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The Glomar Explorer in Film and Print

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The Glomar Explorer in Film and Print Intelligence in Public Literature The Glomar Explorer in Film and Print AZORIAN: The Raising of the K-129, written, directed, and produced by Michael White (Michael White Films, 2009). Project AZORIAN: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129, by Norman Polmar and Michael White (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 239 pages. Reviewed by David Robarge For years, CIA’s involvement with the Glo- In the film AZORIAN and the companion mar Explorer project, the technologically path- book Project AZORIAN, military and intelli- breaking effort to use a specially designed ship gence historian Norman Polmar and documen- to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine from the tarian Michael White have collaborated on the Pacific Ocean floor in 1974, was one of the definitive accounts of this remarkable effort: Agency’s most open secrets. Much information using a battleship-sized, uniquely outfitted about the vessel, usually referred to simply as ship constructed under exceptionally tight the Glomar, and its mission has been publicly security to salvage nuclear weapons and cryp- available since they were exposed in the press tographic equipment from a Soviet Golf-class in 1975. Confusion and inaccuracies quickly submarine (the K-129) that sank in April 1968 emerged, however, over how the wreck was approximately 1,500 miles northwest of located, how much of it was raised, what was Hawaii. It was the first strategic-missile sub- found in it, and what the payoff of the costly marine to have been lost and potentially had project was. substantial intelligence value, but the odds against retrieving it seemed insurmountable. The first book written on the topic estab- Before AZORIAN, the deepest ocean salvage of lished one of the most persistent errors by mis- a ship was from 245 feet, and the only object naming the project JENNIFER (the codename known to have been recovered as far down as for its security procedures) rather than the K-129 lay was a satellite “bucket” weigh- AZORIAN. 1 Later works—based on insider ing only several hundred pounds. The “target interviews, leaked documents, and specula- object,” as the submarine was euphemistically tions of varying reliability—revealed new infor- called then, was nearly 17,000 feet underwater mation but still fell short of being and weighed 2,000 tons. “Project AZORIAN authoritative. 2 More recent titles have postu- was unquestionably the most ambitious and lated unlikely scenarios to explain why the the most audacious ocean engineering effort Soviet submarine was where it was when it ever attempted,” Polmar and White rightly sank—a favorite is that it had “gone rogue” and state. (xi) was headed toward the United States to launch nuclear missiles—and what caused it to do so. 3 In both the movie and the book, Polmar and Meanwhile, no detailed official information White draw on a much wider range of sources about the Glomar program was publicly avail- than have previous chroniclers of the project, able until CIA declassified one of several inter- including the ship’s logs, a declassified CIA his- nal accounts in 2010.4 tory, other documents from US and Soviet All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in this article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2012) 25 The Glomar Explorer sources, and extensive interviews with mem- operations, and the director of the Defense bers of the crews of the Glomar and other ves- Intelligence Agency, who argued on grounds sels involved and with US naval intelligence of cost, intelligence return, and likely diplo- officers and Soviet naval officers and scien- matic repercussions that AZORIAN should be tists. Polmar and White put these new sources cancelled. In late 1972 the DCI persuaded to excellent effect, presenting numerous fasci- National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger nating and hitherto unpublicized or underap- and President Richard Nixon to the contrary, preciated facts about the planning, and the program continued without further implementation, and accomplishments of AZO- bureaucratic resistance. In April and May RIAN. Among the most interesting insights: 1974, just as the last tests of the Glomar were completed and the salvage operation • The K-129 probably sank because the rocket was about to begin, the US Intelligence Board engines in two of its missiles ignited sequen- gave a final favorable evaluation of the proj- tially for unknown reasons and burned for ect. On 7 June the president approved the more than three minutes over a six-minute mission with the caveat that the recovery time span. The exhaust plumes would have itself not begin before he returned from a burned into the pressure hull and, with their visit to Moscow on 3 July. extremely high temperatures and poisonous fumes, quickly killed all the crew. The misfir- • On its way from the East Coast to southern ings occurred while the submarine was near California after transiting the Strait of the surface, with its internal compartments Magellan—the ship was too wide for the Pan- open for ventilation. After part of its sail ama Canal—the Glomar entered the port of structure tore away and its bottom was Valparaiso, Chile, on 12 September 1973, one breached, it began to flood and then sank. day after a military junta overthrew the While investigating the cause of the K-129’s socialist government of Salvadore Allende, demise, Polmar and White refute alternative which had been the target of one of CIA’s theories, such as a collision with or attack by most notorious covert actions three years a US nuclear submarine. before. “Seven [Global Marine] technicians were to board the ship at Valparaiso. After • The “acoustic events” that indicated some- checking in to their hotel, early on 11 Sep- thing unusual had happened to the K-129 tember, the Global Marine personnel were were identified not by the US Navy’s under- awakened by the sounds of the revolution in water SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) the streets.” (85) The declassified Agency array but by hydrophones monitored by the account of AZORIAN notes that “The pres- Air Force’s Technical Applications Center ence of a covert US intelligence ship in a (AFTAC). SOSUS may have picked up the Chilean port during the military coup was a reverberations from the explosion, but they bizarre coincidence quite unrelated to the were unrecognizable to the operators because rumors that ‘the CIA had 200 agents in Chile of their short duration. AFTAC’s recorders, for the sole purpose of ousting Allende.’ There originally deployed to detect Soviet nuclear were no unfavorable incidents involving the detonations, were 10 times more sensitive ship, crew members, or the Global Marine than the SOSUS displays. representative[s].”a5 • To keep the project going after four years of • If the Soviets had learned of the Glomar’s development with costs mounting and no true mission and tried to disrupt the recov- immediate end in sight, DCI Richard Helms ery, the ship would have been helpless had to overcome strong opposition from the because it had no protection within days of it. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the dep- Ships of the Pacific Fleet were too far away to uty secretary of defense, the chief of naval help unless warning of a threat to the Glo- a Global Marine, Inc., was the California-based firm that oversaw the construction of the Glomar—hence the ship’s name. 26 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2012) The Glomar Explorer mar came well in advance. If, as Polmar and placed on the pipe string and capture vehicle White assert, submarines were sent to deal to drive the arms deeper into the bottom soil with a Soviet challenge and possible seizure because the seafloor was harder than of the Glomar, their “only option [upon expected; and the steel used for the grabber arrival on the scene] would be to sink the lift devices, although stronger and tougher than ship….The men on board the Glomar knew other structural steels, also was brittle, espe- nothing of this plan.” (106) cially at low temperatures like those encountered at great ocean depths. • Soviet ships started coming to the search area two weeks after the Glomar got there. • As if living its cover through and through, the The first was a missile range instrumenta- Glomar brought up some manganese nodules tion ship, the Chazhma, whose crew took along with part of the submarine. They photographs from on deck and from a helicop- apparently had lodged between the pressure ter circling above the Glomar. The two ships hull and the outer hull as the K-129 slid exchanged messages, and the Chazhma left down a slope after reaching bottom. Despite four days later. A Soviet naval tug, the SB-10, an “absolutely no souvenirs” order to the was more persistent, staying for nearly two crew, some of the nodules disappeared. weeks and coming as close as 200 yards.a It was nearby just as the capture vehicle—the 179-foot-by-31-foot claw designed to grasp the • Many photographs, drawings, and CGI submarineb—was about to be pulled inside, images and animation enliven the book and raising fears that debris from the retrieved movie, adding sometimes startling visual wreckage might float up around the Glomar impact to the narrative and helping explain and reveal what was happening. Nothing like the almost unfathomable complexity of the that occurred, and the tug left abruptly. The challenge the project engineers faced. released CIA account notes, “One can only conjecture the reaction and chagrin of Soviet Polmar and White add a human touch to the authorities when they later realized that two technology-heavy AZORIAN story by giving Soviet Navy ships were on the scene and, in details about the K-129’s crew and their living effect, witnessed the recovery operation conditions aboard the vessel.
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