NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : NONVIOLENT PUBLIC PROTEST IN THE USSR December 1, 1986 - December 31, 198 9

AUTHOR : Mark R. Beissinger

CONTRACTOR : University of Wisconsin

. PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Mark R Beissinge r

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 804-14

DATE : October 199 0

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b y the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author .

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S

This project could not have been carried out without th e assistance of a number of people . Above all, research assistants Da n Geller and Shelly Sandel provided able support in tracking dow n materials in the library . Dan participated in practically every ste p of the creation of the database, including interpretation of material s and data entry, and deserve special thanks . Jon Cebra also provide d help with computer programming and with the statistical analysis o f the material . Special thanks go to Mario Corti and the staff a t Arkhiv samizdata at Radio Liberty in Munich, who graciously provide d me with the opportunity to peruse their rich holdings of unofficia l newspapers and publications . Needless to say, all errors an d shortcomings in the project are solely the fault of the Principa l

Investigator . a

r CONTENTS

Executive Summary 1 Introduction 6 Description of the Data 1 0

General Patterns of Protest Activity 1 7 Temporal Variations in Demonstration Activity 2 9 Demonstration Activity by Type of Demand 3 6 The Impact of Regime Regulation and Coercio n An Initial Investigation 5 2 The Agenda of Future Research 62 Appendix A : Sources Directly Use d in the Data Base 6 6

Appendix B : Definition of Demand Types 68 Appendix C : Statement on the Distributio n of the Data Base 7 3 Database Structure 7 5 Definitions 79 Coding 83

Endnotes 94

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report analyzes the general contours of non-violen t protest activity in the Soviet Union during the glasnost ' period .' It is based on information collected from a larg e variety of official, unofficial, emigre, and Western source s covering 2,161 non-violent mass protest demonstrations tha t occurred in the Soviet Union from December 1st, 1986 throug h December 31st, 1989 . According to official MVD statistics , therefore, this report analyzes information on somewher e between a fourth and a third of all demonstrations that too k place in the USSR during this period . Although data on violen t mass protests, strikes, and non-violent protest demonstration s before December 1986 were collected, they are still in th e process of coding and systematization and are not included i n this study .

The report documents the radical transformations that hav e taken place in the Soviet Union in recent years in the spher e of public protest and political participation . It is shown that high levels of of protest mobilization have occurre d especially in Transcaucasia, the Baltic, Moldavia, and wester n portions of the Ukraine, although almost a quarter of al l events actually took place within the RSFSR . The discrepanc y has much to do with the varying sizes of demonstrations amon g different groups . Thus, while Russians have protested often, the mobilizing power of Russian groups has not been very high , with over 60 percent of demonstrations in the RSFSR being les s than a thousand in size . By contrast, more than 45 percen t (113) of the demonstrations recorded for Armenia involved mor e than 100 thousand people . Of the approximately 60 millio n person-days of protest accounted for in this study, more tha n half (53 percent) took place in Armenia, and slightly less than a fifth (19 percent) occurred in Azerbaidzhan .

Three distinct periods in the development of Sovie t protest during the time under study are identified : an earl y period of low mobilization and testing of the political water s

(from December 1986 to February 1988) ; an intermediate perio d involving great volatility in mobilizations among relativel y few groups (from February 1988 to February 1989) ; and a thir d period characterized by more constant and less volatile level s of demonstrations and the mobilization of new groups int o protest politics . The timing and development of protest i n twelve republics are compared, as well as the extent to whic h different republics displayed a constant versus a punctuate d pattern of mobilization . It is shown that towards the end o f the period under study in this report (i .e ., the end of 1989 ) high levels of mobilization were becoming increasingly constan t in a number of republics, including the RSFSR, Ukraine ,

Azerbaidzhan, Armenia, and Moldavia . In other words, th e political system was facing a growing explosion of protes t

-2- participation among an increasing number of groups that, i f left unaccomodated, was likely to undermine politica l stability .

Differentiating protest by the types of demands put forth , it is shown that the mobilizing power of liberal groups wa s consistently greater than that of conservative groups . Only Russians displayed a significant degree of ideologica l divisioning in their patterns of protest mobilization . Both protest in favor of liberal demands and protest in favor of a multi-party system grew considerably in the second half o f 1989, particularly among Russians, explaining in part th e decision of the CPSU to abandon its monopoly over the part y system in February 1990 . Liberal protest, ecological protest , protest in favor of secession, protest over non-secessionis t territorial demands, protest over linguistic and cultura l demands, protest against regime coercion, and (more recently ) religious protest have all displayed more or less constan t patterns of mobilization, while protest over social an d economic issues, anti-military protest, and protest ove r foreign policy issues have been intermittent . Anti-militar y protest, while displaying a punctuated pattern of mobilization , grew in significance towards the end of the period studie d here, as did protest over foreign-policy issues . Thus , internal protest increasingly impinged on national securit y decision-making in the Soviet Union .

-3- The enormous variety of causes for protest in the USSR made the search for a general explanation for protes t mobilizations impossible ; neither education, nor part y membership, nor ethnic assimilation, nor urbanization turne d out to be connected with overall levels of protes t mobilization . For non-Russians, a relationship betwee n linguistic Russification and protest in favor of conservativ e demands was found, as well as a strong association between th e availability of native language newspapers and secessionis t protest . Thus, measures of ethnic assimilation appear to b e important as explanations for selected protest issues, but no t for protest overall . Protest over social and economic issue s was found to be related with the level of urbanization of a province, but subsequent analysis found it to be negativel y associated with city size . Consequently, protest over socia l and economic issues was most likely in small towns in highl y urbanized areas of the country . In the RSFSR the larger th e city, the more likely it was that a demonstration expresse d liberal demands, expressed approval for a multi-party system o r for religious freedom, expressed racist or violentl y nationalistic demands, or expressed sympathy with the demand s of other national groups . Thus, like ethnic assimilation , urbanization would seem to have an important impact on selecte d issues of protest in particular places, but not on protes t overall . The penultimate section of the report analyzes efforts b y national and local authorities to contain non-violent protes t through regulation and coercion . It is found that in mos t parts of the USSR laws governing the conduct of demonstration s have remained a dead letter, largely ignored by protest groups , and often unenforceable by the police . A large proportion o f protest demonstrations taking place in the country have no t been authorized by the authorities . Nor have efforts t o contain demonstrations by violence proved successful in mos t cases . Indeed, the evidence presented in this study indicate s that the use of violence against demonstrators actually stimulated greater protest . Coercion has been highest in thos e parts of the country that have exhibited low levels of protes t mobilization in general, but the causal flow of th e relationship is unclear .

A final section of the report outlines plans for futur e research using the database and related materials .

INTRODUCTIO N

Comparative research on protest behavior has been an d continues to be a major area of political inquiry . 2 Such research has focused on the causes and mechanics of socia l protest, the impact of regime violence on protest activity, th e influence protest exercises on public policy, the relationship between violent and non-violent forms of protest, tempora l patterns of change in the volume of protest, and the role o f competition and cooperation among groups within the so-calle d social protest sector of the population . In general, researc h on protest behavior has taken place at three separate levels o f analysis . The lowest level has concentrated on specific , issue-oriented protest movements (such as labor movements , ecology movements, anti-nuclear protests, etc .) and on th e mechanics of protest mobilization . While such research ha s been useful in uncovering factors associated with the succes s or failure of protest movements, like all case-study researc h it is often limited by a lack of generalizability . At th e highest level of analysis have been broad-ranging, quantitativ e cross-national studies of protest and collective violence . These have been useful in testing hypotheses about the cause s of and relationships between different types of protes t activities, but have often suffered from a lack o f

-6- comparability and problems in the collection of comparabl e cross-national data . At the intermediate level of analysi s stand country-specific studies that focus on a range of protes t activities within the social protest sector of a society . Utilizing the group, the locality, or the movement as thei r unit of analysis, such studies seek to combine the advantage s of comparability with those of generalizability .

This project clearly falls into this intermediate level o f

analysis . The wave of protest that has engulfed the Sovie t Union since shortly after the inauguration of Gorbachev' s policy of glasnost' presents a unique opportunity to stud y protest behavior within a comparative yet focused framework . The demographic variety of the country and the enormous numbe r of social movements that have arisen over the past severa l years provide ample opportunity for comparison . The explosio n of protest activity has affected different sectors of societ y to various degrees, allowing one not only to compare th e

intensity and character of protest mobilization betwee n different segments of the population, but also to examine th e relationship between different types of protest events an d their impact on public policy .

Soviet citizens frequently refer to their country today a s a "meeting democracy" (mitingovaia demokratiia), in which political issues are decided on the streets rather than i n

-7 - government offices . In many respects the USSR has come t o resemble Kornhauser's classical model of a mass society ; 3 participation has dramatically increased, but elites no longe r possess the capacity to buffer the state from popular demands . This vast transformation in mass attitudes and behavior toward s politics has been one of the most spectacular of the change s that accompanied Gorbachev's reforms . As one Soviet autho r wrote in 1988 : Several years ago we knew exactly what a rally wa s and what a demonstration was . The former was when w e gathered together in one place to hear someone speak . The latter was when, on a holiday, we passed by a reviewing stand in an orderly column .. . [But now ] there has been a real explosion of socia l activeness . 4

With the onset of glasnost' the availability o f information on Soviet protest events, not only in emigre an d

Western sources, but also in Soviet official and unofficia l publications, has grown exponentially . In the past studies of Soviet protest behavior were subject to distortion due to th e regime's systematic censorship of information on protes t events . By contrast, today it is possible to gathe r information on a significant number of protest events fro m official Soviet sources themselves . Before glasnost', th e Soviet regime's repressive policies towards dissent of any sor t made the risks of mass protest relatively high and th e frequency of mass protest relatively low . An earlier study o f protest demonstrations in the USSR from 1956 to 1983 uncovere d

- 8 - a total of 406 events of all sizes, ranging from a fe w participants to tens of thousands . 5 Yet another study found a total of 497 protest demonstrations of various sizes that too k place from 1965 to 1978 . 6 In a follow-up study of 32 1 demonstrations by Soviet ethnic groups from 1965 to 1978, thi s same author found that most demonstrations during these year s were small, with 58 percent having had less than a hundre d participants,.7 and most of these having less tha n fifty While both of these studies are testimonies to the fact tha t mass protest in the Soviet Union did not begin with glasnost' , the extent of their coverage of events is unclear, and th e quality of the information about these events is limited .

This report analyzes 2,161 non-violent protes t demonstrations in the USSR from December 1st, 1986 to Decembe r 31st, 1989 . The very size of the sample, the extent of it s actual coverage of events, and the quality of the informatio n contained allows for a confidence of analysis concerning Sovie t protest behavior that was hitherto impossible . It is not th e intention of this report to probe all aspects of protes t demonstrations in the Soviet Union or even to develop model s based on Soviet protest behavior . Rather, its goals ar e limited to providing a summary of the data, a characterizatio n of trends in Soviet protest over space and time, and a preliminary examination of some of the relationships that lur k within the data and that warrant further investigation .

- 9- DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

A non-violent mass protest demonstration was defined as a n event that met the following six criteria : 1) it was a voluntary gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against publi c policies ; 2) it involved a minimum of 100 persons ; 3) it wa s bounded by space and time (i .e ., occurred in a specifi c location during a limited time period) ; 4) the number o f participants was not restricted by the organizers of the even t (i .e ., was not a conference, convention, or other restricte d organized meeting) ; 5) it did not have as one of its purpose s the infliction of violence by its participants (i .e ., was no t an event of violent mass protest) ; 6) it was not in itself a refusal to work (i .e ., a strike) . The Russian vocabulary fo r events of this type is rich, including such terms a s demonstration (demonstratsiia), meeting (miting), protes t (protest), manifestation (manifestatsiia), and funera l procession (panikhida) . These terms should be contrasted wit h the vocabulary used to describe events of violent mass protest , such as disorders (besporiadki), pogrom (pogrom), fight (drak) , disturbances (volneniia), and clashes (stychki), or those used to describe strikes (zabastovki) . While strikes and violent mass protests were excluded fro m this analysis, the possibility that these types of events migh t overlap with non-violent demonstrations was recognized i n compiling the database . Strikes can (and often do) involv e non-violent mass demonstrations, and non-violent mas s demonstrations can (and at times do) evolve into violent mas s protest . In such cases, the demonstration dimension of thes e events was included in the database . Demonstrations which did not involve voluntary participatio n but which rather were mobilized by the political authoritie s and were ritual in character (i .e ., official May Day o r Revolution Day parades) were excluded . Mass demonstrations sponsored or encouraged by the political authorities that wer e voluntary and non-ritual in nature were included .

Demonstrations, like all events, are unique in space an d time . However, it should be noted that multiple events ofte n occurred in the same city on the same day . For instance, o n

May 28th, 1989 four separate and unrelated demonstrations too k place in Moscow . A thousand Armenians met at the Armenia n Cemetary to commemorate the independent Armenian republic o f 1918 to 1920 ; a hundred Crimean Tatars gathered outside th e Bulgarian embassy to protest against the treatment of Turks i n Bulgaria ; a hundred thousand Muscovites participated in a demonstration sponsored by Memorial concerning the Congress o f People's Deputies, which was then in session ; and a thousan d

- 1 1 - Muscovites demonstrated in Pushkin Square at a rally sponsore d by the Democratic Union . Each of these events occurred i n different locations in the city and were organized by differen t groups ; nor was there any evidence of overlapping membershi p among the participants . In such cases, every effort was mad e to untangle these events as separate events . However, often i n large demonstrations a portion of the participants break of f from the main group and hold separate marches or protests . Alternatively, small groups that hold their own demonstration s later join large crowds . In cases in which either of thes e conditions were detectable, the events were counted as on e large event rather than a series of separate events . The difficulties presented by this fluid character of protes t behavior were somewhat finessed by the use of protest person - days as an indicator for analyzing protest activity . 8

A minimum size limit was imposed for several reasons . Information on smaller protest events is less likely to b e available and is less likely to be accurate than information o n larger protest events . Demonstrations in the Soviet Union hav e been as small as a single person . But in a period in whic h some protest events included as many as a million participants , reporting on smaller events tended to be scarce . So long a s protest activity was measured in protest person-days, omissio n of smaller events was unlikely to have a perceptible o r significant influence on overall estimates of protes t

-12- mobilization . A minimum size of a hundred was imposed afte r examining reports of hundreds of events . Information on event s smaller in size than a hundred was actually collected, thoug h it was not included in the database because of the spottines s of the data . Events involving a hundred persons, however , appear to have been fairly well reflected in the sources used in this study . 9

Hundreds of sources were examined by the author and tw o research assistants . These sources included not only Wester n sourcesForeign (such as newspaper and wire service reports , Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, and Radi o Liberty/Radio Free Europe reports), but also emigre source s (such as VestiizSSSR, ELTA Information Bulletin, and

Turkistan Today), official Soviet sources (most central and al l republican newspapers, TASS wire service reports, independentl y monitored Soviet shortwave broadcasts), and unofficial Sovie t sources (Russian-language newspapers of major oppositio n political movements, unofficial wire services, and report s published in Radio Liberty's Arkhiv samizdata) . For a mor e detailed listing of those sources that were directly used i n compiling the database, see Appendix A .

Coverage of the actual number of protest demonstration s that took place in the USSR during the period under study wa s of course incomplete, but nevertheless quite substantial .

-13- According to official MVD statistics, in 1989 there were 5,30 0 demonstrations of all sizes in the entire Soviet Union . 10 The database includes information on 1,424 of these, or abou t 27 percent of all demonstrations in the USSR for that year . Considering that the official MVD statistics also cove r demonstrations that were less than a hundred in size, th e coverage offered by this database can be said to be extensive . Certainly, in terms of large demonstrations there were few tha t occurred during this period that were missed, particularl y given the wide range of sources used . Coverage o f demonstrations that took place in 1988 was slightly better tha n for 1989 . 11 According to official MVD statistics, there wer e 2,328 protest meetings throughout the Soviet Union in 1988 ; 1 2

665 of these events, or 29 percent, are reported on in th e database .

After compiling and organizing the material, the data wa s entered ; each source of information was jointly examined b y both the Principal Investigator and a research assistant wit h reading fluency in Russian . Each record includes informatio n not only on the date and place of the event, but also on th e number of participants (at times, several estimates), th e nationality of the participants, the organizers of the protes t (if any), the demands put forth by the protesters (coded int o

145 separate categories), whether the authorities had give n their permission for the demonstration to take place, the us e

-14- of coercion by the authorities against protesters (both i n terms of numbers of arrests, injuries, and deaths, as well as a scale of violence based on this information), and the source s from which the information came . 13 Thus, the databas e functions not only as a source of information for analyzin g protest behavior, but also as a bibliographic reference fo r future historians of the glasnost' period .

While information on earlier events was collected, th e database begins its coverage of demonstrations with Decembe r 1st, 1986 . December 1986 was chosen as a starting date becaus e what are generally considered the first major demonstrations o f the glasnost' era began at that time--the Alma-At a demonstrations and riots of December 17th and 18th, in which u p to ten thousand participants took part . While othe r demonstrations were close in preceding and following thes e events, there is some justification to the claim made by Kazak h writer Olzhas Suleimenov before the Congress of People' s Deputies in June 1989 that "the Alma-Ata students and worker s were the first in the country to conduct unsanctioned meetings," 14 if only in the sense that these demonstration s were the first largescale demonstrations to rock the country in the aftermath of Gorbachev's initiation of glasnost' .

Of course, as is the case with any material dealing wit h contemporary affairs, the data utilized in this study i s limited by the problem of "right-censoring" 15 --i .e ., th e

-15- large number of demonstrations that have occurred since the end of 1989 . According to MVD statistics, in the first fifty-fou r days of 1990 alone, more than 1500 demonstrations took place i n the Soviet Union, with the participation of 6 .4 millio n people . 16 The Azerbaidzhani insurrection of December 1989 - January 1990 was only in its beginning stages at the point i n time that the data in this study ends . All this points to the need to update the study to cover events beyond the end o f 1989, as well as the other events that will undoubtedly occu r during the remainder of the current cycle of protest in th e USSR . 17 GENERAL PATTERNS OF PROTEST ACTIVIT Y

Table I presents the general distribution of demonstratio n person-days by republic and province . The results are als o weighted by population (person-days per 1000 population) fo r more accurate comparison of the degree of mobilization i n particular localities . Essentially, the data show extremel y high levels of protest mobilization in Transcaucasia and th e Baltic, somewhat lower yet not insignificant levels in Moldavi a and Ukraine, and relatively low levels in the RSFSR , Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia . In Armenia, eac h inhabitant of the republic spent on the average 9 .8 days a t protest demonstrations--a rate that considerably exceeded that for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast', the next highes t score, with about seven days of demonstration participation pe r inhabitant . Again, the statistics presented here reflect onl y one type of protest activity . Official Soviet strik e statistics for 1989, for instance, show that 13 .6 percent o f all person-days lost in the Soviet economy as a result of labo r walkouts occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast', a s opposed to only .3 percent in Armenia proper . 18 Obviously , forms of protest have varied considerably from place to place , and all that is being reported here are statistics for one form of protest, not protest activity in general . For one republic ,

Turkmenia, no instances of non-violent protest demonstration s

-17-

TABLE I . PERSON-DAYS OF NON-VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATIO N BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 198 9 TOTA L PERSON-DAYS PE R NUMBER OF REPUBLIC/PROVINCE PERSON-DAYS 1000 POPULATION PROTESTS RSFSR 2016557 13 .68 530 (24 .5% ) Karelian ASSR 700 0 .8 8 Komi ASSR 51000 40 .3 8 Arkhangel'sk 3000 1 .9 1 Vologda 0 0 .0 0 Murmansk 0 0 .0 0 Novgorod 0 0 .0 0 Pskov 0 0 .0 0 Leningrad 235850 35 .3 1 Briansk 0 0 .0 0 Vladimir 0 0 .0 0 Ivanovo 1650 1 .2 5 Kalinin 400 0 .2 4 Kostroma 0 0 .0 0 Orel 200 0 .2 2 Riazan' 650 0 .4 8 Smolensk 560 0 .4 8 Tula 0 0 .0 0 Yaroslavl' 14633 9 .9 5 Moscow 1134280 72 .4 6 Mari ASSR 3000 4 .0 0 Mordvinian ASSR 0 0 .0 0 Chuvash ASSR 0 0 .0 0 Gor'kii 3300 0 .8 9 Kirov 0 0 .0 0 Belgorod 0 0 .0 0 Voronezh 0 0 .0 0 Kursk 0 0 .0 0 Lipetsk 0 0 .0 0 Tambov 100 0 .0 8 Kalmyk ASSR 0 0 .0 0 Tatar ASSR 51850 14 .2 4 Astrakhan 1100 1 .1 0 Volgograd 5000 1 .9 3 Kuibyshev 112533 34 .4 6 Penza 0 0 .0 0 Saratov 1400 0 .4 8 Ul'ianov 0 0 .0 0 Dagestan ASSR 700 0 .3 9 Kabardino-Balkar ASSR 0 0 .0 0 Northern Ossetian ASSR 6000 9 .4 6 Chechen Ingush ASSR 72000 56 .3 8 Krasnodar krai 33650 6 .5 8 Stavropol krai 2150 0 .7 5 Rostov 11500 2 .67

-18 -

TOTA L PERSON-DAYS PER NUMBER O F REPUBLIC/PROVINCE PERSON-DAYS 1000 POPULATION PROTESTS RSFSR (cont .) Bashkir ASSR 2000 0 .5 1 Udmurt ASSR 0 0 .0 0 Kurgan 0 0 .0 0 Orenburg 0 0 .0 0 Perm 2600 0 .8 4 Sverdlovsk 25975 5 .5 0 Cheliabinsk 16000 4 .4 1 Altai krai 0 0 .0 0 Kemerovo 148300 46 .7 1 Novosibirsk 28425 10 .2 2 Omsk 17700 8 .2 7 Tomsk 3900 3 .9 0 Tiumen' 0 0 .0 0 Buriat ASSR 1000 0 .9 6 Tuva ASSR 0 0 .0 0 Krasnoiarsk krai 7050 1 .9 6 Irkutsk 10600 7 .6 9 Chita 0 0 .0 0 Yakut ASSR 1000 0 .9 3 Primorskii krai 1000 0 .4 4 Khabarovsk krai 200 0 .1 1 Amur 0 0 .0 0 Kamchatka 0 0 .0 0 Magadan 2100 3 .8 7 Sakhalin 1000 1 .4 1 Kaliningrad 500 0 .5 7

UKRAINE 2587417 50 .04 368 (17 .0% ) Voroshilovgrad 0 0 .0 0 Dnepropetrovsk 11100 2 .8 6 Donetsk 63900 11 .9 9 Zaporozh'e 3300 1 .5 9 Kirovgrad 0 0 .0 0 Poltava 9800 5 .5 9 Sumi 1000 0 .7 0 Khar'kov 32200 10 .0 8 Vinnitsa 1500 0 .7 8 Volynia 23000 21 .6 6 Zhitomir 26000 16 .8 3 Transcarpathian 24000 19 .17 Ivano-Franko 457500 321 .2 8 Kiev 370783 81 .6 3 L'vov 1286400 468 .1 2 Rovno 13625 11 .6 5 Ternopol' 177633 151 .9 5 Khmel'nitskii 0 0 .0 0 Cherkassy 0 0 .0 0 Chernigov 0 0 .0 0 Chernovitsa 31000 33 .05

-19 -

TOTAL PERSONDAYS PER NUMBER OF REPUBLIC/PROVINCE PERSONDAYS 1000 POPULATION PROTEST S UKRAINE (cont . ) Crimea 50575 20 .5 9 Nikolaev 400 0 .3 0 Odessa 3100 1 .1 7 Kher'son 600 0 .4 8

BELORUSSIA 188500 18 .48 21 ( 1 .0% ) Brest 1700 1 .17 Vitebsk 2000 1 .42 Gomel' 8000 4 .7 8 Grodno 0 0 .0 0 Minsk 176800 55 .2 7 Mogilev 0 0 .0 0 LITHUANIA 3039283 823 .65 194 ( 9 .0% )

LATVIA 2447300 912 .83 90 ( 4 .2% ) ESTONIA 1326450 843 .26 59 ( 2 .7% ) GEORGIA 3501652 642 .62 217 (10 .0% ) Abkhaz ASSR 135290 251 .9 4 Adzhar ASSR 37000 94 .1 5 Southern Ossetian AO 141629 1430 .6 0 Georgia (non-ASSR/AO) 3187733 721 .2 1 ARMENIA 32247340 9822 .52 247 (11 .4% ) AZERBAIDZHAN 11312650 1609 .43 214 ( 9 .9% ) Nakhichevan ASSR 132200 448 .1 4 Nagorno-Karabakh AO 1312600 6981 .9 1 Azerbaidzhan (Other) 9867850 1507 .4 6 MOLDAVIA 1234150 284 .30 91 ( 4 .2% ) KAZAKHSTAN 203300 12 .29 42 ( 1 .9% ) Aktiubinsk 1000 1 .3 6 Alma-Ata 48000 22 .7 5 Eastern Kazakhstan 0 0 .0 0 Gur'ev 38900 51 .5 2 Dzhambul' 0 0 .0 0 Dzhezkazgan 0 0 .0 0 Karaganda 12100 8 .9 5 Kzyl'-Orda 0 0 .0 0 Kokchetava 0 0 .0 0 Kustanai 0 0 .0 0 Pavlodar 0 0 .0 0 Northern Kazakhstan 0 0 .0 0 Semipalatinsk 103000 122 .9 1 Taldy-Kurgan 0 0 .00 -20 -

TOTAL PERSON-DAYS PER NUMBER OF REPUBLIC/PROVINCE PERSON-DAYS 1000 POPULATION PROTESTS KAZAKHSTAN (cont . ) Turgai 0 0 .0 0 Urals 300 0 .4 8 Tselinograd 0 0 .0 0 Chimkent 0 0 .0 0

UZBEKISTAN 343583 17 .26 82 ( 3 .8% ) Karakalpak ASSR 0 0 .0 0 Andizhan 3000 1 .7 4 Bukhara 0 0 .0 0 Dzhizak 0 0 .0 0 Kashkadar'in 0 0 .0 0 Navoi 0 0 .0 0 Namangan 100 0 .0 7 Samarkand 8300 2 .9 9 Surkhandarin 1000 0 .8 0 Syrdarin 400 0 .3 0 Tashkent 306183 72 .2 8 Fergana 24600 11 .4 3 Khorezm 0 0 .0 0

KIRGIZIA 100 0 .02 1 ( 0 .0% ) Issyk-Kul' 0 0 .0 0 Naryn 0 0 .0 0 Osh 0 0 .0 0 Talas 0 0 .0 0 Kirgizia (Other) 100 0 .0 7

TADZHIKISTAN 2600 0 .51 5 ( 0 .2% ) Kuliab 300 0 .1 8 Kurgan-Tiubinsk 0 0 .0 0 Leninabad 200 0 .1 3 Tadzhikistan (Other) 2100 1 .2 0 TURKMENIA 0 0 .00 0 ( 0 .0% )

TOTAL 60450880 210 .84 2161 (100%) with at least a hundred participants were found during th e period under examination, although it is known that violen t mass protest events did take place there during this period . Non-violent demonstrations were also rare in Kirgizia an d Tadzhikistan--areas where significant violent protest also too k place .

Protest politics in the RSFSR have been characterized by a concentration of demonstration mobilization in relatively few provinces (in order of magnitude, Moscow, Chechen-Ingush ASSR , Kemerovo, Komi ASSR, Kuibyshev, Leningrad, Tatar ASSR, an d Novosibirsk) . No demonstrations with at least a hundre d participants were found for 28 out of 70 RSFSR provinces . I n the Ukraine, protest mobilization was centered in the Wester n Ukrainian provinces of L'vov, Ivano-Franko, and Ternopol', with less but still significant activity taking place in Kiev . No demonstrations with a hundred participants or more were foun d for five Ukrainian provinces . Protest demonstrations i n Belorussia were relatively rare during the period unde r examination, with most having been concentrated in Minsk . In Kazakhstan, non-violent demonstrations were centered i n

Semipalatinsk, Gur'ev, and Alma-Ata provinces, while in Uzbekistan Tashkent and Fergana provinces were the main site s of non-violent protest .

Table II presents much the same information, only fo r -22-

TABLE II . PERSON-DAYS OF NON-VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIO N MOBILIZATION FOR SELECTED NATIONALITIES, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBE R 198 9

PERSON-DAYS OF PERSON-DAYS NATIONALITY PROTEST MOBILIZATION PER 100 0 POPULATIO N Russians 2511920 ( 4 .2%) 17 .3 1 Ukrainians 2652417 ( 4 .4%) 60 .1 0 Uzbeks 219317 ( 0 .4%) 13 .1 4 Belorussians 188500 ( 0 .3%) 18 .7 9 Kazakhs 189917 ( 0 .3%) 23 .3 4 Volga Tatars 27300 ( 0 .1%) 4 .1 1 Azerbaidzhanis 10012050 (16 .6%) 1474 .3 1 Armenians 33566461 (55 .5%) 7254 .4 8 Georgians 3362050 ( 5 .6%) 844 .1 0 Moldavians 871550 ( 1 .4%) 259 .7 8 Tadzhiks 2500 ( 0 .1%) 0 .5 9 Lithuanians 2832233 ( 4 .7%) 923 .1 5 Turkmen 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Germans 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Kirgiz 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Jews 2760 ( 0 .1%) 2 .0 0 Chuvash 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Latvians 2295650 ( 3 .8%) 1573 .4 4 Bashkirs 1000 ( 0 .1) 0 .6 9 Mordvinians 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Poles 86710 ( 0 .1%) 77 .0 1 Estonians 1196150 ( 2 .0%) 1164 .7 0 Chechens 41500 ( 0 .1%) 43 .3 2 Udmurts 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Mari 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Ossetians 73762 ( 0 .1%) 123 .3 5 Koreans 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Lezgins 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Crimean Tatars 186925 ( 0 .3%) 694 .8 9 Buriats 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Yakuts 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Ingush 33500 ( 0 .1%) 140 .7 6 Gagauzy 7100 ( 0 .1%) 36 .0 4 Kalmyks 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 Kurds 100 ( 0 .1%) 0 .6 5 Meskhetian Turks 10700 ( 0 .1%) 51 .6 9 Abkhaz 61440 ( 0 .1%) 596 .5 0

TOTAL 60450882 (100 .0%) 210 .84 nationalities . It shows that Armenians, Latvians , Azerbaidzhanis, Estonians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Crimea n Tatars, Abkhaz, and Moldavians (in that order) were the mos t mobilized of groups in terms of demonstration activity pe r thousand population . Indeed, Armenians and Azerbaidzhani s together accounted for over 70 percent of the demonstratio n person-days in this study . Other nationalities that exhibite d significant demonstration mobilization relative to thei r population sizes were the Ingush, the Ossetians, the Poles, th e Ukrainians, the Meskhetian Turks, the Chechens, and the Gagauzy . Groups with extremely low levels of mobilizatio n relative to their populations included the Volga Tatars, Jews ,

Kurds, Bashkirs, and Tadzhiks. During the time period unde r consideration, no non-violent demonstrations with a hundred participants or more were found for the Turkmen, Germans , Kirgiz, Chuvash, Mordvinians, Udmurts, Mari, Koreans, Lezgins , Buriats, Yakuts, and Kalmyks, although some of these groups did engage in violent protest action during this period .

Demonstrations have varied considerably in size from plac e to place and from group to group . To a large extent , variations in the size of demonstrations among groups explain s much of the differences in their overall levels of protes t mobilization . Table III reports the general size o f demonstrations by republic, broken down into size categories . It shows that demonstrations in the RSFSR, though relativel y

-24- frequent in number, were generally small in size, with ove r three-fifths having less than a thousand participants . By contrast, demonstrations in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan tended t o be relatively large ; approximately three-tenths of al l demonstrations recorded for Armenia and a tenth of al l demonstrations recorded for Azerbaidzhan had over 200 thousan d

participants . Thus, the high levels of protest mobilization in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were due less to the sheer numbers o f demonstrations than to the mobilizing capacities of thos e groups organizing these demonstrations .

A number of statistical tests were carried out to prob e the possible existence of relationships between severa l variables that might be expected to be connected with protes t activity and non-violent demonstration mobilization amon g nationalities . Given the strong relationship that has bee n

known to exist between political participation and education , it might have been expected that education per thousan d population (based on 1970 census data) would be related to th e degree to which protest groups mobilized their populations . Party membership per thousand population (based on 1989 data ) is an indicator of the degree to which a population activel y participated within official Soviet institutions, and migh t have been expected to have been negatively associated wit h protest activity . Linguistic Russification (constructed as a weighted scale based on 1989 census data) has at times bee n

-25-

TABLE III . SIZE OF DEMONSTRATIONS, BY REPUBLI C DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 198 9 SIZE CATEGORY (SEE KEY BELOW ) REPUBLIC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Tota l RSFSR 61 .1% 24 .5% 7 .0% 2 .5% 1 .7% 1 .3% 1 .3% .6% -- 100 .0% (324) (130) ( 37) ( 13) ( 9) ( 7) ( 7) ( 3) (530 ) UKRAINE 32 .9% 34 .8% 15 .2% 6 .0% 2 .7% 5 .2% 2 .7% .3% .3% 100 .0% (121) (128) ( 56) ( 22) ( 10) ( 19) ( 10) ( 1) ( 1) - (368 ) BELORUSSIA 14 .3% 33 .3% 23 .8% 14 .3% - 14 .3% -- - 100 .0% ( 3) ( 7) ( 5) ( 3) ( 3) ( 21 ) LITHUANIA 29 .4% 30 .4% 12 .4% 12 .4% 4 .6% 1 .5% 5 .7% 3 .1% -- .5% 100 .0% ( 57) ( 59) ( 24) ( 24) ( 9) ( 3) ( 11) ( 6) ( 1) (194 ) LATVIA 45 .6% 25 .6% 8 .9% 1 .1% 3 .3% 1 .1% 5 .6% 3 .3% 4 .4% 1 .1% 100 .0% ( 41) ( 23) ( 8) ( 1) ( 3) ( 1) ( 5) ( 3) ( 4) ( 1) ( 90 )

ESTONIA 23 .7% 44 .1% 8 .5% 6 .8% 3 .4% 3 .4% 3 .4% 1 .7% 5 .1% - 100 .0% ( 14) ( 26) ( 5) ( 4) ( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ( 1) ( 3) ( 59 ) GEORGIA 30 .9% 39 .2% 11 .1% 8 .8% 2 .8% 1 .8% .5% 2 .8% 1 .8% .5% 100 .0% ( 67) ( 85) ( 24) ( 19) ( 6) ( 4) ( 1) ( 6) ( 4) ( 1) (217 ) ARMENIA 13 .8% 20 .6% 2 .4% 5 .3% 2 .4% 6.1% 3 .6% 15 .4% 22 .3% 8 .1% 100 .0% ( 34) ( 51) ( 6) ( 13) ( 6) ( 15) ( 9) ( 38) ( 55) ( 20) (247 )

AZERBAIDZHAN 9 .3% 25 .2% 23 .4% 7 .0% 4 .2% 14 .0% .5% 5 .1% 7 .9% 3 .3% 100 .0% ( 20) ( 54) ( 50) ( 15) ( 9) ( 30) ( 1) ( 11) ( 17) ( 7) (214 )

MOLDAVIA 22 .0% 37 .4% 8 .8% 13 .2% 5 .5% 3 .3% 8 .8% - 1 .1% - 100 .0% ( 20) ( 34) ( 8) ( 12) ( 5) ( 3) ( 8) ( 1) ( 91 ) KAZAKHSTAN 45 .2% 26 .2% 19 .0% 2 .4% 2 .4% - 4 .8% - - 100 .0% ( 19) ( 11) ( 8) ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 42 )

UZBEKISTAN 32 .9% 47 .6% 4 .9% 7 .3% 2 .4% 4 .9% - -- 100 .0% ( 27) ( 39) ( 4) ( 6) ( 2) ( 4) ( 82 )

KIRGIZIA 100 .0% -- -- 100 .0% ( 1) ( 1 ) TADZHIKISTAN 80 .0% 20 .0% -- 100 .0% ( 4) ( 1) ( 5 ) TURKMENIA

34 .8% 30 .0% 10 .9% 6 .2% 2 .9% 4 .2% 2 .6% 3 .2% 3 .9% 1 .4% 100 .0% (752) (648) (235) (133) ( 62) ( 91) ( 56) ( 69) ( 85) ( 30) (2161)

-26 - TABLE III (cont .) KEYTO TABLE II I Events were classified along the following scale, ranging from 1 to 10, base d on the the average of various estimates for the maximum number of participants foun d in multiple sources . The following scale was used :

AVERAGE # OF PARTICIPANTS SIZE CATEGORY 100-999 : 1 1000-4999 : 2 5000-9999 : 3 10000-19999 : 4 20000-29999 : 5 30000-49999 : 6 50000-99999 : 7 100000-199999 : 8 200000-499999 : 9 Greater than 500000 : 10 For 28 .1% of the records in the database, no precise size estimate wa s available . In these cases, a size category was estimated based on two types of information. First, if the number of participants was listed in a source as bein g in the hundreds [sotni], the thousands [tysachi], or many-thousands [mnogotysachnyi], these were generally assigned categories 1, 2, and 3 respectively . Second, if no other information was available, the closest event in time that too k place in the same city or location, that was organized by the same group, and tha t concerned the same demands was used as a basis of size estimation . Two divergent size estimates were available for 13 .8 percent of the sample, an d three were available for 3 .6 percent of the sample . In cases in which multiple siz e estimated existed but did not diverge, they were not recorded . used as an indicator of the loyalty of a population to th e

Soviet state, 19 and might have been expected to have bee n negatively associated with demonstration mobilization . None o f these variables showed any statistically significan t relationships with protest mobilization, nor was an y statistically significant relationship found between the degre e of urbanization of a province and demonstration mobilization. When only RSFSR provinces were examined, a wea k positive association (r= .24, p= .04) was found between the leve l of urbanization of a province and the degree of protes t mobilization that was statistically significant at the .0 5 level . Clearly, Soviet protest activity is too complex and to o diverse to be explained systematically and in aggregate b y simple hypotheses . Satisfactory explanations of why som e

groups protest and others not must instead seek to disaggregat e protest events down to more discrete forms and types o f behavior and to place them within their' specific contexts . TEMPORAL VARIATIONS IN DEMONSTRATION ACTIVIT Y

Soviet demonstration activity has experienced significan t fluctuations over time, although the general trend in 1989 wa s towards more constant and less fluctuating levels o f mobilization . In general, three periods of demonstratio n activity can be distinguished . Figure I presents two graphs o f protest mobilization for the USSR as a whole over time .

Figures I-a and I-b show that until February 1988 demonstratio n mobilization in the USSR as a whole remained at relatively lo w levels, generally in the 5 to 20 thousand person-day per mont h range, particularly after May 1987 . Soviet demonstratio n activity during this early glasnost' period was largely drive n by the protest activity of six national groups : Russians , Armenians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Crimea n Tatars . Beginning in February 1988, with the exception of two brief respites 20 Soviet demonstration mobilization fluctuate d between one-million and eight-million person-days per month . This second period of demonstration activity, characterized b y great volatility, witnessed massive but sporadic mobilization s of Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis, Latvians, Lithuanians, an d Estonians . A third period began with the onset of the electio n campaign to the Congress of People's Deputies in February an d

March 1989 . This period was characterized by more constan t levels of protest and the mobilization of new groups int o

-29- FIGURE I . USSR DEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATION OVE R TIME, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 198 9 protest politics : Georgians, Russians, Ukrainians, Moldavians , Uzbeks, and Kazakhs, as well as other groups . From April 198 9 to December 1989 demonstration activity was relatively constan t and less prone to extreme variations, ranging largely from two - million to four-million person-days per month .

The extent to which mobilization was punctuated (i .e ., intermittent) or relatively constant varied considerably a s well from group to group . Figure II presents a series o f graphs of demonstration activity during 1988 and 1989 for th e most active twelve republics of the USSR . It shows tha t punctuated mobilization was characteristic of demonstratio n activity in the three Baltic republics, Georgia, Belorussia , Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan . The causes of such patterns , however, appear to be varied . In the case of the Balti c republics, the peaks of mobilization center around simila r month-points for all three--February, March, June, and Augus t (all months of anniversaries of events connected with th e incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR or thei r independence from Tsarist Russia) . Thus, symbolic dates pla y an important role in mobilizing the population for the type o f secessionist protest that has been common in the Baltic . I n the case of Georgia, and to a lesser extent the cases o f Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, peaks of mobilization were ofte n associated with periods of rising interethnic tensions an d violence . Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan displaye d

-31- FIGURE II . DEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATION IN SELECTE D SOVIET REPUBLICS, JANUARY 1988 TO DECEMBER 1989

punctuated patterns of protest activity simply due to thei r lower levels of protest mobilization in general . In thes e republics demonstrations were sporadic and relatively limite d in size, with few exceptions almost invariably having less than 20 thousand participants . Thus, punctuated mobilization i n these cases was a sign of the weakness of local protes t movements . Only one republic followed a pattern of near-constan t mobilization during the 1988-1989 period : Armenia . However , its levels of mobilization varied significantly . In fact , demonstration mobilization in Armenia was considerably less i n 1989 than it was in 1988, perhaps the result of the exhaustio n of society due to the very high levels of mobilization tha t have characterized the republic . After a long period o f quiescence, Moldavia experienced a relatively constant level o f mobilization from January 1989, though at a much lower level o f activity than Armenia . At least three republics--the RSFSR , Ukraine, and Azerbaidzhan--experienced mixed pattern o f punctuated mobilization followed by relatively constan t mobilization . In the RSFSR, protest mobilization wa s intermittent until May 1989--coinciding with the opening of th e first session of the Congress of People's Deputies . An earlie r peak in protest activity in the RSFSR in July 1988 coincide d with Nineteenth Party Conference and the convening of th e legislative organs of the party . Still another peak appeare d in October 1989, at the time of the second session of th e

-34- Congress of People's Deputies . Such patterns suggest tha t national legislative activity and convocations of majo r national significance acted as lightning rods for protest among Russians, even more than among other groups . Only the Ukraine showed some evidence of similarly timed peaks in protes t activity . In both the Ukraine and the RSFSR, significan t increases in demonstration activity also took place at the tim e of elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies i n

February and March 1989 . Ukrainian politics was characterize d by punctuated protest until that time, and afterwards witnesse d a steady increase in protest mobilization, which peaked i n September at the time of the first Rukh Congress . In Azerbaidzhan, protest activity followed a punctuated patter n until August 1989, when, under the influence of the Popula r Front of Azerbaidzhan, a more constant level of mobilizatio n appeared . DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITY BY TYPE OF DEMAN D

Soviet protest has varied considerably by the types o f issues protested, both over time and among different groups . An examination of these patterns provides a fascinatin g overview of Soviet politics under Glasnost' . Figure II I illustrates the evolution of Soviet demonstration mobilizatio n for ten different types of issues over time . It shows tha t protest in favor of liberal demands (Figure III-a) gre w considerably over 1989, becoming a permanent part of th e political landscape . By contrast, support for conservativ e demands (Figure III-c) was relatively weak, following a punctuated pattern . In general, the mobilizing power o f conservative groups in Soviet politics has lagged considerabl y behind that of liberal groups . Not only did the development o f largescale liberal protest pre-date th e development of mass conservative protest by eight months, bu t liberal groups have consistently mobilized anywhere from two t o sixteen times the number of protesters that conservative group s have been capable of mobilizing every month . Demands for a multi-party system (Figure III-b) first obtained a mass protes t base at the time of the first session of the Congress o f People's Deputies in May 1989 . By the end of 1989, suc h protest had grown to the point where it had become a majo r force in Soviet politics, undoubtedly influencing the CPSU' s

-36- FIGURE II I a DEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATION OVER SELECTED ISSUES JANUARY 1988---DECEMBER 1989 a For definitions of demand classification, see Appendix B . decision in February 1990 to allow legal party competition .

Table IV, on liberal and conservative demands b y nationality, offers further confirmation of the weakness o f conservative protest . In total, protests at which libera l demands were raised accounted for 12 .1 percent of all person - days of protest from December 1986 to December 1989, in contrast to conservative demands, which accounted for only 1 . 6 percent . Among Soviet nationalities, only the Russian s displayed a clear pattern of ideological divisioning in term s of their protest demands . However, the mobilizing capacity o f liberal demands among Russians was considerably greater tha n conservative demands . Ukrainians also showed a small degree o f ideological divisioning in their protest behavior, althoug h among Ukrainians the mobilizing capacity of liberal demands was more than four times greater than conservative demands . As fo r other groups, only among Poles, and to a lesser extent Kazakhs , have conservative demands had a significantly greate r mobilizing power than liberal demands . 2 1

Protest over economic and social demands (Figure III-h) , anti-military protest (Figure III-k), and protest over foreign policy issues (Figure III-1) displayed punctuated patterns of

TABLE IV . SIGNIFICANCE OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE DEMAND S AMONG ALL DEMANDS RAISED AT PROTESTS, BY NATIONALITY (PERSON-DAYS OF PROTEST IN WHICH LIBERAL OR CONSERVATIV E DEMANDS WERE RAISED, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 1989 )

TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL LIBERA L CONSERVATIV E PERSONDAY S DEMANDS DEMAND S NATIONALITY OF PROTEST # % # % Russians 2511920 (100%) 1086695 (43 .3%) 647550 (25 .8% ) Ukrainians 2652417 (100%) 870425 (32 .8%) 205800 ( 7 .8% ) Uzbeks 219317 (100%) 31500 (14 .6%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Belorussians 188500 (100%) 116733 (61 .9%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Kazakhs 189917 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 32000 (16 .9% ) Volga Tatars 27300 (100%) 550 ( 2 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Azerbaidzhanis 10012050 (100%) 2228350 (22 .3%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Armenians 33566461 (100%) 800950 ( 2 .4%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Georgians 3362050 (100%) 253400 ( 7 .5%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Moldavians 871550 (100%) 129800 (14 .9%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Tadzhiks 2500 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) o ( 0 .0% ) Lithuanians 2832233 (100%) 546250 (19 .3%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Jews 2760 (100%) 460 (16 .7%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Latvians 2295650 (100%) 1102383 (48 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Bashkirs 1000 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Poles 86710 (100%) 10460 (12 .1%) 86250 (99 .5% ) Estonians 1196150 (100%) 48950 ( 4 .1%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Chechens 41500 (100%) 28000 (67 .5%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Ossetians 73762 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 2000 ( 2 .7% ) Crimean Tatars 186925 (100%) 44100 (23 .6%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Ingush 33500 (100%) 27000 (80 .6%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Gagauzy 7100 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Kurds 100 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Meskhetian Turks 10700 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Abkhaz 61440 (100%) 0 ( 0 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% ) Other 11370 (100%) 3850 ( 0 .0%) 0 ( 0 .0% )

TOTAL 60450882 (100%) 7329856 (12 .1%) 973600 ( 1 .6%)

For definitions of liberal and conservative demands, see Appendix B . mobilization . Protest mobilization over economic and socia l demands, while generally low relative to other protest issues , began a punctuated pattern in 1989, largely in connection wit h the working class unrest of that year . Anti-military protes t generally peaked in April and in September, in anticipation o f the spring and fall call-ups for military service . Significantly enough, these peaks grew rapidly over time . Anti-military protest had become a regular feature of th e

Soviet political scene from February 1989, although the level s of protest mobilization varied wildly . Protest on foreign policy issues, a new form of protest for Soviet politics , displayed its first significant mobilization in June 1989 i n reaction to the crackdown against the student movement i n Peking . Though exhibiting a punctuated pattern, levels o f mobilization over foreign policy issues increased rapidl y towards the end of 1989, particularly in connection with th e issue of border permeability raised by the Azerbaidzhan i insurrection . Based on these patterns and the genera l trajectories of anti-military protest and protest over foreign policy issues, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion tha t internal protest has become an important factor in nationa l security decision-making in the Soviet Union .

Six areas of protest (in addition to protest in favor o f liberal demands) exhibited more constant and self-sustainin g patterns of mobilization : ecological protest (Figure III-d) ;

-41- protest in favor of secession (Figure III-e) ; protest over non - secessionist territorial claims (Figure III-f) ; protest ove r linguistic and cultural demands (Figure III-g) ; protest agains t regime-sponsored coercion (Figure III-i) ; and protest in favo r of religious freedom (Figure III-j) . Ecological demand s reached the peak of their mobilizing power in autumn 1988, bu t gradually began to decline after that . Nevertheless , throughout most of 1989 between 75 thousand and 750 thousan d person-days were spent monthly in protesting ecological issues . Protest in favor of secession has displayed a more or les s constant pattern since August 1988, normally fluctuatin g between 300 thousand and 1 .75 million person-days per month . Non-secessionist territorial demands, by contrast, wer e characterized by two more or less constant periods o f mobilization, the first (May to November 1988) considerabl y larger than the second (May to November 1989) . Whereas in 198 8 non-secessionist territorial protest exhibited greate r mobilizing power than secessionist protest, throughout 1989 th e two displayed roughly similar levels of mobilization- - indicative of the growing challenges to the territoria l integrity of the country .

In general, protest over linguistic and cultural demand s fluctuated between 50 thousand and 400 thousand person-days pe r month, with extremely large mobilizations taking place in Jun e and August 1989 over language policy . Since May 1988, protes t

-42- mobilization against regime-sponsored coercion largely staye d within a range between 100 thousand and 900 thousand person- days per month, with two exceptions : a sharp drop in the aftermath of the earthquake and imposition of martial law i n Armenia in December 1988 ; and a sharp rise in April and Ma y

1989 in connection with Tbilisi massacres . Protest in favor o f religious freedom originally followed a punctuated pattern, bu t since May 1989 fluctuated between 25 thousand and 275 thousand person-days per month . It reached a peak in September 1989 , when the issue of the legalization of the Uniate Church occupied center-stage in the Ukraine .

Table V analyzes the mobilizing capacity of selected type s of issues among various nationalities of the Soviet Union . As such, it provides a summary portrait of the concerns of th e politically-active portion of the population for each nationa l group . It points to unique features of protest within eac h group . While the Balts generally protested in large number s over similar types of issues (in particular, secession an d national symbolism), cultural-linguistic, anti-military, an d ecological issues were of more consistent concern to Estonians , while Lithuanians were more likely to demonstrate over issue s of religious freedom . Among Slays, the character of protes t differed radically . Of the issues analyzed here, Russians wer e mobilized primarily over cultural-linguistic, ecological , symbolic, and socio-economic issues, with smaller number s

-43- mobilized over issues of religious freedom . Ukrainian protest , by contrast, focused on national symbolism and religiou s freedom, with secondary mobilizations over cultural-linguistic , ecological, and secessionist demands . Belorussians wer e primarily mobilized over ecological and symbolic demands, wit h smaller mobilizations over secessionist, socio-economic, an d

religious freedom issues . Among Central Asians, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks largely mobilized under the banner of cultural - linguistic demands, with smaller numbers protesting ecologica l and symbolic issues, whereas Kazakhs largely protested ecological and anti-military issues revolving around nuclea r testing, with smaller numbers protesting socio-economic issues .

A number of statistical tests were performed to explor e relationships between various types of protest, as well a s factors associated with various levels of protest on particula r

issues . It was found that among nationalities empathetic an d secessionist demands tended to be highly correlated (r= .72 , p= .001), suggesting that in most cases solidarity with th e demands of other nationalities had self-interested motives . Those nations that scored high in terms of protest ove r secessionist demands also scored high in terms of protest ove r

symbolic demands (r= .70, p= .001), further confirming th e importance of a well-developed sense of national symbolism i n

fueling secessionist protest . The geographic concentration of

TABLE V . MOBILIZING CAPACITY OF SELECTED TYPES OF DEMAND S BY NATIONALITY (PROPORTION OF PERSON-DAYS OF PROTEST IN WHICH DEMANDS WERE RAISED, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 1989 )

DEMAND TYPES (SEE KEY BELOW) NON- VIOL . EMPA- CULT . SEC . ANTI - SOC . RACIST THETIC LING . ECOL . SYMBOL . SECESS . TERR . MIL . REL . ECON . NATIONALITY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 Russians 0 .6% 0 .7% 20 .3% 16 .1% 16 .7% 0 .1% 0 .7% 0 .2% 6 .8% 14 .7% Ukrainians 0 .0% 0 .4% 12 .6% 8 .2% 44 .2% 22 .0% 0 .0% 0 .2% 36 .8% 2 .4 % Uzbeks 6 .8% 0 .0% 85 .2% 13 .3% 10 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .1% 0 .1 % Belorussians 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .1% 63 .6% 68 .5% 38 .5% 0 .0% 0 .0% 2 .7% 4 .2% Kazakhs 20 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 72 .5% 0 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 72 .5% 0 .1% 20 .3% Volga Tatars 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 87 .9% 11 .0% 2 .8% 0 .0% 0 .0% 10 .1% 0 .0% Azerbaidzhanis 13 .2% 0 .1% 0 .0% 8 .7% 0 .0% 14 .6% 30 .1% 12 .3% 0 .0% 0 .1% Armenians 0 .0% 0 .1% 4 .8% 6 .6% 9 .5% 12 .9% 70 .2% 6 .2% 0 .5% 0 .0% Georgians 3 .1% 0 .3% 8 .2% 3 .9% 26 .8% 57 .6% 1 .3% 2 .2% 1 .0% 0 .1% Moldavians 0 .0% 3 .3% 77 .3% 2 .9% 33 .1% 55 .1% 13 .9% 10 .8% 2 .0% 0 .1 % Tadzhiks 0 .0% 0 .0% 84 .0% 12 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 4 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% Lithuanians 0 .0% 31 .4% 8 .1% 4 .1% 76 .4% 73 .6% 0 .1% 14 .1% 5 .6% 0 .4% Jews 0 .0% 0 .0% 10 .9% 0 .0% 81 .5% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% Latvians 0 .0% 14 .9% 0 .0% 1 .0% 89 .9% 52 .6% 0 .1% 0 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% Bashkirs 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 100 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% Poles 0.0% 0 .0% 68 .0% 0 .0% 9 .2% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .5% 0 .0% Estonians 0.0% 19 .8% 10 .5% 21 .1% 41 .5% 39 .8% 0 .0% 50 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0% Chechens 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 4 .8% 2 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 22 .9% 24 .1 % Ossetians 0 .0% 0 .0% 5 .1% 84 .1% 2 .7% 0 .0% 8 .1% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0 % Crimean Tatars 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 .7% 25 .6% 0 .0% 97 .7% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% Ingush 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 6 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 9 .0% 0 .0% 28 .4% 0 .0% Gagauzy 0 .0% 0 .0% 98 .6% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 85 .9% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% Kurds 0 .0% 0 .0% 100 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 100 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% Meskhetian Turks 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% Abkhaz 0 .3% 0 .0% 65 .1% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 9 .8% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%

KEY : 1=Racist or Violently-Nationalistic Demands 2=Empathetic Demands 3=Cultural or Linguistic Demands 4=Ecological Demands 5=Symbolic Demands 6=Secessionist Demands 7=Non-secessionist Territorial Demands 8Anti-Military Demand s 9=Demands for Religious Freedom 10=Economic and Social Demands

For definitions of demand-types, see Appendix B .

-45 - particular forms of protest was also evident . For the USSR a s a whole, liberal protest tended not to occur in those province s where racist and violently nationalist demands were promimen t (r=- .21, p= .04), whereas conservative protest tended to occu r precisely in those provinces where racist or violently - nationalist demands were also put forth (r= .62, p= .001) . The relative presence or absence of tolerant political attitude s would seem to be a key factor in determining the mobilizin g capacities of liberal and conservative movements withi n particular territories .

For non-Russians, a positive association (r= .35, p= .03 ) was also found between the degree of linguistic Russificatio n of a nationality 22 and protest in favor of conservativ e demands . Ethnic assimilation would seem to play a major rol e in determining the degree to which particular types of protes t movements have been capable of mobilizing their populations .

For non-Russians, for instance, a strong positive associatio n (r= .74, p= .001) was found between the print runs of native - language newspapers per thousand population and secessionis t protest . This suggests that factors associated with lack o f assimilation--i .e ., the extent to which a nationality has bee n able to utilize its native language--have an important effec t in galvanizing secessionist sentiments .

Not surprisingly, within the USSR as a whole a positiv e

-46- correlation was found between the level of urbanization of a province and the degree of protest over economic and socia l issues (r= .35, p= .001) . Yet paradoxically, subsequent analysi s revealed that protest over social and economic issues wa s inversely related to city-size . 23 Assuming both of thes e findings are true, then mobilization over social and economi c issues would seem to be concentrated in small towns withi n highly urbanized provinces .

Within the RSFSR ecological protest and liberal protes t appeared to take place in different places, being negatively related (r=- .56, p= .001) by province . Indeed, furthe r investigation revealed that city size appeared closely relate d to both types of demands, though in opposite ways (See Tabl e

VI) . Thus, in the RSFSR liberal demands were not prominent i n small towns less than 100 thousand in size, while they wer e quite prominent in large cities over a million in size (6 4 percent of all person-days) . By contrast, in small town s ecological protest was the major concern of protestors, bein g associated with 81 .5 percent of all person-days of protest , whereas in large cities ecological demands were relatively les s significant in overall protest activity, accounting for only 8 percent of all person-days . Within the RSFSR mobilization ove r liberal demands, in favor of a multi-party system, ove r representative demands, for religious freedom, over empathetic

TABLE VI . DISTRIBUTION OF DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITY BY TYPE S OF DEMANDS FOR CITIES OF VARIOUS SIZES WITHIN THE RSFSR (PROPORTION OF PERSON-DAYS OF PROTES T IN WHICH DEMANDS WERE RAISED) a

SIZE OF CITIES IN THOUSAND S DEMAND TYPE <100 100-499 500-999 >=1 million

FOR MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM 0 .1% 2 .6% 7 .4% 18 .0 % LIBERAL DEMANDS 4 .6% 48 .3% 50 .9% 64 .3 % CONSERVATIVE DEMANDS 0 .2% 0 .2% 0 .0% 3 .5 % REPRESENTATIVE DEMANDS 0 .2% 21 .5% 26 .0% 36 .8 % SYMBOLIC DEMANDS 5 .0% 1 .2% 22 .5% 16 .4 % ECOLOGICAL DEMANDS 81 .5% 36 .3% 28 .9% 8 .0 % RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 0 .0% 0 .8% 3 .9% 11 .0 % FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 0 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 3 .9 % RACIST/VIOL . NAT . 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .9 % EMPATHETIC DEMANDS 0 .0% 0 .2% 0 .3% 1 .1 % SOCIAL/ECONOMIC ISSUES 45 .0% 36 .5% 12 .5% 4 .1 % AGAINST REGIME VIOL . 1 .8% 19 .3% 14 .1% 16 .8 %

NUMBER OF EVENTS 33 77 56 33 0 NUMBER OF PERSON-DAYS 178510 300875 58583 1478588

aFor definition of demand-types, see Appendix B .

------demands, and over racist or violently nationalist demands al l seemed fairly closely related with city size . While researc h at the individual level would be necessary to delve into thes e patterns more closely, within the RSFSR urbanization or factor s associated with urbanization seem to have played a major rol e in fostering a variety of forms of protest, spurring on populations to be more assertive vis-a-vis local politica l

elites, making them more likely to identify with the nationa l aspirations of other groups, and making those who ar e

-48 - intolerant more likely to express their views as well . Assuming that incidence of religious belief within the Sovie t context tends to be negatively related to urbanization, the n the fact that protest in favor of religious freedom within the RSFSR was positively related to city size suggests tha t urbanization may indeed have a very strong impact on certai n types of protest behavior . Yet, no relationship between cit y size and protest in favor of religious freedom was found fo r the USSR as a whole . Religious policy, it appears, acts as a n important intervening variable . In the Ukraine, for instance , it was found that the urbanness of a province was negativel y associated with protest in favor of religious freedom (p=- .44 , p= .05) . The ban on the Uniate Church meant that religiou s protest in the Ukraine was largely a phenomenon of les s urbanized provinces of the republic, where Uniate believer s were concentrated . Not surprisingly, within the Ukrain e protest in favor of religious freedom and protest in favor o f secession tended to occur in the same provinces (r= .45, p= .02) , suggesting a linkage between these two protest constituencies .

Much the same point about the contextual nature of protes t is illustrated by an examination of variations in protes t behavior within a single national group in different contexts . Table VII portrays the mobilizing capacity of particular type s of demands for Russians in selected republics and provinces . Essentially, it shows that the protest agendas of Russians i n

-49- the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Baltic differed fundamentally from eac h other . Whereas Russians in the RSFSR protested most frequentl y over liberal and representative demands, Russians in the Balti c protested most frequently over conservative an d linguistic/cultural demands, and Russians in the Ukraine mos t frequently over ecological demands, conservative demands, an d socio-economic issues . In the case of the Russians , ideological and situational factors, even more than ethnicity , appear to be driving protest behavior . Table VII also point s to significant differences in the character of protest i n Moscow and Leningrad . While the mobilizing capacity of libera l demands were greater in Moscow and the mobilizing capacity o f conservative demands greater in Leningrad, in general protes t politics were more extreme and more radical (on both sides o f the political spectrum) in Leningrad than in Moscow . Th e mobilizing capacity of racist or violently-nationalist demands , demands in favor of a multi-party system, of protest agains t regime-sponsored coercion, and of symbolic demands were greate r in Leningrad than in Moscow . Thus, Leningrad's politics appea r to be more ideologically divided than Moscow's, perhaps th e result of it close proximity to the Baltic or the conservativ e traditions of its party leaders . TABLE VII . PERCENT OF DEMONSTRATION PERSON-DAYS DEVOTED T O PARTICULAR DEMANDS FOR RUSSIANS I N SELECTED REPUBLICS AND PROVINCE S

LOCATION OF PROTES T DEMAND-TYPE RSFSR MOSCOW LENINGRAD UKRAINE BALTI C FOR A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM 15 .1% 15 .7% 35 .7% 0 .9% 0 .1 % LIBERAL DEMANDS 57 .8% 71 .7% 58 .2% 11 .1% 2 .9 % CONSERVATIVE DEMANDS 2 .8% 3 .1% 7 .4% 35 .4% 98 .0% REPRESENTATIVE DEMANDS 33 .5% 34 .6% 51 .2% 6 .8% 29 .5 % SYMBOLIC DEMANDS 13 .7% 11 .8% 39 .7% 3 .4% 33 .5% ECOLOGICAL DEMANDS 19 .5% 0 .7% 26 .1% 42 .0% 0 .0% RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 8 .8% 14 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 3 .0% 4 .9% 0 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0% RACIST OR VIOL . NAT . 0 .8% 0 .8% 2 .1% 0 .0% 0 .0% EMPATHETIC DEMANDS 0 .9% 0 .9% 2 .4% 0 .3% 0 .1 % LING . OR CULT . DEMANDS 0 .1% 0 .2% 0 .0% 0 .3% 83 .4 % SOCIAL OR ECON . DEMANDS 13 .3% 2 .8% 2 .7% 32 .6% 20 .3 % AGAINST REGIME COERCION 13 .9% 15 .4% 27 .7% 0 .5% 0 .1%

For a description of the classification of demands, see Appendix B .

------

AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION : THE IMPACT OF REGIME REGULATION AND COERCIO N

Precisely how regime coercion affects protest has been th e subject of considerable investigation in the literature o n protestbehavior . Such studies have generally concluded tha t

neither the coercive capacity of the state nor the state's us e of coercion against protesters systematically deter s protest . 24 The Soviet case presents an interesting opportunity to examine this relationship . Policies toward s demonstrations have varied considerably throughout the USSR, a s has local legislation governing the holding of officially -

sanctioned demonstrations . Article 50 of the Sovie t Constitution guarantees Soviet citizens the right to assembl y

and demonstration . However, in the absence of all-unio n enabling legislation, this right was subject to abuse . Onc e demonstrations became common, regulations governing thei r conduct largely developed from below, initially promulgated b y local governments . In late August 1987, after a wave o f demonstrations in downtown Moscow by Crimean Tatars, the Mosco w

City Soviet banned demonstrations in the city center an d established rules for holding meetings elsewhere in the city . Soon regulations were passed in Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, an d other cities, each with their own peculiarities . 25 By the

end of 1987, as one Soviet correspondent noted, the extent t o which citizens were capable of exercising their right t o

-52- demonstrate "still depends to a large extent on the specifi c position of specific officials in the localities ." 26 Suc h diversity of policies was reinforced by guidelines issued b y the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in July 1988 (an d subsequently passed by the Supreme Soviet in October 1988) ; they essentially placed decision-making authority in the hand s of republican and local governments over whether to permi t particular demonstrations, at the same time as establishin g standard penalties for holding unsanctioned demonstrations . 2 7

Violators were potentially liable to fines of up to 2000 ruble s or arrests of up to two months (up to a year for repeated violations) . This was soon followed by a series of laws passe d by republican legislatures to enforce the guidelines .

In the end, the regime's efforts to regulate demonstratio n activity almost invariably failed . A growing gap appeare d between the intentions of the authorities and their ability t o enforce those intentions . The authorities were extremel y reluctant to grant authority for demonstrations by oppositio n groups, at the same time as the followings of those groups were increasing dramatically . In many places, significantly mor e applications for holding demonstrations were rejected than wer e granted, forcing those who were rejected to take the law int o their own hands . In Leningrad, thirty applications were mad e for conducting demonstrations in the first nine months of 1987 , only eleven of which were approved by local authorities . 2 8

-53- The following description of developments in Georgia was fairl y typical of what occurred elsewhere : the holding of unauthorized rallies had become a general rule in the republic largely because th e authorities did not authorize the holding of an y rallies . Having failed to obtain permission to hol d official rallies, representatives of the public an d informal organizations opted for holding unauthorize d rallies .. . Following the adoption of the wel l known legislative acts on the procedure for holdin g rallies and demonstrations in August 1988, th e republic's local organs of power received 3 3 applications for permission to hold sundry mas s events, but local Soviet executive committees gav e permission for only 6 such events . Despite this, 2 8 unauthorized rallies were held, and the holding o f such rallies became the general rule from then on . 2 9

Once the authority of the law had been punctured, it wa s practically impossible to reestablish it . In Lithuania, fo r instance, the violence unleashed by the authorities i n September 1988 in trying to enforce republican laws o n demonstrations led to massive revolt and eventually to th e overthrow of republican leaders . Essentially, from that momen t on republican authority to regulate demonstrations evaporate d entirely . Throughout 1988 and 1989, the proportion o f unauthorized rallies increased steadily . In the first si x months of 1988, 246 unauthorized demonstrations took place i n Moscow, undoubtedly a large proportion of the total number o f demonstrations in the city . 30 In the following four months , the number of unauthorized demonstrations in Moscow had climbe d to 398 . 31 Out of the 724 "mass events" that took place i n the Ukraine in the first nine months of 1989, 338 (46 . 7

-54- percent) were unauthorized . 32 There were even times when th e authorities officially suspended existing legislatio n regulating demonstrations because they realized tha t enforcement actually incited protest rather than contained it . Such was the case in Moscow (and in other cities) during th e first session of the Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989 , when, following an attack by the militia on a Democratic Unio n demonstration of 2,000 people, the Congress suggested that th e Moscow City Soviet set aside Luzhniki Stadium as a fre e gathering spot for demonstrators during the remainder of th e Congress's sessions . 3 3

Nor did force prove successful in containing the spread o f protest . Table VIII presents information on the degree o f coercion applied towards demonstrators, ranging on a five-poin t scale from no known coercion to the use of major violence o n the part of authorities, in different parts of the country . I t shows considerable variation not only between republics, bu t within them as well . Within the RSFSR Krasnoiarsk krai , Novosibirsk province, and Rostov provinc e stand out as some of the more repressive provinces with respec t to demonstrations . Leningrad had a considerably worse recor d than Moscow, while the Tatar ASSR and Irkutsk were some of th e most tolerant territories . In the Ukraine, Poltava and Crime a were cases of high repression ; Khar'kov, Kiev, and L'vov ha d greater histories of repressive policies than Ivano-Franko o r

-55-

TABLE VIII . COMPARISON OF SELECTED REPUBLICAN AND PROVINCIA L POLICIES TOWARDS DEMONSTRATIONS (PROPORTION OF DEMONSTRATION S DRAWING COERCIVE REGIME RESPONSES )

SCALE OF COERCION (SEE EXPLANATION BELOW ) REPUBLIC/PROVINCE 0 1 2 3 4 Tota l RSFSR 71 .5% 10 .8% 9 .8% 6 .0% 1 .9% 100 .0% (379) ( 57) ( 52) ( 32) ( 10) ( 530 ) Leningrad 63 .2% 8 .0% 16 .1% 9 .2% 3 .4% 100 .0% ( 55) ( 7) ( 14) ( 8) ( 3) ( 87 ) Moscow 72 .8% 11 .4% 6 .9% 6 .4% 2 .5% 100 .0% (147) ( 23) ( 14) ( 13) ( 5) ( 202 ) Gorkii 66 .7% 11 .1% 22 .2% 100 .0% ( 6) ( 1) ( 2) ( 9 ) Tatar ASSR 87 .5% 6 .3% 6 .3% -- 100 .0% ( 14) ( 1) ( 1) ( 16 ) Kuibyshev 76 .9% 7 .7% 7 .7% 7 .7% 100 .0% ( 10) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 13 ) Krasnodar krai 73 .7% 21 .1% 5 .3% 100 .0% ( 14) ( 4) ( 1) ( 19 ) Rostov 55 .6% 11 .1% 33 .3% 100 .0% ( 5) ( 1) ( 3) ( 9 ) Sverdlovsk 66 .7% 20 .0% 6 .7% 6 .7% 100 .0% ( 20) ( 6) ( 2) ( 2) ( 30 ) Novosibirsk 55 .6% 11 .1% 5 .6% 27 .8% 100 .0% ( 10) ( 2) ( 1) ( 5) ( 18 )

Krasnoiarsk krai 27 .3% 27 .3% 45 .5% -- 100 .0% ( 3) ( 3) ( 5) ( 11 )

Irkutsk 87 .5% 6 .3% 6 .3% 100 .0% ( 14) ( 1) ( 1) ( 16 )

UKRAINE 69 .6% 7 .1% 15 .8% 6 .3% 1 .4% 100 .0% (256) ( 26) ( 58) ( 23) ( 5) ( 368 )

Dnepropetrovsk 88 .9% 11 .1% -- 100 . 0 ( 16) ( 2) ( 18 )

Donetsk 94 .1% 5 .9% 100 . 0 ( 16) ( 1) ( 17) -56 -

LEVEL OF COERCION (SEE SCALE BELOW ) REPUBLIC/PROVINCE 0 1 2 3 4 Tota l UKRAINE (cont . ) Poltava 12 .5% 12 .5% 50 .0% 25 .0% 100 .0 % ( 1) ( 1) ( 4) ( 2) ( 8 ) Khar'kov 65 .5% 10 .3% 24 .1% 100 .0 % ( 19) ( 3) ( 7) ( 29 ) Ivano-Franko 84 .6% 3 .8% 3 .8% 7 .7% 100 .0 % ( 22) ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 26 )

Kiev 65 .7% 9 .0% 22 .4% 3 .0% 100 .0% ( 44) ( 6) ( 15) ( 2) ( 67 )

Lvov 76 .6% 5 .3% 11 .7% 4 .3% 2 .1% 100 .0% ( 72) ( 5) ( 11) ( 4) ( 2) ( 94 )

Ternopol' 69 .2% 7 .7% 15 .4% 7 .7% 100 .0% ( 9) ( 1) ( 2) ( 1) ( 13 )

Crimea 53 .7% 7 .3% 9 .8% 22 .0% 7 .3% 100 .0 % ( 22) ( 3) ( 4) ( 9) ( 3) ( 41 ) BELORUSSIA 52 .4% 9 .5% 23 .8% 4 .8% 9 .5% 100 .0% ( 11) ( 2) ( 5) ( 1) ( 2) ( 21 ) Minsk 47 .1% 11 .8% 23 .5% 5 .9% 11 .8% 100 .0% ( 8) ( 2) ( 4) ( 1) ( 2) ( 17 ) LITHUANIA 93 .3% 1 .5% 2 .6% 1 .5% 1 .0% 100 .0% (181) ( 3) ( 5) ( 3) ( 2) ( 194 ) LATVIA 82 .2% 3 .3% 8 .9% 4 .4% 1 .1% 100 .0 % ( 74) ( 3) ( 8) ( 4) ( 1) ( 90 )

ESTONIA 88 .1% 3 .4% 8 .5% 100 .0% ( 52) ( 2) ( 5) ( 59 )

GEORGIA 88 .0% 2 .8% 3 .7% 4 .6% .9% 100 .0% (191) ( 6) ( 8) ( 10) ( 2) ( 217 )

ARMENIA 86 .6% 4 .5% 3 .6% 4 .0% 1 .2% 100 .0% (214) ( 11) ( 9) ( 10) ( 3) ( 247 ) AZERBAIDZHAN 93 .9% 1 .9% 1 .9% 1 .4% .9% 100 .0% (201) ( 4) ( 4) ( 3) ( 2) ( 214 )

MOLDAVIA 79 .1% 3 .3% 8 .8% 6 .6% 2 .2% 100 .0% ( 72) ( 3) ( 8) ( 6) ( 2) ( 91) -57 -

LEVEL OF COERCION (SEE SCALE BELOW ) REPUBLIC/PROVINCE 0 1 2 3 4 Tota l KAZAKHSTAN 59 .5% 9 .5% 23 .8% 100 .0 % ( 25) ( 4) ( 10) ( 42 ) Gur'ev 41 .7% 16 .7% 41 .7% 100 .0 % ( 10) ( 4) ( 10) ( 24 ) UZBEKISTAN 65 .9% 17 .1% 7 .3% 3 .7% 6 .1% 100 .0% ( 54) ( 14) ( 6) ( 3) ( 5) ( 82 ) Tashkent 64 .1% 20 .3% 6 .3% 1 .6% 7 .8% 100 .0% ( 41) ( 13) ( 4) ( 1) ( 5) ( 64 )

TOTAL 79 .4% 6 .2% 8 .3% 4 .4% 1 .7% 100 .0% (1715) ( 135) ( 179) ( 95) ( 37) (2161) ------EXPLANATION OF SCALE OF COERCION

A five-point scale was used to summarize coercive measures take n by the authorities against demonstrators . The following coding wa s employed : 0=No known coercio n 1=Physical harassment of demonstrators or summoning o f participants to polic e 2=Low-level coercion (sporadic arrests and/or beatings ) 3=Substantial coercion (10 to 75 arrests or 10 to 4 0 injuries ) 4=Major violence by authorities (more than 75 arrest s or more than 40 injuries ) Ternopol', and Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk had relativel y tolerant attitudes towards demonstrators . Among republics , demonstrators were treated most harshly in Belorussia an d Kazakhstan--areas where there were relatively fewe r demonstrations . By contrast, in the Baltic and Transcaucasia , where there was an abundance of demonstrations, loca l authorities were generally more lenient . However, this shoul d not be interpreted to mean that coercion was necessaril y effective in inhibiting protest . The direction of the causa l flow is unclear . It may be that there was more coercion i n those republics with fewer demonstrations because th e populations of those republics were less mobilized and therefore more easily coerced . In fact, most of the republic s that exhibited relatively low levels of coercion went throug h periods in which high levels of coercion were used agains t demonstrators, usually in the early stages of the developmen t of protest . Whatever prophylactic effect regime violence had , that effect often proved temporary and ineffective agains t massive waves of mobilization .

Indeed, a closer analysis of the evolution of repressiv e measures over time confirms that the use of violence agains t protestors actually stimulated protest rather than preventin g it . Figure IV presents information on number of arrests o f demonstrators, total demonstration mobilization (in millions o f person-days), and demonstration mobilization against regim e coercion (in thousands of person-days) from January 1988 t o

-59- FIGURE IV ARRESTS OF DEMONSTRATORS, PROTEST OF RE - GIME VIOLENCE, AND PROTEST MOBILIZATIO N

(JANUARY 1988-DECEMBER 1989) December 1989 . It shows that, almost invariably, the total number of protest person-days increased sharply in th e subsequent month or two after a peak in the number of arrest s of demonstrators (for instance, June-July 1988, August - September 1988, March-May 1989, August-September 1989, an d

October-November 1989), indicating that increased coercion di d not lead to a decrease in demonstration activity overall, bu t rather had the opposite effect . This is suggested as well by the data on demonstration mobilization against regime coercion , also superimposed on Figure IV . In most cases, whenever a ris e in arrests of demonstrators occurred, this stimulated a shar p rise in the volume of protest against regime violence, which in turn accounted for a significant proportion of the increase i n protest found in months following periods of high coercion . Only for two periods was there evidence of coercion having a perceptible effect on protest mobilization : February-Marc h 1988 and December 1988-January 1989 (this latter case bein g aided as well by the impact of the Armenian earthquake) . However, both periods were soon followed by sharp rises i n levels of protest, in part fueled by rises in protes t mobilization against regime coercion . The effect of coercio n on levels of protest was at most temporary . Coercion was a n effective strategy against protest only so long as oppositio n groups were incapable of mobilizing the population against it .

Overall regime coercion tended to stimulate protest rathe r than prevent it .

-61- THE AGENDA OF FUTURE RESEARC H

The aim of this report was to summarize general pattern s of non-violent protest in the USSR from December 1986 t o December 1989, exploring potential relationships o f significance that merit further investigation rather tha n systematically testing hypotheses about protest behavior . I n part, this agenda was imposed by the richness of the data , which simply in terms of the detail of its description add s considerably to our knowledge of Soviet protest behavior an d our ability to characterize it . In part, this was due t o problems of data availability for a number of independen t variables necessary to explore certain theoretica l propositions . Constraints of space and time also conspired t o leave many avenues of exploration unexplored .

Future research will concentrate on several directions . First, more sophisticated and systematic efforts will be mad e to test the impact of those variables that displayed some for m of association with various types of protest (in particular , urbanization and ethnic assimilation), as well as to explor e the role of a number of variables not examined here (such a s education, degrees of openness or closedness of local politica l systems, or regime concessions) . However, a trade-off betwee n the availability of data for independent variables and th e level at which the protest data is aggregated should be noted .

-62- Much data is currently available at the level of republics, bu t the small number of republics makes statistical analysis o f such data difficult . Moreover, too high a level of aggregatio n tends to hide important relationships in the data . It i s desireable to break the data down to the smallest possibl e unit--both by ethnic group and by location . Unfortunately , data for interesting independent variables are rarely published in such form .

Second, the role of protest traditions as a factor i n sustaining high rates of protest mobilization in the curren t period will be explored . Information on several hundre d demonstrations occurring between 1965 and November 1986 wa s collected for this project, but has not yet been entered int o database form . Once this has been done, it will be possible t o S explore possible relationships between past levels of protes t and current levels of protest .

Third, future research will concentrate on exploring th e relationship between different types of protest events : between non-violent and violent forms of protest ; between strikes over social and economic demands and strikes ove r nationalist demands ; and between various types of protes t events and the degree of non-protest participation in th e political system by the population . As Charles Tilly has note d with regard to violent protest, "To understand and explain

-63 - violent actions, you must understand non-violent actions ." 3 4

Much the same could be said about all forms of politica l participation, which are inherently related . Information o n strikes and violent protests has been collected, though it ha s yet to be entered in database form .

Fourth, future work will focus on regime policies toward s particular political and social organizations and th e mobilizing capacities of those organizations . Information o n the organizers of demonstrations, while collecte d systematically, was not included in this report largely becaus e there was no time to prepare this variable for analysis . Examining changes in the mobilizing capacities of particula r political movements and ultimately explaining such change s might help better understand the forces of evolution at work i n the Soviet political environment . Changes in regime policie s towards demonstrations by particular political movements als o require explanation .

Fifth, the database will be used to explore why protes t has had an impact on public policy in one environment and ha s not in another . This will involve the collection of time - series data on regime concessions towards demonstrators .

Finally, data collection on protest events will b e extended to cover the end of the current cycle of protest i n

-64- the USSR . Thus, not only will it be possible to examine thos e factors that give rise to various forms of protest behavior , but also those factors that tend to dampen protest and lead t o political quiescence . APPENDIX A : SOURCES DIRECTLY USED IN THE DATABAS E

Hundreds of sources were consulted in the process o f compiling the database . The following sources were directl y used :

Western Source s AP Wire Servic e Boston Glob e CMD Wire Service Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report : Sovie t Unio n Current Digest of the Soviet Pres s New York Time s Radio Free Europe Background Report s Radio Free Europe Baltic Area Repor t Radio Liberty Research Bulleti n Report on the USSR (Radio Liberty ) Reuters Wire Servic e The Guardia n The London Times Washington Pos t Wisconsin State Journa l

Official Soviet Source s Bakinskii rabochi i Belorusskaia tribuna (Minsk ) Izvestii a Kommunist (Yerevan ) Kommunist Tadzhikistan a Komsomol'skaia pravd a Literaturnaiagazeta Molodezh Gruzi i Moskovskie novost i Pravda Ukrain y Radio Vil'nius (Shortwave Broadcasts to North America ) Sovetskaia Belorussii a Sovetskaia Estonii a Sovetskaia Latvii a Sovetskaia Molodezh (Latvia ) Sovetskaia Rossiia Zaria vostok a

Emigre Publication s ELTA Information Bulleti n Glasnost' -66- Maintenance of Status of Russian Languag e Against Secession Place Greater Restrictions on Cooperative Movemen t Against Redefinition of Republican Citizenship Right s Increase Russian Influence Over Institutions of Cultur e In Support of the CPS U In Support of the Soviet Arm y For Greater Income Equalit y Greater Representation for Working Class in Legislature s Other Conservative Demand s Against Ruk h

Representative Demands (protest aimed at altering th e composition of political or administrative elites, or th e process by which they are selected ) Database record includes at least one of the following entries : Reform of Electoral Processe s Election of Specific Candidat e Removal of Specific Officia l Democratize Selection of Administrative Bodie s Improve Representation of Nationality in Elite Post s Call for Boycott of Election s Resignation of Entire Local Government Against Factory-Based Election s Recall of Deputies to Congress of People's Deputie s

Symbolic Demands (protest focused on objects or past actions o f largely symbolic significance ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g entries : Commemoration of Victims of Stalinis m Commemoration of National Events of the Pas t Commemoration of Constitution Day or Human Rights Movemen t Protest of Annexation of Territory to USSR or Russi a Preservation of Historical Monument s Restoration of National Symbols of Pas t Preservation of Soviet State Symbol s Commemoration of Victims of Nazi Atrocitie s For Change of Place Name s Commemoration of Victims of 1933 Ukrainian Famin e Commemoration of Murder of Tsa r Commemoration of Victims of Red Terro r Destruction or Denigration of Soviet State Symbol s Commemoration of War Veterans Ecological Demands (protest against pollution and for improvin g environmental quality ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g entries : Ecological Demand s Investigation into Local Accident, Poisoning, or Diseas e

For Religious Freedom (protest for the rights of religiou s believers or religious organizations vis-a-vis politica l authorities ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : For Religious Freedo m For Return of Church Propert y For Legalization of Uniate Churc h

Anti-Military Protest (protest aimed against the institutions , presence, or policies of the USSR Armed Forces) Databas e record includes at least one of the following demands : For Right to Alternative/Voluntary/Local Military Servic e For Creation of National Military Unit s For Withdrawal of Soviet Army from Republi c Other Anti-Military Demand (Close Military Base o r Training ) End to Nuclear Testin g For Nuclear Disarmamen t

Foreign Policy Protest (protest over issues related t o relations with foreign states or the policies of foreig n states ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : For Right of Emigration from Countr y For Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanista n For Free Movement Across Border s Protest of Crackdown in Chin a End to Nuclear Testin g For Nuclear Disarmamen t Other Foreign-Policy-Related Protes t

Racist or Violently Nationalist Demands (protest with racis t slogans or demands, or propounding violence towards anothe r ethnic group ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : Racist or Violently Nationalist Demand s Expulsion of Exiled Caucasian Nationalitie s

Empathetic Protest (protest in solidarity with the demands o f another national group)

-70- Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : Solidarity with Separatist Demands of Other Nationalitie s Solidarity with Victims of April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre s (for non-Georgians ) Solidarity with Armenian Demands on Nagorno-Karabakh (fo r non-Armenians ) Solidarity with Demands of Other Grou p Linguistic or Cultural Demands (protest focused on issue s connected with language or cultural policies ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : Preserve or Extend Non-Russian Linguistic or Cultura l Right s Maintenance of Status of Russian Languag e Against Making Language of Other Group the Officia l Languag e For Change of Alphabet s Other Linguistic/Cultural Demand s Non-Secessionist Territorial Demands (demands aimed at changin g or maintaining the status of territories, excluding issues o f secession ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : In Favor of Irridentist Claim s Against Irridentist Claim s Upgrade Federal Status of Administrative Uni t For Creation of Autonomous Federal Uni t Eliminate Autonomous Status of Territorial Subuni t Against Creation of Autonomous Federal Subunit fo r Minority Against USSR Special Administration in Nagorno-Karabak h For Separation of Territory from Republi c Other Territorial Disput e

Social and Economic Issues (protest over consumer or working - class economic or social issues ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : For Raise in Wage s Improve Working Condition s Decentralize Economic Administratio n Provide More Consumer Good s Provide Better Housin g Democratize Selection of Administrative Bodie s Curb Rising Price s Provide Employmen t Other Economic or Social Demand s Improve Social Conditions

-71- For Right to Strike or Independent Trade Union s Improve Work Benefit s For Greater Income Equalit y Greater Representation for Working Class in Legislature s

Against Regime Coercion (protest against coercion or violenc e conducted by the state or its representatives ) Database record includes at least one of the followin g demands : For Release of Political Prisoner s Against Police Repressio n Mourning for Victims of Recent Regime Violenc e Punish Those Responsible for April 1989 Tbilisi Massacres

APPENDIX C

STATEMENT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF DATABAS E TO INTERESTED SCHOLARS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATED PROJECT S

The database compiled for this project remains available for us e by other scholars upon request . Efforts will be made shortly to brin g the existence of the database to the attention of the scholarl y community, principally through an announcement in the AAASS Bulletin . Full documentation for the database has already been compiled i n distributable form, and users may also want to take advantage of a special FoxBase Plus program written for manipulating the data . Otherwise, the data is available in ASCII fixed-field format . A copy of the documentation for the database is enclosed .

A number of plans for future research are outlined in the las t section of the project's Final Report . The database will be supplemented by three additional databases, material for which wa s already collected under the auspices of this grant : a database o f violent mass protests ; a database of strikes ; and a database o f protest events from 1965 to November 1986 . These will be used t o study the relationship between various types of protest events, a s well as the relationship between past patterns of protest and curren t patterns . In addition, materials will be collected on variou s patterns of political participation during a three-month research tri p to the USSR this fall under the auspices of IREX and Fulbright-Hay s grants . These will be used to examine relationships between within - system and extra-system forms of participation . For examining the impact of regime concessions on protest and the impact of protest o n

-73- public policy, it is intended eventually to create a database o f protest-related regime actions .

It is hoped that additional funding will be found to extend the database to the end of the current cycle of protest in the USSR--a t least several more years, given the present trajectory of events . I t is planned to approach several foundations for funding a t approximately the same yearly level as this grant . Should th e National Council prove interested in providing additional funding fo r the project, I would be happy to submit a proposal .

DATA BASE STRUCTURE AND DOCUMENTATION PROTEST .DBF (Version 1 .1 ) by Mark R . Beissinge r University of Wisconsin--Madiso n

This data base summarizes information on 2,161 non-violen t mass protest demonstrations (sometimes referred to below a s protests or demonstrations) in the Soviet Union from Decembe r 1, 1986 to December 31, 1989 . Violent mass protests an d strikes are not included in this Data base, but will be th e subject of separate data bases that are still being compiled . A non-violent mass protest demonstration was defined as a n event that met the following six criteria : 1) it was a n autonomous gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against publi c policies ; 2) it involved a minimum of 100 persons ; 3) it wa s bounded by space and time (i .e ., occurred in a specific location during a limited time period) ; 4) the number of participants was not restricted by th e organizers of the event (i .e ., was not a conference , convention, or other restricted organized meeting) ; 5) it did not have as one of its purposes the infliction of violence by its participants (i .e ., was not an event of violent mas s protest) ; 6) it was not in itself a refusal to work (i .e ., a strike) . The Russian vocabulary for events of this type i s rich, including such words as demonstratsiia [demonstration] , miting [meeting], protest [protest], manifestatsii a [manifestation], and panakhida [funeral service often involvin g a mass procession] . These should be contrasted with the vocabulary used to describe events of violent mass protest , such as besporiadki [disorders], pogrom [pogrom], drak [fight] , volneniia [disturbances], and stychki [clashes] . While strikes and violent mass protests were excluded , the possibility that these types of events might overlap wit h non-violent demonstrations was recognized in compiling the dat a base . In other words, strikes can (and often do) involv e non-violent mass demonstrations, and non-violent mas s demonstrations can (and at times do) evolve into violent mas s protest . In such cases, the demonstration dimension of thes e events was included in the data base . Demonstrations which di d not involve voluntary participation but which rather wer e mobilized by the political authorities and were ritual i n character (i .e ., official May Day or Revolution Day parades ) were excluded . Mass demonstrations sponsored or encouraged b y the political authorities that were voluntary and non-ritual i n nature were included .

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Demonstrations, like all events, are unique in space an d time . However, it should be noted that multiple events di d occur in the same city on the same day . For instance, on Ma y 28th, 1989 four separate and unrelated demonstrations too k place in Moscow . A thousand Armenians gathered to commemorate e the independent Armenian republic of 1918-1920 ; 100 Crimean Tatars gathered outside the Bulgarian embassy to protes t against the treatment of Turks in Bulgaria ; 100,000 Muscovite s participated in a demonstrations sponsored by Memoria l concerning the Congress of People's Deputies, then in session ; and a thousand Muscovites participated in a demonstratio n sponsored by the Democratic Union . Each of these events took place in separate locations in the city . In such cases, ever y effort was made to untangle these as separate events and t o count them as separate occurrences . However, often in large demonstrations a portion of th e participants break off from the main group and hold separat e marches or protests . Alternatively, small groups that hol d their own demonstrations can later join large crowds . In case s in which either of these conditions were detectable, the event s were counted as one, large event rather than a series o f separate events . A minimum size limit was imposed for severa l reasons. Information on smaller protest events is less likely t o be available and is likely to be less accurate than informatio n on larger protest events . Demonstrations in the Soviet Unio n have at times been as small as a single person . Suc h one-person protests were especially prevalent in th e pre-glasnost' period . But in a period in which some protes t events included as many as a million participants, reporting o n smaller events tended to be scarce . A minimum of 100 wa s imposed after examining reports of hundreds of event s (Information on events smaller in size than 100 was actuall y collected, though it was not included in the data base becaus e of the spottiness of the data) . Events involving 100 person s appear to have been fairly well reflected in the source s consulted in this study . The events in the data base are compiled in the form o f 1,894 records . Some records include information on events o f multiple duration (as reflected in the DURATION variable) . Each record is 834 characters wide, and includes informatio n not only on the date and place of the event, but also on th e number of participants (at times, several estimates), th e nationality of the participants, the organizers of the protes t (if any), the demands put forth by the protesters, whether th e authorities had given their permission for the demonstration t o take place, the use of coercion by the authorities agains t protesters, and the sources from which the information cam e (See Short Summary of Data Base Structure and Definition s below) . Data on the organizers of demonstrations is no t -76 - included in this version, simply because it had not yet bee n cleaned . Coverage of the type of events analyzed in the data bas e is incomplete, but nevertheless substantial . For instance , according to official MVD statistics, in 1989 there were 5,30 0 demonstrations of all sizes in the entire Soviet Union (Pravda , March 26, 1990) . This data base includes information on 1,42 4 of these, or about 27 percent of all demonstrations in the USS R for that year . Considering that the official MVD statistic s also cover demonstrations that were less than 100 in size, th e coverage offered by this data base can be said to be extensive . Certainly, in terms of large demonstrations, there were fe w that occurred in the USSR during the period under study tha t are not covered in the data base . 1988 official--2328 ; dat a base coverage--665 . As is the case with any material dealing with contemporar y affairs, this data base is limited by the problem of "righ t censoring"--i .e ., the large number of demonstrations that hav e occurred since the end of 1989 . According to MVD statistics , in the first 54 days of 1990 alone, more than 150 0 demonstrations took place in the Soviet Union, with th e participation of 6 .4 million people (Pravda, March 26, 1990) . It is hoped that the data base will eventually be extended t o cover to the end of the current cycle of protest in the USSR . The Coding Proces s All data entries were examined and coded upon entry b y both the Principal Investigator (Mark Beissinger) and a research assistant with reading fluency in Russian . Al l records were subsequently checked for accuracy . For question s involving the data or any of the sources used for specifi c entries, contact Mark Beissinger at 608-263-9429 . Upo n request, a FoxBase+ program is available for searching an d manipulating the data .

Short Summary of Data Base Structur e VARIABLE SIZE TYPE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 1 60 CHARACTE R Sources used SOURCE 2 60 CHARACTER Sources used SOURCE 3 60 CHARACTE R Sources used STARTDATE 8 DATE Starting date of event DURATION 3 NUMERI C Length of event PLACENAM E 30 CHARACTE R Place of even t PLACESIZ E 5 NUMERI C Population of Plac e (1979 ) PROVINC E 30 CHARACTE R Name of Provinc e PROVNUMBER 3 NUMERI C Province Cod e ZONENUMBER 2 NUMERI C Zone Cod e REPUBLIC 12 CHARACTE R Name of Republi c REPNUMBE R 2 NUMERI C Republic Cod e EST1PARTI C 6 NUMERI C Estimate of Number o f Participant s EST2PARTI C 6 NUMERI C Estimate of Number o f Participant s EST3PARTI C 6 NUMERI C Estimate of Number o f Participant s CATGPARTI C 2 NUMERI C Category of Number o f Participant s NATPART1 30 CHARACTE R Nationality o f Participant s NATNUMPT 1 2 NUMERI C Nationality Cod e NATPART 2 30 CHARACTE R Nationality o f Participant s NATNUMPT 2 2 NUMERIC Nationality Cod e PERMITTED 1 CHARACTE R Flag (Sanctioned b y Authorities? ) DEMAND 1 60 CHARACTE R Demands of Participant s DEMAND1NU M 3 NUMERI C Demand Cod e DEMAND 2 60 CHARACTE R Demands of Participant s DEMAND2NU M 3 NUMERI C Demand Cod e DEMAND 3 60 CHARACTE R Demands of Participant s DEMAND3NU M 3 NUMERI C Demand Cod e DEMAND 4 60 CHARACTE R Demands of Participant s DEMAND4NU M 3 NUMERI C Demand Cod e DEMAND 5 60 CHARACTE R Demands of Participant s DEMAND5NU M 3 NUMERI C Demand Cod e ARREST S 1 CHARACTE R Flag (Were Arrest s Made? ) ARRESTNU M 4 NUMERI C Number of Arrest s SANCTION S 1 NUMERI C Type of Sanctions Against Arrested VIOLEVE L 1 NUMERI C Degree of Coercion b y Authoritie s INJUREDNUM 4 NUMERI C Number of Injurie s DEATHSNUM 3 NUMERIC Number of Deaths -78- DEFINITION S

Sources (SOURCE1, SOURCE2, SOURCE3 ) Documents published sources of information used in compilin g the data . For further information, see Bibliography o f NationalCouncil report . Starting Date (STARTDATE ) The beginning date of a demonstration . In only a few cases , the precise date of the event was not available, though th e month in which the demonstration occurred was known . Suc h events were included in the data base at the beginning, end, o r middle of the month (whichever seemed the most probable . Duration of Event (DURATION ) The number of days on which the event occurred . In essence , this is a multiplier, since the DURATION variable was ofte n used to cover periods of protest that could not be broken dow n into smaller units for lack of information . All protests tha t occurred on a particular day were considered to be a day i n length, even though in most cases they lasted only for a fe w hours rather than a full day . Place of Event (PLACENAME ) The city, town, or village in which the event occurred . In th e few cases in which the event literally stretched across a geographic unit (such as a "human chain" of protest), this wa s indicated by including the end-points of the protest action . Population Size of Event Location (PLACESIZE ) The population of the city, town, or village in which the even t occurred, according to data from the 1979 Soviet census (th e last currently available), in thousands . If an event locatio n had a population of less than 50 thousand, it was coded as 0 . Size Estimations (EST1PARTIC, EST2PARTIC, EST3PARTIC ) The number of participants in the event, at the moment of it s largest size . The number of participants in a single protes t event can often fluctuate drastically ; these variables reflec t estimates of the largest number of participants . Since estimating the size of crowds is an art rather than a science , multiple and divergent estimates were recorded when available . Two diverging estimates were available for 262 records (13 . 8 percent of the sample), and three were available for 69 record s (3 .6 percent of the sample) . In those cases in which multipl e estimates did exist but did not diverge, they were no t recorded . The phrase "several" [nemnogo] was alway s 79- interpreted to mean 3 . Size Category (CATGPARTIC ) A categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10 reflecting th e average of estimates for the maximum number of participants . The following scale was used : AVERAGE # OF PARTICIPANTS CODE 100-999 : 1 1000-4999 : 2 5000-9999 : 3 10000-19999 : 4 20000-29999 : 5 30000-49999 6 50000-99999 7 100000-199999 8 200000-499999 9 500000> 10 For 533 of the 1894 records (or 28 .1% or the records in th e data base), no precise size estimate was available . In thes e cases, a size category was estimated based on two types o f information . First, if the number of participants was listed i n a source as being in the hundreds [sotni], the thousand s [tysachi], or many thousands [mnogotysachnyi], these wer e generally assigned categories 1, 2, and 3 respectively . Second, a search was made for similar events in the same city , organized by the same group, and over the same demands . If n o other information was available, the closest such events i n time were used as a basis for categorization . Nationality of Participants (NATPART1, NATPART2 ) The nationality of the bulk of participants . In some cases , more than one nationality participated . In such cases, thi s information was recorded . In most demonstrations th e nationality of participants was self-evident from the demand s put forth . However, in some cases in which the demands wer e less nationalist in character, it was less easy to determin e the nationality of participants . This was so in particular i n large metropolitan centers of the RSFSR and in parts of othe r union republics where the population is mixed (for instance , east-bank Ukraine) . Here, 1979 census data (broken down fo r urban and rural areas by oblast', and sometimes even for th e cities in question) was used to pinpoint the probable ethni c distribution of the population in which the protest occurred . Assuming that protest that was non-nationalist in characte r tended to reflect the ethnic distribution of the populatio n from which it was drawn, these figures were used as a basis fo r classifying the nationalities of participants . Demands (DEMAND1, DEMAND2, DEMAND3, DEMAND4, DEMAND5) The issues over which the demonstration occurred . These wer e

-80 - either voiced in speeches at the event, were implicit in th e nature of the event itself, were listed in a formal list o f demands presented by the demonstrators, or occurred as a for m of behavior at the protest itself . These demands were the n placed into 144 separate categories . For details on coding , see below . Arrests Flag (ARRESTS ) A flag indicating whether participants were detained by th e police (either before, during, or after the event) or had som e sanction imposed on them by the authorities for thei r activities connected with the event . Coded as yes (Y), no (N) , or unknown U) . Number of Arrests (ARRESTNUM ) The number of participants detained by the police (eithe r before, during, or after the event) or sanctioned by th e authorities in any way for their activities connected with the event . A -1 was used to indicate that arrests did occur, bu t that the number is unknown . Punishment of Those Arrested (SANCTIONS ) A four-point scale of sanctions imposed against those arrested , coded in the following way : 0=No known sanctions imposed (quickly released ) 1=Fines imposed, or participant fired from work or expelle d from cit y 2=Minor imprisonment (less than 60 days ) 3=Major imprisonment (60 days or more ) Degree of Coercion by Authorities (VIOLEVEL ) A five-point scale summarizing the coercive measures taken b y the authorities against demonstrators . The following coding wa s used : 0=No known coercio n 1=Physical harassment of demonstrators or summoning o f participants to polic e 2=Low-level coercion (sporadic arrests and/or beatings ) 3=Substantial coercion (10 to 75 arrests or 10 to 4 0 injuries ) 4=Major violence by authorities (more than 75 arrests o r more than 40 injuries ) Number of Injured (INJUREDNUM ) The number of injuries (both to participants and to law - enforcement personnel) as a result of the event . A -1 was use d to indicate that injuries did occur, but that the number i s unknown .

-81- Number of Deaths (DEATHSNUM ) The number of deaths that occurred as a result of the event . A -1 was used to indicate that deaths did occur, but that th e number is unknown . CODING

Territorial Codes (PROVNUMBER, ZONENUMBER, REPNUMBER ) The following is a list of the coding used for territoria l units (republics, zones, and provinces) . Republic code s (REPNUMBER) are enclosed in brackets /[]/, territorial zone s (ZONENUMBER) are enclosed in parentheses /()/, and province s (PROVNUMBER) are indicated by a number followed by a perio d /xxx . / RSFSR [01 ] Northern Region (01 ) 1. Karelian ASSR 2. Komi ASS R 3. Arkhangels k 4. Vologd a 5. Murmans k Northwest Region (02 ) 6. Novgorod 7. Psko v Leningrad Region (03 ) 8. Leningrad Central Region (04 ) 9. Brians k 10. Vladimi r 11. Ivanovo 12. Kalini n 13. Kostroma 14. Ore l 15. Riazan ' 16. Smolensk 17. Tula 18. Yaroslav Moscow Region (05 ) 19. Moscow Volga-Viatsk Region (06 ) 20. Mari ASSR 21. Mordvinian ASSR 22. Chuvash ASS R 23. Gor'ki i 24. Kiro v Central Black-Earth Region (07 ) 25. Belgorod -83 - 26. Voronezh 27. Kursk 28. Lipets k 29. Tambov Volga Region (08 ) 30. Kalmyk ASSR 31. Tatar ASSR 32. Astrakhan 33. Volgograd 34. Kuibyshe v 35. Penza 36. Sarato v Ul'ianov37. Northern Caucasus (09 ) 38. Dagestan ASS R 39. Kabardino-Balkar ASS R 40. Northern Ossetian ASS R 41. Chechen-Ingush ASS R 42. Krasnodar kra i 43. Stavropol kra i 44. Rostov Urals (10 ) 45. Bashkir ASS R 46. Udmurt ASS R 47. Kurgan 48. Orenbur g 49. Per m 50. Sverdlovs k 51. Cheliabins k Western Siberia (11 ) 52. Altai kra i 53. Kemerovo 54. Novosibirsk 55. Oms k 56. Tomsk 57. Tiumen ' Eastern Siberia (12 ) 58. Buriat ASS R 59. Tuva ASSR 60. Krasnoiarsk kra i 61. Irkuts k 62. Chita Far East (13 ) 63. Yakut ASSR 64. Primorskii kra i 65. Khabarovsk krai 66. Amu r 67. Kamchatk a 68. Magadan 69. Sakhali n Other 70. Kaliningrad

Ukraine [02 ] Donetsk--Dniepr Region (14 ) 71. Voroshilovgrad 72. Dnepropetrovs k 73. Donets k 74. Zaporozh' e 75. Kirovograd 76. Poltava 77. Sumi 78. Khar'kov Southwest District (15 ) 79. Vinnitsa 80. Volyni a 81. Zhitomi r 82. Transcarpathia n 83. Ivano—Franko 84. Kiev 85. L'vo v 86. Rovno 87. Ternopol ' 88. Khmel'nitski i 89. Cherkass y 90. Chernigo v 91. Chernovits a Southern Region (16 ) 92. Crime a 93. Nikolaev 94. Odess a 95. Kherso n Belorussia [03] (17 ) 96. Bres t 97. Vitebs k 98. Gomel ' 99. Grodn o 100. Minsk 101. Mogile v Lithuania [04] (18) 102 .

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Latvia [05] (18) 103 . (18)=Balti c

Estonia [06] (18) 104 . Georgia [07] (19 ) 105. Abkhaz ASSR 106. Adzhar ASSR 107. Southern Ossetian A O 108. Georgia (non-ASSR/AO ) (19)=Transcaucasu s Armenia [08] (19) 109 . Azerbaidzhan [09] (19 ) 110. Nakhichevan ASSR 111. Nagorno-Karabakh A O 112. Azerbaidzhan (non-ASSR/AO ) Moldavia [10] (20) 113 . Kazakhstan [11] (21 ) 114. Aktiubins k 115. Alma-At a 116. Eastern Kazakhstan 117. Gur'ev 118. Dzhambul ' 119. Dzhezkazga n 120. Karagand a 121. Kzyl'-Ord a 122. Kokchetav a 123. Kustana i (21)=Central Asi a 124. Mangyshla k 125. Pavloda r 126. Northern Kazakhsta n 127. Semipalatins k 128. Taldy-Kurga n 129. Turga i 130. Ural s 131. Tselinogra d 132. Chimken t Uzbekistan [12] (21 ) 133. Karakalpak ASSR 134. Andizhan 135. Bukhar a 136. Dzhiza k 137. Kashkadar'i n 138. Navo i 139. Namangan 140. Samarkand 141. Surkhandar'i n 142. Syrdar'in 143. Tashkent -86 - 144. Fergan a 145. Khorez m Kirgizia [13] (21 ) 146. Issyk-Kul ' 147. Naryn 148. Os h 149. Talas 150. Kirgizia--Othe r

Tadzhikistan [14] (21 ) 151. Kuliab 152. Kurgan-Tiubins k 153. Leninabad 154. Tadzhikistan--Othe r Turkmenia [15] (21 ) 155. Ashkhaba d 156. Krasnovods k 157. Mary i 158. Tashau z 159. Chardzho i

Nationality Codes (NATNUMPTl, NATNUMPT2 ) Below is the list of codes used for the nationality o f participants : 0 . Pan-national in characte r 1. Russian s 2. Ukrainian s 3. Uzbek s 4. Belorussian s 5. Kazakhs 6. Volga Tatar s 7. Azerbaidzhani s 8. Armenian s 9. Georgians 10. Moldavian s 11. Tadzhik s 12. Lithuanian s 13. Turkmens 14. German s 15. Kirgi z 16. Jews 17. Chuvas h 18. Latvian s 19. Bashkir s 20. Mordvinians

-87- 21. Poles 22. Estonians 23. Chechen s 24. Udmurts 25. Mar i 26. Ossetians 27. Avar s 28. Korean s 29. Lezgins 30. Crimean Tatar s 31. Buriats 32. Yakut s 33. Komi 34. Kabardinian s 35. Karakalpak s 36. Uighur s 37. Ingus h 38. Gagauz y 39. Tuvinian s 40. Kalmyk s 41. Karelian s 42. Karacha i 43. Kurd s 44. Meskhetian Turk s 45. Abkha z 46. Peoples of the Nort h 47. Othe r 48. Unknown 49. Only one nationality involve d

Coding of Demands (DEMANDlNUM, DEMAND2NUM, DEMAND3NUM , DEMAND4NUM, DEMAND5NUM )

Below is the list of codes used for classifying the demands o f protesters, as well as a list of all entries placed in th e "other " category (#999) :

0 . Unknown 1. For End of Monopoly of CPSU (For Multi-Party System ) 2. Violent Overthrow of Political Syste m 3. Freedom of Expression (Rights o f Speech/Press/Demonstration ) 4. Freedom of Association and Organizatio n 5. Release of Political Prisoner s 6. General Legal Refor m 7. Right to Alternative/Voluntary/Local Military Servic e 8. Against Police Repressio n 9. Reform of Electoral Processe s 10. Democratization of Political Institution s

-88- 11. Election of Specific Candidat e 12. Removal of Specific Official s 13. Protest Against Corruption by Specific Official s 14. Commemoration of Victims of Stalinism 15. Commemoration of National Events of the Pas t 16. Commemoration of Constitution Day or Human Right s Movemen t 17. Protest of Annexation of Territory to USSR or Russi a 18. Preservation of Historical Monument s 19. Restoration of National Symbols of Pas t 20. Preservation of Soviet State Symbol s 21. Ecological Demand s 22. Religious Freedo m 23. Return of Church Propert y 24. Preserve or Extend Non-Russian Linguistic or Cultura l Rights 25. Maintenance of Status of Russian Languag e 26. Redefinition of Citizenship Along National Line s 27. Racist or Violently Nationalist Demand s 28. Protection of Ethnic Group Against Physical or Verba l Attack 29. Limit Migration to Regio n 30. Creation of National Military Unit s 31. In Favor of Secessio n 32. Against Secession 33. Sovereignty for Republi c 34. In Favor of Irridentist Claims 35. Opposed to Irridentist Claim s 36. Upgrade Federal Status of Administrative Uni t 37. Unspecified or Other Nationalist Demand s 38. Raise in Wages 39. Improve Working Condition s 40. Decentralize Economic Administratio n 41. Provide More Consumer Good s 42. Provide Better Housin g 43. Democratize Selection of Administrative Bodie s 44. Curb Rising Price s 45. Provide Employment 46. Place Greater Restrictions on Cooperative Movemen t 47. Greater Development of Cooperative Movemen t 48. Other Economic or Social Demand s 49. Right of Emigration from Countr y 50. Right to Return to Homelan d 51. Creation of Autonomous Federal Uni t 52. For Punishing Violent Actions Against Ethnic Grou p Member s 53. Mourning for Victims of Interethnic Violenc e 54. Solidarity with Separatist Demands of Other Nationalitie s 55. Representation of Nationality in Elite Post s 56. Against Punishing Those Involved in Interethnic Violenc e 57. Against Ethnic Discrimination in Workplac e 58. Greater Economic Autonomy for Republic -89-

interview with V . Ye . Guliev, in Trud, June 22, 1988, p . 2 . 26. Literaturnaia gazeta, December 9, 1987 . 27. For the text of the guidelines, see Izvestiia, July 29, 1988, p . 2 .

28. Sobesednik, no . 3, January 1988, p . 7 . 29.Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report : Soviet Unio n (FBIS), January 9, 1990, p . 71 (Izvestiia) .

30. FBIS, August 5, 1988, p . 45 (TASS) . According to the report , this was a significant increase over the same period in 1987, when 9 3 unauthorized meetings took place . Of course, the figures refer t o demonstrations of all sizes .

31. Moskovskie novosti, no . 46, November 1988, p . 14 .

32. FBIS, November 30, 1989, p . 69 (Radianska Ukraina) . In the firs t ten months of 1989, more than 200 unauthorized meetings and rallie s took place throughout Uzbekistan . Reuters, October 30, 1989 . 33. See, for instance, FBIS, June 13, 1989, pp, 39-43 . 34. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA : Addison-Wesley . 1978), pp . 182-183 .

NOTES

1. This project underwent considerable evolution since the origina l application to the National Council . Though it was entitled "Ethnic - Based Mass Political Action in the USSR," it was first necessary t o characterize mass political action in general before focusing on it s specifically ethnic component . Upon further examination of events, i t often became difficult to extract specifically ethnic protest fro m non-ethnic protest . Data collection was broadened to include al l events of a mass character, not simply ethnic protest per se . Also , the very large number of events made it necessary to concentrate o n one form of mass protest--protest demonstrations--and to leav e analysis of other forms of mass action--specifically, violent mas s actions and strikes--for later study . 2. For a review of the literature, as well as a full bibliography o n the subject, up to 1980, see Ekkart Zimmermann, "Macro-Comparativ e Research on Political Protest," in Ted Robert Gurr, ed ., Handbook o f Political Conflict (New York : The Free Press, 1980), pp . 167-237 . See also the series of annual volumes on social movements edited b y Louis Kriesberg, ed ., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts an d Change (Greenwich, CT : JAI Press, 1978- ). 3. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, IL : The Free Press, 1959) . 4. Konstantin Mikhailov, in Sobesednik, no . 3, January 1988, p . 7 . 5. See Ludmilla Alexeeva and Valery Chalidze, "Mass Unrest in th e USSR," Report No . 19, submitted to the Office of Net Assessment of th e U .S . Department of Defense (OSD/NA 85-2965), August 1965 . Given th e minimum size requirements for a protest demonstration that wer e utilized in the current study (100 or more participants), only 165 o f the events uncovered in the Alexeeva and Chalidze study would hav e qualified for inclusion in this project .

6. See David Kowalewski, "Trends in the Human Rights Movement," i n Donald R . Kelley, ed ., Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era (New York : Praeger, 1980), pp . 150-181 . 7. David Kowalewski, "Protest for National Rights in the USSR : Characteristics and Consequences," Nationalities Papers, vol . 8, no . 2 (Fall 1980), pp . 179-194 . 8. For the sake of analysis, participation by an individual in a demonstration was counted as a person-day of protest, even though i n the vast majority of cases demonstrations did not last for more than a few hours at most . The use of person-days as a measurement of protes t activity is widespread . For one early example of its use, see Te d Robert Gurr and Raymond Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960s," A Reciprocal Theoretical System With Parameter Estimates," Comparativ e -94-

Political Studies, vol . 6, no . 2 (July 1973), pp . 142-143 . 9 . In terms of number of participants, the demonstrations recorded i n the data base had the following distribution :

SIZE # OF EVENTS PERCENT 100-999 : 752 34 .8 % 1000-4999 : 648 30 .0 % 5000-9999 : 235 10 .9 % 10000-19999 : 133 6 .2 % 20000-29999 : 62 2 .9 % 30000-49999 91 4 .2 % 50000-99999 56 2 .6 % 100000-199999 69 3 .2 % 200000-499999 85 3 .9% Greater than 500000 30 l .4% TOTAL 2161 100 .0% 10. Pravda, March 26, 1990 . 11. This was due simply to the sheer volume of events that occurre d in 1989 . The number of protest events recorded for 1989 was 21 4 percent greater than those recorded for 1988 . Official MVD statistic s show a similar increase in the number of events in 1989 (228 percent) . The evidence in this study suggests that the actual number of person - days of protest was not much different in 1988 and 1989, amounting t o 31 .5 million for 1988 and 28 .7 million for 1989, even though th e number of events was considerably greater in 1989 . This was due t o the fact that demonstrations in 1988 were, on the average, more tha n twice as large as those in 1989 . Thus, protest demonstrations in 198 8 had an average of about 47,500 participants, while those in 1989 ha d an average of 20,200 participants .

12. Kommunist (Yerevan), December 24, 1989, p . l . 13. Those wishing more information on the database, its structure, o r the rules used in compiling and coding data should consult the genera l instructions on the database, which are available for distributio n from the Principal Investigator upon request .

14. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, June 10, 1989 . 15. On the problem of "right-censoring," see Paul D . Allison, Even t History Analysis : Repression for Longitudinal Event Data (Newbur y Park, CA : Sage Publications, 1984) .

16. Pravda, March 26, 1990 . 17. It should also be pointed out that the use of certain statistica l techniques that work well with this kind of data (in particular, ARIM A time-series models) require more time observations than are include d -95 - Against Participation in Foreign Festival with RSFS R Against Perestroik a Against Persecution of Meskhetian Turk s Against Private Ownershi p Against Resettlement of Meskhetian Turks in Georgi a Against Split in Lithuanian Communist Part y Against Treatment of Turkish Minority in Bulgari a Against U .S . Policy Towards Immigratio n Against Upgrading Status of Federal Subuni t Aid to Russians in the Balti c Anniversary of Birth of Nestor Makhn o Boycott of Fall Cotton Campaig n Call for Military Intervention Against Republic Authoritie s Celebration of Armenian Deaths in Earthquak e Celebration of Release of Karabakh Committee Leader s Change Economic Plans for Republi c Change in Leadership and Policies of Rustaveli Societ y Change Leadership of CPSU Central Bodie s Commemoration of Khrushchev's Birthda y Commemoration of Self-Immolation by Nationalis t Commemoration of Victims of Chernobyl Acciden t Commemoration of Victims of Feb . 1988 Sumgait Massacres Concerning Religious Views of Newly-Elected Muft i Concerning Situation in Southern Osseti a Control over Local Water or Land Resource s Discussion of Abkhaz Situatio n Discussion of Congress of People's Deputie s Discussion of Problems of Small Nation s End Aid to Other Republic s Examine Issues of Quality of Production at Plan t For a Meeting with Ryzhko v For a New Agreement of Union for the USS R For Liquidating Raion Party Committee s For Unity of Turkic People s Implementation of July 1989 Agreement with Miner s Improve Care for Victims of April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre s Improve City Transpor t Improve Lang ./Cult ./Educ . for Tadzhiks in Uzbekista n In Support of Gagauz Demands for Autonomous Republi c In Support of Gorbache v In Support of Interregional Group of Deputie s Increased Ties with Ira n Inter-national Harmon y Investigation into Death of Nationalist Activis t Legalization of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churc h Mourning for Cardinal Sheptitski i Mourning for Merab Kostav a Mourning for Victims of 1988 Armenian Earthquak e Prevent Orphans from Being Sent Beyond Republic's Border s Punish Those Engaged in Strike s Punish Those Fanning National Hatre d Punishment of Those Involved in Stalin's Crime s -92 - Raise the Price of Cotto n Recall of Republican Supreme Soviet Deputie s Removal of Gorbache v Remove Monument to Yakov Sverdlo v Resignation of Ligachev Restore Citizenship to Political Exile s Reunification with Ira n Reveal Truth About 1962 Novocherkassk Massacre s Reveal Truth About the Aftermath of Chernobyl Acciden t Solidarity with Palestinians 59. Right of Republic to Separate Representation Abroa d 60. Right of Local Residence (propiska ) 61. Speed Pace of Refor m 62. Against Special Priveleges for Bureaucrac y 63. Coverage of Issues in Medi a 64. Mourning for Victims of Recent Regime Violenc e 65. Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanista n 66. Against Youth Gang s 67. Call for General Strik e 68. Continue Strik e 69. Declare End to General Strik e 70. General Human Rights Demand s 71. Commemoration of Victims of Nazi Atrocitie s 72. In Support of Andrei Sakharo v 73. In Support of Gdlian and Ivano v 74. In Support of Boris Yel'tsi n 75. Religious Servic e 76. Call for Boycott of Election s 77. Rehabilitation of Those Repressed Under Brezhne v 78. Against Neo-Nazi s 79. Solidarity With Victims of April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre s 80. Solidarity with Armenian Demands on Nagorno-Karabak h 81. Improve Disaster Relie f 82. Against Separation of Territory from Republi c 83. Against Discrimination Against Members of Ethnic Grou p 84. Resignation of Entire Local Governmen t 85. Withdrawal of Soviet Army from Republi c 86. Against Proposed Changes to USSR Constitutio n 87. Change Place Name s 88. End Martial Law 89. Against Restriction on Migration to Republi c 90. Against Making Language of Other Group the Officia l Language 91. Make Language of Group the Official Languag e 92. For Change of Alphabet s 93. Eliminate Autonomous Status of Territorial Subuni t 94. Improve Conditions for Refugee s 95. Against Redefinition of Republican Citizenship Right s 96. Legalize Uniate Churc h 97. Improve Social Condition s 98. Other Anti-Military Demand (Close Military Base o r Training ) 99. Against Anti-Semitic Russian Nationalist s 4 100. Against Creation of Autonomous Federal Subunit fo r a Minorit y 101. Against USSR Special Administration in Nagorno-Karabak h 102. Commemoration of Victims of 1933 Ukrainian Famin e 103. Expulsion of Exiled Caucasian Nationalitie s 104. Publication or Renunciation of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pac t 105. Punish Those Responsible for April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre s 106. Return of Citizenship to Paruir Airikia n 107. Siberian Regional Separatis m

-90- 108. End Blockade of Group's Territor y 109. For Separation of Territory from Republi c 110. Increase Russian Influence Over Institutions of Cultur e 111. Against Factory-Based Election s 112. End to Party and Political Controls Over Educatio n 113. Speed Pace of Destalinizatio n 114. Free Movement Across Border s 115. In Memory of Andrei Sakharo v 116. Protest of Crackdown in Chin a 117. Recall of Deputies to Congress of People's Deputie s 118. In Support of Yuri Afanas'e v 119. Attention to Problems of Afghan Veteran s 120. Commemoration of Murder of Tsa r 121. Commemoration of Victims of Red Terro r 122. Destruction or Denigration of Soviet State Symbol s 123. Dissolution of Komsomo l 124. In Support of CPSU 125. In Support of Soviet Arm y 126. End to Nuclear Testin g 127. For Nuclear Disarmament 128. For Introduction of Martial La w 129. For Introduction of Private Property and Market Reform s 130. For Right to Strike or Independent Trade Union s 131. Improve Work Benefit s 132. Restrict Consumption or Sale of Alchoholic Beverage s 133. Against Racketeer s 134. For Greater Income Equalit y 135. Greater Representation for Working Class in Legislature s 136. Investigation into Local Accident, Poisoning, or Diseas e 137. Commemoration of War Veteran s 138. Other Linguistic/Cultural Demand s 139. Other Foreign-Policy-Related Protes t 140. Solidarity With Demands of Other Grou p 141. Other Conservative Demand s 142. Other Territorial Disput e 143. Other Liberal Demand s 144. Against Ruk h 999 . Other [Specify ]

List of Other Demands Entered (999) : Admission of Soviet Role in Katyn Massacre s Against Azerbaidzhani Assimilationist Policie s Against Cancellation of Rock Concer t Against Creation of Georgian Division of Universit y y Against Creation of Vigilante Groups Aiding Polic e Against Formation of Interfron t Against Gorbachev's Reaction to Baltic Separatis m Against Greater Economic Sovereignty for Republi c Against Legalization of Uniate Churc h Against Lenin and Leninis m Against Meeting Between NKAO and Azerbaidzhani Deputie s Against Opening of Polish Consulate

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