A Critical Evaluation of the American

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A Critical Evaluation of the American Destroying Weapons of Coal, Air and Water: A Critical Evaluation of the American Policy of German Industrial Demilitarization 1945-1952 Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie dem Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Philosophie der Philipps-Universität Marburg vorgelegt von Oliver Haller aus Kitchener, Ontario, Kanada 2005 Vom Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Philosophie als Dissertation angenommen am: 07. Dezember 2005 Tag der Disputation: 05. Juli 2006 Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wilfried von Bredow Prof. Dr. Theo Schiller ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful for the help given me by numerous persons. Like every author, I am indebted to many librarians and especially the archivists in Bonn, Berlin, and elsewhere. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada helped me financially. My advisor granted much needed assistance. But I would like to thank Claudia above all others. All errors are my own. December, 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................. ii LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................ vi INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 0.1 Opening and Thesis Statements................................................................................. 1 0.2 Historiography and Methodology.............................................................................. 4 0.3 The Interrelationship of Civilian and Military Industries....................................... 17 0.4 A Note on Sources .................................................................................................... 22 CHAPTER 1: Dual-Use Industry and Prewar Military Mobilization.................... 23 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 23 1.2 American Civilian Industry and Rearmament ........................................................ 24 1.3 German War Industries and Rearmament............................................................... 29 14 Misperceptions of Prewar German Mobilization .................................................... 37 1.5 The Failure of German Industry in War.................................................................. 43 1.6 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 48 CHAPTER 2: Strategic Bombing and Industrial Demilitarization ........................ 50 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 50 2.2 Strategic Bombing Origins and the Demilitarization Panacea............................... 50 2.3 Bombing Operations in Wartime............................................................................. 56 2.4 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey and Industrial Disruption.............. 61 2.5 The Impact of Strategic Bombing on Industrial Capacities ................................... 69 2.6 Urban Bombing and the Misunderstanding of the "Wasteland" ........................... 78 2.7 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 85 CHAPTER 3: The Origins of Industrial Demilitarization........................................ 88 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 88 3.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Policies and the German Future...................................... 88 3.3 The Hard Soviet Peace and German Pastoralization.............................................. 93 3.4 The Liberal-Capitalist Nature of Early American Occupation Policy .................. 99 3.5 The Morgenthau Plan: An Attempt at Policy Clarification.................................. 107 3.6 Directive J.C.S. 1067: The “Technical” Compromise ......................................... 114 3.7 The Yalta Shock: The Masked Incongruity of Allied Positions.......................... 119 3.8 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 125 CHAPTER 4: The Collapse of Dismantling as a Method ....................................... 127 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 127 4.2 The Revisionist Portrayal of Harry S. Truman ..................................................... 127 4.3 Truman’s Views Concerning the Soviet Union and Germany............................ 133 4.4 The Blanket Soviet Seizure of Reparations........................................................... 142 4.5 Reparations at Potsdam and Reactions to Soviet Moral Abandon...................... 145 4.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 157 CHAPTER 5: The Early Stages of Industrial Demilitarization............................. 160 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 160 iv 5.2 The Contradictions of Demilitarization Policy ..................................................... 160 5.3 The Level of Industry Plan and Clay’s Reparations Stop ................................... 171 5.4 Paperclip, Safehaven and Hidden Reparations ..................................................... 186 5.5 An Imprecise Policy of Industrial Demilitarization in Action............................. 192 5.6 Feeding Workers as a Structural Constraint.......................................................... 198 5.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 206 CHAPTER 6: The Militarization of Policy and Views of German Industry....... 207 6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 207 6.2 The Joint Intelligence Committee and Washington’s Perceptions of Conflict... 208 6.3 The American “Shift” and the Impact on Demilitarization.................................. 214 6.4 Byrnes' Speech and the Official Change of Heart ............................................... 225 6.5 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 227 CHAPTER 7: The Marshall Plan and the End of Demilitarization...................... 230 7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 230 7.2 George C. Marshall and the Solidification of the New Course ........................... 232 7.3 The Truman Doctrine ............................................................................................. 240 7.4 The Moscow Foreign Minister's Conference of March 1947.............................. 244 7.5 The Harvard Speech, Marshall Plan and Soviet Rejection .................................. 252 7.6 Policy Revision: The Incongruity of Demilitarization with Recovery................ 258 7.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 262 CHAPTER 8: Explaining the German Productivity Boom.................................... 264 8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 264 8.2 The Dismantling of Rheinmetall Borsig-Alkett and Intervention ....................... 265 8.3 The Joint Logistics Committee and Dual-Use Calculations ................................ 274 8.4 The Demilitarization-Marshall Plan Contradiction .............................................. 280 8.5 The Marshall Plan and Western German Industrial Recovery ............................ 287 8.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 294 CHAPTER 9: Military Radicalization ....................................................................... 296 9.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 296 9.2 The Berlin Blockade and Other Disasters ............................................................. 297 9.3 Perceptions of the Soviet Military and Stalin’s Plans for War ............................ 304 9.4 The Military Defense Assistance Program............................................................ 314 9.5 The Atlantic Military Alliance System and American Designs .......................... 324 9.6 The National Security Council Memorandum No. 68 and the German Role .... 329 9.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................... 333 CHAPTER 10: Rearmament and Military Industrial Capacities......................... 335 10.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 335 10.2 Konrad Adenauer and the Issue of German National Security.......................... 336 10.3 The Korean War and the 1950s War Scare......................................................... 342 10.4 Domestic and Foreign Pressures against Visible Remilitarization...................
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