DOCSLIB.ORG

Scientific and Technical Intelligence of the Polaroid Corporation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Scientific and Technical Intelligence of the Polaroid Corporation The Intelligencer Association of Former Intelligence Officers Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies From AFIO's The Volume 20 • Number 3 • $15.00 single copy price Spring/Summer 2014 Intelligencer 7700 Leesburg Pike, Suite 324 Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Falls Church, Virginia 22043 Web: www.afio.com , E-mail: [email protected] Volume 20 • Number 3 • $15 single copy price Spring/Summer 2014 ©2014, AFIO INTELLIGENGCCE IN THE MIDEAST A Memoir The Spreading Fires of Extremism CIA, Syria, and the SVR • Management of Advanced Cryptographic Systems • Doctor Zhivagoo and the Iron Curtain • Political Stability by Country • NOIRR - A Proposal • Guide to the Study of Intelligenceee: Part 8 — WWI Intelligence • S&T Intelligence • Weapons of Mass Destruction • Law Enforcement Intelligence ong before I joined CIA its analysts had been • Terrorism Analysis • Chapters and National Events • Obituaries of Note • Professional Readings • Film & Book Reviews • Forthcoming Books unable to answer President Eisenhower’s crit- Lical “bomber and missile gap” questions. The president called in the nation’s leading scientists for Guide to the Study of Intelligence advice on what technology might be brought to bear on the issues. This advisory group became known as the “Land Panel” after one the group’s more innovative and active members, Edwin “Den” H. Land, president Scientific and Technical Intelligence of the Polaroid Corporation. The panel quickly came up with solutions to the “bomber and missile gap” and A Memoir by a S&T Intelligence Officer other intelligence questions as well: 1) Get spies inside the Soviet Union, 2) Use high-altitude aerial reconnais- sance to see what missiles and bombers the Soviets by S. Eugene Poteat, LLD(Hon.) have, and 3) begin the development of reconnaissance satellites since aerial reconnaissance will eventually be vulnerable to improving Soviet antiaircraft missile defenses. Surprisingly, Eisenhower directed the CIA EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION to take the lead in developing and operating both the U-2 aerial reconnaissance and the reconnaissance The first Soviet atomic bomb test on 29 satellite efforts with support from the Air Force. Then August 1949 caught the US by surprise. Aided Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles objected, by a long term and successful espionage saying the CIA was not in the business of developing operation against the Manhattan Project, such high-technology systems. Eisenhower’s response the detonation highlighted the lack of US was, “Well, you are in that business now, because it intelligence on the USSR. The next year, UN has to be done in secret.”1 forces in Korea began encountering advanced I was recruited into the CIA from Cape Canaveral, Soviet-made fighters (MIG-15, some flown Florida in 1959 and initially underwent the requisite sub rosa by Russian pilots) that were superior indoctrination into the principals of intelligence and to America’s aircraft. Clearly the US needed espionage. Contrary to the widely held perception more and better intelligence about its adver- that intelligence is the purloining of secret informa- saries and their weapons capabilities in order tion from foreign countries, which is then used for to develop appropriate countermeasures and advantage in wartime and as an aid to diplomacy, its own weapons systems. Existing SIGINT and the catching of foreign spies, or counterintelli- and technical sensors proved inadequate, gence, I learned that intelligence serves a number of calling for a new generation of scientific other purposes, such as technology development in and technical collection systems to support support of other intelligence programs, support to the development of ever more sophisticated US countermeasures and advanced weapons 1. The Land Panel findings were approved by President Eisen- systems. hower in November 1954. The U-2 flew its first mission over the USSR on July 4, 1956 and continued until the May 1, 1960 shoot- The CIA took the lead in the development down of Francis Gary Powers. As a testament to the developers of new, highly sophisticated approaches to of the U-2 it is still in service with the US Air Force and NASA scientific and technical intelligence collec- today. The first successful photographic reconnaissance satellite mission occurred on August 10, 1960. See Richard Garwin, CO- tion. While much of what CIA undertook RONA: America’s First Reconnaissance Satellite System. A View from the remains cloaked behind a curtain of secrecy, Land Panel, Notes for Presentation George Washington University, the following reminiscences of a senior CIA May 23, 1995, at http://www.fas.org/rlg/052295CRNA%20CORO- NA%201-7.pdf ; Gregory Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, The scientific and technical intelligence officer CIA and the U2 Program, 1998, at https://www.cia.gov/library/cen- gives insight into how the CIA responded to ter-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/ the challenge. the-cia-and-the-u-2-program-1954-1974/; and David Robarge, Arch- angel: CIA’s Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft, 2012, at https:// www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/ books-and-monographs/a-12/index.html. Spring/Summer 2014 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 41 treaty negotiations and monitoring, arms control, The Intelligence Community had no hard infor- and more. Until the recent scholarly literature on the mation about the transmitter power of Soviet radars, subject, published materials on intelligence primarily their receiver sensitivity, the spatial coverage of their focused on intelligence disasters, such as the Bay of beams, or even how widespread they were deployed, Pigs or the shoot-down of Gary Powers’ U-2 over the much less anything about their counter stealth capa- Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. The story of American intel- bilities. The CIA’s Clandestine Service could offer no ligence is much fuller. Recounted here are some of the help since it did not have a single case officer inside challenges and successes CIA faced to answer critical the Soviet Union at the time.4 national security questions. American electronic intelligence, or ELINT, Americans were shocked when Khrushchev had virtually nothing to offer about Soviet radar publicly humiliated President Eisenhower over the capabilities against stealth. The only option seemed U-2 affair. Not widely known was that the U-2’s photo- to fall back on making the best possible intelligence graphs had disproved Khrushchev’s boast that Russian estimate with regard to Soviet radar capabilities for missiles were “being cranked out like sausages.” that dealing with a high and fast airplane with a very small American fears of a severe bomber and ballistic missile radar cross section. In the words of other intelligence gap with the Soviets were unfounded, or that its intel- veterans, ‘Estimating is what you do when you don’t ligence was a key ingredient in American diplomacy know and cannot find out.’ that permitted President Kennedy to call Khrushchev’s But there were several problems with the Intel- bluffs during the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban ligence Community’s estimates. There was often missile crisis of 1962. insufficient information available to produce even At the time of the U-2 shoot-down, the CIA already a guess, much less a reasonable estimate, on such was well along in developing the U-2’s replacement, the esoteric topics as a radar’s ability to detect stealthy A-11 OXCART reconnaissance aircraft, at Lockheed’s aircraft. When available, COMINT and photography Skunk Works in Burbank, California. The OXCART were considered the most credible sources of relevant was to fly at over 90,000 feet at Mach 3.3.2 The CIA intelligence, and provided the bulk of the technical and Air Force jointly had the CORONA photographic contributions to National Intelligence estimates satellite well under way in a parallel development that (NIEs). ELINT’s contribution was virtually nil, and would eventually replace all aircraft over-flights of the intelligence analysts considered it next to useless. One Soviet Union. prominent CIA operations officer said that his Clan- Concerns about the vulnerability of the yet-to- destine Service considered ELINT the only five-letter fly OXCART to the Soviet air defense radar network cuss word, that he viewed ELINT as worthless, and were the basis for the most sensitive aspect of the that only his agents could be relied on for worthwhile project. The OXCART was to be invisible to the Soviet information. He was right in that ELINT provided radars—the first-ever stealth aircraft.3 But how small little information about Soviet radars other than their a radar target was stealthy enough? That depended on identification and general location—even when they how good the Soviet air defense radars were. But for were within line-of-sight of our ELINT receivers. Most policy makers there were more questions about the Soviet radars, however, were well beyond the line-of- Soviet air defense radars than there were answers. sight of ELINT. President Eisenhower, having been badly burned over This was the scene when I joined the CIA’s Office the U-2 incident, nonetheless endorsed continued of Scientific Intelligence as a new engineer. I was soon development of OXCART, but made it clear that there cleared into the OXCART project and into its stealth would be no over flights of the Soviet Union unless the aspect. The OXCART mission planners were especially CIA could prove, absolutely, that it would be invisible concerned about just how widespread the Soviet early to their air defense radars. warning radars were and where they were located. It seemed impossible, however, to determine the 2. The original aircraft was designated the A-11 and later the number, exact location, or any other technical infor- A-12. It would become the predecessor to the Air Force’s bet- mation on those radars.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Princeton Diplomatic Invitational 2020
    Top Secret // ORCON // JENNIFER Princeton Diplomatic Invitational 2020 Project Azorian Chairs: Kris Hristov & Scott Overbey Crisis Director: Gabriel Peña 1 Top Secret // ORCON // JENNIFER Top Secret // ORCON // JENNIFER CONTENTS CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................... 2 LETTERS FROM THE STAFF ......................................................................................... 3 COMMITTEE DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................... 5 24 hour format .................................................................................................................... 6 Committee Sessions 1&2 ................................................................................................... 6 Committee Session 3 through 6 ........................................................................................ 6 CURRENT STATUS ............................................................................................................ 7 A Brief Summary of Nuclear Weapons ........................................................................... 7 MAD About You: Nuclear Tactics .................................................................................. 9 Rocketmen: Delivery Systems ......................................................................................... 11 The Red Banner Fleet: The Soviet Nuclear Navy ........................................................ 12 K-129
    [Show full text]
  • Ebook Download Dark Side of Camelot, the Ebook
    DARK SIDE OF CAMELOT, THE PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Seymour M. Hersh | 528 pages | 01 Sep 1998 | Little, Brown & Company | 9780316360678 | English | New York, United States Dark Side of Camelot, the PDF Book Time for the Grab Bag! Hersh asked me a year or two ago if I'd learned anything new; when I told him that a former C. That said, I did not like this book. Does anyone still think John F. A hero. Democracy Now. Hersh has accused the Obama administration of lying about the events surrounding the death of Osama bin Laden and disputed the claim that the Assad regime used chemical weapons on civilians in the Syrian Civil War. Basically what happened is that those women who were arrested with young boys, children, in cases that have been recorded, the boys were sodomized, with the cameras rolling, and the worst above all of them is the soundtrack of the boys shrieking. No trivia or quizzes yet. Some of Hersh's speeches concerning the Iraq War have described violent incidents involving U. Archived from the original PDF on March 26, Friend Reviews. Retrieved September 27, Retrieved May 16, To widen my studies I also include prominent biographies and many other Kennedy tomes. Nothing in ''The Dark Side of Camelot'' gives off even a whiff of the dead-fish aroma of the trust fund for Marilyn's Mom, but Kennedy loyalists, joined by others who just don't want to know, are using Hersh's terrible misstep to dismiss what he has dug up as trifling gossip and unsupported hearsay.
    [Show full text]
  • A Mechanically Marvelous Sea Saga: Plumbing the Depths of Cold War Paranoia Jack Mcguinn, Senior Editor
    addendum A Mechanically Marvelous Sea Saga: Plumbing the Depths of Cold War Paranoia Jack McGuinn, Senior Editor In the summer of 1974, long before Argo, there was “AZORIAN” — the code name for a CIA gambit to recover cargo entombed in a sunk- en Soviet submarine — the K-129 — from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. The challenge: exhume — intact — a 2,000-ton submarine and its suspicious cargo from 17,000 feet of water. HowardUndated Robard Hughes Jr. photo of a young Howard Hughes — The Soviet sub had met its end (no one ($3.7 billion in 2013 dollars),” but none entrepreneur, inventor, movie producer — whose claims to know how, and the Russians of it came out of Hughes’ pocket. Jimmy Stewart-like weren’t talking) in 1968, all hands lost, Designated by ASME in 2006 as “a appearance here belies some 1,560 nautical miles northwest of historical mechanical engineering land- the truly bizarre enigma he would later become. Hawaii. After a Soviet-led, unsuccessful mark,” the ship had an array of mechani- search for the K-129, the U.S. undertook cal and electromechanical systems with one of its own and, by the use of gath- heavy-duty applications requiring robust But now, the bad news: After a num- ered sophisticated acoustic data, located gear boxes; gear drives; linear motion ber of attempts, the ship’s “custom claw” the vessel. rack-and-pinion systems; and precision managed to sustain a firm grip on the What made this noteworthy was that teleprint (planetary, sun, open) gears. submarine, but at about 9,000 feet the U-boat was armed with nuclear mis- One standout was the Glomar’s roughly two-thirds of the (forward) hull siles.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Watches the Watchmen? the Conflict Between National Security and Freedom of the Press
    WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO I see powerful echoes of what I personally experienced as Director of NSA and CIA. I only wish I had access to this fully developed intellectual framework and the courses of action it suggests while still in government. —General Michael V. Hayden (retired) Former Director of the CIA Director of the NSA e problem of secrecy is double edged and places key institutions and values of our democracy into collision. On the one hand, our country operates under a broad consensus that secrecy is antithetical to democratic rule and can encourage a variety of political deformations. But the obvious pitfalls are not the end of the story. A long list of abuses notwithstanding, secrecy, like openness, remains an essential prerequisite of self-governance. Ross’s study is a welcome and timely addition to the small body of literature examining this important subject. —Gabriel Schoenfeld Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law (W.W. Norton, May 2010). ? ? The topic of unauthorized disclosures continues to receive significant attention at the highest levels of government. In his book, Mr. Ross does an excellent job identifying the categories of harm to the intelligence community associated NI PRESS ROSS GARY with these disclosures. A detailed framework for addressing the issue is also proposed. This book is a must read for those concerned about the implications of unauthorized disclosures to U.S. national security. —William A. Parquette Foreign Denial and Deception Committee National Intelligence Council Gary Ross has pulled together in this splendid book all the raw material needed to spark a fresh discussion between the government and the media on how to function under our unique system of government in this ever-evolving information-rich environment.
    [Show full text]
  • Final Report: National Register of Historic Places/California Register of Historical Resources Evaluation for The
    Prepared for: FINAL REPORT: NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES/CALIFORNIA REGISTER OF HISTORICAL RESOURCES EVALUATION FOR THE POINT SUR NAVFAC, POINT SUR Central Coast Lighthouse Keepers STATE HISTORIC PARK, CALIFORNIA P.O. Box 223014 Carmel, CA 93922 And Monterey District 2211 Garden Road Monterey, CA 93940 Prepared by: P.O. Box 721 Pacific Grove, California 93950 April 2013 Point Sur NAVFAC Final National/California Register Evaluation PAST Consultants, LLC April 2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 1 II. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3 Project Description..................................................................................................... 4 Project Team .............................................................................................................. 5 Organization of the Report ........................................................................................ 5 Methodology and Research Materials ...................................................................... 6 Previous Evaluations and Correspondence ............................................................... 8 Federal Guidelines for the Documentation and Historical Evaluation of Cold War Properties..................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Log, 2010-2016
    Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Log, 2010-2016 Requested date: 24-October-2016 Released date: 21-November-2016 Posted date: 12-December-2016 Source of document: Freedom of Information Act Request Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Fax: 703-613-3007 The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. Central Intelligence Agency Washington. D.C. 20505 21 November 2016 Reference: F-2017-00161 This is a final response to your 24 October 2016 Freedom of Information Act request for copies of the Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Log maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency.
    [Show full text]
  • The Implausibility of Secrecy, 65 Hastings L.J
    University of Florida Levin College of Law UF Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2-1-2014 The mplI ausibility of Secrecy Mark Fenster University of Florida Levin College of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub Part of the Administrative Law Commons, National Security Commons, and the Politics Commons Recommended Citation Mark Fenster, The Implausibility of Secrecy, 65 Hastings L.J. 309 (2014), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/347 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Fenster_21 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 1/29/2014 6:39 PM Articles The Implausibility of Secrecy Mark Fenster Government secrecy frequently fails. Despite the executive branch’s obsessive hoarding of certain kinds of documents and its constitutional authority to do so, recent high-profile events—among them the WikiLeaks episode, the Obama administration’s infamous leak prosecutions, and the widespread disclosure by high-level officials of flattering confidential information to sympathetic reporters—undercut the image of a state that can classify and control its information. The effort to control government information requires human, bureaucratic, technological, and textual mechanisms that regularly founder or collapse in an administrative state, sometimes immediately and sometimes after an interval. Leaks, mistakes, and open sources all constitute paths out of the government’s informational clutches.
    [Show full text]
  • Nixon's Wars: Secrecy, Watergate, and the CIA
    Eastern Kentucky University Encompass Online Theses and Dissertations Student Scholarship January 2016 Nixon's Wars: Secrecy, Watergate, and the CIA Chris Collins Eastern Kentucky University Follow this and additional works at: https://encompass.eku.edu/etd Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Collins, Chris, "Nixon's Wars: Secrecy, Watergate, and the CIA" (2016). Online Theses and Dissertations. 352. https://encompass.eku.edu/etd/352 This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at Encompass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Online Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Encompass. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Nixon’s Wars: Secrecy, Watergate, and the CIA By Christopher M. Collins Bachelor of Arts Eastern Kentucky University Richmond, Kentucky 2011 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Eastern Kentucky University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS December, 2016 Copyright © Christopher M. Collins, 2016 All rights reserved ii Acknowledgments I could not have completed this thesis without the support and generosity of many remarkable people. First, I am grateful to the entire EKU history department for creating such a wonderful environment in which to work. It has truly been a great experience. I am thankful to the members of my advisory committee, Dr. Robert Weise, Dr. Carolyn Dupont, and especially Dr. Thomas Appleton, who has been a true friend and mentor to me, and whose kind words and confidence in my work has been a tremendous source of encouragement, without which I would not have made it this far.
    [Show full text]
  • Project Azorian Coordinates: 40.1°N 179.9°E from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
    [1] Project Azorian Coordinates: 40.1°N 179.9°E From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia "Azorian" (erroneously called "Jennifer" by the press after its Top Project Azorian Secret Security Compartment)[2] was the code name for a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) project to recover the sunken Soviet submarine K-129 from the Pacific Ocean floor in the summer of 1974, using the purpose-built ship Hughes Glomar Explorer.[3] The 1968 sinking of the K-129 occurred approximately 1,560 nautical miles (2,890 km) northwest The Hughes Glomar Explorer of Hawaii.[4] Project Azorian was Date 1974 one of the most complex, Location Pacific Ocean expensive, and secretive intelligence operations of the Cold Participants CIA, Soviet Navy, U.S. Navy War at a cost of about $800 million Outcome Successful recovery of a ($3.8 billion in 2015 dollars). portion of Soviet submarine K-129 In addition to designing the high tech recovery ship and its unique lifting cradle, the U.S. used concepts developed with Global Marine (see Project Mohole) that utilized their precision stability equipment to keep the ship nearly stationary above the target (and do this while lowering nearly three miles of pipe). They worked with scientists to develop methods for preserving paper that had been underwater for years in hopes of being able to recover and read the submarine's codebooks. The exact reasons why this project was undertaken are unknown, but likely reasons included the recovery of an intact nuclear missile (R-21, also known as NATO SS-N-5-SERB), and cryptological documents and equipment.
    [Show full text]
  • 2010 Annual Report
    The National Security Archive The George Washington University Phone: 202/994-7000 Gelman Library, Suite 701 Fax: 202/994-7005 2130 H Street, N.W. www. nsarchive.org Washington, D.C. 20037 [email protected] Annual Report for 2010 The following statistics provide a performance index of the Archive‘s work in 2010: Freedom of Information and declassification requests filed – 1,482 Freedom of Information and declassification appeals filed – 219 Pages of U.S. government documents released as the result of Archive requests – 70,759 including such newsmaking revelations as the Taliban‘s use of Pakistani tribal areas to regroup after the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, leading directly to their resurgence in 2005; the Colombian military‘s execution of guerrilla prisoners and the Palace of Justice cafeteria staff during the 1985 hostage tragedy in Bogota; the CIA‘s coverup of the limited success of the 1974 Glomar Explorer attempt to raise a sunken Soviet submarine; President Nixon‘s consideration of nuclear attacks against North Korea in 1969; President Clinton‘s 1999 correspondence with Iranian president Khatami about the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Pages of declassified documents delivered to publisher – 25,092 in two reference collections: Colombia and the United States: Political Violence, Narcotics, and Human Rights, 1948-2010; and The United States and the Two Koreas (1969-2000). Declassified documents delivered to truth commissions and human rights investigators – 21,560 documents to the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile as part of its permanent commemoration of human rights violations committed during the Pinochet dictatorship; 3,360 documents to Uruguay‘s Universidad de la Republica for use by researchers; 200 documents to Argentina‘s Federal Oral Criminal Tribunal No.
    [Show full text]
  • Glomar” Is Such an Apt Name for Preemptive Denial of FOIA Claims1
    Case 1:18-cv-02048-TSC Document 18-3 Filed 02/28/19 Page 1 of 2 Exhibit B 1 Why “Glomar” is such an apt name for preemptive denial of FOIA claims1 The invocation of a so-called Glomar response to Freedom of Information Act requests, though usually inappropriate, is oddly symbolic. The USNS Hughes Glomar Explorer was a ship built in 1971 under CIA’s Project Azorian to recover the Soviet submarine K-129 which sank in 1968. The CIA spent $1.68 billion ($10.63 billion in current value) in a no-bid contract to build the massive, sole- purpose ship. Glomar Explorer’s cover story was that it would “extract manganese nodules” from the ocean floor. But the nautical boondoggle ultimately failed. During an attempt to winch the K-129 to the surface, the submarine broke up, and the most-sought items such as codebooks and nuclear missiles were lost. The vessel was subsequently reflagged the GSF Explorer and roamed the seas like an albatross, searching for a buyer and a new purpose. The massive sums of taxpayer dollars that paid to build and sail the vessel were never recouped and in 2015 it was announced the ship would be sold for scrap. Ever since “boilerplate” refusals to properly respond to public interest FOIA requests about publicly known programs became known as “Glomar” responses. Essential details of Project Azorian were ultimately disclosed in the news media, starting with reporter Jack Anderson in the mid-1970's who claimed, "Navy experts have told us that the sunken sub contains no real secrets and that the project, therefore, is a waste of the taxpayers’ money."2 1 Excerpt from ECF 13-1, FOIA Case 1:15-cv-01431-TSC, pages 2-3 2 Robarge, David (March 2012).
    [Show full text]
  • Project Azorian
    doi:10.3723/ut.30.055 International Journal of the Society for Underwater Technology, Vol 30, No 1, p 55–56, 2011 Project Azorian: For the United States there ‘special operations’ nuclear sub- was the opportunity to discover marine USS Halibut towing prim- Book Review The CIA and the first-hand more about Soviet itive underwater cameras in the nuclear warhead and missile tech- deep ocean, pictures were Raising of the nology and to obtain vital code obtained which showed that at books and cryptographic devices. least one of the K-129 ’s R-21 K-129 In addition, the United States nuclear-tipped missiles remained had serious concerns that K-129 in place. Norman Polmar and could have been a ‘rogue’ sub- The United States intelligence Michael White marine that had attempted an community was able (until later unauthorised missile launch on compromised by spies) to con- Published by Naval Institute the Hawaiian islands. The only ceal its discovery from the Soviets Press, Annapolis, Maryland way to know for sure would be to and commission the construction raise part, or all, of the wreck of of a supposed ‘seabed mining’ Hardback edition, 2010 the K-129 from some 5000m ship, the Glomar Explorer, with help ISBN 978 1 59114 690 2 depth – in an era before the pro- from Howard Hughes. The 238 pages including Annexes duction of deep-ocean remotely Glomar Explorer was equipped operated vehicles (ROV), or with a giant claw intended to high-resolution seafloor mapping scoop the remains of the K-129 When I give talks to the general systems.
    [Show full text]