Fruits; Fresh Vegetables and Fresh Limes” (Opp
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov ESTTA Tracking number: ESTTA881622 Filing date: 03/07/2018 IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Proceeding 91238258 Party Plaintiff Wonderful Citrus LLC Correspondence DARYA P LAUFER ESQ Address ROLL LAW GROUP PC 11444 WEST OLYMPIC BLVD LOS ANGELES, CA 90064 UNITED STATES Email: [email protected], [email protected] Submission Other Motions/Papers Filer's Name Michael M. Vasseghi Filer's email [email protected], [email protected] Signature / Michael M. Vasseghi / Date 03/07/2018 Attachments Opposition with Exhibits-reduced size.pdf(1950576 bytes ) IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Wonderful Citrus LLC, Opposition No. 91238258 Opposer, Application Serial No. 87/472272 v. APB, Inc. dba Vision Produce Company, Applicant. OPPOSER WONDERFUL CITRUS LLC’S OPPOSITION TO APPLICANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS I. INTRODUCTION Applicant moves for judgment on the pleadings (“Motion”), arguing that “there is no genuine issue as to Opposer’s lack of prior rights in a trademark that could be confusingly similar to Applicant’s Mark.” (Motion pg. 3.)1 Applicant’s Motion is not well taken. It acknowledges that Opposer has alleged exactly what it takes issue with – that Opposer has prior rights in a trademark that could be confusingly similar to Applicant’s Mark. Despite this, Applicant seeks to take issue with those allegations, implicitly contending that Opposer will be unable to prove what it has alleged. (Motion pg. 2.) This is not a proper basis for judgment on the pleadings, which must accept as true all allegations asserted in the Opposition. Applicant’s Motion is little more than a series of strawman arguments to which Applicant fails to apply any legal analysis. Instead, Applicant contents itself to a series of unwarranted conclusions. Applicant’s Motion must be denied because Applicant applies incorrect standards, fails to deem 1 Applicant has not numbered the pages of its Motion. {2808553.3} 1 Opposer’s allegations as true and afford Opposer all reasonable inferences, thereby failing to carry its burden. The Board must deny the Motion. II. ARGUMENT A. Applicant’s Motion Must Be Denied Because It Fails To Deem Opposer’s Allegations And Reasonable Inferences As True. Procedurally, Applicant’s Motion must be denied because the determinations it seeks cannot be made at the pleading stage. The sole legal authority Applicant cites that considered judgment on the pleading is Kraft Group LLC v. Harpole, 90 USPQ2d 1837, 1840 (2009). Under Kraft, Opposer, as non-moving party, is entitled to have “all [its] well pleaded factual allegations … accepted as true …[and] All reasonable inferences from the pleadings are drawn in [its] favor.” Id. Applicant’s Motion ignores this legal principle since its motion does not point to any particular lack of allegations in the Notice of Opposition. To illustrate Applicant’s use of an erroneous standard, Applicant quotes Life Zone, Inc. v. Middleman Group Inc., 87 USPQ.2d 1953, 1959 (TTAB 2008): “Without proof of priority, an opposer cannot prevail” (emphasis added). Life Zone, Inc. deals with an opposer’s ultimate burden at trial, not a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Id. at 1953. Whether an opposer may ultimately prove an allegation is irrelevant at the pleading stage, so long as it is reasonably alleged. Applicant impermissibly contradicts Opposer’s allegations on three central points. • Applicant claims “Opposer does not have priority.” (Motion pg. 3.) This is flatly contradicted by Opposer’s express allegation that it marketed produce under its marks “prior to the March 31, 2017.” (Opp. ¶ 4.) • Applicant claims that there can be no likelihood of confusion because Opposer’s marks are too functional to be registrable (Motion pg. 4), in contradiction to Opposer’s allegations that it is “the owner of … Common Law rights for various I KUNIK & Lime Design trademarks for use on or in connection with fresh fruits; fresh vegetables and fresh limes” (Opp. ¶ 2), that these marks are “distinctive” (Id. ¶4), Opposer has “spent significant sums of money advertising and promoting the products offered” under its marks (Id. ¶ 6), by virtue of these actions and {2808553.3} 2 promotion “Opposer owns extremely valuable goodwill which is symbolized by and associated with its I KUNIK & Lime Design Marks” (Id. ¶ 7). • Applicant claims that there can be no likelihood of confusion because Applicant’s mark is “fanciful” and therefore registrable (Motion pg. 5), despite the fact that Opposer has alleged that the marks “so closely resemble” each other that Applicant’s use of its mark is likely “to cause confusion, mistake or deception…”2 (Opp. ¶¶ 9 & 12). Indeed, these are the central issues in dispute, so judgment on the pleadings is improper. Kraft, supra, 90 USPQ2d at 1840. B. Opposer’s Allegations Give Rise to a Reasonable Inference that it Has Developed Acquired Distinctiveness in its Marks. Substantively, the crux of Applicant’s Motion lies in the incorrect argument that because the lime portion of Opposer’s marks are generic or functional, they have no trademark protection and cannot prevent Applicant’s mark from registering. This argument is flawed for five reasons. 1. Opposer Has Alleged Acquired Distinctiveness of a Protectable Mark and Should be Allowed to Proceed with its Opposition Applicant quickly concludes that Opposer’s marks are “as a matter of law, generic or functional for use in association with limes and other citrus products.” (Motion pg. 2). Applicant is mistaken. Preliminarily, Applicant conflates two, distinct concepts: whether a mark is 1) generic or 2) functional. Applicant fails to specify which doctrine it contends justifies judgment on the pleadings. The U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that “A generic term is one that refers to a genus of which the particular product is a species.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992), quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469, U.S. 189, 194 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that distinct from this, “eligibility 2 Applicant overstates the differences between the limes represented in Opposer’s marks compared with Applicant’s mark. Both Opposer’s and Applicants’ Marks are stylized representations of a bisected lime. Having failed to set forth the legal standard regarding what creates an impermissibly “realistic” depiction, a foundational premise of Applicant’s argument, it cannot prevail on its Motion regarding this point. {2808553.3} 3 for protection under § 43(a) depends on nonfunctionality.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992); see also Lanham Act Sections 2(e), 23(c) and 43(c). The significance of this distinction is illustrated in Duramax Marine, LLC v. R.W. Fernstrum & Company, 80 USPQ2d 1780, 2006 WL 2263820, *13 (2006) (“Duramax”), which considered at trial whether an “image of [a] keel cooler [alleged to be] so realistic as to be the equivalent of a photograph, or perhaps a technically precise drawing” precluded registration of a mark for custom manufacturing services of keel coolers. In Duramax, the Board made conflicting decisions on functionality, as opposed to descriptiveness and acquired distinctiveness: “The opposition is dismissed as to opposer’s claim that the proposed mark is functional for applicant’s identified services. The opposition is sustained as to opposer’s claim that the proposed mark is descriptive and has not been shown to have acquired distinctiveness.” Id. at *22. It appears that Applicant argues that Opposer’s marks are generic, not functional. (a) The Conceptual Strength of Opposer’s Marks Cannot Be Decided At the Pleading Stage “[T]he placement of [mark] on the fanciful-suggestive-descriptive-generic continuum is a question of fact.” In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp, 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Genericness is a question of fact. In re Northland Aluminum Products, Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1559, 227 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1301, 91 USPQ2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2009). More pointedly, a finding of genericness must be supported by “clear evidence of generic use.” In re Nordic Naturals, Inc., 755 F.3d 1340, 1342, 111 USPQ2d 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2014). According to the Federal Circuit, that a mark is generic cannot be determined at the pleading stage. McNeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 84 USPQ2d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reversing dismissal on a FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) motion where district court held the alleged mark to be a generic name). The parties have not had an opportunity to conduct {2808553.3} 4 discovery yet. See, Yamaha Intern. Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., Ltd., 840 F.2d 1572, 1576 (1988). Additionally, Opposer has not had an opportunity to offer any evidence of its marks having acquired secondary meaning. A descriptive mark can achieve protection if it has acquired secondary meaning. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). Therefore even if Opposer’s marks are deemed descriptive, they still could have protection by a showing of acquired distinctiveness via secondary meaning, as discussed more fully below. None of these issues can be decided at this stage of the proceeding. Therefore a determination of the conceptual strength of Opposer’s marks – is forms the entire basis for Applicant’s Motion - is premature at this time. Accordingly its Motion must be denied. (b) Opposer Is Entitled To A Reasonable Inference That It Has Established Acquired Distinctiveness. In concluding that Opposer’s mark is not registrable, Applicant ignores that descriptive terms are not completely barred from registration.