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States with Ballistic Missiles 1970S

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States with Ballistic Missiles 1970S Appendix A. Historical Trends in Ballistic Missile Proliferation 1960s: States with Ballistic Missiles 1970s: States with Ballistic Missiles 1980s: States with Ballistic Missiles 1990s: States with Ballistic Missiles 2000s: States with Ballistic Missiles 2010s: States with Ballistic Missiles Country Missile 1st Tested IOC Source Retired Range (km) CEP (m) Afghanistan SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1988 1988 SIPRI/TMB (2012) 2012 300 450 Afghanistan Frog-7b (500mm) 1988 1988 SIPRI/TMB (2012) 2012 70 400 Algeria SS-26 Stone (Iskander E) 2017 2017 TMB; SIPRI 280 70 Algeria Frog-7b (500mm) 1975 1975 SIPRI/TMB; nti.org 1982 70 400 Algeria Frog-3 (540mm) 1970 1970 SIPRI/TMB 1982 61 800 Argentina Condor II N/A N/Anti.org; globalsecurity.org; Carus1993 890 800 Argentina Alacran 1986nti.org; globalsecurity.org; Mistry & GopalaswamyND 1993 150 Argentina Condor I N/A N/Anti.org; globalsecurity.org; 1993 150 Armenia SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1996 1996 SIPRI; TMB (1996) 300 450 Armenia SS-26 Stone (Iskander E) SIPRI; military-today.com; nationalinterest.com; TMB (2017)2016 2016 280 70 Armenia SS-21 Scarab B (Tochka U) 2013 2013TMB (2017, 2013); nti.org 120 95 Armenia Frog-7b (500mm) 1960 1960 TMB 1991 70 400 Azerbaijan SS-21 Scarab B (Tochka U) 2009 2009 TMB (2009, 2018) 120 95 Azerbaijan LORA (650mm) 2018 2018 eurasianet.org 300 10 Bahrain ATACMS Block 1A 2013 2013 SIPRI 300 10 Bahrain ATACMS Block 1 2002 2002 SIPRI 165 50 Belarus SS-25 Sickle 1992 1992 TMB 1992 10500 210 Belarus SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1992 1992 TMB 300 450 Belarus SS-21 Scarab B (Tochka U) 1992 1992 TMB 120 95 Belarus Frog-7b (500mm) 1992 1992 TMB 2018 70 400 Belgium Lance (560mm) 1977 1977 TMB 1992 121 150 Belgium Honest John (M50) (760mm) 1962 1962 TMB 1978 48 230 Brazil VLS 1993 N/A Mistry & Gopalaswamy N/A 1000 Brazil ASTROS II SS-80 (300mm) 1983Rocket Artillery Reference Book 90 Brazil ASTROS II SS-60 (300mm) 1983Rocket Artillery Reference Book 60 Brazil Sonda-series 1965 N/A Mistry & Gopalaswamy N/A Brazil MB/EE-150, -350, -600, -1000 N/A N/A Mistry & Gopalaswamy N/A Bulgaria SS-23 (Spider) SIPRI; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/bulgariajul_aug02; revolvy.com1986 1986 2002 480 70 Bulgaria SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300)SIPRI/TMB; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/bulgariajul_aug021991 1991 2002 300 450 Bulgaria Frog-7a/b (500mm) SIPRI/TMB; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/bulgariajul_aug021991 1991 2002 70 400 Bulgaria SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1971 1971 SIPRI/TMB 1991 300 450 Bulgaria SS-1B (Scud-A; R-11; Elbrus) 1961 1961 SIPRI/TMB 1991 270 5160 Bulgaria Frog-7a/b (500mm) 1960 1960 SIPRI/TMB 1991 70 400 Canada Honest John (M50) (760mm) 1960 1960 TMB 1970 48 230 China 1059 (DF-1) 1960 1961 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com1975 590 2780 China DF-2 (CSS-1) 1962 1970 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com1979 1250 2780 China DF-3 (CSS-2) 1966 1971 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com; DOD report2002 2650 870 China DF-4 (CSS-3) 1969 1981 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 4760 1190 China DF-5 (CSS-4) 1971 1981 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 12000 800 China JL-1 (CSS-NX-3) 1981 1986 fas.org; nti.org; 2016 1000 700 China DF-21 (CSS-5) 1985 1991 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com; missilethreat.csis.org2150 700 China DF-15 (CSS-6/M-9) 1988 1990 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 600 3200 China DF-11 (CSS-7/M-11) 1990 1992 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 280 600 China DF-21A (CSS-5) 1991 1996 missilethreat.csis.org 1770 50 China DF-5A (CSS-4) 1993 1981 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 13030 440 China DF-11A (CSS-7/M-11) 1997 1999 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 600 150 China DF-31A (CSS-10) 1999 2007 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 11000 150 China DF-31 (CSS-10) 1999 2006 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com; missilethreat.csis.org7900 300 China JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) 2002 2015 fas.org; nti.org; 8000 300 China DF-15B (CSS-6) 2003 2006 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 800 10 China DF-15C (CSS-6) 2007 2007 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 700 20 China SY-400 2008 military-today.com 300 50 China DF-21C (CSS-5) 2013 2006 missilethreat.csis.org 2150 50 China DF-21D (CSS-5) 2013 2006 missilethreat.csis.org 1550 20 China DF-41 (CSS-X-20) 2014 N/A ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 15000 100-500 China DF-5C 2017 N/A ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 13000 500 China DF-26 2017 2015 missilethreat.csis.org 4000 450 China DF-5B (CSS-4) N/A 2015 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 12000 300 China DF-16 (CSS-11) 2011 missilethreat.csis.org 1000 10 China DF-15A (CSS-6) 1996 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 900 45 China M-7 (CSS-8) 1986 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com; Kan CRS Report180 China B611 (CSS-11) 2004 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 280 30-150 China DF-12 (M20) 2016 ausairpower.net; astronautix.com 280 30-70 Cuba SS-5 (Skean; R-14) 1962 1962 TMB; nti.org 1962 3700 1130 Cuba SS-4 (Sandal; R-12) 1962 1962 TMB; nti.org 1962 1500 5160 Cuba Frog-3/4/5 (540mm) 1961 1961 TMB; nti.org 1962 61 800 Cuba Frog-3 (540mm) 1962 1962 TMB; nti.org 1990 61 800 Czech Republic SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1993 1993 TMB 1998 300 450 Czech Republic SS-21 Scarab B (Tochka U) 1993 1993 TMB 2005 120 95 Czech Republic Frog-7b (500mm) 1993 1993 TMB 2005 70 400 Czechoslovakia SS-23 (Spider) 1985 1985 SIPRI 1992 480 70 Czechoslovakia SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1964 1964 SIPRI/TMB 1991 300 450 Czechoslovakia SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1992 1992 SIPRI/TMB 1992 300 450 Czechoslovakia SS-1B (Scud-A; R-11; Elbrus) 1961 1961 SIPRI/TMB 1970 270 5160 Czechoslovakia SS-21 Scarab B (Tochka U) 1985 1985 SIPRI 1992 120 95 Czechoslovakia Frog-7a/b (500mm) 1963 1963 SIPRI/TMB 1991 70 400 Czechoslovakia Frog-7b (500mm) 1992 1992 TMB 1992 70 400 Denmark Honest John (M50) (760mm) 1961 1961 TMB 1977 48 230 East Germany SS-23 (Spider) 1985 1985 SIPRI 1991 480 70 East Germany SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1964 1964 SIPRI/TMB 1991 300 450 East Germany SS-1B (Scud-A; R-11; Elbrus) 1962 1962 SIPRI 1991 270 5160 East Germany SS-21 Scarab B (Tochka U) 1983 1983 SIPRI 1991 120 95 East Germany Frog-7a/b (500mm) 1960 1960 TMB 1981 70 400 Egypt Al Kahir N/A N/A Mistry & Gopalaswamy 1969 600 Egypt Project T (Scud-B) 1988 1996 TMB; nti.org; NIE 5-91C 450 450 Egypt Al Zafir N/A N/A Mistry & Gopalaswamy 1969 370 Egypt SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1973 1973 SIPRI/TMB 300 450 Egypt Sakr-30/80 (122mm-325mm) 1984 TMB; fas.org; Jane's Information Group 19942005 80 Egypt Frog-7b (500mm) 1971 1971 TMB 70 400 Egypt Frog-3 (540mm) 1968 1968 TMB 1972 61 800 France M-51 (SLBM) 2004 2010 fas.org 14000 350 France M-5 (SLBM) N/A ND fas.org ND 11000 350 France M-45 (SLBM) 1995 1997 missilethreat.csis.org 6000 500 France M-4B (SLBM) 1980 1985 fas.org 2010 5000 500 France M-4A (SLBM) 1980 1985 TMB; fas.org 2010 4000 500 France SSBS SS3 (IRBM) 1975 1982 revolvy.com; fas.org 1999 3500 France M2 (SLBM) 1973 1974 fas.org 1978 3200 France SSBS SS2 (IRBM) 1971 1971 astronautix.com 1984 3000 France M1 (SLBM) 1971 1971fas.org; missilethreat.csis.org1975 3000 5 France M-20 (SLBM) 1974 1977 fas.org 1991 3000 1000 France SSBS SS1 (IRBM) 1965 ND astronautix.com ND 2900 1000 France Hades 1988 NDrevolvy.com; astronautix.com1997 480 100 France Corporal 1955 1955 SIPRI 1966 121 France Pluton 1965 1974 missilethreat.csis.org 1993 120 150 France Honest John (M50) (760mm) 1961 1961 TMB 1974 48 230 Greece ATACMS Block 1 1998 1998 SIPRI 165 50 Greece Honest John (M50) (760mm) 1960 1960 TMB 1993 48 230 Hungary SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1967 1967 SIPRI/TMB 1991 300 450 Hungary SS-1B (Scud-A; R-11; Elbrus) 1962 1962 SIPRI/TMB 1970 270 5160 Hungary Frog-7b (500mm) 1974 1974 TMB 1991 70 400 Hungary Frog-3 (540mm) 1960 1960 TMB 1991 61 800 Hungary SS-21 Scarab B (Tochka U) 1987 1987 SIPRI 1991 120 95 India SLV-3 1979 astronautix.com; Mistry & GopalaswamyN/A 1983 900 India Prithvi-I 1988military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.org1994 150 300 India Agni-TD Carus; indiatoday.in; astronautix.com; Wisconsin Project1989 ND 1994 1200 India PSLV 1993 N/A Mistry & Gopalaswamy N/A 900 India Prithvi-II 1996military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.org1996 250 500 India Agni-II 1999military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.org2011 3500 40 India Danush (SLBM) 2000military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.org2010 400 50 India GSLV 2001 N/A Mistry & Gopalaswamy N/A 36000 India Agni-I 2002military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.org2004 1200 50 India Sagarika (SLBM) 2004 military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.orgN/A 750 India Agni-III 2006military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.org2014 3200 40 India Shaurya (SLBM) 2008 military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.orgN/A 3500 20-30 India Agni-IV 2014military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.orgN/A 4000 80 India Agni-V 2015 military-today.com; timesofindia.comN/A 8000 10 India Prahaar 2016military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.orgN/A 150 10 India Prithvi-III military-today.com; missilethreat.csis.org; fas.orgN/A 350 75 Iran Shahab-1 (hwasong-5) 1985fas.org; missilethreat.csis.org; astronautix.com1985 330 450 Iran SS-1C (Scud-B; R-17; R-300) 1985 1985 fas.org; TMB; SIPRI 300 450 Iran Oghab (230 mm) 1985 1985 TMB; Mistry 40 Iran Tondor 69 (CSS-8; M-7) 1990 1990SIPRI; TMB; Kan CRS Report 180 Iran Scud-C (Hwasong 6) 1991 1991 SIPRI 500 700 Iran Shahab-3 (Zelzal-3) 1998fas.org; missilethreat.csis.org; astronautix.com2003 1300 2500 Iran Shahab-2/Scud-C 1998 1997fas.org; missilethreat.csis.org 500 700 Iran Fateh-110 2001 missilethreat.csis.org; nti.org; upenn2004 210 100 Iran Mushak-160 (Nazeat-10) (355mm)2001 1988 Mistry; nti.org 160 700 Iran Fateh-110B (Fateh-3) 2002 2010missilethreat.csis.org;
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