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Aral Sea Disaster: Sustainable Water Resources Management in Central Asia

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Aral Sea Disaster: Sustainable Water Resources Management in Central Asia ARAL SEA DISASTER: SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA Dr. Abror Gadaev, Samarkand State Architectural &Civil Engineering Institute, Water Supply, Water Resources Management and Protection Department, [email protected]. Ms. Nargiza Juraeva, Ms.Gulmira Boboeva, Dr.Salim Saidov Water Supply, Water Resources Management and Protection Department, 70 Lolazor Street, Samarkand, UZBEKISTAN, 140147 Background Consequences: Research approach The main issue is the Aral Sea disaster and its In 1948, a top-secret Soviet bioweapons This program is relatively new and has not published a complete report on their methods of research. However, they do have a summary published which states that Uzbekistan’s between existing natural resources and their demand should be a sustainable management and water resources are in the target. laboratopy was established on the Island The main goals of the innovation agenda are: consequences in the middle of the Aral Sea, named as Health Problems · Gather important Uzbekistan and later Central Asian (CA) /international actors in a joint effort to partly renew the way water and water resources management in Vozrozhdeniya island. The base was urban and rural areas; abandoned in 1992 following the · Bring Uzbek and other CA environmental actors in key sectors, such as rural economy and energy into the sustainable water production and supply arena; disintegration of the Soviet Army. · Combine to a greater extent environmental competence with technical competence in water production and in this way fertilize innovation in the water production Rivers and Topography sector; Today, Vozrozhdeniye island as the site Increasingly make use of surplus water streams, industrial waste water streams and urban waste waters (e.g. treated waste water, circulated reusing waters) to be recycled of the former Soviet biological warfare into the urban and rural water supply system with sustainable and environmentally safe technology using approach; waste dump and the island is no Aral Sea Kazakhstan longer isolated from the surrounding region and land bridge has now formed between Vozrozhdeniye and the Uzbek/Kazakh mainland. RURAL AND URBAN INDUSTRY ECONOMY Sir Darya (river) Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Turkmenistan Amu Darya (river) Tajikistan Afghanistan Analysis: SUSTAINABILITY AND NATURAL RESOURCES ISSUES:DEMAND AND Results: ENERGY Challenge SUSTAINABLE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT Samarkand water supply system rehabilitation: Water supply network of the city of Samarkand is 700 km and about 41% of the network is aged and it my require replacement or comprehensive rehabilitation. There are number of water users without water meters and they use treated drinking water for the irrigation Social issues; system in parks and agricultural purposes. One of the main issues in the water supply system is the significant water loss. Among the reasons for this deficiency, the leakage of water in the conveyance pipelines is considered the main cause. The pipelines need Environmental problems; rehabilitation and/or replacement. 1 Samarkand water supply system needs to improve the safety, quality, reliability, efficiency and sustainability of the water supply services. Demography and labor problems; N2 Samarkand does have sufficient quantities of potable ground water to meet municipal needs, however several factors impede this possibilities. Climate change. 1 6 The factors are: · Irrational using of existing water intake and pump stations; 2 · Misuse of potable water; N1 · Aged infrastructure and leakage; · Water technicians need to be trained in management and rational use of water resources; 3 3 At the present the government of Uzbekistan working on Samarkand Water Supply project that totally improved the situation in the city. Samarkand N1 Water Supply project financed by the Republic of Uzbekistan, Samarkand water supply Utilities with a loan of WB, IDA and IBRD. 1 Aral Sea Statistics(1980,1995,2003,2009) N2 2 Results: Water demand is reducing by keeping a high level of the life standards in the city. 4 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2 Drier and shorter summers and in longer and colder winters. N2 Growing season has been shortened to 170 days (200 needed 5 Samarkand city 300 300 276 250 230 215 1 Suburb area 180 180 150 150 150 150 for cotton production) Precipitation decreased by a factor N1 of 10 Surrounding villages 170 192 180 170 160 160 Pollution effect: aresoles into atmosphere, promotes glacial melting 350 300 0 T1 Tcr T2 T 250 1- Demand 200 Ðÿ ä1 2- Non renewable natural resources Ðÿ ä2 3-Renewable natural resources 150 Ðÿ ä3 4-Clean and potable water resources 100 5-Surplus of resources 6-Shortage of resources 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 .
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