Under the Microscope: Why US Intelligence Underestimated the Soviet Biological Weapons Program

Katarzyna Zabrocka Honors Program in International Security Studies Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University May 22 2013

Abstract

Through trend and detail analysis of declassified U.S. intelligence documents, this paper shows that ambiguity in dual-use biological research was the main underlying cause of the US Intelligence underestimation of the Soviet Bioweapons program. Although lack of prioritization of biowarfare issues and complacency due to mirror imaging also existed, such intelligence failures were a result of the uncertainty caused by the dual-use nature of biological research. General statements, lack of absolute certainty about the presence of a Soviet bioweapons program, and wavering attention given to intelligence collection on bioweapons in the Soviet Union were common trends amongst the documents. The nature of biological research and public health events do not lend themselves easily for differentiation between defensive, natural, and illicit. The inability to distinguish between legitimate research and biological research for offensive military purposes was a primary reason for the lack of certainty about the Soviet Union’s pursuits in biology. This unfortunately continues to be an issue as biological technology advances. But due to the clear ambiguity in purpose and potential of dual-use biological research, as well as to avoid infringement upon scientific research, intelligence communities must create stronger relationships with the scientific community, which in turn must develop strong community-responsibility and incentives to detract scientists from pursuing bioweapons under any capacity.

ii Acknowledgements

There are many people to thank for the encouragement and guidance that they have given me during this past year. I will be eternally grateful for their unwavering support. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor David Holloway, for being so committed to helping me in my project. You always read my drafts line by line, helped me find sources, and were always willing to have a long discussion. Our weekly meetings always helped me develop new ideas. Thank you Professor Crenshaw and Colonel Felter for keeping all us CISAC students on schedule and forcing us to develop sound research questions. And thank you to all the other CISAC honors students: Flora Wang, Jessica Ward, Vaeme Afokpa, Ryan Mayfield, David Hoyt, Daniel Khalessi, Daniel Reynolds, Scott Bade, and Ravi Patel. I’m grateful for all the new friendships we made, and you all always believed in me when I doubted myself. And lastly, thank you to all of my friends and family. This thesis would not have been finished without your continued support and words of encouragement. To my mom and dad, you always listened when I complained and reminded me that I am capable of anything. And Chris, whenever I would get frustrated, you would always calm me down and help me work through my thoughts or search for a document. Thank you.

iii Tables and Figures

Table 1. Biological Agents Weaponized and Stockpiled By the US Military (Destroyed 1971-1973) … pg. 6

Table 2. Sample Table of Potential Indicators of Biological Weapons Production Facility … pg. 17

Table 3. Summary of CIA and DIA Documents Analyzed … pg. 22

Table 4. Agents Validated for Biological Weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union … pg. 70

Figure 1. Table from NIE 11-7-85 … pg. 31

Acronyms

BTWC - Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention BW - Biological Weapons, Biological Warfare CBW - Chemical and Biological Weapons, Warfare DURC - Dual Use Research of Concern R&D - Research and Development USCIB - United States Central Intelligence Board

iv Fall 08

Table of Contents Introduction ...... 1 Chapter 1. Literature Review ...... 5 Possibility of and Barriers to Bioweapons ...... 6 Theories on the Miscalculation of the Soviet Union’s Bioweapons Program ...... 10 Conclusions ...... 20 Chapter 2. Analysis of Intelligence Documents ...... 21 General Trends ...... 22 Recognition of Lack of Good Intelligence on BW and Steps Taken ...... 24 The Enigma of Soviet BW ...... 26 Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention and Shift After Sverdlovsk ...... 27 National Intelligence Estimates ...... 32 Defense Intelligence Agency Documents ...... 34 Conclusions ...... 35 Chapter 3. Assessment Through the Lens of Dual-Use Ambiguity ...... 37 Non-Identifiable Buildings in Offensive Biological Research ...... 38 Inability to Detect Offensive Research Through Publications ...... 43 Potential of Research and Equipment Being Within Scope of Defensive Research or Public Health and Agricultural Research ...... 44 A Case Study of the Sverdlovsk Incident - Difficulty of BW Event Attribution ...... 49 Chapter 4. Assessment Through the Lens of Intelligence Failure ...... 54 Lack of Prioritization for Biowarfare Threats ...... 54 Failure to Warn ...... 58 Did Mirror-Imaging Lead to Complacency? ...... 60 Chemical Blindness ...... 63 Conclusions on the Role of Intelligence Failure ...... 65 Chapter 5. Moving Forward in Dual-Use Biological Research Security ...... 66 Nuclear vs. Biological Weapons Dual Use Research ...... 66 Today’s Biological Threats and the Difficulty of Detection ...... 69 Handling potential biosecurity threats in the dual-use realm ...... 73 Conclusions – Learning From the Past to Detect Today’s Threats ...... 77 What We Learned About Intelligence Analysis of BW ...... 77 Recommendations ...... 80 Bibliography ...... 83 Appendix ...... 93

v Introduction

There have been a number of historical accounts of various nations and cultures using biological warfare, often by the dispersal of infected items or carcasses. It wasn’t until the advancement of biological laboratory techniques and knowledge in the 19th and 20th centuries that biological weapons began to be specifically produced and used in war. During the early periods of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued biological weapons programs (the Soviet program began in the 1920’s), however, only the Soviet Union continued on in secrecy after the signing of the 1972 Biological Weapons Conventions until the early 1990’s. To this day, despite the US and Russia working in agreement to secure nuclear and biological weapons and facilities in an effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the secrecy on many aspects of the bioweapons program remains, but its history is relevant.

The Soviet Union’s decision to continue its biological weapons program despite signing the Biological Weapons Convention is still unexplained. It could be that the Soviet Union didn’t believe that the United States would truly give up its program entirely; after all, they were in the midst of a nuclear arms race. At the same time, tensions with China might have ensured continuation of the program due to the possibility of it being more effective over a wider area in disabling an army. The fact that biological weapons epidemics would be hard to distinguish from natural ones, it would save the government from political fallout of instigating a war. However, the secrecy went beyond simply hiding the program and building weapons that would leave no trace. The Kremlin was itself often kept in the dark of what the ministry of defense was specifically working on within the bioweapons program. The nuclear weapons pursuit was much

1 less secret within the government, yet alone internationally. The bioweapons program was pursued with a much more different strategy, one that did not focus on deterrence. Could this also indicate Soviet decline in confidence of nuclear weapons as an effective deterrent or war strategy?

Furthermore, the securing of biological laboratories and “production plants” requires different efforts than that of a nuclear site, although both technologies fall under the category of dual-use. Unlike a missile, a biological agent can be carried out in a vial. At the same time, biological agents require certain environmental conditions in order to sustain themselves. If a laboratory remains abandoned, does the lack of nurturement for the biological agent leave us safe from terrorists? Terrorists or state sponsored bioweapons programs can access methods for forming various biological agents through published research or through theft of agents from laboratories being used for peaceful research. Although abandoning a bioweapons program certainly eliminates one threat, a decrease in security may thus open doors towards new ones.

And bioweapons do indeed remain to be a threat today. Some of the most recent biological terror attacks in the United States include the post-9/11 anthrax–laced letters that killed five people, and crude ricin-laced letters sent to Congressmen and President Obama in April 2013. In 1984, a

Salmonella bacterial poisoning of salad bars in The Dalles Oregon by members of the

Rajneeshee Buddhist cult in an attempt to influence local elections. At least 751 people got very sick. In the 1990’s, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attempted bioterrorism using sarin gas and anthrax spores in Japan, the former having killed 13 people.

So how do we detect bioweapons threats today? Unfortunately, it does not seem that there are valid analytical methods for assessing intelligence on bioweapons, biowarfare, and bioterrorism. US Intelligence failed to accurately assess the size and scope of the Soviet BW

2 program, and it wasn’t until the 1980’s that more certain evaluations began to form. Prior to

1975, US Intelligence produced reports and National Intelligence Estimates that often seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union only had the capability to pursue a BW program. The Soviet

Union had the necessary basic knowledge and materials and could utilize them for large-scale production of weapons if they chose to do so. In reality, the Soviet Union had already developed biological weapons from Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, and possibly more.1 The Soviet BW program employed thousands of scientists, a massive effort in secrecy, and operated at least 20 different BW R&D facilities. And in 1970’s, the Soviet Union modernized and expanded its BW program under the guise of

Biopreparat, a “civilian” continuation of the earlier Soviet BW programs. Although Biopreparat was under the control of the military, it was made to appear as a civilian program focused on

“legitimate” biomedical and agricultural research. Although US intelligence began to be more certain in its assertions about the Soviet BW program in the 1970’s and 1980’s, there was still much that was not discovered until the defection of Soviet scientists and the collapse of the

Soviet Union, which allowed for on-site inspections.

Understanding why the US intelligence community underestimated the Soviet BW program is critical if we wish to defend ourselves against future BW threats and move beyond defensive measures and preparedness strategies that wait until an attack actually occurs. New methods of analyzing BW intelligence and acquiring intelligence on BW have to be developed to avoid such failures of underestimation, or overestimation in the case of the Iraq War. In the chapters that follow, I analyze declassified intelligence documents and argue that the dual-use

1 Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012.

3 nature of biological research played a significant role in US intelligence underestimation of the

Soviet BW program, and this factor was the underlying cause of “surface” intelligence failures such as complacency and failure to prioritize. And although it will not be an easy task, Chapter 5 describes why we must emphasize on-site inspection and an ethically trained and self-regulating international scientific community to mitigate future BW threats without restricting legitimate research that improves our daily lives.

4 Chapter 1. Literature Review

Throughout the Cold War, much of the U.S. intelligence effort was being spent on assessing threats from the Soviet Union. Although there was great concern in the realm of nuclear weapons and working to avoid mutual assured destruction, biological weapons and their use also lay within the spectrum of possibility. After the defection of Soviet scientist Vladimir

Pasechnik to Great Britain in 1989, both British and U.S. intelligence began to recognize their gross miscalculation of the capacity and enormous size of the Soviet bioweapons program. What factors caused the U.S. to underestimate the Soviet program despite awareness of its likely existence? What implications does this failure hold for assessing future offensive biological programs? These are the questions this thesis aims to answer.

The first part of this chapter presents the general stance on the possibility of bioweapons.

Although full assessment of biological weapon capabilities is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is a necessary point to address due to the cyclical nature of political attention given to this topic over the past few decades. It is important to understand the possibility of creating an effective bioweapon, for strategic or tactical purposes, without exaggerating the threat and ignoring the barriers to production in order to understand the importance of the US intelligence miscalculation as well as what this may indicate going forward in assessing Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention violations in dual-use biological research and technology.

The question of why the US did not recognize the scope of the USSR program until near the end of the Soviet Union has several different answers proposed by academics. These are nuclear blindness, mirror imaging, intelligence failure, and the problem of dual-use, each of which will be discussed in turn.

5 Possibility of and Barriers to Bioweapons

The production and dissemination of biological weapons could be crude or large and efficient, depending on the intended size of attack. The most recent confirmed biological attack in the U.S. occurred shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, when several letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to news media offices and two U.S. Senators. The attack killed five people and infected 17 others.2 Although such an attack would not be classified as the use of a weapon of mass destruction, it represents the feasibility with which even a simple attack can be mounted through the illicit use of natural biology.3

Are large-scale biological weapons possible? The most credible answer comes from the

US military, which during its own program weaponized and stockpiled 10 different biological agents and toxins:

Table 1. Biological Agents Weaponized and Stockpiled By the US Military (Destroyed 1971-1973)4 Lethal Agents* Bacillus anthracis Botulinum toxin Francisella tularensis Incapacitating agents* Brucella suis Coxiella burnetti Staphylococcal enterotoxin B Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Anticrop agents** Rice blast Rye stern rust Wheat stern rust *Weaponized **Stockpiled, but not weaponized

2 United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Amerithrax of Anthrax Investigation”. Fbi.gov. Web. December 12, 2012 3 I say natural not in the sense that it is healthy, but that Bacillus anthracis, the bacteria responsible for anthrax spores, is not a man-made bacteria and is found on all continents. 4 Christopher, George W., et al. "Biological Warfare A Historical Perspective." Journal of the American Medical Association. 278.5 (1997): n. page. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.

6 Such weapons are easily mass-produced thanks to the self-replicating nature of bacteria and viruses. The more difficult part of bioweapon creation is advanced bioweaponry - genetically engineering bacteria and viruses to be more virulent, able to withstand various environments, produce more toxins, or be more effective in host-to-host transmission (infectious). And with ever expanding knowledge in the life sciences, especially with increased understanding of biochemical pathways and genetics, such advanced bioweapons are ever more possible. The scientific community tends to agree on the dual-use nature of new and emerging technologies, and that it is not only possible, but ever more feasible, to structure a virus from scratch or sequence genomes and detect genes important for the virulence of a virus or bacteria. The cost of creating bioweapons is also much cheaper than other weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons. In Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World, The National Research Council of the National Academies states:

…in contrast with other weapons, the materials and equipment required to create and propagate a biological attack using naturally occurring or genetically manipulated pathogens remain decidedly “low-tech,” inexpensive, and widely available.5

Despite the comparatively low material and equipment cost, the enhancement of dangerous pathogens requires scientists trained in molecular biology and laboratory techniques in order to overcome the scientific language barrier – the terminology and vocabulary that is specific to the biological sciences and enables understanding of publications and research methodology.

Here is the first barrier to creating bioweapons: states or terrorist organizations must invest significant amounts of time and money (beyond laboratory costs) into educating, training, and/or recruiting scientists who are capable of performing the biological techniques as well as

5 Science and Security In a Post 9/11 World : A Report Based On Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2007.

7 manipulating them accordingly. In her analysis of barriers to bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-

Gormley discusses the synthesis by a group of researchers of Poliovirus from commercially available equipment and the research information available online. This is a remarkable feat that would have certainly been more difficult if not impossible to complete during the Cold War era due to a number of factors, showcasing the number of advances made in knowledge and biotechnology since that time. Nevertheless, the expertise of the scientists was an important factor and Ouagrham-Gormley states, “…their success came only after a long-term, painstaking trial-and-error process that required a combination of skills.” In addition, the experiment took

“three years to achieve” and researchers had to modify protocols available in literature since they

“cannot be easily transferred to a new location or adapted to a different agent.”6 It is not something that any laboratory or non-state actor could easily accomplish from bare materials alone, as we know for nuclear weapons as well.

Because of the knowledge transfer required for the production of and experimentation with bioweapons, organizational and management factors also come into play. Ouagrham-

Gormley once again makes a compelling argument in analyzing various bioweapons programs, including the US and Soviet programs, demonstrating that organizational make up and management style can affect the transfer of knowledge and skills not only across laboratories but within them as well. Covertness forces programs to limit knowledge transfer and lack of teamwork can greatly impede ambitions of creating biological weapons.7

Although assessment and security of potential illicit biological research has not been a main focus of the Obama administration in the past few years (as opposed to the implementation of BioShield during the George W. Bush administration), scientists and security councils

6 Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia B. "Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation."International Security 4, no. 36 (Spring 2012): 80-114. 7 Ibid

8 continue to agree on the preparedness and policies necessary to fight against this “low- probability, high-risk” scenario. The National Research Council of the National Academies recommends that the “U.S. government should develop policies and procedures for the oversight of dual-use life sciences research that foster international collaboration and control strategies.”8

This mimics a 2003 CIA report on a discussion between life science research experts which describes the necessity and willingness of the scientific community to work together with the national security establishment on developing countermeasures and assessing risks and potential illicit research.9 In addition, government organizations such as the Center for Disease Control continue to educate the public and professionals on responding to a bioterror attack, on top of maintaining the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program and emergency response capabilities at all time.10

The potential for a bioterrorist attack depends on many factors and changes over time.

Recognizing three crucial points will be beneficial in understanding the significance of the US underestimation of the Soviet bioweapons program for today’s biosecurity threats: 1)

Biotechnology is advancing and that makes it easier to develop advanced bioweapons, 2)

Expertise, knowledge, and skills in the biology field are necessary to go beyond crude weapons, and 3) Scientific communication and the sharing of research sharing play a role in biodefense and in the assessment of dual-use research.

8 Science and Security In a Post 9/11 World : a Report Based On Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2007. 9 Central Intelligence Agency. “The Darker Bioweapons Future.” Retrieved: Federation of American Scientists. December 12, 2012. http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/bw1103.pdf 10 “Emergency Preparedness and Response – Bioterrorism.” CDC.gov., December 12, 2012. Klietmann WF, Ruoff KL. “Bioterrorism: implications for the clinical microbiologist”. Clin Microbiol Rev. 2001;14:364–81. Web. December 12, 2012.

9 Theories on the Miscalculation of the Soviet Union’s Bioweapons Program

Overall there has not been much discussion of why the US miscalculated the capacity and breadth of the Soviet Union’s bioweapons program. Much of the literature focuses on the history of the program or how to identify and assess covert biological warfare programs. Nevertheless, the history of the program provides insights into how various presidential administrations approached the problem of biological weapons.

Answer One: Nuclear Blindness, Complacency, and Mirror Imaging

During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union were primarily engaged in a nuclear arms race, focusing on who could create the largest and most effective nuclear forces. MAD, or mutually assured destruction, was the doctrine of military strategy and national security policy.

Certainly the threat of nuclear war was a large enough and important issue. The Cold War set us up for what Christopher J. Davis termed “nuclear blindness.”

President Nixon’s biological weapons disarmament declaration in 1969 had conveyed the impression that biological weapons were uncontrollable...Add to this the rise of truly intercontinental ballistic missile delivery of nuclear weapons, and the stage was set for what I have termed “nuclear blindness” and defined as “the tunnel vision suffered by successive governments, brought on by the mistaken belief that it is only the size of the bang that matters.”11

Besides Davis’ declaration of nuclear blindness, there has been no one else that I have found who used to term as such in analysis of why the US did not recognize the bioweapons threats.

However, David Hoffman’s account of the Cold War arms race paints a picture of what the primary focus was of the Reagan administration in negotiations with Gorbachev: nuclear

11 Davis, Cristopher J. “Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq.” Emerg Infect Dis. Aug 1999. Web. December 12, 2012.

10 weapons. Bioweapons were never brought up, despite the fact that intelligence reports existed on the likelihood of the Soviet Union having a bioweapons program.12

Although Richard Nixon may have certainly been blinded by the idea of “nuclear weapons being the supreme deterrent, [making] biological weapons unnecessary,”13 nuclear blindness could not be a major explanation of the failure to recognize the Soviet bioweapons program. James S. Jaehnig mentions in his postdoctoral thesis that “President Nixon understood and stated that BW agents could have massive, unpredictable, and potentially uncontrollable consequences,” but he fails to acknowledge the fact that the American and British bioweapons programs had also developed and tested methods of using biological weapons as “well-controlled strategic weapons.”14 Furthermore, although scientists urged Nixon to give up biological weapons, they also added that “our major interest is to keep other nations from acquiring them.”

In addition, Hoffman mentions that in Nixon’s original declaration, he “expressed hope that other nations would follow the U.S. example.”15 So although “nuclear blindness” might have been a factor in the miscalculation, it was not for lack of understanding the threat that biological weapons posed or the possibility of others attempting to acquire them. Perhaps, a focus on the ultimate deterrence led to complacency in the illicit biological research arena and mirror imaging. Because the US was not focusing on the development of biological weapons, other nations must not be either. We tend to look for the things that we rank as important or are more skilled at detecting, in this case nuclear weapons. Richard Danzing and Pamela Berkowsky venture even further in their assessment as to why bioweapons tend to be low on our agenda:

12 Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand : the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009. 13 Ibid 14 Jaehnig, James S. “Why the United States Underestimated the Soviet BW Threat.” Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. September 2006. Web. December 12, 2012. Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand : the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009. Pp. 125 15 Ibid, pp.126

11 First, because defense against a biological attack is both unfamiliar and difficult, there is a natural tendency to put it aside in favor of problems that are more comfortable. This is abetted by a second factor: the belief that because biological weapons have never been used, they therefore never will be…this is in turn buttressed by a sense that a regime can be deterred from using biological weaponry if we make it clear that this would invite nuclear retaliation.16

According to Hoffman’s analysis, such reasoning did play a role in Nixon’s decision to end the

US offensive biological program. It remains, however, that the US searched multiple times for evidence of an offensive biological program in the Soviet Union, which will be discussed further.

Thus, the nuclear blindness theory doesn’t stand up.

Answer Two: Intelligence Failure

What constitutes good intelligence? Mark M. Lowenthal describes the four major criterions for good intelligence as being timely, tailored, digestible, and clear regarding the known and unknown.17 Accuracy is not a criterion because it is a “difficult standard for assessing intelligence” and using it to assess intelligence can turn analysts towards being “risk-averse because of the political costs of being wrong.”18

Lowenthal’s description will remind us that even if intelligence failure was the cause of the US miscalculation, it wasn’t necessarily because the intelligence was inaccurate in its assessment. Although intelligence on the Soviet program was rare and rarely detailed until the

1980’s, speculation and the desire to learn more about the Soviet program did exist in CIA intelligence estimates in the 1950’s. Hoffman describes how the CIA struggled to find evidence of the Soviet program but was unable to gather enough information.

16 Danzing, Richard and Berkowsky, P. B. “Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological Warfare?” Journal of the American Medical Association. Vol. 278, No.5. 1997. Web. December 12, 2012. 17 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence : From Secrets to Policy. 5th ed. Los Angeles: Sage/CQ Press, 2012. Pp.158- 159 18 Ibid

12 Firm evidence on the subject [of the Soviet bioweapons program] is, however, exceedingly scanty, and is likely to remain so because of the ease with which such a program can be concealed.19

Raymond Zilinskas and Milton Leitenberg, two prominent experts on biological weapons and proliferation, summarize their analysis of western intelligence of Soviet bioweapons programs:

…intelligence about Soviet BW-related activities is relatively thin for the pre- 1972 period; meager and often of dubious value during 1970-1979; and a little less meager and of better quality during 1980-1990.20

Leitenberg and Zilinskas present the idea that the intelligence community might have failed not because of lack of inaccurate assessments or producing “bad” intelligence (I will further analyze how the intelligence qualifies as good intelligence), but rather for the assumption, as Leitenberg and Zilinskas point out, that the “absence of evidence…[means]…no such program existed.”21

In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis analyzes why the intelligence communities failed before the Iraq War in their assessments of the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003. Several conventional explanations are pointed out by Jervis that the IC’s judgments had too much certainty, no alternatives were considered, and there was a lack of sufficient imagination.22 In this case, there was overestimation of the presence of a biological weapons program (in addition to others) rather than underestimation as with the Soviet case. Based on intelligence estimates and reports assessed by Zilinskas, Leitenberg, and Hoffman, US intelligence in the Soviet case suffered from the opposite extremes of the Iraq explanations.

There was too little certainty until the 1980’s and too many alternatives were considered (civilian use). However, both cases suffered from a lack of sufficient imagination and insufficient human

19 Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand : the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009. Pp. 120 20 Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. pp. 345 21 Ibid pp. 393 22 Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails : Lessons From the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010. Pp.126-141

13 intelligence, a factor that Jervis analyzes for the Iraq case. For Iraq, analysts failed to move beyond the idea that Saddam Hussein had to possess WMD programs because of the nature of intelligence analysis at the time being focused on staying “close to the information.” In the

Soviet case, however, staying close to the information at hand certainly contributed towards the assumption that no evidence equals no program. Lack of information from persons who were directly involved with the programs (or lack there of) fostered misinterpretation of the data or inability to attribute different perspectives with certainty.

Jaehnig also cites intelligence failure as a cause for the miscalculation of the Soviet bioweapons program. Most of his focus in this area lies in analysis of what US intelligence communities thought of Soviet research capacities in the life sciences prior to the 1960’s. Indeed,

Soviet research in biology was unfortunately suppressed and delayed due to a campaign in the mid 1930’s to late 1940’s led by Trofim Lysenko, who denounced Mendelian genetics.23

Genetics was stigmatized as a “fascist science.” Although based on reports analyzed by

Leitenberg and Zilinskas, this certainly held back scientific research for a number of years, it did not seem to be a factor in intelligence estimates on the possibility of a Soviet program after the

1960’s. Jaehnig also claims that US intelligence did not give enough focus to the 1979

Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak, but the intelligence failure appears to lie in misassessment of the scientific evidence presented rather in a failure to consider that it might be an accidental biological weapon outbreak.24 Hoffman describes US scientists themselves did not question the validity of the Soviet explanation being “meat contamination,” thus showing the difficulty in assessing epidemics and outbreaks.

23 Jaehnig, James S. “Why the United States Underestimated the Soviet BW Threat.” Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. September 2006. Web. December 12, 2012. 24 Ibid The Sverdlovsk incident has been assessed as an accident of the Soviet bioweapons program in the 1990’s.

14 In all, the Soviet officials had addressed more than two hundred private and governmental medical scientists and arms control experts…Meselson wrote that he found the Soviet explanation “plausible and consistent with what is known from previous outbreaks of human and animal anthrax in the USSR and elsewhere, including the US.”25

Answer Three: The Problem of Dual-Use Biological Research

Although not always mentioned directly, a recurring theme of each of the texts is the difficulty of assessing an offensive biological threat due to the nature of biological research as well as epidemics and outbreaks. Life sciences research is not typically thought of as dual-use, but the difficulty in establishing a line between offensive, defensive, and civilian research was exemplified in the recent debate regarding a study on H5N1 virus (avian flu). In 2011, two scientific papers were submitted for publication, and it wasn’t until the spring of 2012 that the publications were finally approved to appear in their entirety in the journals Science and Nature.

Why was there such a debate over scientific papers that came from civilian research? It was because these scientists managed to produce a strain of H5N1 that was transmissible by air between ferrets. The reports included the methodology (which wasn’t relatively striking) but also named the genes responsible for this increase in virulence. The U.S. Government was afraid that such information could be used in creating a new and deadly weapon against which we have no defenses.

The laboratories from which these reports came from were seeking to add to scientific knowledge for the purpose of eventually creating a defense against H5N1 in case the virus became transmissible between humans. At the same time, such information could provide a stepping-stone for an offensive biological laboratory to create a bioweapon. How could we have then approached the Soviet case in analyzing whether their laboratories were offensive,

25 Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand : the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009. Pp. 307

15 defensive, or civilian in nature? Why was it so difficult to find and assess indicators of illicit biological research?

Leitenberg and Zilinskas approach this question from the area of research and development. Because of the fine line between research for the purpose of advancing medicine and research for the creation of more virulent and toxic strains of pathogens, one would assume that perhaps the only way to truly distinguish between the two is at the point of development.

Either small quantities of vaccines are created for trials, or there are massive production chambers to produce sufficient quantities for a WMD.

If one also concludes, on careful examination, that any piece of basic research could have major “offensive” implications at some future time or in another party’s hands, one is left with the argument that the only distinguishing characteristics of a BW program occurred at the point at which weapon development began…it is a further complicating factor that it is also routine to argue…that some degree of weapon development is permissible within a defensive program, as in the case of several disclosures in the United States in September 2001.26

Even in the case of the US defensive program, research is complicated by the fact that “some” offensive work must be done, presumably to understand what to create defenses against. And that was exactly the argument that Soviet officials used, saying that “everything prior to 1992 was simply to evaluate the biological threat from the US and to produce biodefenses against it.”27

There is no question that the Soviet Union ran an offensive biological weapons program.28 But because even the US admits to having the necessity to venture into some offensive research for

26Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. pp. 326-327 27 Ibid 28 For more information on the evidence, I recommend reading Leitenberg’s and Zilinskas’ text. However, the existence of the program was confirmed by the US government and by Russia shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, although Russia’s stance has since changed.

16 the purpose of defense, are our only determinants of a bioweapons program production, the quantities produced, and the weapons themselves?29

Despite the dilemma, Leitenberg and Zilinskas do agree that some assessment on how research is being done can provide preliminary evidence for the existence of a bioweapons program. Included in their book are several tables produced by the US Army for potential indicators of biological weapons production. Nevertheless, the contents and methods of the research itself do not make a significant appearance amongst the indicators. A sampling of the table is included below.

Table 2. Sample Table of Potential Indicators of Biological Weapons Production Facility30

BW facility Legitimate facility Funding and personnel Elite, foreign-trained Mostly domestically trained workforce workforce Military/civilian ratio high Military unlikely Technical considerations Facilities designed to protect Facilities designed to protect humans from infection animals Pathogenic strains Nonpathogenic Facility equipment & security Access-control badges, Badges security clearances Restricted transportation Public transportation Safety Decontamination showers Not always present HEPA filters/air incinerators HEPA for inflow for outflow Process flow Finished products stored in Product clearly labeled bulk and coded Storage in bunkers, secured, Low security contained, and low- temperature

29 Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. pp. 326-327 30 Ibid, pp. 340

17 The difficulty with these indicators is that scientists and laboratories across the world do not fall neatly into the two categories. Take for example the case of Stanford University, where there are a number of elite, foreign-trained scientists studying pathogenic strains. In the Soviet program, many personnel were domestically trained. Furthermore, national US laboratories such as

Brookhaven National Laboratory have badges, restricted access to the compound requiring prior clearance or invitation, and restricted transportation on to the site. Leitenberg and Zilinskas also note that “more recent technology could reduce the need for large stockpiles that were previously held in readily recognizable storage facilities, depending on the procedures that a nation chose to implement” in a potential, modern bioweapons program.31

Dorothy Dubois assesses methods of identifying covert biological warfare programs by applying them to cases of outbreaks rather than the facilities and organizations alone. Although it can be incredibly difficult to differentiate a natural epidemic or outbreak from one caused by a bioweapon unless the attack was announced explicitly, the circumstances surrounding the event can still serve as valid indicators in analyzing the chance of an outbreak being caused by a bioweapon.32 A summary of the three models she tests against known and unknown cases of biowarfare are:

• Assimilation Model- Examines the relationship between a state or non-state actor’s goals

as well as the foundation of instruments available to achieve those goals. It relies on

thresholds that must be crossed and military applicability.

31 Ibid, pp. 335 32 DuBois, Dorothy L. "Pointing the Finger: Unclassified Methods to Identify Covert Biological Warfare Programs." The War Next Time: Countering Rogue States and Terrorists Armed with Chemical and Biological Weapons.

18 • Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Model- Developed by the Russian FIS after the

Cold War, this model focuses on analyzing four areas of indicators: political, economic,

scientific-technical, and military-technical.

• U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Model- Focuses on signatures of

bioweapons development through observable indicators: research and development,

weaponization and testing, production, and stockpile and delivery.33

Each of the models was useful, as each correctly assessed two Soviet outbreaks of anthrax and smallpox as indicating a high chance of the existence of a covert bioweapons program, and a suspicious outbreak of cholera in Burma as a low chance. At the same time, outbreaks of disease alone were not useful indicators of a bioweapons attack or capability, and reliable human intelligence contributes towards driving conclusions one way or the other.

Furthermore, the information necessary for the analysis showcased how “Cooperation between the intelligence community and public health experts is vital to achieving a full understanding of outbreaks of infectious disease as indicators of covert biological weapons programs.”34 This claim is substantiated by the analysis of the National Research Council of the National

Academies on dual-use biological research, and other statements written by intelligence experts and scientists alike.35 It is therefore abundantly clear that the nature of biological research and public health events do not lend themselves easily to differentiation between defensive, natural, and illicit.

33 Ibid 34 Ibid 35 Science and Security In a Post 9/11 World : a Report Based On Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2007.

19 Conclusions

We have explored three different potential theories as to why the US underestimated the vastness and capacity of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program for so long. Nuclear blindness, intelligence failure, and the problem of dual-use have shown how difficult an assessment of a potential, covert bioweapons program may be. However, nuclear blindness does not hold up as an explanation for why US intelligence underestimated the Soviet BW program.

Similarly, intelligence failure theories based on underestimation of Soviet scientific capability or that the information reported by the US was bad intelligence also do not currently hold.

However, other theories of intelligence failure are still to be explored.

Dual-use biological research as a cause for ambiguity and underestimation in intelligence on Soviet BW has not been explored in depth. Specifically, we would like to connect how the problem of dual-use biological research contributed towards intelligence failure that was otherwise typically accurate in its assessments and “good” intelligence. Could dual-use concerns played a role in addition to other intelligence failures? We must understand what kind of weight each factor held in the assessment of the Soviet bioweapons program, and what kind of information we can gather towards assessing other potential covert programs.

In the next chapter I review declassified US intelligence documents in detail for analytical trends and how the US intelligence community approached the issue of Soviet BW.

What information do these documents hold that could explain the miscalculation? Was it a matter of analytical or systemic intelligence failure, or did a factor such as the biological research itself drive the underestimation?

20 Chapter 2. Analysis of Intelligence Documents

In order to assess why the US intelligence community failed to recognize the scope and capacity of the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program I reviewed declassified and unclassified documents that are available through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The evidence presented in this chapter may be just the tip of the iceberg due to the potentially high number of documents still classified. In addition, it is difficult to estimate how much classified material remains on the issue of Soviet biological weapons. I have limited myself mostly to documents available in the FOIA archives of the websites of the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as my searches for BW-relevant documents have been most fruitful through these websites.

In searching for documents I have used search terms that combined a BW term

(biological weapons, biological warfare, biological, biology, bioweapon) with USSR, Soviet

Union, Soviet, or Russia in order to maximize the chance of results that specifically discuss the

Soviet BW program. Therefore, although I will mention some documents that do not include reference to the Soviet program, documents that do not discuss BW in reference to the Soviet

Union have in general been excluded.

Documents that have been reviewed span the time period of 1948-1993. Many search results, especially from the CIA, were of documents from the 1940’s and 50’s and sometimes duplicates of other memorandums. I include a number of documents from this time period, but documents from the 1960’s onwards appear to be most relevant in answering why the capacity of the Soviet program was miscalculated, as much of the growth of the program occurred

21 during1970-1990.36 Oftentimes, portions of a document have major redactions. I will mention such issues when relevant to the discussion.

I include a table with a summary of the documents that were analyzed:

Table 3. Summary of CIA and DIA Documents Analyzed Agency Document Types Decade Number Central Intelligence National 1940’s 2 Agency Intelligence 1950’s 12 Estimates (NIE), 1960’s 6 Special NIE, Central 1970’s 8 Intelligence 1980’s 8 Bulletins, Memorandums, Letters, Other Summaries Defense Intelligence Intelligence 1970’s 6 Agency Summaries, 1980’s 3 Intelligence 1990’s 1 Appraisals, Other Summaries

General Trends

Looking at a timeline of the CIA documents, it is clear that the organization recognized its lack or insufficiency of evidence to understand the depth and capacity of the Soviet Union’s

BW program. Memorandums and letters state that the Soviet Union possesses biological weapons, and at the same time state that no reliable evidence exists to fully understand the

USSR’s capabilities (is it for small, covert operations, or large-scale warfare?). Furthermore, multiple persons, including the Director of the CIA, appeal to the need for stronger BW intelligence along with knowledge on chemical weapons stocks.

36 Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012.

22 Two intelligence memorandums that are five months apart from the late 1940’s are a prime example of the uncertainty surrounding the BW-topic and the back-and-forth stance portrayed by the CIA in the 50’s and 60’s on the capabilities of the Soviet Union.

Dec 1948: “No reliable evidence that the Soviet Union is or is not capable of waging large-scale biological warfare at this time…We believe, however, that the USSR is capable of carrying out small-scale covert operations against man, domestic animals or crop plants…the Soviet Union possesses, and will possess during 1949, potentialities for waging biological warfare equivalent to those of the US…[types and production unknown]”37 Apr 1949: “There is no definite knowledge of the kinds of research and development now being undertaken by the USSR; it is certain only that research on BW is in progress…A recent unconfirmed report states that the Soviets have bombs for dissemination of biological agents. It is too soon, however, to assert that the Soviets are ready to use BW as a military weapon.”38

Although the reports mention the lack of reliable or confirmed evidence, they nevertheless refer to two drastically different states of capability. The first memo is very specific that the Soviet

Union has the capability for at minimum “small-scale covert operations.” The latter memo maintains that the Soviets are still only within the research stage of BW. It is unclear whether the

CIA considered the potential for small-scale operations to be a marker of BW research, and development to include only large-scale weapons.

A number of documents from 1952 recognize the limited chemical and biological (CBW) warfare/weapon intelligence and attempt to increase the priority of CBW intelligence and to assign clandestine operations for the gathering of such intelligence. It is again unclear what kind of information is possessed by the CIA and what the agency’s specific stance is on whether or not the Soviet Union actually has biological weapons (which are now being categorized together

37 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum No. 105,” December 20, 1948, DOC_0001118006 (Top Secret) 38 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum No. 163,” April 20, 1949, DOC_0001134404 (Top Secret)

23 with chemical weapons). A document from the Intelligence Advisory Committee from January

1952 focuses on the “poor CBW knowledge,” but says that agencies are undertaking collection and research programs in order to make up for this deficiency, especially since gaps exist in intelligence on basic scientific research in the Soviet Union.39 A subsequent Intelligence

Evaluation of Biological Warfare produced two months later, however, concludes that the USSR has capabilities to produce BW agents and munitions. In addition, the document states, “There are a number of suspicious installations where BW activities could well be carried on without our having any positive proof.” BW is recognized as a serious threat without thorough discussion of the effects that could result from a BW attack by the USSR.40 There is no mention of intelligence gaps around BW in the USSR, although the majority of the one and a half page document is redacted.

Recognition of Lack of Good Intelligence on BW and Steps Taken

Nevertheless, documents from 1952 do address the lack of reliable information, including a memorandum circulated by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air

Force, the Joint Chief of Staff, and the Director of Intelligence, which also mentioned the

“inherent difficulty” in gathering intelligence on BW.41 Defense agencies did not raise the

39 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Advisory Committee,” January 27 1952, CIA- RDP80R01731R003500110004-2 (Top Secret) 40 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Evaluation of BW,” March 10 1952, CIA- RDP80R01731R002900470095-0 (Top Secret) 41 Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum to Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Joint Chief of Staff,” August 16 1952, CIA FOIA CIA-RDP80R01731R001300200003-7 (Top Secret)

24 priority for covert collection on BW, in order not to compete with other intelligence collection requirements.42 However, other actions were taken:

• Personnel in biology and medicine in O/SI were assigned to review open literature and

determine what steps can be taken to collect more open literature abroad (but special

intelligence cannot be exploited until such information is collected).

• USCIB (US Central Intelligence Board) accepted detailed priority requirements on BW

and should improve quantity and quality of information.

• The Department of State also assigned high priority to reporting on agronomy and

veterinary medicine, which have direct bearing on BW, including possibly embassy staff

to this work.

• CIA increased the hours of systemic analysis of special intelligence pertaining to

institutions and areas suspected of BW potential and promised to pursue the problem

aggressively despite difficulties. They also increased research activities in the basic

sciences but their abilities would be limited due to the lack of the high priority status of

BW.43

Despite these actions, a memo written to the Director of the CIA by the Assistant

Secretary of Defense in June, 1954 says that evidence is inconclusive on the BW program in the

USSR and that more ways need to be found of increasing the flow of specific information revealing actual Soviet activities and plans in BW.44 However, it does not seem that US intelligence underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet Union to the extent that James Jaehnig

42 Central Intelligence Agency, Replies and other documents to Aug 16 1952 Memorandums, April 18 1952- unknown, CIA FOIA CIA-RDP80R01731R001300200006-4 (Top Secret) 43 Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on Biological Warfare Intelligence,” September 24 1952, CIA FOIA CIA-RDP80R01731R001300200001-9 (Top Secret) 44 Central Intelligence Agency, “Memorandum to the Director of the CIA from Donald A. Quarles,” June 28 1953, CIA-RDP80R01731R001300230026-9

25 claimed in his thesis.45 In an address at the University of Cincinnati, Allen W. Dulles (Director of the CIA) stated that the USSR has equivalent technical and scientific capabilities to the U.S., and those that say the “USSR is mentally superior or inferior are approaching extremes.”46

Although these documents are still from the time period of early BW program development in the USSR, they partially set the stage for repeated inconclusiveness and ambiguity regarding the program in later decades.

The Enigma of Soviet BW

Despite the uncertainty on BW in the Soviet Union, it is still surprising that an intelligence report from 1965, Studies in Intelligence: The Enigma of Soviet BW, stated that:

“There is no firm evidence on the existence of an offensive Soviet BW program.”47

At the same time, the report maintained that suspected dual-use biomedical studies in the Soviet

Union were more than needed for public health requirements.48 This is a phenomenon in confirmed BW programs. The CIA’s bold conclusion may reflect its reassessment, found within this report, of the claim that Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea was a Soviet BW center. This island was a prime suspect for housing a BW facility based on German intelligence received after World War II, but little was known about the island until 1957 when high-level photography showed the type of buildings and installations present on the island.

45 Jaehnig, James S. “Why the United States Underestimated the Soviet BW Threat.” Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. September 2006. Web. December 12, 2012. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457274 46 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Industrial and Technical Challenges of the USSR – Allen W. Dulles Address at the University of Cincinnati,” CIA-RDP80R01731R0017000300006-9 47 Central Intelligence Agency, “Studies in Intelligence: The Enigma of Soviet BW,” Spring 1965, doc ID:60937 48 BW research and biomedical research may share similar initial research stages. This topic will be discussed further in the next chapter.

26 Even though the photographs appeared to confirm the presence of a BW facility, the report states that the CIA speculated that the confirmation of the BW claim stemmed from biased analysis. The buildings and installations seemed to fit the criteria for a BW site because analysts were oriented with the idea that these were photographs of a suspect BW site at Vozrozhdeniya

Island. The report goes on to state that on subsequent analysis, certain aspects of the island suggested that it was not a facility where BW tests could actually be conducted.

“The whole range of other possible functions was therefore examined with all the background information on the area in mind. CW research or testing, a guided missile or electronic installation, fishing and fish processing, geological exploration, a prison, a secret police training establishment, and a paramilitary training area were considered and discarded. The only certain finding was that the general layout of the buildings, parade ground, and other features distinguished it as a military rather than civilian establishment.”49

Despite this setback, the CIA sustained the possibility that the Soviets were pursuing biological weapons research and development, and that new overt collection methods and covert penetration were needed to improve on “low-quality information.” Even though a decade had passed since the proclamation of lack of sufficient intelligence on BW (as elaborated in the previous section) and steps had been taken to improve intelligence on Soviet BW, the CIA was still in the dark and couldn’t confirm the existence of a Soviet BW program.

Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention and Shift After Sverdlovsk

Seven Central Intelligence Bulletins were found from between 1969 and 1971 that deal with the proposals for a ban on the development and storage of biological and chemical weapons.

It is surprising to notice that it was the USSR that first supported initiatives of production bans, disarmament, as well as a comprehensive ban on BW and CW combined. However, Soviet draft

49 Ibid

27 agreements had no provisions for inspections or verification of compliance (although neither did the final draft).50 Although eventually the USSR dropped its insistence on an all-embracing CW inclusion, they remained opposed to international inspections.51

Perhaps because the Soviet Union was a signatory of the Biological Weapons and Toxins

Convention and that the United States had put a stop to its own BW program in 1969, there seemed to be little mention or focus on BW in the USSR during the 1970’s. An NIE from 1972 titled “Soviet Military Research and Development” did not mention any specific details on biotechnology in the Soviet Union.52 Several years later, a national intelligence daily cable from

1977 detailed developments on protein synthesis in the USSR for feed purposes. There was no connection of this information to potential bioweapons research and development, or to any kind of relation to national security. However, there was a redacted page in the document, which could have included the missing link to BW. Nevertheless, there was little focus on Soviet military pursuits within biology in the NIE.

It wasn’t until the accidental anthrax release in 1979 at a BW-facility in Sverdlovsk, that the CIA began to refocus on the Soviet BW potential, although its intelligence was still plagued by uncertainty. An early document on the Sverdlovsk incident referred to ‘rumors’ of an accident, and that it was unknown if the suspect BW installation in Sverdlovsk was the site of the alleged incident.53 Still, BW was considered as only one possible explanation for the incident and there was “insufficient evidence that the alleged deaths can be attributed to unlawful storage of a

50 Central Intelligence Agency, “Central Intelligence Bulletin,” September 23 1969, CIA- RDP79T00975A014600040001-5 (Secret) 51 Central Intelligence Agency, “Central Intelligence Bulletin,” July 23 1971, CIA-RDP79T00975A019600030001-1 (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “Central Intelligence Bulletin,” March 14 1972, CIA-RDP79T00975A021400070001- 6 (Secret) 52 Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Military Research and Development, NIE 11-12-72,” September 19 1972, DOC_0000261921 (Top Secret) 53 Central Intelligence Agency, “Biological Warfare: Additional Rumors of Accident at the Biological Institute in Sverdlovsk,” October 15 1979, DOC_0000100168 (Top Secret)

28 BW agent.” New intelligence, often from sources such as physicians based at a hospital in

Sverdlovsk, later strengthened allegations that casualties were due to a BW accident, and the

CIA sounded more certain of this analytic conclusion despite debate about the type of anthrax that the victims died from. Intestinal anthrax, the cause claimed by the Soviets, would be from infected meat, but respiratory anthrax could point to BW.54 Based on the available reports, the

US intelligence community was leaning towards respiratory anthrax as the cause of the epidemic.

After the Sverdlovsk incident, new NIEs appeared with a renewed focus given to biological research and the possibility of BW development in the Soviet Union.55 Many of these documents are still heavily redacted, but the CIA appeared to be more focused on emerging biotechnology, especially genetic engineering, and how it could be used to create novel agents for biological weapons. Between 1984 and 1986, at least four NIEs were produced that referred to BW in the USSR. The debate surrounding dual-use research attempts to take nonmilitary rationales into account when reviewing research conducted in the Soviet Union continued through the 80’s. One of the documents again mentions that detection is difficult due to nonspecific or non identifiable buildings, onsite inspections being insufficient, and scientific evidence alone being inadequate in differentiating between nonmilitary and military research use.56

Although the CIA mostly maintained a strong certainty that the Soviets were pursuing new and dangerous bioweapons, the Agency still produced mixed analysis over these two years,

54 Central Intelligence Agency, “USSR: Biological Warfare (BW) Accident in Sverdlovsk,” January 28 1980, DOC_0000100169 (Secret) 55 Central Intelligence Agency, “New Directions in Soviet BCW Agent Development and Their Implications, SNIE 11/17-84/CX” January 24 1984, DOC_0001106197 (Top Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, SNIE 11-17-86/S,” August 1986, DOC_0000238473 (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “The Future of Soviet Science, NIE 11-7-85,” November 1985, DOC_0000261291 (Secret) 56 Central Intelligence Agency, “New Directions in Soviet BCW Agent Development and their Implications,” January 24 1984, DOC_0001106197 (Top Secret)

29 especially in the field of molecular or microbiology, one most relevant to new biotechnology- based BW research and development. I highlight here some significant statements from these

NIEs that together showcase such mixed analysis.57

57 Ibid Central Intelligence Agency, “The Soviet Offensive Chemical Warfare Threat to NATO, SNIE 11/17-2-84,” November 20 1984, DOC_0000284028 (Top Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “The Future of Soviet Science, NIE 11-7-85,” November 1985, DOC_0000261291 (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “Worldwide CBW Trends,” July 8 1986, DOC_0001088488 (Top Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, NIE 11-17-86/S,” August 1986, DOC_0000238473 (Secret)

30

Figure 1 Table 5 from NIE 11-7-85, referring to the Soviet Union as weaker in molecular biology.

31 1984 “The support given to Soviet molecular genetics research has allowed scientists to achieve quickly a high level of competence in using sophisticated techniques.” “Biotechnology-based novel agents could be available for test and evaluation within five years.” 1985 “Even where the Soviet contribution is significantly poorer than that of Western countries, as in biological sciences and molecular biology in particular, it is possible to find specific examples…biophysical chemistry and protein conformation…regarded as world class.” “Poor overall performance in molecular biology…the Soviets are currently investing heavily in this field.” 1986 A document on worldwide CBW Trends makes no mention of the Soviet Union, although the majority is redacted. “The Soviets maintain the world’s most comprehensive chemical and biological warfare program…this capability constitutes a serious threat to NATO.” “Over 100 industrial microbiological plants are in the Soviet Union, most doing clearly legitimate research to provide antibiotics, serums, and vaccines.” “Modernization of the Soviet CBW arsenal, ongoing for more than a decade, has concentrated on exploiting advances in biotechnology such as genetic engineering.”

By 1986, it was more obvious that the Soviet Union was pursuing BW, especially after the evidence presented from the Sverdlovsk incident, which is a crux that is often referred in analysis within these documents as positive confirmation that the Soviet Union at minimum had stocks of

BW. Nevertheless, the documents continued to refer to “legitimate research” which was making analysis difficult as defensive operations can often overlap with what can be considered offensive research. We are left with the question: what kind of role did dual-use biological research play in the intelligence community’s analysis of Soviet BW possibilities?

National Intelligence Estimates

National Intelligence Estimates, or NIEs, are produced by the National Intelligence

Council as a coordinated judgment from the whole of the US Intelligence community. They provide estimative analysis on particular national security issues and are typically requested by

32 civilian or military leaders and policymakers. Thus, they are an excellent starting point for assessing the total outlook of the US Intelligence Community towards the Soviet Union’s biological weapons program. It is important to note, however, that the following analysis is based only on declassified documents, and there is no possibility of valid hypothesizing on what other documents may exist.

Amongst a list of hundreds of declassified NIEs, Special NIEs (SNIE), and the former

OREs, produced by the Office of Reports and Estimates, on the Soviet Union and International

Communism, there is only one NIE with reference to biological warfare in its title (NIE 11-11-

69, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities, 13-Feb 1969).58 Furthermore, only 2 out of the 10 pages of this document are specific to biological warfare. Nevertheless, it is clear that US intelligence had evidence of Soviet biological research and development programs not only working in the public health and medical fields, but even in “development of biological warfare (BW) weapons,” separate from defensive efforts in this field. The document also reveals that although it was understood that the Soviet Union was pursuing biological weapons, there was a critical deficiency in intelligence on their full capabilities:

We believe that, through their own research and open US literature, the Soviets are well aware of the properties of a variety of BW agents…We have, however, insufficient evidence on which to base an estimate of the types and quantities of BW agents which might be available to the Soviets for offensive use.59

What does it mean when the majority of an NIE about chemical and biological warfare is dedicated to chemical weapons threats? Looking solely at the titles of the declassified Soviet- related NIEs, there are 9 reports spanning 1963-1984 with ‘chemical’ in the title, 31 with

58 Central Intelligence Agency, “Declassified National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet Union and International Communism,” http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/Declassified%20National%20Intelligence%20Estimates %20on%20the%20Soviet%20Union%20and%20International%20Communism.html 59 Ibid

33 ‘nuclear’ in the title, and 3 with ‘biological’ or ‘BW’ (two titles of which refer to both biological and chemical). We may hypothesize that US intelligence, although not experiencing ‘nuclear blindness’ in terms of assessing the biological weapons threat, may have experienced ‘chemical blindness,’ especially since biological warfare is often being mentioned together with chemical warfare in other intelligence documents.

Defense Intelligence Agency Documents

Documents from the Defense Intelligence Agency, although not comprehensive, show similar trends to those of the CIA’s. Several Intelligence Summaries from the early 1970’s from the DIA’s FOIA collection on Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons, do not mention the

USSR and/or biological warfare, although there are several topic redactions.60 We can assume that the DIA also experienced difficulties in assessing dual-use biological research, as a document focused on BW capabilities in Asia mentions “Equipment and facilities used for [BW research and development] are simply not unique.”61

After the Sverdlovsk BW incident, the DIA also refocused on BW in the Soviet Union, although this agency was much more assertive and aggressive in proclaiming that the Soviet

Union maintained bioweapons. Much of its analysis, however, does appear to be based on the incident at Sverdlovsk. More specifically, the DIA chose to focus on making conclusions on the storage of bioweapons by the Soviet Union, rather than on research into bioweapons. There is limited specific information in these reports on BW facilities or the bioweapons themselves.

60 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Summary,” December 4 1970, DIAIS 283-70 (Top Secret) Defense Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Summary,” January 4 1971, DIAIS 2-71 (Top Secret) Defense Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Summary,” December 1 1971, DIAIS 280-71 (Top Secret) Defense Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Summary,” December 17 1971, DIAIS 294-71 61 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Biological Warfare Capabilities, Asian Communist Countries (U),” January 23 1973, SAO/ST-SS-03-148-72 (Top Secret)

34 Nevertheless, the DIA appears to have been more certain at an earlier stage than the CIA about the Soviet Union possessing BW. It stated in a 1980 Intelligence Appraisal that “Strong circumstantial evidence indicates the USSR possesses an illegal store of biological warfare agents and is involved in probable development or production of BW.”62 It is important to mention that this same document also uniquely defines a bioweapon as a “disease-producing agent [that] is placed in a delivery system for the express purpose of injuring or killing men, animals, or crops,” which could explain the DIA’s focus on the latter stages of BW research and development, possibly defining BW research as impossible to differentiate from legitimate research. An additional document supports this hypothesis by recognizing modern biotechnology’s primary role in agriculture and public health in the Soviet Union.63

Conclusions

We observed several trends throughout the CIA and DIA documents that show repeated uncertainty, reference to dual-use research, difficulty in detecting BW facilities, and lack of consistent and reliable evidence on BW in the Soviet Union. In the next two chapters, the evidence presented here will be further examined through two critical lenses in order to come to a conclusion as to why the intelligence agencies, and the CIA especially, failed to recognize the full BW threat from the Soviet Union.

The literature review in Chapter 1 pointed towards the need to explore dual-use biological research as a potential factor in the underestimation of the BW program. The documents analyzed in this chapter certainly point towards a potential correlation between the

62 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Appraisal, USSR:Biological Warfare,” March 25 1980, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB61/Sverd9.pdf 63 Defense Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Biological Warfare Threat.” 1986. DST-1610F- 057-86

35 repeated uncertainty and ambiguity in analyzing dual-use biological research. Furthermore, other potential intelligence failure theories arise in the documents explored, which furthers the necessity concluded in Chapter 1 to assess potential intelligence failures outside of Soviet capability underestimation and inaccurate intelligence (which were debunked). Thus, based on the trends presented in these documents and the conclusions of Chapter 1, I have chosen to analyze these documents through the lens of intelligence failure the dual-use research point of view in the following chapters.

36 Chapter 3. Assessment Through the Lens of Dual-Use Ambiguity

It is clear that there was a high amount of uncertainty within the intelligence community in regards not only to the extent of the Soviet program, but also to the existence of any such program. While there was enough evidence to raise concern about biological research and development in the Soviet Union, the intelligence documents are plagued by potential non-illicit explanations for the research and development (R&D). Why couldn’t the CIA provide convincing evidence for the Soviet Union’s research and production of bioweapons on a massive scale? We reached two potential causes at the conclusion of the previous chapter – either it was a failure on the part of U.S. intelligence to adequately assess the evidence provided, or the dual-use nature of biological research created ambiguity and uncertainty, making a confident and irrefutable assertion near to impossible.

On the basis of documents explored in the previous chapter, I will analyze the role that the dual-use nature of biological research played in contributing towards the uncertainty and underestimation of the program. Although some of these dual-use dilemmas have already been identified, here I will analyze how these various dilemmas break down into different categories of uncertainty in the assessment of biological dual-use research and technology and ask whether these different categories of uncertainty contributed towards the intelligence community’s underestimation of the Soviet program.

I have chosen three categories of uncertainty to explore based on the range of information provided in the documents as well as on the list of potential indicators of a biological weapons program used by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the U.S. Army.

37 These can be found in the literature review and in the appendix in full.64 My categories differ slightly from those used by AFMIC because they better encompass the type of information sought and analyzed by the CIA and DIA. The three categories are:

1. Biological Research Buildings 2. Scientific Publications and Open Literature 3. Biological Research Methods and Biotechnology Uses

Each of these categories has indicators for illicit or non-illicit biological R&D. However, the overlap between these indicators can be so great that difficulties emerge in differentiating offensive R&D from defensive or biomedical. The fact that the CIA and DIA documents discuss these difficulties provides strong support for the argument that the dual-use nature of biological research prevents detection of offensive state programs on the basis of overt indicators alone.

After reviewing how the dual-use nature of biological research was a major cause of the underestimation of the Soviet bioweapons program, I will explore how the same factors played a role in U.S. uncertainty as to whether the Sverdlovsk incident in 1979 was the result of a bioweapon release, accidental or otherwise. This incident in particular appears to have been a turning point for U.S. intelligence, as documents produced thereafter appeared more assertive in their claims that the Soviet Union does indeed have a sophisticated bioweapons program.

Non-Identifiable Buildings in Offensive Biological Research

The potential indicator lists provided by Leitenberg and Zilinskas include factors that differentiate between a potential BW facility and a legitimate facility. According to these lists, the following factors may indicate a BW facility (legitimate facility indicators in parentheses):

64 Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. Pp. 340-350

38 • Facilities designed to protect humans from infection (Designed to protect animals) • Designed for decontamination/disposal of many animals (Few animal disposals require decontamination) • Weapons-filling equipment (Bottle/vial-filling equipment) • Access-control badges, security clearances (Badges)* • Restricted transportation (Public transportation)* • Quarantine facilities (No quarantine facilities) • Refrigerated bunkers (Cold rooms in plant) • Aerosol-explosive test chambers (No aerosol chambers) • Rail/heavy-truck transportation (Only light truck needed)* • Fences, guard towers, patrol roads, cameras, motion detectors, etc. (Little to no outside security)* • Military presence (No military presence)* • Munitions-filling and storage facilities (No munitions) • Testing/proving grounds (Not applicable) *Not specific enough to indicate a weapons R&D facility.

These same indicators are also mentioned by the Weapons of Mass Destruction

Commission (WMDC), an independent international commission initiated by the Swedish

Government on a proposal from the United Nations.65 However, none of these indicators alone is sufficient to proclaim the presence of a BW program. In fact, many of the “BW facility” indicators could be found at legitimate facilities, or are general enough to be indicators for other weapons facilities. Facilities designed to protect humans from infection are the norm in legitimate labs studying pathogens for the purpose of developing vaccines or drugs. The WMDC also mentions that such safety measures could also be overlooked in a BW facility that has limited resources or is less concerned with population safety.66 Access-control badges and security clearances can be found in U.S. National Laboratories such as Brookhaven and

Lawrence Livermore, which do not conduct offensive biological research. I have placed an asterisk next to items that are not even specific enough to indicate with certainty a weapons R&D

65 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. “Indicators of State and Non-State Offensive Chemical and Biological Programmes.” United Nations. No. 30. August 2005 http://www.wmdcommission.org 66 Ibid

39 facility. Furthermore, some of these items, such as safety equipment, and aerosol-explosive test chambers cannot be determined from photographs of the building or surrounding area itself.

The difficulty in attempting to identify an offensive biological laboratory is that the labs themselves may not differ much from legitimate labs if only research is being conducted there.

Equipment and testing for weaponization are for obvious reasons less likely to be found in legitimate facilities. Even extensive safety measures to prevent infection would be found in a facility studying HIV for the purpose of developing countermeasures. And what is most worrisome of all is that a low-scale biological research lab could fit within a room the size of a

50-person classroom, perhaps even smaller. 67 Illicit biological research laboratories are difficult to identify in state sponsored programs, as they are housed in essentially non-identifiable buildings. Biological laboratories are self-contained and can fit within a small room. Even in- person inspection of the laboratories themselves may prove fruitless if weaponization equipment is absent and any research on select agents is conducted under the premise of “defensive” research.

This uncertainty is evident in US Intelligence efforts to detect facilities and compounds used for biological research testing. The most obvious example found in the intelligence documents is the debate over the status of the buildings on Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea.

After initially confirming the presence of a potential BW facility at Vozrozhdeniya Island based on post-WWII German intelligence on facilities across the USSR, the CIA retracted from that conclusion in 1965 in a document titled “The Enigma of Soviet BW.”68

67 Bernard, Kenneth. "Introduction to the field of Biosecurity." Public Policy 122: Biosecurity and Bioterrorism Response. Stanford, California. 3 Apr 2013. Lecture.

68 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Memorandum No. 163,” April 20, 1949, DOC_0001134404 (Top Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “Studies in Intelligence: The Enigma of Soviet BW,” Spring 1965, doc ID:60937

40 This document states that, “The paucity of real evidence has forced us to resort to indirect signs,” which included examining “all military-related activity in the fields of biology and medicine, all technical publications which appeared to be censored by security considerations, and all biomedical studies which did not jibe with Soviet public health requirements as we know them.”69 This included analyzing photographs and other intelligence that “seemed for a time to confirm” the presence of a BW facility on the island. The document gives a number of reasons why this island appeared well suited for BW experiments, reasons which could also fall under the list of indicators given above. The isolation of the island from large human populations served as a natural quarantine and protection from infection for non-involved persons. It served as a natural barrier against observation and intrusion, thus fulfilling indicators for high security and access limitation.

High-level photography in 1957 seemed to confirm the military and illicit nature of the facilities on the island.

“Photographs of the island revealed the rather extensive installations...There were more than 150 buildings of various sizes grouped into two settlements about 2 miles apart. The northern and largest group of buildings appeared to be the administration, housing, and logistics area, marked "operational headquarters" on the model. Its barrack-like buildings were large enough to accommodate about 1,400 people. The southern group was contained within a high walled area which appeared to be the work or "laboratory" site. South from the "laboratory" area tangled roads and tracks led to five centers, called "test sites" on the model. At each of these centers was a tower and one or two small buildings.”70

Testing grounds, guard towers, fenced off areas, the general layout of the buildings, and the parade ground also distinguished it as a military establishment. These are all potential indicators of a BW facility rather than a legitimate facility, and in the context of trusted intelligence, it seemed almost certain that the Soviet Union was pursuing biological weapons.

69 Ibid 70 Ibid

41 Shortly after, however, when the CIA took away the analytical bias of BW presumption and reassessed the photographs, the evidence appeared less certain and clear. The grid systems for testing were too small, there were no indications of air support for BW test activities, and no decontamination facilities, and there was a population of civilians on a southern island that was in the path of prevailing winds. They were no longer certain that these facilities were a BW site, and concluded that the Soviets might be pursuing a low-scale biological program, possibly on defensive BW research.

In retrospect we know the CIA was wrong in this case as Vozrozhdeniya Island was indeed one of the major BW facilities and testing grounds in the Soviet bioweapons program.71

Without direct evidence, it is not a surprise that U.S. Intelligence analysts were uncertain about the purpose of certain facilities. But what is clear here is that the use of indirect markers alone was bound to fail in conclusively identifying the facilities at Vozrozhdeniya Island as housing biological weapons R&D. Biological laboratories can be self-sustained in small rooms and housed in non-identifiable buildings – ones that show no outside evidence of biological research being conducted inside, whether offensive or legitimate. The Soviet Union seemed to show little concern for testing safety. And although the CIA could ascertain that it was a military establishment, no other building indicators could be found through photographs as evidence of a

BW facility.

71 "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities In Kazakhstan: Past, Present, And Future." . Center For Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies. Web. .

42 Inability to Detect Offensive Research Through Publications

One of the obvious difficulties in detecting offensive biological research through scientific publications and open literature is that it would not be stated outright that the intent of the research is the development of biological weapons. The intelligence community would thus be left to look for bioweapons R&D indicators based on methods and agents used in Soviet research and later published in research papers. However, even in “The Enigma of Soviet BW,” the CIA alludes to the elimination “from the scientific literature all trace [of research transcending public health requirements] except of defensive preparation and attitudes,” although some biomedical research did appear to transcend public health requirements.72 This inability to detect a BW program through open literature was attributed to excellent Soviet secrecy and censorship. There was no doubt this was the case, but publications themselves can be highly ambiguous in the intended purpose of the research if analyzed out of context. An example that will be discussed in Chapter 5 is the delay of several months in the publication of two papers on

H5N1, which determined the causal gene for airborne transmission of the deadly influenza virus, due to the dual-use nature of the content and its potential consequences in biosecurity. If these papers had been published by the Soviet Union during the Cold War when U.S. Intelligence was assessing the presence of a BW program in the USSR, they could easily been counted as evidence of offensive research attempting to increase the virulence and airborne transmission of a virus for use as a BW. In its current context, it is valid research towards development of preventative measure against a potential pandemic.73

Intelligence memorandums from 1952 revealed the intention to gather more evidence for a BW program in the Soviet Union. The steps to be taken included assigning personnel in

72 Central Intelligence Agency, “Studies in Intelligence: The Enigma of Soviet BW,” Spring 1965, doc ID:60937 73 This is further explored in Chapter 5.

43 biology and medicine to review open literature; taking steps to collect more open literature abroad; and increasing the hours of systemic analysis by the CIA of special intelligence pertaining to areas of suspected BW potential.74 As seen in “The Enigma of Soviet BW,” such analyses were inconclusive up to 1965. And although a number of documents would subsequently refer to advances in biotechnology, molecular biology techniques, and genetic engineering in the Soviet Union (presumably through methods in published papers), none of the methods mentioned point exclusively towards illicit biological research.75 This leads us to the exploration of the next category, research methods and biotechnology.

Potential of Research and Equipment Being Within Scope of Defensive Research or Public Health and Agricultural Research

One of the main concerns about the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention was that it was not clear and precise in outlining the differences between offensive and defensive research. Does offensive or illicit research begin with the study of deadly and hazardous biological agents? Or does it begin when the researchers attempt to increase the virulence or toxicity of these bioagents? Unfortunately, the line is not particularly clear-cut. Biomedical research may encroach on “offensive” classification by studying the toxicity and pathogenic properties of biological agents for two related purposes – to understand the mechanism

74 Central Intelligence Agency, Replies and other documents to Aug 16 1952 Memorandums, April 18 1952- unknown, CIA-RDP80R01731R001300200006-4 (Top Secret) 75 Central Intelligence Agency, “New Directions in Soviet BCW Agent Development and their Implications,” January 24 1984, DOC_0001106197 (Top Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, NIE 11-17-86/S,” August 1986, DOC_0000238473 (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency, “The Soviet Offensive Chemical Warfare Threat to NATO, SNIE 11/17-2-84,” November 20 1984, DOC_0000284028 (Top Secret)

44 underlying the agent’s toxicity and to develop preventative, diagnostic, or treatment measures against the bio agent.

Research involved in improving public health can sometimes deal with select agents or testing the virulence, toxicity, or specific molecular mechanisms of action of certain viruses or organisms that cause disease. This is necessary in order to understand how to prevent infection or medicate infected persons. Take the example of HIV. Many research labs have focused on studying how HIV manages to evade typical immune responses and vaccines. One thing we learned from such research is that HIV is not very effective at multiplying its genetic code with strong fidelity. This results in new mutations at a rapid rate that can make various components of the virus resistant to drugs that previously were effective.

One can imagine how such research could be considered dual-use. Doesn’t our knowledge of mutations and methods of evasion by HIV teach us how viruses can be more toxic and immune to countermeasures? What prevents others from combining these mechanisms into a virus such as smallpox?

Despite this dual-use nature of biological research, intelligence agencies still attempted to gain perspective and to search for BW evidence through assessment of Soviet research and biotechnology. It is unclear specifically how this information was gathered, although it is unlikely that it was through covert means within the Soviet Union due to bioweapons not being placed as a high priority for threat and security analysis. But the list of indicators of potential

BW facilities includes several “technical considerations” that may contribute in differentiating legitimate biomedical research from illicit (indicator of a legitimate facility in parentheses for comparison).

45 • Pathogenic or toxic strains (Nonpathogenic or nontoxic strains) • Test aimed at killing animals (Test aimed at protecting animals) • Facilities for large animals such as monkeys (Facilities for smaller animals, specific inbred strains) • No commercial products (Commercial products)

Unfortunately, the list is not very comprehensive, and none of these factors are mentioned within the intelligence documents as differentiating legitimate of Soviet biomedical research from BW-related research. Though particular bio-agents were rarely mentioned in the documents, there was no indication of the research being done with pathogenic or nonpathogenic strains (which would require biological tests).

NIE 11-11-69, titled “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities” and produced in 1969, stated that, “In previous years, virtually all available evidence [of possible military applications in biological agents] could be related to Soviet work in epidemiology, public health, and sanitation, and defensive aspects of biological warfare (BW), but recent evidence points to the development of BW weapons.”76 This was one of the clearest admissions by the CIA that the dual-use nature of biological research poses analytical difficulties. But the summary of new evidence that the CIA regarded as pointing to the development of BW weapons was also ambiguous in its presentation and dual-use implications.

“We believe that, through their own research and open US literature, the Soviets are well aware of the properties of a variety of BW agents, and they have the technical capability to develop, produce, and stockpile them in militarily significant quantities. We have, however, insufficient evidence on which to base an estimate of the types and quantities of BW agents which might be available to the Soviets for offensive use. The Soviets have done research on increasing agent virulence and maintaining high virulence for extended periods of time, retarding aerobiological decay, adapting agents to unusual vectors and testing the infectivity of causative agents of disease not endemic to a particular geographic area.”77

76 Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities, NIE 11-11-69.” February 13, 1969. DOC_0000283815 (Secret) 77 Ibid.

46 Leitenberg and Zilinskas explore the contradictions within this paragraph.78 From a dual- use perspective, it is unclear how the CIA precisely determined the offensive nature of the BW program without knowledge of the BW agents used. Nevertheless, the CIA’s argument still holds some validity. Each of the research methods mentioned does point towards the potential of illicit research, especially the aerosolization of botulinum toxin mentioned at the end of the paragraph.

This is one of the most supportive pieces of evidence presented, since aerosolized botulinum toxin is highly lethal and potent and not used as a medical treatment.79 However, the vagueness of “research on increasing agent virulence” and “testing infectivity of causative agents of disease not endemic to the geographic area” could also be indicative of biodefense research (The subsequent section in this document discusses Soviet military training in defense against biological warfare). At the time this NIE was written, the United States still had an active offensive bioweapons R&D program. In this context, the Soviet biomedical research and biodefense training could easily be attributed to biodefense measures against a BW threat from the United States.

The fluctuating statements on the existence of a BW program in the Soviet Union, when combined with attributions of research to public health or biodefense appropriate, demonstrate the continuing uncertainty of US assessments. An intelligence cable from 1977 discussed how genetic engineering was being used in the Soviet Union to produce synthetic protein feed for livestock, and noted that the USSR was “rapidly expanding its protein synthesis technology.”80

Genetic engineering would be useful in this context in order to transfer a particular gene (which

78 Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. pp. 380 79 "Botulinum Toxin (Botulism) Fact Sheet." UPMC Center for Health Security. UPMC Center for Health Security, 13 Oct 2011. Web. 80 Central Intelligence Agency. “National Intelligence Daily Cable.” April 11, 1977. CIA- RDP79T00975A030000010018-8 (Top Secret)

47 codes for a protein) of interest into bacteria for easier mass production of a protein. Although genetic and genetic engineering techniques were mentioned in other reports as worrisome in terms of their BW applications, this intelligence cable made no reference to BW, but there is a page redacted.81 Nevertheless, it is clear that the context of the research was important for the assessment, and if the research counted as legitimate, uncertainty about the BW program would remain.

Even through the 1980’s, after analysis of the Sverdlovsk incident pointed towards a BW facility at Sverdlovsk, the quandary with detecting facilities or research that were illicit and offensive remained. This might have made it easier to turn a blind eye towards the growing evidence for a BW program in the Soviet Union. In 1986, the DIA discussed the Soviet

Biological Warfare Threat (based mostly on evidence from the Sverdlovsk incident) but concurrently recognized the role of modern biotechnology such as genetic engineering in agriculture and public health.82 An NIE produced in 1986 on the Soviet Chemical and Biological

Warfare Program also states that there are “over 100 industrial microbiological plants in the

Soviet Union, most doing clearly legitimate research to provide antibiotics, serums, and vaccines.”83 While making quite definite statements about the existence of a BW program in the

Soviet Union, the CIA at the same time shed doubt on this analysis by recognizing “legitimate facilities” using the same worrisome biotechnology. How did they differentiate between the legitimate and the illicit? Biopreparat, a section of the BW program implemented in the 1970’s under the guise of civilian-led research, certainly did not contribute towards elucidating these enigmas.

81 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Soviet Offensive Chemical Warfare Threat to NATO, SNIE 11/17-2-84,” November 20 1984, DOC_0000284028 (Top Secret) 82 Defense Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Biological Warfare Threat.” 1986. DST-1610F-057-86 83 Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, NIE 11-17-86/S,” August 1986, DOC_0000238473 (Secret)

48 A Case Study of the Sverdlovsk Incident - Difficulty of BW Event Attribution

On April 2, 1979, an accidental release of anthrax at a biological warfare facility in

Sverdlovsk resulted in the death of at least 68 people. It wasn’t until October that CIA and DIA documents began to acknowledge rumors of this accident and to speculate on its cause. Although eventually the incident was used as a “smoking gun,” it is a prime example of the dual-use uncertainty that can plague an investigation even when it seems quite certain that BW is involved.

This particular case differs from intelligence acquisition on potential BW activity because it was an attempt to determine if BW caused an actual outbreak of disease. A compilation of documents related to the incident in the National Security Archive shows that the main focus of intelligence gathering was human intelligence rather than imagery intelligence or publication analysis, which would have looked at actual facilities to determine their capabilities. Indeed, a number of documents refer to information gathered from Soviet émigrés or persons still living in the Soviet Union. The event would have been impossible to attribute otherwise. The event required epidemiological study – what was it about the anthrax outbreak that differed from a natural outbreak, and how did this point to BW research or weapons storage by the Soviet

Union?84 These questions relate closely to those we come across when analyzing biological research for indications of illicit pursuits. Even in the event of an “unnatural” outbreak due to accidental release from a BW facility, what indicates that the research was in the realm of public health, BW defense, or BW offense? Thus, two dual-use questions needed to be answered about the Sverdlovsk incident – was it a natural epidemic or an intentional attack, and if neither, what was the purpose and intent behind the R&D that resulted in the accidental outbreak?

84 Epidemiology is the branch of medicine that deals with the incidence, distribution, and control of diseases and other factors relating to health.

49 An initial CIA document from October 1979 reported rumors surrounding an epidemic of deaths that might have been related to an accident at a BW facility in Sverdlovsk.85 Although it seemed certain that there had been a disease-related outbreak, the CIA was careful to state that

“an accident at an unnamed BW institute in Sverdlovsk remains speculation and is only one possible explanation for these rumors.” It also noted that there was insufficient evidence to attribute the deaths to storage of a BW agent. A similar report by the DIA additionally stated that there was a facility in Sverdlovsk that was suspected of being connected to BW.86 Furthermore, these reports stated that it was unlikely that the Soviets would be working with large quantities of dangerous biological agents without appropriate prophylactic and treatment measures in place.

However, this was clearly not a universally used indicator for differentiating BW research, since in a 1981 report the Department of the Army stated that limited effectiveness of treatment and prophylaxis in Sverdlovsk was an indicator of the release of large quantities of anthrax spores.87

Once anthrax was suspected as the causative agent, analysts had to determine the type of anthrax infection that occurred in order to more accurately determine the cause of the outbreak.

An anthrax infection can be subcutaneous (infection of an open wound in the skin), respiratory

(caused by inhaled anthrax spores), or gastrointestinal (common amongst grazing animals, and due to ingested anthrax). Subcutaneous infections are most common, accounting for around 95% of cases, and gastrointestinal the least common and accounting for less than 1%.88

Gastrointestinal anthrax due to contaminated meat was the explanation provided by the Soviet

85 Central Intelligence Agency. “BIOLOGICAL WARFARE – USSR: Additional Rumors of an Accident at the Biological Warfare Institute in Sverdlovsk.” Intelligence Report. October 15, 1979. (Top Secret). National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive 86 Defense Intelligence Agency. “Excerpt: Soviet Biological Accident Rumored.” Weekly Intelligence Summary. November 9, 1979. (Secret). National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive 87 Department of the Army, Military Operations. “Alleged Biological Warfare Agent Incident at Sverdlovsk.” NCC Report. October 23, 1981. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive 88Cunha, Burke. "Anthrax." Medscape Reference: Drugs Diseases and Procedures. WebMD, 24 Dec 2012. Web.

50 Union, although intelligence reports claimed that the cases of infection and autopsies pointed towards a respiratory infection.89 Such distinctions would be impossible without human intelligence, although later intelligence documents from 1980 onwards cite Russian newspaper accounts that contributed towards BW attribution. It is interesting, however, that the CIA dismissed gastrointestinal anthrax partially on the basis of it being a “rare disease” when pulmonary anthrax is also relatively rare in comparison to subcutaneous anthrax infections.90

Although their speculation that it was respiratory anthrax infections was correct, their methods of reaching this hypothesis appear flawed and may cause problems in the future.

Although intelligence agencies were on the right track in determining the cause of the

Sverdlovsk incident, it is clear that the difficulties in attribution of public health prevented an unequivocal explanation. A January 1980 document from the CIA showed that although they believed the accident was at a BW installation, “The magnitude of the epidemic and the causative organism remain conjecture.”91 Nevertheless, the DIA was more certain in its analysis that anthrax was the causative agent, which supported the idea of offensive BW research in

Sverdlovsk since the amount of spores necessary to cause an epidemic of such size exceeded the amount that would suffice for public health research.92 However, no new evidence besides the outbreak itself was presented for confirmation that the facility was indeed a BW R&D installation.

89 Wampler , Robert A., and Thomas S. Blanton. "Volume V: Anthrax at Sverdlovsk. US Intelligence on the Deadliest Modern Outbreak." 2001. The National Security Archive. Web. 90 Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Biological Warfare Agent: Probable Cause of the Anthrax Epidemic In Sverdlovsk.” Intelligence Memorandum. 1980. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive 91 Central Intelligence Agency. “USSR: Biological Warfare (BW) Accident in Sverdlovsk” Intelligence Report. January 16, 1980. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive 92 Defense Intelligence Agency. “Trends and Developments: Foreign Technology Weapons and Systems.” March 3, 1980. (Top Secret). National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive

51 In the mid to late 1980’s, re-assessment of the case by Dr. Matthew Meselson, a biochemistry scientist who was previously involved in the U.S. decision to end its own BW program, showed continued ambiguity surrounding the Sverdlovsk case. A State Department

Cable stated that Dr. Meselson held doubts about the thoroughness of the 1980 U.S. study of the incident, and was also not satisfied by the Soviet explanation.93 Meselson presented in 1986 the possibility of gastrointestinal anthrax being a plausible explanation when considering the context of Russian culture – slow simmering of meat would only partially sterilize anthrax spores, and greater male vulnerability due to ulcers or gastritis from alcohol would explain the disproportionate number of adult male victims.94 Inspections conducted by a team led by

Meselson in 1992 finally convinced him that the incident was due to a release of anthrax spores from the Sverdlovsk facility.

Although U.S. intelligence was pointed towards the correct conclusion in the Sverdlovsk incident thanks to previous speculation about a BW program in the Soviet Union, its assessment of the incident would have been impossible without the intelligence gathered from Soviet immigrants. It was still limited in its assertions because it could not make an on-site inspection.

Perhaps today it would be much harder for a country to censor an incident that impacted civilians who are not sworn to secrecy and could freely post their experiences on the Internet. Evidence against the Soviet Union for violating the BWC became stronger thanks to the number of accounts provided by human intelligence. Nevertheless, although the incident refocused U.S.

93 Department of State. “Secretary of State to U.S. Mission, Geneva. Subject: Sverdlovsk – Visit to Washington of Professor Meselson.” Cable No. 291907. September 17, 1986. (Secret) National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive 94 Other documents in the archive disclaimed the gastrointestinal anthrax theory since cooking of the meat would kill anthrax spores. Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Explanation of Anthrax Accident in Sverdlovsk: The Deception Continues.” Directorate of Intelligence Report. May 15, 1988. (Top Secret). National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.61. The National Security Archive

52 intelligence back on the BW threat posed by the Soviet Union, it did not reveal the scope of the entire Soviet BW program. As shown in the previous chapter, DIA reports after the Sverdlovsk incident often singled out the Sverdlovsk incident as the sole evidence of a BW development by the Soviet Union.

U.S. intelligence did gather sporadic information from open literature or Soviet immigrants that indicated the possibility of a BW program in the Soviet Union. However, the reports were rarely conclusive, and speculation about BW development was often countered with the possibility of public health or defensive research. Buildings where offensive research was being conducted could not identified as such from the outside. It took a deadly outbreak of anthrax, which displayed signs of not being a natural epidemic, and witness accounts of that outbreak to indicate that the Soviet Union might be violating the BWC. Nevertheless, doubts remained, and those doubts were not removed until on-site inspections were made possible following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

“The VECTOR lab [in Koltsovo, Russia] had dynamic aerosol chambers…they could simulate UV, control the temperature, humidity, and test what they would expect to see in a [certain] environmental setting. That was really impressive, and totally unnecessary for a medical biodefense program.” – David Franz, describing his account of a former BW facility when he visited the USSR as part of a US/UK team in January, 199195

95 Franz, David. Internet Videoconference Interview. 7 May 2013.

53 Chapter 4. Assessment Through the Lens of Intelligence Failure

The nature of biological research played a clear role in the uncertainty that plagued the intelligence community when assessing the Soviet biological weapons research and development program. However, the documents analyzed also suggest the possibility of other intelligence failure theories playing a role in the miscalculation of Soviet BW. In this chapter, I assess the information found in the documents and the general trends through the lens of typical intelligence failure theories: failure to prioritize, mirror imaging, failure to warn, and blindness by another issue, in this case, chemical weapons.

Lack of Prioritization for Biowarfare Threats

Prioritization of intelligence collection and analysis requirements is a necessity in the intelligence community. What threats, regions, or subjects are given focus and priority is in part determined by political interests and in part by the interests or priorities of the military services or the intelligence agencies themselves. Thus, certain issues do not receive priority for intelligence collection or analysis because they are not a pressing issue for Congress or the military, which might otherwise request (or demand) more data and analysis on the issue. In the classic text, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Mark Lowenthal explains that it is simply impossible to give sufficient attention to every intelligence issue due to the limited number of resources available to gather or process collection data:

“Both policy makers and the intelligence officers acting on their behalf request increased collection on certain issues. However, their requests are made within a system that is inelastic in terms of both technical and human collectors…Moreover, the system has little or no surge capacity…Similarly, one does not simply tap a clandestine services officer

54 and send him or her off to a new assignment…Inelasticity of resources makes the priorities system difficult at best.” 96

It is clear through the review of intelligence documents produced during the Cold War

(see Chapter 2) that the US intelligence community did not have a complete blind spot when it came to bioweapons R&D in the Soviet Union. The trend in the documents showed a varying level of detail and certainty about the Soviet bioweapons program. This may be indicative of varying priority given to the collection of evidence on the bioweapons program and of the amount of manpower assigned by the intelligence community to analyzing the data collected.

Several memorandums from 1952 declassified as one document (which will be referenced throughout this section) show that despite the recognition of intelligence gaps on biological warfare, there was difficulty in prioritizing the issue to a high enough level so that clandestine collection resources could be utilized.97 The first document is dated April 18, 1952, and is a request to the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the CIA by the Director of Research under the Office of the Secretary of Defense for further study on “certain aspects on the offensive use of anti-crop pathogens.” Notably, the first paragraph of the letter states, “The

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has been requested by the Secretary of Defense to prepare, as a matter of priority, an evaluation of biological warfare.” However, this was simply an indication of analysis and evaluation priority by the Secretary of Defense, rather than a priority for data collection. Mr. Robertson, Director of Research, also writes:

“Specifically, we require an estimate of the land use pattern of the principal cereal grain growing oblasts of the USSR and an estimate of the probable spread of infestation…[indiscernible writing] has agreed to undertake the monitorship of this project and to furnish the data on land use pattern…”

96 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence : From Secrets to Policy. 5th ed. Los Angeles: Sage/CQ Press, 2012, pg 76 97 Central Intelligence Agency. Replies and other documents to Aug 16 1952 Memorandums. April 18 1952- unknown. CIA- RDP80R01731R001300200006-4 (Top Secret)

55 Although biological warfare evaluation was prioritized within the Department of Defense, it is nevertheless critical to note that this request did not explicitly ask the CIA for any special data collection, which might have required more resources. The Deputy Director of the CIA, Leftos

E. Becker, agreed to have the requested studies prepared.

As referenced in Chapter 2, Robert A. Lovett, the Secretary of Defense, wrote a memorandum on August 16, 1952 to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the CIA. Despite such study requests as mentioned above,

Lovett focuses on two critical items:

“1. There is an acute requirement for more reliable information regarding Soviet activities, capabilities, and intentions concerning biological warfare. Current intelligence on this subject is so sparse that it does not provide a satisfactory basis for overall evaluation or formulation of Department of Defense planning in this field. 2. The difficulties inherent in gathering intelligence on this subject are recognized. However, the continuing need for more complete and reliable information appears to dictate an accelerated emphasis on biological warfare intelligence.”

Reliable intelligence on BW was sparse, and prioritization of emphasis on BW was necessary in order to gather sufficient evidence. Subsequent responses from Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the CIA, chronicle the attempts made to resolve the issue of inadequate intelligence on BW. In

September 1952, Smith writes that the agency is “needling the collection activities that are subject to [their] control through the Inter-Agency Priorities Committee.” In addition, Smith states the CIA sought higher priority for BW information from USCIB, but noted that the bulk of research activity improvement would have to be done by the DoD (with supplemental research from the CIA). However, a subsequent memorandum by Smith sent a month later stated that priority for covert collection of BW intelligence had not been raised.

“Both the Inter-Agency Priorities Committee and the Intelligence Advisory Committee have considered the BW problem. The Defense agencies do not desire to raise the priority for cover collection of BW intelligence at this time since it would compete with other

56 collection requirements now established by the Department of Defense as vital to early warning responsibilities.”98

Despite an increase in BW intelligence priority by the USCIB and the State Department

(also stated in the referenced memorandum), it is important to note that the Defense Department did not raise the priority because it would compete with other requirements. As an example of

Lowenthal’s description of competing collection priorities described in the beginning of this section, certain issues in 1952 took precedence over BW when it came to using limited resources for covert intelligence collection. One can hypothesize that a major priority was gathering intelligence on nuclear weapons development in the Soviet Union, and any intelligence that might indicate a potential threat of attack. However, I would not argue that this was a case of nuclear blindness or an intelligence failure by the CIA. The potential threat of BW was indeed recognized, but the CIA could not allocate adequate resources for intelligence collection due to lack of prioritization by the IAC. This lack of prioritization for BW intelligence was a deliberate choice by the Defense agencies, and considering the inelasticity of the amount of resources available for data collection, this may have been an appropriate choice if the other priorities posed greater risk at that particular time. It is impossible to know how threat analysis might have changed if collection resources were reallocated towards BW.

In summary, although it was clear in the early 50’s that BW intelligence collection was not prioritized, this was a deliberate choice by the Defense Department with consideration of the existing collection priorities and not blindness by the CIA (or other agencies and departments) to the necessity of more concrete BW intelligence.

98 Ibid The Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) comprised the leaders of the military and civilian intelligence agencies. United States. U.S. Government Printing Office. Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-A Historical Overview. Web.

57 Failure to Warn

Failure to warn is an intelligence failure possibility that stems directly from the previous section’s discussion on lack of prioritization. A lack of priority for BW in Congress, rather than in the intelligence community, could have stemmed from a failure to alert the administration of the BW threat developing in the Soviet Union. Adequate warning and emphasis by the intelligence community could have alerted Congress which in turn could enforce a change in prioritization. The probability of failure to warn appears high when one considers that the documents analyzed in Chapter 2 show that US intelligence had at least some awareness of a

Soviet BW program, although it lacked specific information on the scope of the program. Could this lack of certainty have stemmed from the failure of the intelligence community to warn the administration that without a change in priority, a major threat might be missed?

As discussed in the previous section, the administration, Congress, and military can influence intelligence acquisition priorities through requests for additional information or specific requests for changes in priority. Perhaps if the intelligence community had made greater efforts to put the BW issue front and center, covert intelligence acquisition would have been utilized to gather more evidence and perhaps create greater certainty on the Soviet BW program.

I found few Congressional reports that discussed bioweapons and biosecurity pertaining to the

Soviet Union. However, there was one example of Congress critiquing the intelligence community for not providing earlier warning on the Soviet BW threat before the Sverdlovsk incident. The report on Soviet BW Activities by a Congressional Subcommittee on Oversight stated that despite the doubts about Soviet compliance with the BWC and lack of sufficient evidence to prove a violation, the intelligence community should nevertheless alert policy

58 makers to “evidence inconsistent with the objective of the Convention.”99 Furthermore, a

Congressional Record from December 1970 discusses biological weapons in depth, but mostly in the US context – speeches range from discussion of the decision to end the US BW program, as well as inconsistencies in policies relating to BW/CW weapons use (in relation to allegations of tear gas use and other CW in Vietnam).100 There was only one mention of a biological warfare program in the Soviet Union.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, President Nixon took action to end the US program in the hope that it would lead other nations to end their own programs or not pursue BW at all.

Although Congress and the administration appear to have been at least aware of the debate about a Soviet BW program, the intelligence community may not have provided sufficient warning to ensure proper prioritization. Based on the 1980 Congressional Report, the US intelligence community did have more information than Congress was aware of and they were criticized by

Congress for not taking more action to warn. There is a vicious cycle here: uncertainty in the intelligence community about Soviet activities, and the consequent failure to press for higher priority, may have resulted in the lack of resources being dedicated towards gathering the necessary direct, Soviet human intelligence to prove the program’s existence. On the other hand, intelligence community attempts to warn Congress and administration of the Soviet BW threat might have fallen on deaf ears. David Franz recounts that he spoke with several retired intelligence analysts who truly believed they knew quite a bit about the program, but many people didn’t believe them that the Soviet Union could have such a program.101

99 United States. Select Committee on Intelligence. House. Soviet Biological Warfare Activities. 1980. Web. 100 United States. House of Representatives. Congressional Record - December 30, 1970. 1970. Web. 101 Franz, David. Internet Videoconference Interview. 7 May 2013.

59 Unfortunately, it is difficult without full documentation of actions taken by the intelligence community to gather intelligence on BW to speculate further on whether intelligence was to blame for failure to warn, or whether there was lack of prioritization of BW on both the side of intelligence agencies and other government entities.

Did Mirror-Imaging Lead to Complacency?

Mirror imaging assumes “that other leaders, states, and groups share motivations or goals similar to those most familiar to the analyst.”102 This type of analytical tool, however, fails to take other factors into account, such as differences in motivation, perception, and rationale, and may lead to intelligence failure. The flaw of mirror imaging may occur at an individual or systemic basis and may lead to complacency on an issue or inappropriate action.

Although it would be difficult to prove that U.S. intelligence analysts were influenced by a mirror-imaging mindset, we can theorize that this could have been the case based on documents that discuss the negotiations for an international agreement on a BW weapons ban

(which ultimately resulted in the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention by both the US and the USSR in 1972). NIE-11-11-69, produced February 13, 1969, was mostly dedicated to chemical warfare, but 2 out of 10 pages described intelligence pointing to Soviet BW R&D programs and noted that some Soviet research studies were highly suspect of offensive agent research and development.103 However, the same year, talks began on a potential BW treaty and

102 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence : From Secrets to Policy. 5th ed. Los Angeles: Sage/CQ Press, 2012. Pp.129 103 Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities, NIE 11-11-69.” February 13, 1969. DOC_0000283815 (Secret)

60 several Central Intelligence Bulletins detail the US and Soviet positions on the issue. Below is a timeline summary of bulletins produced between September 9, 1969 and March 14, 1972.104

• Sep 9, 1969 – Swedish Draft of a BW-use ban is introduced, but Moscow remained opposed to initiatives that do not cover ban on production and may produce its own draft. • Sep 23, 1969 – Soviet draft proposal prohibits all biological and chemical weapons (BW/CW) activity and there are no provisions for inspections or verification of compliance. • Feb 16, 1970 – USSR will introduce a comprehensive BW/CW draft treaty, but the draft lacks verification procedures. The US supports the British BW version of the treaty. The request to discuss disarmament seen as Soviet ploy. • Feb 19, 1970 – USSR prefers comprehensive ban on BW/CW, but the US wants only a BW ban. • Apr 17, 1970 – Poland, Hungary, and Mongolia submit a verification amendment to the Soviet draft (UN Security Council can order on-site inspections), but most likely this will not be regarded as sufficient. • Jul 23, 1971 – USSR accommodate changes desired by the US in the draft treaty and in March dropped insistence on an all-embracing CW inclusion. • Mar 14, 1972 – USSR was again circulating a draft convention banning CW, but remains opposed to international inspections.

The BWC was ultimately opened for signature on April 10, 1972 and was essentially a

“gentlemen’s agreement” since it provided limited capability for verification of compliance (The

UN Security Council nations could veto any requests for on-site inspections).105 These documents show a strong drive by the Soviets to impose a ban on both BW and CW. It was easy

104 Central Intelligence Agency. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” September 9, 1969. CIA- RDP79T00975A014500050001-5. (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” September 23, 1969. CIA- RDP79T00975A014600040001-5. (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” February 16, 1970. CIA- RDP79T00975A015600030001-5. (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” February 19, 1970. CIA- RDP79T00975A015600060001-1. (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” April 17, 1970. CIA-RDP79T00975A016000080001- 5. (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” July 23, 1971. CIA-RDP79T00975A019600030001-1. (Secret) Central Intelligence Agency. “Central Intelligence Bulletin.” March 14, 1972. CIA-RDP79T00975A021400070001- 6. (Secret) 105 Arms Control Association. "Biological Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties." Armscontrol.org. Web.

61 for the US to agree on BW – President Nixon ended the program by late 1969. However, CW was still a contentious issue and it is unclear exactly why the US wanted to maintain control over the possibility of developing or stockpiling CW.

The Soviets did not argue or present potential verification procedures to ensure compliance, and this nevertheless should have been a red flag for the intelligence community.

However, neither the US nor the UK made conscientious efforts to include thorough provisions for verification. The documents I managed to find dealing with Soviet BW during the period of the BWC negotiations and the period until the Sverdlovsk incident, sharply decreased.

Intelligence analysts thus might have fallen into the trap of mirror imaging. The US had ended its own program in the hope that other countries would follow its lead, and the Soviets made a strong push for a CW/BW ban, but neither side pressed for strong verification provisions in the convention. Both the US and the USSR signed the convention. Analysts might have conceived it to be rational that, when considering these factors, the Soviet Union would not make attempts to grow a large BW program and would halt any development they had begun. American motivations and rationales were imposed upon the Soviet Union. But the Soviet BW program was first and foremost a top-secret military institution, with top party and government leaders sometimes in the dark about the program itself. If US intelligence did fall prey to mirror imaging, then its rationale clearly did not match that of the Soviets. A 1990 memo from an executive in the Soviet communist party to Mikhail Gorbachev explains the (unfounded) reasoning behind the amplification of the Soviet BW program:

“According to some data, the NATO countries took advantage of the situation [after signing the Convention] to engage in intensive development and production of especially aggressive biological infectious agents. Some of this work is being

62 done on the territory of third countries that had not signed the Convention. Forced to respond, our country also carried out such work until 1989.” – Lev Zaikov 106

Chemical Blindness

In Chapter 2, I presented the possibility of chemical blindness as a factor in the US intelligence underestimation of the Soviet BW program. Nuclear blindness, as discussed in

Chapter 2, was described as having affected BW analysis by the idea of ‘the bigger the bang, the greater the threat.’ However, chemical blindness is a more sound possibility for exploration due to the close association of chemical and biological weapons. Chemical blindness could have factored into intelligence analysis or Congressional prioritization of issues. In this section I will focus on the possibility of chemical blindness in the intelligence community, although previously mentioned Congressional Records also display a tendency towards discussing BW and CW together. My focus, however, is on the causes of the intelligence community’s underestimation of the BW threat, and previous sections addressed the possibility of Congress and other government entities failing to enact priority for biosecurity issues and consequentially priority for BW in intelligence.

Most notably, NIE 11-11-69, titled “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare

Capabilities,” dedicated only 2 out of 10 pages to bioweapons discussion and evidence of a BW program in the Soviet Union. NIE 11-17-86/S, produced in August 1986, stated that, “The Soviet maintained the world’s most comprehensive chemical and biological warfare program…this capability constitutes a serious threat to NATO,” and then proceeded to dedicate the majority of the estimate to discussion of chemical weapons development in the Soviet Union and doctrines

106 The Zaikov letter to Gorbachev, Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev papers, Hoover Institution Archives. Web: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB315/doc06.pdf

63 governing the use of CW in case of war.107 Somewhat disconcerting is the apparent lack of distinction between CW and BW and their unique and distinct development processes. The same

NIE states that, “Modernization of the Soviet CBW arsenal, ongoing for more than a decade, has concentrated on exploiting advances in biotechnology such as genetic engineering.” This may simply be a matter of sentence structure, but genetic engineering biotechnology would play no role in modernization of CW, since CWs cannot be manufactured by genes (which produce proteins, not chemicals). A similar statement was made in SNIE11/17-84/CX.108

A misunderstanding of the differing sciences and methods behind CW and BW could have led to underestimation of the BW program by wrongly encompassing BW R&D under the evidence of CW development. US intelligence had greater evidence for the CW program, as chemical weapons are also easier to detect by nature of their manufacture.109 Encompassing BW under the evidence available of CW would lead to a false understanding of the scope of the BW program, resulting in minimization of intelligence acquisition specifically related to BW since the intelligence appears to have already been there (but CW was a separate endeavor than BW in the Soviet Union).

Why would there be more analysis of CW development than BW in the first place? One major possibility is that analysts were simply more familiar and certain with CW than BW.

Modern CW had been used since WWI, including in the Vietnam War (one CW commonly known as Agent Orange). The US maintained its own BW program until 1969, but there was lack of familiarity with BW on the battlefield, even though its potential effects and dangers were

107 Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, SNIE 11-17-86/S,” August 1986, DOC_0000238473 (Secret) 108 Central Intelligence Agency, “New Directions in Soviet BCW Agent Development and Their Implications, SNIE 11/17-84/CX” January 24 1984, DOC_0001106197 (Top Secret) 109 For example, chemical weapons development can be traced through purchases of certain chemicals to be used for synthesis of CW. BW can be much harder to trace in this respect as BW agents can be acquired from the environment.

64 known. Furthermore, BWC did not ban CW and thus US intelligence might have considered CW a greater threat since the Soviet Union did ratify the BWC. On the other hand, the sense of prior urgency in early CIA documents showed familiarity with the dangers of BW and the overwhelming gaps in intelligence about BW in the Soviet Union, so it is unclear why US intelligence would thus choose to give more focus and resources towards CW analysis over BW

(possibly resulting from Government and Military requests).

Even if chemical blindness did affect intelligence analysis of the Soviet BW program, preoccupation with chemical weapons does not explain why intelligence that was gathered on the

BW program could not be analyzed with certainty, but simply that more resources might have been given towards the acquisition of chemical intelligence at the expense of biological intelligence.

Conclusions on the Role of Intelligence Failure

Ultimately, even if US intelligence did fail to warn the Government, was complacent, or analysis was influenced by chemical blindness, the ultimate upstream cause is the lack of certainty about the Soviet BW program due to the dual-use nature of biological research. If this uncertainty was resolved, more priority might have been given to BW intelligence acquisition to provide further evidence for the accusations and alert the Government of the threat. Failure to initially prioritize BW intelligence acquisition also played a role in the underestimation of the

Soviet BW program. What remains is an unfortunate vicious circle, with dual-use uncertainty and lack of prioritization influencing each other with the unfortunate result of an underrated threat.

65 Chapter 5. Moving Forward in Dual-Use Biological Research Security

The realization that the Soviet Union had a massive bioweapons program shed light again on the perpetual issue of biosecurity. The gross miscalculation of the size and capacity of the

Soviet program also highlighted the fact that the methods used to detect illicit biological research were not comprehensive and accurate enough to detect potential international security risks. The anthrax-letter attacks in October, 2001, as well as the United States overestimation of a biological weapons threat in Iraq in 2003, show that there is still room for improving how the intelligence and government communities assess biological security risks. The aim should be to provide accurate calculations of risk without halting research in the life sciences all-together.

When speaking of biological research security, one of the first comparative examples that come to mind is the case of nuclear physics and nuclear weapons. However, the nature of research in these two fields is drastically different, and thus I will explain why the methods of risk assessment used for nuclear weapons development cannot be used for assessing a biological weapons threat. Furthermore, even though we now understand the miscalculation in the Soviet case, we must explore how today’s biosecurity threats differ from those during the Cold War.

With this information, along with current scholarly discussions of dual-use biological research, I will assess the best methods for assessing and detecting future biological weapons threats.

Nuclear vs. Biological Weapons Dual Use Research

Because of the attention given to nuclear non-proliferation and current attempts to distinguish between illicit and civilian nuclear research and Uranium enrichment in Iran, one is left wondering if the same methods of risk assessment used to detect nuclear weapons

66 development can be used for detection of biological weapons development. Unfortunately, the two fields today are very different in terms of the nature of the dual use research with respect to weapons development.

The most obvious distinction is that it is unlikely that a new nuclear weapon will be developed. Although delivery methods and refinement of existing military technology can improve the strategic and tactical use of nuclear weapons, such improvements do not lie at the core dual use research in nuclear physics but rather explicitly in the realm of military technology development. The nature of the bomb, the science of the physics that explains how the nuclear reaction occurs to release massive amounts of energy, is a system that has been studied to most likely the fullest extent. On the other hand, there are many complex pathways, connections, and systems being discovered in biology. And although physics lays the foundation for the laws of the universe, there is an exponentially greater amount of systems and processes to exploit within biology for weapons development. John L. Finney, a professor of physics at University College

London, provides an excellent description of how biological research looks different from research in physics, and thus changes the outlook on dual use within the field of biology:

…the fact that the physics of nuclear weapons has already been done…[Biological science] concerns processes relating to living systems, and works with relatively large molecular entities and assemblies that have particular functionalities, such as cells, organelles, ribosomes, genes, enzymes, and DNA…We want to understand how biologically relevant entities operate and interact, and how their operation can be tailored to work more or less effectively.110

Although Finney fails to account for research in other types of weapons development in his comparison, his argument still stands because the laws of physics, in general, are known, whereas there are many complex systems within biology that are still being explored. He goes on

110 Rappert, Brian, and Caitriona McLeish. A Web of Prevention : Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research. London: Earthscan, 2007

67 to mention the range of biological research that could be relevant to future weapons development111:

• Synthetic biology • Post-genomic technologies • Immunological research • Drug discovery and delivery • Agricultural and environmental biotechnology • Diagnosis and surveillance of infectious diseases

Furthermore, some systems and pathways that are relatively understood within the biological sciences are beginning to appear more complicated with further research, furthering the potential that some aspect of a biological system can be taken advantage of for illicit purposes.

It is also important to mention the treatment of research historically within these two areas of science. Although nuclear physics has a long history of censorship112, biological research publication has enjoyed much more mild censorship treatment and research from laboratories all over the world is published in journals such as Nature and Cell.

…information about how to produce biological weapons is readily available in published scientific literature. In comparison with nuclear science, where discoveries with weapons implications are usually classified, information sharing in the life sciences has traditionally been completely open.113

In addition, under The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, it is illegal for scientists to conduct research on biological weapons, whereas “within the five nuclear weapons states as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is no international convention prohibiting working on [nuclear weapons].”114 Although this at first appears to simplify the issue of dual use biological research, we are instead left with the necessity to carefully assess research that may be

111 Ibid. 112 Miller, Seumas, and Michael J Selgelid. Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-use Dilemma In the Biological Sciences. [New York]: Springer, 2008 113 National Research Council. Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2004. Web. 114 Rappert, Brian, and Caitriona McLeish. A Web of Prevention : Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research. London: Earthscan, 2007

68 of potential concern in terms of being a biosecurity risk as well as potentially control the use of technology resulting from new research in the life sciences or that increase the ease with which one can pursue certain methods in the life sciences (for illicit purposes).

Today’s Biological Threats and the Difficulty of Detection

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) specifically defines dual use research of concern (DURC) in the biological sciences as “research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or materiel.”115 But has the biological weapons threat changed in any way since the discovery of the Soviet Union’s bioweapons program over two decades ago?

As stated in the first chapter, there was a specific set of viruses, bacteria, and toxins that were weaponized and stockpiled by the United States prior to 1969, and the Soviet Union program worked on a similar list of biological agents for weaponization and increase in virulence.

115 "Dual Use Research." Office of Biotechnology Activities. Office of Science Policy - National Institutes of Health. Web. 14 Feb 2013 http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity.html

69 Table 4. Agents Validated for Biological Weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union116 United States Soviet Union Bacteria Bacillus anthracis Bacillus anthracis Brucella suis Brucella species Coxiella burnetii Coxiella burnetii Francisella tularensis Francisella tularensis Burkholderia mallei Burkholderia pseudomallei (?) Viruses Yersinia pestis Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus Toxins Botulinum toxin Marburg Virus Staphylococcal enterotoxin B Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus Variola virus

Botulinum toxin

Each of the agents listed in Table 4 is also part of the Select Agents and Toxins List that is a compilation of select agents lists from the Department of Health and Human Services and the

Department of Agriculture.117 Each of the agents that are present on the Soviet list but not on the

United States list are also designated as Tier 1 agents, which are defined as “biological agents and toxins [that] present the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effect to the economy, critical infrastructure, or public confidence, and pose a severe threat to public health and safety.”118

But what does each of these lists signify in terms of threats to biosecurity? On the one hand, we can speculate that persons, agencies, or institutions that conduct research on any of these toxins could be posing a security risk by either conducting research for military or offensive purposes or allowing others to gain access to the select agents or toxins. This is why laboratory research of many of these agents or toxins typically requires a laboratory biosafety

116 Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012. pp.288 117 United States. National Select Agent Registry. Select Agents and Toxins List. Revised December 4, 2012. Web 118 Ibid.

70 level designation of 3 or higher.119 On March 29, 2012, the U.S. government also released a new policy that requires federal agencies to review all projects, proposed and already funded, for

DURC potential and to develop a “risk mitigation plan” or “request voluntary redaction of the research publications or communications” for especially sensitive research.120 At the same time, the nature of research in the biological sciences requires the study of such bacteria, viruses, or toxins in order to even begin to fathom potential defensive strategies against these agents.

Although the Soviet Union made attempts to increase the virulence of the agents and toxins that they worked on, it is unclear if they actually succeeded in these endeavors. In terms of international security, today we face a much bigger threat than just weaponization and stockpiling of select agents and toxins. With current advances in research techniques and technology, scientists would not necessarily be limited to a specific set of viruses, bacteria, or toxins in creating a biological weapon. Technically, any genomic DNA can be recombined and theoretically one can create a new bacteria or virus from the properties of others. A clinical use of such technology includes reengineering viruses for gene and protein therapy, such as that of using a disabled HIV virus to reengineer the T-cells of a patient to help those cells fight leukemia.121 Such endeavors have become more commonplace and easier to achieve with increased study of genetics thanks to the development of techniques such as Polymerase Chain

Reaction (clones DNA sequences), faster and cheaper methods of genetic sequencing, and increased knowledge of cellular and molecular systems.

119 National Research Council (US) Committee on Scientific Milestones for the Development of a Gene Sequence- Based Classification System for the Oversight of Select Agents. “Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line.” Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2010. Web. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50865/ 120 Malakoff, David. "U.S. Requires New Dual-Use Biological Research Reviews." Science Insider (Science) 29 Mar. 2012 Web. 13 Jan. 2013. 121 Bates, Claire. "The cancer girl cured by the HIV virus: Seven-year-old makes extraordinary recovery after U.S. doctors re-wire her immune system to destroy leukemia cells." Daily Mail . 11 Dec 2012

71 Concurrently, publicized research can now easily be searched for and accessed on the web through websites such as PubMed.gov. Although access to full texts of many articles is restricted to subscribers of the corresponding databases or journals, institutions such as universities or national laboratories purchase online and/or print access to these journals for the whole member body of the institution. This means that unlike during the Cold War when the

Soviet Union restricted access for Soviet scientists to Western scientific journals and publications, people all over the world can find access to current biological research, techniques, and technology via the Internet. Furthermore, with the current growing genomic databases, viruses can be rebuilt without the natural virus template.122

The landscape in which we deal with threats stemming from dual-use biological research has changed since the case of the Soviet bioweapons program. However, the premise remains the same in that research on certain agents and toxins can straddle a fine line between beneficial and malevolent, and there remains a significant variety of ways through which a state or non-state actor can pursue the development of a biological weapon.

122Scientists at Stony Brook School of Medicine were able to recreate infectious poliovirus from scratch by using a published poliovirus DNA sequence to rebuild the complementary DNA of the virus, which was translated to viral RNA through a RNA polymerase. This viral RNA replicated and created infectious virus in a cell-free extract. This has had major implications for the field of biosecurity, since it was shown that a person does not need to directly acquire a whole and infectious pathogen. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 1, such experiments can require years of technical expertise in the biological sciences. Cello, J., AV. Paul, and E. Wimmer. "Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template." Science. 297.5583 (2002): 1016-1018. Web. 1 Feb. 2013

72 Handling potential biosecurity threats in the dual-use realm

Today, biosecurity risks can be mitigated preventatively with two strategies: (a) censorship of dual use research and technology or (b) countering illicit actions in research or weapons development by a state or non-state. Needless to say, the strategies are linked by the fact that states or non-state actors retain the possibility of accessing information on dual use research for illicit means.

Intelligence assessment must put emerging biotechnology threats in context. There are obstacles to biological weapons proliferation, one of which is the expertise required to appropriately understand and manipulate scientific content found online in journals and publications.123 Sonia B. Ouagrham-Gormley and Kathleen Vogel argue that the biosecurity risk of knowledge proliferation for weapons development is slightly overblown in that it is wrongly assessed as being the sole driver for threat development. They argue that the dual use threat should be put in context of a biotech evolution rather than revolution.

The biotech revolution is a dystopian tale in which scientific advances lead to rapid changes in biotechnology, its applications, and its potential threats. [It] fails to reflect the complex social, economic, scientific, and technical factors that shape biotechnology and life science developments. The biotech evolution, however, describes slower and more complex trajectories for biotechnology development and threats.124

Although the potential misuse of knowledge is worrisome, openness in research did not drive illicit biological research or weapons development in the Soviet Union. The Soviet program involved thousands of scientists in bioweapons development. It required massive organization,

123 Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia B. "Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation."International Security 4, no. 36 (Spring 2012): 80-114. 124 Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia Ben, and Kathleen M. Vogel. "The Social Context Shaping Bioweapons (Non)proliferation." Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. 8.1 (2010): 9-24. Web. 20 Jan. 2013

73 resources, and funding, and it restricted access to new research from the West. All this indicates that open research was not a driving factor of Soviet bioweapons developments.

In addition, as discussed previously in Chapter 1, terrorist individuals or groups would have a difficult time in applying information from research publications in the production of biological weapons. Expertise and tacit knowledge (learned from studying and experimenting in biology) stand as barriers in translating research into the large scale production of weapons of mass destruction. Although biotechnology may be becoming cheaper and simpler, making it easier to acquire and utilize, understanding of how to manipulate it towards the production of bioweapons requires a biology background. This was also true during the Soviet Union’s increase in bioweapons R&D in their Biopreparat program. The Stepnogorsk facility, commissioned in 1982, had a civilian arm that studied Bacillus thuringiensis (a biological pesticide), and a weapons segment, which sought to produce a highly virulent version of B. anthracis (officially #836 anthrax). Despite large funds, resources, new and large fermenters meant to create tons of anthrax, and personnel experienced in biological research and even weapons development, it proved difficult to transfer the production of the 836 weapon into a new context where the intent was to create greater amounts and reduced weight, even with hundreds of pages of documentation detailing the production of 836.125 Tacit knowledge and the social dimensions of the research and development team that previously worked on this weapon proved critical to development of 836 in this new facility. This was a case of a well-funded and large biological facility experiencing trouble in translating research and weapons production in a new context. A terrorist deciding to build a biological lab in a cave, as some people imagine, would find it even more difficult to create a weapon by reading publications on PubMed.

125 Vogel, Kathleen M. Phantom Menace Or Looming Danger? : a New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, pg. 115-119

74 Returning again to the Chapter 1 example of the H5N1 avian flu papers that were delayed in publication due to dual-use concerns, there seems to be little legitimate reason to believe that such papers could be a strong influence on the development of biological weapons or make it easier for BW programs or lone terrorists to reproduce the experiments or make novel weapons. I believe the greatest concern is if the laboratory pursuing the research of dual-use concern is intentionally seeking to produce weapons. This was not the case with the scientists researching

H5N1. Furthermore, the most recent biological attacks of the 21st century were crude and non- weaponized biological agents tossed into envelopes.126

This begs the question of whether we should be more concerned about biologists becoming terrorists, as might have been the case with the 2001 “Amerithrax” letters. This was directly brought up in a report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and

Terrorism, titled “World at Risk.”127 Raising the priority of preventing biological weapons proliferation and creating a biosecurity culture were two recommendations mentioned in the report. The Nuun-Lugar Threat Reduction initiative also hired Soviet biological scientists after the collapse of the Soviet Union in an attempt to prevent the dissemination of BW knowledge.128

Although such initiatives held good intentions, one must also keep in mind the effect that a “biologists becoming terrorists” mindset might have on the life sciences community. In an interview, Dr. David Franz, a retired Army colonel and now a prominent figure in biosecurity advising on national security policy, said that there may be some truth to the concern of

126 The “Amerithrax” letters mailed in September and October of 2011 had anthrax spores that were fermented in a laboratory in the U.S., but were of a naturally occurring strain found in Texas. In 2013, ricin-tainted letters were sent to the President and other public officials (although the suspect was found, his reasoning is still unclear). The ricin was of a crude, non-pure form created by crushing castor beans. 127 Graham, Bob, James M Talent, and Graham T Allison. World At Risk: the Report of the Commission On the Prevention of Wmd Proliferation and Terrorism. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. Web. 128 United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation Initiative. Web. http://www.dtra.mil/Missions/nunn-lugar/nunn-lugar-home.aspx

75 biologists becoming terrorists, but application of this idea in national security policy or reviews has been a double-edged sword.

“It has done enormous damage to our scientific community. It made us look at our scientists as the enemy. The problem is not the research, but it is the mind in the user. We started looking suspiciously at research and the scientists in the problem sectors.”

Dr. Franz also revealed that when the Fink report coined the term “dual-use research of concern,” perhaps a more appropriate term would have been “responsible life sciences.”129 In that case, perhaps we would focus more on leadership, culture, and individual responsibility rather than singling out individual technologies since technology and knowledge are ubiquitous

(although there is tacit knowledge that not a lot of people know unless they search for it or are experienced as scientists).

There are multiple factors to consider when attempting to develop prevention strategies for BW development or proliferation. Technology has progressed and the internet has made it easier than ever to access publications, research, and methods that may potentially be used for illicit means. However, the most of the world’s biological scientists are engaged in legitimate research that benefits society through advances in medicine. Traditional methods of non- proliferation or halting weapons development that are used with nuclear weapons simply do not work in biology – there are too many systems that can be exploited. We might perhaps be better off encouraging scientists to take a more active role in ensuring prevention of misuse to avoid disruption of beneficial research.130

129 Biotechnology Research In an Age of Terrorism. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004. Web. 130 Relman, David A. "The biological century: coming to terms with risk in the life sciences." Nature Immunology. 11.4. 2010. Web.

76 Conclusions – Learning From the Past to Detect Today’s Threats

What We Learned About Intelligence Analysis of BW

At first glance, it would be easy to attribute the US intelligence community’s underestimation of the Soviet bioweapons program to nuclear blindness. The CIA’s inability to analyze the size and details of the biological weapons threat from the Soviet Union was explained by an alleged belief that the bigger the bang, the greater the damage (and thus of greater analytic importance). But even if the intelligence agencies prioritized nuclear weapons intelligence acquisition and analysis, it certainly was not a nuclear blindness defined by a lack of understanding of BW consequences or complete evasion of the subject. On the contrary, the intelligence community understood the impact of a biological weapon based on the research of the US BW program. The documents presented in these chapters clearly show that attention was given to analysis of the potential Soviet BW threat, and even if ambiguous data elicited a tone of concern. However, the nuclear weapons threat might have certainly been greater than the threat of a BW attack – a carefully calculated and intentional nuclear blindness. This is not a topic I debate, as it would appear clear that there was greater threat of a nuclear attack. A smaller proportion of analytical and intelligence acquisition resources given to BW analysis might have thus been an “intentional” intelligence failure by way of prioritization. Nevertheless, neither concept of nuclear blindness explains the Soviet BW underestimation – the data was there, why was it misinterpreted?

On the surface, it would appear that traditional intelligence failure theories were the cause of the BW miscalculation. But lack of prioritization for BW intelligence acquisition is a factor that is partially influenced by orders and requests made by the military, Congress, and other government entities. The CIA failed to warn Congress because of the ambiguous analysis. Even

77 if the intelligence community became complacent after the ratification of the Biological

Weapons and Toxins Convention or became preoccupied with chemical weapons analysis for which there was more data, none of these possibilities explain why the BW intelligence that was available could not be analyzed with certainty.

Through analysis of intelligence documents produced across five decades of the Cold

War, it has become clear that the intelligence community’s inability to project certainty about the presence and size of the Soviet BW program stemmed from the dual-use nature of biological research. Attempts to detect a BW program in the Soviet Union through the use of indicators that potentially differentiate between a legitimate and illicit laboratory, building, or research program, simply did not work. Factors that were to differentiate between a BW research compound and a legitimate research facility failed because BW research buildings are non-identifiable – one cannot differentiate from the outside if a building is conducting medical countermeasures research on anthrax or methods of increasing anthrax virulence. The CIA backtracked on its claim of Vozrozhdeniya Island housing a BW facility due to such uncertainty. But even at the publications and research level, and partially thanks to Soviet censorship, the US intelligence community could not determine if the research being conducted with new biotechnologies of the time, including genetic engineering, were for BW purposes or something less sinister, such as agricultural pesticides or feed. Even when evidence seemed to suggest the presence of BW research, uncertainty remained due to the often-fine line between offensive and defensive biological research. Furthermore, potential indicators of an illicit research compound at the research level (such as use of pathogenic or toxic biological agent strains, conducting tests aimed at killing animals, and not producing commercial products) cannot be confirmed without on-site inspections. It was not until the Sverdlovsk incident that the intelligence community could

78 determine with certainty that the Sverdlovsk biological research facility at minimum stored pathogenic strains of anthrax based on the reported deaths. Even then, the CIA and DIA learned of such a small public health event thanks to intelligence gathered from Soviet émigrés.

Biological research and BW development differs from nuclear research and nuclear weapons development. BW R&D can be conducted on a much smaller scale and exploit a greater variety of systems. Furthermore, biological research, and even the study of pathogens that are on the Select Agents list or that pose a threat if release from the laboratory, is important for discovering new advances in medicine and the life sciences which impact us on a daily basis.

The previous chapters make it clear that traditional technical indicators and analysis of weapons development is simply insufficient for detecting BW R&D. This conclusion is especially true when there is no accessibility to the scientists involved in the program or on-site inspections.

Indeed, the US intelligence community did not prioritize BW for covert intelligence collection and the BTWC did not (nor does it now) contain adequate measures for verification of compliance. The questions that remains are how can US intelligence reliably detect and verify

BW R&D, and how do we apply these lessons to today’s biological threats?

In the post 9/11 world, we may be less concerned with a state-sponsored BW program than of terrorists or “lone-wolfs” taking advantage of the “poor man’s bomb.” As explored in

Chapter 5, the possibility of a terrorist (group) acquiring the necessary information and skills to produce a biological weapon solely from open source literature is unlikely due to the amount of tacit knowledge required. This may explain the existence of crude “bioterror” attacks such as the

Amerithrax letters or the 1984 salad bar poisoning in The Dalles, Oregon.131

Because of the widespread use of biological technologies and the importance of biological research, it makes little sense to restrict legitimate research to prevent nations or

131 Refer to the introduction for more information on these attacks.

79 terrorists from pursuing BW. Intent is one of the most important factors to understand when attempting to detect BW research or production, or “bioterror” attacks. The US intelligence community could not verify with certainty the existence of a large BW program in the Soviet

Union based on technical analysis, but it also failed to understand the Soviet’s intents behind the

BW program. Consequently, US intelligence must differentiate amongst biological scientists those who are seeking to do legitimate research and those who want to create BW based on their intents. The difficulty remains, however, in detecting terrorists who are pursuing BW. Their intent is clear, although technical analysis still stands in the way because of the widespread use of biotechnology (thus difficult to track) and the possibility of terrorists utilizing scientists who are working for legitimate laboratories to achieve illicit means.

Recommendations

Public health preparedness for bioterrorism has grown since 9/11. There are “push-packs” of smallpox vaccines, antibiotics, and other medicines, available in the case of an emergency.

Bioweapons detection systems are strategically placed in cities across the United States (the locations are undisclosed). However, these are only measures that deal with detection and mitigation of a BW attack. More still needs to be done to prevent one in the first place by detecting BW R&D at its source. Although my two recommendations below are not novel ideas, the reasons behind US underestimation of the Soviet BW program further strengthen the necessity for policy makers, intelligence communities, and scientists to pursue implementation of these recommendations to their fullest potential.

80 1. There is no need to search for a treaty that prevents all BW research, development, and

use – it already exists as the BTWC. However, what is lacking are strong verification

measures. Currently, BTWC signatories are subject to voluntary annual reporting of

“Confidence Building Measures” to the United Nations. BTWC signatories should amend

the BTWC with verification measures that allow for an international team to conduct on-

site inspections if compliance with the BWTC is in question. Such inspections were

crucial in verifying that Iraq was running a state-sponsored BW program in the early

1990’s, when tests of residue within fermenter lid O-rings were positive for anthrax in a

facility supposedly only producing BT pesticide.132

2. To prevent restriction of biological sciences research, we must work on building a self-

regulating, international scientific community. This includes training in research ethics

and biosecurity issues, accepting responsibility to regulate one’s own work and reporting

suspicious activity elsewhere, and working together with the intelligence community to

provide direct signals intelligence. This is a recommendation embraced by the Federation

of American Scientists, and already initialized by the connections made possible by the

Internet and travel.133 However, the intelligence and science communities must do more,

as these chapters emphasize the importance of human intelligence in assessing BW

threats.

The BW threat continues to exist today, with BW proliferation and the Syrian state- sponsored BW program both being mentioned as concerns in the 2013 Annual Threat

132 Franz, David. Internet Videoconference Interview. 7 May 2013. 133 "Case Studies in Dual Use Biological Research." . Federation of American Scientists. Fas.org. Web. .

81 Assessment.134 Although the assessment recognizes the dual-use nature of biological research and the globalization of biological research and technologies, it continues to mistakenly assume that one can predict BW development based on these “dangerous technologies.” However, it is critical that the US intelligence community and government recognize the necessity of the study of intent in BW detection, as well as put greater emphasis on implementing the recommendations above. “There is no one perfect solution, but engaging internationally has a dissuasion effect by opening channels of education between individuals and science communities and reduce the likelihood that someone will pursue BW.”

134 Clapper, James R. United States. US Intelligence Community. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. 2013. Web.

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92 Appendix The following tables are from (Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A Zilinskas. The Soviet Biological Weapons Program : a History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012.). These lists were prepared by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center in 1993.

93

94

95

96