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Legwaila Transcript ST/DPIST/DPI ORALORAL HISTORYHISTORY (02)(02) L521L521 Yale-UNYale-UN OralOral HistoryHistory ProjectProject Legwai1aLegwai1a JJosephaseph Legwai1aLegwai1a JeanJean Krasno,Krasno, InterviewerInterviewer FebruaryFebruary 10,10, 19991999 NewNew York,Yark, NewNew YorkYark 11 Yale-UN Oral History Project 11 Legwaila JosephJoseph LegwailLegwailaa JeanJean Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr February 10,19910,19999 11 New York, New YorYorkk 11 Index: Namibia African Group 19 African National Congress (ANC) 22 Apartheid 33 Civil Police (CIVPOL) 28 ­ Democratic RepublicRepubl ic of Congo (ORC)(ORe) 23 Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) 11,15-16,18 11 Front-line States I, 7-9, 26 German Democratic Republic (GDR) 10 Koevoet 21,23 11 Mercenaries 23 Namibia Elections 31-32,37-38 11 Independence 20-21,33 Non-Aligned Movement 8-9 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 2, 17 I Refugees 32-33 Resolution 435 1,9,13,33,371,9, 13,33,37 South Africa I Involvement with Elections 4,11-19,364, 11-19, 36 South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)(SWAPO) 2-4,7-8,10,15-17,19,21,31-32,34-36 South West African Police (SWAPOL) 28 I South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) 22 Turnhalle Paliy Conference 11 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) 33 I UN Development Programme (UNDP) 33 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 33 UN Security Council 6-7, 9-10,21, 27 UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 1-5,7,9,12,1-5,7,9,12,14,16,19,23-25,29,35-3614, 16, 19,23-25,29,35-36 I World Health Organization 33 I I I I I I I I Yale-UN Oral History I Legwaila Joseph LegwailLegwailaa February 10, 19919999 I New York, New YorYorkk I Interveiwer: Jean KrasnKrasnoo I I Jean Krasno (JK): To begin with Ambassador, I wanted toto ask you a littlelittle bit aboutabout thethe I role that you had played in the United Nations prior to your position as Deputy SpecialSpecial Representative ofthe Secretary-General to UNTAG. I I Joseph Legwaila (JL): I was recruited from the United Nations where II was thethe Permanent Representative of my country, Botswana. I was appointed Permanent I Representative in 1980. Then I was asked by the Secretary-General of thethe United NationsNations I to go to Namibia to help with the implementation of resolution 435. II was askedasked notnot atat the begim1ing of the process but in June as a consequence of ---- II am suresure you rememberremember -­-­ I what happened on the eve of the implementation of 435 on thethe 31 stst of March whenwhen allall I hell broke loose on the border ofNamibia and Angola. After that,that, thethe Secretary-General I thought that it would be best to send me to Namibia toto help appease thethe matter andand helphelp the Special Representative as somebody who comes from thethe regionregion and fi'omfi'om thethe I grouping which was called the Front-line States. My country, Botswana, was aa membermember I of the Front-line States. So, I went there, not to represent thethe Front-line States, asas such,such, but to help as somebody who came from the neighborhood. I I I 2 I I JK: Because Mr. Martti Ahtisaari [the Special Representative ofof thethe Secretary-Secretary- General] was from Finland. I I JL: Mr. Ahtisaari was from Finland, yes. So, therethere was nono deputydeputy whowho waswas anan African. In other words, I was sent therethere as a deputy fromfrom thethe continentcontinent andand theythey werewere I lucky that I was not only fro111 the continent but also fromfrom thethe region.region. I I JK: At that time, were you aware of any controversy thatthat hadhad comecome aroundaround celiainceliain decisions by Mr. Ahtisaari, or any pressure within thethe UN oror fromfrom thethe OAUOAU oror otherother I groups? I JL: Yes, because on the eve of thethe beginning ofthe implementationimplementation process,process, asas II said,said, I there was a confrontation between thethe South African forcesforces andand thethe SWAPOSWAPO cadres.cadres. I Actually, let me put it this way: the SWAPO cadres, believing thatthat NamibiaNamibia isis theirtheir country, crossed into Namibia on thethe eve of thethe implementationimplementation processprocess andand UNTAGUNTAG waswas I not on the ground. Very few UNTAG military were on thethe ground.ground. TheyThey werewere supposedsupposed I to monitor the borders. So, therefore, theythey crossed and thethe SouthSouth AfricansAfricans inin reactionreaction I decided to put pressure on U1\TTAGUNTAG toto allow themthem toto go andand confrontconfront them.them. So,So, thethe controversy arose as a result happened thereafterthereafter when thethe SouthSouth AfricansAfricans demandeddemanded toto I be allowed to go to the border. And UNTAG foundfound thatthat theythey hadhad nono otherother alternativealternative butbut to allow them to go to the border because otherwise thethe process wouldwould probablyprobably collapse.collapse. It would have collapsed even before itit had started. So, theythey allowedallowed thethe SouthSouth AfricanAfrican I 3 I troops to go there. It was the confrontation between SWAPOSWAPO and the South African I troops which caused the controversy, because a lot of people in fact were killed. In one Sh01i space of time a lot of people were killed and killed tragically at a time when there ,~' I· was hope that Namibia would start a new chapter, a chapter that would end the long war I of liberation. So, that is what caused the controversy and that is one of the reasons that the Secretary-General felt that under the circumstances, we should send somebody there I to help Mr. Ahtisaari deal with the situation. Fortlmately, by the time I got there, the I situation had normalized. I JK: So, when you got there in June ... I I JL: Well, the security had already been normalized by that time. It became normal by the end of May through negotiations. The Americans got involved. It was Chester I Cracker,Crocker, the South Africans, the Russians were there and UNTAG. By that time, they I had negotiated to stabilize the situation and the implementation process was back on track. So, I just went there to find that the crisis was over. I to find that the crisis was over. I JK: When you anived in Namibia in June of 1989, what were your responsibilities? I JL: Regarding my responsibilities, I remember before I left I had a meeting with the I Secretary-General and he said to me, "I want you to participate in all the negotiations." I NowNow that the process was back on track, there was a series of negotiations were underway. We were negotiating with the South Africans on the registration laws, the I I I 4 electoral laws, the return of refugees and all the other activities which going onon betweenbetween I­ UNTAG and the South Africans. I was supposed toto participate actively alongsidealongside thethe Special Representative. I was not assigned an exclusive portfolio of responsibilities,responsibilities, butbut I to do exactly what the Special Representative was doing. InIn thethe course ofof mymy staystay there,there, II I was able to do certain things like, for instance, liaise with thethe SWAPO people whomwhom II knew very well and, of course, I dealt with the other internalinternal political parties onon behalfbehalf ofof I UNTAG. I JK: We will get to that some more because I would likelike toto lmowlmow somesome ofof thethe I particulars that came up in the negotiations that you had toto do. Did you feelfeel thatthat thethe I communications were adequate? Both the method of communicating andand thethe equipmentequipment I between Namibia and New York headquarters and also inin thethe fieldfield around Namibia?Namibia? I JL: I'll start with Namibia, the internal communication. We, UNTAG, establishedestablished tenten I regions in Namibia. Then we set up offices there toto run thesethese regions.regions. InIn additionaddition toto thatthat we had people going out to even the smallest villages. InIn other words, ourour presencepresence waswas I felt even more than the administration here. We lmewlmew all thethe corners of NamibiaNamibia moremore I than they did. There were times when we infonned themthem about somesome thingsthings whichwhich theythey I didn't know, things happening in the country which theythey were nmning becausebecause wewe hadhad very good communications. We also had a very good communication systemsystem withwith thethe I headquarters here in New York, independent of theirtheir telephonestelephones therethere inin Namibia.Namibia. So,So, wewe I were able at any time to get through to headquarters and toto thethe tasktask forceforce whichwhich waswas headed by the Secretary-General here in New York. We didn't have anyany problemsproblems there.there. I I 11 5 ­ 1K:JK: As long as you bring up the "task force," II had a question onon that.that. WhatWhat waswas youryour 11 perception ofthe task force in New York? Did theythey understand whatwhat waswas goinggoing onon inin 11, Namibia? 11 1L:JL: Well, they understood to a certain extent. When you areare notnot onon thethe ground,ground, itit isis 11 very difficult for you to have a well-cooked appreciation ofof thethe situationsituation onon thethe ground.ground. I They were inhibited in their understanding because ofthe distance,distance, WhenWhen atat timestimes wewe thought that they misunderstood us, we understood why theythey misunderstoodmisunderstood us.us. WeWe werewere ­ there and on a daily basis we had toto solve problems. Most ofof thethe problemsproblems therethere werewere 11 emergencies, urgent problems, very urgent. The rumorrumor mongering therethere waswas thethe worstworst II I have ever seen. You would wake up one morning and someonesomeone wouldwould phonephone andand say,say, "A"A plane was seen landing in some airstrip very farfar away fromfrom WindhoekWindhoek inin somesome cornercorner ofof I Namibia." Then, of course, as UNTAG we had toto rushrush therethere onlyonly toto discoverdiscover thatthat therethere I isn't even a strip there.
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