United Nations Oral History Project

David Lush 20 March 1990 ST/reilST/rei/ Of/lLDrilL Ht JTorzY(V 2 Jj L-I Yale-UN Oral History Project David Lush Jean Krasno, Interviewer March 20, 1999 Namibia

Index: Namibia

Apartheid 4, 15~16 Cold War 56 Democratic Tumhalle Alliance (DTA) 39-40,46,49,51-55 Human rights 11 Koevoet 32-35,44-45,48 Namibia Elections 2,12, 14,45,47,50-55 Independence 2,5,7-11,3~ 47, 57 The Namibian 1-3,5-10,19-20,22,43,46 Ponhofi boycott 25-26 Resolution 435 25 National Democratic Institute (NDI) 49 South African Defense Force (SADF) 32,44 South African Press Agency 41 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 8 South West African Broadcast Corporation 2,10,46-50 South West African Police Organization (SW(SWAPO)APO) 11-12, 14,20-21,24,29-31,33-36,39-40,43, 45, 48, 51-56 South West Afi:ican Territorial Force 32 UNliN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 46 Yale -- UN Oral History

David Lush

InterviewedInterviewed by: Jean Krasno

March 20, 1999

Namibia

Jean Krasno: This isis an interviewinterviewwith David Lush inin Windhoek, Namibia on

thth March 20 ,, 1999, and II firstfirst wanted toto say thankthank you so much forfor lettingletting me come and do this,this, and wanted toto mention your book, thethe titletitle of which isis Last Steps toto lJhuru.lJhuru. And thethe publisher isis New NamibianNarnibian Books, so ififpeople want toto trytry toto get itit theythey could trytry there.there.

So toto begin with, could you justjusttelltell us a littlelittle bit about your background and where you were born and educated and thenthen when you arrived ininNamibia?

David Lush: I'mI'm a freelancefreelancejournalist.journalist. II was born and grew up and studied inin thethe U.K., came toto Namibia inin thethe beginning of 1988, toto work as volunteer forfor The

Namibian newspaper, which at thethe timetime was reallyreally sort ofthethe only media organization within Namibia which tooktook a pro-independence stance. II came purely out ofcuriosity, as

II said, justjust as a volunteer toto see what was going on inin Namibia, and eleven years laterlater I'mI'm still here, having obviously arrived at an incrediblyincredibly momentous time.time. And working forfor

The Namibian newspaper, was luckylucky enough toto have thisthis front-rowfront-row seat ofthethe independenceindependenceprocess, as itit unfolded. And so, obviously, thethe developments happening as theythey were, was thethe reasonreason II stayed toto see itit throughthrough and thenthen after independence,independence, settled down here, and as II say, I'm still here. Having been luckylucky enough toto witness thethe independence process, thethe birth ofofaa newnew nation,nation, whichwhich veryveryfewfewpeoplepeople dodo havehavethethe

chance toto do, I thoughtthought itit was importantimportanttoto atat leastleast getget mymy ownown impressionsimpressions downdownonon

paper so I could write thisthis book, whichwhichwaswas published.

JK: What isis the year ofpublication?

DL: It was published inin '93,'93, soso ititjustjust dealsdeals withwith sortsort ofofthetheperiodperiod '88'88toto '92,'92,thethe

transition toto independence,independence, and focusesfocuses largelylargelyononthethe daysdays beforebefore independence,independence,thethelastlast

days of South African rule,rule, thethe independenceindependence process,process, thetheU.N.-monitoredV.N.-monitoredelections,elections, andand then thethe very early days ofindependence.independence.

JK: Okay, okay. Actually, describedescribe toto meme aalittlelittle bitbitaboutaboutthethe newspaper,newspaper, TheThe

Namibian, because II was surprisedsurprised toto seesee thatthat itit waswas allowedallowed toto existexist toto aa celiainceliainextentextent during thatthat period oftime, because asas youyou say,say, itit waswas pro-independence,pro-independence, andandyetyetmuchmuchofof the media, includingincluding radioradio -- South WestWest AfricanAfrican BroadcastBroadcast CorporationCorporation-- waswas reallyreally controlled by thethe govel11ment here. SoSo howhowwaswas ititthatthat TheThe NamibianNamibian waswasreallyreally allowedallowed to exist?

DL: Well, 'cause'cause therethere were nono lawslaws preventingpreventingit.it. Yes,Yes, II supposesuppose itit-- ififyouyoulooklookatat that was thethe nature ofthethe South AfricanAfrican regime,regime, II meanmean itit waswas thethe samesame inin SouthSouthAfrica.Africa.

You had a private sector. The mediamedia waswas notnotnecessarilynecessarily state-controlled.state-controlled. NowNowlargelylargely the private media was -- you had thethe businessbusiness interestsinterests alignedaligned withwiththethe SouthSouthAfricanAfrican regime, thethe minority regimeregime inin SouthSouthAfricaAfrica andand similarlysimilarly ininNamibia.Namibia. ButButtheretherewaswas

22 nothing preventing other people from setting up. Now having said that, an attempt was made, when The Namihian tried to register as a company, usually it was a fOlTI1ality for any media organization to register, and you paid a fairly small fee. I the authorities suddenly slapped on a 20 grand registration fee, which would have bankrupted the newspaper from day one. This is back in 1985, when 20 grand was a hell ofa lot of money. So obviously there was an attempt to stop it, there, and the Namibian challenged that decision and won, and so the paper was allowed to register.

JK: That's very interesting, that in a certain sense there was a kind ofrule oflaw that wasn't controlled by the state.

DL: Yeah, as I say, it was sort ofone ofthose, I think - because you didn't have de facto - it was a dictatorship. It was an undemocratic regime, but it was still- the whole nature ofthe law - there was still SOli ofscope within the law, and this -- I think this was why probably the South African regime in Namibia, and celiainly the nationalist party in

South Africa, was actually fighting a losing battle, 'cause'cause it hadn't established - it inherited infrastructure (legal infrastructure, social infrastructure, whatever) which again itself was a bit ofa mish-mash ofdifferent periods ofhistory. And so it didn't establish a system, therefore it didn't inherit an authoritarian regime per se. So it was always trying to damn up the holes, and again I'm sure after The Namibian appealed --well maybe not in this case -- but it was always having to apply legislation, and then when there was a gap found in it had to damn it up. And in the end resulted in South Africa to a state of emergency and tried to do it in Namibia, but there was always these gaps, and as long as

3 you had sort ofa courageous alternative media, comageous alternative lavvyerslavvyers whowho werewere

prepared to challenge that system and you had the funds ---- mobilize thethe fundsfunds toto dodo it,it,

these people you could sometimes make your way through.through.

JK: Well was it because there were a number of South African white andand GelmanGelman

whites and so forth that wanted a system oflaw, a rule of lawlaw here inin Narnibia, thatthat inin

fact the government had to maintain some kind of semblance ofthethe rulerule ofoflaw?law? IsIs thatthat aa

possible interpretation?

DL: Apartheid was a legal regime. Apartheid was based on legislation,legislation, soso ininthatthat

respect it was pretty disgraceful legislation, but itit was legislationlegislation nonetheless. SoSo therethere

was - yes, there was that fundamental belief in the rule oflaw,law, be itit perverse lawlaw oror bebe itit

whatever --

JK: Democratic law.

DL: Democratic law. There was this belief in it.it. So therethere was a belief inin thethe legallegal system. And therefore it was only when that - out ofdesperation -- that'sthat's whywhy II thinkthink itit was known - Apartheid regime was probably always onto a loser.loser. At thethe veryvery endend itit resorted to extra-judicial means, but for a long time itit was tryingtrying toto peg itsits -- thisthis repression on a system of law. Now of comse, in a war situation thatthat systemsystem ofoflawlaw brokebroke down largely, and that's what you had the case in thethe North ofthethe country. BattlesBattles werewere

4 fought in court. So as longlong as you had thethe peoplepeople toto challengechallenge thethe law,law, nono mattermatter howhow

oppressive it was, therethere was quite often aa loophole.loophole.

JK: That's really fascinating.fascinating. But II wantedwanted toto askask oneone moremore questionquestion aboutaboutthethe

newspaper itself,itself, because II was readingreading anan account,account, actuallyactually today,today, thatthatduringduring thatthattimetime

that there were death t1ueatstlueats against thethe editoreditor ofofTheThe Namibian.Namibian. DoDo youyou knowknowanythinganything

about that?

DL: I know - again, thisthis isis sortsortofthethe -- TTthink,think, asas youyou say,say, asas wewe sortsortofoffoundfound out,out,

there was this sort of extra-judicial elementelement toto thethe ApartheidApartheidregime,regime, particularlyparticularly-- well,well,

obviously in South Africa itselfitself-- but inin Namibia,Namibia, SOliSOli ofofbeingbeingthethe frontier,frontier, andand thesethese

covert activities. So you had thisthis very murkymurky -- itit waswas obviouslyobviously-- a a lotlotofofititwaswasstate­state-

sponsored or certainly done inin thethe name ofofthethe state,state, byby thethe securitysecurityforces,forces, butbut again,again, notnot

overtly done so. So you never quite knewknewwhowho thesethese peoplepeople were.were. DeathDeaththreats?threats? Yes,Yes,

particularly as thethe independenceindependence -- fromfrom mymy ownown experienceexperience-- pmticularlypmticularly asas thethe

independence process got underway, itit becamebecame very heavy,heavy, andand TheThe NamibianNamibian waswasanan

obvious target for thosethose opposed toto thethe independenceindependencesettlement.settlement. TheTheofficesoffices werewereblownblown

up in October'88.

JK: Really? They were?

DL: They were firebombed.

55

• JK: Here, in Windhoek?

DL: Yes, this was at the time where the shady, rightwing movement called thethe WhitWhit

,Wolwes was sort of operative in South Africa and Namibia. Prior toto that,that, evereversincesince TheThe

Namibian started in '85, obviously things like mail were intercepted.intercepted. Telephones werewere

tapped. You were followed. Wherever you went onjobs often you were watchedwatched byby thethe

police. Ifthere was a demonstration you were coming -- covering demonstrations oror

whatever, you as journalists became targets for police as theythey clamped down onon

activities. So it was - yeah, and then there were death threatsthreats which came inin differentdifferent fonns, be it -- being you stopped in, whatever, somewhere -- so you were aa target,target, andand thethe

staff ofThe Namibian were constantly a target of either surveillance, as wewe say,say, butbutalsoalso

sometimes very hostile attacks.

JK: Where you personally targeted?

DL: Was I personally targeted? No, because I wasn't sort ofa significantsignificant enoughenough person. I was in the respect that I was working at thethe newspaper, soso we werewere allall targeted.targeted.

My mail was intercepted. I'm sure my telephone was tapped.tapped. As farfar as personallypersonally beingbeing threatened, occasionally, you were somewhere and people knew who you were,were, yes,yes, thenthen you would get a pretty rough ride. People could be pretty unpleasant. II thinkthink ititwaswas -- butbut as long as you were working in The Namibian, in thatthat environment, everybody waswas aa target. And so for example, yeah when the offices get blown up, II mean obviously it'sit's the whole people affected.

6 JK: Were therethere any people inin thethe office when itit was blown up?

DL: No, itit was empty at thethe time.time. It was done at night.

.TK:.TK: Oh, wow.

DI.;: But laterlater on, when at thatthat stage newspaper was only weekly, so we closed down at

night. But laterlater on, particularly during thethe independenceindependence process, we used toto work at

night, 'cause'cause itit became a daily newspaper, and I was working on thethe nightshift, and we

constantly felt very very vulnerable. At times,times, at twotwo o'clock inin thethe morning when

you're going home you're being followed home, you kind of- there'sthere's always thisthis sense

thatthat somehow you're sitting therethere inin thisthis illuminatedilluminated office, likelike a goldfish behind a

goldfish bowl, and therethere was people out there.there. So itit was - therethere was thisthis constant sense where you'd go and start thethe car and you never knew whether maybe todaytoday itit was thethe timetime for thethe car toto blow up or whatever. There was thatthat kind ofcycle - always thatthat constant pressure, but Gwen, inin particular, she was -

JK: Now thisthis isis thethe editor, Gwen Lister.

DL: Yes, Gwen Lister. She was obviously thethe SOli ofnumber one target,target, being thethe editor, being thethe founder ofthethe newspaper, being thethe person who writes thethe editorials and whatever. And as timetime got on, she was very much - becanle very much a target.target. And

7 during the independence process, when there was the assassination ofAnton Lubowski, and there was -- I think it's been established there was a hit list ofprominent people who were ready for assassination, and she was one ofthem. And attempts came out -- throughthrough the Truth and Reconciliation Commission] - attempts were - her assassination was planned, and someone was sent to carry it out.

Jt<.: Now, you're talking about the South African Truth and Reconciliation

Commission?

DL: So yes, she was a target, and they somehow didn't manage to get her, but theythey tried. So yes, it was - she was very much a target, yes. The newspaper as a whole and the staffas a whole were just sort ofon this constant threat of- yeah, intimidation.intimidation.

JK: Well, now, of course I'm interviewing about the U.N.,IT.N., so I wanted toto ask you: when the IT.N.U.N. did finally arrive and in enough presence, did that help your security situation at all? Did it seem as though there were fewer threats against you because thethe

IT.N.U.N. was here observing, or did that not seem to change?

DL: No.

JK: It didn't change.

DL: It increased.

8 JK: It increased?

DL: Well during the independence process-

JK: Oh, because it was getting closer to the independence.

DL: Well, as I say, right up to the end and afterwards. You had Lubowski's assassination in September, two months before the elections. Certainly at thatthat timetime itit waswas probably the most intense, and that was the time when thethe U.N.UN. had established itselfitselfandand was functioning at

JK: Yeah, at full force.

DL: But the U.N. was functioning largely at a political level.level. The people itit waswas dealing with was the political parties and the establishment, and The Namibian waswas notnot part ofthat, and in that respect, yeah, you still had the South African police forceforce runningrunning the show. Okay, the U.N.D.N. was SOli of monitoring the police force but -I-I thinkthink itit waswas more everybody had so much to do at that stage that you didn't -- itit wasn't likelike somethingsomething would happen and you would run to the D.N and say "Hey, please, teacher,teacher, teacher."teacher."

JK: Yeah, okay.

9 •

DL: It wasn't like that.that. ItItwas -- thethe U.N.D.N. diddid notnot havehave thatthat-I-Ithinkthinkperhapsperhaps largelylargely

because ofwhat happened inin April, when thethe peacepeace processprocess firstfirst started,started, thetheU.N.U.N. didn'tdidn't

have that sense, wasn't perceived toto have thatthat role.role. ItItwaswas aapeacekeepingpeacekeepingmission,mission, yes,yes,

but it was more, as I say, at a political level.level. ItItwaswas overseeingoverseeing thethe systemsystemofofgovernment,government,

the transition. It was dealing with thethe parties. WeWe werewere notnotpartpartofthat.ofthat. WeWe werewere ininthethe

middle. We were sort of- thethe media was out therethere onon itsits own.own. ItItwaswas thethe privateprivatemedia,media,

so the U.N.D.N. also didn't have any jurisdictionjurisdiction overover us.us. ItItdidn'tdidn't havehave anyany involvementinvolvement inin

us, whereas it did inin some respectsrespects with thethe officialofficial statestate media,media, thethe BroadcastingBroadcasting

Corporation in particular. Somehow itit wasn't -- thethe U.N.U.N. waswas also,also, thetheU.N.D.N. waswas aatargettarget

and was targeted several times.times.

JK: The U.N. itself was targeted?targeted?

DL: Yeah, the U.N.D.N. offices inin Outjo were blownblown upup..

.TK: In what town?

DL: Ou~jo. It was similar, in some respectsrespects therethere waswas somethingsomething inin commoncommonwithwiththethe

U.N. The Namibian was a targettarget and thethe U.N.V.N. waswas aa targettarget forfor thosethose opposedopposedtoto thethe

independence process.

JK: Okay, Outjo, which isis up inin thethe north, notnot allall thethe wayway up,up, but-but-

1010

111\$ DL: The U.N.D.N. certainly didn't wieldwield thatthat sortsort ofofauthority.authority. ItItwaswas basicallybasicallymakingmaking

sure the independence process went through,through, butbut itit didn'tdidn'treallyreally havehave thethe influenceinfluencetoto -~-~

JK: To really provide security, oror deterdeter ititthroughthrough observationobservationoror monitoring.monitoring. Well,Well,

you mentioned Anton Lubowski, andand asas longlong asas youyou diddidmentionmentionthat,that, maybemaybewe'llwe'll gogo toto

that point, because II wanted toto ask youyou aboutaboutthatthat assassination.assassination. \\Tho\Yho waswas he,he, andand wherewhere

was he assassinated, and what significancesignificance diddid thatthat havehave forfor thethe process?process?

DL: He was born and bred inin Namibia.Namibia. HeHe becamebecame aa lawyer.lawyer.

I JK: Is he whhe?

DL: Yes, he's a white guy. And he sortsort of,of, asas IIunderstandunderstandit,it,gradually gradually sortsortofof

rejected what he was obviously brought upup inin ---- sortsortofofthethe white,white, privilegedprivileged environmentenvironment

-- but gradually came toto reject thethe SouthSouthAfricanAfrican rule,rule, camecame toto ratherrather bebepro­pro­

independence and thenthen migrated toto SWAPOSWAPO andand becamebecame aa SWAPOSWAPO member.member. HeHe waswas aa

very sort of flamboyant character, veryvery-- quitequite charismatic,charismatic, andand startedstarted takingtakingonon humanhuman

rights work. And so gradually he builtbuilt upup thisthis reputationreputation asas aasortsortofofaawhitewhite liberalliberal

opposed toto South African rule.rule. Therefore,Therefore, havinghaving comecome fromfrom thethe countrycountry itself,itself, andand

having been born ininNamibia andand bornborn inin thethe establishment,establishment, hehe waswasaarealreal traitortraitorasasfarfar asas

that establishment was concerned, soso moremore andand moremore becamebecame involvedinvolved inin tradetradeunionunion

1111 work, as well as human rights work, and then gradually sort ofbecause ofthat sortsOli of became acquainted with certain SWAPO leadership within the country.

JK: But he stayed in Namibia. He did not go into exile as the other SWAPOSWAPO leadersleaders had done.

DL: No, he became a SWAPO member, and he was -- gradually as he became more involved in the struggle within the country obviously won favorfavor with SWAPO and thenthen was co-opted into SWAPO's election organization when they came back, and was very much involved, and therefore was considered part ofthethe SWAPO leadership,leadership, and probably was heading towards a political post, maybe a minister or a deputy minister or something within post-independence at the time. He'd reached thatthat sortsort ofoflevellevel ofof influence once - at the time ofhis assassination. But as II say, because hehe waswas -- hehe himselfbecame a bit like Gwen, became a sort of a - stood out fromfrom thethe crowdcrowd andand therefore was a - became a target as far as - symbolic inin many respects.respects. HeHe waswas notnot crucial to SWAPOSWAPO leadership. He was not a key member of SWAPO leadership,leadership, butbut hehe was symbolic ofyour sort ofwhite liberal who had abandoned thethe establislunentestablishmentand and therefore was very symbolic. And so he was then assassinated. II thinkthink itit waswas SeptemberSeptember the 10th?

h JK: Well I have it September li ..

12 JK: Yes, I have it.

DL: Which was the day - two days before Sam Nujoma was due to arrive back in the

country.

th .TK: Yeah, Nujoma arrived on September 14 .

DL: So, his assassination was, I think - obviously meant as a sort of a warning to

Nujoma.

JK: I was wondering, ifthere was a connection.

DL: Warning - the whole "We ain't taking this thing lying down. Nujoma, you're next" SOli of thing. That was graffiti that was actually sprayed on the wall Katutura the next day. We found that the next day: "Nujoma, you're next" sort ofthing, or "watch out," something like that. So it was all part of this psychological warfare, and --

JK: So he was assassinated in Windhoek. Did he live in - he didn't live in Katutura?

DL: No, no, he lived in one ofthe poshest parts oftown.

JK: Oh, okay. Where was he assassinated then?

13 DL: Outside his house. Yeah, he was driving. He just drove home. He was supposedsupposed

to meet now Prime Minister, then head ofthe elections - SWAPO's election--

JK: Hage-

DL: Hage Geingob.

JK: Geingob.

DL: For dinner that evening. So I think he'd gone home to get changed. He'd got out ofhis car to open the gate and he was shot.

JK: He was shot, wow.... Well, now, I guess I'll just -I wanted toto cover thatthatbecause you had brought it up, and then I'll backtrack a little bit. When you arrived inin 1988, what month was it that you arrived?

DL: February, begiill1ing ofFebruary.

.TK: Beginning ofFebruary, 1988. So what did you discover, what were your impressions when you arrived in Namibia at that time?

14 DL: I came with - incredibly naive, so all thethe impressionsimpressions whichwhich werewere mademade werewere veryvery strong. I didn't have a clue of where I was going, what II was comingcomingto.to. SoSo initialinitial impressions: very strong was the sense ofoccupation ofNamibia. ObviouslyObviously thatthatwaswas much stronger in the far north but even within Windhoek, thethe militarymilitary occupationoccupationwaswas very strong. The segregation -I arrived, one ofthethe firstfirst people IImetmetononthethe airplaneairplane waswas this, I think he was an Afrikaaner businessman or something, whowho sortsort ofofproudlyproudly announced that Apartheid had been abolished inin Namibia inin 1978,1978, tentenyearsyears before.before. II spent a few days in South Africa, where you had not only a statestate emergency,emergency, butbutyouyou hadhad illegal Apartheid still enforced, largely. I arrived ininNamibia toto bebe told,told, nono ApartheidApartheidhadhad been abolished ten years ago, and I came- 1'd heard ofSuwaito, butbut forfor somesome reasonreason II somehow thought this was the only township inin thethe entire Southern Africa,Africa, andandofofcoursecourse you arrive and you find that no every littlelittle fann, every littlelittle -- obviouslyobviously WindhoekWindhoek hadhad its townships - but every little small town, every littlelittle farmfarm had thisthis segregation,segregation, visiblevisible segregation still existing. So that was a very strong impression,impression, thatthat everywhereeverywhere youyou went there was segregation, even though legallylegally segregation had beenbeen abolished;abolished; SoSo youyou still had this massive divide ofsociety.

JK: And in Windhoek itself, you had Katutura, right,right, which waswas forfor onlyonly blacks,blacks, oror how was Windhoek divided?

DL: Well again, it was, physically, thisthis physical segregation. YouYouhadhad whitewhite

Windhoek which had black people living inin it,it, your more affluent blackblack peoplepeoplewhowho could afford -- particularly politicians from thethe South African regime,regime, fromfrom thisthis sortsortofof

15 semi-autonomous government which had black people inin it.it. SoSo youyou hadhad veryvery fewfew blackblack

people living in town, then sort ofphysically divided by roadsroads oror openopen space,space, whatever.whatever.

You had, your townships of Katutura, Khomasdal ---- Khomasdal beingbeing thethe so-calledso-called

"colored township."

JK: And how do you say that word, Khomasdal?

DL: Khomasdal.

JK: Okay.

DL: And then segregated - and then Katutura, although Katutura andand KhomasdalKhomasdalwere were

together, next to each other - again there was segregation. There waswas openopen land.land. ItItwaswas

like a no-man's-land between the two townships,townships, and toto thethe extentextentthatthattaxistaxis didn'tdidn'teveneven

drive between the two, because the two communities were totallytotally separate.separate.

JK: Really?

DL: IfYOllIfyou wanted to go from Katutura toto Khomasdal, you couldcould look,look, IImeanmean literallyliterally

the two townships were divided by 500 meters ofland,land, maybe lessless ininplaces,places, whichwhich inin

itselfdid not divide, but simply because thethe social divide was suchsuch thatthat ififyouyou werewere goinggoing to visit someone in Khomasdal you'd get a taxitaxi fromfrom Katutura intointo Windhoek -- intointo towntown

16 - and then get a Khomasdal taxi out to Khomasdal. It was thatthat sort ofsegregation. II

went and lived in Katutura. I lived in Katutura.

JK: Oh, you did?

DL: So there was nothing illegal about that.

JK: Okay.

DL: But it was weird.

JK: There wouldn't too many white people, blond with blue eyes, as yourself, livingliving

in Katutura.

DL: Well I was one of 80,000. I was one white person inin 80,000 black people atatthatthat time. I was not the first person to live there. You had crazy volunteers likelike myself whowho would come, who didn't have any money. The main reason was: itit was soso lonelylonely livingliving in town, because ifyou weren't part of the scene you were very excluded, and IIfeltfelt veryvery lonely there, whereas all the people I worked with lived in Katutura. The people II knewknew lived in Katutura, so it made sense to go and live there, but also I didn't have any moneymoney so it was cheaper to live there.

JK: It was cheaper to live there. Okay.

17 DL: So there was nothing stopping me as aa whitewhite personperson goinggoingandand livingliving ininKatutura,Katutura, but generally, it was not done, and so therethere was thisthis socialsocial segregation.segregation. ButButyes,yes, soso thosethose were the two main impressions thatthat reallyreally hit whenwhen youyou anivedanived-- andand ititwaswas allall pervading. The nature ofsegregation influencedinfluenced everyevery aspectaspect ofoflife,life, werewere ititthethe waywayyouyou related to people, the way you physically lived,lived, wherewhere youyouwentwenttoto school,school, wherewhere youyou whatever, although it wasn't entrenched by lawlawanymore.anymore. AndAndthenthen thisthis sensesense ofof occupation, this military occupation, and thisthis waswas reallyreally strongstrong inin thethe north,north, andand youyou literally when you crossed what was called "the"theredred line,"line," whichwhich waswas wherewherethethe commercial farms ended and your, what was calledcalled "Owambo"Owambo land"land" whichwhichwaswas thethe communal area for the majority ofthethe population ofofOshivambo,Oshivambo, andand itit waswas alsoalso thethe warwar zone where the liberation guerrilla war ---- thethe liberationliberation strugglestruggle ---- waswas beingbeingwagedwaged-- atat least the military conflict was being waged. ThereThere ititwaswas likelike goinggoing intointo aa differentdifferent country. You went from a very sort ofregimentedregimented restrest oftheofthe countrycountry intointo -- andand onceonceyouyou crossed into the war-zone you knew -- thisthis whole thingthing ofoflawlaw andand order.order. WhereasWhereas inin

Windhoek, in the south, itit was -- you kind ofknewknew wherewhere youyou stood.stood. ThereTherewaswas aa certaincertain degree"oflawdegree·oflaw and order. You went intointo thethe war zonezone andandyouyou knewknew thatthat wentwent outoutthethe window, because it was a military -- itit was a war zone,zone, andand thethe tension,tension, you'reyou're constantlyconstantly aware ofthe military presence -- heavy, heavy, heavyheavy militarymilitary presence.presence.

JK: So visually how did thatthat present itself?itself? WereWere therethere anum'edanum'ed vehicles?vehicles?

1818

0 ------_ 0 DL: Yes, constantly annored vehicles, convoys up and down, up and down, so which

i was a very oppressive presence anyway, physically. And thesethese were sort ofmean - war

~ machinery was mean looking.looking. There was a curfew, and you could get shot. Basically

,,'1\1,', 1.1 thatthat was thethe law.law. If you were out ofthethe curfew, you could be shot, which ofcourse had li ,'Ill, massive psychological as well as physical implicationimplication for people livingliving inin thethe far north, !,'I ,tl and people were shot. Often thethe pretext for killing people, when people were killed, was '1\ 11 !I \, thatthat theythey were violating thethe curfew, and therethere was a lotlot ofextra-judicial shootings, if '1 1 I: that'sthat's thethe right word. So you had thatthat- thatthat manifested itselfitselfas well. Literally, as far as I,I' where you were driving, where you were going, you - always had thisthis constant sense of

11 !, danger inin that,that, ififyou were even driving on thethe main roads maybe therethere were landland mines. i','ll

.1 Maybe driving past military bases -- therethere was always gun towers.towers. You know, what's toto

ii1,'.,,'1 stop somebody? It was psychological, a lotlot ofit,it, but - because you went therethere knowing t, \! t,;,,:"·""1

I1" thatthat people had got killed. You went therethere knowing thatthat people had gotten blown up by ,![ il'1I \! landmines.landmines. You went therethere knowing that,that, inin thethe middle ofthethe bush -- ifyou'd get caught :1 I' I inin thethe crossfire or whatever. There was a war going on.

JK: Now I can't remember ififyou toldtold me thisthis earlier, but ififyou did thenthen I want toto get

itit on thethe tape,tape, thatthat therethere was somebody walking - and itit was before thethe curfew - but he

was shot and killed because thethe people knew where he livedlived and knew thatthat he wouldn't

be able toto get home before thethe curfew was over. Did you telltell me that?that?

DL: No, I didn't. Yeah, that'sthat's - thisthis was thethe SOli ofthethe work which The Namibian

was doing, was actually reporting thesethese sort ofincidences,incidences, and for thethe first timetime thethe media

19 was covering thisthis sortsort of thing,thing, because thethe firstfirst timetime therethere was media focusingfocusing on thethe farfar

north, on thethe war zone. And yes, you go back throughthrough thethe pages of The Namibian, week­

inin week-out, therethere were storiesstories likelike this:this: "So and soso got killed" or "So and soso was inin

hospital. They were shotshotpresumably because of curfew violation," or "So and soso was­

thethe soldierssoldiers came toto theirtheir homestead, and theythey were suspectedsuspected ofbeing SWAPO

supporterssupporters or suspectedsuspected ofharboring SWSWAPOAPO guerrillas or something,something, got beaten up."

They're horrific torturetorture storiesstories -- peoples' facesfaces being put on car exhausts, thethe storystory you

toldtold me about thethe person being hung fromfrom a helicopter and flownflown over a village.

JK:JK: They would taketake theirtheir head offand put itit on thethe exhaust pipe?

DL: No, no, no, thethe faceface pressed on it-it-so,so, obviously thethe securitysecurity forcesforces had theirtheir

mission, which was toto fightfight SWSWAPO,APO, and soso when theythey were lookinglooking inin thethe bush, theythey were lookinglooking forfor SWSWAPOAPO guerrillas, theythey would come across a homestead, theythey thinkthink thatthat maybe thethe people had information,information,they they ask people "Have you seen SWAPO?" And ififtheythey feltfelt theythey weren't getting thethe information,information, often thenthen torturetorture would resume.resume. They would thenthen trytry toto torturetorture people toto get informationinformation out ofthem.them. And soso you have cases.

That's one thatthat standsstands out, because thisthis young guy, thethe securitysecurity forcesforces suspectedsuspected thatthat he knew where somesome SWSWAPOAPO guerrillas were. He wouldn't telltell them,them, soso theythey grabbed him, and thethe military vehicle, itit was -- thethe engine was stillstill going, soso thethe exhaust pipe was very, very hot, and theythey pushed his faceface against thethe exhaust pipe toto trytry and make him talk.talk.

JK:JK: Oh, thethe hot exhaust pipe, toto bum his face.face.

20 DL: Yeah, yeah. It was - oh it was horribly mutilated, and justjusttoto trytry andandgetget

information out ofhim. When there was fighting going on, people would -- oftenoften thethe

SWAPO guerrillas would take cover in maybe a homestead. The securitysecurity forcesforces wouldwould

drive into the homestead, literally, with their annored vehicles. IfIfyou werewere inin thetheway,way,

tough luck. I covered one story that a little baby was -- a a guen'illa ranran intointo thethe homestead,homestead,

trying to get away from the security forces who were chasing him, and nextnext thingthing thethe

mother knew the baby was out crawling in the homestead. InIn came thisthis armoredarmored vehicle,vehicle,

crashed through the wooden fence, and drove over thethe baby -- killed it.it. AndAnd soso thethe

homestead was flattened. The baby was killed - crushed. This total-total- itit waswas likelike thisthis

obsession that somehow you gotta' get the guerrillas, and whatever isis inin thethe wayway getsgets itit

regardless.

JK: Now, I was up in the north, when I saw thethe homesteads. So justjusttoto describedescribe it,it,

generally they're a couple hundred yards square or rectangular, with woodenwooden polespoles putput inin

the ground as a kind ofhigh fence that covers it.it. So thatthat would, II guess, bebe thethe

homestead.

DL: Yes.

JK: And then there were the round stick huts with thethe thatchedthatched roofs.roofs. ThenThentherethere

could be several within that.

21

JIiII'_.....;.~.•....•...... •..- ••-~_. .•...... DL: Yes, clusters ofhuts.

JK: Okay, so the tank would just,just, or thethe armoredarmored vehiclevehicle wouldwouldjustjustdrivedriverightright through the fence - just crush thatthat and go rightright in.in.

DL: Yes.

JK: Okay.

DL: Then ifthere's shooting going on andand youyou getget ininthethe waywayandandyouyougetget killed,killed,wellwell tough luck.

JK: So now, I think I asked you thisthis before, youyou coveredcovered thethenorthnorthandandWindhoek,Windhoek,aa bit, right? You covered mostly Windhoek, butbut sometimessometimes youyouwouldwouldgogo toto thethenorth?north?

DL: Yeah.

JK: And when you would go toto thethe north thenthen youyou wouldwould taketake anotheranotherpersonpersonwithwith you? Somebody nan1ed Chris?

DL: Yes, well Chris was The Namibian's chiefchiefatrocityatrocityreporter.reporter. HeHewaswasfromfromthe-the-

JK: Oh, okay, what was bis full name?

2222 DL: Chris Shipanga.

JK: Shipanga.

DL: Yes.

JK: Okay.

DL: He was Oshivanlbo speaking. He was from the north, originally. He --thereforetherefore

his beat tended to be the far north ofthe country, and often we went together toto cover

stories up in the north, yeah.

JK: Okay. Well, now, in your book - which I had an opportunity to read a littlelittle bit, before I lost it - you described, in 1988, that there was a student boycott, or uprising, or II don't know how you would exactly describe it, that started in the north. When about did that take place, and what were the circumstances that started that?

DL: It started, I think it was around February, March, at a school called Ponhofi

Secondary School, which was very near the boarder ofAngola.

JK: Okay.

23 DL: It was in a very small place called Ohangwena, and there was basically school, a

few shops, a few houses, and a military base. Now there was this running controversy

about South African military bases being built next to hospitals and schools. The South

Africans claim they put them there to protect this social infrastructure. People, a lot of people from the areas complained that they were actually there as - that this hospital was there to provide protection, to try and deter attack ofthe military base. At this actual secondary school there was -- had been a lot of- several incidents over the years. Firstly, when the military base was attacked by SWAPO guerrillas, often the school got hit as well. Now, again, the soldiers said it was SWAPO who hit the school. The people at the school said no, it was this military - but anyway, it got caught in the crossfire. Then there were incidences - soldiers came from the base, went into the school and raped students in the hostels. And I think it was basically one ofthese incidents --II think it was a rape - somehow that was the final straw after these several incidences along the way.

The students said enough was enough, and they boycotted the school, saying they're not going back to the school until the military base moves. And, as I say, there was sort of­ often, throughout the region there were schools, schools next to military bases. As I say, it'd been an ongoing issue, but now this became the focal point, and it spread like wildfire, very quickly, so from this one school to another school to another school. And itit became suddenly that the students were very well- the student organization, nationally, was very well organized, and itit became a protest issue.

JK: Okay.

24 DL: What started at this one school- a boycott, a student walked out - it became-

then spread very quicldy to the whole ofthe north then to the rest ofthe country. And the mobilizing issue was troops away from the bases. Obviously it was all wrapped around

opposing South African rule and whatever, but the focal issue was this dismantle military bases from the school, added to which there was there was issue with conscription as well, but this was the focal point.

JK: So it started in the north and then spread throughout all ofNamibia?

DL: Well most throughout the whole ofthe country, yes.

JK: So it was also going on here, in Windhoek?

DL: Yes, as I said, the Ponhofi boycott started in, it was early March, and by May, that was when a nationwide boycott was called. It became a nationwide boycott, and it was then followed by a general strike. So it became the rallying point for resistance within the country, which at the time it was very noticeable, people were getting very tired, very despondent as far as the whole independence process. And somehow there was this despondency, but at the sam.e time still widespread opposition to South African rule ­ despondency that, ten years after Resolution 435, still nothing had happened. And it was as ifnothing's gonna'gonua' happen. At that stage, the first peace talks started outside the country in March, April I think, but within the country it was: "It'sjust more talks."

25 JK: Oh, okay, so they were just considered more talks.

DL: More talks.

JK: Yes.

DL: And - but so the focus within the country was not the talks going outside the

country but the student boycott, which became a nationwide boycott, which became a really sort ofgalvanized protest to South African occupation and was the focus right through until September - everybody's focus. And these peace talks that were going on­ thethe cease-fire in Angola - was fairly incidental to events actually going on in the country.

The studentstudent boycott was met, and then the general strike was met with a pretty harsh responseresponse fromfrom thethe South MricanAfrican authorities within the country.

JK: Okay, so was therethere a kind ofcrackdown.

DL:DL: There waswas a realreal crackdown; therethere was an attempt to declare a state ofemergency.

SoSo itit waswas aavery,very, very tensetense timetime and very, II mean very exciting times in the respect that suddenlysuddenly thisthis oppositionopposition again hadhad become galvanized. There was, nationwide, probably thethe mostmost concertedconcerted oppositionopposition fromfrom withinwithin thethe country toto South MricanAfrican rule,rule, a demonstrationdemonstration againstagainst it.it. I1thinkthink obviouslyobviously people were aware ofthethe peace talkstalks and that maybemaybe thingsthings werewere actuallyactually gaininggaining momentummomentum outside thethe country. So you had thisthis reactionreaction toto that,that, asas wellwell asas that.that. So,So, IIthinkthink thethe SouthSouth AfricanAfrican regimeregime partly realizedrealized itit

2626 was in its death throws now, and that maybe this time it was happening. So it was kind ofa savage reaction to that, as well as a civil protest.

JK: Okay, so it wasn't completely separated. They weren't completely independent channels. There was some awareness or overlap.

DL: I think so, yes, and obviously as the peace talks got going and I think it was - when was the South African withdrawal from Angola, I mean, where you physically saw it, the South African troops pulling out. Again it was: "But this has happened before."

JK: Yes.

DL: So again, it was: "Well we'll believe it when we see it." "The South Africans are just buying time, because they've been getting a bit ofhammering in Cuito Cuanavale, in

Angola." So things weren't going - it was a pattern, and that was the way it was read:

"This has happened before. Don't believe it." Meanwhile, it's business as usual within

Namibia, i.e. clampdown, protests, repression. The struggle continues. So there was certainly not this obeyance. The student boycott was very significant in that perhaps it was the last nail in the coffin for the South Africans, because militarily they were under pressure. At home they were under pressure - economically as well as socially: "Why are we still fighting this war?"

JK: Okay.

27 DL: Then, within Namibia, you suddenly have this nationwide boycott, you have this very vociferous nationwide opposition. It obviously contributed to the South Africans finally signing.

JK: That's really fascinating. Now, in February of 1988, there was a bank that was blown up in the north. Where did that take place? I don't know the town where that took place?

DL: It's a place called Oshakati.

JK: Oshakati? Okay.

DL: Which is the main town in the far north, but it was also the main military garrison for the South Africans.

JK: Was it in connection with the student boycott, or was it a different event?

DL: No, it was before.

JK: Oh it was before, okay.

28 DL: It happened before, and again it could well have been part ofthe chain reaction. It

must have been part ofthe chain reaction.

JK: Okay.

DL: It was a horrific event. In the end 18, 19 people got killed, all ofthem civilians.

A bomb was planted in the bank, on payday. It was when all the nurses and teachers

were getting their pay, their paychecks, and they were in the bank cashing their

paychecks. So it was the middle ofthe day, the bank was full ofpeople cashing their

paychecks, and so you got horrific injuries and a lot ofpeople injured and a lot ofpeopJe

killed.

JK: So, did they ever find out who did it?

DL: Well, yes, in the respect that, a few months later this guy was arrested and

charged. The guy was claimed to be a SWAPOSWAPO guelTilla,guenilla, and that he was on a mission,

and therefore he was doing this on behalfofSWAPO.SWAPO. Nobody quite knows. At the time people believed he had been put up. This was justj list a propaganda thing.

End ofTape 1, Side 1

JK: Okay, so we've just turned the tape over.

29 DL: I think at the time people, a lotlot of SWAPO supporters,supporters, didn'tdidn't wantwant toto believe,believe, andand didn't believe it that it was necessarily a Plan fighter,fighter, a SWAPO lighterlighter whowho diddid this.this. ItIt was propaganda by the South Africans. Nobody knows, toto thisthis day.day. TheThe guy'sguy's stillstill around. I suppose maybe a few people might know. He celiainly knowsknows quitequite who'swho's orders he was operating on, ifhe was operating on anyone's ordersorders atat all,all, butbutatat thethe time,time, it was that South Africans blamed itit on SWAPO, SWAPO supporters.supporters. TheThe majoritymajority ofof people blamed it on the South Africans. Certainly South Africans usedused itit asas aa pretextpretexttoto launch attacks on SWSWAPOAPO bases in Angola. Within hours ofthatthatbombbomb goinggoing offoffthethe

South Africans had launched air attacks on SWAPO bases inin Angola.Angola.

JK: But, strategically, who would itit benefit? What would bebe thethe purposepurposeofblowingofblowingitit up?

DL: Well this is why -I don't know. Nobody knows. Nobody knew.knew. ThoseThose opinionsopinions being so polarized, you drew your own conclusions. ItIt seemedseemed asas ififitit waswas aa fairlyfairly callouscallous

-I mean, at the time, from the perspective -- I'dI'djustjustarrived inin thethe countrycountry-- soso fromfrom aa perspective, from where I was coming from, thethe people II was with,with, thethe peoplepeople II waswas talking with, it appeared that it was a very callous propaganda stancestance byby thethe SouthSouth

Africans. As I say, within hours they'd launchedlaunched attacks on SWAPO basesbases inin Angola,Angola, and then were trying to shift the blame - were shifting thethe blame onon SWSWAPOAPO veryvery quickly. The South African propaganda machine was putting thethe blameblame onon SWSWAPO.APO.

Obviously, as time goes on and they produce thisthis guy who claimsclaims toto bebe aa PlanPlan fighter,fighter, aa

SWAPO fighter, getting caught a few months later,later, you say,say, "Oh"Oh hanghang on,on, thisthis isn'tisn't-"-" butbut

30 "Ah, it's propaganda." As time goes on, you don't know. Namibia in some respects needs a Truth and Reconciliation to delve into these things. Who gavc those orders or who could get this guy up and say: "Well whose orders were you acting on?" But today, you don't know. We still don't know, but at the time it seemed like a very callous act.

And the blame was put on the South Africans.

JK: Did SWSWAPOAPO do that kind ofthing, though? Could it be plausible that SWSWAPOAPO would've done that? Did they blow up other kinds ofthings that had civilians in them?

DL: As the years went on, it seems that the differentiation bctween military targets and soft targets - military targets and civilian targets - became a bit blurred. Again, one theory is this guy was just acting on his own, and somehow was a loose canon. I don't know, I mean, civilian targets were hit in Windhoek. A carpark in the center oftown, a hotel carpark got blown up, and SWAPO claimed responsibility. I don't know. I vaguely remember the justification being that it was a place where military people went. Perhaps,

I don't know. Later that year, a hotel got blown up. Civilians got killed. It had no military significance whatsoever, but again SWSWAPOAPO denied they did it. By that stage everything was so confused. South Africans would blame SWAPO, SWSWAPOAPO denied they did it, and then the perception was largely, by the majority that this was a very callous propaganda stunt, and civilians got killed; and it certainly contributed to this chain reaction which followed the student boycott - the nationwide boycott - and contributed to this whole heightened tension, this whole heightened sense of outrage at the continued

South African occupation.

31 JK: Okay, now what I wanted to ask you was that there were a number ofanns ofthe

South West African security system, so you had the South African military forces, but

you had also security forces and then a special group called the Koevoet. So could you kind of describe how these different arms ofthe security would operate?

DL: You had your conventional soldiers - your professional soldiers - in the South

African Defense Force [SADF]. You also had a lot of conscripts from South Africa in the South African Defense Force [SADF], and now they were in Namibia primarily fighting in Angola. They were fighting the more conventional war in Angola, and ­ depending on what perspective you take - defending the boarders but also obviously fighting within Angola, fighting the combined forces; and that was made up ofconscripts and professional soldiers. You then had the South West Africa Territorial Force

[SWATF], which again, was largely conscripts from Namibia, again, run by a few professional soldiers.

JK: Okay, so they were drafted into that force. They had to go.

DL: Yes, and as within South Africa, you had compulsory conscription. So that was your conventional fighting force, which was based all over the country but concentrated within the north ofthe country, largely waging war in Angola. Then you had your police unit called Koevoet, which was part ofthe police force; it was a counterinsurgency force;

It was a paramilitary force, but they came under the police; And they were doing police

32 operations, supposedly, but basically were the front line ofthe fight against SWAPO

guerrillas. So they were maintaining the law, doing police work which was killing

guerrillas. And they, well they were set up late 70s, early 80s as this paramilitary force,

and because they weren't under your military command, they were under the police

command, and they were fairly autonomous. They didn't really fall under your

conventional police command. They were in law unto themselves, and they had a very

specific mission, which was to kill SWAPO guerrillas; And they went about that in their

own way; They didn't have your conventional military discipline; They were all full time

people - paid. It was their job -- was to go out and fight - and highly motivated people

who did not let a lot get in the way oftheir mission, which was to fight SWSWAPOAPO on a

guerrilla warfare basis.

JK: Right, they had the reputation ofbeing extraordinarily brutal. Did you ever come

across any people who were in Koevoet? Did you ever have the chance to interview or

talk to them?

DL: Working where we were working, obviously we stayed well clear ofthem,

because we were perceived as p81i ofthe enemy, in some respects, but occasionally you'd

meet these guys in bars and whatever; And certainly on a couple occasions, I remember ­

when we were working up there in the north - we'd bump into people - Koevoet people

- off duty, and so, not revealing who we were, sort ofget chatting with them and yes, so

very occasionally. Otherwise, if you were out reporting or whatever, and you would

33

~------.----_ ..__ .._-----_.------_ ... ------.-._------come across these people face to face - they werewerc on duty or whatever - but obviously it

was at anTI's length in those circumstances.

JK: So I think you had described to memc an incident where you were talking and they

were speaking somewhat about the training that they had gone through.

DL: Yes, the bulk ofKoevoet or a lot of Koevoet members were people from Owambo

land, Oshivambo speakers, who were recruited, either just because it was ajob, because

somehow maybe they were opposed to SWAPO, or else there were occasions where

captured SWAPO guerrillas were then turned and drafted into Koevoet. And one day we

were in a bar with one offduty Koevoet guy - the local guy - and he was talking about

how, when he'd been drafted into Koevoet, he went through very rigorous indoctrination

- as far as political indoctrination, as far as what the job was and about what SWSWAPOAPO

was; And actually he said to us that, after that process, that indoctrination, that ifhe'd

been told his mother was a SWAPO he would have killed her. So it was heavy. It was

heavy psychological whatever. And it showed from their point ofview, the Koevoets

were at the very sharp end ofthe South African's fight against SWAPO, and were really

vulnerable - particularly the Oshiwambo speaking members of Koevoet - not only were they fighting for a regime which was hated and detested by their own people, but they were doing it within their own communities; And they were often usually pitted against members oftheir own communities; so that sort ofalienation was very very strong - that sense ofalienation. Then you had very highly motivated South Africans -largely white

South Africans - running Koevoet units, who were on a mission. They were there to save

34 white civilization, Christianity, blah,blab, blah, blah.blab. The Koevoet units would pray every

day, before they went into battle. They would line up and pray. So there was this really

strong motivation - strong psychological motivation - towards a very brutal regime,

you're out there in the bush, and you're a target, and SWSWAPOAPO guerrillas similarly were

motivated. Really, this was where the battle was at most. Everybody was at each other's

prey. You were literally prey. And so very little emotion was shown.

JK: Well, they seem to have had a policy ofbasically shoot-to-kill, take no prisoners.

DL: Yes, the conflict where the shooting and took place, it was a battle situation. It

was an ambush situation. Now, Koevoet were ambushing, got to know where guerrillas

were and were attacking them, so it was defense attack, or else Koevoets were ambushed

by SWAPO guerrillas; And so everybody was fighting for their lives. What the other

approach was toto track guerrillas, and that was largely what Koevoet's prime aim was - to

track down, and obviously it was in their interest in some respects to take prisoners toto get

information. A lot ofcaptured Plan fighters were then turned and made to fight for

Koevoet. So they didn't kill everybody, no, because it wasn't inin their interest. It was just

as much in their interest to capture some SWAPO guerrillas, but whenever there was

fighting, you make sure you're the one who gets out alive, whichever side you're 011. But

Koevoet's techniques for - as we described earlier - ofgetting information out oflocal people - again, this was not a conventional war, this was guerrilla warfare, therefore every civilian you saw could be a SWSWAPOAPO guelTilla, and in that respect - the Koevoets were in uniform, at least; SWAPO guenillasguelTillas weren't necessary in uniform - it was a

35 gucn'illaguen'illa warfare. You had a very pro-SWAPO community population,population, andand therefore,therefore, toto find out who was the guerrillas and thereforetherefore who was youryourenemy,enemy, theythey employedemployed prettypretty heavy-handed interrogation techniquestechniques toto get theirtheir information;information; AndAnd whenwhentheythey werewere actually chasing SWAPO guerrillas, very littlelittle got inin theirtheir way.way.

JK: Now, you had mentioned before thatthat thethe tensiontension waswas incredibleincredible-- thethe stress­stress­ when you would go up to the north toto trytry toto cover a story,story, soso whatwhat waswas thethe feelingfeeling ofof that?

DL: I think it was the constant sense of military, ofwar, thethe factfact thatthat itit waswas aa guerrillaguerrilla war, therefore at any moment thethe road you were driving onon couldcould bebe landmined,landmined, couldcould blow up; The bridge you were about toto drive over could blow up;up; TheThe roadroad you'reyou're drivingdriving on in the middle ofthe bush - maybe there'sthere's an ambush ororyou'reyou'rejustjust aboutabouttoto drivedrive intointo a fight or something like that, plus thethe curfew, thethe factfact thatthat youyou knewknew thatthat ififyouyouwerewere outout after dark or even -- as I say it was sunset toto sumise curfew ---- now,now, dependingdepending ononwhichwhich time ofthe year and what the weather was likelike -- depending whenwhen thethe sunsunwentwent down.down. SoSo you could be out - and sunrise and sunset does not happen atat aa certaincertain time--time-- soso itit waswas open to interpretation. So you would be driving past military bases,bases, whenwhen thethe sunsun waswas going down, always thinking: "Well, now, am lout?lout? Am II a a target?"target?" So,So, ififyou'reyou're having to live under that sort ofcircumstance -- thethe constant threatthreat thatthat anyany momentmoment youyou might be in the wrong place at thethe wrong time,time, when suddenlysuddenly securitysecurity forcesforces areare chasingchasing guerrillas or guerrillasguerri11as arc looking for sanctuary, or whatever, andand you'reyou'rejustjustinin thethe wrong place at the wrong time, and you get caught. This waswas constant,constant, constant,constant,

36 constant, and you knew there was no recourse. I mean, itit was no point saying,saying, "Excuse"Excuse

me, I'm ajoumalist," or "Excuse me, you're just about toto shoot me. This isis illegal.illegal. II

want my lawyer." Forget it, this was a war zone. So yeah, itit was constant tension,tension, andand

all ofthat, when you're living in that sort ofenvironment, people are tensetense asas well,well, andand soso

constant suspicion: "Who are you? What are you? Where are you from?from? WhatWhat areare youyou

doing?" So it all combined to this incredibly tense atmosphere -- environment ---- which,which,

the moment you drove out, back into the south ofthethe country, out ofthethe warwar zonezone -the-the

official war zone - it was like this huge weight would liftlift offyour shoulders,shoulders, becausebecause atat

least you were returning to a place where you knew roughly where you stood.stood. ItItwaswas notnot

so likely that the place was land-mined. Ifyou see soldiers, they'rethey're therethere onon theirtheir wayway toto

somewhere, or they're part of- you knew where you stood.

JK: Well, I wanted to talk to you about the events surrounding April first.first. TheThe U.N.U.N.

operation was scheduled to begin on April first, 1989, and thethe Special Representative ofof

the Secretary General, Martti Ahtisaari, arrived inin Windhoek on thatthat day. So,So, werewere youyou

covering the events here in Windhoek at that time?

DL: Yes, I was in Windhoek at the time. 11leThe night before was a night ofofmassivemassive

celebration - certainly in Katutura. It was: "Independence has come. It'sIt's happening.happening.

Today is the day," and midnight, it was New Year's Eve twotwo hundred timestimes over.over. PeoplePeople

were out and about, and then people just didn't sleep thatthat night; And thenthen thethe nextnext

morning there was a march, because, again, it was perceived that:that: "Hey, freedom!freedom! WeWe

can go wherever we like. We do what we like," and therethere was thisthis big, big,big, bigbig march.march.

37 .II 1 J The tradetrade unions organized aa bigbig march.march. ItItwaswas actuallyactually onon somesomepolitical political thing,thing, asas farfar asas

"No toto denationalization". II thinkthink thethe interiminterim governmentgovernment hadhad plannedplanned toto sellsell offoffstatestate

utilities or something. But itit waswas basicallybasically everybodyeverybody saying,saying, "Hey,"Hey, independenceindependence hashas

arrived," and thisthis big march startedstarted fromfrom KatuturaKatutura intointo town;town; AndAnd itit waswas stoppedstopped ononthethe

outskirts of towntown by thethe police, whowho hadhad tear-gas,tear-gas, andand theytheyjustjustformedformed thisthis cordoncordonacrossacross the road and said: "You're notnot comingcoming intointo town."town." So,So, suddenly,suddenly, youyou cancan imagineimagine thisthis people - having not slept,slept, havinghaving drunkdrunk aa lot,lot, andand thenthen thisthis statestate ofofeuphoriaeuphoria-- saying:saying:

"We're off intointo town,town, where we'vewe've nevernever beenbeen ableable toto gogo before withwith ourourralliesrallies andand marches, because todaytoday independenceindependence starts,starts, 'cause'causethethe U.N.V.N. areare arriving,arriving, andand todaytodayisis

April one;" And you were stoppedstopped inin youryour trackstracks byby thethe oppressoroppressor whowho waswas therethere ininfrontfront of you; and thethe march was turnedturned back,back, andand ititwaswasgetting getting veryvery ugly,ugly, andandititdidn'tdidn'tactuallyactually break intointo conflict, but you couldcould seesee thethe frustrationfrustration andand basicallybasically thethe policepolice forceforce saying:saying:

"No, thethe U.N.V.N. thinksthinks theythey can changechange thatthat much?much? YourYourmarch march isis stillstill againstagainst thethe law."law."

So thatthat was how thethe day began. AndAnd thenthen IIwentwent backback toto thethe office,office, andand suddenlysuddenly thisthis report came throughthrough thethe telextelex -- onon thethe wirewire serviceservice -- thatthat unidentifiedunidentifiedinsurgentsinsurgents hadhad been intercepted,intercepted, had come acrossacross fromfrom Angola,Angola, hadhad beenbeen interceptedintercepted inin thethe farfar north,north, and thatthat heavy fightingfighting had nownow brokenbroken outout inin thethe farfar north.north.

JK: But now also, justjusttoto backback upup aalittlelittle bitbit onon thatthat day,day, therethere waswas aa demonstration,demonstration, aa rally at thethe airport, soso who was that?that?

DL: That was largelylargely -.

3838 JK: This was to meet Ahtisaari, to begin, at thethe airport.

01.,: Yes, it was largely OTA [Democratic Tumhalle Alliance] peoplepeople (the(the DTADTAbeingbeing

the main party within the interim government, thethe pro-South African semi-autonomoussemi-autonomous

regime). And basically the intcrim government parties shippedshipped theirtheir supporterssupporters outouttoto thethe

airport to welcome Ahtisaari, but it was mcantmeant obviously toto create anan impressionimpression thatthat

"Hey, you people have been dealing with SWAPO all thisthis time,time, but we'rewe're here,here, andand

we've got big support."support," The road was actually painted: "Viva OIA!" -- hadhad slogansslogans allall

the way along the road, painted on the road itself.itself.

JK: On the tar ofthe road!

01: On the tar ofthe road, so you did drive over thesethese slogans.slogans. AllAll alongalong thethe roadroad were orAOrA - this is a forty-kilometer stretch from airport intointo towntown -- soso aboutabout everyevery twotwo or three, four kilometers was one ofthese slogans on thethe road,road, and thenthen therethere waswas DTDIAA posters, "Viva OTA1" and whatever. And then a lotlot ofDTA supporters,supporters, plusplus thesethese otherother interim parties gathered at the airport to welcome him, but toto say:say: "Hey,"Hey, we'rewe'reherehere asas well. It's not just SWAPDSWAPO you're dealing with."

JK: And then SWAPO was kept from going there?there?

39 DL: Well, there was nothing stopping themthem fromfrom goinggoing therethere -- werewere theythey stoppedstopped fromfrom

going there? 1don't know. 1don't thinkthink theythey were stoppedstopped iromtrom goinggoing there.there. No,No,

people were busy celebrating inin town.town. No, thethe march fromfrom KatuturaKatutura waswas not-not-

JK: To the airport. It was toto thethe center of Windhoek.

DL: To the center oftown, yes, so itit was different strategies.strategies. TheThe DTADTA said,said, "let's"let's

get out to the airport," and they had thethe resourcesresources toto getget peoplepeople outout toto thethe airport.airport.

JK: Because it was so far - nobody can walk all thatthat way.way.

DL:OL: No, you had trains. You even had your Himba people,people, whichwhich areare youryour veryvery traditional people from the far north, very subsistence,subsistence, traditionaltraditional peoplepeople whowho stillstill wandered around bear-breasted and inin loin-clothesloin-clothes werewere broughtbrought downdown andand werewere there,there, camped outside the airport. They had been brought onon trains.trains. AllAll thethe peoplepeoplehadhad beenbeen shipped there, and it was a massive operation. Huge resourcesresources werewere used.used.

JK: But all done by DTOTA?

DL: DTA and the interim government parties, toto createcreate thisthis impressionimpression forfor AhtisaariAhtisaari on his alTivaJ.alTival. So. yes, that was his first impressionimpression ofNamibia.Namibia. PeoplePeopletherethere werewere waving flags and "Welcome!" whatever, whatever, whatever,whatever, butbut itit waswas DTOTA,A, DTA,OTA,

DTA. Meanwhile, in town, thisthis big rallyrally was stoppedstopped onon thethe outskirtsoutskirts oftowl1.oftowl1.

40 JK: So he couldn't see that.that.

DL: Didn't see that, no.

JK: So then he went to thethe hotel, and thenthen he receivedreceived thisthis informationinformationthatthat SWAPOSWAPO

forces had come over the border. So where was thatthat informationinformationcomingcoming from?from? WhoWho hadhad

access to that information, then?then?

DL: As far as he was concerned, II don't know. WeWe gotgot ititthroughthrough thethe wirewire services,services,

and largely were reliant on thethe wire services.

JK: And who controlled thethe wire services?

DL: The main wire service was South African PressPress Agency,Agency, whichwhichwaswas notnot aa

government-controlled news agency, but itit was ownedowned byby mostmost ofofthethe newspapernewspaper groups,groups,

most ofwhich were pro-establishment, pro-minority rule.rule. ItItwaswas businessbusiness interests,interests,

conservative business interests thatthat ranran thethe media andand thereforetherefore ownedownedthisthis agency,agency, butbutitit

was not state propaganda. It was journalistsjournalists -- correspondents ininthethe northnorth -- findingfinding

stories, saying "Hey, what's going on here?" So ititwaswas not SouthSouthAfricanAfricanpropaganda.propaganda. ItIt

was true fact, in that respect, and thisthis was all we hadhad toto gogo on,on, asas journalistsjournalists atat thethetime.time.

JK: So you didn't have any other independentindependent sourcesource ofofinformation?information?

4141 - , DL: Well, as soon as this infonnation started coming through,through, wewe triedtried toto phonephone people in the north, but obviously no one knew what was goinggoing on.on. NobodyNobody knewknew whatwhat was going on. So for the first couple ofdays, day or so,so, itit was:was: "Well,"Well, thisthis isis whatwhat thethe wire agencies are saying. This is what U.N.D.N. says. This isis whatwhat SouthSouth AfricansAfricans say.say. AndAnd then Chris Shipanga went up pretty soon after thethe first reportsreports camecamethrough through -- probablyprobably the next day - so he went up for a few days, and thenthen came backback withwith hishis reportsreports andand interviewing ofeye-witnesses. So it was a fairlyfairly slowslow process.

JK: Now, when you or Chris would go up, again, how diddid youyou getget accessaccess toto thethe information? I mean, I think you had mentioned toto me thatthat itit waswas reallyreally thethe SouthSouth

African military that would have to taketake you toto wherever you'reyou're going.going.

DL: Well, not us, 'cause'cause we knew where we were going. WhatWhat youyou hadhad ---- alongalong withwith

Ahtisaari's arrival, you had ofcourse your internationalinternational press contingentcontingent-- mediamedia core­core­ who arrived basically to record a few press conferences, a fewfew handshakes,handshakes, andand aa fewfew colorcolaI' pieces on "This is Namibia on thethe dawn ofthisthis independence,independence, aa newnewcountry,country, thethe process about to start," and all ofa sudden, fightingfighting breaks outout700700 kilometers toto thethe north - 700 or 800 kilometers to the north, inin a place where nobodynobody knew?knew? SoSo youryour actual press-corps - suddenly you've got your editors inin Europe andand NorthNorth AmericaAmerica saying: "Hey, get up there. Get the story." Few ofthemthem would havehave knownknown whatwhat thethe hellhell was going on. The only place to stay was in Oshakati inin thethe militarymilitary garrison.garrison. YouYou gotgot there, you need pictures, you need a story. Who's gonna' provideprovide that?that? OfOfcoursecourse thethe

42 South African military. So, as a rule, your internationalinternational presspress corpscorps waswas fairlyfairly reliantreliant onon

the South Africans as sources of infonnation,infonnation, because therethere werewere nono otherother sourcessources ofof

infonnation. And they didn't necessarily know thethe place.place. TheyThey couldn't,couldn't, obviously,obviously,

speak Osmvambo and they had deadlines, but obviously TheThe NamibianNamibian ---- thethe locallocal mediamedia

-- knew the area, h~d its contacts, knew what itit was doing,doing, theythey hadhad peoplepeople whowho spokespokethethe

language. So we went up and we didn't, out ofprinciple, didn'tdidn't getget infonnationinfonnation-I-I

mean, you got the South African side ofthethe storystory fromfrom WindhoekWindhoek-- soso actuallyactually wentwent upup

there and went to scenes offighting, intointo thethe villages, wentwent toto seeseethethe bodies,bodies, andandtriedtried toto

put together what had happened throughthroughthesethese eye-witness interviews.interviews. SoSo thatthat waswas howhow

we went about it, and that was where we were getting ourour infonnationinfonnationfrom.from.

JK: Okay, so what kind ofinformationinformation did you get?get? WasWas thethe fightingfighting happeninghappening inin

various different places, or was therethere some centralization toto it?it?

DL: What was obviously happening was thatthat you had thesethese groupsgroups ofofSWSWAPOAPO fightersfighters

coming across, walking - so villagers were tellingtelling usus -- toto getget themselvesthemselves upup toto thetheU.N.,V.N.,

to fonn bases in Namibia, but theythey were moving asas groups,groups, groupsgroups ofofprobablyprobablyaroundaround 1010

to 20, which was not usual.

JK: And were they just open? Out inin thethe open, walking?walking?

DL: Well they were initially, thatthat way when therethere werewere attacked,attacked, theytheywerewereinin aa group.group.

They weren't out in the open, but at thethe same time,time, somesome villagersvillagers wouldwoulddescribe describe howhow

43

:- thcythey came singing. They were singing liberationliberation songssongs asas theythey madcmadc theirtheir wayway throughthrough

the bush. So it was obviously not an undercover operation, butbut atat thethe samesame timetime youyou werewere

moving through countryside, throughthrough dense bush, and theythey werewere armed,armed, andand theythey werewere

moving into the war zone. So you sensed, putting togethertogether thethe eyewitnesseyewitness accounts,accounts, thethe

sense that these guerrillas, they were at thethe same timetime probablyprobably wary,wary, butbut theythey werewere notnot

fully alert. They obviously initially believed thatthat thethe cease-nrcccase-l1re was holding,holding, andand theythey

were not going to be attacked, but theythey were.

JK: But they were attacked?

DL: And then word soon spread thatthat theythey were attacked. WhenWhen theythey werewere attacked,attacked, then fighting started, and then people spreadspread..

.TK:JK: So when they were attacked, who was attacking them?them? WasWas itit Koevoet,Koevoet, waswas ititthethe

Security Force?

DL: Initially, it was Koevoet. For thethe firstfirst week itit was Koevoet,Koevoet, becausebecause KoevoetKoevoet were police. At that stage, South African forcesforces -- SADF [South[South AfricanAfrican DefenseDefense Force]Force] and the SWATF (the South West African Territory Force), thethe conventionalconventional armies,armies, hadhad been confined to base - the cease-fire.

JK: Okay, so those groups had been confined toto base, butbutthethe policepolice-- andand KoevoetKoevoet asas part ofthe police - were not confined toto base.

44 DL: Yes, Koevoet were part ofthe police force and therefore were not confined to base. And this issue was a contentious issue right up until about two weeks before the elections - which was November - it was not resolved; and it was a constant battle for the U.N., and it was one ofthe main areas ofcontention. U.N. said: "Koevoet is military, therefore must be confined to base, de-armed, demobilized." South Africans said: "No,

Koevoet are police, therefore they're carrying on," and went on, but they were basically the people who then fought - who obviously heard that the guerrillas were coming across

- and attacked. They said: "This is an invasion. These people are entering the country illegally. They are SWAPO. They are armed, and they went in."

JK: Okay, so when the news was coming in that there was fighting in the north, it was between SWAPO and Koevoet, because Koevoet hadn't been confined to base.

DL: Right.

JK: Okay. Well, I guess what I wanted to ask you -- because now we're getting close to the end - when voter registration began to take place, and their was an attempt to develop a code ofconduct, PerezP6rez de CuellarCu611ar had come to Windhoek and had brought the parties together to develop some kind of sense ofcooperation, what was the reaction?

How did the media respond to that?

45 DL: When thethe U.N. arrived, itit had nothing or very littlelittle inin place, certainly as far as

informationinformation dissemination - media strategy - itit was starting from scratch. Now

obviously you come, you arrive, and war breaks out, and right from thethe start, therefore,therefore,

theythey were facing a lotlot ofmedia hostility. They were on thethe defensive. They had no timetime

toto make any kind ofcontacts with thethe locallocal media, didn't know anybody, nobody knew

them,them, and all ofa sudden you've got thisthis major p.r. jobjob on your hand tryingtrying toto explain

what was going on. So thethe relationship between thethe media, all ofthethe media -- from The

NamibianNarnibian itit was obviously hostility inin thethe respect of"What thethe hell's going on here?"

channeling thatthat sense ofdisbelief, despondency, outrage from thethe readership, thethe majority

ofthethe people. It was: "What thethe hell isis going on here? You were supposed toto be

bringing peace, and war's broken out." Then from thethe pro-South African, pro-DTA

camp, thethe media was hostile because UNTAG [United Nations Transitional Assistance

Group} was coming toto sell thethe country down thethe river toto thethe communists. So

immediatelyimmediately thethe U.N. was caught between thethe media. Now, as timetime went on, theythey

obviously got theirtheir p.T., theirtheir informationinformation operation inin place, started using thethe media, but

largelylargely used thethe media which theythey could at leastleast have some influenceinfluence over, which was thethe

Broadcast there.there.

JK: The radio.

DL: Yeah, thethe South West Africa Broadcasting Corporation, which because itit was a state organ you could get intointo it,it, throughthrough thethe South African Regime. Obviously, thethe radio was thethe main way ofreaching people, as well, so itit was vital- strategically impOliant-impOliant-

46 but it was also the medium over which at least the UN. could have some influence, although it was again a pretty hostile, love-hate relationship because it was the South

African mouthpiece as well. It was a similar relationship with the SWABC, which the

D.N.U.N. had, as it did with the police force, as it did with the army, as it did with the South

African authorities, this sort of: "Well, we've gotta' work together, but hell, we hate your guts." Well, maybe that's a bit ofa simplification, but whereas the private media - which was largely the newspapers - as time went on, obviously the UN. information department and people did a lot ofwork to try and establish relationships with it. And gradually it did, but there was still- as far as coverage was concerned - it was basically trying to get cooperation, the UN. was trying to get cooperation but obviously couldn't count on it because it was private media. So it was not the main focus oftheir information, apart from placing adverts and things like that. So, when it actually came to things like election codes and things like that, the media was always asking questions. It was criticizing, analyzing, asking questions about these things, voicing - obviously depending on the constituency - concerns about these things. The election code, there was obviously some people who were unhappy with it. It was a compromise. Would it work? Everyone was still very skeptical. This sort ofskepticism remained. Obviously it took a lot ofundoing, and it remained right up until the election, based largely, I think, on the experiences ofApril one and those first few days ofthe independence process.

JK: That whole event really soured the whole process.

47 . DL: The U.N.,V.N., it'sit's a miracle theythey managed toto salvagesalvage somethingsomething outout ofofit,it, andand thatthat byby the end it could at leastleast get an election oifthe ground,ground, going.going. TwoTwo weeksweeks beforebeforethethe elections, there was still- particularly up inin thethe farfar northnorth-- therethere waswas violence.violence. PeoplePeople werc saying: "Well hell, are thesethese elections gonna'gonna' gogo ahead'?"ahead,?" AndAnd IIthinkthink theythey werewere ready to call it off. The UN.V.N. was readyready toto callcall itit offoffrightright upup untiluntil thethe finalfinal day.day. ItItwaswas that hit and miss, thatthat touchtouch and go, because theythey hadhad toto createcreate thisthis environmentenvironmentwherewhere free and fair elections would taketake place; AndAnd II thinkthink thatthat waswas wherewherethethe mediamediawaswas important, in that itit was always questioning: "Is"Is thisthis environmentenvironment freefree andand fair'?"fair'?" AsAsII said, right up until twotwo weeks before, Koevoet waswas notnot demobilized.demobilized. "Is"Isthis this freefree andand fair? Can you really have a fairfair election whenwhen you'veyou've gotgotthethe mainmain SWAPOSWAPO batteringbattering ram wandering around and intimidating."intimidating." IIthinkthink thethe mainmain thrustthrust oftheofthepro-Southpro-South

Africans complaint, "Will thesethese elections be freefree andand fair,"fair," waswas that:that: "Well"Well thetheU.N.U.N. isis biased, anyway," and itit was constantly lookinglooking toto discreditdiscredit thethe UN.,U.N., andand thatthat SWSWAPOAPO wasn't playing by thethe rules. So everyone was tryingtrying toto justifyjustify aa point,point, andand ininthethemiddlemiddle was the U.N.V.N. trying toto make a situation where itit waswas freefree andand fair,fair, wherewhere ititcouldcould gogo ahead, because obviously thatthat was theirtheir mission, butbut beingbeingbarragedbarraged left,left, right,right, andand center, being told what isis not freefree and tail'.tail'.

JK: Now I wanted toto ask you, justjust briefly, aboutabout somesome thingsthings thatthat eventuallyeventually happenedhappened with the South West Africa Broadcasting Corporation, becausebecause rightright aroundaround thethe timetime ofof the elections, the control ofthe Broadcasting CorporationCorporation beganbegan toto disintegrate.disintegrate. WereWere you aware ofany ofthat,that, or what was going onon withwith thethe radio?radio?

4848 DL: What, from the U.N. point ofview? They felt that it was disintegrating?

JK: No, I was just reading something that NDI (the National Democratic Institute) had put ollt a report that a lot ofthe board ofthe SWABC resigned.

DL: Okay, did they resign?

JK: Right before the elections.

DL: What stands out, it wasn't necessarily the resignation - they were replaced, weren't they? I think what had happened was that basically the credibility ofthe

SWABC - the SWABC was important as far as voter education, vital- and this was the problem the U.N. was faced with, that it was having to work through the SWABC, but the SWABC was totally biased. And this was established. A group did research on

SWABC news coverage and found consistently that it was biased. It was pro-South

African, for various reasons, not all ofit necessarily propaganda. There was incompetency as far as not being able to analyze - which is a problem that exists today in the media- but basically, news programming was biased in favor ofSouth Africa and the

DTA and against SWAPO. And this was, again, a constant battling point for the U.N., because obviously the pressure was from SWAPO to say: "Look, this is unfair. This is not conducive to free, fair elections. You've got propaganda. You've got a biased broadcaster," which the D.N was having to work with as its main conduit for information.

49 JK: So the U.N.V.N. did not have itsits own radioradio broadcastingbroadcasting systemsystem itit hadhad toto workwork through...

DL: Through SWABC. So II thinkthink what happened,happened, eventually,eventually, againagain theretherewaswas aa compromise that all thethe parties formed.formed. ThereThere waswas anan advisoryadvisory committeecommitteethatthat SWSWABCABC then had to relate to.to. Now II don't recallrecall thethe SWABCSWABC boardboard members,members, butbut theythey weren'tweren't people you socialized with or tooktook much noticenotice of,of, anyway.anyway. IIthinkthink maybemaybe theythey werewere forced to resign and were replacedreplaced by thisthis sortsort ofofcommittee,committee, whichwhich thethe SWABCSWABC thenthen hadhad to work with, and thisthis committee was made upup ofofallall thethe parties,parties, becausebecauseitit waswas largelylargely around the issue ofelection coverage, now -- campaigncampaign coverage.coverage.

JK: So it was importantimportant thatthat thatthat happened priorpriortoto thethe elections,elections, becausebecause ititseemedseemed toto have happened justjust a week or so before.

DL: Again, it was very lastlast minutes andand camecame afterafter monthsmonths andand monthsmonths ofofwrangling,wrangling, ofpeople saying: "SWABC isis biased. It'sIt's notnot doingdoing itsitsjob.job. It'sIt'snotnot impartial,"impartial,"andand somehow the South African authorities saying:saying: "No,"No, itit isis alright,"alright," makingmakingsuresure ititwaswas notnot going to relinquish control of SWABC forfor asas longlong asas possible.possible.

JK: This is almost at thethe end orthe tape,tape, soso IIthinkthink I'mI'mgonna'gonna'justjuststopstopititandand startstartaa few minutes in the next tape,tape, ififthat'sthat's okay withwith you.you.

End ofofTapeTape 11

5050 JK: Okay, so we were just talking about the election result coming in from the

Namibian election.

DL: So, everybody's gathered around the radio, and everybody's focus is now

suddenly on the results, but the impression was on who won which constituency,constituency. rather

than the numbers involved. And as the results came in, all ofthem were being won - or

virtually all ofthem - were being won by DTDTA.A.

JK: Now, was it explained that these were results from the first ballots coming in fro111

the south? Did people understand that?

DL: Yes as far as geographical area, but as the night went on it was from all over-

everywhere. Thafs why I said the numbers I don't think were registering - political

parties had obviously done their math, I would have thought,thought. did their mathematics - but

from the point ofview,view. even as journalists, you get a result: "constituency: DTA,"DTA." -- and

no one's necessarily adding up the figures as they go along, because it was more

constituencies - so: "How can DTA win that town? Oh,Oh. that town is gone:' Because it was geographical location and political party. Those were the two main issues. Then,

Windhoek,Windhoek. everyone was expecting a SWAPO landslide, and it wasn't. SWAPO won,won. but - so it gave the impression that it was a constituency-based election,election. which it wasn't.

The important tIling were the numbers,numbers. but because they were being l:!llIlounced according

51 to voting station - polling area - the impression that was being created was as if it was a

constitucncy~based election, and that therefore everywhere was going DTA.

JK: Because it was proportional, but on a national basis.

DL: Yeah, that's right.

JK: Okay, just for the record, I just want to get that on there.

DL: So the last constituencies coming in were the far north - was the Owambo region

and Rundu region, and the one before that was Windhoek, so it was the numerically

larger constituencies. So Windhoek went SWAPOSWAPO - this is the impression - Windhoek went SWAPO but not by the size people expected. It wasn't the majority that people

expected. So no one had really done their mathematics, so there was just this impression created that DTA won all these seats, or won all these constituencies, therefore probably was - well it was - numerically superior.

JK: At that point.

DL: But no one quite realized the number ofvotes that still had to come in from the

Owambo constituency and the Rundu/Kavango constituency, which were two of the biggest constituencies. So throughout the night the counting continued, and you got the

Windhoek result, too. The next morning, you woke up, and DTA was poised for victory

52 numerically, but without realizing quite thethe number ofofvotesvotes thatthat stillstill hadhad toto comecomein.in.

And so DTA was winning, and DTA supporters werewere outout inin thethe streetsstreets celebrating,celebrating, withwith just two constituencies left.left. You didn't know howhow significantsignificant thesethese twotwo constituenciesconstituencies were. I got a phone call very early thatthat morning -I-I waswas livingliving inin KatuturaKatuturajustjustacrossacross thethe way from where Sam Nujoma was staying -- and II gotgot thisthis call:call: "Go"Go andand interviewinterview

Nujoma."

JK: You were going toto interviewinterviewNujoma?

DL: Yeah, "Go and knock him up. He'sjust hadhad hishis breakfast.breakfast. GoGo andand interviewinterview him.him.

Ask him how he feels." And so II walked across thethe valley.valley. II didn'tdidn't quitequite knowknow wherewhere this call to go and interview him had come from,from, whetherwhether theythey hadhad initiatedinitiated itit anyway.anyway.

So I walk in there and sit down, and he's therethere sitting',sitting', coolcool asas aa cucumber,cucumber, readingreading thethe newspaper, and so I say "Well, what about it?it? ItItlookslooks asas ifSWAPO'sifSWAPO's losing."losing." "Ahhh,""Ahhh," he says - still very, very cool. So inin thatthat respectrespect obviouslyobviously hehe waswas awareaware oftheofthe sizesize ofof the constituencies which were coming in,in, but as II say,say, II wentwent therethere interviewinginterviewing him,him, basically the angle was: "This isis interviewinginterviewingNujoma,Nujoma, brinkbrink ofofdefeat."defeat." HisHisimpressionimpression was: "I'm cool as a cucumber. II know what's happening,"happening," butbut still,still, II leftleftthatthat interviewinterview saying: "I bet SWAPO's about toto lose,lose, and what isis gonna'gonna' happen?"happen?" SoSo II wentwent backback toto the office, and then the Kavango resultresult canlecan1e in.in, SWAPOSWAPO gotgot aa veryvery bigbigmajority,majority, IIthink.think.

So suddenly you think: "Hello!" Then peoples' perceptionsperceptions beganbegantoto change.change. AndAndthenthen the Owambo result came in,in, and thisthis massive, massive, massivemassive landslide,landslide, andand suddenly,suddenly, the figures clicked. People said: "Oh! No, SWAPO hashas won."won."

5353 JK: So Nujoma understood that.that. HeHe mustmust have,have, becausebecause thatthat waswas whywhy hehe waswas soso cool.cool.

DL: Obviously. ItIt was theirtheirjobjob toto dodo thethe mathematics.mathematics. HavingHaving saidsaidthat,that, hadhad thethe farfar

north gone - thosethose twotwo constituencies -- gonegone moremore thethe wayway thethe restrest ofofthethe constituenciesconstituencies

had gone - a SWAPO strong area, but maybemaybe thethe DTDTAA hadhad gotgotaa lotlot ofofvotesvotes inin thatthatarea,area, it was touch and go. The perception was,was, suddenlysuddenly youyou thoughtthought SWSWAPOAPO hadhad lost,lost, andand everybody thought SWSWAPOAPO had lost.lost. Wham-bam,Wham-bam, withinwithin thethe spacespace ofoftwotwo hours,hours, no,no,

SWSWAPOAPO had won, and now all thethe SWAPO supporterssupporters werewere outout ononthethe streetsstreets andand celebrating. So itit was as quickly as that.that.

JK: Well, as I toldtold you before, I had gonegone upup toto thethe northnorth andand interviewedinterviewed BishopBishop

Dumeni, and Bishop Dumeni -- thethe reasonreason I'mI'm askingasking youyou isis this,this, isis becausebecause hehe toldtoldmeme that the news over thethe radioradio was thatthat DTADTA waswas winning.winning. AndAnd hehe saidsaid everyoneeveryone waswas gathered around whatever radioradio theythey had, andand hehe explainedexplained toto meme thatthatsittingsitting inin hishis office,office, at his desk, he had a radioradio therethere and hishis suitcasesuitcase andand briefcasebriefcasenextnext toto him,him, becausebecause ifif

DTA had won he would justjustget out ofthethe country.country.

DL: Yes, well obviously forfor people likelike himhim thatthat waswasthethe option,option, andand theythey thoughtthought about it. From our point ofview itit was totallytotally unknown.unknown. WhereasWhereas youyou hadn'thadn'teveneven contemplated thatthat DTA would win, suddenlysuddenly you'reyou're facedfaced withwith this:this: "What's"What'sgonna'gonna' happen?" And you knew full-wellfull-well thatthat itit waswas notnotgoinggoingtoto bebe pleasant,pleasant, andand thatthat afterafter allall this time SWSWAPOAPO was 110t going toto -- afterafterwagingwaging thisthis liberationliberation warwar-- waswas notnotgoinggoingtoto

5454 accept that sort ofdefeat. And at the same time, ifDTA did win, what did that mean for

us? But it was very unknown, and it wasn't necessarily just high people like Bishop

Dumeni. SWSWAPOAPO supporters who had lived in the country and had tolerated the South

African regime and opposed it, but opposed it from within the country - conventional

people, day-to-day people - were going to leave the country, and you would have

probably had this mass exodus from the country,country. But they were, people were suddenly

faced with this thought: "The DTA is gouna'gonna' win. We're gauna'gonna' have to leave the

country,country. We're off. Ifthey do, we're out of here." So it was that monumental, and tobe

hanging on -- to that respect -- to what was an announcement over the radio, to detemline

your fate, as far as whether you're off, out ofthe country, or whatever. So you can then

imagine the exhilaration when suddenly this result - this tidal wave result - comes in

from the n01ih, and all ofa suddensudden'everybody'everybody says: "But no, SWAPO had won,"won." You

can imagine also the DTA's point ofview, the euphoria that "We've done it! We've done it! We've kept the communists out." I doubt very much they would have realized the implications ofa DTA victory, as far as it obviously meant SWSWAPOAPO was going back to the bush and that the war was going to continue. I don't sense there was that perception - maybe Security Forces - but it was more: "No, we kept them out." It was this SOli ofvindication: "We've done it! We've done it!" without really necessarily analyzing the consequences. But imagine that heightened expectation and suddenly realizing it's not true after all. So all the DTA supporters disappeared offthe streets, and onto the streets poured SWSWAPOAPO supporters. It was like euphoria. Although, in typical

Namibian style, inin Windhoek it dissipated - central Windhoek dissipated pretty quickly.

This one journalist described it as sort ofa lunchtime revolution. Everybody poured onto

55 the street, and then by the middle ofthe afternoon itit had gonegone quietquiet again.again. TheyThey werewere sitting there in this cafe thinking: "Where's everybody gone?gone? ThisThis isis independence,independence, freedom," whatever. But everybody had gone back toto Katutura,Katutura, forgottenforgotten aboutabout work,work, and for days and days and days people were justjust partying, andand celebrating,celebrating, andand whatever,whatever, but in town it was much more subdued because suddenlysuddenly thisthis realizationrealization thatthat SWSWAPOAPO had won, it was a lot for people to swallow.

JK: Well, just to finish up - because now II know we're gettinggetting late,late, andand youyou wantedwanted toto get going, too - what, in summary, what were your impressionsimpressions ofofthethe U.N.'sU.N.'s role,role, andand dodo you have any kind offeeling thatthat thethe U.N.D.N. could have donedone aa betterbetterjobjoboror inin somesome ways,ways, how the U.N.D.N. might improve what itit does?

DL: Obviously they could have done a better jobjob fromfrom 1978,1978, butbut thethe U.N.U.N. isis aa conglomerate ofgovernments, and that'sthat's where you're alwaysalways goinggoing toto bebe compromised.compromised.

As far as day-to-day basis, I think thethe U.N.D.N. civil servantsservants diddid aa miraculousmiraculousjobjob considering the constraints that theythey had. II mean, why diddid AprilApril oneone happen?happen? AprilApril oneone happened because they didn't have any people on thethe ground. NoNo oneone everever thoughtthoughtthisthis through. And Namibia, in that respect -- and II thinkthink that'sthat's thethe mainmain legacy,legacy, eveneven ififwewe seesee it today - there was a quick-fix solution, as farfar as thethe major powerspowers werewere concerned,concerned, andand the U.N.D.N. had to implement a very quick-fix and poorly thought-outthought-out solutionsolution toto anan ongoing, very protracted conflict. And basicalIy thethe main powerspowers wantedwanted NamibiaNamibiaoffoff the agenda: "Get it settled. Sort itit out. The Cold War's over.over. Namibia'sNamibia's notnotparticularlyparticularly significant. The big one's South Africa. Get Namibia out oftheofthe way.way. GetGet itit done.done. GetGetitit

56 sorted, but without spending tootoo muchmuch money,money, please."please." SoSo thatthatwaswas thethejobjobwhichwhichtheythey had toto do, and theythey pulled itit offoffmiraculously,miraculously, toto manymany extents,extents, butbut yeah,yeah, whatwhathavehaveyouyou got? Today, nine years down thethe line,line, you'veyou'vegotgot aaconstitutionconstitutionwhich,which, atatindependence,independence, was heralded as wonderful, decent,decent, supremesupreme lawlawthatthatninenineyearsyears downdownthethe linelinenono oneone really understands. Because why?why? ItItwaswas neverneverdebated.debated. WhereasWhereas thethe SouthSouthAfricanAfrican thing went throughthrough years and yearsyears ofofdebate,debate, andand civilcivil societysocietyinvolvement,involvement, andand rewriting, and realreal participatory politics,politics, Namibia?Namibia? YouYou hadhad aa month.month. ItItwaswas drafteddrafted behind closed doors. The only peoplepeoplewhowho hadhadaa saysay inin thatthatthingthingwaswasthethe politicalpolitical parties, who basically did theirtheir tradingtrading-- politicalpolitical orchestratingorchestrating-- behindbehind closedcloseddoors.doors.

You had threethree internationalinternational drafters,drafters, thethe U.N.U.N. tryingtryingtoto holdhold itit together,together, andandit'sit'spast.past. It'sIt's gone. So todaytoday you've got aa constitutionconstitution whichwhichveryveryfewfew peoplepeopleunderstand.understand. CertainlyCertainly the democratic principles are stillstill beingbeing workedworked out.out. WhatWhatdoesdoes youryourfundamentalfundamental rightsrights mean? Everyone's still working thatthat out,out, andand okayokay great,great, thethe constitution'sconstitution's therethere asas thisthis sort ofbackstop, at leastleast therethere asas sortsort ofofthethe tinalfinal thing,thing, butbutitsits ininaaprocessprocess whichwhichisis goinggoing through after thethe event, ratherrather thanthan duringduring thethe draftingdraftingprocess.process. You'veYou'vegotgot aawholewhole lotlotofof issues thatthat have been umesolved andand carryon,carry on, whichwhich havehave neverneverbeenbeen addressedaddressed oror resolved because ofthethe speed.speed. BasicallyBasically NamibiaNamibiawentwentfromfrom warwartoto peacepeace andand independence inin a space ofa year,year, 1212 months.months. YouYouknow,know, wham-bamwham-bamthankthankyouyou ma'am.ma'am.

It's through - done, so very littlelittle addressingaddressing ofofissues,issues, veryvery littlelittle soulsoul searching.searching. SoSo thenthen you've got a government comes ininwithwithnationalnational reconciliation.reconciliation. WhatWhat areare wewe reconciling? These sorts ofthings haven'thaven't beenbeenthoughtthoughtthroughthrough becausebecause ofofthethe speedspeed inin which thethe process was implemented.implemented. ButBut SouthSouthAfricaAfricawaswas thethe bigbigoneone asas farfar asas thethe mainmain

U.N. powers were concerned. It'sIt's wherewhere allall theirtheirpolitical,political, financial,financial, commercial,commercial,

5757 economic interestsinterests were. Namibia waswas insignificantinsignificant inin thatthat respect,respect, soso getget itit sealedsealedandandasas cost effectively as possible. But,But, asas II say,say, consideringconsidering thosethose constraints,constraints, whatwhathappenedhappened was pretty miraculous. So theythey diddid aa prettyprettygoodgood job,job, IIsuppose.suppose.

JK: Well thankthank you soso much. IIthinkthinkthat that thisthis waswas reallyreally enlightening,enlightening, andandII appreciate your takingtaking thethe timetime toto dodo this.this. ThankThank youyou veryvery much.much.

DL: Pleasure.

EndEnd ofofInterviewInterview

5858 Yale-UN Oral History Project David Lush JeanJean Krasno, InterviewerInterviewer MarchMarch 20,20, 1999 Namibia

Name Index:Index: Namibia

Ahtisaari, MarttiMmtti 37-41 Dumeni, Kleopas 54-55 Geingob, Rage 14 Lister,Lister, Gwen 7, 12 Lubowski,Lubowski, Anton 9,9,11-1411-14 Nujoma, Sam 13,52-54 P6rezPerez de Cu611ar,Cuellar, Javier 45 Shipanga, Chris 22-23,42