DOCSLIB.ORG

Chemical Warfare Agents

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Chemical Warfare Agents Manuscript for Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology August 2019 CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS This is the pre-print manuscript of an article published in the Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/0471238961 The published version of the article is available at the Wiley website: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/0471238961.0308051308011818.a01.pub3 How to cite: Costanzi, S. (2020). Chemical Warfare Agents. In Kirk‐Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, (Ed.). doi:10.1002/0471238961.0308051308011818.a01.pub3 Stefano Costanzi Department of Chemistry and Center for Behavioral Neuroscience American University, Washington, D.C. [email protected] Chemical weapons are weapons that exploit the toxicity of chemicals to bring about death or harm. The toxic chemicals on which chemical weapons are based are known as chemical warfare agents. The elimination of this entire category of weapons is the aim of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also known as Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC, which was opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. Administered and implemented by the Hague- based Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the CWC is an international treaty that enjoys almost universal embracement, having been ratified or acceded by 193 States Parties. Importantly, the CWC poses a complete and absolute ban on chemical weapons, mandating State Parties to renounce “(a) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; (b) to use chemical weapons; (c) to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; (d) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party” under the Convention (CWC Article II, Paragraph 1) (1-3). This complete ban marks a substantial departure from previous international treaties or national policies on chemical weapons, which prohibited exclusively their use, chiefly intended, either implicitly or explicitly, as “first use” of these weapons – for instance, see the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or Richard Nixon’s 1969 “Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs” (4-6). The complete ban posed on chemical weapons by the CWC mirrors an analogous ban posed on biological weapons and toxins by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. In fact, the BWC explicitly mandated State Parties to conduct negotiations in good faith to reach a similar agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons (BWC Articles IX and XII) (7). Despite the complete ban posed by the CWC, chemical weapons are far from being relegated to the past. After the entrance into force of the CWC in 1997, for a period of about 15 years, there were no reports of chemical weapons usage. However, beginning in 2012, chemical weapons have been used in several occasions by state and non-state actors as weapons of mass destruction or for targeted assassinations. In particular, they have been used in the Syrian civil war by both state and non-state actors (including the notorious Ghouta attack in August 2013, attributed to the Syrian regime by the United Nations, which led to the death of about 1400 people), in Iraq by non-state actors, in Malaysia for the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, half-brother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un, in February 2017, and in the United Kingdom for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in March 2018. This recent trend in the use of chemical weapons has led international security and arms control experts to think about ways of restoring the restraint on the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, the international community formed the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, launched in Paris in January 2018, with the aim of supplementing the existing international mechanism to combat the proliferation of chemical weapons (6,8-11). This article starts by providing some definitions of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents as well an overview of key toxicology concepts and some notes on the physicochemical properties of the agents. Subsequently, it illustrates the chemistry, biochemistry, and medical countermeasures of the main classes of chemical warfare agents, namely vesicants, choking agents, blood agents, irritants, nerve agents, and centrally incapacitating agents. This article does not cover personal protective equipment, detection, chemical and biochemical analyses, or decontamination. Similarly, it does not cover biological toxins, beyond discussing their coverage by the CWC in Section 1.1. For these matters, the reader is referred to other sources (12-20). 1. Definitions 1.1. Chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents. Chemical weapons are weapons intended to cause death or incapacitation through the toxic properties of chemicals. Chemical weapons are clearly defined in Article II of the CWC, according to which chemical weapons “means the following, together or separately: (a) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; (b) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in 2 subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b)” (CWC Article II, Paragraph 1) (1,3). Of extreme importance to understanding chemical warfare agents which, as explained are the toxic chemicals on which chemical weapons are based, is the second paragraph of Article II of the CWC. According to this paragraph, toxic chemicals are defined as “any chemical (emphasis added) which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere…” (CWC Article II, Paragraph 2) (1). The definition of chemical weapons provided by the CWC is broad and comprehensive. Any weapon designed to bring about death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm through the toxic properties of chemicals is considered a chemical weapon. As one can notice, the CWC does not establish any toxicity threshold in its definition of toxic chemicals. In fact, toxicity thresholds cannot be established because the toxicity of chemicals is entirely dependent on the amount of the chemical (the dose) to which an individual is exposed. As it had already been noted by Paracelsus, “all things are poison, and nothing is without poison; only the dose permits something not to be poisonous” (21). In other words, if administered at a high enough dose, all substances can exert a toxic effect. This implies that comprehensive lists of chemical warfare agents cannot be established. Some chemicals, for instance nerve agents, have no known legitimate uses. Hence, it is straightforward to classify these chemicals as tout court chemical warfare agents. Other chemicals, for instance chlorine or phosgene, have many legitimate uses in chemical industry. Despite their legitimate uses, such dual use chemicals are indeed considered chemical warfare agents if they are employed to intentionally cause death, incapacitation, or harm through their toxicity, and weapons based on such chemicals are indeed considered chemical weapons. Beyond the toxic chemicals themselves, paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the CWC extends the definition of chemical weapons to their precursors, i.e. the chemicals used to synthesize them (1). Some precursor chemicals have little or no use beyond serving as reactants for the synthesis of chemical warfare agents. However, in the majority of cases, precursors are dual use chemicals that, beyond their role in the synthesis of chemical warfare agents, also have legitimate, peaceful applications. Just as in the case of dual use toxic chemicals, dual use precursors indeed fall within the CWC prohibitions if they are intended to be employed for the synthesis of chemical warfare agents. In its Annex on Chemicals, the CWC lists three schedules of chemicals, Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 3 (2). These schedules are not intended to provide a comprehensive list of chemical warfare agents and their precursors – as mentioned, that would be an unfeasible task, as any chemical becomes a chemical warfare agent when it is intentionally employed to kill or harm through its toxic properties. Instead, the schedules are intended to support the CWC 3 verification regime, by identifying chemicals of concern that are subject verification measures under the auspices of the OPCW and must be declared by States Parties. Schedule 1 identifies chemicals that are considered exclusively or primarily as chemical warfare agents or chemical warfare agent precursors. Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 identify dual use chemicals of concern, i.e. chemical warfare agents and precursors that have also legitimate uses,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Novichok Agent - Wikipedia
    18-3-2018 Novichok agent - Wikipedia Novichok agent Novichok (Russian: Новичо́к, "newcomer") is a series of nerve agents the Soviet Union and Russia developed between 1971 and 1993.[a][2][3] Russian scientists who developed the agents claim they are the deadliest nerve agents ever made, with some variants possibly five to eight times more potent than VX,[4][5] and others up to ten times more potent than soman.[6] They were designed as part of a Soviet program codenamed "FOLIANT".[7][1] Five Novichok variants are believed to have been weaponised for military use.[8] The most versatile was A-232 (Novichok-5).[9] Novichok agents have never been used on the battlefield. Theresa May, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, said that one such agent was used in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in England in March 2018.[10] Russia officially denies producing or researching Novichok agents.[11] In 2013, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Scientific Advisory Board reported that it had insufficient information to comment on the existence or properties of Novichok agents,[12] and in 2011 it noted there was no peer reviewed paper on Novichok agents in scientific literature.[13] Contents Design objectives Disclosure Development and test sites Description of Novichok agents Chemistry Effects Use Poisoning of Kivelidi Poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal See also References Further reading External links Design objectives These agents were designed to achieve four objectives:[14][15] To be undetectable using standard 1970s and 1980s NATO chemical detection equipment; To defeat NATO chemical protective gear; To be safer to handle; To circumvent the Chemical Weapons Convention list of controlled precursors, classes of chemical and physical form.
    [Show full text]
  • Decontamination of Agent Yellow, a Lewisite and Sulfur Mustard Mixture
    EPA 600/R-14/436 | March 2015 | www.epa.gov/research Decontamination of Agent Yellow, a Lewisite and Sulfur Mustard Mixture Office of Research and Development National Homeland Security Research Center Decontamination of Agent Yellow, a Lewisite and Sulfur Mustard Mixture Evaluation Report National Homeland Security Research Center Office of Research and Development U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 ii Disclaimer The United States Environmental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development’s National Homeland Security Research Center funded and managed the research described here under EPA Contract Number EP-C-10-001, Work Assignment Number 4-28 with Battelle. This report has been peer and administratively reviewed and has been approved for publication as an Environmental Protection Agency report. It does not necessarily reflect views of the Environmental Protection Agency. No official endorsement should be inferred. The Environmental Protection Agency does not endorse the purchase or sale of any commercial products or services. Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to: Lukas Oudejans, Ph.D. Decontamination and Consequence Management Division National Homeland Security Research Center Office of Research and Development U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (MD-E343-06) 109 T.W. Alexander Drive Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 Phone: 919-541-2973 Fax: 919-541-0496 E-mail: [email protected] iii Acknowledgments The following individuals are acknowledged
    [Show full text]
  • Warfare Agents for Modeling Airborne Dispersion in and Around Buildings
    LBNL-45475 ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIn NAL LABORATORY Databaseof Physical,Chemicaland ToxicologicalPropertiesof Chemical and Biological(CB)WarfitreAgentsfor ModelingAirborneDispersionIn and AroundBuildings TracyThatcher,RichSextro,andDonErmak Environmental Energy Technologies Division DISCLAIMER This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. While this document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor The Regents of the University of Catifomia, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of anY information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by its trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommend at i on, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or The Regents of the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof, or The Regents of the University of California. Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory is an equal opportunity employer. DISCLAIMER Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced
    [Show full text]
  • Verification of Chemical Warfare Agent Exposure in Human Samples
    Toxichem Krimtech 2013;80(Special Issue):288 Verification of chemical warfare agent exposure in human samples Paul W. Elsinghorst, Horst Thiermann, Marianne Koller Institut für Pharmakologie und Toxikologie der Bundeswehr, München Abstract Aim: This brief presentation provides an overview of methods that have been developed for the verification of human exposure to chemical warfare agents. Methods: GC–MS detection of nerve agents (V- and G-type) has been carried out with respect to unreacted agents as well as enzyme-bound species and metabolites. Methods involving di- rect SPE from plasma, fluoride-induced release of protein-bound nerve agents in plasma and analysis of their metabolites in plasma and urine have been developed. Exposure to blistering agents, i.e., sulfur mustard, has been verified by GC–MS detection of the unreacted agent in plasma and by LC– and GC–MS analysis of its metabolites in urine. Results: After incorporation nerve agents quickly bind to proteins, e.g., acetylcholinesterase, butyrylcholinesterase or serum albumin, and only small parts remain freely circulating for a few hours (G-type) or up to 2 days (V-type). Concurrently they are converted to O-alkyl methylphosphonic acids by phosphotriesterases and/or simply by aqueous hydrolysis. As a re- sult, different biomarkers can be detected depending on the time passed between exposure and sampling. Unreacted V-type agents can be detected in plasma for 2 days, the O-alkyl methyl- phosphonic acids in plasma for about 2–4 days and in urine for up to 1 week. Fluoride-indu- ced release of protein-bound nerve agents can be carried out until 3 weeks post exposure.
    [Show full text]
  • Lewisite Fact Sheet
    Lewisite Fact Sheet HIGHLIGHTS: It is unlikely that the general population will be exposed to blister agents Lewisite or Mustard-Lewisite. People who breathe in vapors of Lewisite or Mustard-Lewisite may experience damage to the respiratory system. Contact with the skin or eye can result in serious burns. Lewisite or Mustard-Lewisite also can cause damage to bone marrow and blood vessels. Exposure to high levels may be fatal. Blister agents Lewisite and Mustard-Lewisite have not been found in any of the 1,585 National Priorities List sites identified by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). What are lewisite and mustard-lewisite? Lewisite is an oily, colorless liquid with an odor like geraniums. Mustard-Lewisite Mixture is a liquid with a garlic-like odor. Mustard-Lewisite is a mixture of Lewisite and a sulfur mustard known as HD. Lewisite might have been used as a chemical weapon by Japan against Chinese forces in the 1930s, but such reports have not been confirmed. Any stored Lewisite in the United States must be destroyed before April 2007, as mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention. What happens to lewisite and mustard-lewisite when it enters the environment? • Blister agents Lewisite and Mustard-Lewisite could enter the environment from an accidental release. • In air, blister agents Lewisite and Mustard-Lewisite will be broken down by compounds that are found in the air, but they may persist in air for a few days before being broken down. • Lewisite and Mustard-Lewisite will be broken down in water quickly, but small amounts may evaporate. • Lewisite and Mustard-Lewisite will be broken down in moist soil quickly, but small amounts may evaporate.
    [Show full text]
  • Warning: the Following Lecture Contains Graphic Images
    What the новичок (Novichok)? Why Chemical Warfare Agents Are More Relevant Than Ever Matt Sztajnkrycer, MD PHD Professor of Emergency Medicine, Mayo Clinic Medical Toxicologist, Minnesota Poison Control System Medical Director, RFD Chemical Assessment Team @NoobieMatt #ITLS2018 Disclosures In accordance with the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) Standards, the American Nurses Credentialing Center’s Commission (ANCC) and the Commission on Accreditation for Pre-Hospital Continuing Education (CAPCE), states presenters must disclose the existence of significant financial interests in or relationships with manufacturers or commercial products that may have a direct interest in the subject matter of the presentation, and relationships with the commercial supporter of this CME activity. The presenter does not consider that it will influence their presentation. Dr. Sztajnkrycer does not have a significant financial relationship to report. Dr. Sztajnkrycer is on the Editorial Board of International Trauma Life Support. Specific CW Agents Classes of Chemical Agents: The Big 5 The “A” List Pulmonary Agents Phosgene Oxime, Chlorine Vesicants Mustard, Phosgene Blood Agents CN Nerve Agents G, V, Novel, T Incapacitating Agents Thinking Outside the Box - An Abbreviated List Ammonia Fluorine Chlorine Acrylonitrile Hydrogen Sulfide Phosphine Methyl Isocyanate Dibotane Hydrogen Selenide Allyl Alcohol Sulfur Dioxide TDI Acrolein Nitric Acid Arsine Hydrazine Compound 1080/1081 Nitrogen Dioxide Tetramine (TETS) Ethylene Oxide Chlorine Leaks Phosphine Chlorine Common Toxic Industrial Chemical (“TIC”). Why use it in war/terror? Chlorine Density of 3.21 g/L. Heavier than air (1.28 g/L) sinks. Concentrates in low-lying areas. Like basements and underground bunkers. Reacts with water: Hypochlorous acid (HClO) Hydrochloric acid (HCl).
    [Show full text]
  • First Aid in the Prevention and Treatment of Chemical Casualties
    OCD 2202-1 January 1943 FIRST AID in the Prevention and Treatment of CHEMICAL CASUALTIES Revised MEDICAL DIVISION OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE Washington, D. C. PREFACE This booklet is intended for the personnel of Emergency Medical Field Units and others who may be immediately concerned in the cleansing of persons and the administration of first aid to chemical casualties. Identification, character- istics, and tactical uses of the various agents are discussed only briefly; the reader is referred to the Civilian Defense textbook, “Protection Against Gas,” for a more extensive discussion of these matters. For information on medical care and treatment consult Technical Manual 8-285, “Treat- ment of Casualties from Chemical Agents,” prepared by the War Department and published by the Government Printing Office. CONTENTS Chapter Page I. General Considerations 3 A. Kinds - 3 B. Recognition 3 1. Identification by Odor 4 2. Table of Odors and Effects 4 C. General Protective Measures 5 If. Lung irritants (Phosgene, Chlorpicrin, Chlorine, Nitric Fumes) 6 A. Latent Period 6 B. Effects 6 C. Symptoms 7 D. First Aid 7 Iff. Blister Bases (Mustard, Lewisite, Ethyldichlorar- sine) „ 8 A. Special Characteristics 8 Table of Differences between Lewisite and Mustard-_ 10 B. Mustard H 1. Effects-- 11 2. Prevention—First Aid . 12 C. Lewisite 14 1. Early Effects 15 2. Late Effects 15 3. Prevention—First Aid 15 D. Ethyldichlorarsine 16 1. Immediate Effects 16 2. First Aid 16 1 496407°—43 1 IV. Tear liases (Lacrimators) (Chloracetophenone, Chloracetophenone Solution, C N B Solution, Brom- benzyl cyanide) 17 A. Effects .1 ’ 17 B.
    [Show full text]
  • Argonne Report.Pdf
    CONTENTS NOTATION ........................................................................................................................... xi ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 1 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Overview of the Emergency Response Guidebook ................................................ 5 1.2 Organization of this Report ..................................................................................... 7 2 GENERAL METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................... 9 2.1 TIH List ................................................................................................................... 10 2.1.1 Background ................................................................................................. 10 2.1.2 Changes in the TIH List for the ERG2012 ................................................. 11 2.2 Shipment and Release Scenarios ............................................................................ 11 2.2.1 Shipment Profiles ........................................................................................ 12 2.2.2 Treatment of Chemical Agents ................................................................... 14 2.3 Generics, Mixtures, and Solutions .......................................................................... 17 2.4 Analysis of Water-Reactive
    [Show full text]
  • Measurement Technique for the Determination of Photolyzable
    JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH, VOL. 102, NO. D13, PAGES 15,999-16,004,JULY 20, 1997 Measurement techniquefor the determination of photolyzable chlorine and bromine in the atmosphere G. A. Impey,P. B. Shepson,• D. R. Hastie,L. A. Bartie• Departmentof Chemistryand Centre for AtmosphericChemistry, York University,Toronto, Ontario, Canada Abstract. A techniquehas been developed to enablemeasurement of photolyzablechlorine and bromineat tracelevels in the troposphere.In thismethod, ambient air is drawnt•ough a cylindricalflow cell, whichis irradiatedwith a Xe arc lamp. In the reactionvessel of the photoactivehalogen detector (PHD), photolyrically active molecules Clp (including C12, HOC1, C1NO,C1NO2, and C1ONO2) and Brp (including Br2, HOBr, BrNO, BrNO2, and BrONO2) are photolyzed,and the halogenatoms produced react with properieto form stablehalogenated products.These products are thensampled and subsequently separated and detected by gas chromatography.The systemis calibratedusing low concentrationmixtures of C12and Br2 in air from commerciallyavailable permeation sources. We obtaineddetection limits of 4 pptv and 9 pptv as Br2 andC12, respectively, for 36 L samples. 1. Introduction (or C12)in the Arctic, largely as a result of the lack of suitable analyticalmethodologies. This paperreports the developmentof The episodicdestruction of groundlevel ozonein the Arctic at a measurementtechnique for the determinationof rapidly sunriseis a phenomenonthat hasbeen observed for many years. photolyzingchlorine (referred to hereas Clp) and bromine (Brp) With the onsetof polar sunrise,ozone levels are often observed speciesat pansper trillion by volume(pptv) mixingratios in the to drop from a backgroundconcentration of •40 ppbv to almost atmosphere.Impey et al. [this issue]discuss the resultsobserved zero on a timescaleof a day or less [Barrie et al., 1988] for from a field studyconducted in the Canadianhigh Arctic at Alert, periodsof 1-10 days.
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Medical Countermeasures
    Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Medical Countermeasures Ron Manning,g, Ph.D. Chief, Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Division of CBRN Countermeasures June 7, 2011 Roadmap • Rad Nuc Background and the threat • Rad Nuc Scenario considerations and Reqquirements development • Areas of Rad Nuc Programmatic Interest • Rad Nuc Portfolio Strategy • Special Considerations for Development Efforts • Solicitations in Fed Biz Ops • The Chemical Threat • Vesicants • Chem Special Instructions • Continuing Challenges • Interagency Partnering • BARDA funding 11 Rad Nuc Background •The detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) has the potential to produce a large number of victims with multiple and mixed injuries •Exposure to radiation induces dose-dependent injury to cells and tissue through a cascade of molecular and biochemical changes that lead to cell death or disruption 98-- 7- 6 5- 4- Dangerous Fallout 3- ground-zero 2- --1- 0- Light Damage Miles from 1 kT Moderate Damage 0.1 kT 10 kT MdiMedium Severe Damage Small Large •Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) is the medical consequence of approximately 2 Gy exposure •The symptoms and progressionprogression of radiation injuryinjury occur even after the radiation exposure has ceased and there is a continuity of medical consequences from the ARS to the Delayed Effects of the Acute Exposure (DEARE) to chronic radiation damage 2 IND Scenarios and Requirements Development • Hundreds of IND scenarios ─ Developed with modeling and working groups with subject matter experts ─ Several cities modeled ─ Several radiation yields ─ 12 months (Jan - Dec): (e.g. Monthly winds and weather affect the fallout pattern)pattern) • Requirements established from modeling scenarios • Fulfillment of requirements ─ Acquisition of products via Project BioShield contracts ─ Development of products via Advanced Research and Development contracts ─ Review portfolio as requirements change • Requirements are reviewed on a regular basis and do change over time.
    [Show full text]
  • High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications
    Order Code RL31861 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications Updated September 9, 2003 Dana A. Shea Analyst in Science and Technology Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications Summary Terrorist use of chemical agents has been a noted concern, highlighted after the Tokyo Sarin gas attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased Congressional attention towards reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks. High-threat chemical agents, which include chemical weapons and some toxic industrial chemicals, are normally organized by military planners into four groups: nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents. While the relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, use of these chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event. High-threat chemical agents, depending on the type of agent used, cause a variety of symptoms in their victims. Some cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some inhibit breathing and lead to asphyxiation. Others have caustic effects on contact. As a result, chemical attack treatment may be complicated by the need to identify at least the type of chemical used. Differences in treatment protocols for the various high-threat agents may also strain the resources of the public health system, especially in the case of mass casualties. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk.
    [Show full text]
  • Acutely Hazardous Waste List
    ACUTELY HAZARDOUS WASTE P011 1303–28–2 Arsenic pentoxide P012 1327–53–3 Arsenic trioxide The following materials, when a waste, are specifically listed in P038 692–42–2 Arsine, diethyl- 40 CFR 261.33 as Acutely Hazardous Wastes, when they are the only active ingredient, and are unused/unaltered. Also, P036 696–28–6 Arsonous dichloride, phenyl- certain solvent mixtures (of at least 10%) containing dioxin are P054 151–56–4 Aziridine Acutely hazardous wastes. P067 75–55–8 Aziridine, 2-methyl- P013 542–62–1 Barium cyanide The primary hazardous property(ies) of these materials are P024 106–47–8 Benzenamine, 4-chloro- indicated by the letters T (Toxicity), R (Reactivity), I (Ignitability) and C (Corrosivity). Absence of a letter indicates that the P077 100–01–6 Benzenamine, 4-nitro- compound is only listed for toxicity. P028 100–44–7 Benzene, (chloromethyl)- 1,2-Benzenediol, 4-[1-hydroxy-2-(methylamino)ethyl]-, P042 51–43–4 The list was last updated on 10/30/08. (R)- P046 122–09–8 Benzeneethanamine, alpha,alpha-dimethyl- Haz P014 108–98–5 Benzenethiol waste CAS Material 7-Benzofuranol, 2,3-dihydro-2,2-dimethyl-, No. P127 1563–66–2 methylcarbamate. P023 107–20–0 Acetaldehyde, chloro- Benzoic acid, 2-hydroxy-, compd. with (3aS-cis)- P002 591–08–2 Acetamide, N-(aminothioxomethyl)- P188 57–64–7 1,2,3,3a,8,8a-hexahydro-1,3a,8-trimethylpyrrolo[2,3- P057 640–19–7 Acetamide, 2-fluoro- b]indol-5-yl methylcarbamate ester (1:1). P058 62–74–8 Acetic acid, fluoro-, sodium salt 2H-1-Benzopyran-2-one, 4-hydroxy-3-(3-oxo-1- 1 P002 591–08–2 1-Acetyl-2-thiourea P001 81–81–2 phenylbutyl)-, & salts, when present at concentrations greater than 0.3% P003 107–02–8 Acrolein P028 100–44–7 Benzyl chloride P070 116–06–3 Aldicarb P015 7440–41–7 Beryllium powder P203 1646–88–4 Aldicarb sulfone.
    [Show full text]