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Why US Intelligence Underestimated the Soviet Biological Weapons Program

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Why US Intelligence Underestimated the Soviet Biological Weapons Program Under the Microscope: Why US Intelligence Underestimated the Soviet Biological Weapons Program Katarzyna Zabrocka Honors Program in International Security Studies Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University May 22 2013 Abstract Through trend and detail analysis of declassified U.S. intelligence documents, this paper shows that ambiguity in dual-use biological research was the main underlying cause of the US Intelligence underestimation of the Soviet Bioweapons program. Although lack of prioritization of biowarfare issues and complacency due to mirror imaging also existed, such intelligence failures were a result of the uncertainty caused by the dual-use nature of biological research. General statements, lack of absolute certainty about the presence of a Soviet bioweapons program, and wavering attention given to intelligence collection on bioweapons in the Soviet Union were common trends amongst the documents. The nature of biological research and public health events do not lend themselves easily for differentiation between defensive, natural, and illicit. The inability to distinguish between legitimate research and biological research for offensive military purposes was a primary reason for the lack of certainty about the Soviet Union’s pursuits in biology. This unfortunately continues to be an issue as biological technology advances. But due to the clear ambiguity in purpose and potential of dual-use biological research, as well as to avoid infringement upon scientific research, intelligence communities must create stronger relationships with the scientific community, which in turn must develop strong community-responsibility and incentives to detract scientists from pursuing bioweapons under any capacity. ii Acknowledgements There are many people to thank for the encouragement and guidance that they have given me during this past year. I will be eternally grateful for their unwavering support. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor David Holloway, for being so committed to helping me in my project. You always read my drafts line by line, helped me find sources, and were always willing to have a long discussion. Our weekly meetings always helped me develop new ideas. Thank you Professor Crenshaw and Colonel Felter for keeping all us CISAC students on schedule and forcing us to develop sound research questions. And thank you to all the other CISAC honors students: Flora Wang, Jessica Ward, Vaeme Afokpa, Ryan Mayfield, David Hoyt, Daniel Khalessi, Daniel Reynolds, Scott Bade, and Ravi Patel. I’m grateful for all the new friendships we made, and you all always believed in me when I doubted myself. And lastly, thank you to all of my friends and family. This thesis would not have been finished without your continued support and words of encouragement. To my mom and dad, you always listened when I complained and reminded me that I am capable of anything. And Chris, whenever I would get frustrated, you would always calm me down and help me work through my thoughts or search for a document. Thank you. iii Tables and Figures Table 1. Biological Agents Weaponized and Stockpiled By the US Military (Destroyed 1971-1973) … pg. 6 Table 2. Sample Table of Potential Indicators of Biological Weapons Production Facility … pg. 17 Table 3. Summary of CIA and DIA Documents Analyzed … pg. 22 Table 4. Agents Validated for Biological Weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union … pg. 70 Figure 1. Table from NIE 11-7-85 … pg. 31 Acronyms BTWC - Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention BW - Biological Weapons, Biological Warfare CBW - Chemical and Biological Weapons, Warfare DURC - Dual Use Research of Concern R&D - Research and Development USCIB - United States Central Intelligence Board iv Fall 08 Table of Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1. Literature Review .................................................................................................. 5 Possibility of and Barriers to Bioweapons ...................................................................................................................... 6 Theories on the Miscalculation of the Soviet Union’s Bioweapons Program ............................................... 10 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................................ 20 Chapter 2. Analysis of Intelligence Documents ...................................................................... 21 General Trends ......................................................................................................................................................................... 22 Recognition of Lack of Good Intelligence on BW and Steps Taken ................................................................... 24 The Enigma of Soviet BW .................................................................................................................................................... 26 Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention and Shift After Sverdlovsk ........................................................ 27 National Intelligence Estimates ........................................................................................................................................ 32 Defense Intelligence Agency Documents ...................................................................................................................... 34 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................................ 35 Chapter 3. Assessment Through the Lens of Dual-Use Ambiguity .......................................... 37 Non-Identifiable Buildings in Offensive Biological Research .............................................................................. 38 Inability to Detect Offensive Research Through Publications ............................................................................. 43 Potential of Research and Equipment Being Within Scope of Defensive Research or Public Health and Agricultural Research ................................................................................................................................................... 44 A Case Study of the Sverdlovsk Incident - Difficulty of BW Event Attribution ............................................ 49 Chapter 4. Assessment Through the Lens of Intelligence Failure ........................................... 54 Lack of Prioritization for Biowarfare Threats ............................................................................................................ 54 Failure to Warn ........................................................................................................................................................................ 58 Did Mirror-Imaging Lead to Complacency? ................................................................................................................. 60 Chemical Blindness ................................................................................................................................................................ 63 Conclusions on the Role of Intelligence Failure ......................................................................................................... 65 Chapter 5. Moving Forward in Dual-Use Biological Research Security ................................... 66 Nuclear vs. Biological Weapons Dual Use Research ................................................................................................ 66 Today’s Biological Threats and the Difficulty of Detection ................................................................................... 69 Handling potential biosecurity threats in the dual-use realm ............................................................................ 73 Conclusions – Learning From the Past to Detect Today’s Threats .......................................... 77 What We Learned About Intelligence Analysis of BW ............................................................................................ 77 Recommendations .................................................................................................................................................................. 80 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 83 Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 93 v Introduction There have been a number of historical accounts of various nations and cultures using biological warfare, often by the dispersal of infected items or carcasses. It wasn’t until the advancement of biological laboratory techniques and knowledge in the 19th and 20th centuries that biological weapons began to be specifically produced and used in war. During the early periods of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued biological weapons programs (the Soviet program began in the 1920’s), however, only the Soviet Union continued on in secrecy after the signing of the 1972 Biological Weapons Conventions until the early 1990’s. To this day, despite the US and Russia working in agreement to secure nuclear and biological weapons
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