Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers∗ Daniel M. Smithy Shane Martinz May 16, 2016 Abstract We investigate whether politicians whose family relatives previously served in parliament and cabinet enjoy a competitive “legacy advantage” in progressing from the backbenches to cab- inet. This advantage may stem from two potential mechanisms: a direct effect attributable to the informational advantages of legacies, or an indirect effect that operates through greater electoral strength. We evaluate the relative contribution of each mechanism using candidate- level data from Irish parliamentary elections and cabinets from 1944-2016. Our results reveal that politicians with a family history in cabinet do enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection, and that this advantage cannot be attributed simply to greater electoral popularity. Keywords: political dynasties, ministerial selection, Ireland Word count: 9,156 (excluding references and online appendix) ∗We thank Mark Daley, Anna Gomez, Max Goplerud, Darragh Nolan, and Aaron Roper for research assistance, and Matt Blackwell, Gary Cox, Jon Fiva, Simo Goshev, Torben Iversen, Horacio Larreguy, Phillip Lipscy, Kenneth McElwain, Benjamin Nyblade, Dustin Tingley, David Willumsen, Ista Zahn, and Christopher Kam and three anony- mous reviewers for helpful comments. yAssistant Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University. Email:
[email protected] (Corresponding author). zReader in Comparative Politics, Department of Government, University of Essex. E-mail:
[email protected]. Under parliamentarism, the cabinet “emerges from” the legislature and represents the apex of po- litical power. Scholars have thus long sought to understand which political parties win cabinet seats, particularly in coalition governments, as the interparty distribution of ministerial portfolios can impact policy outputs (Laver and Schofield, 1998; Strøm, Muller¨ and Bergman, 2003; Back,¨ Debus and Dumont, 2011).