London's Swine Flu Pandemic
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Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust Executive Office Tel: 020 3214 5760 Fax: 020 3214 5761 4 February 2010 Sarah Hurcombe Assistant Scrutiny Manager Post Point 10 City Hall The Queen's Walk London SE1 2AA Dear Ms Hurcombe, I am responding to your request for feedback in relation to London's response to Swine Flu. !asked my Director of Nursing Practice, who is our Infection Control lead, to consider the questions you asked and he has provided me with the following comments: 1. Communication was a bit of an issue at first but this improved rapidly in time. I generally found that staff at NHS London were doing their best to advise where they could. Teleconferencing was a big help and saved a lot of travel time. One final point is that there wasn't any panic at any time when it was declared to be a pandemic. 2. At some of the meetings members of NHS London could become rather defensive to constructive comments. They appeared to take these as personal attacks. A more open debate on the challenges we were all facing would have been helpful. I hope that the above comments are useful. We look forward to viewing others views and feedback when published on your web-site. Yours sincerely, Claire Murdoch Chief Executive Trust Headquarters, Greater London House, Hampstead Road, London NWl 7QY Tel: 020 3214 5700 Fax: 020 3214 5701 www.cnwi.nhs.uk Dear Sarah, Further to the letter from James Cleverly, Chair of Health and Public Services Committee, and in answer to the questions posed: The Ealing Hospital NHS Trust has yet to complete its local debrief, but in general we believe we responded well to the challenge. Jules Arnould on behalf of Julie Lowe, Chief Executive Jules Arnould Head of Communications Ealing Hospital NHS Trust Uxbridge Road Southall UB1 3HW 020 8967 5288 Bleep 451 Mobile: 07966 297469 www.eht.nhs.uk Trust Head Office Goodmayes Hospital Barley Lane Ilford Essex IG3 8XJ Telephone: 0844 600 1201 Ext 4308 15th February 2010 Sarah Hurcombe Assistant Scrutiny Manager London Assembly Post Point 10 City Hall The Queen’s Walk London SE1 2AA Dear Ms Hurcombe In response to your letter dated 20 January 2010 and the request for information regarding the London response to swine flu. The North East London NHS Foundation Trust is pleased to provide the following information: 1. What aspects of the response to swine flu in London were handled well? The daily ‘Noon Brief’ worked well from the start and throughout the pandemic, and provided an excellent means of communicating and disseminating messages and requirements. It was useful for providing onward communication to internal staff and often meant that rather than lots of emails circulating around the IPC’s, everyone knew that the information had been received centrally by signing up to the Noon Brief. However there is a danger of it outliving its usefulness to some extent, now that the information about the pandemic is falling. The teleconference concept was good for managing the need to coordinate the information flow and also meant that time was not lost in travelling into London for meetings. Mental Health specific teleconferences were particularly beneficial and helped prevent mental health being 'lost' in the wider needs of Acute and Primary Care Trusts and provided a forum for mental health specific issues. Chair: Jane Atkinson Chief Executive: John Brouder 2. What aspects of the response to swine flu in London could have been improved and how? Online data capture worked well once it was up and running but there were several false starts with ImmForm and then a period when the database was unavailable requiring manual submissions. It would be useful if data sets and collection requirements for organisations could be identified earlier and systems fully tested before going live. The daily data reporting systems imposed on a national level became overly time consuming as the deadlines were tight for Trusts to submit data each day. The benefits of the relevance of the information requested and what was actually required given the level of activity being experienced proved a source of frustration for local staff. As an organisation which has satellite community teams covering four boroughs, the timescales around the daily sickness reporting meant that often the first couple of hours each day were spent chasing for information, which was often no more than ‘no absence today’. A more measured approach could have been considered with the amount of data reporting required increasing as the activity of the pandemic increased. This was remedied though to some extent as the pandemic progressed with some data elements being dropped from the daily reporting requirements. If you require any further clarification of the above points, we would be happy to provide additional information. Yours sincerely Stephanie Dawe Chief Operating Officer/Chief Nurse Trust Headquarters Northwick Park Hospital The Trust Office Watford Road Chairman: Mr Tony Caplin Direct Line: 0208 869 2002 Harrow Fax: 0208 864 5511 Middlesex Chief Executive: Ms Fiona Wise Direct Line: 0208 869 2002 HA1 3UJ Fax: 0208 864 5511 17 February 2010 Via email Sarah Hurcombe Assistant Scrutiny Manager Post Point 10 City hall The Queens Walk London SE1 2AA Dear Ms Hurcombe, Thank you for your letter dated 20 January 2010 requesting information regarding London’s response to swine flu. I would like to offer the following comments from an acute trust perspective: NHS London established an ‘incident room’ and communications links set up pan London immediately. There were daily briefings to nominated leads within the Trust which were essential during the first wave as the situation was changing almost daily. This was a very effective method of communication. All Trusts developed robust plans to demonstrate resilience to the Flu pandemic and a number of exercises took place to test plans as part of an assurance process. In terms of improvement, demands for information in the initial phases came from several different sources. For example, the Health Protection Agency was requesting the same information as NHS London. This could have been better co-ordinated centrally to avoid unnecessary duplication. There were huge strains on laboratory services, particularly at the Regional Health Protection lab at Kings where all flu swabs from London had to be sent. Provision should therefore been made in other hospital laboratories to support the virology service required in pandemic situations. I hope you find the above comments useful. Yours sincerely Fiona Wise Chief Executive London Assembly Response: London Assembly Health and Public Services Committee – London response to swine flu. Deadline 26th Feb 2010. Contributors: Dr Sarah Furrow: Consultant Microbiologist and Clinical Lead for Infection Control Dr Sneha Patel: Consultant Microbiologist Derek Cock, Chief Pharmacist Fiona Moore, Senior Nurse, Occupation Health Maggie Clancy, Senior Nurse, Paediatrics and NNU Dr Andy Winrow, Consultant Paediatrician and Divisional Director Penny Williams: Pandemic Flu Lead and Emergency Planning Mairead McCormick: Service Manager and Head of Nursing AE and MAC. Summary of response: Good planning guidance from NHSL and Department of Health with regularly updated treatment algorithms. However there was very little guidance on contact tracing and prophylaxis treatment until the containment phase was reached. Daily communication to all providers from NHSL which some staff felt was excessive. Flu planning was resource hungry especially for clinical staff within Critical Care, AE and Paediatrics. However despite the heavy workload the commitment to ensuring a workable plan was completed was sustained throughout. The National Pandemic Flu Service opened in July when the AE activity had already peaked in May. The final figure for staff vaccination uptake was good but the Occupational Health and Flu Team had to work hard to balance negative messages. Overall summary Although it is difficult to anticipate the infectiousness of any flu virus the number of critical cases and deaths remained small throughout. The preparation and response was out of proportion to the virulence of the strain because the plans were based on avian flu which is highly infectious. A case could be made to have flu plans and an operational strategy which would reflect the anticipated virulence of the expected virus rather than have one to cover all types leading to possible over reaction. To assist in referencing the areas of good practise and areas for improvement the following table is displayed chronologically starting with the pre-pandemic work from Jan 09 to the end of December 09. P Williams 03/02/10 Date and Phase Guidance received Good practise Areas for improvement. Jan 09 – Mar 09 Local Flu Plan Local Flu Plan and Hospital Wide Lengthy guidance meant lengthy local flu plan which was Pre-pandemic Ref: National Pandemic flu committee not easy to reference. framework for Flu Good Guidance concentrated on early Early plans did not reference contact tracing or Pandemic and management and treatment through AV prophylaxis as guidance from DH concentrated on preparation guidance collection points. management and treatment. for acute hospitals Good clinical guidance for doctors to 2007. patients. Ethical framework for policy and planning. April 09 Infectious diseases Hygiene Information to public Limited labarotory swabbing capacity - only 20 per day Phase 4 Outbreak top line HPA Screening and Assessment at St Georges. Containment briefing (Algorithm) Algorithm for management of suspected CMO advised that all cases with flu like illness should be phase swine flu cases gave clarity on swabbed but this was retracted after a week. It caused 1st Surge management of cases – when to swab and confusion locally with large numbers of swabs from GP’s when not to swab. arriving at KHT for onward transfer to labs. Patients told not to attend AE Algorithms changed frequently and often quite subtly.