

Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon [Estonian National Election Commission] 2015). These preliminary results also highlight recent, slight political party preference shifts from the long-dominant pro-Russian Center Party to the Social Democrats (Ammas 2015). The preliminary results also reflect the particularities of Estonian policies related to citizen- ship as practice. Since roughly 1992, non-citizens have been allowed to vote in Estonian local elections, although they are barred from participating in national elections, hold public office, join a political party, or be employed within the public sector (Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004; Trimbach 2014). Such policies highlight underlying inequitable political (power) relations, which impact the civic and political life of Russian-speakers. From these data, it appears that Russian-speaking Narvans are politically fractured, disengaged, and unincorporated. Narva’s Russian-speakers also seem to be wary of Estonian party politics and non-local political institutions, which are perceived as out of reach or unrepresentative of their varied political interests. While Narvan Russian-speakers are politically fragmented, do spatial affiliations unite this borderland community?

Narvans and spatial identity There are many identity studies focused on the former Soviet space (Laitin 1998; Aalto 2003;Fein2005; Duvold and Berglund 2014); however, these studies often privilege the national scale and national constructions of membership, ignoring local or alternative scales or spaces of identification (for counter examples, see O’Lear 1997, 1999;O’Lear and Whiting 2008). Narvans, like other Russian-speaking communities outside of the Russian Federation, maintain plural and hybrid identities (Smith and Burch 2012), which are not defined solely by the territorial state. Identities may be associated with other spaces. For instance, the majority of Narvans indicated that the city/town (Narva) is the most important spatial identity (21.7 percent), followed by Estonia (18.6 percent), world (17 percent), region/county (Ida-Viru) (14.3 percent), EU (13.5 percent), and Russia (11.6 percent). When various citizenship status groups were asked to define their spatial identities, Estonian citizens and Russian citizens alike were more inclined to define themselves, respectively, with Estonia and Russia. At first glance, these spatial identity findings imply a strong relationship between formal national citizenship and (national) spatial identity. However, when additional spatial scales (ranging from local to global) are included as response options, identities among Estonia’s Russian-speakers illustrate the complex plurality and hybridity of their identities with an overwhelming emphasis on the local scale (Narva). Narvans were also asked about their respective homeland (in Russian, rodina). Respondents identified their homeland mostly as Estonia (44 percent), followed by Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015 Narva (16 percent), Russia (6 percent), and other, non-geographic descriptions (25 per- cent). Narvans overall tend to maintain a strong local identity, and most residents geo- graphically imagine Narva as unique (79 percent) within Estonia. These different associations with spaces and identity with homeland reflects the plural and hybrid iden- tities of Narva residents. Anecdotally, many residents recognize the spaces outside of Narva’s municipal borders as “Estonia,” while Narva remains solely characterized as “Narva” and distinct from Estonia altogether. For many Narvans, spaces outside of Narva are almost foreign or distinctly Estonian. This localized affiliation highlights the spatial importance of Narva for Narva’s Russian-speaking community and illustrates how Narvans construct Narva in juxtaposition to Estonia, Russia, and the EU. Hybrid and complex spatial identities were revealed and reinforced through interviews. One Narvan stated that, 8 D.J. Trimbach

I never know who am I exactly. Am I Estonian? Am I Russian? I am like half Estonian and half Russian [linguistically and culturally] and I am really lucky and I really like it… And it is hard. You are stuck and you don’t really feel like a person. You feel yourself like a half-broken person. (Interview, 9/10/2013)

The preliminary data suggest that Narva’s Russian-speakers embody an array of plural and hybrid spatial identities, with an emphasis on the local. Complex spatial identities have consequences and political entanglements. From the data, it seems that spatial identities problematize how Russian-speakers identify and engage with political and ter- ritorial spaces, while also reifying the importance of localisms and local community affiliations.

Discussion and implications Narvans are not a monolithic community and should not be as assumed to be a homogenous group associated solely with Russia or Russian-ness. Narva’s Russian- speakers and ethnic Russians comprise an array of political perceptions, citizenship statuses, and spatial identities. Such variations coupled with the prospect of hybrid warfare or cyberwar, already a major threat to Estonia’s e-state system (Kaiser 2015), make any accurate geopolitical or security analyses difficult. What can be gleaned and examined from this research? Although Narvans maintain plural and hybrid spatial identities and citizenship practices and perceptions, they emphasize the local spaces and communities in which they are embedded and engaged. Narva remains a focal point for attachment and spatial affiliation. Narvans perceive their hometown and community as distinct even when compared to other Estonian Russian communities, like those in Tallinn. Such strong local affiliations illustrate how Narvans contribute to and challenge how Narva is socially constructed and discursively produced at a multiplicity of scales (Kaiser and Nikiforova 2008). Such strong local attachments, coupled with a lack of social integration and political incorporation also pose serious challenges to Estonian, EU, and NATO activities to counter Russian overtures and nationalist discourse. Narva’s political and citizenship landscape remains fractured, and Narvans themselves tend to be politically disengaged. While Narvans have pursued local autonomy in the past and maintain strong localisms, politically they are weak and unin- terested. Although Narvans do participate in political and civic life, particularly at the local/city level, they tend to perceive the Estonian, Russian, and EU political systems as out of reach. Citizenship continues to be problematic for Russian-speakers and the Estonian state.

Downloaded by [University of Kansas Libraries] at 09:04 11 November 2015 Russian-speakers are not naturalizing and acquiring Estonian citizenship, as previously seen in the 1990s (Poleshchuk 2013). Narvans with Russian citizenship and stateless residency view Estonian citizenship as inaccessible without additional worthwhile bene- fits and remain resentful for the loss of citizenship and political opportunities following independence. Stateless and Russian citizens in Narva also tend to share similar views of Russian citizenship and politics, while maintaining trust and strong political engage- ment at the local rather than national scales. While Narvan Russian-speakers remain resentful of the Estonian state, they also are wary of Russian overtures for fear of instability and lower living standards. Narva’s strong local attachments and Russian linkages by no means equate to affable responses to any future Russian interventions or potential annexation. Although there are definite generational divides in opinion, many Narvans understand and experience firsthand the Eurasian Geography and Economics 9

differences in living standards, stability, and relative political openness of Narva, Esto- nia, and the EU when compared to the Russian Federation. Narva’s proximity to its Russian twin-town of Ivangorod just across the Russian border and Narvan cross-border experiences problematize Russian engagement in the region because of the stark economic, social, and political differences illustrated between the two entwined commu- nities. Ivangorod and Narva have historic ties (at various times the municipalities merged), innumerable familial cross-border bonds, and shared economic interests. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the cities’ ties were severed because of border re-demarcation, and Ivangorod suffered steep economic and living standard declines, compared to Narva. In 2010, as a consequence of decline, Ivangorod symbolically sought separation from Russia in order to join Narva in Estonia (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty 2010). Current waves of Russian nationalism may have dampened Ivangorod’s regionalist aspirations and Narvans’ strong local affiliations; however, Narvans, cognizant of Ivangorod’s (and Russia’s) troubled situation, maintain their strong localisms while remaining cautiously bound to Estonia and Europe. Narva’s pre- cariousness and Narvans’ strong local attachment illustrate the necessity for scaled-down research and more critical approaches to the current geopolitical dilemma. As media and diplomatic storm clouds gather over Narva and other potential sites of tension, it is imperative to keep in mind local specificities and community dynamics. The current pace of militarization and security-driven discourse is subject to essentialist and broad assumptions. Ignoring post-Soviet trends and local complexities hinders thorough under- standing in scholarship, policy-making, and military activities.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of Xanthippe Wedel, Senior Research Data Engineer, Institute for Policy & Social Research, University of Kansas; and John Biersack, PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Kansas.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID David J. Trimbach http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1402-4137

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