THREE AGAINST MOSCOW

So man?! swpet'fiC'ia.l c011111arisons have recentlll been dTa1U11. between the RUBs'ian catnpaign of Na1Joleon and that of todall tha·t o,n ana/1/S'is of this s~lbjeet wottld seem desiTable. To 11wke tMs analY8'is still cleat'er we have inclnded anothel' campaign-that of Chat'les XII of Sweden. Up to 1941 his ca,Jn1Jaign and Napoleon's wel'e the two llwst celebrated man~hes on Moscow. Both fa·iled. F?'om this some wonld Wee to draw the conclu· sion that the pI'esent one tntl8t fail too. On/lI tim.e will tell, But Itlready the similwrities and differences in the thl'ee camwt'igns. se1JaTated by 1'oughl1l a centw'1l fro'ln clleh otltel'. a1'/~ suff'ieientlll clem' fa?' a em/'/.­ J}ll'l'ison.-K.M.

CHARLES XII, 1708-1709 With the rise of Peter the Great and haupt, and to use Pskov as a base for his dl"ive for an outlet to the Baltic the drive against Moscow. But Peter, Sea, Russia and Sweden - the mistress anticipating this plan, had ordered the of the Baltic - had become the two devastation of the Baltic lands and the chief rivals of northeastern Europe. evacuation of the inhabitants of DOl'pat, At Karva in 1700 Charles XII, the Narvu, and other cities to northeastern brilliant young king of Sweden, defeat­ Russia. Charles, impatient and self­ ed Peter's large but primitive army. confident, decided to march straight Believing that he had dealt Russia a towards the east and ordered Lewen­ deathblow, Charles thereafter for many haupt to join him with ammunition years directed his efforts against and supplies. Poland, thus giving Peter time to reorganize his army on the basis of the The road from Minsk to Moscow lessons learnt at Narva and to occupy leads through the famous gap between a large section of the Baltic countries. the Baltic river Dvina and the Black Sea "ivel' Dniepr, ~ g~p which at its Finally, with conquered Poland as narrowest point is 45 miles wide. an ally. Ch3"le~ dp.cioed to turn ~gail1 There iR only one mlljOl' natural obstacle on Peter. With one Swedish army on the way, the Beresina river. In under Le...... cnhuupt uL Rigu I,;oyt:ring vain did the Russians try to IJ1'eVent his left flank, he crossed the Vistula Charles' crossing it a few miles south early in 1708 with bis main force of Borissov, and when they made of 46,UOO men. Using all available a stand at Golovtchin, northeast of parallel l'oads, the Swedes in a quick Mohilev, they were defeated on July and exemplary winter march reached 3, 1708. While the Russian forces l'e­ Grodno and Radoszkowicze near Minsk. tired to Smolensk. the traditional post Here they stayed two and a half months guarding the Dvina-Dniepr gap, Char­ to organize the supplies for their fur­ les remained for a month in Mohilev, ther advance. but then, tired of waiting for Lewen­ haupt, he pushed on towards Smolensk. Charles faced a serious problem: He got as far as Tatarsk, and it was which road was he to take to reach his here that he made the most momentous goal, Moscow? His generals advised decision of the war: abruptly abandon­ the northern route through the Baltic ing his previous direction, he turned states in order to operate from a at a sharp angle towards the south. region closer to Sweden, to join Lewen- leaving orders for Lewenhaupt to follow. 108 THE XXth CENTURY

It was by now the middle of Septem­ hand a detour through the[~uth seemed ber, 1708. to otTer many advantages. For there the rich and still intact fields of the What made Charles give up his head­ Ukraine beckoned, a country inhabited on drive against MoscoW't For the by a population restive under Russian last 233 years historians have tried to domination and apparently ready to answer this question, and many theories rise under their leader, Hetman Mazepa. have been advanced. Evidently Charles There was news of a rebellion against had convinced himself on the one hand Peter among the Cossacks of the Don; that the Russians had strong positions there was the possibility of aid from at the traditional gateway to Moscow Turkish or Tartar armies; and there and that they were ruthlessly laying was finally the lack of strong Russian waste the country, thus depriving the defenses on the southern approaches to Swedes of any supplies. On the other Moscow. There appeared to be only

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@ARLE.SXII 1708-1709

MOSCOW

o Tul.a. THREE AGAINST MOSCOW 109

one disadvantage: the tremendous dis­ Their communications with Poland and tances to be covered. Sweden had long been cut. No general uprising against Moscow occurred in Charles' decision is one of the South Russia. No aid arrived from the turning-points in European history. The Tartars or the Turks. The small-scale advantages which he had expected from warfare of the winter months allowed his march to the south did not mate­ no decision to be reached but only rialize, but the disadvantage - the served to decimate the Swedish forces. enormous size of the country-remain­ And all the time Peter avoided a battle. ed. Charles was soon to feel the He was biding his time. He waited consequences. First Lewenhaupt, still until cold, hunger, guerrilla warfare, trying to catch up with the main and disease had sufficiently weakened force, was defeated at Lyessnaya. He the isolated army of Charles. lost his supplies and artillery and reached Charles with only half his army It was not till the summer that left. Next it became clear that, in the Peter felt his time had come. In the absence of careful preparations, the battle of Poltava on June 7, 1709, some march to the Ukraine had become an 40,000 Russians with 70 guns fought adventure rather than a military enter­ 18,000 Swedes with 30 guns. The prise. The Ukrainians were by no Russian army and Peter's generalship means pleased with Charles' unexpected had both vastly improved in the years decision, which carried the war into since Narva. The greatest handicap the heart of their country. Although for the Swedes was not their small Mazepa himself remained true to his numbers but the fact that their king promise to aid Charles, he was joined had been wounded a few days earlier by only 2,000 Cossacks, the others either so that he was prevented from leading holding themselves aloof or, electing a his men in person. His generals, used counter-Hetman, even turning against to relying on the genius of their king, him. Though they hated the Russians, made blunders now that they had to the orthodox Ukrainians feared that a act on their own. The Swedes were victorious Swedish advance into their utterly defeated. Charles, suffering from country would ultimately lead to its wound-fever, was barely saved from control by the detested Roman Catho­ capture. Mazepa fled. The army sur­ lic Poles. For Sweden was far away, rendered. while neighboring Poland was an ally For ~weeien. th", hattie of Poltava of Charlca. was a blow from which she never re­ Worflt of nll, the 'winter of 1708/0 coverod, and ohc hl\3 l"Cn1Uincd a was unusually bitter. When Mazepa's secondary power ever since. For Russia main bnso, Baturin, was dcatro.}'cd by it mcnnt the foundation of her un­ the Russians, the Swedes found them­ disputed hegemony in northeastern selves without decent winter quarters. Europe.

NAPOLEON, 1812

During the years 1807 to 1812, while perhaps to open through her the road Napoleon was extending his control to India - the brightest jewel in the over Europe and vainly trying to British crown - Napoleon decided to defeat England through his Continental march against Moscow. With this Blockade, Russia under Tsar Alexan­ decision he accepted war on two der I was playing for time. Though fronts, for the fighting in Spain was formally an ally, Napoleon could never still tying down a French army of be sure of Russia's position. The final 290,000 men and claiming considerable break came in 1812. To force Russia losses. There was also unrest in into a dependable co-operation and France and other parts of Europe. 110 THE XXtb CENTURY

Yet Napoleon was confident. He had to St. Petersburg, and Tchitchagov's some 600,000 men at his disposal in in the south. the east, of which 470,000, "la Grande Armee," were ready to march into Napoleon began his campaign by Russia. His left flank was protected crossing the Nyemen on June 24. His by strong forces, including a Prussian plan was to drive a wedge between corps under Yorck, and his right the two main armies of the Russiall!l flank by some 30,000 Austrians under and to defeat each of them in turn.

March Of Napoleon.

=== Mat~""ofi<.U}SiM Arrnie)

~~.~.. fenu Around Nllpoltor.l~ :. -- "~1 i1'2d Alley"

.Poltava

Schwarzenberg. On his march toward But the Russians constantly withdrew Moscow he faced two Russian armies, without engaging in any major battle one of 120,000 men under Barclay de and finally effected a junction of their Tolly in the neighborhood of Vilna, the armies at Smolensk. On three occa­ other, 37,000 strong, under Bagration, sions-at Vilna, Vitebsk, and Smolensk south of the Pripet river. In addition -Napoleon hoped to force the Russians to these there were Wittgenstein's into battle, but each time they retired. northern army to guard the approaches After their retreat from Smolensk, THREE AGAINST MOSCOW 111

Kutuzov, the hero of an earlier war city, and on the following day huge with Turkey and by this time sixty­ fires broke out which laid waste the seven years old, took over the Russian greater part of it, destroying quarters command. To reach Smolensk on and supplies. In vain Napoleon hoped August 18, Napoleon had taken two that the Tsar would sue for peace. A months. He felt he had no time to lose. further campaign without a base against the elusive enemy was impos­ In Smolensk Napoleon decided to sible. Winter was closing in. Moscow carry out what Charles XII had avoided: was at the tip of a long and narrow a head-on attack on Moscow. He had, wedge - its sides hundreds of miles to be sure, a much larger army than long. The French were engulfed by a Charles, but otherwise he faced the hostile nation armed and patriotic. same difficulties, and his army of men Only one ruined road linked Napoleon and horses was melting rapidly away. with Europe. Powerful Russian armies The roads were poor, the distances were threatening his rear 450 and 700 tremendous, the devastation of the miles away, at Drissa and Brest-Litovsk. countryside on the part of the retreat­ ing Russians ruthless and thorough. On October 19 Kapoleon began his From Smolensk eastward Napoleon was retreat. What was left of his army no longer on Polish or Lithuanian but was demoralized and had lost all march­ purely Russian soil. Yet no attempt ing discipline. Pressure from Kutuzov was made to win over the Russian forced him to take the same road back peasants by liberation from their age­ over which he had advanced. In the old servitude. The French knew that terrible Russian cold a life and death they were facing a nation united in race set in for the Beresina river. patriotic effort. From three sides atmies were rushing toward the ford: Napoleon from the Before Moscow Kutuzov decided to east, harassed by Kutuzov's forces make a stand. In the battle of Borodino marching slightly to the south of him, on September 7 Napoleon finally got his Wittgenstein from the north, Tchitcha­ long-awaited chance. (The Germans gov from the south. Against huge crossed the same battlefield on October odds and a combined Russian army of 14.) Each army was about 125 000 129,000, Napoleon effected a crossing men strong. The French were exhausted of the Beresina during the last days by the long marches through devastated of November. But only a small number lands. Napoleon was not his old self. of Frenchmen reached the other bank, The Russians resisted stubbornly and and a few days later Napoleon left both sides suffered terrible losses, but the miserable remnants of his army in the end the Russians gave way and and hurried back to Paris. From abandoned Moscow. On September 15 Moscow his path led straight to Leipzig, Napoleon entered the almost empty Elba, Waterloo, and St. Helena.

HITLER, 19U

Two important parallels between the same endless plains, marshes, and forests present and previous campaigns in of Eastern Europe. Russia have rightly been stressed, those However, these two parallels are of time and space. In all three opposed by a long list of divergences. instances serious fighting began in the Attention has been called to the fact second half of June (Charles XII forc­ that Napoleon, starting out almost ed his way across the Beresina on simultaneously with Hitler, entered June 16, Napoleon crossed the border Moscow on September 15, when the June 24, Hitler on June 22) and today, German armies were still some 150 as then, the theater of war lies in the miles from that city. It is true, 112 THE XXth CENTURY

Napoleon advanced with greater speed they are suffering heavier losses than than the German troops, especially as their opponents. all movements were made on foot. If This difference becomes particularly it were a question of winning the race clear if we look at the role of Smolensk to Moscow, Napoleon would deserve the in the three campaigns. Charles, after cup. But the problem was to defeat almost reaching it and without sufficient Russia. And here Napoleon's speed, forces for a head-on attack, tried the far from being an advantage to him, detour through the Ukraine. After was actually the cause of his downfall. marching hundreds of miles practically Napoleon marched as rapidly as he did without fighting-much farther than it because his chief aim, to force the would have been to Moscow-he suffered Russians to full battle, was not accom­ a tragic defeat. Napoleon passed plished. From the border almost all Smolensk quickly, and on his almost the way to Moscow, over a distance of unopposed march to and from Moscow 500 miles as the crow flies, Napoleon he lost his entire army. The German chased the Russians in vain. Although armies, after breaking through to Napoleon's army marched an average Smolensk on July 16, that is a whole of almost 6.3 miles per day (520 miles month before Napoleon, did not follow from the Nyemen to Moscow in 83 his example, but waited almost three days), the Russians managed an aver­ months until their wings had straighten­ age of 9 miles per day for Barclay de ed out the front from Leningrad to Tolly's forces and even 16.2 miles per the Crimea. When Napoleon marched day for Bagration's. When they finally eastwards from Smolensk he courted made a stand at Borodino Napoleon's disaster with his dangerously open army ,was tired and decimated by the flanks threatened from both the north long march through devastated country. and south. When the German troops advanced on October 2, six weeks later Herein is to be found the chief than Napoleon. their flanks were safely difference. In both the earlier cam­ anchored on the shores of the Baltic paigns the Russians succeeded in saving and Black Seas. And on October 19, when their own strength and in evading Napoleon began his disastrous retreat, battle until they were ready to fight the German army, without perceptible an enemy far from his base, exhausted, loss of striking power, was shelling and lost in the enormous space. Tbis Moscow. they were able to do because the Swedish and French armies marched Both Charles and Napoleon paid for like slim arrows into the vastness of the speed of their advance with the Russia. Charles' small force was never breakdown of their communication more than one column. And Napoleon's system::! in the rear. Doth had hoped army of half a million, while starting to live off the land, Charles in the from a broad base, quickly narrowed Ukrai"ne, Napoleon upon reaching Mos­ down to the one column that marched cow. Both were unprepared for the on the main road to Moscow. The Russian "scorched earth policy." In German army today, on the other hand, the end it was not so much the cold is moving in a broad front, like a of the Russian winter as the lack of flood tide from the Arctic to the Black communications which caused the col­ Sea. In this frontal attack the Russian lapse of their armies. armies must fight, whether they like it Neither the Swedes nor the French or not. They could not adopt the prepared their campaigns with the dilatory and withdrawing tactics of meticulous and detailed care and fore­ the previous campaigns because that sight of the Germans. Compared with would have meant losing their main the present war, where every eventuali­ industrial areas, developed in western ty has been taken into consideration, Russia since Napoleon. Thus instead their campaigns seem like grand imp~o­ of saving their strength for the finish visations. Napoleon had taken wIth THREE AGAINST MOSCOW 113

him neither winter clothing for his while they destroyed everything in the army nor special winter horseshoes. path of Napoleon); the existence of The lack of the latter caused serious railroads and motortrucks for carrying los~es to his artillery and train as a supplies, and so on. There is one large number of horses broke their legs difference, however, which is of even in slipping on the icy roads. For a care­ greater importance: that is the differ­ fully equipped army the Russian winter ence in the spirit of the three armies has one advantage: it bridges all rivers marching against Moscow. and bogs with ice. The wars of 1708 and 1812 might There is no need to elaborate on all almost be called the personal affairs of the technical differences between the Charles XII and Napoleon. Neither the first two wars and today. It is enough Swedish nor the French soldier's had to mention the mechanized equipment any personal interest in the war, just which has tremendously increased the as Europe in those days had no grudge speed and striking power of the armies against Russia nor any fear of her. and hence reduced the size of Russia Charles' men followed him in the spirit for all practical purposes; the advantage of adventure and because they loved held in mechanical warfare by a nation the brilliant personality and leadership trained for generations in the sphere of their king. Few men in the armies of industry over a people that in its of Napoleon, which had largely been masses has only recently turned toward raised by force, saw either sense in the technical fields; the use of huge their participation or necessity for the airtleets which carry the war far into campaign itself, But today Europe and the territory behind the Soviet armies, the soldiers of the German and Allied destroying their means of supply and armies know what they are fighting communication (the Russians of 1812 for and what a Bolshevist victory .could tight from unscathed country would mean.