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11: Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems

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11: Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems Chapter 11 Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems CONTENTS Page Introduction. ...................171 Anti-Armor Munitions . .............172 Top-Attack Munitions. ...........173 Mines . ... .. 177 Countermeasures . .. .. ... ... ... ..178 Delivery System Issues . ..........181 Introduction . ..........,...181 Missile Guidance Technology . ..........................181 Box Box Page A. Delivery Error Budget . 183 Figure No. 11-1. Smart Submunitions . .............................175 Table No. Page 11-1. Anti-Armor Munitions . 176 11-2. Smart Submunition Sensors . .........................177 11-3. Assault Breaker Results . ............................174 11-4. Missile Guidance Technologies. .+ ............182 11-5. Guidance Technology–NATO Conventional Missiles. ............184 Chapter 11 Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems INTRODUCTION Munitions currently in the inventory and be- ● Can these goals be achieved at a reason- ing procured, as described in chapter 9, are de- able cost? signed mainly to attack soft area targets (e.g., formations of trucks or lightly armored vehi- At this stage of development, it is not possi- cles, or field command posts) and hard fixed ble to say with confidence whether such a prac- targets (bridges, power stations). The technol- tical balance among reliability, countermeasure ogies embodied in these munitions—cluster resistance, and cost can be achieved in the de- munitions for soft area targets, large unitary sign of smart submunitions, nor which designs munitions for fixed targets-are straightfor- are most likely to succeed. To date, tests of pro- ward; the munitions themselves are relatively totype smart submunitions have been carried inexpensive and are considered effective against out under artificial conditions that make tar- their intended targets. An important question gets easier to detect—clear weather, high con- is whether new anti-armor munitions now un- trast backgrounds, and, in some cases, artifi- der development can be made effective and af- cially enhanced thermal signatures. Because fordable. of the considerable differences between U.S. and Soviet armored vehicles (Soviet vehicles New anti-armor munitions under develop- generally are harder to detect) and between the ment, called ‘‘smart submunitions, make use climates and terrain of U.S. test ranges and of sensors that autonomously search a target potential European battlefields (more often area for a tank and are designed to strike the obscured by fog, rain, and vegetation), it is es- tank on its lightly armored top surface, in some sential that testing be carried out with realis- cases using novel lethal mechanisms. If suc- tic targets, under realistic conditions. A rig- cessful, these smart submunitions will clearly orous testing program, such as that provided add a major new capability to attack armored now by the Chicken Little and Special Projects vehicles beyond line of sight and without di- efforts at Eglin Air Force Base, may well be rect operator control, but their very “smart- an essential continuing element in the devel- ness” leads to greater cost, greater technical opment and evaluation of these submunitions. risk, and greater risk of being spoofed by coun- termeasures. Thus, if, as a matter of policy and analysis, it becomes clear that substantial ef- A second issue is the role of mines. Histori- fort should be devoted to attacking tanks, a cally, mines have been relatively ineffective number of technological questions come into weapons and have received correspondingly lit- play concerning these new munitions: tle analytical attention. A major limitation was that they had to be emplaced by hand, a slow • Can they be made to operate reliably, un- process that allowed little flexibility to react der realistic conditions? to changing circumstances. New technologies ● Can they be made to resist likely counter- that permit mines to be delivered by aircraft measures? Or will the deployment of ef- or artillery may allow mines to play a more im- fective countermeasures impose a sub- mediate and responsive role in the attack of stantial economic or military cost on the armored units. For example, mines might enemy? quickly be emplaced immediately in front of 177 172 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack a moving unit, creating a concentration of ve- them a high probability not only of halting or hicles that could then be directly attacked. delaying a tank but of actually destroying a Such mines are now being procured; however, tank-are farther down the road. Again, the the lack of a clear doctrine for their employ- role that such a weapon could play in follow- ment appears to be hindering plans for the ac- on forces attack is a key question that needs quisition of significant quantities. Mines that to be addressed. incorporate new lethal mechanisms-giving ANTI-ARMOR MUNITIONS The development of effective anti-armor mu- sensors that can detect the target and guide nitions for follow-on forces attack is compli- or aim the munition for an accurate hit. cated by two facts: First, the number of tar- There is, of course, nothing magic about top gets is large, and they are in enemy territory. An effective weapon will have to be able to en- attack; indeed if the threat against tanks shifts gage multiple targets per pass, and will have substantially to top attack, future tanks may to tolerate less than pinpoint delivery accuracy. well be designed with added top armor protec- Second, Soviet armored vehicles have over the tion. Clearly the most effective course in the long run–though likewise the most expen- past two decades undergone substantial im- provements in armor protection, a trend that sive—is to maintain a balanced variety of weap- is continuing. Armor has become thicker, new ons that attack from all aspects, forcing the materials such as ceramics which offer greater Soviets to make compromises in their tank de- protection per pound than steel have been in- signs. In the short run, however, top-attack corporated, and add-on reactive applique ar- weapons are likely to prove difficult to counter. mors which are very efficient in deflecting high- As discussed below in the section on ballistic explosive anti-tank munitions are being in- countermeasures, existing Soviet tank designs stalled both on new tanks and as a retrofit on are not well suited to retrofitting with top ar- older tanks.1 mor because of the prohibitively large weight that effective armor would add and because All of this has meant that, to be effective, of the need to maintain unobstructed air flow new anti-armor munitions must be able to pene- to the engine radiators. trate greater thicknesses of armor and must have a higher probability of hitting the tank The choice of warhead technology is another accurately—and ideally at a specific, vulner- factor in armor/anti-armor competition. Armor able point on the tank’s surface. Because ar- which is most effective against one of the two mor protection has been concentrated on the principal types of warheads used in wide-area front surfaces of tanks to meet the primary anti-armor weapons is not generally most ef- threat of direct fire from opposing tanks and fective against warheads of the other kind: infantry-fired anti-tank guided missiles, it is Shaped-charge warheads typically penetrate the top and bottom surfaces that are the most greater thicknesses of armor than do explo- lightly protected and thus the most vulnerable. sively formed penetrators (EFPs) but can be Almost all new anti-armor munitions designed more easily countered; EFPs typically pene- trate less armor’ but are harder to counter. If to engage armored vehicles at some distance —— exploit these vulnerabilities. Increased prob- ‘Not considered here is another important class of kinetic- ability of hitting a target is achieved, first, by energy warheads which are less suitable for submunitions: long, inert, preformed projectiles, such as are used today in armor- making the munitions smaller so that more can piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot (APFSDS) artillery be dropped over the target area; and second, rounds. They may be fired by an electromagnetic gun being de- in the case of “smart” munitions, by adding veloped by the Army, DARPA, and DNA. The Air Force’s de- velopmental high-velocity missile (HVM), although powered, I For more information, see vol. 2, app. 1 l-A, fig. 1 l-A-l. is also a long, inert (i.e., nonexplosive), preformed projectile. Ch. 11—Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems ● 173 a proposed tank were expected to f ace a threat ons have the potential to cause multiple kills consisting primarily of warheads of a single per shot;4 they are also relatively inexpensive type, its designers could optimize its armor (see table 11-1); and the technology and man- against that type by trading off protection ufacturing experience are well in hand. against the other type. An adversary’s abil- Possible countermeasures include the use of ity to use warheads of multiple types forces applique armor to add extra protection to designers to forego ideal protection against one lightly armored vehicles and armor skirts5 to type in order to seek balanced protection protect the vulnerable tires and radiators of against all. trucks, dispersing vehicles, and emplacing ve- hicles such as self-propelled artillery in earth Top-Attack Munitions revetments. Three generations of top-attack munitions could be used for FOFA. These are cluster mu- Sensor-Fuzed Munitions nitions (the current generation), and two gen- A second generation of anti-armor muni- erations of “smart” submunitions now in de- tions–the first generation of “smart” anti- velopment: sensor-fuzed and terminally guided armor submunitions—is now under full-scale submunitions. development (see figure 11-1). These submu- nitions--called sensor-fuzed munitions-employ Cluster Munitions autonomous sensors that detect a vehicle and Current-generation anti-armor munitions are trigger the firing of an explosively formed unguided cluster bombs. They blanket a large penetrator, also known as a self-forging frag- area with a randomly dispersed shower of small ment, at the target.
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