38005 3047

SUPPLEMENT

TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the ist of JULY, 1947 published by Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 3 JULY, 1947

FIRST AND SECOND BATTLES OF Layman) and HAVOCK (Lieutenant-Com- NARVIK ON loW AND 13$* APRIL mander R. E. Courage), left Sullom Voef at 1940 RESPECTIVELY. dawn on 7th April, in company with the The following Despatch was submitted on the Twentieth Destroyer Flotilla and joined 25th April, 1940, to the Lords Commissioners RENOWN north of the Shetlands. The whole of the Admiralty 'by Rear Admiral R. H. C. force proceeded in company towards Vest Fiord, Hallifax, Rear Admiral (D1), Home Fleet. destroyers being eventualy detached to lay the minefield off Eggdoysa at dawn, 8th April, Rear Admiral (Z>), Home Fleet, 1940. HM.S. Woolwich. 3. After guarding the (minefield for a few z$th April, 1940. hours reports of 2 enemy destroyers were re- ceived from GLQWiWGRM and ships of the Be pleased to lay before the Board a narra- Second Destroyer Flotilla joined RENOWN tive of the First Battle of Narvik, which has southwest of the Lofoten Islands before dark. been prepared by the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. HOTSPUR, the senior surviving officer, 4. At daylight on 9th April, 1940, the and the report of the C.O. H.M.S. HAVOCK. RENOWN encountered SCHARNHORST and (Sgd.) R. H. C. HALLIFAX, HIPPER. The Second Destroyer Flotilla, Rear Admiral. stationed astern of RENOWN carried out a divi- sional concentration on HIPPER but the range H.M.S. HOTSPUR. was probably too great. All destroyers were 25th April, 1940. soon left behind in the heavy seas, but not before both HARDY and HUNTER had nar- SIR, rowly escaped being hit. I have the honour to forward herewith re- ports from H.M. Ships HOTSPUR and 5. The Second Destroyer Flotilla was then HOSTILE on the destroyer raid on Narvik detached to patrol east of the Lofoten Islands. on roth April, 1940. As senior surviving After about two hours this patrol was broken officer of this raid, -I feel I should also attempt off on receipt of orders to go to Narvik. Just to give some co-ordinated account. In doing 'before leaving her patrol position HOTSPUR so, 1 am using information obtained from made visual contact with REPULSE. H.M. Ships HOTSPUR, HOSTILE and sur- 6. (Available reports tended to show that viving officers from H.M.S. HARDY. No Narvik was only lightly held so the flotilla was report has yet been received from H.M.S. stopped off Tranoy at about 1600 to obtain in- HAViOCK and of course, nothing is available formation and HOSTILE (Commander J. P. from H.M.S. HUNTER. Wright) joined. It was then learnt that the 2. HARDY (Captain B. A. W. Warburton- enemy held the place in force. Lee*), HUNTER (Lieutenant-Commander L. 7. The following " Most Immediate " mes- de Villiers), HOTSPUR (Commander H. F. H. sage was sent by Captain (D), Second Destroyer * Admiralty footnote: Captain (D), 2nd Destroyer f Admiralty footnote: Sullom Voe—a harbour Jo Flotilla. the Shetland Isle. 3048 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 Flotilla, to AdimiraHjy, Commander-in-Chief, 13. By this time the enemy destroyers and Home Fleet and Vice Admiral Commanding shore batteries inside the harbour had opened Battle Cruiser Squadron. fire. The shore guns all used tracer ammuni- " Norwegians report Germans holding tion, which appeared to be smaller than 4 in. Narvik in force also 6 destroyers and i sub- and the shooting was not accurate. marine are there and channel is possibly 14. HOTSPUR and HOSTILE saw nothing mined. to the northward of Narvik though low visibility Intend attacking at dawn, high water." prevented a proper examination of Rombaks T.O.O.* 1751/9/4/40. and Herjangs Fiords. These two ships covered No permission to attack was asked or further the retirement of the other three from the inner instructions sought. I submit that this message, harbour by putting up a smoke screen, which made by the late Captain Warburton-Lee, seemed very effective. HOTSPUR then fired 4 should 'be given a place in our historical records. torpedoes into the harbour and hit two merchant ships, which sank. At least six torpedoes were 8. The Admiralty replied as follows in mes- fired by the enemy out of the harbour but all sage 0136/10 to Captain (D), Second Destroyer missed or ran under without exploding. Flotilla, repeated Vice Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Squadron, and Commander-in- 15. All five ships then approached the Chief, Home Fleet. harbour entrance again and engaged any suit- able targets they could see. This time a fairly " Norwegian coast defence ships intense fire was encountered from shore batteries EIDSVOLD and NORGE may foe in German and enemy destroyers but the flotilla was able hands. You alone can judge whether in to withdraw, practically undamaged, to a these circumstances attack should be made. position off Skjomnes. We shall support whatever decision you take." 16. On board HARDY the position was then summed up as follows. The Flotilla had been 9. The plan for the attack was given by off an enemy harbour for over an hour and Captain (D) Second Destroyer Flotilla in the were undamaged. A surprise attack had been following messages to the flotilla: — made and 24 torpedoes had been fired into the 1430/9 as amended by 1955/9, with a final harbour. HOSTILE still had her full outfit of addition in message 2040/9. The gist of torpedoes whilst HOTSPUR had 4, HAVOCK 3 these messages was briefly as follows. Ships and HARDY i torpedo remaining. There was were to be at action stations from 0030/10 no sign of enemy warships outside the harbour as enemy batteries were reported on both and those inside must have been either sunk or sides of Ofot Fiord near Ramsundet. On damaged. It was estimated that 3 or 4 enemy approaching Narvik, HARDY, HUNTER warships had been inside the harbour and that and HAVOCK were to attack ships in the probably only 2 were somewhere outside and inner harbour. HOTSPUR and HAVOCK could be dealt with if met. Captain (D), were to engage batteries reported on Framne- Second Destroyer Flotilla, therefore, decided to sodden and any ships seen to the north west. make one more attack on the harbour. These two ships were also to cover the re- 17. At about 0520 HARDY led the Flotilla tirement of those in the inner harbour, with into the final attack on the harbour, ships smoke. All ships were to be ready to send forming astern of her in the order HAVOCK, a small landing party in the event of opposi- HUNTER, HOTSPUR and HOSTILE. A speed tion proving light. of 15 knots was not exceeded and the line was 10. The 50 mile passage from Tranoy to snaked to keep guns bearing on the harbour Narvik was made in continuous snowstorms entrance, now shrouded in mist. As each ship with visibility seldom greater than 2 cables. turned to port off the harbour entrance, shore Ships were twice separated owing to merchant batteries or any other targets visible were vessels passing through the line and on the one engaged. Whilst turning, HOSTILE .fired 4 occasion that land was seen the whole flotilla torpedoes into the harbour and one enemy almost ran aground. The safe arrival of ships torpedo passed harmlessly underneath her. off Narvik at 0415 on loth April, 1940, is a She was also hit by a shell just abaft her star- tribute to the skill of the navigating officer of board anchor but this did little damage. HARDY (Lieutenant-Commander R. C. 18. Just after turning to port HARDY sighted Gordon-Smith) and to the handling of the ships enemy ships north of Narvik and Captain (D), in rear. Second Destroyer Flotilla, made an enemy 11. HARDY immediately entered the har- report " i enemy cruiser and 3 enemy bour at Narvik. After backing and filling among destroyers off Narvik. Am withdrawing to the the merchant ships at anchor she fired torpe- westward." T.O.O. 0551/10. At the same does, 3 at a warship and 4 more into the north- time he ordered the Flotilla to withdraw at eastern corner of the harbour. One torpedo 30 knots. must have hit the warship, as there was a 19. Whilst turning to port and withdrawing to violent explosion and sparks came out of her. the west, the Flotilla engaged these enemy ships HARDY then used her guns on another warship at ranges between 6,000 and 8,000 yards. The seen at anchor and then withdrew. enemy replied but did no damage. 12. Surprise had been complete and the 20. When about half way along the Ofot Fiord HARDY sighted 2 more warships about enemy had not yet opened fire. HUNTER and 3 miles ahead crossing from port to starboard. HAVOCK now entered the harbour. HUNTER At first she hoped they might be our own fired 4 torpedoes at a destroyer and 4 more at cruisers and made the challenge; but it was some other target but the result is not known. answered by a salvo. Captain (D), Second HAVOCK fired 5 torpedoes and secured hits on Destroyer Flotilla, soon identified the 2 ships a destroyer with gunfire. as large German destroyers (Leberecht Maas * Admiralty footnote: T.O.O.—Time of origin. Class) and engaged them. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3049 21. Captain (D), Second Destroyer Flotilla, 160 men got ashore. The epic story of how then made to the Flotilla " Keep on engaging most bf itbe'se men reached the village of! enemy." T.O.O. 0555/10. This was the last Ballangen and were rescued by IVANHOE 3 signal he made as shortly afterwards a shell days later, has been told elsewhere. burst on HARDY'S bridge and he was mortally 27. About an hour after landing, HARDY's wounded. Everyone on HARDY'S bridge and torpedo officer made his way back on board and in the wheelhouse was now either killed or with a 9 Ib. T.N.T. charge" from the detonator wounded. The ship, not under control and on tank blew up the steel chests in the Captain's fire forward, was making at high speed for Cabin. He was also able to rescue the Navigat- the south shore of the fiord. The Captain's ing Officer, who had been too badly wounded Secretary (Paymaster Lieutenant G. H. to abandon ship. The action of Lieutenant Stanning) was wounded, but struggled down G. R. Heppel in returning to the ship, which from the bridge to find an empty wheelhouse. was still on fire forward, is most creditable. He took the wheel himself for a short time but on relief by an Able Seamen returned to the 28. The results of the raid are difficult to bridge. By this time the ship had practically assess and time alone will show the full effect. lost steam and the Captain's Secretary directed It is probable that 2 or 3 enemy destroyers were her to be beached. The torpedo officer put out of action and 7 or 8 merchant ships (Lieutenant G. R. Heppel), thinking that sunk. One ammunition ship was blown up. bridge steering was out of action, had gone aft Some damage was done to wharves and jetties to connect tiller flat steering but finding the by gunfire. On our side, HUNTER was sunk, bridge still controlling had returned there in HARDY put out of action and HOTSPUR time to agree to the beaching of the ship. The severely damaged. The appearance of the action taken at a critical time by Paymaster flotilla in a snowstorm must have given a shock Lieutenant Stanning may well have resulted in to the Germans on the day after their occupa- saving many lives. Whether it was right or tion. Any plans which the enemy had for wrong, he showed great initiative in an blocking the approaches must have been inter- unaccustomed role. fered with and the way was paved for our sub- 22. Shortly after HARDY had been hit, sequent attacks. Some encouragement must HUNTER was seen to be on fire and her forward have been given to the Norwegians by the torpedo tubes were missing, indicating some prompt appearance of our warships in their explosion. She was seen to -lose steam just ahead occupied waters. of HOTSPUR at the same moment the latter's 29. Finally, on behalf of those who took part steering and all bridge communications were put in the raid, I would like to pay a tribute to out of action. Whilst not under control the initiative and fine fighting spirit shown by HOTSPUR collided with the damaged our leader, Captain B. A. W. Warburton-Lee, HUNTER and these two ships, locked together whose conduct was an example to us all. drew all the enemy's fire. By means of verbal I have the honour to be, orders to engine room and tiller flat, given from Sir, " X " gun deck, HOTSPUR was able to extri- cate herself from this predicament but the com- Your obedient Servant, bined effects of the collision and the damage (Sgd.) H. F. LAYMAN, done by the enemy caused HUNTER to sink. Commander. The Rear Admiral Commanding 23. The enemy, however, must have received Home Fleet Destroyers. considerable punishment. One destroyer appeared to have been struck by a torpedo and seemed to be aground whilst others had been H.M.S. HAVOCK, hit by gunfire. HOTSPUR and HOSTILE April, 1940. had fired torpedoes at the enemy who had replied with four, which passed close down H.M.S. HAVOCK was in company with HOTSPUR'S starboard side. Captain D.2 in HARDY," HOTSPUR, HOSTILE and HUNTER during the night of 24. When withdrawing after her collision April 9th-ioth and was the fourth ship in the HOTSPUR was still under fire from at least 4 line during the passage up the Otfiord. enemy ships. HOSTILE and HAVOCK had got clear to the westward practically undamaged. 2. The weather was overcast, with frequent Quickly taking in the situation, they immediately squalls of snow and the visibility varied between turned back into the Fiord and covered 5 and 2 cables. HOTSPUR'S retirement. This was a bold move, 3. The passage up the fiord was without in- skilfully executed in narrow waters and it cident except that touch was lost once due to a probably persuaded the enemy from following sudden alteration of course. up his advantage. 4. At 0426 the snowstorm cleared and the •25. As HOTSPUR was being conned from aft south side of the harbour of Narvik and some and had no signalling arrangements HOSTILE merchant ships were disclosed. took charge and escorted her to Skjel Fiord. When about 18 miles west of Narvik, the 5. Captain D. entered the harbour between German ammunition ship RAUENFELS was the British s.s. NORTH CORNWALL and the seen steaming up the fiord. Mistaking us for remainder of the merchant ships, and opened German destroyers she continued her course and fire with guns and torpedoes. HUNTER was then stopped and blown up by HAVOCK. followed and as soon as she was clear HAVOCK followed her. Fire was opened with the guns 26. HARDY had last been seen aground and at a destroyer alongside a merchant ship whose on fire with men clambering over the side. gun-flashes could be seen, and with torpedoes One gun was still firing and it seemed likely at merchant ships and a destroyer at anchor. that the enemy would close and finish her off. Three torpedoes only were fired as HUNTER In the event, however, the enemy held off and appeared to have hit all the merchant ships in 3050 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 sight, and a second destroyer was not seen until there was a high column of smoke from her the sights were past. All torpedoes were heard after boiler room and much flame from the to hit ana the destroyer vanished. As the enemy funnel. Actually from accounts afterwards this gun-fire was getting hot and they had the advan- was a salvo of shell, and she rapidly lost way tage of the light I increased speed and cleared and passed astern. out. 16. As I was now at the head of the line 6. Just before entering the harbour two and no enemy appeared to be to the westward columns of water were seen ascending just in- of us, I turned to starboard 180 degrees and shore of the HUNTER, and it is thought that closed the enemy astern, opening fire at 10,000 they were caused by badly aimed torpedoes from yards. an enemy destroyer. 17. During 'this run I passed HUNTER who 7. While leaving the harbour 1 passed close was on fire and losing speed and HOTSPUR to NORTH CORNWALL, and one of the whose steering gear seemed to be out of action. guards there fired on the bridge with a revolver. He was silenced by a Lewis gun. 18. Unfortunately the order to open fire could not be complied with as both foremost 8. Firing now increased from the harbour guns were out of action, and having no tor- and HAVOCK was straddled but not hit. Fire pedoes I decided that it would be folly to close was returned by the after group and an ex- the range any further, and turned to starboard plosion seen in an enemy ship, while the fore- passing close astern of HOSTILE who was most group bombarded the shore with H.E. making smoke. shell, from which quarter a hot fire from rifles and machine guns was arriving. •19. At this moment the two leading enemy appeared to be unhit and were firing well 9. Once clear of the harbour HAVOCK placed salvos, while two in rear were very passed backwards and forwards across the en- ragged. HAVOCK was again straddled but trance engaging ships inside with gunfire at not hit except by splinters. -While withdrawing 3,000 to 4,000 yards. Spotting was almost im- the after group continued the engagement, until possible owing to smoke but blind ladders were the enemy was lost in smoke. used and success hoped for. 20. .While .running to the west HOTSPUR 10. At 0507 a number of torpedoes were seen was observed to collide with HUNTER who approaching from the harbour and were avoided appeared to be in a bad way, but the former by going full speed ahead or astern. One tor- got clear. pedo appeared to pass underneath the ship, and 21. Once clear of the smoke I drew up along- if it was fitted with a magnetic pistol the de- side HOSTILE and both foremost guns being gaussing circuit undoubtedly saved the ship. I reported again in use, followed her back into then withdrew out of torpedo range and as ships the action to relieve the pressure on 'HOTSPUR. were interfering with each others fire formed Fire was opened at 10,000 yards and continued astern of Captain D. who made a signal until HOTSPUR was out of range when all " Follow Round " at 0514. By this time we ships withdrew. The leading enemy appeared were 6,000 yards from the harbour. to be still untouched and were straddling effec- 11. At 0535 we passed the harbour for a tively while we were turning. They made no second time but were not fired at and then attempt however to close the range, after we HARDY led towards Rombaks Fjord. had slowed to HOTSPUR'S speed. 12. At 0540 three German destroyers were 22. On the way down the fjord a merchant sighted bearing 350 degrees apparently coming ship was sighted which proved to be the from Herjangs Fjord. Captain D. ordered 30 German S.S. RAUENFELS, and HOSTILE knots and withdraw to the westwards at stopped her with a shot and ordered me to the same time opening fire on the second ship. examine her. I fired another round into her I turned to follow him and engaged the leading bow and she stopped and her crew hurriedly ship at 10,000 yards. HARDY made an enemy abandoned ship. I stopped and picked them report of a cruiser and two destroyers and in up while the ship slowly drifted to the beach. the bad light this looked possible. The enemy I sent an armed boat over but she was burn- however appeared to turn away under our fire. ing furiously and I was uncertain as to whether she had used her W/T to call her friends, I 13. At 0558 two more enemy destroyers decided not to risk the loss of my party and appeared ahead and opened fire. HAVOCK ordered their return. When the boat was was slightly to port of HARDY and I engaged hoisted I fired two 'H.E. into her to hasten the left hand ship but as soon as I saw that the fire and went ahead. The result was cer- the leader was not fired at shifted to her. The tainly startling, as the German literally erupted range was about 3,000 yards, and fire soon took and a column of flame and debris rose to over effect, the third salvo hitting aft and caused a 3,000 feet as testified both by HOSTILE and violent explosion. She ceased fire with her main HARDY'S survivors to the west who saw it armament but continued to fire machine guns, over the mountains that height. Fortunately an incendiary bullet from which set fire to a no casualties were sustained in HAVOCK but ready-use cordite locker at A gun. some damage to the hull was done. Judging 14. As we passed her I ordered the remaining from the fragments picked up she contained torpedoes to be fired but they unfortunately all the reserve ammunition and torpedoes for passed astern due to an underestimation of the the destroyer flotilla, and also the Narvik mine- enemy speed. field. 15. Just before HAVOCK fired! torpedoes 23. HAVOCK then joined HOSTILE off enemy torpedoes were seen approaching on the Tranoy Light. surface and easily avoided by combing the 24. From the evidence of the crew of the tracks. HARDY however who was steering NORTH CORNWALL there were four more to port appeared to be hit by one as destroyers in Narvik harbour when the attack SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3051 commenced, two alongside the oiler, one along- Bow Protection gear* and is to form ahead of side the ore pier and one at anchor. Two of leading T.S.D.S.* Destroyer when latter is in these were hit by torpedoes from HARDY, station on WARSPITE. The four destroyers HUNTER or HAVOCK and sank immediately. working their Asdics as far as practicable. The other two were hit by gunfire and set on Other destroyers form Anti-submarine screen fire. They never left the harbour. One of the as ordered by the Vice-Admiral Commanding, five met outside was driven ashore and two Battle Cruiser Squadron. The force will pro- more damaged. The former were seen ashore ceed up Vest Fiord in this formation and it by HARDY survivors. The number of mer- is suggested a destroyer should be detailed on chant ships sunk cannot be stated. each side to throw a depth charge in any (Sgd.) R. E. COURAGE, likely inlet that could harbour a submarine. Lieutenant-Commander. (vi) On reaching Baroy Island which is the suspected Minefield area, the A/S* screen should as far as practicable swing into the The following Despatch by Vice-Admiral W. J. swept waters until past the Island. Whitworth, C.B., D.S.O., Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, was (vii) The force will proceed into Ofot Fiord submitted on the 27th April, 1940, to the engaging shore defences in passing, making Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty by the full use of short range weapons as jvell as Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. heavier guns. Non-T.S.D.S. destroyers and WARSPITE covering advance of sweeping H.M.S. WARSPITE. de&troyers with gunfire. It is specially impor- April, 1940. tant that destroyers sighted should be engaged SIR, before they can fire torpedoes at WARSPI1E. I have the honour -to forward the following (viii) T.S.D.S. sweeping is to be continued report of -the attack on the enemy Naval Forces up to longitude 16° 55' East. Sweeping and Shore Defences at Narvik on Saturday, destroyers are then to haul clear of WAR- SPITE recover or cut their sweeps and assist I3th April, 1940. the non-T.S.D.S. destroyers. Failing other 2. Force " B " which was placed under my targets they fmay drop back and destroy orders for this operation, was composed of the shore defence guns on Baroy Island or else- following of His Majesty's Ships: — where. WARSPITE will proceed to a posi- WARSPITE. _ Captain V. A. C. tion 5 miles from Narvik depending on Crutchley, V.C., D.S.C. (Flying the flag of circumstances and from there cover the Vice-Adrairal Commanding, Battle Cruiser advance of the destroyers into the harbour Squadron). and adjacent waters where enemy ships may BEDOUIN.— Commander J. A. McCoy. 'be located. (ix) Destroyers are normally to make smoke COSSACK. — Commander R. St.V. if required by Vice-Admiral Commanding, Sherbrooke. Battle Cruiser Squadron. ESKIMO. — Commander St.J. A.' (x) The force will withdraw as ordered by Micklethwait, D.S.O. , the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle PUNJABI.—Commande r J. T. Lean. Cruiser Squadron. HERO.— Commander H. W. Biggs. (xi) FURIOUS is to arrange Air Attacks ICARUS. —Lieutenant-Commande r C. D. on the following enemy positions. All forces Maud. to synchronise with WARSPITE'S approach. KIMBERLEY. — Lieutenant-Commander Attack (a] Baroy Island defences about R. G. K. Knowling. 1215. FORESTER. — Lieutenant - Commander (b) Romness Point, longitude E. B. Tancock, D.S.C. 16° 31' East and opposite FOXHOUND. — Lieutenant-Commander shore about 1300. G. H. Peters. (c) Warships an Ballangen, longi- tude 17° oo' East, and Narvik 3. The following instructions for the conduct harbour and Herjangs and of the operation were received from you. batteries at Narvik about " Operation D.W. will take place Saturday 1345'. I3th April. Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser (i) Object destruction of German warships, Squadron, will signal exact times at which Merchant ships and defences in Narvik area. these attacks are to commence. (ii) Ships of Force " B " are to rendez- vous- with WARSPITE flying the flag of the (xii) FURIOUS is to provide Anti-sub- Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser marine patrol for WARSPITE from 0830 vide Squadron, in position 67° 44' North 13° 22' paragraph (ii). East at 0730. Time of origin 1909/1201 April. (iii) HOSTILE and HAVOCK to protect 4. The following information in regard to Skjel Fiord. the Operation was contained in your signal (iv) Remaining destroyers are to rendez- 1547/I2th April: — vous with Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, in position 68° oo' North 11° 20' East at (i) Minefield reported 68° 24' North 1030. 15° 59' East. (v) After arrival of other Destroyers, (ii) U-Boat in Vest Fiord area. HERO, FOXHOUND and FORESTER will * Admiralty footnotes: T.S.D.S.—Two Speed be detached to get out T.S.D.S. Destroyer Destroyer Sweep. Bow Protection Gear—Paravanes. of the aoth Destroyer Flotilla is to get out A / S—Anti-Submarine. A2 3052 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 (iii) Five or six LEBERECHT MA AS (including FORESTER, her T.S.D.S. sweep class some damaged and six Merchantmen having failed) formed an A/S screen on her— sunk inside harbour. one ahead and two on each bow. (iv) HARDY beached 68° 23' North 11. At 1058 Force " B " was approaching 17° 06' East. ESKIMO off Tranoy Light. .ESKIMO (v) Baroy Island 68° 21' North 16° 07' signalled " Submarine bearing 240° from me." East has Military Defences including possibly This submarine was on the surface and flashed magnetic Torpedo tubes. " U " to ESKIMO presumably thinking she was (vi) Three 12 or 18 pounder guns on hill friendly. On ESKIMO turning towards the North of Ore Quay, Chart Number 3753, submarine dived. Although contact was not facing North-west. Four inch calibre guns obtained depth charges were dropped by both sides of fiord near entrance to Ranchet destroyers in the vicinity. 68° 26' 30" North 16° 29' 30" East and 68° 24' 30" North 16° 29' 30" East. 12. The aiea between Tranoy Light and (vii) One or two unidentified aircraft were Baroy Island had been reported dangerous due to mines. As the Force approached this area sighted in Vest Fiord on i2th April. screening destroyers closed ready to form (viii) Two friendly Norwegian submarines astern of the sweep. are in vicinity of Sommersoct 68° 27' North 15° 29' East. 13. At 1152 in position five miles westward of 5. At 0200 on I3th April, 1940, having with Baroy Island WARSPITE'S aircraft was flown considerable difficulty, owing to heavy swell, off with instructions: — completed the transfer of my flag to H.M.S. (a) To carry but reconnaissance for Force WARSPITE at sea, I proceeded with H.M. " B " advancing up Ofot Fiord with Ships COSSACK, HERO, FOXHOUND and particular reference to the presence of German FORESTER to the rendezvous in position vessels in side fiords, the movements of 67° 44' North 13° 22' East, where H.M. Ships German forces and the position of shore BEDOUIN, PUNJABI, KIMBERLEY and batteries. ICARUS joined my flag. H.M.S. ESKIMO (6) to bomb any suitable targets; was at this time on patrol in the vicinity of Tranoy Light. (c) to return to Skjel Fiord. 6. Force " B " proceeded up Vest Fiord. 14. On reaching Baroy Island the screening The weather was overcast, heavy melting snow destroyers moved to .the van; BEDOUIN, clouds producing intermittent rain, wind PUNJABI, ESKIMO to starboard, COSSACK, South-west Force 3-4*, visibility. 10 miles. KIMBERLEY and FORESTER to port. Snow lay thickly on the mountains surrounding 15. A " Swordfish " aircraft from FURIOUS the fiords, down to sea level. was sighted approaching from the starboard 7. At 0747 a signal was made ordering quarter. It was believed to be that allocated H.M.S. FURIOUS to commence air attack at to Task A in the operation orders, namely, the times stated in the orders for the operation the bombing of Baroy Island defences. Inspec- (vide paragraph 3 (xi)). tion of the Island however showed no sign of enemy activity and a signal was made to the 8. At 0915 I made the following signal to aircraft "I see nothing to bomb on Baroy Force " B ". Island ", in which the observer concurred and " We are proceeding to attack the defences reported that he was returning to his ship. of Narvik and any German war or merchant ships met. I am sure that any resistance on 16. At 1203 WARSPITE'S aircraft reported the part of the enemy will be dealt with in " German destroyer in position one mile north the most resolute and determined manner. I of Hamnesholm (67° 25' North 16° 36' East), wish you all every success." steering west." At 1229 BEDOUIN reported 9. At 1009 I made the following signal sighting the enemy bearing 073°. Fire was amplifying the operation orders issued by you. opened by destroyers in the van. The enemy " Operation D.W. paragraph (vi). Any retired at long range and fire was intermittent sign of enemy activity on Baroy Island is to owing to the poor visibility and smoke. be destroyed by gunfire. Paragraph (vii). The blackened bow of the ammunition ship ' If a guide to fire distribution is necessary odd RAUENFELS blown up by the 2nd Destroyer numbered destroyers take south side and even Flotilla during their retirement on loth April, number take north side. Enemy warships was passed in position 68° 24^' North 16° 28' take precedence over shore targets. East. Paragraph (viii). On arrival east of 17° 17. At 1240 the aircraft reported that two East destroyers may use high speed but should enemy destroyers were off Framsk (68° 24' not lose the support of WARSPITE'S fire. North 16° 49' East) and at 1250 that these Any enemy warship in the fiord to the north destroyers were hiding in a bay five miles ahead of Narvik is to be provided for before the of the screen, and were in a position to fire harbour to the south is entered. torpedoes. The number was later corrected to Paragraph (x). If ordered to withdraw, one destroyer. the signal D.B.O. by V/S and W/T will be 18. The action became more general. Enemy used." destroyers sighted in Ofot Fiord were engaged 10. ICARUS, HERO and FOXHOUND in at long range and WARSPITE opened fire with that order sweeping directly ahead of main armament. WARSPITE while the remaining five destroyers 19. The enemy destroyer reported by WAR- * Admiralty footnotes: Refers to the Beaufort scale of windforce. Force 3—Gentle breeze (7-10 m.p.h. SPITE'S aircraft, believed to be one of the at sea level). Force 4—Moderate breeze (11-15 m.p.h. Roeder class, had manoeuvred into the small at sea level). bay in a position 68° 24^' North 16° 48' East, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3053 at the head of which lies Djupvik. Her bows 31. At 1417 PUNJABI passed WARSPITE pointed to the eastward, and her torpedo arma- withdrawing from the action owing to hits which ment bore across the fiord. She was hidden had put the main steam pipe and all guns from -the approaching destroyers. temporarily out of action. 20. The warning conveyed by the aircraft 32. At the same time a heavy explosion shook was therefore invaluable. The leading destroyers WARSPITE: the cause was not ascertained. turned their guns and torpedo armament on the starboard tow, and before the enemy could 33. At 1421 WARSPITE ceased fire on the fire more than one salvo, she was heavily target in Narvik .Bay owing -to our own engaged. Two torpedoes, one from BEDOUIN destroyers fouling the range. This target had and one from ESKIMO struck the ship and in proved to be a destroyer alongside the quay three minutes she was on fire forward and aft. and not a shore battery. A report was received, however, that a figure 34. The situation then developed as follows: — was seen standing by the torpedo tubes and her One enemy destroyer badly on fire, ran destruction was completed by salvos from ashore at Herjangen (68° 33' North 17° 33^' WARSPITE'S main armament. Torpedoes East) and was struck by a torpedo from fired by the enemy .but passed clear of our ESKIMO. destroyers. The destroyer, which had just left Narvik 21. Meanwhile more enemy destroyers had Harbour, broke out in flames forward and appeared in Ofot Fiord. In ,the smoke and aft, and was abandoned iby her crew close haze the targets were not clear, but at least to 'the shore northwest of Narvik. four ships were observed. The enemy steamed An unknown number of destroyers retired to and fro across the Fiord bringing guns and up Rombaks Fiord, under cover of smoke torpedoes to bear and turning as the limit of from funnels and floats and were followed by the run was reached. Our destroyers, with the ESKIMO, FORESTER, HERO, ICARUS exception of those sweeping, adopted a loose and later BEDOUIN. formation from one to three miles ahead of The destroyer alongside in Narvik Harbour WARSPITE altering course as necessary ,to continued to fire. COSSACK and FOX- bring armament to bear and avoid shell fire. HOUND entered the harbour supported by From this point Force " B " advanced up Ofot KIMBERLEY, and under their combined Fiord at a mean speed of 10 knots. attack the enemy caught fire. FOXHOUND 22. At 1318 WARSPITE'S aircraft sighted approached to 'board but was received with five torpedo tracks approaching from ahead. Machine gun fire from the shore. Then the These passed clear to port and subsequently destroyer blew up and resistance in-the har- an explosion was observed at the water's edge bour ceased. on 'the port beam. While carrying out this attack COSSACK 23. WARSPITE'S main armament engaged drifted on to a submerged wreck. the enemy when a target presented itself. But 35. Until defensive action in Narvik ceased owing to the smoke of the destroyer engagement WARSPITE lay off the entrance 'and at 1450 fire was intermittent. Speed was adjusted to I signalled to the Commander-in-Chief: — maintain support of the destroyers but to keep " Three enemy destroyers still up Rombaks WARSPITE dear of the torpedo danger as far Fiord. No enemy opposition in Narvik Bay. as possible. Four enemy destroyers destroyed. Am 24. At 1341 FURIOUS'S aircraft were sighted investigating possibility of occupying the on the port quarter approaching to the attack. town." 25. A further torpedo exploded on the fore- 36. At 1500 I proceeded up Rombaks Fiord shore bearing Red 20°.* to clear up -the situation there. Two enemy 26. At 1345 sweeping destroyers hauled their destroyers were reported at the head of the sweeps and subsequently proceeded in support Fiord by the aircraft and ESKIMO was leading of the Destroyers of the Striking Force. five destroyers to the attack. 27. At 1350 COSSACK reported yet another ESKIMO passed through the narrow neck torpedo approaching. WARSPITE was in Rombaks Fiord followed closely by manoeuvred to present the smallest target but FORESTER and HERO and engaged -two the track was not seen. enemy ships in sight. The enemy replied with gun and torpedo fire and at 1450 ESKIMO' was 28. At 1352 WARSPITE'S aircraft reported struck by a torpedo which removed the bow no destroyers in Skjomen Fiord. of the ship. Of the two enemy ships, one, 29. Meanwhile the engagement with the after firing torpedoes, ran aground at Sildvika enemy manoeuvring to the North of Narvik where she was destroyed by gunfire and aban- had become closer and another destroyer was doned. The other retired under cover of smoke seen leaving the harbour distant 12,000 yards to the top of the fiord. from WARSPITE. She was engaged by destroyers on the starboard wing and by WAR- 37. Difficulty was then experienced owing to SPITE'S main armament and was soon severely the congestion in the narrow neck of this fiord. damaged. The enemy's fire was becoming ESKIMO was trying to get clear stern first ragged and shots were falling round WAR- assisted by FORESTER, the remaining SPITE. destroyers were endeavouring to enter and con- tinue the chase. 30. Gunfire was then observed in Narvik Harbour and was thought to be from a shore 38. At 1520 I ordered all available destroyers battery. At 1402 I ordered the destroyers to to concentrate in Rombaks Fiord. engage enemy destroyers while WARSPITE At 1530 a report on the situation was received engaged the shore battery. from BEDOUIN as follows: — * Admiralty footnote: Red 20° = 20° on the port " One aground out of action (this was at bow. Sildvika). Two more round the corner out 3054 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 of sight. If .they have torpedoes they are With the force available only a small party in a position of great advantage. HERO and could be landed and to guard against the in- BEDOUIN ammunition almost exhausted. evitable counter-attack it would be necessary BEDOUIN " A " mounting out of action. to keep the force concentrated close to the 1520." water-front and to provide strong covering gun- I thereupon signalled BEDOUIN: — fire. In fact I considered it would be necessary " The torpedo menace must be accepted. to keep WARSPITE off Narvik. Enemy moist be destroyed without delay. 45. A signal was then received from FOX- Take KIMBERLEY, FORESTER, HERO HOUND that the Officer prisoners taken had and PUNJABI under your orders and reported the presence of several German sub- organise attack sending most serviceable marines in, the Fiord. destroyer first. Ram or board if necessary. 46. At 1800 twelve enemy aircraft were 1540." sighted approaching from the westward. 39. Meanwhile WARSPITE'S aircraft was 47. Apart from the above considerations I recalled and hoisted inboard and preparations felt, that, to place, at the end of a long and were made to carry out an indirect bombard- strenuous day, a party of less than 200 tired ment of the ships at the head of the fiord, seamen and marines in the midst of a force of should this be necessary. On its return WAR- not less than 2,000 professional German SPITE'S aircraft reported sinking a submarine soldiers, would be to court disaster, even allow- anchored off Bjerkvik, in Herjangs Fiord, by ing for the moral effect -which the day's bombing. This sinking was accepted as a engagement must have had on the enemy. fact.* 48.. The cumulative effect of the roar of 40. While I was in communication with WARSPITE'S fifteen inch guns reverberating BEDOUIN, HERO, ICARUS and KIM- down and around the high mountains of the BERLEY proceeded up Rombaks Fiord and, Fiord, the bursts and splashes of these great as soon as the targets could .be observed in the shells, the sight of their ships sinking and burn- smoke, opened fire on the destroyers at the ing around them must have been terrifying to head of the Fiord. No reply was made, how- the enemy. But such an effect cannot be of ever, and fire was checked. The enemy had a lasting nature to the soldiers on shore, and abandoned the ships, of which there proved I felt that to be taken full advantage of, it to be three. One was already scuttled, one would 'have required a trained, organised sank forthwith and HERO and ICARUS sent military force, ready to land directly the Naval away a iboarding party to the one remaining. engagement had ceased. If such a force had BEDOUIN, on arrival, ordered boarding par- been present, I believe that they would have ties to return, and the enemy was sunk by a succeeded in establishing themselves so strongly torpedo from HERO. HERO states the boarded in Narvik that its eventual capture would only destroyer was .the HANS LUDEMANN. be a matter of time and reinforcements. 49. I thereupon decided against keeping 41. As the destroyers had successfully dealt WARSPITE stopped in the Fiord off Narvik, with all enemy forces at the top of .the Fiord, subject to submarine and air attack. indirect bombardment .by WARSPITE was not 50. At 1832 I signalled: — necessary and it was decided to return to Narvik " General from BC. One.* Am with- Bay to investigate the state of affairs there. drawinfg. KIMBERLEY is to guard 42. COSSACK was still grounded on a wreck COSSACK withdrawing iher if possible from and had been under spasmodic fire from a shore Narvik harbour. PUNJABI to guard gun of small calibre. Although not definitely ESKIMO." located, the COSSACK silenced it by retalia- 51. HOSTILE (Commander J. P. Wright) tory fire in its direction. and IVANHOE (Commander P. H. Hadow), FOXHOUND, standing by, had sent her based on Skjel Fiord, had been placed at my Medical Officer to COSSACK and was picking disposal by your signal. I ordered these up survivors from the German destroyer destroyers to proceed to Narvik and reinforce abandoned on fire off Narvik. those to be stationed there. IVANHOE had been ordered to patrol the entrance to the Fiord 43. At 1742 I made the following report of and was therefore in the vicinity. the situation. 52. I proceeded down Ofot Fiord with "WARSPITE, COSSACK and FOX- FOXHOUND ahead. BEDOUIN, HERO and HOUND in Narvik Bay. Little opposition. ICARUS followed withdrawing from Rombaks All German destroyers sunk, three of them Fiord. FORESTER was delayed embarking after retiring up Rombaks Fiord. One sub- the majority of ESKIMO'S crew. marine sunk by WARSPITE'S aircraft. Parties of men, possibly soldiers retreating 53. At 1840 when close to Hamnesholm Light over hills. One field Howitzer silenced by (67° 25' North 16° 36' East) FOXHOUND COSSACK. Enemy aircraft have been obtained a submarine contact and counter- sighted. Damage to own ships so far attacked. This submarine was apparently reported:—ESKIMO bows blown off by escaping out of Ofot Fiord. A later report torpedo. COSSACK damaged and ashore in received from the Hamnesholm Lighthouse Narvik Bay. PUNJABI one boiler out of keeper confirms this. I have since come to action. 1742." the conclusion that a submarine navigating sub- merged in the narrow waters of a fiord would 44. I thereupon considered the landing of a find himself in a not very enviable position party to occupy the town as the opposition with Anti-submarine destroyers operating over- had apparently been silenced. head and his desire to get out of it is there- * Admiralty footnote: It has since been confirmed fore understandable. that this submarine was sunk by WARSPITE's air- * Admiralty footnote: A signal to all ships present craft. from V.A.C, ist Battle Cruiser Squadron. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 3055 54. The four destroyers then formed an Anti- 59. Transferring the wounded took a very submarine screen and preparations were made long time, and I was acutely aware of the pos- to repel the attack of the twelve aircraft which sibility of submarine and air attack. As regards were still in sight to the northward. This the former I felt that Ofot Fiord had become attack did not develop although IVANHOE too unhealthy an area for a submarine, witness reported being bombed on passage up the FOXHOUND'S attack and position of sub- Fiord. marine. As regards air attack WARSPITE was ready to go ahead at any time and slip 55. I ordered destroyers in company to be destroyers alongside, and if air attack did prepared to transfer wounded to WARSPITE develop it did not matter where it took place. under cover of darkness at 2230. At 2027 I In any event WARSPITE was there to support made the following report: — the destroyers who had done such grand work, " Cornmander-in-Chief, Home Fleet and I was not disposed to abandon them in (Repeated) Admiralty from Vice Admiral their distress. Commanding Battle Cruiser Squadron. 60. IVANHOE had, while proceeding up the My 1742. I am withdrawing with WAR- Fiord, been intercepted by a Norwegian vessel SPITE, PUNJABI, HERO, ICARUS, FOX- on board which were survivors of HARDY* HOUND and FORESTER when wounded and British Merchant ships. Tihe opportunity are collected. was taken to distribute these survivors number- BEDOUIN and KIMBERLEY remaining ing about 200 men to various destroyers. to assist ESKIMO and COSSACK. Have 61. Several large fires and explosions were ordered HOSTILE and IVANHOE to sup- seen in Narvik nine miles to the Eastward. port them. 62. I received a report from COSSACK that Seven enemy destroyers and one submarine the condition of some wounded was so serious have been destroyed. There are now no as to make transfer by destroyer inadvisable enemy warships at Narvik. No shore and I therefore at 0250 closed Narvik to effect batteries were observed but a Howitzer on the the transfer by boat.- hill behind Narvik and a field gun on the foreshore were reported to have been firing. 63. During WARSPITE'S approach white Thirteen merchant ships in the harbour, half Verey Lights were fired by a Merchant vessel appeared German. Our destroyers being in in the harbour. This signal was presumed to occupation oif the harbour these were not be a warning to whatever shore defences were sunk. Formationis of twelve enemy air- manned. craft approached about 1830 but no attack 64. At 0326 COSSACK managed to draw has as yet been made on WARSPITE, clear of .the wreck and was berthed alongside though IVANHOE was bombed while on WARSPITE. patrol off Tjel Sundet. Damage to ships and casualties will be reported when received. 65. When all wounded were embarked I Some German prisoners have been taken, ordered withdrawal, the following dispositions details of which will be reported later." being made:— KIMBERLEY and IVANHOE to remain 56. Reports which were received, however, at Narvik. indicated that a number of wounded remained ESKIMO accompanied by BEDOUIN and in the destroyers at Narvik. Accordingly, at COSSACK by FORESTER to proceed to 2050 I ordered course to be reversed and Skjel Fiord. signalled to COSSACK at Narvik: — WARSPITE and remaining destroyers to " All wounded are to be collected in proceed to the westward. PUNJABI to rendezvous with me in 17° 66. At 1027 in reply to Admiralty message East at midnight." timed 0913/14^1 April asking for an estimate of strength of enemy in Narvik area the follow- 57. At 2210 I made the following signal: — ing reply was sent: — " Commander - in - Chief, Home Fleet, " Admiralty J(Repeated) Commander-in- (Repeated) Admiralty Chief, Home Fleet, AURORA, from B.C. One. SOUTHAMPTON from B.C. One. My impression ds that enemy forces in Narvik were thoroughly frightened as a Your 0913. Information from Norwegian result of to-day's action and that the presence sources estimate 1,500 to 2,000 troops in of WARSPITE was the chief cause of this. Narvik. German Naval Officer prisoner states that there are many more than this, I recommend that the town be occupied but I think this statement was made with without delay by the main landing force. intent to deceive. He also states that guns I intend to visit Narvik again to-morrow on shore are being .positioned with the main Sunday in order to maintain the moral effect object of opposing a landing but COSSACK of the presence of WARSPITE and to accept aground in Narvik Bay for 12 hours yester- the air and submarine menace involved by day was not seriously molested. this course of action." I am convinced that Narvik can be taken In making this signal I knew that the troop by direct assault, without fear of meeting convoys making for Vaagsfiord were at sea and serious opposition on landing. I consider that envisaged them -being diverted direct to Narvik. the main landing force need only be small •but that it must have the support of Force B • 58. Meanwhile I proceeded to the Narvik or one of similar composition. A special area. On arrival all destroyers in company requirement being ships and destroyers with having wounded were brought alongside WAR- the best available A.A. armaments." SPITE in turn to 'effect the transfer while the * Admiralty footnote: HARDY was lost in the first remainder carried out A/S patrol in the vicinity. engagement at Narvik three days previously. 3056 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 3 JULY, 1947 General Remarks. 70. Our destroyers enjoyed a .tactical advan- 67. The safe return of ESKIMO and tage in their ability to fire a heavy armament COSSACK to Skjel Fiord was a fitting conclu- on forward bearings. sion to an operation which I consider was an 71. The enemy reports made by WAR- unqualified success. SPITE'S aircraft were invaluable. I doubt if ever a ship-borne aircraft has been used to such Seven or eight enemy destroyers and one sub- good purpose as it was during this operation. marine—the total German Naval Forces present In addition the aircraft bombed and sank an —were sunk without the loss of a British ship. enemy submarine. (The enemy destroyer " already scuttled " in 72. Apart from the effective fire developed Rombaks Fiord vide paragraph 40 may have by WARSPITE her presence undoubtedly gave been abandoned after -the attack by tyie and great confidence to our own destroyers and put Destroyer Flotilla on loth April, 1940.) fear into the hearts of the enemy, who must have realised that they were caught like rats in 68. Our casualties also were comparatively a trap. small—28 killed, 55 wounded, while the casual- 73. The precision and coolness with which ties amongst enemy destroyers with their com- WARSPITE was handled during the approach, plement of 280 each must have been very and when both main 'and secondary armament heavy. were engaging the enemy was typical of the Commanding Officer — Captain V. A. C. 69. I cannot speak too highly of the vigour Crutchley, V.C., D.S.C. and determination with which our destroyers (Sgd.) W. J. WfflTWORTH, went into the attack—they had to bear the brunt of the enemy's defence, and it was only Vice-Admiral Commanding, by •the skilful handling of their ships that they Battle Cruiser Squadron. avoided receiving heavy damage from gunfire Commander-in-Ohief, and torpedo. Home Fleet.

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