THREE AGAINST MOSCOW So man?! swpet'fiC'ia.l c011111arisons have recentlll been dTa1U11. between the RUBs'ian catnpaign of Na1Joleon and that of todall tha·t o,n ana/1/S'is of this s~lbjeet wottld seem desiTable. To 11wke tMs analY8'is still cleat'er we have inclnded anothel' campaign-that of Chat'les XII of Sweden. Up to 1941 his ca,Jn1Jaign and Napoleon's wel'e the two llwst celebrated man~hes on Moscow. Both fa·iled. F?'om this some wonld Wee to draw the conclu· sion that the pI'esent one tntl8t fail too. On/lI tim.e will tell, But Itlready the similwrities and differences in the thl'ee camwt'igns. se1JaTated by 1'oughl1l a centw'1l fro'ln clleh otltel'. a1'/~ suff'ieientlll clem' fa?' a em/'/.­ J}ll'l'ison.-K.M. CHARLES XII, 1708-1709 With the rise of Peter the Great and haupt, and to use Pskov as a base for his dl"ive for an outlet to the Baltic the drive against Moscow. But Peter, Sea, Russia and Sweden - the mistress anticipating this plan, had ordered the of the Baltic - had become the two devastation of the Baltic lands and the chief rivals of northeastern Europe. evacuation of the inhabitants of DOl'pat, At Karva in 1700 Charles XII, the Narvu, and other cities to northeastern brilliant young king of Sweden, defeat­ Russia. Charles, impatient and self­ ed Peter's large but primitive army. confident, decided to march straight Believing that he had dealt Russia a towards the east and ordered Lewen­ deathblow, Charles thereafter for many haupt to join him with ammunition years directed his efforts against and supplies. Poland, thus giving Peter time to reorganize his army on the basis of the The road from Minsk to Moscow lessons learnt at Narva and to occupy leads through the famous gap between a large section of the Baltic countries. the Baltic river Dvina and the Black Sea "ivel' Dniepr, ~ g~p which at its Finally, with conquered Poland as narrowest point is 45 miles wide. an ally. Ch3"le~ dp.cioed to turn ~gail1 There iR only one mlljOl' natural obstacle on Peter. With one Swedish army on the way, the Beresina river. In under Le........cnhuupt uL Rigu I,;oyt:ring vain did the Russians try to IJ1'eVent his left flank, he crossed the Vistula Charles' crossing it a few miles south early in 1708 with bis main force of Borissov, and when they made of 46,UOO men. Using all available a stand at Golovtchin, northeast of parallel l'oads, the Swedes in a quick Mohilev, they were defeated on July and exemplary winter march reached 3, 1708. While the Russian forces l'e­ Grodno and Radoszkowicze near Minsk. tired to Smolensk. the traditional post Here they stayed two and a half months guarding the Dvina-Dniepr gap, Char­ to organize the supplies for their fur­ les remained for a month in Mohilev, ther advance. but then, tired of waiting for Lewen­ haupt, he pushed on towards Smolensk. Charles faced a serious problem: He got as far as Tatarsk, and it was which road was he to take to reach his here that he made the most momentous goal, Moscow? His generals advised decision of the war: abruptly abandon­ the northern route through the Baltic ing his previous direction, he turned states in order to operate from a at a sharp angle towards the south. region closer to Sweden, to join Lewen- leaving orders for Lewenhaupt to follow. 108 THE XXth CENTURY It was by now the middle of Septem­ hand a detour through the[~uth seemed ber, 1708. to otTer many advantages. For there the rich and still intact fields of the What made Charles give up his head­ Ukraine beckoned, a country inhabited on drive against MoscoW't For the by a population restive under Russian last 233 years historians have tried to domination and apparently ready to answer this question, and many theories rise under their leader, Hetman Mazepa. have been advanced. Evidently Charles There was news of a rebellion against had convinced himself on the one hand Peter among the Cossacks of the Don; that the Russians had strong positions there was the possibility of aid from at the traditional gateway to Moscow Turkish or Tartar armies; and there and that they were ruthlessly laying was finally the lack of strong Russian waste the country, thus depriving the defenses on the southern approaches to Swedes of any supplies. On the other Moscow. There appeared to be only ~ ~ @ARLE.SXII 1708-1709 MOSCOW o Tul.a. THREE AGAINST MOSCOW 109 one disadvantage: the tremendous dis­ Their communications with Poland and tances to be covered. Sweden had long been cut. No general uprising against Moscow occurred in Charles' decision is one of the South Russia. No aid arrived from the turning-points in European history. The Tartars or the Turks. The small-scale advantages which he had expected from warfare of the winter months allowed his march to the south did not mate­ no decision to be reached but only rialize, but the disadvantage - the served to decimate the Swedish forces. enormous size of the country-remain­ And all the time Peter avoided a battle. ed. Charles was soon to feel the He was biding his time. He waited consequences. First Lewenhaupt, still until cold, hunger, guerrilla warfare, trying to catch up with the main and disease had sufficiently weakened force, was defeated at Lyessnaya. He the isolated army of Charles. lost his supplies and artillery and reached Charles with only half his army It was not till the summer that left. Next it became clear that, in the Peter felt his time had come. In the absence of careful preparations, the battle of Poltava on June 7, 1709, some march to the Ukraine had become an 40,000 Russians with 70 guns fought adventure rather than a military enter­ 18,000 Swedes with 30 guns. The prise. The Ukrainians were by no Russian army and Peter's generalship means pleased with Charles' unexpected had both vastly improved in the years decision, which carried the war into since Narva. The greatest handicap the heart of their country. Although for the Swedes was not their small Mazepa himself remained true to his numbers but the fact that their king promise to aid Charles, he was joined had been wounded a few days earlier by only 2,000 Cossacks, the others either so that he was prevented from leading holding themselves aloof or, electing a his men in person. His generals, used counter-Hetman, even turning against to relying on the genius of their king, him. Though they hated the Russians, made blunders now that they had to the orthodox Ukrainians feared that a act on their own. The Swedes were victorious Swedish advance into their utterly defeated. Charles, suffering from country would ultimately lead to its wound-fever, was barely saved from control by the detested Roman Catho­ capture. Mazepa fled. The army sur­ lic Poles. For Sweden was far away, rendered. while neighboring Poland was an ally For ~weeien. th", hattie of Poltava of Charlca. was a blow from which she never re­ Worflt of nll, the 'winter of 1708/0 coverod, and ohc hl\3 l"Cn1Uincd a was unusually bitter. When Mazepa's secondary power ever since. For Russia main bnso, Baturin, was dcatro.}'cd by it mcnnt the foundation of her un­ the Russians, the Swedes found them­ disputed hegemony in northeastern selves without decent winter quarters. Europe. NAPOLEON, 1812 During the years 1807 to 1812, while perhaps to open through her the road Napoleon was extending his control to India - the brightest jewel in the over Europe and vainly trying to British crown - Napoleon decided to defeat England through his Continental march against Moscow. With this Blockade, Russia under Tsar Alexan­ decision he accepted war on two der I was playing for time. Though fronts, for the fighting in Spain was formally an ally, Napoleon could never still tying down a French army of be sure of Russia's position. The final 290,000 men and claiming considerable break came in 1812. To force Russia losses. There was also unrest in into a dependable co-operation and France and other parts of Europe. 110 THE XXtb CENTURY Yet Napoleon was confident. He had to St. Petersburg, and Tchitchagov's some 600,000 men at his disposal in in the south. the east, of which 470,000, "la Grande Armee," were ready to march into Napoleon began his campaign by Russia. His left flank was protected crossing the Nyemen on June 24. His by strong forces, including a Prussian plan was to drive a wedge between corps under Yorck, and his right the two main armies of the Russiall!l flank by some 30,000 Austrians under and to defeat each of them in turn. March Of Napoleon. === Mat~""ofi<.U}SiM Arrnie) ~~.~.. fenu Around Nllpoltor.l~ :. -- "~1 i1'2d Alley" .Poltava Schwarzenberg. On his march toward But the Russians constantly withdrew Moscow he faced two Russian armies, without engaging in any major battle one of 120,000 men under Barclay de and finally effected a junction of their Tolly in the neighborhood of Vilna, the armies at Smolensk. On three occa­ other, 37,000 strong, under Bagration, sions-at Vilna, Vitebsk, and Smolensk south of the Pripet river. In addition -Napoleon hoped to force the Russians to these there were Wittgenstein's into battle, but each time they retired.