The United States and the Soviet Union During
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Milton E. Blackwood, Jr. he United States and the Soviet Union during the Reduction (CTR) program, which supports joint pro- Cold War stockpiled the world’s largest arsenals grams between the United States and the former Soviet Tof chemical weapons. As the Cold War ended, republics to secure and dismantle weapons of mass de- the United States and Russia signed two bilateral agree- struction, prevent weapons proliferation, and demilita- ments, in 1989 and 1990, designed to hasten the destruc- rize the former Soviet defense industry. Since 1992, more tion of these weapons, and in than one billion dollars has 1997 both countries ratified been spent under the CTR, the Chemical Weapons Con- and an additional $425 vention (CWC), which bans VIEWPOINT: million was included in the the use, development, pro- FY1999 appropriation duction, stockpiling, and ARSENIC AND OLD bill. Most of this money transfer of chemical weap- WEAPONS: CHEMICAL has gone to reduce the ons and requires that signa- nuclear threat in states of tory states destroy their WEAPONS DISPOSAL IN the former Soviet Union, chemical weapons stock- but the United States has piles by April 2007. Despite RUSSIA provided $200 million for these commitments, both chemical weapons dis- countries are finding that by Milton E. Blackwood, Jr. posal in Russia. Other na- destroying their chemical tions are providing smaller weapons stockpiles is not an amounts of funds for the easy task. While the United Russian disposal program: States disposal program has proven to be extremely Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden are sup- costly, there is little doubt that the resources are avail- plying some $31 million for the destruction of Russian able to eventually complete this program. In contrast, a blister agents, and the European Union has agreed to lack of adequate funding brings into question whether provide the Russian program with an additional $15 Russia will be able to meet its disposal requirements million through 1999. The amounts of money available even with the five-year extension that a country can re- still fall well short of the billions that the Russian dis- quest on a one-time basis under the CWC. posal program will require for completion, however. Russia signed an agreement in 1992 with most other Russia has claimed that a project designed to recover members of the Commonwealth of Independent States ultrapure arsenic from its stockpile of the chemical war- in which it assumed sole responsibility for destroying fare agent lewisite will provide an additional source of the former Soviet chemical weapons stockpile of some funding for its disposal program—a claim that I will ar- 40,000 tons of chemical agents. The Russian disposal gue is unconvincing. In any case, the lack of money is program has been estimated to cost three to eight billion not the only problem that the Russian government faces dollars, and this amount may be optimistic considering as it tries to destroy the country’s chemical weapons. the cost increase the United States program has experi- An equal, if not bigger, problem will be convincing a enced upon going from the planning to the operational skeptical Russian population that the disposal program stage.1 The Russian government stated that it would fi- will be conducted in a safe manner. Until these concerns nance its chemical weapons disposal program through are met, the successful disposal of Russia’s chemical federal support and foreign assistance. Government sup- weapons cannot be assured regardless of increases in port and foreign assistance, however, are currently at domestic or foreign funding of the disposal program. levels well below the billions of dollars the Russian Fortunately, the configuration and condition of weap- chemical weapons disposal program will cost. Only 14 ons in the Russian chemical stockpile makes them less a percent of the money promised to the disposal program proliferation threat than has sometimes been implied. from 1995-1997 was delivered by the Russian federal government.2 Milton E. Blackwood, Jr., is a Postdoctoral Associate in The United States is providing assistance to the Rus- the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. He sian disposal program through the Cooperative Threat holds a Ph.D. in Chemistry from Princeton University. The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1999 89 Milton E. Blackwood, Jr. Yet the weapons do, without doubt, present threats to tively as energetics), which eliminates some of the dif- their local environments and communities—a condition ficulties with weapons disposal experienced in the United that foreign assistance could help reduce. States, where many munitions are fully configured with This viewpoint addresses financial and environmen- energetics. tal issues related to Russian chemical weapons disposi- Besides the tons of munitions that must now be de- tion, in five parts. First, I will describe the size and scope stroyed, the Soviet chemical weapons production pro- of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile, with a par- gram produced a legacy of severe environmental and ticular emphasis on its environmental and health dan- health problems. A 1998 photo essay in The New York gers. Then, I will review past and current strategies and Times Magazine dubbed the town of Dzerzhinsk, a facilities for disposition of this stockpile. Third, the view- former site of Russian chemical weapons production, point will address the possibility of raising funds for the “The Most Tainted Place on Earth.”4 David Hoffman of disposition effort by selling arsenic recovered from The Washington Post has also reported on the effects of lewisite; and fourth, considering this as well as other buried and dumped chemical weapons in Russia.5 sources of funding, it will lay out the overall prospects Former workers in the Soviet chemical weapons pro- for financing the disposition effort. Finally, I argue that gram claim they are suffering from adverse health ef- local opposition may be as great a barrier to current dis- fects because of the lack of adequate safety measures in position plans as financial considerations, and that for- the factories, and in communities around these sites citi- eign assistance ought to focus more on local zens suffer from the unsafe production practices and environmental threats than on proliferation threats. haphazard disposal of waste and unwanted chemical weapons in the past.6 RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS At Chapayevsk in the Samara Province, where lewisite In 1987, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev an- and mustard gas were produced, tests performed in 1993- nounced that, with the closing of nerve agent factories 1994 reportedly found arsenic concentrations in the soil at Novocheboksarsk in Chuvashia, the Soviet Union had around the former plant to be 8,500 times the permis- halted the production of chemical weapons. The declared sible concentration (two milligrams per kilogram); in Soviet stockpile included approximately 32,200 tons of areas of the surrounding town, they were two to ten times nerve agents (sarin, soman, and V-agents) and 7,700 tons the permissible concentration.7 Mental deficiencies and of blister agents (lewisite, mustard, and mustard/lewisite diseases of the central nervous system are reportedly mixtures) stored at seven sites.3 The agents exist in a higher among children in Chapayevsk compared to chil- variety of conditions and configurations, with the older dren of other cities in the Samara province.8 The aver- blister agents mostly stored in bulk containers and the age arsenic concentration in soil from Leonidovka, newer nerve agents stored in artillery and aviation mu- where chemical munitions were reportedly buried in the nitions (Table 1). Fortunately, Russian munitions are not early 1960s, was found to be some 15,000 times the per- loaded with explosives and propellants (known collec- missible concentration. Burial as a means of disposal Table 1: Declared Russian Chemical Munitions Storage Sites SITE AGENTS STORAGE APPROXIMATE TONNAGE Maradikovsky VX, Sarin, Soman, Weaponized 7760 Mustard/Lewisite mixture Leonidovka VX. Sarin, Soman Weaponized 6880 Pochep VX, Sarin, Soman Weaponized 6720 Kizner VX, Sarin, Soman, Lewisite Weaponized 6410 Kambarka Lewisite Bulk 6300 Shuchye VX, Sarin, Soman Weaponized 5440 Gorny Mustard, Lewisite, Bulk 1160 Mustard/Lewisite mixture 90 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1999 Milton E. Blackwood, Jr. was not unique to the Soviet Union in past decades. In weapons destruction are required to include provisions the United States, as part of its “non-stockpile” chemi- that improve the social conditions and infrastructure for cal disposal program, the United States Army is work- the areas that surround disposal sites.12 The plans must ing to locate and remediate suspected chemical munition also receive local public approval, and President Boris burial sites.9 However, no such program exists in Rus- Yeltsin has pledged benefits for former chemical weap- sia, and the presence of the weapons burial sites is not ons workers and the construction of medical centers near acknowledged by its government or military. any new chemical weapons disposal facilities. US assistance for Russian chemical weapons disposal DISPOSAL EFFORTS has focused on helping Russia destroy its stockpile of Russia currently lacks the necessary capacity to dis- weaponized nerve agents, including a joint evaluation pose of its chemical munitions. In previous decades both of the two-stage disposal process that the Russians have the United States and the Soviet Union routinely dis- selected. Russian chemical weapons, unlike US weap- posed of chemical weapons by open-pit burning, land ons, are welded shut during assembly, prohibiting the burial, and sea dumping. The CWC does not stipulate “reverse-assembly” process used in the United States in the disposal technology to be used, but these three op- its disposal program. The proposed destruction process tions are forbidden, and the chosen technology must for the Russian nerve munitions involves sending them minimize risk to the health of humans and the environ- through “drill-and-drain” machines to remove the nerve ment.