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From Poisoned Darts to Pan-Hazard Preparedness

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From Poisoned Darts to Pan-Hazard Preparedness Historical Overview: from Poisoned Darts to Pan-Hazard Preparedness Chapter 1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: FROM POISONED DARTS TO PAN-HAZARD PREPAREDNESS GEORGE W. CHRISTOPHER, MD, FACP*; DANIEL M. GERSTEIN, PhD†; EDWARD M. EITZEN, MD, MPH‡; and JAMES W. MARTIN, MD, FACP§ INTRODUCTION EARLY USE THE WORLD WARS THE US PROGRAM THE SOVIET PROGRAM THE SPECIAL CASE OF IRAQ OTHER NATIONAL PROGRAMS BIOCRIMES BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM SOLUTIONS: TOWARD PAN-HAZARD PREPAREDNESS Disarmament: The Biological Weapons Convention Smallpox Preparedness Dual Use Research of Concern Toward Pan-Hazard Preparedness SUMMARY *Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), Medical Corps, US Air Force; Chief Medical Officer, Joint Project Manager-Medical Countermeasure Systems (JPM- MCS), 10109 Gridley Road, Building 314, 2nd Floor, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5865 †Colonel (Retired), US Army; Adjunct Professor, School of International Studies, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016; formerly, Undersecretary (Acting) and Deputy Undersecretary, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC ‡Colonel (Retired), Medical Corps, US Army; Senior Partner, Biodefense and Public Health Programs, Martin-Blanck and Associates, 2034 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 270, Alexandria, Virginia 22314-4678; formerly, Commander, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland §Colonel (Retired), Medical Corps, US Army; Chief of Internal Medicine, US Army Healthcare Clinic, Vicenza, APO AE 09630-0040; formerly, Chief, Operational Medicine Department, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland 1 Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare INTRODUCTION Humans have used technology for destructive as pathogens may inadvertently provide information well as beneficial purposes since prehistory. Aboriginal that could be deliberately misused for biological use of curare and amphibian-derived toxins as arrow weapons proliferation.3 poisons anticipated modern attempts to weaponize Numerous historical examples exist of military biological toxins such as botulinum and ricin. The disasters resulting from failures to adapt policy, strat- derivation of the modern term “toxin” from the ancient egy, and doctrine to offset the impact of revolutionary Greek term for arrow poison, τωξικον φαρμακον advances in weapons technology.4 Biological medical (toxicon pharmicon; toxon = bow, arrow)1,2 underscores defense programs, begun as narrowly focused efforts to the historical link between weaponry and biological counter a limited number of biological weapons agents, agents. are being expanded as versatile capabilities, with a Multiple factors confound the study of the history of shift in emphasis from pathogen-specific approaches to biological weapons, including secrecy surrounding capabilities-based programs to enable rapid responses biological warfare programs, difficulties confirming to novel, potentially genetically engineered biological allegations of biological attack, the lack of reliable weapons agents. The response to biological weapons microbiological and epidemiological data regard- has fueled robust enterprises in basic and applied ing alleged or attempted attacks, and the use of medical research, product development, manufactur- allegations of biological attack for propaganda and ing, stockpiling, infrastructure, public health policy, hoaxes. A review of historical sources and recent planning, and response capacities at local, national, events in Iraq, Afghanistan, Great Britain, and the and international levels.5 Medical capabilities and bio- United States demonstrates that interest in biological medical research are being linked to diplomacy, com- weapons by state-sponsored programs, terrorists, merce, education, ethics, law enforcement, and other and criminal elements is likely to continue. Human- activities to enable pan-societal sector responses to both kind is witnessing a “democratization in the life sci- biological weapons and the inevitable and dynamic ences,” in which the field is becoming industrialized challenges of naturally occurring emerging infectious and therefore making biotechnology available to an diseases.3 Integration of biological defense and public ever increasing number of people, some of whom health programs and their mutual development must will undoubtedly have ill intent. In addition, there be continuous to optimize outcomes and maximize are growing concerns that well-intentioned life sci- efficient utilization of limited resources, because the ences research to advance medical defenses against challenges posed by both biological weapons agents biological weapons agents and other highly virulent and naturally emerging pathogens are open-ended.5 EARLY USE The impact of infectious diseases on military forces outbreaks of disease that occur due to disruptions of has been recognized since ancient times.6,7 The use of war, and the adverse psychological impact of biological disease as a weapon was used long before microbial attacks on military operations. pathogenesis was understood. Military leaders only During a naval battle against King Eumenes of knew that a cause and effect relationship existed Pergamum in 184 BCE, Hannibal ordered earthen pots between certain activities, locations, or exposures to filled with snakes to be hurled onto the decks of enemy victims of disease that resulted in the spread of infec- ships. The pots shattered on impact, releasing live tions that ultimately provided a military advantage. serpents among the enemy sailors. The Carthaginian For example, an early tactic was to allow an enemy to victory is attributed to the ensuing panic rather than 8 take sanctuary in locations endemic for infectious dis- envenomation ; this illustrates that the psychological eases in anticipation that its troops would be afflicted, contagion of biological weapons may amplify their thus allowing unimpeded access of opposing armies to impact beyond their potential to cause organic disease. areas where transmission of malaria was highly likely. One of the most notorious early biological warfare Numerous anecdotal accounts exist of the attempted attacks was the hurling of cadavers over the walls use of cadavers, animal carcasses, plant-derived of the besieged city of Caffa, a Genoese colony in 9,10 toxins, and filth to transmit disease during antiquity the Crimea, in 1346. After war broke out between through the Napoleonic era into modern times. Several the Genoese and the Mongols in 1343 for control of examples illustrate the complex epidemiologic issues the lucrative caravan trade route between the Black raised by biological warfare, the difficulty in differenti- Sea and the Orient, the Mongols laid siege to Caffa. ating epidemics resulting from biological attacks from The plague, later known as the Black Death, was 2 Historical Overview: from Poisoned Darts to Pan-Hazard Preparedness spreading from the Far East and reached the Crimea in have traversed an open distance of several hundred 1346. The Mongols were severely afflicted and forced meters between the Mongol encampment and the city 10 to abandon their siege. As a parting shot, they hurled walls. Transmission from sylvatic to urban rodents “mountains of dead” over the city wall, probably with is infrequent, at least under current ecological condi- 12 the use of a trebuchet, in the hope that “the intoler- tions. Regardless of the portal of entry, the epidemic able stench would kill everyone inside.” An outbreak may have been amplified under siege conditions due of plague in the city followed. A review by Wheelis10 to deteriorating sanitation and hygiene resulting in suggests that the introduction of plague into the city expansions of rats and fleas. by the cadavers—as a result of a tactically successful Smallpox was particularly devastating to Native biological attack—may be the most biologically plau- Americans. The unintentional yet catastrophic in- sible of several competing hypotheses on the source troduction of smallpox to the Aztec empire during of the outbreak. Although the predominant mode of 1520, and its subsequent spread to Peru in advance of plague transmission has been attributed to bites from Pizarro’s invasion of the Inca empire, played a major 13 infected fleas (which leave cadavers and carcasses to role in the conquest of both empires. During the parasitize living hosts), modern experience (United French and Indian Wars (1754–1763), British forces States 1970–1995)11 has implicated transmission from provided Native Americans with handkerchiefs and contact with infected animal carcasses in 20% of blankets contaminated with scabs from smallpox pa- instances in which the source of the infection could tients to transmit disease.14–18 An epidemic of smallpox be attributed. Contact with tissue and blood would followed among the Native Americans of the Ohio have been inevitable during the disposal of hundreds River Valley. It is difficult to evaluate the tactical suc- or possibly thousands of cadavers. Alternatively, cess of these biological attacks in retrospect because plague could have been introduced by imported hu- smallpox may have been transmitted during other man cases or infected rodents brought into the city contacts with colonists, as had previously occurred through maritime trade, which was maintained during in New England and the South. Smallpox scabs are the siege. The importation of plague by a rodent-flea thought to have low
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