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English).” Wash- Achieving Results Against the Odds Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Building for Peace Reconstruction for Security, Public Disclosure Authorized Equity, and Sustainable Peace in MENA Public Disclosure Authorized Building for Peace Reconstruction for Security, Equity, and Sustainable Peace in MENA © 2020 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpre- tations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to: World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; Fax: 202-522-2625; E-mail: [email protected]. The cover image is one of the 100 artworks produced by 500 Lebanese and Syrian children, who worked together for the art exhibition “Butterfly: Promoting Peace through the Arts” in Beirut, Lebanon, and Washington, DC, during October–December 2017. الزلت صغري و الأفهم بأمور السياسة حتى اآلن، لكن اظن اتحاد الدوله مع الشعب صدق .الدوله مع الشعب عدم تدخل جهات خارجيه يف مجتمعنا واألهم الثقه بني األفراد I am still young, and I don’t understand political “stuff” yet, but I reckon a union between the government and the people, when the government is honest with the people, stopping foreign interventions in our society and most importantly, trust between individuals. —High-school student from Wasit Province In response to the question, “What does constitute a prosperous society?” RIWI online survey. Iraq, March 2019 Contents Acknowledgements ix Executivesummary xii Introduction 1 Chapter1 Goingbeyondreconstructioninfluid,fractured,andinformalconflicts 9 The changed nature of conflicts 9 Conflict traps in MENA 12 Learning from previous reconstruction and peacebuilding experiences 14 In sum 18 Notes 19 References 19 Chapter2 Fromrebuildingthepasttobuildingforsustainablepeace 29 The Building for Peace integrated approach 30 Creating stronger incentives for peace 32 Applying the integrated approach to develop a long-term strategy 37 In sum 39 Notes 40 References 40 Chapter3 Understandingpolicytradeoffs:Pathstakenandnottaken 47 Decisionmaking at the crossroads: Tradeoffs and path dependencies 48 Examples of paths taken and not taken 49 Creating inclusive institutions while ensuring stability and elite buy-in 49 Restoring urban structures while promoting social cohesion and reconciliation 52 Securing economic livelihoods while investing in sustainable economic opportunities 52 Providing services for all while laying the groundwork for social cohesion and trust in government 54 In sum 57 Notes 57 References 57 Chapter4 Howtochoosetheroadforward:Increasinghowmuchweknow 67 Peace for Elements of an informed assessment 68 Building Understanding the past 68 | Making sense of the present at all levels 68 Understanding institutions and governance 69 Understanding the role of communities and their coping mechanisms 69 Contents A long-term vision of the future 70 v Taking off blinders for a more informed assessment 70 Blinders 71 Collecting information only from accessible areas 72 Assuming that a peace agreement ends a conflict 73 Considering only people’s physical security 73 Omitting key actors 74 Ignoring structural factors 75 In sum 76 Notes 77 References 77 Conclusion 79 Annexes 1 Methodology of the report 83 2 Background papers produced for the Building for Peace report 85 3 Methodology for online surveys in partnership with RIWI Corporation 88 4 Assessment tools 93 Spotlights 1 Listening to more than 13,000 citizen voices 5 2 Yemen’s mosaic of fluid conflicts 22 3 Libya’s polarizing dynamics reinforce a stalemate 42 4 Iraq at a crossroads 60 Boxes 1.1 Social contracts, social cohesion, and social capital 13 1.2 Sustainable peace and security 16 2.1 Facilitating a common vision through multiactor perspectives and consensus building 33 2.2 Land disputes as a trigger for ongoing tensions and conflicts in arenas of contestation 34 2.3 How are women contributing to peacebuilding? 36 3.1 Transitional justice mechanisms 51 3.2 The choices of young people in conflict settings 54 4.1 Enhancing assessments with new technologies 72 4.2 Energy politics in the Middle East and North Africa: A regional geo-economic issue? 75 Figures ES1 Fragile State Index for Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, 2006–19 xii ES2 Listening to voices of people in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen xiii ES3 Focusing on people and their changing incentives in space and time xv Peace for ES4 An opportunity to plan for a different future xvi ES5 Looking at the entire chessboard of players, spaces, and times xviii Building | 1 The World Bank Group’s Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2 S1.1 Most significant thing individuals and communities have lost since the beginning of war 6 S1.2 What people believe is the most important element needed to achieve lasting, sustainable peace 6 Contents S1.3 Who is most trusted to improve the economic situation for individuals and their families 7 1.1 Conflicts and incidents of one-sided violence have increased since 1946, peaking in the past few years 9 vi 1.2 Fragile State Index for Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, 2006–19 12 1.3 Listening to voices of people in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen 17 2.1 What’s been lost since the beginning of war 29 2.2 Focusing on people and their changing incentives in space and time 30 3.1 An opportunity to plan for a different future 47 S4.1 What do you believe has been lacking in previous peacebuilding work in Iraq? 62 S4.2 What do you believe is the most important element needed to achieve lasting, sustainable peace? 62 S4.3 Iraq’s total production and consumption of petroleum and other liquids, 1990–2017 63 4.1 Looking at the entire chessboard of players, spaces, and times 71 A1.2 The time continuum for sustainable peacebuilding 84 A3.1 Weighted and unweighted age groups by country 91 A3.2 Financial situations by country 92 A3.3 Arab Barometer Wave V: How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country? 92 A4.1 Comparing PDNA and PCNA — two examples 101 A4.2 How area-based approaches differ from other approaches 104 Maps 1 Conflict and fragility are widespread 1 1.1 “Urbicide,” or killing cities — Aleppo, Mosul, and Raqqa 11 S2.1 Yemen in tatters — Summer 2018 23 2.1 Local dynamics in Libya 38 S3.1 Libya’s disintegration — Summer 2018 43 S4.1 Iraq: Ethno-religious dynamics 61 Tables ES1 Removing the blinders on assessments xix 2.1 Preconflict social, political, and economic contexts 37 4.1 Blinders, their effects, and ways to remove them 76 A1.1 Contributors to the methodology 83 A3.1 Completed surveys by country 90 A4.1 Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment 93 A4.2 Risk and Resilience Assessment 97 A4.3 Post Disaster Needs Assessment 98 A4.4 Disaster/Dynamic Needs Assessment 102 A4.5 Area-based approach 103 Peace for Building | Contents vii Acknowledgements This report is the product of the collaborative ef- Albrecht from the University IUAV of Venice; Fab- fort by a core team led by Francesca Recanatini, rice Balanche from University of Lyon II; Bernhard Lead Economist, and Ellen Hamilton, Lead Urban Trautner from the German Development Insti- Specialist. The report was produced under the tute; and Leah Moncada and Kate Dier from RIWI overall guidance of Abdallah Al Dardari, former Corporation. The team would like to thank all the Senior Advisor on Reconstruction. The core team participating authors and staff from the above- comprised Mahi A. El-Attar, Sergio De Cosmo, Ka- mentioned institutions, including the Institute for trin Heger, Roland Lomme, and Joseph Saba. This State Effectiveness, the Middle East Institute, the work was carried out under the general direction American University in Cairo, the Arab Gulf States of ­Renaud Seligmann and Ayat Soliman while they Institute in Washington, the Centre for Syrian Stud- were Practice Managers in MENA for the Gover- ies at the University of St. Andrews, SOAS Univer- nance Practice and the Social Urban, Rural, and sity of London, Brookings Institute, the University Resilience Practice, respectively. It also benefited IUAV of Venice, and RIWI Corporation (see annex 2 from the guidance of Jaafar Friaa, Urban Practice for a detailed list of contributing authors). Manager, and Sarah Michael, FCV Practice Manag- er. The team appreciates the support and advice The team would also like to thank the German provided by Deborah Wetzel and Ede Jorge Ijjasz- Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Vasquez, while Senior Directors for the Governance Development, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Inter- Practice and the Social Urban, Rural and Resilience nationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, and the Practice, respectively, and by Najy Benhassine, German Development Institute for their gener- Regional Director for EFI MENA. The team also ous support toward the realization of this report. thanks Mouayad Albonni for his excellent research That supported included a financial contribution, assistance. technical assistance through background research, and hosting seminars and consultations during the The team acknowledges the critical contributions conceptualization and development phases of by the extended team of authors of background the report.
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