Yemen, a Possible Strategic Stage for the Rivalry Between Saudi Arabia and Iran Since 2015
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Anastasie Danset Yemen, a possible strategic stage for the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran since 2015 By Anastasie Odile Camille Danset 2149419 – 501654 November 2020 Supervisors: Dr. Ivo Hernandez Dr. Shawn Donnelly Programme: European Studies, Master of Science Comparative Public Governance, Master of Arts Institution: University of Twente, Faculty of Behavioural, Management and Social Sciences, The Netherlands Westfälische-Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Department of Political Science, Germany P a g e 1 | 52 Anastasie Danset Abstract: The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is not recent. Symptoms of this disparity appeared in 1979, after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and have developed over time. Whereas, before both states were allies, their relationship progressively moved into a conflictual one. They are today competing through a religious scope to become the regional power. The aim of the thesis is to analyse if the war in Yemen represent a strategic arena for Saudi Arabia and Iran's competition, and if their actions in Yemen since 2015 have developed the conflict into a proxy warfare. By following the offensive realism and security dilemma theory of the International Relations field, this thesis is examining if this rivalry has any consequences on ongoing war in Yemen. Keys words: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen, Realism, Regional Power, Shiite, Sunni, Security Dilemma, Balance of Power P a g e 2 | 52 Anastasie Danset Table of content: I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 4 1.1. Research Question ..................................................................................................................... 6 1.2. Hypotheses ................................................................................................................................ 6 1.3. Structure and methodology........................................................................................................ 7 1.4. Subject of research and relevance of the topic ........................................................................... 9 II. Theoretical Framework: Realism and Balance of power ........................................................ 10 2.1. Offensive Realism and Security Dilemma theory .................................................................... 10 2.2. Balance of Power .................................................................................................................. 13 III. The concept of regional power in the Middle East: Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional power 14 3.1. Understanding the concept of ‘regional power’ ................................................................. 14 3.2. Riyadh and Tehran’s relationship ....................................................................................... 17 3.3. Iran and Saudi Arabia as potential Regional Powers ........................................................... 20 3.3.1. Hard power .................................................................................................................... 20 3.3.2 Soft Power ....................................................................................................................... 22 3.4. Sunni VS Shia – Becoming a Regional Leader by being ideologically dominant ................... 25 IV. The concept of Proxy war .......................................................................................... 29 4.1. Proxy Warfare: the conflicts of the future ...................................................................... 29 4.2. Example of Proxy Warfare ............................................................................................. 31 V. Yemen a Proxy warfare? A ground of confrontation .................................................. 32 5.1. The War in Yemen...................................................................................................... 32 5.2. How Yemen can jeopordise and profit Riyadh’s security .................................................... 35 5.3. Yemen’s strategic value for Iran ................................................................................. 36 5.4. Yemen, a proxy warfare? ........................................................................................... 37 VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 38 VII. Literature ......................................................................................................... 40 VIII. Appendix..................................................................................................... 51 P a g e 3 | 52 Anastasie Danset I. Introduction ‘The worst humanitarian crisis of recent history’ (UN, 2017). This is how the War in Yemen has been described by the United Nations in 20191 (UN, 2019). In 2015, the Saudi-led coalition2 started a military operation that developed into a complicated war. The heavy external interventions by the Saudi-led coalition and the fact that they are controlling and restricting naval and airs import of essential goods and aids for the population is disastrous and the first victims are the civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Austin, 2019). The supply of energy is also limited, thus, there is not enough generators for the hospitals and to pump water from homes (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Since the beginning of the war, more than 10.000 civilians have died, 3.1 million have been displaced, famine and disease as cholera are hitting the population (Grumet, 2019). The UN is estimating that 80% of the Yemenis would need assistance (UN, 2019). Despite multiple attempts by the international community and the United Nations to negotiate a cease-fire3, the war remains ongoing until today (Sharp, 2020). A local conflict had already emerged before, however, the well-known war of Yemen started in 2015, when Saudi Arabia’s military forces, with eight other Sunni Arab states4, (the so-called Saudi-led coalition), bombed the North of Yemen targeting Shiites rebels and their allies (BBC, 2020; Gambrell, 2015). Nonetheless, a few months before this attack, a local conflict had already started. The national political instability of the country created an internal discord that resulted in a civil war (Mitreski, 2015). The origin of the conflict was a local tension between the Houthis and the central government. The Houthis are a northern Islamic political group following Zaidism5, a sect from the Shia branch of Islam, and are often referred to as the ‘Shiites Rebels’ (Michael, 2015). The Yemeni’s central government at this time was led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was leading the country 1 Stephen O’Brien the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator pronounced these words in the U.N. Security Council in New York after visiting Yemen on March 10, 2017 (UN, 2017) 2 The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco are Sunni Arab countries and are part of the Saudi-led coalition (Gambrell, 2015). 3 The Stockholm Agreement is the first agreement achieved between President Hadi and the Houthis on 13 December, 2018., This accord has been promoted by the United Nations, by the Resolution 2451 (OSESGY, 2019) and has been signed in Stockholm after a series of failed negotiations. This agreement did not result in a peaceful end of the war, but it was the first agreement that improved the humanitarian situation in the country (OSESGY, 2019 & Lackner, 2020). 4 The Saudi-led coalition 5 Shia Islam represents 10% of all Muslims, is one of the two main branches of Islam with Sunnis Islam. Shia Muslims are in the majority in Iraq, Iran, Bahrain and Yemen (BBC, 2016). P a g e 4 | 52 Anastasie Danset through the Sunni6 Branch of Islam. When Hadi was president, he had developed close ties with the Saudi government (Mitreski, 2015). This close relationship was based on religious interests since, Saudi Arabia is considered as the centre of the Middle East, and of Sunni Islam. Before 2015, tensions between the government and the Houthis were already present, the Houthis distrusted the government’s behaviour toward Saudi Arabia and were demanding recognition and rights for its group (Mitreski, 2015). Due to the lack of dialogue between the two parts, the Houthis started to take control of the North of Yemen in 2014. Once the Houthis managed to take over the capital, Sanaa, the civil war has turned into a regionalised war (Salisbury, 2015). Because the Shiite group managed to take control of the political institutions in the capital, the threat was ubiquitous for the Hadi government and the neighbour states. This event generates a coalition of nine Arabs states led by Saudi Arabia and this group started to launch air strikes against the Houthis in March 2015 (Baron, 2019; BBC, 2020; Juneau, 2016; Salisbury, 2015).The official explanations of these attacks were to re-instore the Hadi government, recognised by the international community as being the official one of Yemen (Buys & Garwood-Gowers, 2019). However, there are other explanations behind the actions of Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Besides the official reason for the Saudi-led coalition to attack Yemen, different reports and authors argue that Saudi Arabia had more personal reasons for the attack (Stenslie, 2015; Ponížilová, 2016; Beck, 2020; Clausen, 2015; the Independent, 2018). Saudi Arabia has had “a continuing interest and involvement in Yemen”