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The Final Airmen to Leave Iraq Found the End of the Mission As Memorable As the First Days of Desert Storm, Nearly 21 Years Earlier

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The Final Airmen to Leave Iraq Found the End of the Mission As Memorable As the First Days of Desert Storm, Nearly 21 Years Earlier The final airmen to leave Iraq found the end of the mission as memorable as the first days of Desert Storm, nearly 21 years earlier. The Last Days in Iraq n mid-January 1991, Capt. direction with his eyes on yet another troops left in December. Major General Anthony J. Rock, an F-15C target. Rock also spent 2011 in Iraq, leading pilot assigned to the 1st Fight- The first night of that complicated the advisory and training mission dur- er Wing at Langley AFB, Va., air campaign eventually involved more ing USAF’s final year in the country. led a flight of Eagles dur- than 600 aircraft and took months to Not one of the three Air Force leaders ing the initial air campaign map out. The intent was to dismantle ever imagined they would be working of Operation Desert Storm. Saddam Hussein’s military, stop his together to close out the US military IThe strike package was charged with forces from seizing Saudi Arabia, and mission in Iraq more than 20 years after ensuring air superiority during an at- free the Kuwaiti people. that first air campaign. “Our first mission tack on Talil Air Base near Nasiriyah was to destroy the Iraqi military. Our in southern Iraq. Long, Tough Road mission 20 years later is to build the Capt. Russell J. Handy, a fellow Operation Desert Storm’s air war last- Iraqi military,” said Handy, as he stood Eagle pilot assigned to the same wing ed just 43 days, but the US effort would on the ramp of a C-17, minutes after it at Langley, took off on another sortie continue for another two decades—first landed at Talil’s Camp Adder for the that day. His mission was to protect through 12 years of enforcing the no-fly last airlift flight out of Iraq. the strike package and provide a close zones over northern and southern Iraq, Handy’s story is not unique. More escort for EF-111s and F-4G Weasels and culminating last December after than 170,000 Americans served in as they flew toward their objective 100 nearly nine years of combat during Op- Iraq at the height of operations; most miles west of Baghdad. erations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn. served multiple tours. The operations This particular aircraft package also Goldfein, now a lieutenant general, defined a generation of airmen and left included Capt. David L. Goldfein, is commander of US Air Forces Cen- a lasting impression on countless Air an F-16 pilot out of Shaw AFB, S.C. tral in Southwest Asia. Major General Force careers. As Handy broke left toward Al Asad, Handy was the senior Air Force officer The cumulative numbers are stagger- Goldfein headed off in the opposite in Iraq from August 2010 until the last ing. Since 1991, the US and coalition 24 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 The Last Days in Iraq USAF photo by MSgt. Cecilio Ricardo By Amy McCullough, Senior Editor allies flew more than 500,000 sorties and generated 7,635 air tasking orders in the area of operations. Just since the fall of Baghdad in 2003, remotely piloted aircraft flew more than 415,000 hours of persistent intelligence, sur- veillance, and reconnaissance missions in the AOR and analysts processed USAF photo by MSgt. Cecilio Ricardo over 50,000 of those images. Mobility crews moved more than two million tons of cargo and four-and-a-half mil- lion passengers, while security forces accumulated more than 183,000 hours of guard duty, said Goldfein. “For over 20 years, Iraq has been a defining part of our professional and personal lives,” said Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the end- of-mission ceremony Dec. 15. Speaking within a heavily fortified compound at the former Sather Air Top: A convoy of trucks carrying the last remaining US military forces in Iraq Base in Baghdad, Dempsey told the crosses the border into Kuwait. Here: SSgt. Gerardo Munoz guards the C-17 that assembled airmen, soldiers, sailors, and was slated to airlift the last USAF airmen out of Ali AB, Iraq, on Dec. 18. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 25 DOD photo MQ-1B Predators, such as this one landing in Iraq at sunrise, were the last US combat aircraft to leave Iraqi airspace. marines—who would be, collectively, Sather, the first airman to lose his life capital’s skyline, without worrying about the last American combat forces out of in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in April snipers or rocket-propelled grenades. Iraq—“The road we have traveled was 2003—not only to end the mission in Panetta and the other senior leaders long, and it was tough.” Iraq, but also to remember the thousands participating in the departure ceremony The outcome, Defense Secretary of lives lost. encouraged the troops to keep their Leon E. Panetta said at the ceremony, “Those lives have not been lost in heads high as they left Iraq, knowing “was never certain, especially during vain,” Panetta insisted. “They gave birth they were leaving behind a country the war’s darkest days.” to an independent, free, and sovereign that is free of Saddam’s brutal regime, “To be sure, the cost was high” in Iraq. And because of the sacrifices made, able to govern and secure itself, and “the blood and treasure of the United these years of war have now yielded to that could be a US ally for many years States and also of the Iraqi people,” a new era of opportunity.” to come—a prospect even more im- he continued. Nearly 4,500 American Smoke and fire no longer dominate portant in light of the “Arab Spring” servicemen and some 319 coalition the skies above Baghdad, and the morn- uprisings of 2011. personnel died, and more than 32,000 ing rush hour now clogs the highways “The Iraqi Army and police have were injured or maimed. More than instead of military convoys. In Decem- been rebuilt and they are capable of 100,000 Iraqis died in the invasion and ber, service members deployed to the responding to threats; violence levels subsequent sectarian violence that rav- international zone were able to walk are down; al Qaeda has been weakened; aged the nation. Pentagon leaders flew the rooftops of the former Ba’ath Party ... and economic growth is expanding to Sather—named for SSgt. Scott D. headquarters, for one last look at the Iraqi as well,” said Panetta. 26 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2012 “This progress has been sustained even as we have withdrawn nearly 150,000 US combat forces from this USAF photo country. ... We salute the fact that Iraq is now fully responsible for directing its own path to future security and future prosperity.” Yet its future remains uncertain. The last US troops rolled across the border into Kuwait just after dawn on Dec. 18. Days later a series of coor- dinated car bombs exploded across Baghdad, killing at least 70 people and injuring hundreds more. Less than a week later, a suicide bomber set off another car bomb near the Iraqi Interior Ministry, killing seven people and wounding 32 others. Arguing About Everything Though not completely unexpected, Maj. Gen. Anthony Rock (l) and CMSgt. Gerald Delebreau, command chief for the 321st AEW, present a flight attendant with a challenge coin. The attendant was the bombings have left many to ques- working the chartered Delta flight that brought troops back to the US from Kuwait tion whether a resurgence of sectarian after the war ended in December. violence will unravel the progress made over the last nine years. building Iraq’s military capacity by You argue about everything, and that’s Panetta warned frankly of the poten- offering basic operator training and not the way FMS works.” tial danger. modern equipment through the Foreign Pearson said it is “taking us a long “Let me be clear: Iraq will be tested Military Sales program, explained a time—it’s taking me a long time—to in the days ahead—by terrorism, by spokesman. establish the relationships to the point those who would seek to divide, by It’s a tall order for an organization where they will believe what we are economic and social issues, by the used to operating with a much larger saying.” demands of democracy itself,” he said. footprint. In early 2011, nearly 50,000 Active FMS cases with Iraq cur- “The United States will be there to stand US troops and thousands of Defense rently total some $8 billion, and that with the Iraqi people as they navigate Department contractors provided secu- doesn’t include the long-awaited F-16 those challenges to build a stronger and rity, outreach, and training to the Iraqis. sale, said US Ambassador James F. more prosperous nation.” Now, the significantly smaller OSC-I Jeffrey during a roundtable discussion A small contingent of uniformed team carries the burden of laying the in Baghdad in November. American personnel will remain in foundation for the new US-Iraqi strategic The US had already agreed in Sep- Iraq under the new mission of pro- security partnership. tember 2011 to supply Iraq with 18 viding security assistance. Some 157 “That is especially challenging,” said Lockheed Martin-built F-16 Block 52 of them will serve there under the Air Force Lt. Col. Mark Pearson, who aircraft. In December, the Pentagon newly established Office of Security is overseeing F-16 sales to Iraq within notified Congress of a proposed sale of Cooperation-Iraq, a subordinate of the OSC-I. 18 more of the fighters, which would US Embassy headquartered in Bagh- “Theirs is a negotiating culture ..
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