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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implications of Advances in Science and Technology Acknowledgments

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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implications of Advances in Science and Technology Acknowledgments TECHNICAL REPORT The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implications of advances in science and technology Acknowledgments This project was supported by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office under award from the Strategic Programme Fund to the Royal Society, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) via grant N00244-15-1- 0039 awarded to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and IAP: The Global Network of Science Academies. This summary is designed as a record of issues that were discussed during the international workshop on advances in science and technology for the BWC, held 13 – 15 September 2015. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the consensus opinions of workshop participants, the organizations that provided support for the project, or the 107 academies of science that form IAP nor mention of trade names, commercial practices, or organisations imply endorsement by the US or UK governments or other sponsors. Biosecure was commissioned to produce the background documents and initial drafts of the report documents. iapbwg.pan.pl The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 2 Contents Introduction 6 Executive summary 7 1. Scope of the BWC 10 2. Monitoring developments in science and technology 12 3. The global ability to deal with disease 13 3.1 Understanding disease 13 3.1.1 Transmissibility and host range 13 3.1.2 Pathogenicity and virulence 14 3.1.3 Toxins 15 3.1.4 Unusual disease agents (including prions and fungi) 16 3.1.5 Immunology and host-pathogen interactions 17 3.1.6 Improved tools to characterise disease 18 3.1.7 The role of the microbiome in disease 19 3.1.8 The role of biofilms in pathogenesis 19 3.2 Detection of disease 19 3.2.1 Differentiating between deliberate and natural outbreaks 20 3.2.2 Biosensors 20 3.2.3 Biomarkers 21 3.2.4 Mass Spectrometry 21 3.2.5 Microscopy and imaging 22 3.3 Diagnosis and surveillance 22 3.3.1 Diagnosis of unknown pathogens 23 3.3.2 Bioforensics 23 3.3.3 Sequencing 23 3.3.4 PCR diagnostics 24 3.3.5 Distributed diagnostics (including point-of-care diagnostics) 25 3.3.6 Laboratory capacity 26 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 3 3.3.7 Genetic and Molecular epidemiology 26 3.3.8 Cheap and disposable equipment 26 3.3.9 Diagnostic speed and accuracy 26 3.4 Preventing, mitigating and treating disease using vaccines and drugs 27 3.4.1 Drug development 29 3.4.2 Novel drugs 30 3.4.3 Vaccine design 30 3.4.4 Vaccine and drug production 31 3.4.5 Vaccine and drug delivery 33 3.4.6 Antimicrobials and drug resistance 36 3.5 Responding to, rolling back, and recovering from disease 37 3.5.1 Improving community buy-in for responders 38 3.5.2 Medical management and infection control (including quarantine) 38 3.5.3 Protective equipment 39 3.5.4 Decontamination 39 4. Advances that reduce risks relevant to the BWC 40 5. Developments in science and technology posing future risks for the BWC 41 5.1 Developing a biological agent 41 5.1.1 Obtaining agents from nature 42 5.1.2 Synthesizing an existing agent 42 5.1.3 Adding functions to existing agents - Pathogenicity 43 5.1.4 Adding functions to existing agents – Circumventing host immunity 43 5.1.5 Adding functions to existing agents – Transmissibility and host range 44 5.1.6 Adding functions to existing agents – Antimicrobial and drug resistance 45 5.1.7 Adding functions to existing agents – Environmental stability 46 5.1.8 Designing a novel agent 46 5.1.9 Toxins 48 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 4 5.2 Producing and stockpiling biological agents 48 5.2.1 Changing footprint of production 49 5.2.2 Industrial scale up 49 5.2.3 Microengineering and microfluidics 50 5.2.4 Bio-based production and biosynthesis 50 5.2.5 Scaffolds 51 5.2.6 Biopharming 51 5.2.7 Outsourced production and modular facilities 51 5.2.8 Disposable, synthesized and repurposed equipment 52 5.2.9 Modification of agents, freeze-drying and non-cold chain storage 53 5.2.10 Microencapsulation and smart particles 53 5.3 Dispersal and delivery of biological agents 55 5.3.1 Aerobiology and modeling a release 55 5.3.2 Targeted and improved delivery 55 5.3.3 Alimentary delivery 55 6. Advances that increase risks relevant to the BWC 56 Appendices 57 Staff 57 Organising Committee 57 Topics covered during the intersessional process 2012 – 2014 58 Annotated references 59 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 5 Introduction The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) will hold its Eighth Review Conference late in 2016 which will consider ‘new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention’. This review will draw upon work undertaken in a standing agenda item in the BWC’s 2012 – 2015 work programme. Each year, States Parties have reviewed developments In September 2015, a Trends Symposium to review in science and technology relevant to the BWC, relevant developments in the science and technology focusing on advances that could have benefits for, was organised by the Royal Society, the US National or which could possibly be used in contravention to Academies of Sciences and the IAP: Global Network this international instrument. During the course of of Science Academies, represented by the current their work, States Parties supported by international Chair of the IAP Biosecurity Working Group, the Polish organizations, scientific bodies, companies and Academy of Sciences. The Symposium was attended individual experts, have reviewed developments in: by 72 participants from 30 countries. enabling technologies; for dealing with disease; in the understanding of pathogenicity, virulence, toxicology, A series of background documentsi were commissioned immunology and related issues; as well as production, to inform the discussions at the Trends Symposium, dispersal and delivery technologies. which were then reviewed in light of the presentations and discussions to produce this technical document and accompanying summary documents.ii i. The background documents that this technical report draws on include the background information documents compiled by the BWC ISU, research on the BTWC process, presentations, statements and other contributions by States Parties, international organizations and Guests of the Meeting at meetings of the BWC from 2012 to 2014, and reports and outputs from international scientific and techni- cal workshops and were commissioned from Biosecure. ii. Available at iapbwg.pan.pl The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 6 Executive summary The Trends Symposium and background documents noted many issues of relevance to the Review Conference and reached several overarching conclusions which are outlined below. The Trends Symposium concluded that: There were four themes that arose from the • Technological barriers to acquiring and background papers and during the Trends using a biological weapon have been significantly Symposium around which this report is structured: eroded since the Seventh Review Conference, • Biosciences are developing at an unprecedented there had been no further novel developments rate. that could enable activities inconsistent with the • The BWC should continue to monitor these aims and objectives of the BWC. developments. • Likewise, there were no developments that • Global ability to detect and treat disease has would not be covered by the treaty or additional been enhanced. supplementary understandings, but • Recent advances could facilitate the development • The speed at which the life sciences and of biological weapons. technology are advancing, and the rate of convergence of disciplines, is still accelerating. Summaries of these sections are provided below This increases the likelihood of such and each is considered in detail in each chapter in developments in the foreseeable future. the reminder of this report, including a synopsis of the • Such potential problems, as well as any research papers which lie behind the developments appropriate responses could be discussed provided in the annotated references. prior to the 9th Review Conference. The biosciences are developing at an • Biotechnology is increasingly important around unprecedented rate the world as a manufacturing technology and has The rate and scale of progress in the life sciences therefore become a potential target for biological and biotechnology continues to grow rapidly. There weapons itself. It should be explored whether is an increasing diffusion of knowledge around the there are any risks not already captured by existing world and more interconnection between knowledge treaties and laws of weapons that cause damage to hubs, many of them ‘virtual’. Laboratories operate in equipment supplies, or material associated with the more diverse geographic locations and across different bio-economy. sectors of our societies. • There was an increased need for education and outreach to promote the aims and objectives of the The character of life sciences and biotechnology BWC amongst the scientific community. is evolving with greater focus on rational design, biological engineering, and more flexible production. Moving from ‘concept’ to ‘application’ is becoming ever simpler, unlocking further potential for progress. The adoption of engineering paradigms has contributed to progress. All these factors have both positive and negative implications for the BWC. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 7 The BWC should continue to monitor these Increasing ‘digitization’ of pathogen data enables developments. the identification and characterisation by centralised For this reason, the BWC should continue to ensure facilities of the infectious agent facilitating development that such developments are not used in prohibited of countermeasures and the use of ‘distributed activities, whilst facilitating their use for peaceful diagnostics’ at the site of the outbreak. This concept has purposes. It could achieve this by devising an effective, already been partially implemented in both developed on-going, and suitably resourced mechanism to: and developing countries.
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