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20 Years of Communicating Facts and Figures 2 2008 Increasing Prevalence of ESBL-Producing Steffens I Enterobacteriaceae in Europe 48 Coque T Et Al

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20 Years of Communicating Facts and Figures 2 2008 Increasing Prevalence of ESBL-Producing Steffens I Enterobacteriaceae in Europe 48 Coque T Et Al Europe’s journal on infectious disease epidemiology, prevention and control YEARS • Featuring a selection of articles published between 1996 and 2016 www.eurosurveillance.org Editorial team Editorial advisors Based at the European Centre for Albania: Alban Ylli, Tirana Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Austria: Maria Paulke-Korinek, Vienna 171 65 Stockholm, Sweden Belgium: Koen de Schrijver; Tinne Lernout, Antwerp Telephone number Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sanjin Musa, Sarajevo +46 (0)8 58 60 11 38 Bulgaria: Iva Christova, Sofia E-mail Croatia: Sanja Music Milanovic, Zagreb [email protected] Cyprus: Maria Koliou, Nicosia Czech Republic: Jan Kynčl, Prague Editor-in-chief Denmark: Peter Henrik Andersen, Copenhagen Dr Ines Steffens Estonia: Kuulo Kutsar, Tallinn Senior editor Finland: Outi Lyytikäinen, Helsinki Kathrin Hagmaier France: Judith Benrekassa, Paris Germany: Jamela Seedat, Berlin Scientific editors Greece: Rengina Vorou, Athens Karen Wilson Hungary: Ágnes Hajdu, Budapest Williamina Wilson Iceland: Thorolfur Gudnason, Reykjavík Assistant editors Ireland: Lelia Thornton, Dublin Alina Buzdugan Italy: Paola De Castro, Rome Ingela Rumenius Latvia: Dzintars Mozgis, Riga Cecilia Silfverling Lithuania: Milda Zygutiene, Vilnius Associate editors Luxembourg: Thérèse Staub, Luxembourg Andrea Ammon, European Centre for Disease Prevention and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Aziz Pollozhani, Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden (resting associate editor- Skopje ship during tenure as acting Director of ECDC) Malta: Tanya Melillo Fenech, Msida Tommi Asikainen, Brussels, Belgium Montenegro: Senad BegiĆ, Podgorica Magnus Boman, Stockholm, Sweden Netherlands: Danielle Nijsten, Bilthoven Mike Catchpole, Stockholm, Sweden Norway: Katrine Borgen, Oslo Denis Coulombier, Stockholm, Sweden Poland: Malgorzata Sadkowska-Todys, Warsaw Natasha Crowcroft, Toronto, Canada Portugal: Paulo Jorge Nogueira, Lisbon Christian Drosten, Bonn, Germany Romania: Daniela Pitigoi, Bucharest Karl Ekdahl, Stockholm, Sweden Serbia: Mijomir Pelemis, Belgrade Johan Giesecke, Stockholm, Sweden Slovakia: Lukáš Murajda, Bratislava David Heymann, London, United Kingdom Slovenia: Maja Sočan, Ljubljana Heath Kelly, Canberra, Australia Spain: Rosa Cano Portero, Madrid Irena Klavs, Ljubljana, Slovenia Sweden: Anders Wallensten, Stockholm Karl Kristinsson, Reykjavik, Iceland Turkey: Fehminaz Temel, Ankara Daniel Lévy-Bruhl, Paris, France United Kingdom: Nick Phin, London Jacob Moran-Gilad, Beer-Sheva, Israel World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe: Robb Panayotis T. Tassios, Athens, Greece Butler, Copenhagen Hélène Therre, Paris, France Henriette de Valk, Paris, France Sylvie van der Werf, Paris, France Design / Layout Fabrice Donguy / Dragos Platon Online submission system http://www.editorialmanager.com/eurosurveillance/ www.eurosurveillance.org © Eurosurveillance, 2016 Contents 2016 20 years of communicating facts and figures 2 2008 Increasing prevalence of ESBL-producing Steffens I Enterobacteriaceae in Europe 48 Coque T et al. 1995 Immunisation schedules in the countries of the European Union 4 2009 New influenza A(H1N1) virus infections in Guerin N et al. Spain, April-May 2009 60 Surveillance Group for New Influenza A(H1N1) Virus 1996 The European Programme for Intervention Investigation and Control in Spain. Epidemiology Training 7 Moren A et al. 2010 Spotlight on measles 2010: An epidemiological overview of measles outbreaks in Poland in 1997 Four cases of H5N1 influenza in Hong Kong 8 relation to the measles elimination goal 64 Watson J et al. Rogalska J et al. 1997 Surveillance of tuberculosis in Europe: first data 2011 Large and ongoing outbreak of haemolytic emerge from “EuroTB”. 10 uraemic syndrome, Germany, May 2011 70 Handysides S et al. Frank C et al. 1998 Global HIV epidemic 11 2012 Seroepidemiology for MERS coronavirus using Nicoll A microneutralisation and pseudoparticle virus neutralisation assays reveal a high prevalence of 1998 Reported association between measles, mumps, antibody in dromedary camels in Egypt, June 2013 73 and rubella (MMR) vaccine, autism, and bowel Perera RA et al. syndrome 12 Miller E et al. 2013 Genetic analysis of novel avian A(H7N9) influenza viruses isolated from patients in 1999 Travel associated legionnaires’disease in Europe: China, February to April 2013 80 1997 and 1998 13 Kageyama T et al. Slaymaker E et al. 2014 Concurrent outbreaks of dengue, chikungunya 2000 HIV reporting in western Europe : national and Zika virus infections – an unprecedented systems and first European data 17 epidemic wave of mosquito-borne viruses in the Infuso A et al. Pacific 2012–2014 95 2001 Bioterrorism preparedness and response in Roth A et al. European public health institutes 21 2015 Working group of Ebola outbreak investigation Coignard B et al. team of Madrid. First secondary case of Ebola 2002 Commissioner again pledges European centre outside Africa: epidemiological characteristics for disease control by 2005 28 and contact monitoring, Spain , September to Pritchard L et al. November 2014 103 Lopàz MA et al. 2003 Retrospective cohort study among German guests of the Hotel ‘M’, Hong Kong 29 2016 Migration-related tuberculosis: epidemiology Radun D et al. and characteristics of tuberculosis cases originating outside the European Union and 2004 West Nile outbreak in horses in Southern European Economic Area, 2007 to 2013 109 France: September 2004 31 Ködmön C et al. Zeller H et al. 2005 Surveillance of listeria infections in Europe 33 de Valk H et al. 2006 Clostridium difficile PCR ribotype 027 outbreaks in the Netherlands: recent surveillance data indicate that outbreaks are not easily controlled but interhospital transmission is limited 40 van den Hof S et al. 2007 Reasons for the sharp increase of genital chlamydia infections reported in the first months of 2007 in Sweden 42 Velicko I et al. YEARS © Eurosurveillance www.eurosurveillance.org 1 Editorial 20 years of communicating facts and figures Ines-Steffens1 1. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Stockholm, Sweden Correspondence: Ines-Steffens ([email protected]) Since 1995, when a first pilot issue was published, attacks in 2001 in the United States [16], the outbreak Eurosurveillance has provided the European public of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [17], the health community with a platform to exchange rel- 2009 influenza pandemic [18], the emergence of Middle evant findings on communicable disease surveillance, East respiratory syndrome (MERS) [19], as well as the prevention and control. From the outset, the journal setup of the European Programme for Intervention has been open access and has not charged article pro- Epidemiology Training (EPIET) programme [20] and cessing costs. discussions about establishing a European Centre for Disease Control [21]. In 2016, we celebrate 20 years of regular publication. A glimpse at the Eurosurveillance archives demonstrates Rapid communications were an early feature for the how the journal has matured over the years in terms of journal at a time when rapid processing of articles was format and content. It shows, for example, the merging not a common element of scientific journals. The evolu- of the formerly weekly and monthly issues, acceptance tion, growth and opportunities offered by the Internet of the ‘weekly’ for indexing in PubMed/MEDLINE and facilitated timely communication and fast turnaround the evolution from a print and online journal to a full times tremendously. The initially short news-like items online journal and a gradual geographical expansion of are the element of the journal that has most evolved. the origin of published articles. Today, rapid communications are well-recognised short scientific dispatches. Several of them are among However, already from the start, topics covered were our most highly cited articles, but more importantly, remarkably similar to those that are high on the pub- their value has been in their impact on public health lic health agenda today. One of the articles in the pilot practice. issue in 1995 gave an overview of immunisation sched- ules in Europe [1], a topic still of interest nowadays. Our While we have been able to present ‘firsts’ on several aim to provide insightful and balanced information on occasions [22,23] and track epidemics and emerging vaccination was shown after the later retracted publi- diseases in a timely manner [24], we are publishing an cation by Wakefield et al. that included subsequently increasing number of (systematic) reviews to provide falsified claims of an association of measles mumps sound evidence and support for decisionmaking [25]. and rubella vaccines with autism [2]. Just one week Working with Eurosurveillance is rewarding. The journal afterwards, Eurosurveillance ran a commentary in its has many supporters and collaborators in Europe and weekly edition, followed, two months later, by one enti- beyond whom we are not able to name individually. We tled ‘Further evidence that MMR vaccine, inflammatory would like to express our gratitude to them and also bowel disease, and autism are not linked’ [3,4]. The thank our board members, colleagues and publisher public health challenges that Europe faces in reaching wholeheartedly for their continued support. Our 20th the measles elimination goal in Europe were marked in anniversary is a reason to celebrate. We marked the a ‘Spotlight on measles’ series on ongoing outbreaks occasion on Wednesday 30 November with a lunchtime and their
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