Chapter 21 the BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT

The Biological Warfare Threat Chapter 21 THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT LESTER C. CAUDLE III, M.D., M.T.M. & H.* INTRODUCTION EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM Indirect Evidence Direct Evidence Current Evidence PROLIFERATION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Military Incentives Technical Incentives Economic Incentives Political Incentives NONHUMAN TARGETS OF ATTACK Animals Crops Material THE CURRENT THREAT North Korea and China Iraq Foreign and Domestic Terrorism SUMMARY *Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army; formerly, Command Surgeon, On-Site Inspection Agency, P.O. Box 17498, 201 West Service Road, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041-0498; currently, Assistant Chief, Department of Retrovirology, U.S. Army Medical Component, Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences, APO Area Pacific 96546, 315/6 Rajvithi Road, Bangkok 10400, Thailand 451 Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare INTRODUCTION Biological warfare agents may be more potent care delivery are serious threats, and resources must than the most lethal chemical warfare agents and be allocated to develop an effective response plan. provide a broader area of coverage per pound of Countering this threat will require that the highest payload than any other weapons system. The pro- levels of our government find ways to1 liferation of technology and the scientific progress in biochemistry and biotechnology have simplified • strengthen and verify international arms production requirements and provided the oppor- control agreements, tunity for creation of exotic agents.1 • maintain the United States’s ability to re- Genetic engineering holds perhaps the most dan- spond with a broad range of alternatives gerous potential. Pathogenic microorganisms ca- against any aggressor who attempts to pro- pable of creating a novel disease, perhaps on an liferate biological weapons, and epidemic scale, could be tailor-made. Suppose that • maintain a robust biological defense effort an adversary inserted a gene lethal to humans into for our U.S. armed forces, one that would a virus or bacterium. This agent could then spread equally and effectively apply to our civil- a disease that could overwhelm the diagnostic, ian population in case of use by terrorists. therapeutic, and preventive capacity of a country’s 2 health service. The threat posed by new biological Unfortunately, biological weapons are consid- and chemical weapons requires our urgent attention: ered by some nations to be part of their military armamentarium, and there are military, technical, Certainly it is of great importance that new and economic, and political incentives for nations to de- insidious biochemical weapons are being devel- velop and maintain such a program. A goal of this oped and deployed, in total disregard for existing treaties, while the perpetrators routinely deny all chapter is to present the evidence in such a way charges and, in turn, counter that their accusers are that the reader can conclude that the threat is real fabricating the allegations as a propaganda device. and significant; it is neither in the realm of science It seems clear that the highest priority should fiction nor confined to our own nation. As a Rus- be afforded this issue for efforts toward its sian writer stated in 1993: resolution.3(p498) I have been gathering information on bacteriologi- The use of biological agents in future wars and cal weapons (BW) for several years. Out of all the terrorist attacks is a realistic concern. The difficult means of mass destruction, this kind can be con- issues of degraded troop performance and health- sidered as the most mysterious.4(p15) EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM We have known for many years that the Soviet Yekaterinburg) caused the death of a number of Union maintained an offensive biological warfare Soviet citizens from pulmonary anthrax.1 (This program in violation of the 1972 Biological Weap- event is also discussed in Chapter 22, Anthrax.) ons Convention, which they initiated and signed Details about this epidemic were not disseminated without reservation. This knowledge has been re- by the Soviets, and it was not until much later that ported to the U.S. Congress and the American pub- the Western communications media became aware lic since 1984, and our government has repeatedly of it. raised this subject, first with the Soviet leadership, and On February 13, 1980, the widely circulated Ger- more recently with the current Russian leadership.5 man magazine Bild Zeitung carried a story describ- ing an accident in a military settlement in Sverdlovsk Indirect Evidence in which an anthrax cloud resulted, which prevail- ing winds carried into the outskirts of the city. The Beginning in the latter 1970s and continuing magazine article went on to state that only a chance throughout the 1980s, U.S. intelligence agencies re- change in wind direction prevented the cloud from peatedly alleged the existence of a Soviet biologi- passing through the main section of the city. When cal weapons program. Then in April 1979, a major this story was published, major Western newspa- outbreak of anthrax in the city of Sverdlovsk (now pers finally began to take an interest in the event. 452 The Biological Warfare Threat Several weeks later, the U.S. government asked the military had illicitly developed aerial bombs the Soviet government for an explanation of the epi- and rocket warheads. These warheads were capable demic—specifically, whether this was a biological of carrying several biological warfare agents, in- warfare experiment gone awry. Moscow denounced cluding anthrax, tularemia, and Q fever. General the suggestion as slanderous propaganda but did Kuntsevich revealed that the biological weapons acknowledge the outbreak of anthrax. They insisted effort had been maintained through at least 1990 that the outbreak was caused by poor food control, but had been scaled down during the 6 years of which had somehow allowed contaminated meat Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency.9 to be dispensed to the population of Sverdlovsk.6 In April 1992, Yeltsin issued a decree that out- However, a recently released report7 on a series lawed all activities that were prohibited by the 1972 of 42 autopsies, done on what is thought to be the Convention. General Kuntsevich stated, following majority of the fatalities from this outbreak, consis- Yeltsin’s decree, that all offensive biological weap- tently revealed pathological lesions diagnostic of ons programs in territorial Russia had been banned inhalational anthrax: hemorrhagic necrosis of the and placed under firm control of the government; thoracic lymph nodes involved in the lymphatic that the large biological test area near the Aral Sea, drainage of the lungs, and hemorrhagic medi- Vozrozhdeniya Island, had been closed; and that astinitis. These are not findings seen in gastrointes- Russia had no stockpiles of biological weapons. tinal anthrax associated with contaminated meat. Unfortunately, that same month, Russia failed to The U.S. government found Moscow’s explana- meet the deadline set forth for all Convention sig- tion disturbing for several reasons, including strong natories to declare their total inventory, stockpiles, U.S. intelligence reporting that listed Sverdlovsk as and production sites for offensive and defensive a site of a biological warfare establishment; the fact biological weapons programs. This requirement had that shortly after 3 April 1979, D.F. Ustinov, then been established in the set of confidence-building the Soviet Minister of Defense, visited Sverdlovsk; measures that had been agreed upon at the Third and the difficulty in imagining an anthrax epidemic Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Con- attributable to contaminated meat in a developed vention in September 1991, at which Russia was a nation with a highly effective and functioning pub- participant. The Russian government finally sub- lic health service.6 Last and perhaps even more com- mitted their report in late July 1992, but, according pelling, satellite photography had revealed some to U.S. officials, the report lacked key details. This time earlier that the compound in which the acci- delay only strengthened our heightened concerns dent took place (Military Compound 19) was about the extent of the former or still-existent So- heavily guarded, had special security precautions, viet program.9 and had ventilation and animal pens typical of a The Soviet offensive biological weapons program biological weapons facility.8 was monitored by the United States for decades. In February 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin We know that scientific personnel at a number of admitted that the 1979 outbreak of anthrax in microbiological research institutes in the former Sverdlovsk was indeed linked to an accident at a Soviet Union are capable of performing research secret biological weapons facility. He went on to and development with highly infectious disease reveal that the former Soviet Union had conducted agents and very potent plant, animal, and micro- an illegal biological warfare program in violation bial toxins. Likewise, their considerable work in of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. He fur- aerobiology, cloud physics, airborne infections, and ther acknowledged that the Soviet Union had failed disease-agent stabilization has direct application to (1) to implement its commitment under the conven- biological warfare. Much of the knowledge and tion to destroy existing biological weapons and (2) technical expertise at

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